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well structured and is a very good exposition of the different ways of understanding intrinsic value.
What might it mean to say nature has “intrinsic value”? Do you think it has?
Many environmental philosophers turn to the idea that nature has intrinsic value in order to respond to two problems in environmental philosophy, which can be drawn out from Richard Routley’s article “Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?” In the scenario that Routley describes, the last man, who knows that he is the last of the human species, sets about destroying the natural environment Routley argues that although intuition tells us that what the last man does is wrong, according to traditional !estern ethical systems it is entirely permissible "his is because according to the dominant !estern ethic human beings are the only morally considerable class of beings, and any constraint on people’s treatment of nature comes out of concern for other people, who might be deprived of its use #ince no future human beings will be affected by his actions, the last man is under no obligation to treat nature any better$
$ #ylvan %Routley&, R “Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?” in 'immerman, M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice, -all Inc $../& pp $0 , 12
"he first problem then, is the ethical 3uestion of whether nature is valuable only as a means to the purposes of humans, or whether it might be valuable for its own sake 4n anthropocentric ethic values nature only insofar as it is useful to humans, whereas biocentric and ecocentric ethics propose that at least some parts of non, human nature have 5intrinsic value’ which means that they are valuable apart from their usefulness and are direct ob6ects of moral concern "his therefore, is the first interpretation of the term 5intrinsic value’, and is intended to establish that nature is valuable for its own sake I shall be using the term 5final value’ to refer to this type of value, which is contrasted with 5instrumental value’, that is, valuable as a means to something else
"he second problem is a meta,ethical one and is also implied in Routley’s thought e7periments "he 3uestion concerns the source of value8 whether value e7ists 5out there’ in the world, independently of humans, who therefore discover it, or whether it is humans who assign value to things in the world "hese two positions are known as value, ob6ectivism and value,sub6ectivism respectively "he 3uestion is relevant for our purposes since it could be argued that if sub6ectivists are right, there is no reason for the last man to refrain from damaging the environment, since he does not destroy anything of value "hat is, since there will be no people to value nature, no loss of value can result from his actions 9b6ective values are believed to be necessary for environmental ethics for a number of other reasons too I will outline these reasons and provide some arguments against them further below :or now, it is sufficient to note that the second
which will be discussed more fully below "hus there are three distinctions in value @ that between instrumental and final value. and is supposed to establish that nature is valuable whether or not there are people in the world who value it Intrinsic value is ascribed to nature in environmental philosophy in both these senses and the two meanings are very often conflated 4rne (aess. which is value a thing has due to its relations with other things ?nless otherwise stated. 1$$ %p $. inherent worth&.non. independent of the usefulness of the non. for e7ample.C . that between sub6ective and ob6ective values and that between intrinsic and e7trinsic value In each case one of the poles is sometimes called 5intrinsic value’ @ which can therefore mean value that is independent of usefulness %final value&. the term 5intrinsic value’ will be used in this sense. value that is independent of human valuing %ob6ective value& and value that is independent of circumstances %intrinsic value proper& 1 (aess. interest or appreciation of it by any conscious being”1 "here is also a third sense of 5intrinsic value’ that one could argue is what the term properly means "his is the value that a thing has independently of its circumstances. as opposed to e7trinsic value.human world for human purposes” and that “the presence of inherent value in a natural ob6ect is independent of any awareness. argues that “the well.human life on <arth =has> value in =itself> %synonyms* intrinsic value. being and flourishing . 0& B ./& pp $.interpretation of 5intrinsic value’ identifies it with ob6ective value..B . M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice. 4 “"he Aeep <cological Movement* #ome philosophical 4spects” in 'immerman. -all Inc $.
when this is taken to mean value that a thing has independently of its circumstances. independently of its usefulness Does nature have ‘intrinsic value’? In “"wo Aistinctions in Doodness” Ehristine Forsgaard shows that intrinsic value is often taken to be the same thing as the converse of instrumental value. since this interpretation of intrinsic value fails to account for most of the value that environmentalists find in nature I will also argue against a standard method of establishing ob6ective value in nature that locates the desired ob6ectivity in the fact that natural ob6ects have a good of their own I will then e7amine whether the two problems mentioned above are valid reasons for preferring an ob6ectivist meta.I will argue against the idea that nature has 5intrinsic value’.ethic and argue that a sub6ectivist account of the final value of nature fulfills both purposes that the concept of the 5intrinsic value’ of nature is e7pected to fulfill8 i e to establish that nature can be valued independently of its usefulness. and not only for the sake of humans Eallicott. G . if it is valuable as an end or for its own sake. final value If a thing’s value does not derive from its utility. for e7ample. or ought to. value nature for its own sake. then it is claimed that it has intrinsic value Indeed what most environmental philosophers try to secure when they argue for the 5intrinsic value’ of nature is that it is valuable for its own sake. that is. and also that it would have value even if there were no humans around to value it "o say that nature has 5intrinsic value’ therefore is best interpreted as meaning that people can.
argues that “something is intrinsically valuable .10G 2 9’(eill. independently of their circumstances. #n defense of the land ethic* Essays in Environmental Philosophy %(ew Iork* #tate ?niversity of (ew Iork +ress $. and things that are good only sometimes. of which there are a B Eallicott. or valuable for its own sakeG 4ccording to Forsgaard. because it is a member of an endangered species.. something is intrinsically valuable if it includes its own goodness. the distinction in goodness between intrinsic and e7trinsic value is meant to distinguish between things that are always good. a particular tiger is considered especially valuable.. . %(ew Iork* Eambridge ?niversity +ress $. is contrasted with final value. whereas instrumental value. F 5"wo Aistinctions in <nvironmental Doodness’ in Environmental &alues ' %$. ) 5"he Jarieties of Intrinsic Jalue’ in The %onist 02 %$. is necessarily tied up with the ob6ect’s relations with other things :or e7ample. if its value is not derived from its utility.0& pp 1G. E 5"wo Aistinctions in Doodness’ in Forsgaard. for whom intrinsic value is something that depends on the intrinsic nature of the thing in 3uestion./.& p $B$ G Forsgaard.1& pp $$. ) Haird. E Creating the $ingdom of Ends.C& pp B$..GC 2 .relational properties "herefore. and because of their relations with other things )ohn 9’(eill and Faren Dreen point out that when environmental philosophers argue that nature has 5intrinsic value’ they do not usually mean that it has value independently of its circumstances2 C "he value of some natural ob6ects.$B0 C Dreen.. at least from an environmentalist’s perspective. which turns out to be its non. but is independent of any use or function it may have in relation to something or someone else” B Forsgaard points out that this is not what the term 5intrinsic value’ means and she reminds us that intrinsic value is properly opposed to e7trinsic value. such as particular organisms or species. while an e7trinsically good thing gets its value from something else "he distinction originates in the moral theory of D < Moore.
that is. where it causes disruption 4s Faren Dreen points out the central properties valued by environmentalists. since it is something we always value. unless perhaps they are referring to the value of the whole biosphere. where it plays a role in maintaining the stability of the ecosystem. only that when environmental philosophers talk about nature having intrinsic value they do not usually mean it in Moore’s sense. which may be intrinsically valuable. since a species always e7ists in an environment 4 species may have value in its natural environment. ecosystems such as forests might also be said to have intrinsic value in this sense. such as rarity. the concept of intrinsic value in Moore’s sense is not able to accommodate much of the value that environmentalists seek to protect in nature "his of course. but rather depends on its circumstances If tigers were as numerous as cows say. Dreen claims. and stability all form part of an organism or species’ e7ternal relations and thus cannot be called their intrinsic values at all It is only the survival of the biosphere as a whole. this particular tiger’s value would be considerably less8 it might possibly even become negative value. since diversity and stability form part of their intrinsic natures #till. since the tiger might then be a threat to other species Kikewise. but none in a foreign one.limited number "his is a relational property @ it is not part of the intrinsic nature of the particular tiger. uni3ueness. irrespectively of the circumstances "o this one might add that other comple7 wholes. or an ecosystem C . does not establish that nature does not have intrinsic value in the sense used by Moore. diversity. to determine the value of a species it cannot be taken in isolation.
try to establish that nature has 5intrinsic value’. but that is valuable only in some circumstances. which we have seen is not the same thing as being intrinsically valuable It is perhaps regrettable that environmental philosophers talk of 5intrinsic value’. like Eallicott. when what they mean is that something is valuable for its own sake. it is usually in order to counter the idea that it is only valuable as means to human purposes "hus what they re3uire is that nature can be said to have final value. although it does not have intrinsic value. their theory unnecessarily opens itself to the criticism that the notion of intrinsic value in Moore’s sense has been sub6ect to 0 . can still be valued for its own sake If we keep the two distinctions in mind. such as its rarity.!hen final value is given the name 5intrinsic value’. is valuable only instrumentally "herefore. such as the tiger. that is between intrinsic and e7trinsic value and instrumental and final value. it is valuable only as a means to something else. it becomes evident that what is valued for its e7trinsic relations. for its own sake. and would not be as valuable if it were more pervasive. and not for the sake of anything else It was pointed out earlier that when environmental philosophers. can still be valued as a final good. since then. with things that have value for their own sakes It also leads to the mistaken conclusion that anything that is not always valuable. perhaps diversity 4s 9’(eill shows this is wrong. it is supposed that since the tiger is valuable because it is rare. this leads to the confusion of things that have value independently of their circumstances. and not in others. a thing valued because of its relational properties.
is sometimes used as a synonym for 5ob6ective value’. “value that an ob6ect possesses independently of the valuations of valuers”0 -ence a third distinction in value besides those between intrinsic and e7trinsic value and instrumental and final value. preferences and so on”/ 0 9’ (eill p $1L / 9’(eill p $1L / . ethics8 the debate of whether value has ob6ective e7istence. therefore. and whether or not they actually do perceive it 4rguing for 5intrinsic value’ in this sense. “that the source of all values lies in valuers @ in their attitudes. denies the sub6ectivist view. has to do with meta."o conclude* 4lthough it may be possible to speak of the intrinsic value of the survival of the biosphere and of other comple7 wholes like ecosystems. if they mean it in Moore’s sense "his does not e7clude the possibility that nature has final value which is what most environmental philosophers mean by 5intrinsic value’ and which is the kind of value re3uired for an argument against anthropocentrism Does nature have objective value? 9’(eill points out that 5intrinsic value’. or whether it is conferred upon things by people 9b6ective value e7ists in the world whether or not there are people to perceive it. as was mentioned earlier. it seems that most of the values that environmentalists seek to establish in nature depend on the relations of natural ob6ects and can change according to the ob6ect’s circumstances "hus environmentalists cannot say that these things have intrinsic value.
like -olmes Rolston and +aul "aylor. Moreover. irrespective of human interests and preferences Jarious environmental philosophers. "aylor’s theory of respect for nature “assumes that animals are beings to which it is correct to apply the ob6ective concept of entity. such as species and ecosystems can flourish or be in6ured. and this is independent of whether humans think greenfly ought to flourish or be in6ured 4gain. they can have lives. !n #ntroduction with "eadings %Kondon* Routledge 1LLL& pp 1$2. the best e7amples of which.own” . a natural ob6ect or collective entity has this good independently of human interests and preferences "o determine what it takes for a natural ob6ect to flourish or to realiMe its own good. an ecosystem will flourish if it is stable. . its normal conditions.of. 5Respect for (ature’ in Henson. he claims.having. + ! .its. we only need to know the characteristic features of the kind of thing that it is. ) Environmental Ethics. "aylor. an animal will achieve its own good if it is healthy .111 %p 11L& . like being healthy or being stable.good. seem to subscribe to this view 9’(eill makes a similar case for ob6ective values. are to be found in nature 9’(eill’s argument for ob6ective values rests on the premise that individual organisms and also collective entities.4 standard way of establishing the ob6ective value of nature links the re3uired ob6ectivity to the fact that things in nature have their own good. abnormal.a. or be in states that are better or worse "herefore these things can be said to have their own good 4n animal or ecosystem that is flourishing will display certain properties. greenfly has its own good to which mild winters are conducive. other properties such as being defective. and we need make no reference to human preferences :or e7ample. or unstable are evidence that the thing has not achieved its own good #imilarly.
it. overall. to use words like 5flourishing’ or 5good.of. $L . one must presuppose that there is a broad human preference for life and health over sickness and death "herefore. even though humans might prefer to see it unachieved.own’ and not a more value neutral word such as 5growing’ or 5state’. how can we say that mild winters affect greenflies favorably by enabling them to 5flourish’. does seem to presuppose certain general human values "hat is. rather than simply affect them neutrally by enabling them to grow in numbers? $L 9’(eill p $1. though humans might not value the flourishing of greenfly. and this good therefore is independent of human preferences Iet to call a particular state of an organism or collective entity its 5good’. these evaluative properties and goods must be ob6ective It will be noted that 9’(eill’s argument is a lot more elaborate than the outline I have given8 I have simplified it a great deal mostly in order to draw a parallel with similar arguments that make a case for ob6ective value in nature on these grounds In 9’(eill’s e7ample.4s 9’(eill puts it the good of these things is “independent of both human interests and any tendency they might have to produce in human observers feelings of approval or disapproval”$L :or 9’(eill it is only humans who confer value. and this is what enables them to speak of the 5good’ of greenfly 9therwise 9’(eill has to show is how a particular state can be called a 5good’. stable and so on point to a good that is independent of human values. they do value flourishing. greenfly was said to have its own good. unless we take account of humans’ ordinary preference for life. and therefore. since the evaluative properties such as being healthy.
a defective organism. but this is not all Heing normal does not always carry positive evaluation. is its having three legs. say a three. life and so on. and approval of health. of @ their @own ’ that are independent of any preferences for them at all Referring to these states as 5goods’ in the first place. presupposes human beings’ general interest in. which are normally $$ .human biological interests and preferences are nothing like human psychological ones.legged dog. and therefore the value we ascribe to things in calling them healthy or defective remains sub6ective "o further clarify this point it might help to point out that an entirely ob6ective language that was independent of what humans prefer would describe the differences between a healthy and a defective sample of a species simply as differences without implying that one was better or worse !ithout the notion that health and life are better than sickness and death. a natural property "he evaluative dimensions of 5defective’ depend on a further preference for health to deformity If we allow that other species can be said to have preferences.My argument here is against the claim that living beings and collective entities have 5goods. what is needed in this case is a preference for dogs being normal over being deformed "he property that e7ists ob6ectively in the dog then. might be described as 5original’ "o move to the evaluative term 5defective’ it is true that we need to know what the normal characteristics of the species are. or interests then humans can take the standpoint of other species to discover what is good from their perspective "hus we might value deformity in the dog negatively because it is seen to be contrary to its %biological not psychological& interests -owever these non.
or not to impede it "o use 9’(eill’s e7amples. yet this does not mean we have any moral obligation to promote them It would seem that this sort of ob6ective value. then. and is therefore irrelevant for an environmental ethic "o establish that there are ob6ective values by claiming that a thing has a good of its own independently of whether humans value this good or not renders the concept of the good of a natural ob6ect ethically uninteresting 4 more promising approach. a dictatorship and a virus can also be said to have their own good and to flourish.accompanied by thoughts about what is right or desirable "he 5good’ of a natural ob6ect. we call a particular state of a natural ob6ect its 5good’ because we sub6ectively place value on natural organisms flourishing. then. and developing in their biologically determined way. becomes nothing more than its biologically determined end. and as he readily admits the concept is of limited use to the environmentalist. is necessarily divorced from prescriptivity. I believe would be to recogniMe the sub6ective aspect in valuing the good of an ob6ect "hat is. even though we might not value this particular ob6ect’s flourishing In this way we can let our other sub6ective preferences decide when and what sort of flourishing we value #ub6ectivism however is considered suspect in environmental ethics for a number of reasons. since it entails no moral implications "here is no way of deriving from the fact that beings have a biological end or norm towards which they strive. any obligations to promote it. which I will outline in the ne7t section $1 . and loses a great part of what the word 5good’ normally indicates "his is in fact what 9’(eill seems to mean by the good of an ob6ect.
since it is a distinction in $B . and correspond to the two problems which we saw the last man e7ample raises "hus the first reason is the belief that a sub6ectivist account of value leads necessarily to anthropocentrism.human ob6ects for their own sakes. for its own sake. there is nothing in sub6ectivism that e7cludes non. confuses claims about the source of values with claims about their ob6ects <ven if what is valuable does depend upon the preferences and attitudes of people. even though this value is sub6ectively conferred "hus I might value the e7istence of a rainforest. this does not mean that people can only value other people Moreover.anthropocentric values "he suggestion that if value is conferred upon things by humans then it is necessarily conferred only upon humans. the idea that only humans can be valuable for their own sakes. the distinction between valuing something as a means and valuing it as an end seems to have more to do with the sub6ective aspect of valuing. people may value non. and the second is the idea that sub6ectivism cannot account for value in a world without humans "he first reason is easily dismissed8 as 9’(eill demonstrates. and not for any instrumental use it might be to me even though I recogniMe that ultimately this value depends on my preferences and attitude Indeed.Subjective final value is sufficient for an environmental ethic Many environmental philosophers argue for the ob6ectivity of values as it is believed to be a necessary starting point for a satisfactory reply to the last man e7ample "he reasons for this are twofold.
according to 9’(eill. can be valued from the perspective of this actual world $G .the way we value things "o value something for itself rather than as a means to something else re3uires only a change in attitude on our part. there is no reason why they cannot be conferred on a world without people in it Robert <lliot. for which we might value it "herefore a sub6ectivist meta. to enable the ob6ect to reveal its properties. if nature is valuable only because people find it so. this confuses the source and ob6ect of values8 even if values are conferred upon things by people. here and now in which valuers e7ist. and does not e7ist ob6ectively in the world. the last man has destroyed nothing of value. by attending to it disinterestedly "hus we might value deformity in the dog negatively because it is seen to be contrary to its %biological not psychological& interests "he second reason for which environmental philosophers might prefer an ob6ectivist meta. elaborates further on this point "he fact that there is a world. means that possible worlds that are empty of valuing agents. that is. in “:acts about (atural Jalues”.ethic. that we adopt a disinterested perspective. there is no way of saying that the world as the last man left it was any better or worse than it would have been had he left it intact In other words. then a world without human beings cannot possibly have any value "he problem therefore. is how there could be loss of value in the state of the natural environment after the last man is gone "hat is. because there will be no people to confer value on it 4gain.ethic is compatible with the idea that nature is valuable for its own sake8 it simply states that this value is something that we confer upon nature. rests on the premise that if value originates in the e7periences of a valuer. then once people are out of the picture.
from the perspective of this present world. R 5:acts about (atural Jalues’ in Environmental &alues 2 %$. R 5+ostmodernism. through words. and 9b6ectivity’ in Environmental &alues $L %1LL$& pp $G2. Jalue. more general ob6ections to sub6ectivism in ethics. since we are always correct about our own preferences %e7cept in unusual cases for e7ample when we $$ <lliot. we cannot be wrong about our values either. to which I will now turn It is argued that sub6ective values do not allow for disagreement. and presumably other methods such as mental pictures and so on$$ "herefore a possible future world without human beings but where a rainforest is preserved can still be more valuable than one in which the rainforest too is gone. what “Rainforests are valuable for their own sakes” really means is something like “I have a preference for rainforests” "hus engaging in debate with another would involve no disagreement. is a statement of our preferences8 for e7ample. because people in this present world do place value on rainforests. even though there are no people in his hypothetical world to perceive the loss of value "here are still other."here is no need for a valuer to be in direct interaction with a state of affairs in order to value it8 he or she can rather represent it to himself or herself.1BG $1 "his argument is made in 4ttfield. and that conse3uently there is no point in moral debate If my values are dependent on my preferences and attitudes and yours are likewise dependent on yours. assess the last man’s actions as wrong.C& pp 1B$. and this value is e7tended even to rainforests in possible worlds where people do not e7ist Kikewise. then you and I cannot possibly disagree about whether a rainforest has intrinsic value or not $1 "his is because what our arguments amount to.$C1 $2 .. because he has destroyed something of value. an opponent in a debate would not disagree that I have a preference for rainforests Eonse3uently. we can.
are being insincere& and there is no ob6ective truth to be discovered #ub6ectivism implies that nothing is good or bad. and not to state that I have a preference for rainforests "hus the argument that there cannot be disagreement rests on a mistaken notion of what moral utterances are meant to do$B Moral debate does have a purpose8 it is undertaken in the attempt to align others’ preferences and values to one’s own 4lthough a sub6ectivist meta.. though it e7presses an attitude or preference.$& pp GB1. if I claim that 5rainforests are valuable for their own sakes’.GG$ $C . my purpose in making the utterance is to influence people’s behaviour. and our attitude and preferences change "o paraphrase Rachels. a thing will be said to have value if a completely reasonable and impartial person would find it valuable after having thought through the facts "his is the standard then to which sub6ectivist value 6udgments can appeal $B Rachels. this does not mean that there can be no value 6udgments that are better or worse 4 value 6udgment. but involve an attempt to influence others’ "hat is.ethic implies that there is no ob6ective truth about values. that what we do when we engage in moral discussion is report our preferences Moral utterances are not made simply to report one’s preferences. ) 5#ub6ectivism’ in #inger + %ed& ! Companion to Ethics %97ford* Hasil Hlackwell Ktd $. is backed by reasons. right or wrong ob6ectively )ames Rachels shows that this argument rests on the mistaken idea that ethical 6udgments are simply a statement of fact. to enable them to appreciate the value of rainforests. and therefore we can after all. discover that we were wrong about our values if after we have considered the facts we feel differently about the matter.
it was argued. and to try to change others’ attitudes to the forest in order that they might begin to look at it in this way $0 . there is no reason to suppose that this value must be ob6ective. meaning that people confer this value on it !hat might it mean then to say 5nature has intrinsic value’. since sub6ectively conferred final value can satisfy both re3uirements that nature is valued for its own sake. still rely on reasons "hus we might value the rainforest. however. is that it establishes that nature 5has’ value for its own sake. but rather for other properties that are not particularly useful to humans If engaged in debate with a person who did not so value rain forests. for the concept of the 5intrinsic value’ of nature to be useful for environmental ethics. is not what most environmentalists mean by the intrinsic value of nature In addition. apart from any medicinal properties its species might have. and not only as a means to one’s purposes Jaluing it in this way would. natural harmony and e7ceptional biological diversity It would be basically to argue that there is another way of looking at the forest. one might give reasons for one’s evaluation of it. and that it is valuable even if there are no people in the world at the time to value it 4ll that is re3uired of the notion of 5intrinsic value’ for an environmental ethic then. that does not perceive it as a means to another good. only one turns out to be necessary for an environmental ethic 5Intrinsic value’ in Moore’s sense. perhaps by pointing to its beauty. on this account of intrinsic value? It would be to say nothing about nature ob6ectively. rather it would be to e7press an attitude that leads one to value it for its own sake.9f the three different meanings ascribed to 5intrinsic value’ in the introduction then.
that it has intrinsic value in the sense of final value. since most things in nature are valued because of their e7ternal relational properties. health and so on 9therwise the 5good’ of an ob6ect turns out to be its biologically determined end. or valuable for its own sake. since there is no way of deriving moral obligations from it $/ . and that it has intrinsic value in the sense of ob6ective value. and therefore this value is very much dependent on circumstances !hen environmental philosophers talk of the intrinsic value of nature. and can have no conse3uences on our actions. that it has intrinsic value in the term’s proper sense of value that is independent of circumstances. what they usually mean is that it is valuable for its own sake Many environmental philosophers argue that there is value in nature that is ob6ective. independently of whether people actually do place value on it Intrinsic value in its proper sense is not what environmentalists have in mind.onclusion I have argued that to say that nature has intrinsic value can be interpreted in three ways. and a standard way of establishing this is to claim that natural ob6ects have a 5good’ that is independent of human preferences I have argued that calling this a 5good’ or claiming that a thing 5flourishes’ depends on a general preference for life.
1& pp $$. R 5:acts about (atural Jalues’ in Environmental &alues 2 %$. R 5+ostmodernism. and it was therefore concluded that the only sense of 5intrinsic value’ that is necessary to ascribe to nature.ethic is compatible with what the concept must accomplish "o say that 5nature has intrinsic value’ therefore can be best interpreted as meaning that it can %or ought to& be valued by people for its own sake I have not argued for whether it does 5have’ value in this sense. for an environmental ethic.. ) 5#ub6ectivism’ in #inger + %ed& ! Companion to Ethics %97ford* Hasil Hlackwell Ktd $. and re3uires only a change of attitude on our part !ibliogra"hy# 4ttfield.2$ Rachels..& <lliot. @$B0 RabinowicM ! N ROnnow. #n defense of the land ethic* Essays in Environmental Philosophy %(ew Iork* #tate ?niversity of (ew Iork +ress $."he reasons for preferring an ob6ectivist to a sub6ectivist account of value were outlined and re6ected./$& 9’(eill./. ) K Ethics: #nventing "ight and (rong %Middlese7* +enguin Hooks $. ) 5"he Jarieties of Intrinsic Jalue’ in The %onist 02 %$. and 9b6ectivity’ in Environmental &alues $L %1LL$& pp $G2. is that of final value. E Creating the $ingdom of Ends...GC Forsgaard.. E 5"wo Aistinctions in Doodness’ in Forsgaard. ) Environmental Ethics: !n introduction with readings %Kondon* Routledge 1LLL& Eallicott. ) Haird. Jalue.0& pp 1G.. since it seems evident that anything at all can be valued in this way. %(ew Iork* Eambridge ?niversity +ress $.C& pp 1B$. F 5"wo Aistinctions in <nvironmental Doodness’ in Environmental &alues ' %$.1BG Dreen. . and that a sub6ectivist meta.C& pp B$.Rasmussen " 5IIP4 Aistinction in Jalue* Intrinsic and :or Its 9wn #ake’ in Proceedings of the !ristotelian Society $LL %1LLL& pp B$.10G Mackie.$C1 Henson.GG$ $.$& pp GB1.
-all Inc $./& 1L ..Rolston.//& 'immerman. -olmes Environmental Ethics: )uties to and &alues in the *atural (orld %+hiladelphia* "emple ?niversity +ress $. M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice.