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RULE 19 # 4. NUNAL V CA FACTS: 1. Civil Case No.

872:partition and accounting of a parcel of land was filed by EMMA DE LEON as guardian ad litem (herein PR) vs LUISA NUÑAL now deceased and herein represented by her heirs wherein PR claim that title (owned by Frank C. Lyon)has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares. RTC – partition but not accounting. CA – Affirm Motion to quash filed by Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of Frank C. Lyon, although she was not a party. Should render the decision unenforceable it affects her rights and interest in the land DISMISSED Board of Commissioners for the partition manifested to the trial court that in view of the fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she could therefore be construed as one of the heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then sought. LCOURT: EMMA: submit named of all heirs entitled to share while LUISA: asks for the partition – LCOURT no ruling on this still ordered the partition later Mary Lyon Martin was included as co-owner MR by PET was DENIED. APPEAL DENIED PET for REV @ CA

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ISSUE: The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory. HELD: NO! they cannot! 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT BECOMES FINAL, MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT; EXCEPTIONS. — In the case of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, (195 SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ". . ., nothing is more

settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose." Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872 ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among plaintiffs and defendants has long become final and executory. Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987 ordering the Board of Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of said property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said Order, therefore, resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered in Civil Case No. 872. In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

RULE 36 # 4. IMSON v CA FACTS: 1. Because of a vehicular collision bet. Car (toyoto corolla, totally wrecked) of IMSON and Truck of FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation, complaint for damages filed against later and truck driver Felix B. Calip, Jr.; the beneficial owners of the truck, Gorgonio Co Adarme, Felisa T. Co (also known as Felisa Tan), and Cirilia Chua SiokBieng, and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corporation total of P320K Defendants driver and beneficial owners failed to answer and were declared in default. 4 On May 29, 1987, however, petitioner and defendant insurer, entered into a compromise agreement so the complaint was DISMISSED. TC: Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation- dismiss the case against all the other defendants. It argued that since they are all indispensable parties under a common cause of action, the dismissal of the case against defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them TC DENIED Elevated to CA - Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Restraining Order – CA REVERSED based on Lim Tanhu v. Hon. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425, as applied later in Co v. Acosta, 134 SCRA 185, to support its averment CA SAID that the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case SC: issue: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 248-R THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN LIM TAN HU VS. RAMOLETE IS APPLICABLE 3.

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case against the other defendants, including those in default. The ruling is rooted on the rationale that the court's power to act in a case involving a common cause of action against indispensable parties "is integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest. 10 For Lim Tanhu to apply to the case at bench, it must be established that: (1) petitioner has common cause of action against private respondents and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R; and (2) all the defendants are indispensable parties to the case. In the case at bench, it is clear that petitioner has different and separate causes of action against the defendants in the case. The allegations in the Complaint show that petitioner seeks to recover from the TRUCK DRIVER for his wrong which caused injury to petitioner and his car. The cause of action against him is BASED ON QUASI-DELICT under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Quasi-delict, too, is the basis of the cause of action against defendants beneficial and registered owners. But in their case, it is Article 2180 of the same Code which governs the rights of the parties. However, with respect to defendant Western Guaranty Corporation, petitioner's cause of action is BASED ON CONTRACT. He seeks to recover from the insurer on the basis of the third party liability clause of its insurance contract with the owners of the truck. Quite clearly then, Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case at bench for there is no showing that petitioner has a common cause of action against the defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R.

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ISSUE: WON the doctrine is applicable in the case at bar HELD: SAY NO to DRUGS! =) 1. Essentially, the doctrine adverted to essays that in a common cause of action where all the defendants are indispensable parties, the court's power to act is integral and cannot be split, such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest. Lim Tanhu states that where a complaint alleges a common cause of action against defendants who are all indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal against any of them by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff necessarily results in the dismissal of the

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