James Schmidt and Thomas E. \,\Iartenbcrg
93. Foucault Reader, 38.
94. Hacking, "Self_Improvement," 238.
95. Foucault Rpadcr, 48.
96. Ibid., 50.
tl "Critique of Impure Reason," 463.
97. 1 C ar lY, ,
. 1 N' tz· he Cruelty" Polit-
'1'11 . "C"al'nl\"lis of AtroCIty: FOllcau t, 1 le sc, '
98. See James tV 1 Cl, ,< ,
ical71/Cory 18 (1990): 478. .
. . . TI 'IS E. vVartcnberg, The Forms oj power: From Dmlll-
99. ,For Temple University Press), 1990.
na/IOIt fa Trall.'!J0nlla /Oil '
" 9°8
100. I-lacking, "Self-Improvement, •
. "Critique as a Philosophic Ethos," 421 (italics in original).
101. BernsteIn, .
. J G /" d' am der kloml da Lll-
9 Cl . l' Carve Versw:lw iiber verschw( ,esellS all t.: : 1 1
10_. ,Ins tan , '. 179
) re finted in Dlcter Henne 1, C(.,
cralur, und ficm (Fr!kfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967), 134-
Kalil, CClllz., Rchberg: Uber /Com 1L11( •
1 I
'· l "On the Common Saying: 'This May be Tnle in Theory,
1 lmmanue '\.illl, . . 67
"ION t Apply in Practice," in Poiiliw[ 1Vnlmgs, .
But toes 0
" 9°9
104. Hacking, "Self_Improvement, _:J
. (C b' 1 . C'lmbridge University
a O'Neill Constructions oj Rl!aSOIl ,am rIC ge. -'< • 'h'"
I 58-59. 'For a discussion of the antifoundationalism ot Kant s et lCS,
less, . , ,
see pp. 18-19,56,64.
Clifiql/.l! oJJudgmt:nl §40.
"The Return of Morality," in Foucault Live, 330.
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
Gilles Deleuze
,Vhat happened during the fairly long silence following The History
a/Sexuality? Perhaps Foucault fell slightly uneasy about the book: had
he not trapped himself within the concept of power relations? He
himself put fonvard the following objection: "That's just like you,
always with the same incajJacit,.)1 to cross the lhw, to pass over to the
other side ... it is always the same choice, for the side of power, for
what power says or of what it causes to be said."l And no doubt his
own reply was that "the most intense point of lives, the one where
their energy is concentrated, is precisely where they clash with power,
struggle with it, endeavor to utilize its forces or to escape iL"I traps."
He might equally have added that the diHi.lse centers of power do
not exist without points of resistance that are in smne way primary;
and that power does not take life as its objective without revealing or
giving rise to a life that resists power; and finally that the force of the
outside continues La disrupt the diagrams and turn them upside
But what happens, on the other hand, if the transversal relations
of resistance continue to become resu'atified, and to encounter or
even construct knots of power? Already the ultimate failure of the
prison movement, after 1970, had saddened Foucault, on top of
which other events, on a world scale, must have saddened him even
more. If power is constitutive of truth, how can we conceive of a
"power of truth" which would no longer be the truth of power, a
truth that would release transversal lines of resistance and not inle-
gral lines of power? How can we "cross the line"? A.nd, if we must
Gilles Deleuzc
attain a life that is the power of the outside, what tells us that this
outside is not a terrifying void and that this life, which seems to put
up a resistance, is not just the simple distribution within the void of
"slow, partial and progressive" deaths? We can no longer even say
that death transforms life into destiny, an "indivisible and decisive"
event, but rather that death becomes multiplied and differentiated
in order to bestow on life the particular features, and consequently
the truths, which life believes arise from resisting death. What re-
mains, then, if not to pass through all these deaths preceding the
great limit of death itself, deaths which even afterwards continue?
Life henceforth consists only of taking one's place, or every place, in
the cortege of a "One dies."
It is in this sense that Bichat broke with the classical conception of
death, as a decisive moment or indivisible event, and broke ,vith it
in two ways, simultaneously presenting death as being coextensive
with life and as something made up of a multiplicity of partial and
particular deaths. When Foucault analyzes Bichat's theories, his tone
demonstrates sufficientiy that he is concerned with something other
than an epistemological analysis::! he is concerned ,vith a conception
of death, and few IllCll more than Foucault died in a way comlnen-
surate with their conception of death. This force oflife that belonged
to Foucault was always thought through and lived out as a multiple
death in the manner of Bichat.
vVhat remains, then, except an anonymous life that shows up only
when it clashes with power, argues with it, exchanges "brief and
strident words," and then fades back into the night, what Foucault
called "the life of infamous men," whom he asked us to admire by
virtue of "their misfortune, rage or uncertain madness"?3 Strangely,
implausibly, it is this "infamy" which he claimed for himself: "My
point of departure was those sorts of particles endowed with an en-
ergy that is all the greater for their being small and difficult to spot."
This culminated in The Use of Pleasure's searing phrase: "to get free of
oneself. "'\
]fw History of Sexuality explicitly closes on a doubt. If at the end of
it Foucault finds hinlself in an impasse, this is not because of his
conception of pmver but rather because he found the impasse to be
where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as
we run up against it in our smallest truths. This could be resolved
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch
it away from tile void and pull it back from death. This would be like
a new axis, different from the axes of both Imowledge and power.
Could tillS axls.be the place where a sense of serenity would be finally
attamed and hfe truly affinned? In any case, it is not an axis tilat
annuls all others but one tilat was already working at the same time
as the otilers, and prevented tilem from closing on the impasse.
Perhaps this third axis was present from tile beginning in Foucault
Uust as power was present from tile beginning in knowledge). But it
could emerge only by assuming a certain distance, and so being able
to CIrcle back on the other two. Foucault felt it necessary to carry out
a general reshuffle in order to unravel this path which was so tangled
up in the others that it remained hidden: it is this recentering which
Foucault puts forward in the general introduction to The Use of
But how was tilis new dimension present from the beginning? Up
untIl now, we have encountered three dimensions: the relations
which have been formed or formalized along certain strata (Knowl-
edge); the relations between forces to be found at the level of tile
diagram (Power); and the relation with the outside, that absolute
relation, as Blanchot says, which is also a nonrelation (Thought).
Does this mean that there is no inside? Foucault continually submits
interiority to a radical critique. But is there an inside that lies deeper
than any intem,al world, just as the outside is farther away than any
external world? The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter
animated by peristaltic movement, folds and foldings that together
make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside,
but precisely the inside of the outside. The Order of Things developed
this theme: if thought comes from outside, and remains attached to
the outside, how come the outside does not flood into the inside as
the elements that thought does not and cannot think of? The ~ n ­
thought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart,
as that impossibility of tilinking which doubles or hollows out the
The classical age had already stated that tilere was an inside of
thought, the unthought, when it invoked the finite, the differeut
orders of infinity. And from the nineteenth century on it is more the
dimensions of finitude which fold the outside and constitute a
Gilles Deleuzc
, 'tl d l'nto itself" an inside to life, labor and
"d 1'" "densIty WI 1 1
ept 1, a , 'b. Id d if only to sleep, but converse Y
I guage in whlch man IS em ec e , 'k'
an, .' '.' _ bedded in man "as a living beIng, a wor Ing
wblch IS also llselt em I' t"6 Either it is the fold of the infinite,
individual or a finitude which curve the outside and
or the l;f" 1irth oj the Clinic had already shown how
constItute t 1e lnSl e. ," to the surface but equally how patho-
the clinic brought tile body up d d' this body deep foldings
, l' ubsequently Intro uce In
10gICa anatomy s , .1 Id tion of interiority but constituted
which did not reSUSCItate t le 0
, I th inside of this outsIde,'
Insteac. new ,f of the out"iide: in all his work Foucault
The mSlde as an opera IOn of an inside which is merely the fold of
seems haunted by tIllS theme f I lin of the sea, On the subject
the outside, as if the ShIp were
a c sea in his boat, Foucault
of the Renaissance madman w 10 IS P
, . 1 exterior and inversely, ' , a prisoner in the
he is put in the lD tenor of t 1e. t' f routes' bound last at the infinite
f I
'the freest the openes 0 . . [' I
midst 0 W 1at 1S 'j ,. )' 'lhu;(" that is the prisoner 0 - t le
d H
's the P'lssenger '')(11 Lxa I. '" ,
crossroa s, e 1 "
I' th'm this madman himself. As Blanchot
lt t;le outside, that is, constitutes it in an
says 0 oncau, . "'-I
., f xpectation or exceptlOll. '
intenonty. o. e. I' I has always haunted Foucault is that
a rather the theme w llC 1, ' ,
of But th,e
on the contrary, It IS an 1I d bi' f the Other It is not a re-
doubling of the One, but a re on mg 0 f the It is not
roduetion of the Same, but a repetItIon o. ". nee
P 'f. "I" but something that places In Immane
the emanatlOn 0 ,In , . It is never the other who is a double
an always other or a NOl;-sdf. self tInt lives me as the double of the
, I d bl'111g process It IS a , ,
m t le oU,' 1 t 'I I find the other m
other: I do not encounter on le OU SIC e, Other the Distant,
me ("it is always concerned wIth shOWIng how the _ '-I' '
, I tl S'lme") 10 It resembles exactly t le ll1vagma-
IS also the Near al1C le , 'f 1 hi' ' 1 sewing' twist
lion of a tissue in elnbryology, or the act 0 (OU mg 11' , ,
fold stop and so on, , I
" d It' 1 its Inost paradoxica pages,
The Archaeology oj [(noH/hI ge S 10wec , 11
'-.. . .. f other and above all how one
how one phrase was the repetItIOn 0 an ,
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
statement repeated or doubled "something else" that was barely dis-
tinguishable from it (the transmission of letters on the keyboard,
AZERT), Equally, the books on power showed how the stratified
£or111s repeated relations between forces that were barely distinguish-
able from one another, and how history was the doubling of an
emergence, This permanent theme in Foucault had already been
analysed in depth in Raymond Roussel. For what Raymond Roussel
had discovered was the phrase of the oUL'iide, its repetition in a
second phrase, the Ininuscule diflerence between the two (the "snag"
[I 'accra,] ), and the twistiug and doubling from one to the other. The
snag is no longer the accident of the tissue but the new rule on the
basis OfV·lhich the external tissue is twisted, invaginated and doubled.
The "facultative" rule, or the transmission of chance, a dice-throw.
They are, says Foucault, games of repetition, of difference, and of
the doubling that "links them,"
This is not the only time Foucault presents in a literary and hu-
morous way what could be demonstrated by epistemology or linguis-
tics, which are both serious disciplines. Raymond Roussel has knitted
or sewn together all the lueanings of the word dOll-blufe, in order to
show how the inside was always Il,e folding of a presupposed out-
side,ll And Roussel's last method, the proliferation of parentheses
inside one another, multiplies the foldings within the sentence. This
-'-. is why Foucault's book on Roussel is ilnportant, and no doubt the
path it traces is itself double, This does not at all mean that the pri-
macy can be reversed: the inside will always be the doubling oj the
outside, But it does mean that either, like Roussel recklessly searching
for death, we want to undo the doubling anel pull away the folels
"with a studied gesture," in order to reach the outside and its "stifling
hollowness"; or like Leiris, who is more wise and prudent but none
the less in another sense incredibly audacious, -we follow the folds,
reinforce the doublings frmTI snag to snag, and surround ourselves
with foldings that form an "absolute memory," in order La make the
outside into a vital, recurring elementY-'! As The ilislOl")' oj fHadl/l!ss
put it: to be put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely. Perhaps
Foucault has always oscillated between the two forms of the double,
already characterized at this early stage as the choice betl-veen death
or IT1Cmory. Perhaps he chose death, like Roussel, but not without
having passed through the detours or foldings of memory,
Gilles Delellzc
Perhaps he even had to go back to the Greeks. In this way even
the most impassioned problem would be giveu a context that
restore a sense of calm. If folding or doubling haunts all Foucault s
work but surfaces only at a late stage, this is because he gave the
of "absolute memory" to a new dimension which had be
distinguished both frmn relations between forces or
from stratified forms of Imowledge. Greek educatIOn presents
an ld' . I
new power-relations which are very different the 0 Impena.
forms of education and materialize in a Greek hght as a system of
visibility, and in a Greek logos as a of statements. We can
therefore speak of a diagram of power whrch extends across ,all qual-
ified forms of knowledge: "governing oneself, managmg one s estate,
and participating in the administration of the city were prac-
tices of the same type," and Xenophon "shows the contmlllty and
isomorphis111 between the three 'arts,' as th.c
sequence by which they were to be practlsed m the hfe of an mdmd-
"13 Hmvever not even this marks the great novelty of the Greeks.
ua. , .
Such novelty ultimately emerges thanks to a double unhookmg or
"differentiation" [deaoc1wgt!]: when the "exercIses that enabled
to govern oneself' brcome detached both from. power as a
bellveen forces, and from knowledge as a stratIfied fornl, or code
of virtue. On the one hand there is a "relation to oneself' that con-
sciously derives from one's relation others; the other
is equally a "seH:'constitution" that conscIously denves from the moral
code as a rule for knowledge.

This derivative or differentiation must be understood in the sense
in which the relation to oneself aSSUIl1eS an independen t status. It is as
if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow
a relation to oneself to elnerge, and constitute an inside which IS
hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension: "enkrateia,"
the relation to oneself that is self-mastery, "is a power that one
brought to bear on oneself in the power that exercised over
others" (how could one claim to govern others If one could not
govern oneself?) to the point where the to
"a principle of internal regulation" in relatIOn to the constItuent
. - 15
powers of politics, the family, eloquence, games VIrtue:
This is the Greek version of the snag and the doubhng: a dIfferentia-
tion that leads to a folding, a reflection.
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
This,. at is Foucault's version of the novelty of the Greeks.
And tlus verSIOn appears very important in both its detail and iL'i
superficial "Vhat the Greeks did is not to reveal Being or
unfold the Open m a world-historical gesture. According to Foucault
theY.dId a deal less, or more.
They bent the outside, through
senes of practICal exercises. The Greeks are the first doubling. Force
IS what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation between
other forces: it is inseparable in iL<;elf from the power to affect other
forces (spontaneity) and to be affected by others (receptivity). But
\vhat com.es as a is a relation which Jorce has with itselj; a
jJOwerto a/leciltselj, an affect ofsel[ on self Following the Greek diagram,
can dommale ("free agents" and the "agonistic
rel,lllOns between them are dlagraxnmatic characteristics). [7 But how
could they dominate others if they could not dominate themselves?
The domination of others must be doubled by a domination of one-
self. The relation with others must be doubled by a relation with
The obligatory rules for power must be doubled by faculta-
tIve rules for the free man who exercises power. As moral codes here
and there execute the diagram (in the city, the family, tribunals,
games, etc.), a "subject" must be isolated which differentiates itself
from the code and no longer has an internal dependence on it.
This is what the Greeks did: they folded force, even though it still
f?rce. They made it relate back to itself. Far from ignoring
IntenOrIty, or subjectivity they invented the subject, but
only as a derIvative or the product of a "subjectivation." They discov-
ered the "aesthetic existence" - the doubling or relation with one-
self: the facultative rule of free man.'" (If we do not regard this
derIVatIOn as beIng a new dilnension, then we must say that there is
no sense of subjectivity in the Greeks, especially if we look for it on
the level of obligatory rules.) Foucault's fundamental idea is that of
a dimension of subjectivity derived from pov./er and knowledge with-
out being dependent on them.
. In ano.ther way it is The Use PleasUFl! which in several respects
differentIates from the previous books. On the one hand it invokes
a long period of time that begins -with the Greeks and continues up
to the present day by way of Christianity, while the previous books
considered short periods, between the seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries. On the other it discovers the relation to oneself, as a new
Gilles De1cuze
dimension that cannot be reduced to the pmver-reIations and rela-
tions between forms of knowledge that were the object of previous
books: the whole system has to be reorganized, Finall):, there is a
break with The Histor)' of Sexualit)', which studied sexualIty from the
double viewpoint of power and knowledge; now.the one-
self is laid bare, but its links with sexuality remaIn uncertatn.-O Con-
sequently, the first step in a cOlnplete is
does the relation to oneself have an elective affinity wIth sexualIty,
to the point of renewing the project of a of sexuality"?
The reply is a vigorous one: just as pm,;er-relauons can affirmed
only by being carried out, so the relatIon to bends
these power relations, can be established only by bemg carned out.
And it is in sexuality that it is established or carn:cl not
immediately; for the constitution of an inside IS ahme,n-
tary before it is sexual.:!! But here again, what IS It that
to "differentiate" itself gradually fronl alimentary consideratIOns and
beC0111e the place in which the relation to oneself is e,nacted? Tl:e
reason is that sexuality, as it is lived out by the ,Greeks, Incarnates, In
the female the receptive element of force, and In the nlale the actIve
or spontaneous elenlent.::!::! From then on, the relation
himself as self·detennination \\rill concern sexuahty In three ways: In
the simple form of a "Dietetics" of pleasures, one governs oneself in
order to be capable of actively governing one's body; in composed
form of a domestic "Economics," one governs oneself In order to be
capable of governing one's wife, who in turn may attain a good
receptivity; in the doubled fOrIn of an "Erotics" of boys" one governs
oneself in order that the boy also learns to govern himself, to be
active and to resist the power of The Greeks not only in-
vented the relation to oneself, they linked it to sexuality, composing
and doubling it within the latter's terms. In short, the Greeks laid
the foundation for an encounter between the relation to onese1fand
sexuality. ,
The redistribution or reorganization takes place all on Its own, or
at least over a long period. For the relation to oneself will remain
the withdrawn and reserved zone of the fi"ee man, a zone ll1depen-
dent of any "institutional and social system." The to oneself
will be understood in terms of power-relations and relatIOns of know 1-
edge. It will be reintegrated into these systems from which it was
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
originally derived. The individual is coded or recoded witl .
" I" kI lIn a
mora r lO\:led.ge, and ab,ove all he becomes the stake in a power
struggle and IS dlagrammatlzed.
The fold therefore seems unfolded, and the subjectivation of the
free man IS transformed into subjection: on the one hand it involves
being "subject to someone else by control and dependence," with all
the, processes of,ind.ividuation and modulation which power installs,
actIng on the daIly hfe and the interiority of those it calls its subjects;
on the other It makes the subject "tied to his own identity by a
consCIence or. self-knowledge," through all the techniques of moral
human sCIences that go to make up a knowledge of the subject."!
sexuahty becomes organized around certain focal
POll1ts of power, gives rise to a "scientia sexualis," and is integrated
Into an agency of "power-knowledge," namely Sex (here Foucault
returns to the analysis given in The Histar), of Sexuabty) ,
rvlust we conclude from this that the new dimension hollowed out
by the Greeks disappears, and falls back on the two a.,es of know ledge
and power? In that case we could go back to the Greeks and find a
re1ation to oneself on free individuality, But this is obviously
not the case, There wIll always be a relation to oneself which resists
codes powers; the relation to onself is even one of the origins of
these of resistance which we have already discussed, For ex-
ample, It would be wrong to reduce Christian moralities to their
a:tempts at and the pastoral power which they invoke,
wlthout also taI(lng Into account the "spiritual and ascetic move-
ments," or suqjectivation that continued to develop before the Ref-
ormatIon (there are collective It is not even
enough sa7 that the latter resist the former; for there is a perpetual
bet1,veen them, whether in terms of struggle or of
"\That must be stated, then, is that subjectivation, the
to continues to create itself, but by transforming
Itself dnd changIng ItS nature to the point where the Greek mode is
a distant memory. Recuperated by power-relations and relations of
knowledge, the relation to oneself is continually reborn elsewhere
and otherwise, '
The most general formula of the relation to oneself is the affect
of self by self, or folded force. Subjectivation is created by folding.
Only, there are four foldlllgs, four folds of subjectivation, like the
Gilles Deleuze
rivers of the inferno. The first concerns the material part of ourselves
which is to be surrounded and enfolded: for the Greeks this was the
body and its pleasures, the "aphrodisia"; but for Christians this will
be the flesh and its desires, desire itself, a completely different sub-
stantial modality. The second, properly speaking, is the fold of the
relation between forces; for it is always according to a particular rule
that the relation between forces is bent back in order to become a
relation to oneself, though it certainly makes a difference whether
or not the rule in question is natural, divine, rational, or aesthetic,
and so on. The third is the fold of knowledge, or the fold of truth in
so far as it constitutes the relation of truth to our being. and of our
being to truth, which will serve as the formal condition for any kind
of knowledge: a subjectivation of knowledge that is always different,
whether in the Greeks and the Christians, or in Plato, Descartes, or
Kant. The fourth is the fold of the outside itself, the ultimate fold: it
is this that constitutes what Blanchot called an "interiority of expec-
tation" from which tl,e subject, in different ways, hopes for immor-
tality. eternity. salvation, freedom or death or detachment. These
four folds are like the final or formal cause, the acting material cause
of subjectivity or interiority as a relation to oneselC:!G These folds are
enlinently variable, and moreover have different rhythms whose var-
iations constitute irreducible modes of They operate
"beneath the codes and rules" of knowledge and power and are apt
to unfold and merge with them, but not without new foldings being
created in the process.
On each occasion the relation to oneself is destined to encounter
sexuality, according to a modality that corresponds to the mode of
subjectivation. This is because the spontaneity and receptivity of force
will no longer be distributed on the basis of an active and a passive
role, as it was for the Greeks, but rather as in the completely different
case of the Christians, on the basis of a bisexual structure. From the
viewpoint of a general confrontation, what variations exist between
the Greek sense of the body and the pleasures, and the Christian
sense of flesh and desire? Can it be that Plato remains at the level of
the body and the pleasures to be found in the first folds, but is already
beginning to raise himself to the level of Desire to be found in the
third fold, by folding truth back into the lover, and is consequently
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
isolating a new p f"
. "( rocess a subJecllvation that leads to a "des' .
su and no Ion b' ' mng
ger to a su of pleasures)?"
And what can we ultimate!, s· b
modes add .) ay a out our own contemporary
n our rno ern relatIO t 1
If it is true that power increasin
1 l¥hal,are ,ourjourjolds?
riority and our individuarty. 'f' glY our dally hves, our inte-
I , I It las become individ r' 'f"
true that knowledge itself 1 b . . ua mng; I' It IS
forming the hermeneutics
wha. t remains for our suhiectivl'ty' Tl
f J' lere never remaIn'" 1 '
o the subject, since he is to be created a h ,s . anyt.un
. f . ' n eac occasIOn hke a D 1
pOlOt a reSIstance, on the basis of the folds which s 11' '.. 1 oca
edge and bend each u O1owl-
the body d' 1 power. Perhaps modern subjectivity rediscovers
an Its p easures as opposed t d' I
too subjugated by Law' Ye't tl' . a a eSlre t lat has become
, l1S IS not a return to the G k '
there never is a return.28 The struggI £. d ree s, sInce
through a resistance to tIle hyO p e Olr
1.-\ resent Lorm f b' ,
consisting of individualizing ISO su the one
£ ourse ves on the basis of '
power, the other of tt. -' " . constrall1ts of
ognized identity fi ad I actIng ejach Ind1VIdual to a known and rec-
, xe once am for ',11 Tl . . 1 .
presents itself, therefore as tl . I' .' le stru.
e for
, . le ng It to dIfference ..
metamorphosis (H ' , ' vanatIOn and
, ere we are multiplyu tl .
are touching on the un bI' I d 1? le questIOns, since we
, [tlle projected fourth (iI
la chaiT
IOta very last topics of research.) ,,/lal y , anc beyond
In l1w Usc of Pleasure, Foucault d .
fact he had already defined it ., does not the subject. In
the statement But b r d ' ,£ envatlve, a functIon derived from
conditioned tl,e It as a derivative of the outside,
ible dimension So ,ye 11" (h1mb
out fully and gIVes it an irreduc-
, ave t e aSIS for a' 1 ' 1
question: How can '''e 1 . . lep ) to tle most general
, l1aITIe t lIS new dimeI' 1 .
oneself that is neither knowl d ISIOn, t lIS relation to
self pleasure or de '. '0 e
ge nor power? Is the affect of self by
., Sll er reo ,"e c 11 't ". d' .
, a I 111 IVldual c 1 ." I
conducl of pleasure or desire;J vVe sh 11 fi d 1 one HCt, t le
we note the lbnits which third:i 111. t le exact term only if
periods of time TI. . . lTIenSIOI1 assumes over long
. le "ppemance of a folding ftl 'd
unique to Western d I a le Out.sl e can seem
e\e opment. Perhaps the Orient does not r
ent such a phenOInenon and tl r f _ . p es-
float across a stiflin h011 Ine 0 the outside continues to
g OWl1ess: 111 that case asceticism would be a
Gilles Deleuzc
culture of annihilation or an effort to breathe in such a void, without
any particular production of subjectivity.3I)
The conditions for a bending of forces seem to arise with the
agonistic relationship between free men: that is, with the Greeks. It
is here that force folds back on itself in relation with the other force.
But even if we made the Greeks the origin of the process of subjec-
tivation, it still occupies a long period of time in the run-up to the
present day. This chronology is all the more remarkable given that
Foucault examined the diagrams of power as places of mutation, and
the archives oflul0wledge, over short periods oftime,31 Ifwe ask why
The Use oj Pleasure suddenly introduces a long period of time, perhaps
the simplest reason is that we have all too quickly forgotten the old
powers that arc no longer exercised, and the old sciences that: arc
no longer useful, but in llloral matters we arc still \veighecl down with
old beliefs which we no longer even believe, and we continue to
produce ourselves as a subject on the basis of old modes which do
not correspond to our problems. This is what led the film director
Antonioni to say that we are sick with Eros ... Everything takes place
as if the modes of subjectivation had a long life, and we continue to
play at being Greeks or Christians, and to indulge in a taste for trips
down memory lane.
But there is a deeper positive reason. The folding or doubling is
iL"Ielf a IvlelTIOry: the "absolute memory" or memory of the outside,
beyond the brief 111emory inscribed in strata and archives, beyond
the relics remaining in the diagrams. The aesthetic life of the Greeks
had already essentially prompted a memory of the future, and very
quickly the processes of subjectivation were accompanied by writings
that were real memories, Ivlemory is the real name
of the relation to oneself, or the affect on self by self. According to
Kant, tilne was the form in which the mind affected itself, just as
space was the fonn in which the mind was affected by sOlnething
else: time was therefore "auto-affection" and made up the essential
structure of subjectivity.:I:1 But time 'as subject, or rather subjectiva-
tion, is called memory, Not that brief menlory that COlnes afterwards
and is the opposite of forgetting, but the "absolute memory" which
doubles the present and the outside and is one with forgetting, since
it is itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted: its fold, in fact,
merges with the unfolding, because the latter remains present within
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
the as the thing that is folded. Only forgetting (the unfolding)
recmers what IS folded II1 memory (and in the fold itself).
. There IS a final rediscovery of Heidegger by Foucault. Memory
IS contrasted .not WIth forgetting but with the forgetting of forget-
tmg, whIch chssolves us into the outside and constitutes death, On
ot.her, hand, as long as the outside is folded an inside is coexten-
SIve :VIth It, as memory is coextensive with forgetting, It is this coex-
tenSIve nature 'which is life a long pel'I'od of t' T' b .
. , " lme. Ime ecomes a
subject It IS the folding of the outside and, as such, forces
present. Into b:lt preserves the whole of the past
:vIthm y: forgettIng IS the Impossibility of return, and nlcmory
IS th,e necessl.ty of renewal. For a long time Foucault thought of the
as beIng an ultimate spatiality that was deeper thar: time; but
In hIS late he the possibility once more of putting time
on the and th111lung of the outside as being tinle, conditioned
by the fold.""
It is on point that the necessary confi'ontation between Foucault
anel Heldegger takes place: the "folel" has continued to haunt the
work but finds its true dimension in his last research. In
what ways IS he similar to and different from Heidegger? We can
evaluate. them only by taking as our point of departure Foucault's
?reak ,WIth .phenoinenology in the "vulgar" sense of the term: with
The idea that consciousness is directed towards the
thIng gai,ns in the world is precisely what Foucault
refuses to In fact mtentionality is created in order to surpass
psychologlsm naturalism, but it invents a new psychologisln
a, new naturahsm to the point where, as lvIerleau-Ponty himself
saId, It can hardI}' be distinO'uished f!'oln a "I" . "
. • • • D £ earnIng process. It
synthesizes consciousness and signif-
a of the savage experience" and of the thing, of
the al1nless eXIstence of the thing in the world.
This rise to Foucault's double challenge, Certainly, as long as
we rema1110nthelevelof\vod.l I .
. , . r sane p lrases we can belIeve in an
IIltentIOnah h , through whi I . ..
, "'J C 1 conSCIOusness IS dIrected towards some-
thmg and aains significance ('\ tl . . 'fi
• D_ <- S some llng SIgl1l lCant); as long as \ve
remam on the level of things and states of tl'· b I' .
" ". . llngs we can e Ieve 111 a
savage expenence that lets tl I . d' L • le t lIng wan er aImlessly through
Gilles Deleuzc
, 1 1 "places things in parenthesis,"
consciousness. But If p lenomeno ogy
, l' t d thl's ought to push it beyond words and phrases
as It Calms 0 0, . d'
towards statements, and beyond things and states of thIng.s s
, '/'['t' . B t statements are not directed towards anytlung, SInce
tnSl Jl 1 lC.\. U b' t
the are not related to a thing any nlore than they a su
bu:"efer only to a language, a langllage-being, that gIves them umque
subjects and objects that satisfY particular .condltions as
, 11 A'lcl vI'sl'bilities are not deployed 111 a savage world already
vana)es.ru . b ., D
d t
' prl'ml'tive (pre-predicative) conSClOusness, llt Ie er
opene up 0 a _.
only to a light, a light-being, which gives them
and perspectives that are immanen t In the proper sens,e IS,
, f ' 11' nal gaze 'Ifi Neither languao-e nor hght wIll be
free 0 - any Inten 0, b _ ,._.
exanlined in the areas that relate them to one another (.deslgna.tIOn,
si nification, the signifying process of language; a. physIc.al
g 'bl' 'Iltelligible world) but rather 111 the IrredUCIble
ment, a tangl e or I '. .'
' , tllat gl','es both of them as separate and sel.f-suffiClent
ImenSlOn . , ' I'
. ' Uti ' I'S" II'gllt' and "there is" language. All llltentlOna ity
entItles: Iele -, ,
' tl gap tl,'lt olJens up bet1veen these two monads, or In
co apses 111 Ie ,
the "nonrelation" between seeing and speakIng. .
This is Foucault's major achievement: the cOH:erslOn of
, , t ology For seeinrr and speaking means know1I1g
eno ogy mto epis em .' b '-- . 1-
'] I It ,ve clo not see what we speak about, nor do we spea ...
SllVOlr,)l - . .. ('
about what we see; and when we see a pIpe we shall .say .In
, th)' "till'S is not a pipe" as though 111tentlOnahty
one way 01 ana er.. '. .
denied itself, and collapsed into itself. :verythlOg IS knowl:dge,
this is the first reason why there IS no savage . IS
nothing beneath or prior to knowledge, But knowledge IS
double since it involves speaking and seeIng, language and lIght,
which j's the reason why there is no intentionality, .
But it is here that everything begins, because for Its part
' 'd - to cast off the psychologism and naturahs111 that
eno ogy, 1Il 01 el L _ , '
to burden it, itself intentionality as relatIon
between consciousness and its object (being [['iitanl or Sande]), A11d
in Heidegger, and then in Merleau-Ponty, the surpassmg of mten-
tionality tended towards Being [L'Et11! or SCI'Il], the fold of Bemg,
, , '. 1 r 11 f b' g to Bemg from phenom-
From IntentlOnahty to lIe 10 (, rom eln ,
enology to ontology, Heidegger's disciples taught us to what extent
, , bl f 1 f 1 I "nee Being was preCIsely the
ontology was ll1separa e rom tIe 0 ( , 51
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
fold which it made with being; and that the unfolding of Being, as
the inaugllral gesture of the Greeks, was not the opposite of the fold
but the fold itself, the pivotal point of the Open, the unity of the
unveiling-veiling, It was still less obvious in what way this folding of
Being, Ule fold of Being and being, replaced intentionality, if only
to found it. It was Merleau-Ponty who showed us how a radical,
"vertical" visibility was folded into a Self-seeing, and from that point
on made possible tlle horizontal relation between a seeing and a
An Outside, more distant than any exterior, is "twisted," "folded,"
and "doubled" by an Inside that is deeper than any interior, and
alone creates the possibility of tlle derived relation between the in-
terior and the exterior. It is even this twisting 'which defines "Flesh,"
beyond the body proper and its objects, In brief, the intentionality
of being is surpassed by the fold of Being, Being as fold (Sartre, on
the other hand, remained at the level of intentionality, because he
was content to make "holes" in being, ,...,ithout reaching the fold of
Being), Intentionality is still generated in a Euclidean space that
prevents it from understanding itself, and must be surpassed by an-
other, "topological," space which establishes contact between the
Outside and the Inside, the most distant, the most deep.C}!;
There is no doubt that Foucault found great tlleoretical inspiration
in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for the theme that haunted him:
the fold, or doubling, But he equally found a practical version of it
in Raymond Roussel, for the latter raised an ontological Visibility,
forever twisting itself into a "self·seeing" entity, on to a different
dimension from that of the gaze or its objects," We could equally
link Heidegger to Jarry, to the extent U1at j}(ltaj)"ys;cs presents itself
precisely as a surpassing of metaphysics that is explicitly founded on
the Being of the phenomenon, But if we takeJarry or Roussel in this
way to be the realization of Heidegger's philosophy, does this not
mean that the fold is carried ofT and set up in a completely different
landscape, and so takes on a different meaning? vVe must not refuse
to take Heidegger serionsly, but we Inust rediscover tlle imperturb-
ably serious side to Roussel (orJarry), The serious ontological aspect
needs a diabolical or phenomenological sense of humor.
In fact, we believe that the fold as doubling in Foucault will take
on a completely new appearance while retaining its ontological im-
Gilles Dcleuze
d' to Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty,
port. In the first place, accor 109 \'t, only to found the latter in
the fold of being surpasses mtelntIVonab1le)or the Open does not give
, "I" s why t le lSI ,
a new dImenSIon. t 115 1 'd' something to speak, SInce
. -, i thout also provl Ing ...
us somethIng to see w . I ment of sight only If It also
' tl Self-seemg e e
the fold will constItute ",e I t flanguage to the point where
, I S If. peakmg e emen 0 , , If'
constitutes t lC e -5 , . If' language and sees Itse III
II tl at speaks 1tse 10 ,
it is the same wor,( 1 I P ty Light opens up a spealung
' I and Mer eau- on , , h '
sight. In f elC egger "'fi ,t' l11aunted the visible Wh,C 10
. as If signt ca 101 ,
no less than a seeIng. ' " t be so in Foucault, for whom
d 'n JHTlllscanno
turn murmure meant g. . 'I 'l't1'es and language-Being to statc-
. '. rs only to VISI )1 1 , < • •
the hght-Bemg Ie e bl' co1lnd an intentionahty, smce
I '11 t be a e to re,' ,
ments: the fole WI n.o -I d' " tion between the l .. vo parL.;; of a
the latter disappears In t lC
'. ever intentIonal. .
knowledge t lat 15 n· , d b rOl'ms how could a subject
. titnte y two L1 -. •
If knowledge IS cons I b'ect since each form has Its
. . lily lmvarc s one a , .
display any Intentl0na . tie ',ble to ascribe a relatlOll
. - l' Yet It mus ) "
own oblects and su 'Jec , f tl 'r "ll0n-relation," Knowl-
- - 1 . 1 erges Tom leI
to the two forms w l1C 1 em C f B ' g but Being lies between two
. h first figure 0 CII1, "
edge is BeIng, tel. '- hat I-Ieidegger called the "between-two
forms. Is this not precIsely w '" I C1,c
or chiaslluls"? In fact, they
1 . ed the ill tef a .
or Ivlerleau-Ponty _ . 1 . For Nlerleau-Pollty, the Of
are not at all the tim g f' Id B t not for Foucault. There 15 an
rges WIth the 0 . u . . I
between-two me , I "bl anel the articulable: It 15 t le
. ," Ig of t lC VISl e
interlacing or Intertwll1.lI I 'Intentionality. But this inter-
f' ng that rep aces
Platonic mode a weall I' b ttle between two implacable
, ' f ' 'tnngleho\c, 01 a a ,
lacing IS In act a, s , I I Being' if)loU like it is an mtel1-
I f 'ms of'know e( ge-, ,
foes who are t le 01, 'bl I multiplied in both directlOns,
tionalily. but one that IS .e, . opk It is still not the fold
. fi . teslDlal 01 filel ase .
anel has become 111 111 . . . f 'ts two forms. It is still not a
, b " tl er the mterlacmg 0 1 , ,
of Bemg, ut 1 a 'I ' t ' tegy of the interlacmg, Every-
topology of the fold, but were reproaching Heidegger
thing takes place ,as thoug 1 0 "II A 1(1 Ivll'lt he finds in Rous-
f 'g too qlUC {y, 1 ,
and Merleau-Pon ty or gam 'd Ivllat he could have
. .. . 1 in Nlacrntte, an
sel, in a dIfferent way agau. r/:I is the audiovisual battle, the
founel in yet another sense ,111 Ja
y'l t 1lquered the visible, the
1 . of worc s t 1a co
double capture, t 1e nOlse ,.. I bl ·10 In Foucault there
fury of things that conquered the arncu a e. ,
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
has been a hallucinatory theme of Doubles and doubling that trans-
forms any ontology.
But this double capture, which is constitutive of knowledge-Being,
could not be created behveen two irreducible forms if the interlock-
ing of opponents did not flow from an element that was itself infor-
mal, a pure relation between forces that emerges in the irreducible
separation of forms. This is the source of the battle or the condition
for its possible existence. This is the strategic domain of power, as
opposed to the stratic domain of knowledge, From epistemology to
strategy. This is another reason why there is no "savage" experience,
since battles imply a strategy and any experience is caught up in
relations of power. This is the second figure of Being, the "Possest,"
power-Being, as opposed to knowledge-Being, It is the informal forces
or power-relations that set up relations "between" the 1:\'1'0 forms of
formed knowledge, The two forms of knowledge-Being arc forms of
exteriority, since statements are dispersed in the one and visibilities
in the other; but power-Being introduces us into a different element,
an unformable and unformed Outside which gives rise to forces and
their changing combinations. This shows that this second figure of
Being is stilI not the fold. It is, rather, a Ooating line 'with no contours
which is the only element that makes the two [arms in battle com-
municate. The lferaclitean elelnent has always gone deeper in Fou-
cault than in Heidegger, for phenomenology is ultimately too
paciJYing and has blessed too many things,
Foucault therefore discovers the e1ement that comes from outside:
force, Like B1anchot, Foucault will speak less of the Open than of
the Outside, For force is linked to force, but to the force of the
olltside, such that it is the outside that "explains" the exteriority of
forms, both for each one and for their mutual relation. This accounts
for the import:'lnce of Foucault's declaration that l-Ieidegger always
fascinated him, but that he could understand him only by way of
Nietzsche and alongside Nietzsche (and not the other \vay round):!]
Heidegger is Nietzsche's potential, but not the other way round, and
Nietzsche did not see his own potential fulfilled. It was necessary to
recover force, in the Nietzschean sense, or power, in the very partic-
ular sense of "will to power," to discover this outside as limit, the last
point before Being folds, Heidegger rushed things and folded too
quickly, which was not desirable: this led to the deep ambiguity of
Gilles Deleuzc
his technical and political ontology, a technique of knowledge and a
politics of power. The fold of Being can come about only at the level
of the third figure: can Jorce fold so as to be self-action, the affect of
self by self, such that the outside in itself constitutes a coextensive
inside? What the Greeks did was not a miracle. Heidegger has a
Renan side to him, with his idea of the Greek light or miracle:" In
Foucault's opinion the Greeks did a lot less, or a lot more, depending
on your choice. They folded force, discovered it was something that
could be folded, and only by strategy, because they invented a rela-
tion between forces based on the rivalry between free men (the
government of others through self-government, and so on). But as
a force among forces man does not fold the forces that compose him
without the outside folding itself, and creating a Self within man. It
is this fold of Being which makes up the third figure when the forms
are already interlocked and battle has already been joined: from this
point Being no longer forms a "Sci est" or a "Possest," but a "Se-est,"
to the extent that the fold of the outside constitutes a Self, while the
outside itself fonns a coextensive inside. Only through a stratico-
strategic interlocking do we reach the ontological fold.
These three dimensions - knowledge, power, and self - are ir-
reducible, yet constantly imply one another. They are three "ontol-
ogies." Why does Foucault add that they are historical?"" Because they
do not set universal conditions. Knowledge-Being is determined by
the two [or111s assumed at any moment by the visible and the articul-
able, and light and language in turn cannot be separated from "the
unique and limited existence" which they have in a given stratlUTI.
Power-Being is determined withi11 relations between forces ,,,,hieh are
themselves based on particular features that vary according to each
age. And the self, self-Being, is determined by the process of subjec-
tivation: by the places crossed by the fold (the Greeks have nothing
universal about them). In brief, the conditions are never luore gen-
eral than the conditioned element, and gain their value [rom their
particular historical status. The conditions are therefore not "apod-
ictic" but problematic. Given certain conditions, they do not vary
historically; but they do vary with history. What in fact they present
is the way in which the problem appears in a particular historical
formation: what can I know or see and articulate in such and such a
condition for light and language? What can I do, what power can I
Foldings. or the Inside of Thought
claim and what resistances may I counter;J VVl t I
folds can I surround myself I . la can be, with what
or 10W can I produce myself as b'
n t1,ese three questions th "I" d .' a su
a set of particular . Odes .nho.t desIgnate a universal but
pIe wit 111 a One speaks-O .
ne confronts, One lives·1-1 N . I' ne sees,
from one age to another' bu; e solutIOn can be transposed
certain proble _. '. can penetrate or encroach on
matlC fields, wlllch means that the "g' ." f
problem are reactiva d. Ivens a an old
somewhere in (Perhaps there still is a Greek
in a "problematizalI'o ,,' f vlea e 'y a certam fmth which he places
F" .. ". n 0 p easures.)
lnally, It IS praxIs that constitutes the sale can· .
and present, or, conversely the ,\-va . ,. unulty between past
the past. If Foucault's inte1Views jorm
the prese.n t
because they extend tIle I . t . I . .gml part oj 'IlS work, It IS
lIS onca problem t·..· f
books into th _. a lZatIOn ° each of his
e constructIon of the present II .
punishment or sexuality '1"- t. I' pro) em, be It madness,
, . v' 11a are t Ie new type' f . 1 .
are transversal and immediate .. tl 1 so. stlligg e, whIch
tized? VVllat are the "intellect 11, a" ler tlan and media-
or "particular" r tl. I s new functIOns, which are specific
a ler t Ian unlversaP "VI
subjectivation, which tend to have ar)e modes of
Scan J do,.
were lIke the "reh .. 1" f I
three questions ·J5 "\That' '1' h ealSd 0 t lese
. ,IS OUI Ig t and wlnt . I
to say, our "truth" today' WI t <- IS our angu.age, that is
. . la powers must we cont· t d I
IS our capacity for resistanc' t d 1 Ion ,an w lat
to say that the old a
ayw lIen we can no longer be content
we not perhaps above all no onger worth anything? And do
"production of a new sub to and even participate in the
find an unexpected .. Dtlo nlot the changes in capitalislll
111 Ie s ow emerge f .
as a center of resistanc 'E I . nee 0 a new Self
£ e. ac I time there· , . 1 I .
not a movement of sub.ecL"' . IS SOCIa c lange, IS there
also its potential' TI 1ve eCOI1VerSIOll, with its ambiguities but
. lese questIOns rna b ·d
tant than.- . D . Y e conSI ereel lllore impor-
• aleelencetoluan'suniversalrightsinclud' . I I
of pure law. In Foucault, ever rth' ., .' _ 111 t Ie rea m
alion' the variabl f k } Ing IS subject to variables and vari-
. ,es 0 nowledge (fo" I' .
as immanent variables of th r examp e, objects and subjects
relation between forms' I e and the variation in the
, t le vanable partIcularities of power and the
Gilles Dcleuze
variations in the relations hetv.,reen forces; the variable subjectivities,
and the variation of the fold or of subjectivation.
But ifit is true that the conditions are no more general or constant
than the conditioned elenlcnt, it is none the less the conditions that:
interest Foucault. This is \vhy he calls his work historical research
and not the work of a historian. He does not write a history of
luentalities but of the conditions governing everything that has a
mental existence, namely statements and the system of language. He
does not write a history of behavior but of the conditions governing
everything that has a visible existence, namely a system of light. He
does not 'write a history of institutions but of the conditions governing
their integration of different relations between forces, at the limits
of a social field, He does not write a history of private life but of the
conditions governing the way in which the relation to oneself consti-
tutes a private life, He does not write a history of subjects but of
processes of subjectivation, governed by the foldings operating in the
ontological as much as the social field:
In truth, one thing haunts
Foucault _ thought. The question: does thinking signify?
What do we call thinking?" is the arrow first fired by Heidegger and
then again by Foucault. He \vrites a history, but a history of thought
as such. To think means to experinlent and to problematize. Knowl-
edge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of
thought. In the field of knowledge as problem thinking is first of all
seeing and speaking, but thinking is carried out in the space between
the two, in the interstice or disjunction between seeing and speaking.
On each occasion it invents the interlocking, firing an arrow from
the one towards the target of the other, creating a flash of light in
the midst of words, or unleashing a cry in the midst of visible things.
Thinking luakes both seeing and speaking attain their individual
limits, such that the two are the coml11on limit that both separates
and links them,
On top of this, in the field of power as problem, thinking involves
the transmission of particular features: it is a dice-throw. vVhat the
dice-throw represents is that thinking always comes [r0111 the outside
(that outside which v./as already engulfed in the interstice or which
constituted the common limit), Thinking is neither innate nor ac-
quired. It is not the innate exercise of a faculty, but neither is it a
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
learning process constituted in the external .
the innate and the acq1l' d 'I I WOl Id, Artaud contrasted
Ire Witl tle "ge 't'l" I "
thought as such a thougl1t I' I nl ,1, t1e genItalIty of
, w HC 1 comes fro n ' . I
farther away than any external world a l.:tn outsiC e that is
internal world, Must this outside b II' dnCdl hence .closer than any
. e ca e lance;lJ, The d I
oes In fact express the sim Ie t' . Ice-t HOW
one established be
ve'el1 aPrtl' s IPOs
slble p. oIVer·or·force-relation, the
p" cu ar -eature 'd b
numbers on the different faces). sarnve at ychance (the
The relations between fo F
cern not only men bllt tl fces
, as ;oucaull understands them, con-
Ie e ements the I'll f I
which grouj) either at ral1d . '. e ers 0 t le alphabet,
, < am 01 accordIng to 'l"' I
han and frequency dictated b _' cel a1l1 aws of attrac-
only in Ule first case' whil tl a partIcular language. Chance works
. , ' e le second case perhap' ..
conciItlons that are partiall
d s opel ates under
) etermmed by the first ' "I
chain, where we have a SLIC .' f ' . ' as In a IV_ arkov
, cessIOn o· partIal ' I' I' , .
outside: the line tlrlt' . < < 1 e III ClllgS, ThIS IS the
" contInues to lInk up r' d .
of chance and depend en C "ill om events 111 a Inixture
cy. onsequently, thin kin I ,. I' ,
new figures: drawing 01 t ' . I g lere La ...es on
c, I parl1cu ar features' lin1-'
each occasion inventl'l1g tl '. I ' ung events; and on
le senes t lat rno I f -1 '
of one particular feature to tl 'TI \e rOln t le neIghborhood
le next. lere are all' -, [ .
features which have all f' ' sorts 0 parucular
" come 10m outsIde- .. ' I
power, caught up in the l'el' t' , ) ' pal tIC.ll ar features of
a Ions )etween forc 'D
tance, which pave the way Co I . es, eatures of resis-
.11 r c lange' and even r
remain suspended outsid ' I ' . savage .1eatures which
, e, WIllOut enterIng int . I '
Ing themselves t 1 . . Ole atlOns or aIIow-
, 0 )e lIHegrated (only here does "S'1\" "
meamng, not as an experience b t, I _ . ,age take on a
I d
' u as t 1at whIch cannot t b b-
sor)e 111 to experience) ,.!R < ye e a
All these determinations of thou ht ar I" ,"
the action of thought Al de, I g ,e a I eady ollgmal figures of
, 1 .01 a ong time F I d'd
that thought coulcl be' a th' I '-. oucall t 1 not believe
, ny mg e se Ho II I
Illorality, since thought can C I 'I: ,w ,cou c t 1.ou
ht invent a
< 11nc not ung In Its If· I '
from which it cOlnes a I I' I ' '-. e except t lat outSIde
L nc w lIC 1 resIdes' . - " I
Fiat! which destroys any in " In It as tle unthought"? That
speeds up the elnerg' el1C IPferal1ve 111 advance:
However, Foucault
e 0 one strange fin I fi 'f I .
farther away than any external world " a I t le
world is tl " _ ' ' IS also closeJ Ulan any 111ternal
, lIS not a SIgn that thou rl t aff; .
outside to be its 0 I g 1 ects Itself, by revealing the
wn unt lought element?
Gilles Deleuzc
It cannot discover the unthought ... without immediately bringing the
unthought nearer to itself - Of even, perhaps, without pushing it further
away, and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a change
by that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between them."o
This auto-affection, this conversion of far and near, will assume more
and more illlportance by constructing an i'l1side-sjJace that will be
completely copresent with the outside-space on the line of the fold.
The problematical unthought gives way to a thinking being who
problematizes himself, as an ethical subject (in Anaud this is the
"innate genital"; in FOllcault it is the meeting bct:\veen self and sex-
uality). To think is to fold, to double the outside with a coextensive
inside. The general topology of thought, which had already begun
"in the neighborhood" of the particular features, now ends up in the
folding of the out'iide into the inside: "in the interior of the exterior
and inversely," as lvIaciuess and Civilization put it. We have shown how
any organization (differentiation and integration) presupposed the
primary topological structure of an absolute outside and inside that
encourages relative intennediary extcriorities and interiorities: every
inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside-space, inde-
pendent of distance and on the lilnits of a "living"; and this carnal
or vital topology, far from showing up in space, frees a sense of time
that fits the past into the inside, brings about the future in the
outside, and brings the two into confront.:ltion at the limit of the
living present.
Foucault is not only an archivist in the manner of Gogol, or a
cartographer in the manner of Chekhov, but a topologist in the
manner of Bely in his great novel Pelm:'1burg, which uses this cortical
folding in order to convert outside and inside: in a second space the
industry of the town and of the brain are 111erely the obverse of one
another. It is in this way - which no longer owes anything to I-Iei-
degger - that Foucault understands the doubling or the fold. If the
inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, between them
there is a topological relation: the relation to oneself is homologous
to the relation with the outside and the two are in contact, through
the intermediary of the strata which are relatively external environ-
ments (and therefore relatively internal).
On the limit of the strata, the whole of the inside finds itself actively
present on the outside. The inside condenses the past (a long period
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
of time) in ways that are n til'
it with a future that comes but h?stead confront
it To thinl- m t b utslde, exchange It and re-create
. ,eans a e embedded' tl .
serves as a limit: what can 111 le present-LIme stratum that
. I '. I see and what can I say today' But tI ..
1nvo ves uunklng of the ast as i ., ,. .. . . 118
relation to oneself (tller
. C
IS kcondensed m the lI1slde, 111 the
e ]S a ree' In me CI··
on). We will then think the past against th' or a lnsUan, so
latter, not in of a return but "in fav:rP;e:l:nt and
. the
c01l1e" (Nietzs I ) I . ' pe, a a tnne to
the outside Soct,le t' t lall
, ?y lllaking the past active and present to
la samet l111g new 'II C all
tl ' k' "I,m y come about so tllat
1111 'mg always· I I '
the past') b 't' ' md
reac 1 t lOught. Thought thinks its own history
, u lI1 or er to free it Iffr I' .
and be able finally to "tl . I' I se . o,:n w lat It thl. nks (the present)
.', un," at lenVlse (the future) 52
ThIS IS what BIanchot called "tl' .
, le pa'SlOn of the " I " r
that tends towards the outsid, __ . e, a .lorcc
become "intimacy" ". t . :_ only beCcluse lhe oltt'ilde ilself has
< , 1I1 rUSlOn. ;)3 The three a enci -' f
and constantly
so tl . . of contmually produClng levels that force
me llng new to be seen or . 1 B
outside has t ' :,alc. ut equally the relation to the
of all, the last
new modes o[subjectivation. Foucault's v _.. . 10. UClng
great works that t . I I \ ork lInks up agam WIth tile
or us laVe clanged what it means to think.

'" '"

1. Una of the outside
2. Strategic zone
3. Strata
4. Fold (zone of subJectlvatlon)
Gilles Deleuze
-' "But never has fiction
, ,thing but ctIOns". _'
"I have never wntten an) II ,ve n'lrrate Foucault s
1" rty How coU c '
roduced such truth ane .lea 1 I" of superimposed surfaces, ar-
" ? TI rld IS mac e up 1
reat fictIOn. 1e wo I I clge But strata are crossee
1 I ld is thus ,-nowe ' L
chives or strata. T 1e \\or lone hand the visual scenes,
1 t "ep'lrates on t le
v a central fissure t 1a s, I "t'CIIlable and the visible on
J 4 1 rYes' t 1e ar I " "
and on the other the soune cu 'bl ' forms of knowledge, Light and
the two Irreduc
e , 'b'I"" d
each stratlun, '. f t riority where VISI 1 Illes an
r l'onments a ex e bl
Language, two vast en,1 't d 50 ,"e are caught in a dou e
t' I depoSI e, ,
statements are respec Ive y I f In stratum to stratum, fr01n
' rse ourse ves ro L I
movenlent. e 1ll1me _ sand cun'es; we follow t le
. the surfaces, scene
band to bane; we cross , '" f the world: as Melville says, we
ach an IntenOl a h
fissure, in or er to re fraid that there ,vill be no one : ~ l ' e
look for a central charnber, a I' blltan ilnmense and ternfylng
, I viII reveal not ung' , B
and that man s sou, "r I'fe among the archIVes?), ut
I' I" o[\oolong ,or I I
void (who wou C t lIn \. "b b the strata in order to reac 1
, try to dun a ave " I
at the same tune we " onstrcltified substance t 1at
, heric elelnen t, an,
an outsIde, an aunosp I tl t vo forms of knowledge can
f 1-' 'ng lOW le:\
would be capable a exp amI , I tr'1tum from one edge of the
' -t ne on eac 1 S" , I
embrace an Intel WI I ould the two halves of t le
" If ot then lOW c
fissure to the at leI" n, II t tements explain scenes, or
. 1 w cou C saL
archive cOInmunlcate, 10
'II t te st'ttements? I '
scenes 1 us ra , -I lent stann)' zone w lerc
, _ '·d-' 's a battle, a tUI)U, .
The Infonnal olltSI e 1 . f' f " between these pOInts are
. d th relatIOnS a orces .
particular pomts. an e II t d a' nd solidified the vISual dust
"t erely co ec e
tossed about. tl a am. "bove them But up above,
, I r tl battle ragmg a ",
and the sonIC ec 10 a le r _ alld 'ue neither bodIes nor
, f' - lrlVe no 1.01 nl " ,
the partIcular eatuIes , . _ I d 'n of uncertain doubles
. _ W'" enter Into t 1e omal _'
speakmg pel son.s, e I ' t'lniially emerge and fade (Bl-
, I I re t lIngs con
and partIal deat lS, W le I" H I"e s"ys Faulkner, ,ve no longer
.' . opo ItKS. e ,(
chat's zone), TIllS 15. a mlcr I " f atl,ers deaf and blind to one
l'k 1:1 mollS 01 e, c, f
act like people. btlt Ie. vo [' Id slowly dispersing dotlds a
'" I'd t f the unous at , 1
another, 111 t 1e JIll s a I' g Death to the bastards! Kill,
, - - lather s 10utlll
dust that we fhng at e(lc 1 . I' e corresponds to a diagranl
. t te In t lIS zan
Kill!" Each atmosp er. IC s a I' I . taken up b)' relations: a
, I f tures w lIC 1 are " .
of forces or partlcu ar ea I' 't tegy belongs to the all'
-" ' _ f tl e earth t len a s ra
strateg), If strata al e a 1 " , b t l)e ftllfilled in the stratum,
", tl > strategy sJo 0 1
or the ocean. t\llt IS lC, f 't' n in the archive, anC
, , . b to come to rUI 10
jusl as it is the dIagram s JO
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
the nonstratified substance's job to become stratified, To be realized
in this way means becoming both integrated and different. The
informal relations between forces differentiate from one another by
creating two heterogeneous forms, that of the CUl\-'es which pass
through the neighborhood of particular features (statements) and
that of the scenes which distribute them into figures of light (visibil-
ities). And at the same time the relations between forces become
integrated, precisely in the formal relations between the two, from
one side to the other of differentiation. This is because the relations
between forces ignored the fissure within the strata, which begins
only below them, They are apt to hollow out tlle fissure by being
actualized in the strata, but also to hop over it in both senses of the
term by becoming differentiated even as they become integrated,
Forces always conle from the outside, from an outside that is far-
ther mvay than any form of exteriority, So there are not only partic-
ular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular
features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these re-
lations and to change the unstable diagram. And there are even
savage particular features, not yet linked up, on the line of the outside
ilself, which fonn a teeming mass especially just above the fissure.
This is a terrible line that shuffles all the diagrams, above the very
raging stornlS, It is like Ivlelville's line, whose two ends remain free,
~ which envelops every boat in its complex twists and turns, goes into
hon-ible contortions when that moment comes, and always nms the
risk of sweeping sonleone away wilh i t ~ or like 1vIichaux's line "of a
thousand aberrations" with its growing molecular speed, which is the
"whiplash of a furiolls charioteer." But however terrible this line may
be, it is a line of life that can no longer be gauged by relations
between forces, one that carries man beyond terror. For at the place
of the fissure the line forms a Law, the "center of the cyclone, where
one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence," It is as if
the accelerated speeds, which last only briefly, constituted "a slow
Being" over a longer period of time, It is like a pineal gland, con-
stantly reconstituting itself by changing direction, tracing an inside
space but coextensive with the whole line of the outside. The most
distant point beCOllleS interior, by being converted into the nearest:
life within tile folds, This is the central chamber, which one need no
longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes
Gilles Deleuze
fane's seed and, relatively speaking, a n:aster of one's
and particular features, in this zone of subJectlVatlOn: the
boat as interior of the exterior.
A Sl
. d (London: Tavistock and
The Archaeology oj Knowledge, trans. . len an
New York: Pantheon, 1972).
L'arclu!oio!:,ric fiu s(1voir (Paris: Gal1imard, 1969).
. . . A SI . 1 (London: Tavistock and New
The Birth of the Chmc, trans. . lcn( an
York' Pantheon, 1973).
'l\Tp G"'" 'st pas 111J(! 1,ij)c (Montpcllier: Fat<t Morgana, 1973).
w r t . CR' (New
Death and lhe Lab)'linlh: the 'World of Raymond Roussel, trans. .A. uas
York: Doubleday, 1986 and London: Athlone, 1987).. .
. .' 1 P , .". Thl' Birth of the Prisoll, trans. A. SherIdan (London.
Dlsnplwl! am /llll.\ t. "iT 'k' p. thean 1977- reprinted Harmondsworth:
Allen Lane and New lor. an , ,
Peregrine, 1979).
Hisioire dc fa rll'c'igi? dassiqllc (Paris: Gallimarcl, 1972).
. . R Hurley (New York:
The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: All IntroductIOIl, "
1978 'md I-hrmondsworth: Pengum, 198·1).
Pant leon, < < 197' d
. . R' .. [r'ms F. Jellinek (New York: Pantheon, ' !J an
IPH 1, PWrYl' IVwm... < •
Hannondsworth: Peregrine 1978).
LCP Lallgllagt, Counter-AIclllory, Pradicr!, edited by D. Bouchard (Oxford: Black-
well, 1977). .
LIAI "TI rfc of infamous men," in Powcr, Tlllfh, Sfralcg)', edited by M. Morns
(Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979) pp. 76-91. H
. R H \ 'ard (New York' Random ouse,
,"BC .I.\1adlll!ss and Cillitizatwn, trans. . 0 \ .
1965 and London: Tavistock, 19(7).
Les 1II0tS el ICI choses (Paris: Gallimard, 19(6). .
. '. R' .. · (Paris' Gallimard:Julliard, o\1vrage collecttf, 197::\).
.I.HPR .I.HOI, Pwnc lVIeI/!... " ,< <
. p . U iversit'lires de France, 1963; re-
Naissance de fa diniqllc (Pans: resses n "
vised 1972). , '.,
. l' '1 . l'histoire' in HOllllllage rl Jean HypjJobte (Pans.
NGff 'Nletzsche a genea ogle, " . 1-1"
de France, 1971). 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, lstory,
trans. D. Bouchard and S, Simon, in LCP, pp.
O[) L'ordre dll disnmrs (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
OT The Order oJ Things, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock and New York:
Pantheon, 1970).
PDD 'La pensee du dehors', Critique, No. 229 (June 19(6): 523-546.
Qll 'Qu 'est-ce qu 'un auteur?', Bulletin de la Socii5t,! Jranfaisc de j)hilmojJhie, 63,
No.3 (1969),73-104,
RR Raymond Roussel (Paris: Gallimard, 1963).
SP Suroeiller el jmnir. Naissancc dc fa prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
SS Lc sOl1a de soi (Histoire de la sexualitc III) (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).
TDL "The Discourse on Language," trans. R. Swyer, in The Ardweology oj Knowl-
edge (New York, 1972),
TNP This is lIot a /Jipe, trans. James Harkness (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1981).
TUP The Useo/Plcasllre, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Random House, 1985 and
Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986),
UP L'usage des j)laisirs (Histoire de la sexualitc II) (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).
l'HI 'La vie des hommes in fames', LI?s cahias dlt chemin 29 (1977), pp, 12-29.
1'S La vo/mlte de sa1Joir (Histoire de la sexualite I) (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).
VI'll 'What is an Author', trans. D. Bouchard and S. Simon, in LGP, pp. 113-
1. VHf, p. 16 [LIM, p. SOJ.
2. NG, pp. 142-148, 155-156 [BG, pp. 140-146, 152-153J,
3. VHf, p. 16 [LIM, p. 80J. vVe note that Foucault differs from two other views
of infamy. The first, akin to Bataille's position, deals with lives which pass into
legend or narrative by virtue of their very excess (for example the classic infamy
of a Gilles de Rais, which through being "not.orious" is consequently hllse). In
the other view, which is closer to Borges, life passes into legend because its
complex procedures, detours, and discontinuities can be given intelligibility only
by a narrative capable of exhausting all possible eventualities, including contra-
dietary ones (for example, the "baroque" infamy of a Stavisky). But Foucault
conceives of a third infamy, which is properly speaking an infamy of rareness,
that of insignificant, obscure, simple men, who are spotlighted only for a moment
by police reports or complainL<;, This is a conception that comes close to Chekhov .
4. UP, p. 14 [TUP, p. 8J,
5. See pp. 333-339 pp. 327-8J for "the Cogilo and the unthought."
See also PDD.
6. i'vlG, pp. 263, 32'1, 328, 335 [01; pp, 251, 313, 317, 324J.
7. NG, pp. 132-133, 138, 164 [BG, pp. 131-136, 161J.
Gilles Deleuze
8. HI·; p. 22 [MAC. p. 11].
9. M. Blanchot, L'ElIlrelicll ill:iilli (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 292.
10. lVIC, p. 350 lOT, p. 339] (and on Kantian man as being an "empirico-
transcendental doublet," an "empirico-critical doubling").
11. [Translator's Hofe: As well as meaning "double," "doubling," etc., La ])ouh[ure
(Paris: Lemerre, 1897) is also the title of a novel wrillen in Alexandrines by
Roussel]. These arc the constant themes of HR, especially chapter 2, where all
the meanings of dOllblure are recapitulated in a discussion of Roussel's Chiqllen-
aud/!: "les vers de la doublure dans la piece de Forban talon rouge" (M p. 37)
("the verses of the understudy in the play of Red Claw the Pirate" [DL, p. 25]).
(This gradually becomes "les vers de la douhlure dans la piece du fort pantalon
rouge" (RR, p. 38) (''lhe mole holes in the lining of the material of the strong
red panL,"' [DL, p. 26])].
12. vVe must quote the whole text on Roussel and Lciris, because we feel it
involves something that concerns Foucault's whole life: "From so many things
without any social standing, from so many fantastic civic records, (Leiris] slowly
accumulates his own identity, as if within the folds of words there slept, with
nightmares never completely extinguished, an absolute memory. These same
folds Roussel parts with a studied gesture to fmd the stifling hollowness, the
inexorable absence of being, which he disposes of imperiollsly 1.0 create forms
without parentage or species" (DL, p. 19).
13. UP, p. [TUP, p. 76].
14. See UP, p. 90 [TUP, p. 77] for the two aspects of "differentiation" after the
classical era.
15. UP, pp. 93-94 [TUP, pp. 80-81].
16. This accounts for a certain tone in Foucault, which distances him from
Heidegger (no, the Greeks are not "famous": see the interview with Barbedette
and Scala in Lt:s Noltvelh!s, 28June 1984).
17. Foucault does not directly analyze the diagram of forces or power relations
unique to the Greeks. But he does appreciate what has been done in this area
by contemporary historians such as Detienne, Vernant, and Vidal-Naquet. Their
originality lies precisely in the fact that they defined the Greek physical and
mental space in tenns of t.he new type of power relations. From this point of
view, it is important to show t.hat the "agonistic" relation to which Foucault
constantly alludes is an original function (which shows up especially in the
behavior of lovers).
!8. On the constitution ofa subject, or "subjectivation," as something irreduc-
Ible 1.0 the code, see UP, pp. 33-37 [TUP, pp. 25-30}; on the sphere ofaest.hetic
Foldings, or the Inside of Thought
s:e UP, pp. 103-105 [TUP, pp. 89-91]. "Facultative rul ,".. .
taken nm from Foucault but from Labov which . es IS a phlase
adequate on the level ofa statement t d.. . none .the !;eems perfectly
that are no longer constants H .' ? . functIOns ofmternal variation
d. . . .. el e 1t ,1cqUlres a more general mCOl .
eSlgnate I eguJatmg functlons as opposed to codes. ,mng, to
19. UP, p. 73 [TUP, p. 62].
20. Foucault says that he had begun by writin Tab IT , .••
to HS, in the same series)' "'tl I I g 00," on sexu,lhty (the sequel
, 1en wrote a Jook on t1 . f
techniques of self in which sexualit ha ... ,. Ie notIOn 0 self and the
rewrite for the third time a book in a.nd I was obliged to
the two." See Dre){us and Pal' 996 ed to maltltam a balance between
"-" )mow, p. __ ).
21. UP, pp. 61-62 [TUP, PI" 50-52].
22. TTTl
UF, pp. 55-,07 [TUP, PI'. 46-47].
23. See TUP, parL'i 2, 3 and 4. On the "
[TUP, p. 221]. antinomy of the boy," see UP, p. 243
24. See Dreyfus and Rabinow pp 911 W
pieces of information as different
mode of subjectivation, but the' arc in i ..' va po es, l Ie code and the
the of I} 1 .proportlOn to one another, and
[r one llnoves LIe dimmutlOtl of the other (UP ,
TUP, pp. (b) subjectivatiol1 tends to pass into a 1 .
empty or fi?"'d to the profit of the code (this is a general
new type 01 power ·lppea 1· I '''I, (c) ,1
etrating the this task of individualizing and pen-
is then taken over by the power of tl S Ie p(lstoral power of the Church, which
215: this text bv FOllcaultlinh 11 Ie. tate Rabinow, pp. 21"1-
modulating pO\\;er'). I,.; p wIlh DP s analysts of 'mdividualizing and
25. UI', p. 37 [TtIP, p. 30].
26. I am systematizing the four as . r
[TU? 9h 3
] .. pects out med by Foucault in UP, pp. 32-39
, pp. - .. I ol1cault uses the word "subjection" to desigtnt t1· d
aspect of the subject's constitution. but tl· . .1 Ie' e le secon
different t t1. ,liS WOl( t len takes on a meaning
relations. :: subject is subjected to power-
to 01: which in fact and us to return
an obiect of knowledg b' I: d all( angu<1ge were hrst and foremost
:J c, elore Jelng folded t ·t·
a cons Ilute a more profound
27. See the chapter on Plato, part 5 of TUP.
28. HS had already shown that the b 1,· d· .
uality without sex" was the 1 Q(} dn Its pleasures, that IS to say a "sex-
. -, . moe ern means of "resisting" the agency of "Sex,"
Gilles Deleuze
. 1 (V5 90R[HS P
anci the body the
view was related to the agonistic relations between free an
to a "virile society" thal was unisexual and excluded ,:lule we ob-
viously looking here for a different t}'pc of relations that 15 umque to OUI own
social fIeld.
D. b" "J11 91 9
29. See Dreyfus an l"'-.£l lIlOW, pp. --_.
" I II' lsclfsufficiently competent to treat the subject
'10 FOlIC mIt never conSlC cree 1m. . "
, f'O' ;'1 forms of development. He occasionally alludes to the ars
o .ne,; db' different either from Qur "scicntia scxualis" (1-15) or irom the
erotica as emg . Id b " tl >. Self or a
" " " [I G k" (]'UP) The questIOn wou e: IS lei e a <
aesthettc lIfe 0 t le ree s . ._
process of in Orien Lal techlllquesr'
[ I
. d 1 ort durations in history and their relation to
31. On the problema ong<ln Sl... .' (77 [0 H" "'
" F B"" 1 1 j,'cn'l5 mr {,hislOire (Pans: Flammanon, 1 J 11 15(01),
the senes, see . I ,me e .' " < \ S I _
" S M' uhews Chicago: University 01 ChlCago Press, 1982]. In , : pp. .1
tI ans. . <l ., . I' .. I )eriods of wne were
16 [.'1K, pp. 7-81 Foucault showed how eplsteI110 oglca J
necessarily short.
32. See SS, pp. 75-84.
This is one of Heidegger's main in of
late declarations in which he Imks hImself to Heldegget, see hs
NOll1ldles, 28 June 198,L
1 f
" 1 0 tside 'md of exteriority which at first seemed to
'14 Itwast.hetlemeso tIC u_ , [(T 340]
. rinnc)' of sp'1Ce over time, as is borne out by MC, p. 351 J, p. . .
lin pose a p < <
'35" lill, PI'" 136-140 [Dt, PI'" 105-108]"
a tl e Fold the interlocking or the chiasmus, the on itself
, "I M Merleau-Ponty, LelJisible elf'i'Hvisible (Pans: Galhmard,
ofl.le\lSI, .' . . . r·' E ,. n' Northwest.ern Unt-
1964 [TII(' Vi,'ible and lhl? lllll/Slblt!, trans. A. Lmgls, \<lnsto . . .
" p"" "1969]) And the "work-notes" insist. on the necessity 01 surpass1l1g
verslt.y ress,. . . . I "" t - . t olom!
" " I" . I "'"tl '1 vertical dnnenSlOn t Iat con sum es ,lOP 01
II1tentlona tty on tIe wa) '\1 1, . . I "£1 I"
( ).263-264). In !v[erleau-Ponty, this topology implies t.he t es 1
.I'll I of such an act. of return (which we already find 111 Heldegger,
IS \.1e pace . I /' I [P' . Minuit
. . 'd' r to Didier Franck, i-iddegger d Ie IJrobieme (e eS)(lCC ans. . '
<1CCOl mg '.' . 1 ' . , ducted by Foucault III
1986]) This is why we may beheve t.IMt the ,tn<l )SIS con
Les (lveux de fa chair in turn concerns t.he wh?l: of the pr
. " 1 CI -isthn ongms of t-les 1 lrom
of the "fold" (incarnatton) when It stresses t le ,11. ,
the viewpoint of the history of sexuality.
The text uflU{, pp. 136 and 140 [DL, pp. 105-106; 108] insists point,
. 1 en-holder "An mtenor cele-
when the gate passes through the ens set m t 1e p .
" "[]" "I "I" r"lte fron) be"lng seen [although] access to
)ratlOl1 of bemg ... a VIS1 )1 Ity sepa , '
Folc1ings, or the Inside of Thought
it is through a glass lens or a vignette [ ... ] it's [ ... ] to place the act of seeing
in parenthesis [ ... ] a plethora of beings serenely impose themselves."
38. According to Heidegger, t.he Lichlilugis the Open not only for light and the
visible, but also for the voice and sound. 'Ve find the same point in Merleau-
Panty, (1). cit., pp. 201-202. Foucault denies the set of these links.
39. For example, there is no single "oqject" that would be madness, towards
which a "consciousness" would direct itself. But madness is seen in several dif·
ferent ways and arliculated in st.ill other ways, depending on the period in time
and even on the different stages of a period. vVe do not see the same madmen,
nor speak of the same i1Jnesses. See AS, pp. 45-46 [AK, pp. 31-32].
"10. It is in Btisset that Foucault finds the bTfeatest development of the battle:
"He undertakes to restore words to the noises that gave birth to words, and to
reanimate the gestures, assault':i, and violences of which words stand as the now
silent blazon" (GL, xv).
41. "fvty whole philosophical evolution has been determined by my reading of
Heidegger. But I I'Ccobrnize that it is Nietzsche who brought me 1.0 him" (Les
NOllvelles, p. 40).
42. 'Vhat is interesting about E. Renan is the way the Pril:m sltrf'Acro/Jole present':i
the "Greek miracle" as being essentially linked to a memory, and memory linked
in turn to a no less fundamental forgetting within a temporal structure of bore-
dom (turning away). Zeus hirnselfis defined by the turning back [Ie repll] , giving
birth to Wisdom "having turned in on himself [n1)lilD, having breathed deeply."
43. See t.he French edition of Dreyfus and Rabinow, MidwlFollC(luli, /t'lljmrcollrs
'" /J/tilosojJ/tiqlll! (Palis: Gallimard, 191H), p. :1:'\2.
44. On Foucault's three "problems," which obviously must. be contrasted with
Kant's three questions, see UP, pp. 12-19 [TUP, pp. 6-13]. See also Dreyfus and
Rabinow, p. 216, where Foucault admires Kant. for having asked not only if there
is a universal subject, but also the question: "vVhat are we? in a precise moment
of history."
"15. To read some analyses, you would think that 19G8 took place in the heads
ofa few Parisian intellectuals. We must. therefore remember that it is the product
of a long chain of world events, and of a series of currents of international
thought, that already linked the C!/ new j017I1S C!/ stl1lgg1e fo fhe prodllction
(!t't1 Hew sllbjectivity, if only in it5 critique of centralism and its qualitative claims
conceming the "qualitJ' of life." On the level of world evenL<; we can brieny quote
the experiment with self-management in Yugoslavia, the Czech Spring and its
subsequent repression, the Viet.nam War, the Algerian "Val' and the question of
networks, but we can also point to t.he signs of a "new class" (the new working
class), t.he emergence or students' unions, the so-called institutional
Gilles Dclcuzc
an the level o[ currents of
. 1 I fOn"II centers, an so all. .
psychiatnc all( cc uea I , L 1_'- 1 sc Histor)' and Class COJlSCIOIlS-
d ht go back to u ...<les, W 10
thought we must no ali. I' I cw subicctivihl' then the Frankfurt
.. estlOl1S to ( 0 WIt 1 an.
1/I!SSWi.l" alrc<tc y raIsmg qu • . I" "alltonOITll'" (Tronti); the rcOection
I" '1>+ -ism 'mel the first SIgns 0 . (G)'
school, Ita mn ,lrx , ' . . f the new workmg class orz,
d S'lrlre on the quesl10n 0 .
that rcvo vcc aroun '.. . 'b' ""SilU<ltionism," "the COn1tllumst
"Socnhsrn at Bal ansm,
the groups sue 1 as , . d I " . (0 olitics of desire"). Certain cur-
. . II F'I' G . Uan an tIe n11C p .
Wal'" (cspcCla y ·c lX < , •• n f-ll After 1968 Fou-
' . led to make theIr 111 uenee c . ,
renL<; and events have con tIn\. . [ > forms of struggle, with GIP
r overs the questIon 0 new d
cault persona .y fec lSC . I". ,I the struggle for prison rights, an
, f about nsons) an c 1
(Group for norma IOn , '" DP He is then led to think throug 1
1 " 'crophl'slCs of power m . 1
elaborates tIe 011 , l' , 'er)' ncw way, Then he turns to tIe
1 1 of the tntellectua tn.l \ .,(, d
and live out t lC 1'0 e 'transformed bctween h.) an
l' ctivity whose gIVens are , k
question of a new su )Je , 1" kIt AmericUl movemenL". On the lin'
. I 1" . s perhaps In e( 0' I '
TUP, WhlCl t lIS lime I. , II' [ .1 nd subJ'ectivity, see Foucau ts
l'rf t 'uggles the mte ec 1M a . '
between the e t erent s I .' 'll! 91
Foucault's interest in new forms
analyses in Dreyfus and Rabmow, - -- -, ,
of subjectivity was also surely essenth11. .
9] The most profound study on Foucault, hIstory
46, See UP, p. b [7 UP, p, " "F 'ault revolutionizes history," in Comment
,' ,', by P'ml VeYlle, ouc, . , " . "
and cone IUons, IS , C 'l "111 t on the question oj- . Invanants.
011 lh:rill'histoil'l.' (Pans: SCUll, 1971), eSptXh )
11 -. d Artaud is invoked above all at the
47. The trinity of Nietzsche, Ma arme ,111 c •
end of OT
· I' 5 a "s'lvage exteriority" and offers the
1 re Foucau t 111VO "e. . , 1 d
48, See aD, p. I, W le 1 b' I gictl objecL" concepL<;, and met 10 s
example of Mendel, who dreamee up °1 't' 11'5 d.'t)' This does not at all
, '1 ted by the 10 ogy 0 1. "
that could not be aSSIn11 a, ... ience, It does not exist, hecause
. lIt there IS no Sa\i,lge exper ,
contradict t Ie Ie ea t 1a . J I' I powcr-relations, Thereforc for
, I 1)' supposes know ee ge ane , I
any expenence a reae " I themselves IJushcd out 01 know-
. '" Infltcular features IInc· ,
this very reason sa\ dge , . 1 . tl1a[ 'cicnce ClOnol recogmze
" ins" so nlue I so " ,
edge and power into tIe 'marg ., .
them, See aD, pp. 35-37.
lil'e the throw of dice or the
1 I
. 1[' . ked in thoug It alIa .. ..
Husser mllse lI1VO "' Phiilwmmwlob
ulld jJlulIIolllcl/oio-
. . t' oint in his Idem Z.1l e/llcr rCIJ/en
posltlOns 0 a p
gisdwll Philosophic (1913).
"0 'IC' lOT p. 327]. See also the commentary on Husserl'sphenomen-
:J . J, p, , oJ ,
olo6'Y, Me, p. 336 [07; p. 325]. .
" I" f . It' (Paris' Presses UIllV-
,.,1 See G. Simonden, L'indil1idu cf sa gelli:.I'I? j)hyslC()')1O otf1q r ."
, . 96'
crsitaires de France, 1964), pp. 258-_ :J,
52. See UP, p. 15 [TUP, p. 9].
53. tv!. Blanchot, L'enlrctien injini, pp, 64-66.
Foucault and Feminism: A Critical Reappraisal
Jana Sawicki
Feminist appropriations of Foucault have resulted in path breaking
and provocative social and cultural criticism. Original analyses of
anorexia nen'osa, the social construction offemininity, female sexual
desire, sexual liberation, the politics of needs and the politics of
differences have changed the landscape of feminist theory. 1 vVhy has
Foucault's poststructuralist discourse been of special interest to fem-
inists? Foucault's attention to the productive nature of power, and
his emphasis on the body as a target and vehicle of modern discipli-
nary practices were compatible with already developing feminist in-
" sights about the politics ofpersonallifc, the ambiguous nature of the
so-called "sexual revolution" in the sixties, the power of internalized
oppression, and the seeming intractability of gender as a key to
personal identity. In addition, Foucaultwas one of the most politically
engaged of the poststructuralists. He did not confine his political
interventions to the experiments in playing lvith language character-
istic of the literary avant-garde. His books were intended to sen1e as
interventions in contemporary practices that govern the lives of op-
pressed groups such as homosexuals, mental patients, and prisoners.
1vloreover, his skeptical attitude toward Enlightenment humanism,
universalist histories, and traditional emancipatory theories coin-
cided with feminist critiques of the linlits of liberalism and rvlarxism.2
Recently, however, some feminists have put the feminist collabo-
ration with Foucault into question. They argue that felninist appro-
priations of Foucault's discourses on subjectivity, power, and
resistance threaten to undermine the emancipatory project of fem-
© 1994 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights resenred. No part of this book may be reproduccd in any form by
any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or
information storage and rClricval) without permission in writing from the
This book was set in Baskerville by DEKR Corporation and printed and bound
in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Critique and power: recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate / edited by
Michael Kelly.
p. CTTl. - (Studies in contemporary German social thought)
Includes bibliobrrapbical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-11182-9. - ISBN 0-262-61093-0 (pbk.)
1. Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984. 2. Power (Social sciences)
3. Habermas,Jiirgen. '1. Critical theory. 1. Kelly, !vlichael, 19.1')4-
II. Foucault, III. Habermas,Jiirgen. IV. Series.
B24'lO.F72'IC75 1994
194-dc20 93"16227
Sources and Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
Michael Kelly
Part I
2 Two Lectures
Michel Fouml.l!t
3 The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the
Hmnan Sciences: I'vIichc1 Foucault
.fiirglm Habenllos
4 Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Po\ver:
Foucault Again
Jllrgl?11 IJabrmJl{ls
5 Critical Theory/Intellectual History
j\!Iichc! Foucault
6 The Art of Telling the Truth
JVlic/wl Fou(,({If/1
7 Taking Aim at the I-Icart of the Present: On
Foucault's Lecture on Kant's H'lwl h Enlightellment?
Jiirgen ]labenJl({s

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