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Warming GoodRussia

Index Notes.......................................................................2 1NC.........................................................................8 Warming Saves Russian Economy......................9 Wea Russia ! Nationa"ism...............................1# Russian Nationa"ism Im$acts.............................1% Russian Econ. Co""a$se Im$acts........................18 &ec"ine ! War ' ()* #8 Co""a$se &is$roves.....2+ &ec"ine ! War ' ()* No Resources...................2,

-vervie.* Russia will collapse unless the Arctic Pole melts, meaning that global warming needs to continue in order to prevent the impacts stemming from a Russia collapse. W/en to 0se* Works against any case that claims to solve global warming and/or creates/develops/promotes any type of alternative energy. In order to win the debate, you re going to have to remember the following! timeframe, magnitude, probability. ". #he impacts from the $A happen %uicker than the impacts from &W'every second that passes after the implementation of the plan pushes Russia closer to the edge. (pecifically, oil prices will fall as a conse%uence of the aff'this leads to collapse. ). #he impacts from the $A are bigger and worse than &W'nukes * whatever other impacts you wanna read. W/y 0se It* A lot of teams won t know how to argue against this besides the typical +case outweighs, arguments. If you can beat those -which you can., the $A is pretty solid. Strategy* Run any type of case/specific $A that doesn t have a warming impact -you gotta stick with the +warming good, story.. If you want to run a $A/0P with an environmental impact, make sure you stress that the neg has the ability to run multiple world scenarios 1ust as long as you don t take two competing worlds into the )2R.

Russian co""a$se is imminent$o$u"ation1 energy $ro2its1 and mi"itary dominance are d.ind"ingt/e me"ting (rctic is t/e on"y /o$e. 3ec 1 3. #%4#+42#15. #he $iplomat! +Russia Is $oomed, http!//"5/46/russia/is/doomed 3achary 7eck is Associate 8ditor of The
Diplomat where he authors #he Pacific Realist blog. 9e also writes a monthly column for The National Interest. Previously, he worked as $eputy 8ditor of eInternational Relations and has interned at the 0enter for a 2ew American (ecurity and in the :.(. 0ongress, where he worked on defense issues// The Diplomat is a #okyo/based, online current affairs maga;ine covering politics, society and culture in the Asia/Pacific region.In $ecember )4"4, the online news aggregator -R0W. cited #he $iplomat as one of the top/five world news sites of )4"4. In )4"", R0W again listed the #he $iplomat as one of its top/five world news sites. 8verywhere one looks today, signs of a resurgent Russia are omnipresent. Although <ladimir Putin has undoubtedly worked hard to craft this image, it is a mirage.

Russia is doomed over t/e "ong'term1 and its s/ort'term maneuvers aren6t enoug/ to com$ensate 2or t/is 2act. #raditionally, Russian power has rested on four pillars! population, energy, weaponry and geography. )/ree o2 t/ese are diminis/ing. #he backbone of modern Russian power has been its massive population. 2owhere was this better demonstrated than in
WWII. Russia no doubt played a leading role in orchestrating 9itler s demise, starting with its legendary stands in =eningrad and (talingrad. 9owever, (talin sapped the military might of 2a;i &ermany less because of the strategic or tactical genius he possessed, and almost entirely through his willingness to e>pend the lives of his citi;enry. According to some estimates, the (oviet :nion lost somewhere between )) and )? million people during WWII. #o put this in perspective, the :nited (tates and &reat @ritain each lost less than half a million people and even &ermany only lost between A and B million lives during the war. 2onetheless, for nearly half a century after the war the (oviet :nion could credibly threaten the much richer West solely because of the sheer number of men it could put under arms.

7et like most

of 8urope, Russia /as recent"y seen its $o$u"ation d.ind"e even as countries like 0hina, India and much of the third world have seen sharp rises in their own populations. As A8I s 2icholas 8berstadt observed in World Affairs! +in the last si>teen years of the 0ommunist era, births e>ceeded deaths in Russia by "".5 millionC in the first si>teen years of the post/(oviet era, deaths e>ceeded births by ").5 million., 0n"ess Russia can reverse

t/is de$o$u"ation 2or a sustained $eriod o2 time1 it .i"" "i e"y 8ecome increasing"y irre"evant in internationa" $o"itics. Another source of modern Russian power has been its massive energy reserves. Indeed, high oil prices during the "BA4s
allowed the (oviet :nion to fle> its muscles abroad. 9owever, as energy prices stabili;ed during the "B?4s the artifice upon which the (oviet system began to crumble. Dar from continuing to e>pand, the end of the decade saw the (oviet empire disintegrate, with Eoscow powerless to stop it. #he so/called resurgence Russia has en1oyed since Putin first assumed power has also been built on high energy prices. And like the (oviet leaders before him, Putin has s%uandered the temporary respite provided by high energy prices instead of using it to reinvest in the country and its people. As the 8uropean @ank of Reconstruction and

$evelopment noted gloomily in $ecember )4"), +2ot only are Russian e>ports highly concentrated in natural resources, this concentration has increased over time! the shares of oil, gas and other minerals in Russia s e>ports are higher today than they were "F years ago., It went on to reflect! +In )4") Russia remains highly dependent on its natural resources. Gil and gas now account for nearly A4 percent of total goods e>portsH. Gil and gas revenues also contribute around half of the federal budget . #he non/oil fiscal deficit has averaged more than "" per cent of &$P since )44B, while the oil price consistent with a balanced budget is now in the region of :(I""F per barrel and rising., #he problem with the Russian Dederation s economic model, much like that of the (oviet :nion s before it, is that it is only sustainable so long as energy prices remain artificially high. @ut, of course, energy prices are almost certainly going to decline over the coming years as a result of greater energy efficiency in the West, slowing growth in the 8ast, and greater supply as a result of the energy revolutions being en1oyed in the Western 9emisphere and elsewhere around the world . (nd as goes t/e $rice o2 oi" so goes t/e Russian state. Also like the (oviet :nion, Putin s Russia has managed to maintain a modicum of global influence through the sale of its military weaponry.
Although Russian military technology is greatly inferior to the West and the :nited (tates, it is sufficient to meet the national security needs of most states around the world. Eore importantly, Eoscow continues to e>hibit a willingness to provide it to states that the West refuses to deal with on

moral or geostrategic grounds. In these states at least, Russia has been able to maintain a degree of influence. #his source of influence will also diminish in the years ahead. In some places, this will be because of declining defense budgets. In most cases, however, it will merely be because of greater competition from the likes of 0hina and (outh 7orea, the former at least also willing to overlook the moral transgressions of potential buyers. #hus, over the long/term Russian $ .i"" /ave to come near"y exc"usive"y 2rom its $ri9ed geogra$/y. #o be fair, t/e va"ue o2 t/is rea" estate is increasing t/an s to t/e increased im$ortance o2 (sia and t/e .arming o2 t/e (rctic. (till, this alone is hardly sufficient to sustain Russia as the ma1or power it once was, and may someday become again. Warming "eads to increase in Russian trade and mi"itary $o.erso"ves co""a$se. 3ec 1 3. #242142#15. #he $iplomat! +Russia to 8stablish Arctic Eilitary 0ommand, http!//"5/4)/russia/to/establish/arctic/military/
command/ 3achary 7eck is Associate 8ditor of The Diplomat where he authors #he Pacific Realist blog. 9e also writes a monthly column for The National Interest. Previously, he worked as $eputy 8ditor of e-International Relations and has interned at the 0enter for a 2ew American (ecurity and in the :.(. 0ongress, where he worked on defense issues//The Diplomat is a #okyo/based, online current affairs maga;ine covering politics, society and culture in the Asia/Pacific region .In $ecember )4"4, the online news aggregator -R0W. cited #he $iplomat as one of the top/five world news sites of )4"4. In )4"", R0W again listed the The Diplomat as one of its top/five world news sites.

Russia will establish a new strategic military command in the Arctic by the end of the year, according to local news reports. RIA Novosti, citing a high ranking official in Russia s &eneral (taff, said the new force would be called the 2orthern Dleet/:nified (trategic 0ommand. 3

+#he new command will comprise the 2orthern Dleet, Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units as well as additional administrative structures., #he report went on to say that the 2orthern Dleet/:nified (trategic 0ommand +will be responsible for protecting Russia s Arctic shipping and fishing, oil and gas fields on the Arctic shelf, and the country s national borders in the north., Russian President <ladimir Putin has made boosting Russia s military presence in the Arctic an important
#he news agency %uoted the source as saying! priority during his third term in office. At a meeting of the Russian $efense Einistry @oard last $ecember, Putin said! +I re%uest that you pay special attention to the deployment of infrastructure and military units in the Arctic., Gther Russian officials have said that Eoscow will reopen at least seven

airfields as well as a number of ports on the 2ew (iberian Islands and the Dran; Josef =and archipelago in the Arctic.
Eoscow has also begun enhancing its aerospace defense and early warning radars in the Arctic region. =ast 2ovember the commander of Russia s Aerospace $efense 0ommand stated! +#he e>pansion of Kmissile early warningL radar coverage is one of the key areas of our work, especially when it comes to KRussia sL e>treme north M we have already started the deployment of electronic warfare units in the Arctic., #he Russian 2avy has also made boosting its presence in the

Arctic a key priority for )4"5. In $ecember of last year RIA Novosti paraphrased a Russian military spokesperson as saying that in )4"5 +#he 2orthern
Dleet will conduct sailing and diving e>peditions in the Arctic and develop a series of ice/class patrol ships to protect the country s interest in the region., #he 2orthern Dleet/:nified (trategic 0ommand is aimed at bringing the disparate efforts of Russia s different military services'as well as its coast guard presumably'together in a coherent manner. )/e me"ting o2 t/e (rctic ice /as o$ened u$ vast energy reserves and .i"" create ne. strategic s/i$$ing

routes t/at will have huge implications for geopolitics in the coming years. Dor e>ample, the new shipping lanes produced by the melting of the ice will greatly reduce the distance between Asia and 8urope as well as Asia and 2orth American states like 0anada and the :nited (tates. As a result, there has been something of a scramble among Arctic countries and their neighbors to assert claims over the Arctic region. As my
colleague (hannon reported earlier today, 0hina has been re/asserting its interests in the Arctic region this week following America s decision to appoint an ambassador to the Arctic last week. With the possible e>ception of 0anada 1 no country /as t/e $otentia" to 8ene2it more 2rom t/e .arming o2 t/e

(rctic t/an Russia1 which has the largest Arctic border of any country in the world. Eoscow has long coveted a warm water port, which was an important consideration behind its invasion of Afghanistan in "BAB. A warmer Arctic will allow Russia to connect its 2orthern and Pacific 2aval fleets for the first time. Russia also considers its e>clusive control over the 2orthern (ea Route connecting Asia and 8urope to be a +core national interest., #he :.(., among others, considers the 2(R to be an international shipping lane. #he opening of the Arctic .i"" a"so great"y im$rove Russia6s a8i"ity to ex$ort energy resources to 2ortheast Asian nations, especially (outh 7orea and Japan. Eoscow has been actively taking steps internally to build the necessary infrastructure to connect future Arctic ports to energy fields inside Russia. Russian co""a$se "eads to extinction. )/ree scenarios* 1.: Russian Nationa"ism ( "oss o2 $ em8o"dens Russian nationa"ists Nodia1 &eorgian political analyst who served as the Einister of 8ducation and (cience in the 0abinet of &eorgia , 2##9
=G(# 8EPIR8,, Journal of $emocracy, <ol. )4, Iss. )C pg. 65, Pro%uest. I believe that the crucial factor in e>plaining the peculiarity of the Russian case -or, to use the 0hurchillian words, -April )44B, &hia, +#98 WG:2$( GD

the NkeyN to the Russian NenigmaN. has to do with developments in Russian nationa"ism1 or t/e Russian $erce$tion o2 t/e .or"d and Russia;s $"ace in it. #he
concept of nationalism mostly brings to mind small nations striving for independence from larger ones. @ut big/nation nationalism is no less important, even if many contemporary analysts of international relations fail to gauge its significance. (mall/nation nationalism is typically about sovereignty, about being recogni;ed as a player that can make its own choices. @ut great/power nationalism is about $artici$ation in determining t/e .or"d order1 a8out

/aving a voice in setting internationa" norms. It is a8out t/e recognition not merely of sovereignty, but of greatness. Dailure to attain such recognition leads to deep feelings of resentment! It is the note of resentment that makes this variety of nationalism the most powerful factor in international politics 1 especially post/0old War politics. #he syndrome is mostly characteristic of nations that once had, but have now lost, great/power status . Russia is one of the most conspicuous cases of great/power
resentment, though certainly not the only one. (uch resentment e>presses itself in various ways in the behavior of nations as different as Drance, #urkey, Iran, and 0hina. #he Eainspring of Policy #he most popular target of such resentment is the :nited (tates/not necessarily because it has

done something wrong -it may have done so, of course, but that is not at issue here. but because it is the great power of the day. #he resentment
may also take as its target a vaguer entity called Nthe West,N because in the modern world, Nthe WestN has ac%uired the collective moral power to set norms in politics and much more besides.

Resurgence o2 Russian nationa"ism triggers Wor"d War III Israe"yan1 Soviet (m8assador1698
-<ictor Israelyan was a (oviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. #he Washington Ouarterly "BB? Winter .

#he first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. (upporters of this option would, in the name of a Nunited and undivided Russia,N radically change domestic and foreign policies. Eany would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobili;e the people against the outside Nenemy.N (uch steps would include RussiaPs 4

denunciation of the commitment to no/first/use of nuclear weaponsC suspension of the (trategic Arms Reduction #reaty -(#AR#. I and refusal to ratify both (#AR# II and the 0hemical Weapons 0onventionC denunciation of the @iological Weapons 0onventionC and reinstatement of a full/scale armed force, including the ac%uisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium/ and short/range missiles such as the ((/)4. (ome of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, RussiaPs military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. #his will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence // and indeed, reali;ing its unfavorable odds against the e>panded 2A#G, Russia will place new emphasis on the first/use of nuclear weapons 1 a trend that is underway already. #he power scenario envisages a hard/line policy toward the 0I( countries 1 and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly
magnified. Eoscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in 0I( countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Gf

the use of direct military force in places like the @altics cannot be ruled out. (ome will ob1ect that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator e>ists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure . (ome $uma
those means, even members // such as <ictor Antipov, (ergei @aburin, <ladimir 3hirinovsky, and Albert Eakashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament // are ready to follow this path to save a Nunited Russia.N @aburinPs NAnti/2A#GN deputy group boasts a membership of more than )54 $uma members. Gne cannot help but remember that when Weimar &ermany was isolated, e>hausted, and humiliated as a result

Adolf 9itler took it upon himself to NsaveN his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than F4 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, &ermanyPs economic situation in the "B)4s was hardly that strong either. #hus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenarioPs would/be authors from attempting it. @aburin, for e>ample, warned that any political leader who would Ndare to encroach upon RussiaN would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Dederation Nby all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons.N n"4 In autumn "BBQ Gleg &rynevsky, Russian ambassador to (weden and former (oviet arms control negotiator, while saying that 2A#G e>pansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the :nited (tates and 8urope. n"" Dormer Russian
of World War I and the <ersailles #reaty, minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that RussiaPs vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this conte>t, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals // and tensions // Russia and the :nited (tates remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol =ieven, who wrote, NIt may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian orderPs many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together.N n")

2.: Civi" 0nrest Russian economic co""a$se "eads to interna" .ars$i""s over and goes nuc"ear. &avid 99 -(tephen, Professor of Political (cience R Johns 9opkins, Doreign Affairs, Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars,
January/Debruary, =e>is.
R:((IA2 $RID# At no time since the civil war of "B"? // )4 has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. #he fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. Dor A4 years, the (oviet :nion operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the 7&@ and the 0ommunist Party. 2ow its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. :nable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. @ut the Seltsin administration has ab1ectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups // the Russian Eafia // increasingly hold sway. 8>pectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and EoscowPs inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a $rime cause. Drom "B?B to the present, the &$P has fallen by F4 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely e>isted, it reached B.F percent in "BBA with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. #wenty/two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line -earning less than I A4 a month.. Eodern Russia can neither collect ta>es -it gathers only half the revenue it is due. nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privati;ation as the countryPs cure/all, but in a land without well/defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American/style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, RussiaPs condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get

worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would %uickly draw in RussiaPs military. In the (oviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. @ut with the 0ommunist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an e>ceedingly fragile foundation // personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Eeanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. $rastic cuts in spending mean inade%uate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. 2ewly enhanced ties
between military units and local authorities pose another danger. (oldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. $raftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and

Eoscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. $ivining the militaryPs allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Dederation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. RussiaPs ?B republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Eoscow -if even that far., power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay ta>es to Eoscow when they receive so little in return. #hree/%uarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. (trong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted (oviet policies may motivate non/Russians to secede from the Dederation. 0hechnyaPs successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Eoscow responds with force, civil war is likely. (hould Russia succumb to internal war, the conse%uences for the :nited (tates and 8urope will be severe. A ma1or power like Russia // even though in decline // does not suffer civil war %uietly or alone. An embattled 5

Russian Dederation might provoke o$$ortunistic attac s from enemies such as 0hina. Eassive flows of refugees would pour into central and western 8urope. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. $amage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuc"ear $"ants, would poison the environment of much of 8urope and Asia. Within Russia, the conse%uences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of (oviet communism , a second civil war might produce anot/er /orri2ic regime. Eost alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to "oss o2 contro" over its nuclear arsenal. 2o nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim conse%uences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 2#1### nuc"ear .ea$ons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. (o far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, EoscowPs already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti'(merican grou$s and states. (uch dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest $/ysica" t/reat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war. %.: G"o8a" economic co""a$se 0S economy re"ies on Russian economy Coo$er 6#9 -William 9., (pecialist in International #rade and Dinance, R:((IA ( 80G2GEI0 P8RDGREA208 A2$ PG=I0I8( A2$ #98IR
IEP=I0A#IG2( DGR #98 :2I#8$ (#A#8(, June )Bth, http!//").pd.

Russia s economic prospects have direct and indirect implications for the :nited (tates . Gne way to measure the direct implications is by e>amining the status of :.(./Russian economic ties. :.(./Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post/0old War period reflecting the changed :.(./Russian relationship. Eany e>perts have suggested that the relationship could e>pand even further. :.(. imports from Russia have increased substantially, rising from I4.F billion in "BB) to a peak of I)Q.? billion in )44?. #he large increase in :.(.
imports reflects not so much an increase in the volume of trade but the rise in world prices of raw materials, particularly oil, that comprise the bulk of those imports -Q5T in )44?.. :.(. e>ports have increased from I)." billion in "BB) peaking at IB.6 billion in )44?. Ea1or :.(. e>ports to Russia consist of machinery, vehicles, and meat -mostly chicken..AB $espite the increase in bilateral trade, the :nited (tates and Russia still account for small shares of each others trade. In )44?, Russia accounted for about 4.AT of :.(. e>ports and ".6T of :.(. imports. It was the "Ath largest source of imports and )?th largest e>port market for the :nited (tates. #he :nited (tates accounted for 6.5T of Russian e>ports and F.5T of Russian imports. It was the fifth largest source of imports and "4th largest e>port market for Russia.?4 According to Russian government data, by the end of )44?, the :nited (tates accounted for 6.6T of total accumulated foreign direct and portfolio investments in Russia and was the eighth largest source of foreign investment. 9owever, the first three countries were 0yprus -)".FT., the 2etherlands -"A.FT., and =u>embourg -"6.4T., suggesting that at least F4T of the investments night have been repatriated Russian funds.?" Russia and the :nited (tates have never been ma1or economic partners, and it unlikely that the significance of bilateral trade will increase much in the near term. 9owever, in some areas, such as agriculture, Russia has become an important market for :.(. e>ports. Russia is the largest foreign market for :.(. poultry . Durthermore, :.(. e>ports to Russia of energy

e>ploration e%uipment and technology, as well as industrial and agricultural e%uipment, have increased as the dollar has declined in value. Russian demand for these products will likely grow as old e%uipment and technology need to be replaced and moderni;ed. Russia s significance as a supplier of :.(. imports will also likely remain small given the lack of international competitiveness of Russian production
outside of oil, gas, and other natural resources. :.(./Russian investment relations could grow tighter if Russia s business climate improvesC however, :.(. business concerns about the Russian government s seemingly capricious intervention in energy and other sectors could dampen the enthusiasm of all but adventuresome investors. #he greater importance of Russia s economic policies and prospects to the :nited (tates lie in their indirect effect

on the overall economic and political environment in which the :nited (tates and Russia operate. Drom this perspective, Russia s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the :nited (tates . @ecause financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. (uch was the case during Russia s financial meltdown in "BB? and more recently with the )44?/)44B crisis. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has
been a basis for :.(. support for Russia s membership in international economic organi;ations, including the IED, the World @ank, and the W#G. As a ma1or oil producer and e>porter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect :.(. consumers. #he impact of Russian economic policies and prospects

also plays a role in :.(. national security interests . Dor e>ample, Russia is a ma1or supplier of natural gas to many :.(. 8uropean allies. In )44Q, Russia
accounted for )4T of Drance s, )FT of Italy s, and 6QT of &ermany s consumption of natural gas, making these allies possibly vulnerable to political pressure.?) Gn several occasions, most recently on January ", )44B, Russia has temporarily shut/off gas supplies to :kraine over a price dispute, and in so doing cut supplies to 8urope. Although supplies were resumed two weeks later, the disruptions have affected 8uropean views of Russia as a reliable supplier of gas.?6 Russia is also a primary supplier of natural gas to other former (oviet republics, providing it with potential political leverage. #he :nited (tates has been promoting the construction of pipelines that by/pass Russia, thus decreasing Eoscow s monopoly control of 0aspian and 0entral Asian energy flows.

0S ey to t/e g"o8a" economy"argest $roduce and consumer Straits )imes 11 -(traits #imes, +:( 8conomy! @attered but by no Eeans 7nocked out,, 2ovember B, )4"", =e>is2e>is. What is your economic outlook for the :(PU )<E .or"d;s "argest economy is 2acing severa" serious $ro8"ems.= Dirst, its post/crisis
recovery and growth have been anaemic. #he economy is pro1ected to grow around ".Q per cent this year, and between ) per cent and ).) per cent ne>t year. 0ontinued concerns over sovereign debt in the 8uropean :nion and a slowdown in ma1or emerging economies will also weigh on :( growth prospects.U (econd, the :( is facing deep structural challenges, including a persistently high unemployment rate. U #hird, the :( hit its debt ceiling of :(I"5.6 trillion -:(I"?." trillion. in Eay. #he political polarisation that characterised the debt ceiling discussions underscored the prevailing concern around governance, decision/making and policy certainty. 0ompanies may need to prepare for policy uncertainty, especially at the federal level, when engaging the :(.U In this case, should I disregard the :( marketV U 08R#AI2=S not. &es$ite t/e concerns and s"uggis/

economy1 it is too ear"y to .rite o22 t/e 0S mar et. )/ere are severa" 2actors t/at account 2or (merica;s resi"ience which internationalising (ingapore/based companies should consider. W (i;e of the market! In t/is current c"imate1 it is easy to 2orget t/at t/e 0S is t/e .or"d;s "argest economy -:(I"5.A trillion in gross domestic product., which is e>uiva"ent to t/e com8ined economies o2 C/ina1 ?a$an and Germany. Wit/ a $o$u"ation o2 %1# mi""ion ma ing u$ 52 $er cent o2 t/e g"o8a" consumer mar et1 it re$resents a su8stantia" mar et 2or com$anies .U W 8ase of doing business! #he :( is a relatively easy place to do business. )/e "a8our 2orce is one o2 t/e most com$etitive in t/e .or"d .it/ $roductivity /ig/er t/an in most ot/er deve"o$ed states. In addition, union participation in the private sector has declined dramatically from )F per cent in "BAF to

Q.B per cent last year.U

Economic dec"ine triggers nuc"ear .ar <arris and @urro.s 9

-Eathew, Ph$ 8uropean 9istory at 0ambridge, counselor in the 2ational Intelligence 0ouncil -2I0. and Jennifer, member of the 2I0 s =ong Range Analysis :nit +Revisiting the Duture! &eopolitical 8ffects of the Dinancial 0risis, http!//"Q"A?X"6BF).pdf. Increased Potential for &lobal 0onflict Gf course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many

/istory may 8e more instructive t/an ever. While we continue to believe that t/e Great &e$ression is not likely to be repeated, the "essons to be drawn from that period inc"ude t/e /arm2u" e22ects on 2"edg"ing democracies and mu"tiet/nic societies -think 0entral 8urope in "B)4s and "B64s. and on the sustaina8i"ity o2 mu"ti"atera" institutions -think =eague of 2ations in the same period.. )/ere is no reason to t/in t/at t/is .ou"d not 8e true in t/e t.enty'2irst as muc/ as in t/e t.entiet/ century . Dor that reason, the ways in which t/e $otentia" 2or greater con2"ict cou"d gro. would seem to be even more apt in a constant"y vo"ati"e economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. )errorism6s a$$ea" .i"" dec"ine i2 economic gro.t/ continues in t/e Aidd"e East and yout/ unem$"oyment is reduced.Dor those terrorist groups that remain active in )4)F, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. )errorist grou$s in )4)F .i"" likely be a combination of descendants of long established
possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Duture opportunity for unintended conse%uences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. 8ven so, groupsXinheriting organi;ational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksXand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that

8ecome se"2'radica"i9ed1 $articu"ar"y in t/e a8sence o2 economic out"ets t/at .ou"d 8ecome in an economic do.nturn. )/e most dangerous casua"ty o2 any economica""y'induced o2 0.S. mi"itary $resence .ou"d almost certainly 8e t/e Aidd"e East. Although Iran s ac%uisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, .orries about a nuclear/armed Iran cou"d "ead states in t/e region to deve"o$ ne. security arrangements .it/ externa" $o.ers1 ac>uire additiona" .ea$ons1 and consider $ursuing t/eir o.n nuc"ear am8itions.It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that e>isted between the great powers for most of the 0old War would emerge naturally in the Eiddle 8ast with a nuclear Iran. 8pisodes of low intensity con2"ict and terrorism taking place Yunder a nuclear umbrella cou"d "ead to an unintended esca"ation and 8roader con2"ict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. )/e c"ose $roximity o2 $otentia" nuc"ear riva"s combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual/capable Iranian missile systems also .i"" $roduce in/erent di22icu"ties in ac/ieving re"ia8"e indications and .arning o2 an im$ending nuc"ear attac . #he lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, s/ort .arning and missi"e 2"ig/t times1 and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may $"ace more 2ocus on $reem$tion rather than defense, potentially "eading to esca"ating crises. 6Q #ypes of con2"ict that the world continues to e>perience, such as over resources1 cou"d reemerge1 $articu"ar"y i2 $rotectionism gro.s and t/ere is a resort to neo'mercanti"ist $ractices. Berce$tions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this cou"d resu"t in interstate con2"icts i2 government "eaders deem assured access to energy resources , for e>ample, to be essentia" 2or maintaining domestic stability and the surviva" o2 t/eir regime . 8ven actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Earitime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and moderni;ation efforts, such as 0hina s and India s development of blue water naval capabilities. I2 the 2isca" stimu"us 2ocus 2or these countries indeed turns in.ard1 one o2 t/e most o8vious 2unding targets may 8e mi"itary. @ui"du$ o2 regiona" naval ca$a8i"ities cou"d "ead to increased tensions1 riva"ries1 and counter8a"ancing moves , but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. Wit/ .ater also 8ecoming scarcer in (sia and t/e Aidd"e East1 coo$eration to manage c/anging .ater resources is "i e"y to 8e increasing"y di22icu"t 8ot/ .it/in and 8et.een states in a more dog'eat'dog .or"d. Statistica" ana"ysis $roves economic dec"ine causes con2"ict$re2er our studies Roya" 1#
$irector of 0#R -Jedediah, $irector of 0ooperative #hreat Reduction M :.(. $epartment of $efense, +8conomic Integration, 8conomic (ignaling and the Problem of 8conomic 0rises,, 8conomics of War and Peace! 8conomic, =egal and Political Perspectives, 8d. &oldsmith and @rauer, p. )"6/)"F. ZZ(. @rock @lomberg is a professor of economics R 0laremont 0ollege. &regory 9ess is also a prof of economics R 0laremont.

=ess intuitive is how periods of economic dec"ine may increase t/e "i e"i/ood o2 externa" con2"ict . Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. (everal notable contributions follow. Dirst, on the systemic level, Pollins -)44?. advances Eodelski and #hompsonPs -"BBQ. work on leadership cycle theory, finding that r/yt/ms in t/e g"o8a" economy are associated .it/ t/e rise and 2a"" o2

a $re'eminent $ and t/e o2ten 8"oody transition 2rom one $re'eminent "eader to t/e next . As such, e>ogenous shocks such as economic crises cou"d us/er in a redistri8ution o2 re"ative $ -see also &ilpin. "B?". that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing t/e ris o2 misca"cu"ation -Deaver, "BBF.. Alternatively, even a re"ative"y certain redistri8ution o2 $ 7

cou"d "ead to a $ermissive environment 2or con2"ict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power -Werner. "BBB.. (eparately,
Pollins -"BBQ. also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among ma1or, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. (econd, on a dyadic level, 0opelandPs -"BBQ, )444. theory of trade e>pectations suggests that ;2uture ex$ectation o2 trade; is a signi2icant varia8"e in

understanding economic conditions and security 8e/aviour o2 states. 9e argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. 9owever, i2 t/e ex$ectations o2 2uture trade dec"ine , particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, t/e "i e"i/ood 2or con2"ict increases1 as states .i"" 8e inc"ined to use 2orce to gain access to t/ose resources. Crises cou"d potentially be the trigger for decreased trade ex$ectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.5 #hird, ot/ers /ave considered t/e "in 8et.een economic dec"ine and externa" armed con2"ict at a nationa" "eve". @"om8erg and <ess C2##2: 2ind a strong corre"ation 8et.een interna" con2"ict and externa" con2"ict1 $articu"ar"y during $eriods o2 economic do.nturn. #hey write! #he linkages between internal and e>ternal conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. 8conomic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Eoreover, the $resence o2 a recession tends to am$"i2y t/e extent to ./ic/ internationa" and externa" con2"icts se"2'rein2orce eac/ ot/er. -@lomberg [ 9ess, )44). p. ?B. Economic dec"ine /as also 8een "in ed .it/ an increase in t/e "i e"i/ood o2 terrorism -@lomberg, 9ess, [
Weerapana, )445., which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to e>ternal tensions. Durthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. N&iversionary t/eoryD suggests t/at1 ./en 2acing un$o$u"arity arising 2rom economic dec"ine1 sitting

governments /ave increased incentives to 2a8ricate externa" mi"itary con2"icts to create a ;ra""y around t/e 2"ag; e22ect. Wang -"BBQ., $eRouen -"BBF.. and @lomberg, 9ess, and #hacker -)44Q. find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. &elpi -"BBA., Eiller -"BBB., and 7isangani and Pickering -)44B. suggest that t/e tendency to.ards diversionary tactics are greater 2or democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. $eRouen -)444. has provided evidence showing that $eriods o2 .ea economic $er2ormance in t/e 0nited States1 and t/us .ea Bresidentia" $o$u"arity1 are statistica""y "in ed to an increase in t/e use o2 2orce . In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the fre%uency of economic crises, whereas $o"itica" science sc/o"ars/i$ "in s economic dec"ine .it/ externa" con2"ict at systemic1 dyadic and nationa" "eve"s .F #his implied connection
between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic/security debate and deserves more attention.

Ext. Warming Good

Warming saves Russian economy. )/e Aosco. )imes* +Dor Russia, &lobal Warming @enefits PGutweighP 2egatives,, @y 2atalya 7rainova $ec. 4) 2#1#.
http!// The Moscow Times is an 8nglish/language daily newspaper published in Eoscow, Russia since "BB). #he paperPs circulation in )44? stood at 6F,444 copies. #he newspaper regularly publishes articles by prominent Russian 1ournalists, many of whom take critical positions towards the current Russian government in general.

G"o8a" .arming in t/e next 5# years .i"" a""o. Russian aut/orities to save on centra" /eating1 increase agricu"tura" $roduction and extend sea navigation in t/e nort/, a leading Russian climatologist told a Russian/&erman conference Wednesday. @ut
authorities will have to fork out money to reconstruct several big (iberian and Dar 8astern cities to prevent them from collapsing as a result of a warmer climate, <ladimir 7limenko, head of =aboratory of &lobal Power 8ngineering Problems at the Eoscow Power 8ngineering Institute told the conference co/organi;ed by Ale>ander von 9umbolt Doundation. 9owever 1 Dt/e

reduction o2 /eating a"one out.eig/s a"" t/e

negative resu"ts Eo2 t/e g"o8a" .armingF 8y many times 1D 7limenko said. If the money saved through reducing heating Nis spent sensibly, then
something can be achieved,N he said. 7limenko based his 8nglish/language report on the findings of his laboratory. 0limate was discussed elsewhere #uesday. #he World Eeteorological Grgani;ation said during the annual :2 0limate 0hange 0onference in 0ancun, Ee>ico, that scorching heat waves that killed thousands of

7limenko said the heating season in central Russia will be two weeks shorter by )4F4, which will allow Russian authorities to reduce energy consumption by 6 billion tons of oil by that time. #he season will shorten further by )"F4, which will save "A billion tons of oil by then. In agriculture, the duration of the growing season will increase and the land area potentially suitable for agricultural use will increase by 66 million hectares by )4F4 and 5Q million hectares by )"F4. #he duration of ice cover along the Arctic shoreline will decrease, resulting in a longer navigation of F4 days by )4F4 and "4F days by )"44. Also, by the end of the century, the @arents and Pechora seas will be ice/free the whole year round and summer transpolar voyage will become possible. Permafrost will considerably retreat within an area of 6.Q million s%uare kilometers by )4F4 and F.Q million s%uare kilometers by )"F4, which will re%uire authorities to replace many dilapidated buildings in such
people in 8urope in )446 and that choked Russia earlier this year were set to appear like an average summer in the future as the 8arth continued to warm. (iberian cities as <orkuta, 0hita and Eagadan. Andrei (hmakin, head of the =aboratory of 0limatology at the Institute of &eography of the Russian Academy of (ciences, said in a telephone interview Wednesday that the global warmingPs impact on agriculture could be harmful in RussiaPs southern regions because of the threat of harvest/destructive droughts. (hmakin also said navigation could become more dangerous because the global warming could increase the number of icebergs for several do;en years, which would also be potentially harmful for oil rigs. Authorities can prevent dilapidated buildings from collapsing by driving pillars, on which the buildingPs foundations rest, deeper into the permafrost, (hmakin said. Another potential effect of the global warming will be heavier snowfalls in (iberia, which will be good for harvest but bad for driving on the roads, (hmakin said. #he average yearly temperature as a result of the global warming will rise

in Russia by ).F degrees 0elsius by )4F4 and by F degrees by )"F4 , compared with the global rise by " and ) degrees by respective years,
7limenko said.

Ext. Wea Russia ! Nationa"ism

( .ea ened Russia em8o"dens nationa"ism @arry 9 M Eoscow correspondent for #he 2ew Sork #imes -"/")/)44B, 8llen, +:.(./Russia relations at a crossroadsC Eoscow can elect path of cooperation or one
of retrenchment,, #he International 9erald #ribune, =e>is. E&E @ut others see the crisis pushing Russia in the opposite direction. #he second scenario

is one of retrenchment and nationalism. PP=ess resources means more selfish behavior,PP (ergei Earkov, director of the Institute of Political (tudies in Eoscow, said . In this scenario, Russia finds itself facing internal dissent and the threat of regional separatism, while also short of the oil money that it used to disburse to maintain control. When forced to fight for their own survival, political leaders tailor their policies to public opinion. #hey tend to focus on an e>ternal enemy, for instance the :nited (tates, which Russian leaders already blame for the financial crisis and for provoking Russia by trying to e>ert military influence over :kraine. @y this logic, it would be absurd for Eoscow to cede ground to the West now, after the long/awaited taste of satisfaction that Russia e>perienced with the recent war with &eorgia. Indeed, many Russians see the war last August as having restored RussiaPs rightful place in the world. PPRussia has returned, period,PP <yacheslav 2ikonov, president of the 7remlin/aligned Polity Doundation, said. PP#hat will not change. It will not get back under the table.PP (o which scenario is more likelyV Dirst, it is clear that the Russian authorities are preparing to defend their political power. After presenting himself as a liberal moderni;er, Eedvedev has made it a priority to e>tend the presidential term to si> years from four. Eeanwhile, the
president also signed a law last week that eliminates 1ury trials for PPcrimes against the statePP and that, pending legislation, would e>pand the definition of treason

( .ea Russia em$o.ers nationa"ists G t/is is em$irica""y true Neumann 8 G 2orwegian political scientist and social anthropologist, a professor of Russian studies at the :niversity of Gslo and has been research director at the
2orwegian Institute of International Affairs since )44? -)44?, Iver, +Russia as a great power, "?"FM)44A,, Journal of International Relations and $evelopment, http!//www.palgrave/""/n)/full/1ird)44?Aa.html. E&E

Drom early contacts between Euscovy and the 9oly Roman 8mpire through the rapid increase in contact during and following Peter the &reatPs reign and finally during the (oviet period, Russia has tried to be recogni;ed by the leading 8uropean powers as their e%ual ." #his %uest has taken on an importance that places it s%uarely at the centre of Russian identity politics . Indeed, Russian nationalism congealed historically around this very issue. When, in the early "BB4s, leading politicians wrote newspaper articles about how they did not want to live in a \banana republic and when Russian and 8uropean politicians point to data in a wide range of fields listing Russia on a par with smaller powers, the message lends its power from the tacit assumption that a small/power Russia is an impossibility.) Russia has to be a great power, or it will be nothing. Indeed, this is an e>plicit, self/referential a>iom in Russian identity politics, and has been so for a very long time . #o %uote the Russian Doreign Einister from "44 years ago, Aleksandr P. I;volPsky, \decline to the level of a second class power KHandL become an Asiatic state KHL would be a ma1or catastrophe for Russia -=ieven "B?6! Q.. #he persistence of the theme and the intensity of its presence in Russian identity politics suggests that RussiaPs %uest for recognition as a great power has not been a successful one. #his is because, if an identity claim is successful, it forms part of the hori;on of the political debate rather than its substance. Recognition of Russia as a great power can only be given by great powers that are firmly established as such. 9istorically, that means the 8uropean powers to the West of Russia. It follows that if we want to account for RussiaPs feeling of non/recognition, then we need to give an account of what the criteria for great powerhood have been, and then discuss where Russia has been found wanting. 2ote that the main focus must then fall on how Russian state/building was represented by contemporary
great powers.

Russia6s dec"ine s$ar s nationa"ism 3it2ie"d 8 G national security and foreign affairs correspondent for 2ational Journal maga;ine, an independent and non/partisan newsweekly on politics and
government published by Atlantic Eedia 0ompany -")/)4/)44?, James, +RussiaPs 2ew Red =ines,, #he 2ational Journal, =e>is. E&E DRussiaPs

most important national goal is to make the country count again in international affairs 1 or as President Eedvedev put it, ;Russia exists as a great $o.er1 or it doesn;t exist at a"" 1; D said #homas &raham, who served as the director for Russia on the 2ational (ecurity 0ouncil from )44) to )44A. #he region that historically gave Russia geopolitical weight in the world, he noted, is the former (oviet satellites on its periphery. N8>panding 2A#G Kto RussiaPs bordersL would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post/0old War era.N//&eorge 7ennan in "BBA N&reat powers are supposed to radiate influence, so where else can Russia do so but in its own neighborhood, which is critically important to RussiaPs economic prosperity, to its sense of security, and to its self/identityVN said &raham, speaking at the A8I. N#he biggest issue that continues to poison :.(./Russian relations // and we saw it in spades during 10

the &eorgian conflict last summer // is whether the :.(. and Russia can manage relations in that part of the world in a way that recogni;es Russian interests but at the same time respects the sovereignty and independence of countries in the region.N Although 0linton and @ush administration officials rightfully point to the gains in freedom and stability that came with 2A#GPs e>pansion, former 2ational (ecurity Adviser @rent (cowcroft and other e>perts warned all along that the policy was flawed. 8>pansion lacked a logical end point, he said, and failed to take into account RussiaPs perception of being surrounded by a military alliance that it could never 1oin. Another prominent critic was &eorge 7ennan, a noted Russia e>pert and the architect of the strategy of NcontainmentN of the (oviet :nion that triumphed in the 0old War. N8>panding 2A#G Kto RussiaPs bordersL would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post/0old War era,N 7ennan wrote in a "BBA2ew Sork #imesop/ed. N(uch a decision may be e>pected to inflame the nationalistic, anti/ Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinionC to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracyC to restore the atmosphere of the 0old War to 8ast/West relationsC and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.N 7ennanPs dire warnings look increasingly prescient. Western leaders assumed that in the long term Russia would remain on the road toward democratic reform and thus generally compliant with the democratic development of its neighbors. In the short term, the West also considered Russia too weak and dependent on Western aid and trade to thwart allied designs. In recent years, both of those assumptions appeared increasingly dubious yet Washington and other alliance capitals hardly seemed to notice. In fact, ever since 2ormer 3G@ a$$aratc/i H"adimir Putin became president in 2###1 Russia /as marc/ed steadi"y in a more aut/oritarian and anti'democratic direction. )/e 3rem"in /as ta en contro" o2 virtua""y a"" 8roadcast media . #he government routinely buys stakes in independent businesses through strong/arm tactics, and political opponents and critics of Putin, both at home and abroad, have a disturbing habit of winding up in prison or in the morgue. Butin /as sto ed Russians; nationa"ism and sense o2 grievance to a 2ever $itc/ .it/ anti'(merican diatri8es com$aring t/e @us/ administration to t/e Na9i )/ird Reic/ and lamenting the dissolution of the (oviet :nion as the Ngreatest catastrophe of the )4th century.N Putin has even implied that the :nited (tates was indirectly responsible for the horrific @eslan school massacre in )445, during which 0hechen rebels took ","44 hostages, 665 of whom were killed in the rescue operation. NWhat I hear from many friends whoPve been to Russia recently is their surprise and dismay at the hostility and intensity of the official rhetoric directed at the :nited (tates and reflected in the state/controlled media, and increasingly wePre seeing the authoritarianism at home in Russia reflected in its policies abroad,N said $aniel Dried, assistant secretary of (tate for 8urope and 8urasia, speaking at the &erman Earshall Dund. Russia today is increasing"y a DrevisionistD $o.er1 "oo ing to turn 8ac t/e c"oc 1 Iried contends. DRussia;s demand 2or a ;s$/ere o2 in2"uence; and $rivi"eged re"ations .it/ countries t/at used to 8e $art o2 t/e Soviet 0nion is rea""y a 19t/'century vie. t/at reca""s C9ar Nic/o"as. (nd Russia /as tried Ein GeorgiaF to en2orce it t/roug/ 19t/'century means.D (s one o2 t/e .or"d;s "argest energy ex$orters1 Russia /as regained economic strengt/ in recent years t/roug/ t/e 2"o. o2 $etrodo""ars. (t t/e same time1 t/e Russian mi"itary /as resumed some o2 its most $rovocative Co"d War $ractices. Russian 8om8ers /ave again ta en to 8u99ing 0.S. aircra2t carriers and entering t/e N()- a""ies; air s$ace. Aosco. /as a"so soug/t $artners/i$s .it/ suc/ 0.S. adversaries as Iran and Hene9ue"a. N()- "eaders cou"d $"ausi8"y argue a decade ago t/at a re"ative"y .ea Russia determined to integrate .it/ t/e West .ou"d come around to vie. t/e a""iance as 8enignJ t/ey cannot $"ausi8"y ma e t/at argument o2 t/e stronger1 increasing"y anti'democratic1 and 8e""icose Russia o2 2##8. Western nations ne. t/at o$erations in Ira> and (2g/anistan /ad severe"y stretc/ed t/e ca$acities o2 t/e 0.S. mi"itary and its N()- counter$arts1 8ut t/ey didn;t t/in t/at Aosco. .ou"d notice. (s it turns out1 Russia not on"y $erceived t/at .ea ness 8ut ex$"oited it in its .ar on Georgia. (nd Georgia came a2ter a series o2 N()- moves angered t/e 3rem"in. In t/e year $receding t/e out8rea o2 /osti"ities in Georgia1 t/e @us/ administration and many Western a""ies o22icia""y recogni9ed 3osovo;s inde$endence des$ite Russia;s strong o8Kections and Butin;s t/reats to recogni9e t/e inde$endence o2 Sout/ -ssetia in return. (t t/e @uc/arest summit "ast s$ring1 t/e a""ies announced $"ans to o22er a $at/ to.ard N()- mem8ers/i$ 2or Georgia and 0 raine1 2ormer states o2 t/e Soviet 0nion ./ose 8orders Russia /ad "ong insisted .ere red "ines t/at N()- crossed at its $eri". )/e 0nited States a"so uni"atera""y announced $"ans to 8ui"d a missi"e de2ense system in Bo"and and t/e C9ec/ Re$u8"ic over stringent o8Kections 2rom Aosco.. DBut yourse"2 in Butin;s s/oes 2or Kust a moment1D George Iriedman1 $resident o2 t/e $rivate inte""igence and ana"ytic 2irm Strat2or1 advised in an intervie.. D7ou;ve stated $u8"ic"y t/at t/e 8rea u$ o2 t/e Soviet em$ire .as a geo$o"itica" catastro$/e 2or Russia1 and t/en you "oo around and a"" your neig/8ors are 8eing admitted to a mi"itary a""iance t/at you 2oug/t 2or 5# years. 7ou "oo at democratic revo"utions in Georgia and 0 raine1 and you see a systematic cons$iracy 8y 0.S. inte""igence to strang"e t/e mot/er"and 8y surrounding Russia .it/ $ro' Western sate""ites. 7ou a"so see t/e 0nited States tied do.n in t/e Aidd"e East and N()- in (2g/anistan1 and you rea"i9e t/at your adversaries /ave misca"cu"ated t/e re"ative $ 8a"ance o2 t/e moment. W/at do you doL 7ou ta e advantage o2 t/at .ea ness 8y c/oosing a country c"ose"y a"igned .it/ t/e 0nited States1 "i e Georgia1 and 11

you /umi"iate it. )/en you turn to ot/er countries in t/e region "i e 0 raine and t/e @a"tic nations1 and you say1 ;Moo 1 t/at;s ./at 0.S. security guarantees are .ort/.; D ("exander CSandy: Hers/8o. .as t/e 0.S. am8assador to Russia 2rom 2##1 to 2##+1 and am8assador to N()- 8e2ore t/at. D)/e Russians /ave come to 8e"ieve .it/ great conviction t/at t/e 0nited States is out to .ea en t/em and de$rive Russia o2 its rig/t2u" $"ace in t/e .or"d. )/at vie. is 2undamenta""y .rong1 8ut it re2"ects t/e vie.s o2 3G@ and security'2orce $eo$"e ./o /ave come to dominate Russia;s "eaders/i$ under Butin1 and ./o never acce$ted t/e $aradigm o2 t/e West trying to integrate Russia into a Euro$e t/at is ./o"e1 2ree1 and at $eace1D /e said recent"y at t/e Center 2or Strategic and Internationa" Studies. Berceiving t/at t/e 0nited States is .ea ened 8y t/e .ars in Ira> and (2g/anistan1 and 8y t/e 2inancia" crisis1 Dt/e Russians are no. in $ay8ac mode and intent on sett"ing scores1D Hers/8o. said. D)/at cou"d ma e "i2e very di22icu"t 2or t/e next administration.D C/a""enging -8ama )/e con2"uence o2 t/e Georgia con2"ict1 t/e g"o8a" 2inancia" crisis1 and t/e c/ange o2 administration in Was/ington is $roducing a moment in 0.S.' Russian re"ations 2raug/t .it/ ris '' and o$$ortunity.. )/e $reci$itous dro$ in oi" $rices /as 2urt/er roc ed t/e Russian economy. Some ex$erts 8e"ieve t/at t/e a2ters/oc s /ave s/a en Aosco.;s trium$/a"ism o2 (ugust1 underscoring t/at Russia iso"ates itse"2 2rom t/e West and t/e g"o8a" economy at its o.n ris . )/e Russian economy remains one'dimensiona""y centered on energy and 8ad"y needs moderni9ation and Western tec/no"ogy. Some ex$erts a"so advise t/at ta" ing .it/ t/e Russians ./en oi" is se""ing at "ess t/an N+# a 8arre" .ou"d 8e more 2ruit2u" t/an ./en it .as near"y N1+# a 8arre". DAany Western countries .ere stunned in 2##, ./en Russia s/ut o22 its oi" s/i$ments to 0 raine in a s/ over $ricing1 and many attri8uted it to t/e Russian "eaders/i$;s /eady exu8erance and intoxication over t/eir oi" .ea"t/ and economic reviva"1D said Oeyno @aran1 an energy ex$ert and t/e director o2 t/e Center 2or Eurasian Bo"icy at t/e <udson Institute. DNo. .it/ oi" $rices going .ay do.n1 a ne. rea"ism may cree$ into t/e ca"cu"ations o2 Russia.D -n t/e ot/er /and1 if Putin continues to blame the :nited States 2or a"" o2 /is country;s i""s and to sto e xeno$/o8ic nationa"ism to maintain domestic $o"itica" su$$ort in toug/ times1 t/e Russian mood cou"d turn even nastier. (t some $oint1 t/at narrative 8egins to read "i e Germany;s Weimar Re$u8"ic in t/e years1 a destitute society nursing its grievances and $"otting revenge1 "arge"y in iso"ation. Russia6s nationa"ist resurgence is 2ue"ed 8y non'/egemonic status @og"e1 no date M teaches history and political science with an educational background in international conflict -Allan, +#he Rise of Russian 2ationalism,,
http!// E&E

#he reemergence of Russian nationalism since the collapse of the former (oviet :nion has led not only to a reevaluation of American/ Russian relations but also to the possibility of a second 0old War . Parties with strong nationalistic platforms based on racial or cultural views of (lavic superiority now make up thirty per cent of the $uma, Russia s governing assembly. As the Russian economy continues to struggle, %uestions remain unanswered as to the source of turmoil within Russia. #he recent war with 0hechnya resulting in the deaths of over ten thousand Russian soldiers only clouds the issue furtherC leading many in Russia to contemplate their own standing within the world. #hese factors, coupled with the loss of prestige, power and a plummeting standard of living has fueled the re/emergence of Russian nationalism both within the 7remlin and without, from pro/Putin factions to violent fascist organi;ations who wish to rid Russia of anything deemed undesirable, from Western influence to that of racial and cultural segregation. 0aught in the middle are small democratic parties struggling not only to find a viable place in Russian politics but also to fend off violent opposition within their own country. Russian nationalism is on the rise, but it is not the same notion that prevailed in the days of @oris Seltsin, when nationalism was diluted with the temperance of other ideologies such as communism or the anger over social ine%uality. Russian nationalism has secured an agenda completely devoid of such trappings and has instead centered on patriotic fervor, strengthening opposition against the moral and spiritual decay of Russian values . #he Russian Grthodo> 0hurch has for the first time 1oined it in voice. South parties not seen during the communist era have sprung up, held together by a loose agglomeration of strong/arm patriotism and youthful fervor. <ladimir Putin has consolidated his power and a backlash has been unleashed against Russian capitalist ventures such as Sukos and Eenatep,
resulting in the past arrest and imprisonment of Eikhail 7hodorkovsky and Platon =ebedev, key business leaders.


Ext. Russian Nationa"ism Im$acts

(.: 0.S.'Russian Re"ations Russian nationa"ism /inders 0S'Russia re"ations Ha"eriano and Ho9nya 1# M ZAssistant Professor of Political (cience at the :niversity of Illinois / 0hicago A2$ ZZPh$ in Pol(ci -@randon and <italiy,
+Rivalry #ransformation and #ermination! #he :nited (tates and Russia after the 0old War,, http!//]bvaler/RivalryT)4#ransformationT)4and T)4#erminationT)4IIT)400T)4versionT)4gut.pdf. E&E

2ationalism is one of the most important reasons the Russia M :.(. rivalry continues. < as%ue; predicts that, +because nationalism had been tied to territory, the resurrection of such issues in the post/0old War era provides the greatest threat to peace, -"BB5! )"F.. 2ationalist leaders typically advocate aggressive foreign policies not consistent with the termination of the Russia M :.(.
rivalry. After "BB6, nationalist viewpoints gained a greater role in the formation of Russia s foreign policyC this was especially so in time of crises, be it from terrorism or war. As Eedvedev writes, +even liberal groups have drifted toward the nationalist side of the political spectrum, -"BBB! 5).. <arious forms of nationalism have been adopted by political actors within Russia. #umine; -"BBQ. defines nationalism as an elite/generated political ideology that includes a definition of self/image and a statement of a national mission. 2ationalism in the Russian conte>t advocates a strong Russian state. With the ascendancy of <ladimir Putin,

Russian nationalism was fully and openly embraced. #o win the hearts of the Russian people, Putin first won the war in

0hechnya. A successful campaign in 0hechnya in "BBB/)444 brought a sense of pride and revenge for the "BB5 failure. As any nation in time of war, Russians

embraced nationalism if only as a medication from everyday problems . #he new administration in the 7remlin acted %uickly to tap the
nationalist capital. Gne move was to restore the red flag as the flag of the Russian armed forces. Another very popular action by Putin was the increased centrali;ation of power during both the first and second terms of his presidency. Public surveys have continuously relayed the same story! Russians prefer

law and order over chaos and instability associated with democratic reforms . What has emerged after "BB6 and especially under Putin is an increased call for the revival of Russian power and dominance in the post/(oviet space. #he post "BB6 shift towards an antagonism for :.(. M Russian relations was motivated by both the rise in 2ationalists challenging Selstin and later Putin, but also because of the failure of
market based reforms in many sectors of the economy. #he re1ection of Western economic ideas leads to the conclusion in domestic actors that the :nited (tates is a threat to Russia -3immerman )44).. #he blame for the failed market and political reforms had to be placed somewhere. What better

source of blame than the prominent rival, the :nited (tatesV #he continuation of the rivalry seemingly was a natural choice for the leadership of both states and the public. #he political right in both states pushes the rivalry along. In Russia the political right seeks greater Russian power and influence regionally and globally . In the :nited (tates the political right seeks to punish
appeasement and infiltrations of 0ommunist ideology. Gne need only watch Do> 2ews in the :nited (tates for evidence that the 0old War endures with fre%uent attacks against communism, socialism, planned economies, and weakening :.(. influence aboard.

Re"ations ey to so"ve mu"ti$"e scenarios 2or extinction. Gra/am #9 #homas &raham served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the 2ational (ecurity 0ouncil staff, )445M4AResurgent Russia and :.(. Purposes http!//
#he challenges facing the :nited (tates are well captured in the intelligence community s most recent effort to peer into the future, the recent report by the 2ational Intelligence 0ouncil, &lobal #rends )4)F! A #ransformed World." As the report notes, global dynamism is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific region, most notably in the economic realm, but ineluctably in the geopolitical and the intellectual realms. #he Eiddle 8ast is in the midst of a historic'and destabili;ing'struggle between the forces of modernity and tradition. 2ation/states, the fundamental unit of the international system since the #reaty of Westphalia of "Q5?, are under severe pressure from transnational forces and from sub/regional actors. #here is a fundamental and growing mismatch between a global economy and nationally based regulatory systems'a mismatch graphically revealed by the current economic crisis. G"o8a"i9ation has laid the foundation for greater prosperity worldwide, but also it /as

raised ne. dangers and compounded old ones't/e $ro"i2eration o2 .ea$ons o2 mass destruction1 megaterrorism1 $andemic diseases1 c"imate c/anget/at are 8eyond t/e ca$acity o2 states to dea" .it/ a"one and 2or ./ic/ current internationa" organi9ations, notably the :nited 2ations and the @retton Woods Institutions, are inade>uate. Bo$u"ation gro.t/, and the still/hoped/for long/term prosperity, is putting stress on energy, food, and water resources and raising t/e ris s o2 vio"ent con2"ict over them. )/e 0nited States remains the preeminent power by any measure, and will remain so well into this century. @ut its margin of superiority is narrowing, particularly with 0hina, and increasing"y it needs to .or .it/ ot/er maKor $o.ers to manage t/reats and e>ploit opportunities. #he current deep economic crisis only reinforces that point, drastically reducing the resources the :nited (tates can devote to foreign policy and underscoring its e>cessive and growing dependence on foreign financing of its debt. As a result,
more so than in the past, the :nited (tates will have to establish priorities, to pursue a more focused policy, and build multilateral coalitions to shape a new e%uilibrium that will ensure its long/term security and prosperity. What are, or should be, the :.(. priorities in this uncertain worldV 9ow important is Russia to :.(. interestsV 2onproliferation )/ere is no graver t/reat to :.(. security t/an t/e $ro"i2eration o2 .ea$ons o2 mass destruction to states

or terrorist organi9ations intent on doing us /arm. $ealing with this threat entails strengthening the nonproliferation regime, enhancing the security and reducing the %uantity of fissile material and chemical and biological agents that can be 13

used for weapons of mass destruction, controlling the knowledge and know/how to build such weapons, and preparing to mitigate the conse%uences should such a weapon be used. Russia is the second ma1or nuclear power -the :nited (tates and Russia W together control BF percent of the world s nuclear arsenal:, with long e>perience in the development, manufacturing, and dismantlement of nuclear weaponsC massive stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium -the fuel for nuclear weapons. and biological and chemical agentsC and a long history in civil nuclear power. It is indis$ensa8"e to any e22ort to manage t/e $ro"i2eration $ro8"em and $revent terrorist organi9ations 2rom gaining $ossession o2 .ea$ons o2 mass destruction. Eanagement of the International 8conomy #he current global economic crisis has laid bare the
deficiencies of the current structure for regulating the global economy. #he :nited (tates has an interest in reforming the present international financial and economic institutions, and creating new ones, so that the downsides of markets could be moderated without sacrificing their dynamism and so that an open global economy can be promoted in the face of rising protectionist sentiments worldwide. Russia has played an increasing role in the global economy as it recovered W from its turbulent transition in "BB4s. It has accumulated the third/largest international currency reserves -although they are being depleted rapidly as the Russian government manages the devaluation of the ruble.. It deserves a seat at the table in discussions of the current global economic crisis, and it should receive a larger role in the management of the global economy in the future. #hat said, leading 8uropean states, Japan, 0hina, India, and perhaps @ra;il are all more important than Russia to the global economic and financial future. #he @roader Eiddle 8ast )/e 8roader Aidd"e East $resents sets o2 critica" security c/a""enges to t/e 0nited

States1 $articu"ar"y concerning Israel/Palestine, Ira%, Iran, and Afghanistan/Pakistan/India. In brief, the :.(. interest in this region includes bringing an enduring conclusion to the Eiddle 8ast peace process -Israel/Palestine., sta8i"i9ing Ira>1 $reventing Iran 2rom o8taining nuc"ear .ea$ons and desta8i"i9ing t/e region1 e"iminating t/e terrorist t/reat and ensuring sta8i"ity in (2g/anistan and Ba istan1 and reducing t/e ris o2 ma1or conflict'with the possible use o2 nuc"ear .ea$ons8et.een Ba istan and India. Russia retains a .ide net.or o2 contacts in t/e Aidd"e East C it has W improved ties with Israel. Although its influence pales in comparison to our own, its cooperation could be helpful in managing the peace process and in dealing with Iran . Russia6s su$$ort is essentia" to maintaining one of the most valuable corridors'across Russia and through 0entral Asia'for supplying 2A#G and American forces in Afghanistan, a corridor that grows in value as instability deepens in Pakistan. At the same time, as a riva"1 it .ou"d /ave great $otentia" to do misc/ie21 to com$"icate our c/a""enges1 and to t/.art our initiatives. 8nergy (ecurity and 0limate 0hange Providing sufficient energy for powering the
global economy at affordable prices and in an environmentally friendly way is critical to long/term American prosperity. Dossil fuels, barring a ma1or technological breakthrough, will remain the chief source of energy for decades to come. Euch needs to be done in locating and bringing online new fields, ensuring reliable means of delivery to consumers, protecting infrastructure from attack or sabotage, and reducing the temptation to manipulate energy supplies for political purposes. 2uclear energy is en1oying a renaissance, but that raises proliferation concerns. Intensive scientific work will be necessary to develop new sources of energy for commercial use and to deal with climate change. As the world s largest producer of hydrocarbons, a leader in providing W civil nuclear energy, and a ma1or energy consumer itself, Russia is indis$ensa8"e to guaranteeing energy security and dea"ing .it/ c"imate c/ange. As one of the world s leading scientific powers, Russia has an important role to play in developing new sources of energy, using traditional fuels more efficiently, and managing climate change.

0.S. Russian Coo$eration is ey to so"ve $ro"i21 nuc"ear terrorism and nuc"ear use Berry and Sco.cro2t1 6#9 -William and brent, 0hairs 0DR, april, +:( 2uclear Weapons Policy,.
$espite nearly universal opposition, 2orth 7orea has developed a small nuclear arsenal, and Iran appears to be following in its footsteps. Gther states, particularly in the Eiddle 8ast, are starting nuclear power programs modeled after that of Iran. )/e $ro"i2eration o2 nuc"ear .ea$ons and 2issi"e materia"s is thus dangerous"y

c"ose to a ti$$ing $oint. @eyond this danger, there are still tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. I2 Kust one o2 t/ese t/ousands o2 .ea$ons 2e"" into t/e /ands o2 terrorists1 it cou"d 8e detonated .it/ catastro$/ic resu"ts . (o,
although the old danger of a massive nuclear e>change between great powers has declined, a new risk looms of a few nuclear detonations being set off by a terrorist group or a nuclear/capable rogue state, or of a nuclear power making a tragic mistake. #he threat of nuclear terrorism is already serious, and, as more nations ac%uire nuclear weapons or the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will increase. Gf course, t/e detonation o2 a re"ative"y $rimitive nuc"ear

8om8 in one (merican city would not be e%uivalent to the type of nuclear e>change that was feared during the 0old War. 2onetheless, the results would be catastrophic, with the devastation e>tending well beyond the staggering fatalities. #he direct economic losses would amount to many hundreds of billions of dollars, but the indirect economic impact would be even greater. #he social and political effects are incalculable, especially if the detonation were in Washington, $0, and disabled a significant part of the :.(. government. #he terror and disruption would be beyond imagination . 9igh priority should be accorded to policies that serve to prevent such a catastrophe1 specifically programs that reduce and protect e>isting nuclear arsenals and that keep new arsenals from being created. All such preventive programs, by their nature, have international dimensions. )/eir success de$ends on t/e 0nited States 8eing a8"e to .or coo$erative"y .it/ other countries, most notably Russia. #hat such international cooperation can be successful is illustrated by the 2unn/=ugar
0ooperative #hreat Reduction Program in the "BB4s. :.(./Russian efforts on that program led to thousands of nuclear weapons and their launchers being dismantled and thus made the world safer. @ut unless :.(./Russia relations improve, it is difficult to imagine those two governments cooperating on future programs that re%uire such a high level of mutual trust.

@.: Racism Russian nationa"ists 2oster a society o2 racists and xeno$/o8es PiQe 11 M Ph.$., 9ead of $epartment at the Einistry of Doreign Affairs of the Republic of #urkey -(pring )4"", An^l, +Rise of Russian 2ationalism M Dootsteps of
the (lavophilesV! :nderstanding the $ynamics of 2ationalism as a (tate Policy in Russia,, A=#8R2A#I<8( #:R7I(9 JG:R2A= GD I2#8R2A#IG2A= R8=A#IG2(,".pdf. E&E

#he ethnic nationalists are the representatives of e>treme right in Russia whose goal is to achieve +ethnic purity, of Russia based on (lavic origin. #hey are e>tremely racist, >enophobic and populist. #hey advocate the deployment of all people of 14

non/(lavic origin, especially people from the 0aucasus whom they consider as the reason of the increase in crime and public disorder. #hey are anti(emitic and loyal defenders of the slogan +Russia for Russians ,. #oday, Russian nationalist intellectuals seem to be gathered around the literary 1ournal 2ash (ovremennik, a periodical with a nationalist and patriotic content. #he articles issued in the above
mentioned 1ournal vary from a neo/Grthodo>, conservative, neonationalist approach to >enophobic and racist ideologies.

Racism ma es a"" 2orms o2 vio"ence inevita8"e. It must 8e reKected in every instance Aemmi 2
E8EEI Professor 8meritus of (ociology R :nv. Gf Paris Albert/C RA0I(E, translated by (teve Eartinot, pp."Q6/"QF

it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. Gne cannot be indulgent toward racism. Gne cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. #o give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. #o accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, in1ustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim -and which KpersonL man is not KthemselfL himself an outsider relative to someone elseV.. Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominatedJ that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. #he anti/racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in %uestion, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. 9owever, it remains true that one s moral conduct only emerges from a choice! one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its conse%uences. =et us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. #his is almost a redundancy. Gne cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the e>clusion of the other and his or her sub1ection to violence and domination. Drom an ethical point of view 1 if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is +the truly capital sin.,fn)) It is not an
#he struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, accident that almost all of humanity s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not 1ust a %uestion of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not 1ust a %uestion

All things considered, we have an interest in banishing in1ustice, because in1ustice engenders violence and death. Gf course, this is debatable. #here are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. @ut no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. Gne day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All un1ust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. +Recall,, says the bible, +that you were once a stranger in 8gypt,, which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal M indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. @ecause, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A 1ust society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. #rue, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. (uch unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments.

C.: Bro"i2eration Russian nationa"ism s$urs nuc"ear 2orce moderni9ation1 co""a$sing t/e 0S deterrent and causing a""ied $ro"i2 S/eridan 8 M foreign editor of #he Australian -"4/)F/)44?, &reg, +@eware Rushing @ear,, Weekend Australian, =e>is. E&E RussiaPs political leadership has undergone a total ideological transformation over the past decade. =ong gone is its co/operation with the :( and the 8:. Instead, its leadership now emphasises its ideological hostility to the West . (omewhat like 0hina, ultra/nationalism, suspicion of foreigners and a restoration of state power have become the regime ideology. #his is evident in RussiaPs military actions. (ince )444, its military budget has increased by nearly F44 per cent. Gfficially, Russia is now the worldPs second largest military spender, but this is only because 0hina radically understates its true military budget. #he things Russia is spending its money on are disturbing. =ike 0hina, it is engaging in a comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. #his is the sub1ect of an important paper by @radley #hayer and #homas (kypek, two arms control e>perts, in the :( 1ournal #he 2ational Interest. #hey argue that while the :( has a preponderance of strategic nuclear weapons today, Russia will reverse that situation over the ne>t decade. Eoscow , they say, is systematically modernising its nuclear bombers, nuclear submarines and its inter/continental ballistic missiles, while the :( is doing nothing . Russia is building new missiles and new classes of
missiles and consistently carries out 0old War scale military e>ercises involving strategic weapons. #hey write! ``KRussiaL has the worldPs largest nuclear weapons production comple>, with two plants for nuclear weapons assembly and one plant for plutonium and uranium pit production.PP Russia is actively developing

new nuclear delivery systems, especially new missiles. (ome may think this is all pretty harmless! more fool the Russians for spending so much money on nuclear weapons that can never be used. @ut #hayer and (kypek argue that the trend is profoundly dangerous, because i2 "e2t unc/ec ed it .i"" u"timate"y erode t/e $ o2 t/e 0S nuc"ear deterrent. And, they further argue, if the :( nuclear deterrent lacks credibility in any part of the world, then nations that today shelter under the :( nuclear umbrella, such as Japan, (outh 7orea and (audi Arabia, could decide they need their own independent nuclear deterrent . #his also shows the foolishness of analysis that puts the :( at the heart of the failure of nuclear disarmament or even counter/proliferation. 15

#he :( has greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal since the end of the 0old War. @ut while the :( is doing nothing to keep its nuclear arsenal
contemporary and reliable, every other nuclear weapons state is engaged in active development of more modern weapons. #he former foreign minister, &areth 8vans, the head of RuddPs 0ommission on 2uclear $isarmament, gave a pathetic press conference in (ydney recently in which he committed the gross fau> pas of saying how much better he thought Gbama would be than John Ec0ain for the prospects of nuclear disarmament. #his is 8vans as pure motormouth. (urely in his position he should be bipartisan about imminent elections in fellow democracies. @ut more than that, apart from comments on Iran and 2orth 7orea, he gave the impression the :( was the key stumbling block on the road to nuclear disarmament, without a word about the big nuclear weapons e>pansion programs of Russia and 0hina. It could even be, as #hayer and (kypek argue, that :( complacency on nuclear weapons will ultimately harm the cause of nuclear disarmament

and non/proliferation. In any event, Russian nationalism and militarism, and the countryPs vast arsenal of ever more modern nuclear weapons, will be a big part of all geo/strategic e%uations in the decade ahead. Bro"i2eration causes nuc"ear .ar

0tgo22, (ummer )4#2, (urvival, vol 55, no. ), ProOuest

In sum, widespread $ro"i2eration is "i e"y to "ead to an occasiona" s/oot'out .it/ nuc"ear .ea$ons1 and t/at suc/ s/oot'outs .i"" /ave a su8stantia" $ro8a8i"ity o2 esca"ating to t/e maximum destruction $ossi8"e with the weapons at hand. 0n"ess nuc"ear $ro"i2eration is sto$$ed1 .e are /eaded to a .or"d t/at .i"" mirror t/e (merican Wi"d West of the late "?44s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear \si>/shooters on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. &.: Genocide Russian nationa"ism "eads to aggressive anti'semitism and genocide Co$i"a #81 8manuel, teaching assistant and a Ph$ candidate within the Daculty of Political (ciences, Philosophy and 0ommunicational (ciences, from West
:niversity of #imisoara -Romania. + @8#W882 0G2#I2:I#S A2$ 09A2&8!#98 R8(:R&8208 GD 2A#IG2A=I(E I2 PG(#/(G<I8# R:((IA, Romanian Review on Political &eography, http!//>es 289. #he anti/(emite dimension of the Russian nationalism Anti/(emitism

is almost inherent to any form of aggressive nationalism. #he allogene, depicted best in this type of discourse by the image of the stateless Jew, corrupts and undermines the nations in which he carries out his activities, thus national mobili;ation must be firstly directed towards the subversions and strangers from within and only then towards e>ternal dangers. $uring the (oviet era, after the year "BQ4, anti/(emitism had become a re%uisite of the all finer refined Russian nationalism,
reaching all the way to the roots of the Gctober Revolution. #herefore, the true @olshevik heroes were only =enin and (talin, #rotsky and his partisans being only a subversive cli%ue oriented towards the divergence of the Revolution so it would benefit the global Jewish establishment. #he 3ionist movement 5? was

blamed for repeated tentative of destabili;ing and compromise on worldwide communism, Dascism and 3ionism being considered e%ual. $o;ens of books, hundred of articles have confirmed -H. that Judaism had no other goals than to install a worldwide Dascism. Jews were portrayed as the everlasting aggressors, chauvinists, assassins, parasites. #heir aimV #o dominate the world through astuteness, corruption and murder. Pioneers of capitalism, they were accused of being the source of all historical plagues, being on top of the fight against communism, especially against Russia, which they were trying to destroy . 9istory had been rewritten. -H. 9itler and his 2a;is were depicted as puppets in the hands of the Jews. In "B5", they pushed the Duhrer into attacking the :((R. #heir complicity with 2ational
(ocialism went up until encouraging the e>termination of the poorest of the lot in the death camps 8manuel 0GPI=A a A) Drom the manifestos of the Pam1ati national movement, active only in the late ?4s, we find out that in the first government of the (oviet :nion, made up of )) members, only two were Russians , the rest being +nationalistic Jews,. #hese would have contributed actively to the demolishment of churches and of worship houses and of the deportations of intellectuals in camps. 8ven in &orbachev s time, the Jews were accused of occupying the best places in the Russian economy and that they had access

to higher education in a much larger proportion than the rest of the population. F4 Among the diseases of the Russian nationalistic sentiment after "BA4, anti/(emitism is a constant presence. 8verything that goes on in Russia, and also all around the world, and is not agreed by the e>treme nationalists, must necessarily be corollary of Jewish or freemason intrigues. F" 2ot even today, at the beginning of the )"st century, does the anti/(emitism in Russia show any signs of fading. Eoreover, the concept has been reinforced, and the conse%uences it has triggered at a social level are unsettling! the numbers of neo/2a;i groups and their victims are increasing day by day. Gnly in )445 the neo/2a;i organi;ations, among which #he Eovement for Russia s 2ational :nity stands out, have killed 55 people, a considerable figure which says a lot about the radicali;ation of the Russian nationalism . F) A fre%uently met tendency of the Russian neo/2a;is is to organi;e +s%uads, made up of volunteers that will act out at the outskirts of large cities so as to fight against the crimes caused by Asian or Euslim immigrants Genocide ris s destruction on a g"o8a" "eve" G a"" 2uture genocide causes extinction Cam$8e"" 2##1 / Professor Gf Political (cience And International Relations -7enneth J., :niversity of $elaware, Assistant &enocide and the &lobal <illage, p.


Regardless of where or on how small a scale it begins, the crime of genocide is the complete ideological repudiation of, and a direct murderous assault upon, the prevailing liberal international order. &enocide is fundamentally incompatible with, and destructive of an open, tolerant, democratic, free market

international order. As genocide scholar 9erbert 9irsch has e>plained! #he unwillingness of the world community to take action to end genocide and political massacres is not only immoral but also impractical. KWLithout some semblance of stability, commerce, travel, and the international and intranational interchange of goods and information are sub1ected to severe disruptions. Where genocide is permitted to proliferate, the liberal international order cannot long survive. 2o group will be safeC every group will wonder when they will be ne>t. =eft unchecked, genocide threatens to destroy whatever security, democracy, and prosperity e>ists in the present international system. As Roger (mith notes! 8ven the most powerful nations'those armed with nuclear weapons'may end up in struggles that will lead -accidentally, intentionally, insanely. to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not only each other, but KhumankindL mankind itself, sewing the fate of the earth forever with a final genocidal effort. In this sense, genocide is a grave threat to the very fabric of the international system and must be stopped, even at some risk to lives and treasure. #he preservation and growth of the present liberal
international order is a vital interest for all of its members'states as well as non/states'whether or not those members recogni;e and accept the reality of that ob1ective interest. 2ation states, as the principal members of the present international order, are the only authoritative holders of violent enforcement powers. 2on/state actors, though increasing in power relative to states, still do not possess the military force, or the democratic authority to use military force, which is necessary to stop determined perpetrators of mass murder. 0onse%uently, nation/states have a special responsibility to $revent1 suppress, and punish all

malicious assaults on the fundamental integrity of the prevailing international order. 0ni>ue ris o2 genocide in Russia no.vio"ent race riots$ing t/e nation Iig/t <atred 11, #he Jabotinsky International 0enterPs think tank to combat anti/(emitism. + Eoscow! Anti/(emitic incitement spreads in wake of race riots,, "/6/"" http!//"5/moscow/anti/semitic/incitement/spreads/in/wake/of/race/riots 289. #he violent

race riots directed against natives of the 2orth 0aucasus and other non/(lavs in EoscowPs Eane;h (%uare last month have also lead to an upsurge of openly anti/(emitic e>pression in Russia s online media, blaming the Jews for the incidents and calling for attacks on them. As in past cases, the connection between Russia s anti/immigrant nationalists and anti/(emitic incitement and violence has been very visible. #he riots started as some F,444 football fans and Russian nationalists gathered on the s%uare to protest inept police handling
in the killing of Segor (viridov, a (partak Eoscow football club fan who was shot dead in early $ecember during a street fight with migrants from the 0aucasus. Aslan 0herkessov, )Q, from the 2orth 0aucasus republic of 7abardino/@alkaria, has been formally charged with the killing and placed in custody. Immediately after the Eane;h clash, Aleksandr 7ogan of the Israeli/Russian portal, i;, reported that +many Russian bloggers and authors of e>tremely popular

outlets, wrote stories of an openly anti/(emitic nature, in some cases blaming the Jews for the clashes and in others calling for turning popular anger on them.N $ays after the riots, $avid (hechter, a spokesman for the Jewish Agency in Eoscow, said that +as a result of the disorders and manifestations in Eoscow we have noted a sharp increase in interest among the Jewish population, in emigration to Israel. (ince that time, the situation has moved from the blogosphere to the streets . (chechter was %uoted as saying that +on the wall of the metro entrance on Eane;h (%uare have appeared graffiti featuring large black letters Kcalling forL \the 7ikes to &et Gut of Russia and featuring a swastika, Suri 7anner, the president of the Russian Jewish 0ongress, noted that there has been a growth of >enophobic and anti/(emitic articles in the blogosphere. 9e pointed out that at the time of the disorders, the Russian militia had visibly increased security around synagogues and other Jewish sites in Eoscow, an indication that they were ready to block any threat but also one that shows they were concerned that such a threat was likely and immediate .


Ext. Russian Economic Co""a$se Im$acts

(.: Iran Economic do.nturn in Russia "eads to sa"e o2 advanced missi"e systems to Iran Sestanovic/ 8 -(tephen, &eorge D. 7ennan (enior Dellow for Russian and 8urasian (tudies, +Russia and the &lobal 8conomic 0risis,, ""/)F, 0ouncil on Doreign
Relations, http!//"A?55Vbreadcrumb_T)DpublicationT)DbyXtypeT)DregionXissueXbrief. :nlike most other countries, Russia

can always use its arms e>ports as a means of sweetening commercial deals. At a time when Russian economic needs are especially great, however, its customers are likely to press their advantage/seeking more advanced e%uipment than they have been offered in the recent past. 0hina, whose own military purchases from Russia have slowed recently, is one Russian client likely to push for such upgrades. Iran and <ene;uela are two others of special interest to the :nited (tates. It is widely thought that Russia, while steadily increasing its arms sales to Iran, has declined to sell #ehran its most advanced air/defense systems. A protracted economic crisis will surely inspire many inside the Russian defense industry//and probably within the government as well//to call for a review of this policy. All of these strategic ad1ustments//in defense spending, arms control, pipeline construction, weapons e>ports //represent matters of high policy for RussiaPs leadership. Set, all politics being local, some of the most conse%uential issues created by the economic crisis may prove to be those that would ordinarily be
considered matters of low policy. When production falls and unemployment rises in Russia, many of the &astarbeiter, or guest workers, that have been needed to fuel the boom are usually sent home. Dor countries of the 0aucasus and 0entral Asia, which have provided most of this enormous transient labor force -some estimate more than one million workers in Eoscow alone., this will be a huge 1olt. Ouickly, Russia will go from being an important safety valve for

socioeconomic discontent to a source of it. In the short term, RussiaPs neighbors will doubtless see this reflu> of their own citi;ens as a reason to maintain good relations with Eoscow, in hopes of winning coordinated management of a potentially dangerous problem.

Iranian missi"e sa"es "ead to nuc"ear .ar Ierguson , -2ial, professor of history at 9arvard, +#he origins of the &reat War of )44A / and how it could have been prevented,, #elegraph, "/"F/4Q,
http!// With every passing year after the turn of the century, the instability

of the &ulf region grew. @y the beginning of )44Q, nearly all the combustible ingredients for a conflict / far bigger in its scale and scope than the wars of "BB" or )446 / were in place. #he first underlying cause of the war was the increase in the regionPs relative importance as a source of petroleum. Gn the one hand, the rest of the worldPs oil reserves were
being rapidly e>hausted. Gn the other, the breakneck growth of the Asian economies had caused a huge surge in global demand for energy. It is hard to believe today, but for most of the "BB4s the price of oil had averaged less than I)4 a barrel. A second precondition of war was demographic. While 8uropean

fertility had fallen below the natural replacement rate in the "BA4s, the decline in the Islamic world had been much slower . @y the late "BB4s the fertility rate in the eight Euslim countries to the south and east of the 8uropean :nion was two and half times higher than the 8uropean figure. #his tendency was especially pronounced in Iran, where the social conservatism of the "BAB Revolution / which had lowered the age of marriage and prohibited contraception / combined with the high mortality of the Iran/Ira% War and the subse%uent baby boom to produce , by the first decade of the new century, a %uite e>traordinary surplus of young men. Eore than two fifths of the population of Iran in "BBF had been aged "5 or younger. #his
was the generation that was ready to fight in )44A. #his not only gave Islamic societies a youthful energy that contrasted markedly with the slothful senescence of 8urope. It also signified a profound shift in the balance of world population. In "BF4, there had three times as many people in @ritain as in Iran. @y "BBF, the population of Iran had overtaken that of @ritain and was forecast to be F4 per cent higher by )4F4. Set people in the West struggled to grasp the implications of this shift. (ubliminally, they still thought of the Eiddle 8ast as a region they could lord it over, as they had in the mid/)4th century. #he third and perhaps most important

precondition for war was cultural. (ince "BAB, not 1ust Iran but the greater part of the Euslim world had been swept by a wave of religious fervour, the very opposite of the process of secularisation that was emptying 8uropePs churches. Although few countries followed Iran down the road to full/blown
theocracy, there was a transformation in politics everywhere. Drom Eorocco to Pakistan, the feudal dynasties or military strongmen who had dominated Islamic politics since the "BF4s came under intense pressure from religious radicals. #he ideological cocktail that produced P IslamismP was as potent as either of the

e>treme ideologies the West had produced in the previous century, communism and fascism . Islamism was anti/Western, anti/
capitalist and anti/(emitic. A seminal moment was the Iranian president Eahmoud Ahmadine1adPs intemperate attack on Israel in $ecember )44F, when he called the 9olocaust a PmythP. #he state of Israel was a Pdisgraceful blotP, he had previously declared, to be wiped Poff the mapP. Prior to )44A, the Islamists had seen no alternative but to wage war against their enemies by means of terrorism. Drom the &a;a to Eanhattan, the hero of )44" was the suicide bomber. Set Ahmadine1ad, a veteran of the Iran/Ira% War, craved a more serious weapon than strapped/on e>plosives. 9is decision

to accelerate IranPs nuclear weapons programme was intended to give Iran the kind of power 2orth 7orea already wielded in 8ast Asia! the power to defy the 0nited StatesC
the power to obliterate AmericaPs closest regional ally. :nder different circumstances, it would not have been difficult to thwart Ahmadine1adPs ambitions. #he Israelis had shown themselves capable of pre/emptive air strikes against Ira%Ps nuclear facilities in "B?". (imilar strikes against IranPs were urged on President @ush by neo/


conservative commentators throughout )44Q. #he :nited (tates, they argued, was perfectly placed to carry out such strikes. It had the bases in neighbouring Ira% and Afghanistan. It had the intelligence proving IranPs contravention of the 2on/Proliferation #reaty. @ut the President was advised by his (ecretary of (tate, 0ondolee;;a Rice, to opt instead for diplomacy. 2ot 1ust 8uropean opinion but American opinion was strongly opposed to an attack on Iran. #he invasion of Ira% in )446 had been discredited by the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction (addam 9ussein had supposedly possessed and by the failure of the :(/led coalition to %uell a bloody insurgency. Americans did not want to increase their military commitments overseasC they wanted to reduce them. 8uropeans did not want to hear that Iran was about to build its own WE$. 8ven if Ahmad/ine1ad had broadcast a nuclear test live on 022, liberals would have said it was a 0IA con/trick. (o history repeated itself. As in the "B64s, an anti/(emitic demagogue broke his countryPs treaty obligations and armed for war. 9aving first tried appeasement, offering the Iranians economic incentives to desist, the West appealed to international agencies / the International Atomic 8nergy Agency and the :nited 2ations (ecurity 0ouncil. #hanks to 0hinaPs veto, however, the :2 produced nothing but empty resolutions and ineffectual sanctions, like the e>clusion of Iran from the )44Q World 0up finals. Gnly one man might have stiffened President @ushPs resolve in the crisis! not #ony @lair, he had wrecked his domestic credibility over Ira% and was in any case on the point of retirement / Ariel (haron. Set he had been struck down by a stroke as the Iranian crisis came to a head. With Israel leaderless, Ahmadine1ad had a free hand. As in

the "B64s, too, the West fell back on wishful thinking. Perhaps, some said, Ahmadine1ad was only sabre/rattling because his domestic position was so weak. Perhaps his political rivals in the Iranian clergy were on the point of getting rid of him. In that case, the last thing the West should do was to take a tough lineC that would only bolster Ahmadine1ad by inflaming Iranian popular feeling. (o in Washington and in =ondon people crossed their fingers, hoping for the deus e> machina of a home/grown regime change in #eheran. #his gave the Iranians all the time they needed to produce weapons/grade enriched uranium at 2atan;. #he dream of nuclear non/proliferation, already interrupted by Israel, Pakistan and India, was definitively shattered. 2ow #eheran had a nuclear missile pointed at #el/Aviv. And the new Israeli government of @en1amin 2etanyahu had a missile pointed right back at #eheran. #he optimists argued that the 0uban Eissile 0risis would replay itself in the Eiddle 8ast. @oth sides would threaten war / and then both sides would blink . #hat was (ecretary RicePs hope / indeed, her prayer / as she shuttled between the capitals. @ut it was not to be. #he devastating nuclear e>change of August )44A represented not only the failure of diplomacy, it marked the end of the oil age. (ome even said it marked the twilight of the West. 0ertainly, that was
one way of interpreting the subse%uent spread of the conflict as Ira%Ps (hiPite population overran the remaining American bases in their country and the 0hinese threatened to intervene on the side of #eheran.

@.: &isease Economic dec"ine "eads to disease s$read G transmission and 2ai"ed survei""ance Rice , M (enior Dellow R &8$
(usan, (enior Dellow, Doreign Policy, &lobal 8conomy and $evelopment, #he #hreat of &lobal Poverty, @rookings Institute

Poverty contributes substantially to the outbreak of infectious disease. As the search for clean water and fire wood drives impoverished people deeper into forested areas, the risk of animal contact and e>posure to new pathogens increases. @y spurring population growth, contributing to immune/compromising malnutrition, and e>acerbating crowding and poor living conditions, poverty a"so fuels the transmission of disease. Almost two million people will die this year of tuberculosis and another nearly 5
million from lower respiratory infections, most of whom live in poor, crowded parts of the developing world. #hese communicable diseases are mutating dangerously and spreading to other regions. Antibiotic/resistant #@, for e>ample, is resurgent in the :nited (tates, especially among immigrant populations.

Aore ev G "o. income countries $rove Rice , M (enior Dellow R &8$

(usan, (enior Dellow, Doreign Policy, &lobal 8conomy and $evelopment, #he #hreat of &lobal Poverty, @rookings Institute

#he lack of ade%uate health/care infrastructure and surveillance capacity in poor countries hinders early detection and timely treatment of disease, while also reducing states ability to halt its spread abroad . According to the World 9ealth Grgani;ation, low and middle income countries suffer B4T of the world s disease burden but account for only ""T of its health care spending. Per capita spending on health in the West African country of 2iger amounted to IQ in )44", compared with I5,??A in the :.(. #hese disparities have potentially deadly conse%uences. C.: Hio"ence Economic dec"ine "eads to .ides$read vio"ence G turns va"ue to "i2e Strauss'3a/n 9 M Eanaging $irector R IED $omini%ue, +8conomic (tability, 8conomic 0ooperation, and Peace'the Role of the IED,, http!//www.>ternal/np/speeches/)44B/"4)64B.htm =et me stress that the crisis is by no means over, and many risks remain. 8conomic activity is still dependent on policy support, and a premature withdrawal of this support could kill the recovery. And even as gro.t/ recovers1 it .i"" ta e some time 2or Ko8s to 2o""o. suit. )/is economic

insta8i"ity .i"" continue to t/reaten socia" sta8i"ity .U )/e sta es are $articu"ar"y /ig/ in t/e "o.'income countries . Gur colleagues at the :nited 2ations and World @ank think that up to 9# mi""ion people mig/t 8e $us/ed into extreme $overty as a result of this crisis. In many areas of the world, what is at stake is not only higher unemployment or lower purchasing power, but life and death itself. Economic marginali;ation and destitution cou"d "ead to socia" unrest1 $o"itica" insta8i"ity , a breakdown of democracy, or war. In a sense, our collective efforts to fight the
crisis cannot be separated from our efforts guard social stability and to secure peace. #his is particularly important in low/income countries. U War might 1ustifiably be

"eads to deat/1 disa8i"ity1 disease1 and dis$"acement o2 $o$u"ation. War increases $overty. War reduces gro.t/ $otentia" 8y destroying in2rastructure as .e"" as 2inancia" and /uman ca$ita". War
called +development in reverse,. War


diverts resources to.ard vio"ence1 rent'see ing1 and corru$tion. War .ea ens institutions. War in one country harms neighboring countries, including through an influ> of refugees.U Aost .ars since t/e 19R#s /ave 8een .ars .it/in states . It is hard to estimate
the true cost of a civil war. Recent research suggests that one year of conflict can knock )/)b percentage points off a country s growth rate. And since the average civil war lasts A years, that means an economy that is "F percent smaller than it would have been with peace. Gf course, no cost can be put on the loss of life or the great human suffering that always accompanies war.U #he causality also runs the other way. Just as wars devastate the economy, a .ea economy ma es a

country more $rone to .ar. )/e evidence is >uite c"ear on this point'low income or s"o. economic gro.t/ increases t/e ris o2 a country 2a""ing into civi" con2"ict. Boverty and economic stagnation "ead $eo$"e to 8ecome margina"i9ed1 .it/out a sta e in t/e $roductive economy. Wit/ "itt"e /o$e o2 em$"oyment or a decent standard of living, t/ey might turn instead to vio"ent activities. $ependence on natural resources is also a risk factor'com$etition 2or contro" over these resources can trigger con2"ict and income from natural resources can finance war.U And so .e can see a vicious circ"e'war makes economic conditions and prospects worse, and weakens institutions, and this in turn increases the likelihood of war. -nce a .ar /as started1 it6s /ard to sto$. (nd even i2 it sto$s1 it6s easy to s"i$ 8ac into con2"ict. &uring t/e 2irst decade a2ter a .ar1 t/ere is a +# $ercent c/ance o2 returning to vio"ence1 $art"y 8ecause o2 .ea ened institutions. Economic dec"ine 8reeds con2"ict and structura" vio"ence 3im and ConceiQSo 1# M $irector of the Gffice of $evelopment (tudies at :2P$, assistant professor at the #echnical :niversity of =isbon, degrees in
Physics and 8conomics from the #echnical :niversity of =isbon and Ph$ in Public Policy from the =@J (chool of Public Affairs at the :niversity of #e>as at Austin / Gffice of $evelopment (tudies :2$P 2amsuk and Pedro, (ummer )4"4, +#98 80G2GEI0 0RI(I(, <IG=82# 0G2D=I0#, A2$ 9:EA2 $8<8=GPE82#, https!//"FX"/7im0onceicao"Fn".pdf A recent strand of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that U economic

conditions are im$ortant determinants o2 t/e out8rea and recurrence o2 U con2"ict. In particular, .ars o2ten start 2o"" gro.t/ co""a$ses -0ollier et al., )44B, p. U "F.. S/ar$ economic s" and "o. "eve"s o2 income $er ca$ita a$$ear to increase U t/e "i e"i/ood o2 con2"icts. In this
conte>t, it is opportune to e>plore insights from this U literature, linking it also with the human development implications of both growth U slowdowns and conflict. In particular, the paper highlights the risks of the emergence of U low human development/conflict traps.U When it comes to the conse%uences of conflict, there is no doubt that vio"ent U con2"ict is one o2 t/e most extreme 2orms o2 su$$ressing c/oices and advancing rig/ts ,U and therefore a

maKor t/reat to /uman deve"o$ment -:2$P, )44F, p. "F".. (ince "BB4, U more than 6 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing
countries U -Earshall, )44F.. #he total war deaths are far more than the battle deaths. Dor e>ample, U the total war deaths are estimated as ".) million in 8thiopia during "BAQ/"BB", but only U )T of them were directly engaged in the battles. -=acina and &leditsch, )445.. Con2"ict U /as a"so non'"et/a" conse>uences

t/at may "ast across generations -:2$P, )44?a.. )/e U con2"ict 8ecomes even more /a9ardous i2 con2"ict resu"ts in a $ersistent con2"ict tra$. A U typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces a 55 percent risk of returning to U conflict within five years -0ollier et al.,
)446, p. ?6.. Whether or not a country will U e>perience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the country e>perienced U wars in the past -0ollier et al., )445..U As far as drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings in the U literature is that many economic conditions -low income, slow growth, and especially U severe economic downturns. are

corre"ated .it/ t/e out8rea o2 con2"ict1 .it/ some U evidence strong"y suggesting t/at t/e causa" direction runs 2rom economic conditions to U con2"ict -0ollier and 9oeffler, )445.. #here is also a rich
literature on the impact of U hori;ontal ine%uality and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the U risk of conflict.

&.: War Economic dec"ine "eads to .ar Aead 9

Walter Russell. 9enry A. 7issinger (enior Dellow in :.(. Doreign Policy at the 0ouncil on Doreign Relations. )/5/B. http!// id_FA"cbbbB/)??A/5d?"/?F5)/B)e?6B"FfFf?[p_). (o far, such half/hearted e>periments not only have failed to workC they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front/runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to 0hileC Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the @altic states and 0entral 8urope. Dre%uently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengt/en t/e /and o2 re"igious extremists1 $o$u"ist radica"s1 or aut/oritarian

traditiona"ists ./o are determined to resist "i8era" ca$ita"ist society 2or a variety o2 reasons. Eeanwhile, the companies and
banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the conse%uences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes//as, inevitably, it does. And, conse%uently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. #his may be happening yet again. None o2 ./ic/ means t/at .e can Kust sit 8ac and enKoy t/e recession. <istory may suggest t/at

2inancia" crises actua""y /e"$ ca$ita"ist great $o.ers maintain t/eir "eads''8ut it /as ot/er1 "ess reassuring messages as .e"". I2 2inancia" crises /ave 8een a norma" $art o2 "i2e during t/e %##'year rise o2 t/e "i8era" ca$ita"ist system under t/e (ng"o$/one $o.ers1 so /as .ar. #he wars of the =eague of Augsburg and the (panish (uccessionC the (even Sears WarC the American RevolutionC the 2apoleonic WarsC the two World WarsC the cold war! )/e "ist o2 .ars is a"most as "ong as t/e "ist o2 2inancia" crises. @ad economic times can 8reed .ars. Euro$e .as a $retty $eace2u" $"ace in 19281 8ut t/e &e$ression $oisoned German $u8"ic o$inion and /e"$ed 8ring (do"2 <it"er to $ I2 t/e current crisis turns into a de$ression1 ./at roug/ 20

8easts mig/t start s"ouc/ing to.ard Aosco.1 3arac/i1 @eiKing1 or Ne. &e"/i to 8e 8ornL )/e 0nited States may not1 yet1 dec"ine1 8ut1 i2 .e can;t get t/e .or"d economy 8ac on trac 1 .e may sti"" /ave to 2ig/t.

0ndercuts interna" sta8i"ity G "eads to g"o8a" .ar (us"in 9 / Resident (cholar M American 8nterprise Institute Eichael, and $esmond =achman, Resident Dellow M American 8nterprise Institute, +#he &lobal
8conomy :nravels,, Dorbes, 6/Q, http!//"44"?A 0onversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, t/e souring o2 t/e $o"itica" environment must 8e ex$ected to 2an the corrosive $rotectionist

tendencies and nationa"istic economic $o"icy res$onses that are already all too much in evidence.

After spending much of )44? cheerleading the global economy, the International Eonetary Dund now concedes that output in the worldPs advanced economies is e>pected to contract by as much as )T in )44B. )/is .ou"d 8e t/e 2irst time in the post/war period that out$ut contracted in a"" o2 t/e .or"d;s maKor economies . #he IED is also now e>pecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in )4"4, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. (adly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging/market economies .i"" not 8e s$ared 8y the ravages of the g"o8a" recession. -ut$ut is a"ready dec"ining precipitously

across Eastern and Centra" Euro$e as .e"" as in a num8er o2 ey (sian economies1 "i e Sout/ 3orea and )/ai"and .
A number of important emerging/market countries like :kraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil/dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full/blown currency crisis. Perhaps o2 even greater concern is t/e virtua" grinding to a /a"t o2 economic gro.t/ in C/ina. #he IED now e>pects that 0hinaPs growth rate will appro>imately halve to ,T in )44B. (uch a growth rate .ou"d

2a"" 2ar s/ort o2 ./at is needed to a8sor8 t/e 2# mi""ion 0hinese workers ./o migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political
and social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International =abor Grgani;ation. #he I=G believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 64 million 1obs worldwide in )44B, while in a worst case scenario as many as F4 million 1obs could be lost. What do these trends mean in the short and medium termV #he &reat $epression showed how social and g"o8a" c/aos 2o""o.ed /ard on

economic co""a$se. #he mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans
suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. 8%ually worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free/market systems. )/e t/reat o2 insta8i"ity is a $ressing concern . 0hina, until last year the

C/ina 2aced upward of R#1### "a8or u$risings a year. ( sustained do.nturn $oses grave and $ossi8"y immediate t/reats to C/inese interna" sta8i"ity. #he regime in @ei1ing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with 0hinaPs neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, /as /ad to $ut do.n riots in its Iar East as .e"" as in do.nto.n Aosco.. <ladimir PutinPs rule has been predicated on s%uee;ing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devilPs bargain falls apart, then .ide' sca"e re$ression inside Russia1 a"ong .it/ a continuing t/reatening $osture to.ard RussiaPs neig/8ors1 is "i e"y. 8ven
worldPs fastest growing economy, 1ust reported that )4 million migrant laborers lost their 1obs. 8ven in the flush times of recent years, apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly e>ternal conflict. As JapanPs e>ports have plummeted by nearly F4T, one/third of the countryPs prefectures have passed emergency economic stabili;ation plans. 9undreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. (painPs unemployment rate is e>pected to climb to nearly )4T by the end of )4"4C (panish unions are already protesting the lack of 1obs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the "B?4s, is haunting the country. Eeanwhile, in &reece, workers have already taken to the streets. Euro$e as a whole .i""

2ace dangerously increasing tensions between native citi;ens and immigrants, largely from poorer Euslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the
past several decades. (pain has absorbed five million immigrants since "BBB, while nearly BT of &ermanyPs residents have foreign citi;enship, including almost ) million #urks. #he >enophobic labor strikes in the :.7. do not bode well for the rest of 8urope. ( prolonged g"o8a" downturn, let alone a co""a$se1 .ou"d

dramatica""y raise tensions inside t/ese countries. Cou$"e t/at .it/ possible protectionist legislation in the :nited (tates, unreso"ved et/nic and territoria" dis$utes in a"" regions o2 t/e g"o8e and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. )/e resu"t may be a series of sma"" ex$"osions t/at coa"esce into a 8ig 8ang. Economic dec"ine ris s great $ con2"ict and increase nation6s 8e""igerance. Green and Sc/rage in U9
Eichael J &reen, (enior Advisor and Japan 0hair at the 0enter for (trategic and International (tudies -0(I(. and Associate Professor at &eorgetown :niversity. (teven P (chrage, the 0(I( (choll 0hair in International @usiness and a former senior official with the :( #rade RepresentativePs Gffice, (tate $epartment and Ways [ Eeans 0ommittee. Asia #imes. Earch )Q )44B. http!//$k4".html

t/e Great &e$ression taug/t us t/at a do.n.ard g"o8a" economic s$ira" can even /ave Karring im$acts on great $o.ers. It is no mere coincidence t/at t/e "ast great g"o8a" economic do.nturn .as 2o""o.ed 8y t/e most destructive .ar in /uman /istory. In t/e 19%#s1 economic des$eration /e"$ed 2ue" autocratic regimes and $rotectionism in a do.n.ard economic'security deat/ s$ira" t/at engu"2ed t/e .or"d in con2"ict . )/is s$ira" .as aided 8y t/e $reoccu$ation o2 t/e 0nited States and ot/er "eading nations .it/ economic trou8"es at /ome and insu22icient attention to .or ing .it/ ot/er $o.ers to maintain sta8i"ity a8road . #odayPs challenges are different, yet "B66Ps =ondon 8conomic
9owever, 0onference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to ne>t monthPs =ondon &roup of )4 -&/)4. meeting. #here is no %uestion the :( must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. @ut the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the @arack Gbama administration and reali;e that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising powerV Dour areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed AsiaPs fundamental strategic picture. 0hina is not replacing the :( as regional hegemon, since the leadership in @ei1ing is too nervous


about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the :( will be brought to its knees because 0hina is the leading holder of :( debt often miss key points. 0hinaPs currency controls and full employment/e>port/oriented growth strategy give @ei1ing few choices other than buying :( #reasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the 0hinese economy to generate greater long/term consumer demand at home, 0hinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status %uo -though @ei1ing deserves credit

)/e greater danger .it/ C/ina is not an ec"i$sing o2 0S "eaders/i$1 8ut instead t/e ind o2 s/i2t in strategic orientation t/at /a$$ened to ?a$an a2ter t/e Great &e$ression . Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before "B6) and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. )/e .or"d.ide de$ression and $rotectionism o2 t/e 19%#s devastated t/e ne."y ex$osed ?a$anese economy and contri8uted direct"y to mi"itaristic and autar ic $o"icies in (sia as t/e ?a$anese $eo$"e reacted against ./at counted 2or g"o8a"i9ation at t/e time. C/ina today is simi"ar"y converging .it/ t/e g"o8a" economy1 and many ex$erts 8e"ieve C/ina needs at "east 8T annua" gro.t/ to sustain socia" sta8i"ity. Realistic growth predictions for )44B are closer to FT. <eteran 0hina hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the =unar 2ew Sear
for short/term efforts to stimulate economic growth.. holiday last month to find factories closed and 1obs gone. #here were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and 0hinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen ne>t year either. 9owever, the economic slowdown has only 1ust begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in 0hina between the ruling communist party and the ".6 billion 0hinese who have come to see President 9u JintaoPs call for Nharmonious societyN as ine>tricably linked to his promise of Npeaceful developmentN. If the Japanese e>ample is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a

It is note.ort/y t/at Nort/ 3orea1 Ayanmar and Iran /ave a"" intensi2ied t/eir de2iance in t/e .a e o2 t/e 2inancia" crisis1 ./ic/ /as distracted t/e .or"d;s "eading nations1 "imited t/eir mora" aut/ority and so.n $otentia" discord. With @ei1ing worried about the potential impact of 2orth 7orean belligerence or instability on 0hinese internal
dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in 0hina too. $angerous states stability, and leaders in Japan and (outh 7orea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the 2orth 7orean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their countryPs claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. #he 1unta in Eyanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the "4/country Association of (outheast Asian 2ations. Iran continues its nuclear program while e>ploiting differences between the :(, :7 and Drance -or the P/6 group. and 0hina and Russia / differences that could become more pronounced if

is $ossi8"e t/at t/e economic do.nturn .i"" ma e t/ese dangerous states more $"ia8"e 8ecause o2 2a""ing 2ue" $rices CIran: and greater need 2or 2oreign aid CNort/ 3orea and Ayanmar:1 8ut t/at may de$end on t/e extent t/at aut/oritarian "eaders care a8out t/e .e""'8eing o2 t/eir $eo$"e or 2ace interna" $o"itica" $ressures "in ed to t/e economy . (o far, there is little evidence to suggest either and
economic friction with @ei1ing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western 8uropean governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system.

Economic dec"ine "eads to .ar .it/ C/ina Iried8erg 1# M Ph$, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton :niversity
0hina Rivalry, (urvival! &lobal Politics and (trategy <olume F), Issue 5

Aaron, A/)"/"4, +Implications of the Dinancial 0risis for the :(M

)/e dramatic economic deve"o$ments t/at 8egan to un2o"d in t/e summer o2 2##8 /ave 8een .ide"y com$ared to t/e Great &e$ression o2 t/e 19%#s." At that time, a sharp drop in stock prices was accompanied by a banking crisis, which led to a protracted slowdown in global growth, the rise to power of fascist regimes in 8urope and Asia and, ultimately, the outbreak of the (econd World War. While the first several steps in t/e current crisis appear similar -market crash, bank failures, global slowdown., its 2u"" economic1 $o"itica" and strategic im$"ications are not yet c"ear.)U (mong the many potential conse>uences o2 t/e recent do.nturn and its aftermath cou"d 8e increased 2riction 8et.een t/e 0nited States and C/ina and an intensification in their evolving military and diplomatic rivalry. In addition to altering their bilateral
interactions, the global slump could affect the ability of both countries to pursue a long/term strategic competition, as well as changing their position in, and relationship to, the rest of the international system.U (everal caveats are in order here. Dirstly, and most obviously, the crisis that began in )44? has yet to run its course. #he ultimate duration and depth of the current economic slowdown will go a long way towards determining the full e>tent and character of its strategic implications. Gther things e%ual, the more protracted and severe the slump, the greater the likelihood of dramatic and potentially dangerous effects. A full accounting of the likely economic impact of various scenarios on the :nited (tates and 0hina would also re%uire a systematic analysis of their trade and investment with the rest of the world, and with each other, something that is beyond the scope of this article.U Dinally, as will %uickly become apparent, the three aspects of the (ino/American relationship discussed here are closely intertwined. #hus, for e>ample, t/e gro.t/ traKectories o2 t/e 0nited States and C/ina .i"" de$end, in part, on t/e state

o2 t/eir 8i"atera" re"ations and will in part determine their future roles in the international system. $ividing the problem into three separate pieces helps to
make it more tractable analytically, albeit at the cost of some oversimplification. U Internal effectsU In broad outline, the :nited (tates and 0hina passed through similar e>periences following the start of the global financial meltdown nearly two years ago. @oth e>perienced sharp drops in aggregate demand and a decline in growth rates -in the :( case triggered by a contraction of credit and the collapse of consumer spending, in 0hina as the result of a sharp fall/off in e>ports. and both initiated large/ scale stimulus programmes designed to boost demand and restore growth. In the :( case the slowdown was sufficient to tip the economy into a protracted recessionC in 0hina e>pansion slowed briefly and then resumed at near pre/crisis rates. #he difference in the two countries performance has caused some observers to conclude that 0hina must be the \winner in the current crisis.U Drom a geopolitical perspective what matters most are relative rather than absolute gainsC not how fast each economy is growing -or contracting., but how wide the differential is between their respective growth rates. (ince the end of the 0old War the :( economy has been e>panding at an average of about 6T per year while 0hina has en1oyed annual growth rates closer to "4T. It is this persistent seven/point gap that has caused many economists to predict that, by the middle of this century, at the latest, 0hina will have overtaken the :nited (tates in terms of total output. If both countries return %uickly to their pre/ crisis growth tra1ectories the date of e>pected convergence will not change. If, on the other hand, one recovers more rapidly or more completely than the other, that moment could either be moved up, or pushed even further into the future.U While there are some optimistic outliers, t/e emerging consensus among

2orecasters is t/at t/e 0nited States .i"" not 8ounce 8ac immediate"y to its $re'crisis $er2ormance . Instead of averaging 6M
6.FT per year -to say nothing of the 5T some had predicted at the turn of the century, before the bubble burst. growth is e>pected to remain at about )M).FT for much of this decade and perhaps beyond.6 As for 0hina, after rising to a peak of "6T in )44A, its annual growth was cut almost in half -to around AT on a year/on/ year basis., during the initial stages of the global crisis.5 #hanks to a very aggressive response by the central authorities, growth climbed back to 1ust under BT in )44B. (ome estimates show it hovering between B and "4T for at least the ne>t few years, while others are even more bullish, at least in the near term.F I2 C/ina can

return to somet/ing near its $re'crisis1 dou8"e'digit gro.t/ rates ./i"e t/e 0 nited States continues to limp along at roug/"y #.+G1T "ess t/an its ear"ier $er2ormance1 t/e ga$ 8et.een t/e t.o countries .i"" obviously c"ose even more ra$id"y t/an it .as 8e2ore.U W/et/er or not C/ina can sustain its initia" recovery remains to 8e seen . At least in the near
term, @ei1ing responded to the crisis by doubling down on a development model that was already approaching the limits of its utility. Rather than taking aggressive steps to boost consumer spending as a share of &$P, a course that both outside e>perts and many 0hinese officials have identified as essential to sustaining long/term growth, the regime chose initially to pump even more money into infrastructure pro1ects and to provide both direct and indirect support for a variety of e>port industries.Q While this approach may have been effective in preventing an even steeper short/term drop in output, it threatens to create massive e>cess capacity, fuelling


asset bubbles, weighing down banks with more non/performing loans and setting the stage for another slowdown that will be even deeper and more difficult to manage. As economist (tephen Roach points out, @ei1ing appears to have acted on the assumption that, as in previous recessions, foreign -and especially :(. demand would soon recover, leading to a rise in e>ports and a resumption of rapid growth. If this turns out not to be the case, however, Roach concludes that 0hina \runs the real risk of facing a more pronounced shortfall in economic growth .A In sum, s/ort'term ex$edients may end up /astening t/e day o2 rec oning 2or

C/ina;s investment'/eavy1 ex$ort'"ed deve"o$ment strategy. While the regime has recently taken steps to encourage domestic demand,
permitting workers wages to rise and the renminbi to appreciate, the changes to date have been small and tentative.? U $espite its magnitude, @ei1ingPs stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a si;eable spike in unemployment. #he regime acknowledges that upwards of )4 million migrant workers lost their 1obs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and Am recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.B 2ot surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. 8ven before the crisis hit, the number of so/called \mass incidents -such as riots or strikes. reported each year in 0hina had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, @ei1ing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in )44F."4 2evertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In @ei1ing, for e>ample, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost "44T increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts."" (ince the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. #hus, at the start of )44B, an official news/agency story candidly warned 0hinese readers that the country was, \without a doubt H entering a peak period of mass incidents .") In anticipation of an e>pected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 6,4?4 county/level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot/control tactics, and over )44 intermediate and lower/level 1udges were also called in for special training."6 U @ei1ingPs stimulus was insufficientU At least for the moment, the 0hinese 0ommunist Party -00P. appears to be weathering the storm. @ut if in the ne>t several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, @ei1ingPs troubles will mount. #he regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the partyPs leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. (inologist Ein>in Pei points out that the greatest danger to 00P rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societa" discontent Umig/t 8e su22icient to tem$t some members of the e"ite to

ex$"oit t/e situation to their own political advantage using U$o$u"ist a$$ea"s to .ea en their riva"s and, in the process, o$enEingF u$ divisions .it/in t/e $arty;s seemingly unified u$$er ran s6."5 I2 t/is /a$$ens1 all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a 8"oody civi" .ar1 .i"" suddenly 8ecome $"ausi8"e. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, t/e regime /as 8een very care2u" to ee$ whatever di22erences e>ist over /o. to dea" .it/ t/e current crisis within bounds and out o2 vie.. If there are
significant rifts they could become apparent in the run/up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for )4"). U (hort of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis cou"d induce it to a8andon its current1 cautious $o"icy o2 avoiding con2"ict with other countries

. I2 t/ey 8e"ieve t/at t/eir 8ac s are to t/e .a""1 C/ina;s "eaders mig/t even 8e tem$ted to "as/ out, perhaps $rovo ing a con2rontation .it/ a 2oreign $ in t/e /o$es o2 ra""ying domestic su$$ort and de2"ecting $u8"ic attention 2rom t/eir day'to'day trou8"es. @ei1ing might also choose to
while patiently accumulating all the elements of \comprehensive national power implement a policy of \military 7eynesianism , further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy."F U In sum, despite its impressive initial performance1 @eiKing is 8y no means on so"id ground. )/e

rever8erations 2rom t/e )44?M4B 2inancia" crisis may yet s/a e t/e regime to its 2oundations1 and cou"d induce it to 8e/ave in une>pected, and perhaps unex$ected"y aggressive1 .ays.U #he impact of the financial crisis on the :nited (tates is more likely to be one of
lingering debilitation than radical destabilisation. After a brief interval of surpluses in the late "BB4s, a combination of ta> cuts and spending increases during the &eorge W. @ush years pushed the federal budget back into the red. #he recession has caused ta> revenues to fall and the deficit to grow, and the federal governmentPs efforts to contain the banking crisis and stimulate the economy have produced even bigger imbalances. In the span of only a year the deficit %uadrupled in si;e from I5FB billion -or 6.)T of &$P. to I".?F trillion -"6."T of &$P.."Q #his would be the most rapid deterioration on record, far worse than any previous recession."A U Eore important than the speed with which this gap has opened is its sheer si;e! the deficit is now larger in relation to the economy as a whole than at any time since the end of the (econd World War."? In order to cover the difference between revenues and e>penditures, Washington has had to borrow at an unprecedented rate, with the result that the federal debt has ballooned from 5"T of &$P to Q4T."B Dor the moment, low interest rates have helped hold down the cost of servicing this massive increase in debt. As interest rates rise from their current low levels, so too will the si;e of the federal governmentPs payments to its creditors. Within the ne>t decade, for the first time on record, annual payments on the federal debt will e>ceed outlays for national defence.)4 U #his transition is symbolicC higher debt payments do not necessarily have to mean downward pressure on defence spending. Dor a variety of reasons, however, this is likely to be the case. #he combination of rising interest costs, slower growth and the long/awaited e>plosion in entitlement programmes due to population aging will tend to s%uee;e all forms of \discretionary spending .)" Gf these, the defence budget is the biggest and, in political terms, it may turn out to be the most vulnerable. As the :nited (tates disentangles itself from Ira% and Afghanistan, there will be calls to pocket the resulting \peace dividend and to direct more resources to urgent domestic needs. Instead of being freed to spend more on systems relevant to a possible long/term competition with 0hina, the $efense $epartment is likely over the coming decade to face the necessity of making cuts in R[$ and procurement.))U @arring some ga"vanising event1 t/e 0nited States may "ac not on"y t/e resources to conduct a

sustained riva"ry .it/ C/ina 8ut t/e inc"ination to do so. Recent opinion polls show a sharp increase in the number of Americans who believe
their country should \mind its own business and let others get along on their own . Indeed, nearly half of those %uestioned in )44B agreed with this proposition, the largest fraction on record, bigger even than at the end of the <ietnam War. #hese sentiments no doubt reflect the nationPs unhappy e>periences over the last eight years with terrorism and insurgency, but they are also clearly a product of the recent economic downturn. (ince the start of the crisis the number of Americans who see their country as the worldPs leading economic power has fallen sharply -from 5"T in Debruary )44? to )AT in 2ovember )44B., even as those who see 0hina in this role have grown more numerous -from 64T to 55T.. W/i"e ordinary citi9ens remain .ary o2 C/ina1 t/ey s/o. "itt"e sign o2 .anting to

com$ete .it/ it 2or in2"uence. #o the contrary, the American people at present seem far more inclined to want to tend to their own problems than to go out
into the world looking for trouble.)6 What remains to be seen is whether and if so how 0hina will try to e>ploit an interval of American introspection. U @ilateral relationsU Drom the 2i>on administrationPs first feelers to @ei1ing until the #iananmen (%uare \incident and the end of the 0old War, the :nited (tates and 0hina were drawn together mainly by their shared opposition to the (oviet :nion. Dor the last )4 years, by contrast, the two powers have been united primarily by trade. )/e

8ene2its 2rom increasing"y c"ose commercia" ties /ave /e"$ed to at "east $artia""y o22set under"ying ideo"ogica" and geo$o"itica" im$u"ses to.ard mutua" mistrust and strategic riva"ry. #o be sure, economic issues were, at times, a source of contention.
(till, recurrent disputes over intellectual property rights, subsidies and currency values were never serious enough to threaten bilateral flows of trade and investment, still less to poison the larger political relationship between the :nited (tates and 0hina.U #he current crisis may mark the end of a period in which trade served to stabilise (ino/American relations and the beginning of one in which it will become a source of increasing friction and conflict. Recent events may a"so "ead

to at "east a $artia" decou$"ing o2 t/e t.o nations6 economies , a development that could have significant implications for their dealings with
each other, and with the rest of the world.U Dor the better part of two decades the :nited (tates has been importing more from 0hina than it e>ports and paying for the difference with #reasury bills and other dollar/denominated assets. $espite the fact that it was heavily lopsided, this arrangement had clear benefits for both sides.


American consumers en1oyed ine>pensive goods and lower interest rates than would otherwise have been possible. Dor their part, 0hinese manufacturers -or, more precisely, manufacturers with final production facilities in 0hina, some of which were actually owned by American and other foreign companies. gained access to the vast :( market. #he 0hinese government helped boost e>ports by holding down the value of the renminbi -by using it to buy dollars. and invested the resulting surplus in #reasury securities and other dollar/denominated assets that were generally assumed to be safe, stable investments. U Gver time, cheap 0hinese imports did cost some Americans their 1obs, but with the :( economy growing steadily through most of the "BB4s, these negative effects were small in comparison to the actual and perceived potential benefits of more trade with 0hina. In terms of their political clout, the industries that hoped to gain from this trade -aerospace, electronics and financial services, among others. and which therefore opposed the imposition of any protectionist measures were also far stronger than their opponents. Drom the early "BB4s the e>ecutive branch was thus able to deflect demands for tariffs or other industry/specific measures by \1aw/boning @ei1ing into making small ad1ustments in e>change rates that were presumed to help all American e>porters. In spite of this, between )44F and )44A, 5F pieces of legislation were introduced in 0ongress for the purpose either of raising the cost of specific 0hinese imports or, by threatening to impose across/the/board tariffs, compelling @ei1ing to modify its e>change/rate policy. 2one of these bills could generate sufficient support, in large part because, as Roach notes, \they were introduced during a period of prosperity and low unemployment . With the onset of the crisis both conditions have changed, with the result that \long/standing pressures on American workers are intensifying M as are related pressures on their elected representatives to act .)5U I2 gro.t/ remains s"o. and unem$"oyment stays /ig/ , the balance of $o"itica" 2orces cou"d begin to s/i2t in 2avour o2 $rotection. 8ven as calls for trade restrictions grow, the increasing frustration of many American companies at their inability to protect intellectual property, compete with favoured local rivals, and make money in the 0hinese market means that the advocates of continued openness are less united and less powerful than they once were.)F Serious measures to restrict im$orts 2rom C/ina .ou"d endanger t/at country;s

recovery and long/term growth and .ou"d "i e"y trigger an esca"atory res$onse and a do.n.ard s$ira" in trade and $o"itica" re"ations. $espite the obvious dangers, the odds of this happening over the ne>t several years are probably greater than at any time since #iananmen and perhaps since the era of \reform and opening up began in the late "BA4s. Indeed, t/e $ossi8i"ity o2 a 0SGC/ina trade .ar /as 8een identi2ied by some market analysts as Ut/e 8iggest ris to g"o8a" sta8i"ity over t/e next 2e. years6 .)QU Dor the moment, trade tensions
have been channelled into the continuing dispute over currency values. 9ere, although they have thus far behaved cautiously, @ei1ing and Washington are playing what amounts to a game of \chicken . Rather than proceed immediately with a formal accusation of currency manipulation, as future #reasury (ecretary #imothy &eithner hinted that it might during the )44? presidential campaign, in its first year in office the @arack Gbama administration allowed congressional pressure to build, while at the same time hinting that it might not be able to hold back popular demands for action.)A Public statements by top :( officials seemed designed to convey the message that, whatever sound economic reasoning might dictate, and regardless of the preferences of leaders on both sides, failure to make ad1ustments could have grave conse%uences that neither will be able to control. As Gbama himself put it towards the end of )44B, if the two countries do not succeed in correcting deep economic imbalances, they will impose \enormous strains on their relationship.)? U @ei1ing and Washington are playing a game of \chicken U @ei1ingPs announcement in June )4"4 that it would \enhance the renminbiPs \e>change rate fle>ibility seems to have been designed in large part to deflect pressure from the :nited (tates and 0hinaPs other advanced industrial trading partners.)B Whether the resulting ad1ustments will be sufficient to achieve this end remains, at this writing, unclear, but there are reasons to doubt it. Within hours of its formal statement, the PeoplePs @ank of 0hina indicated that it did not consider large/scale shifts in currency values to be 1ustified, provoking angry responses from American politicians and trade/association representatives.64 U Whatever its economic effects, an escalating (ino/American commercial conflict presents the most likely near/term path to a far more hostile political relationship and a much more intense and open strategic rivalry. Rising trade tensions would also increase the chances that 0hina might try at some point to use the potential leverage it appears to have ac%uired by becoming AmericaPs leading creditor. If @ei1ing were to dump its stash of dollar/denominated assets :( interest rates would climb, the value of the dollar would fall and the American economy would be thrust into a deep and protracted recession. (uch a scenario is generally thought to be implausible in large measure because, even as it inflicted pain on the :nited (tates, 0hina would also do be doing grave damage to itself. A falling dollar and a decline in aggregate demand in the :nited (tates would mean fewer American imports of 0hinese goods, and this is to say nothing of the likelihood that Washington would retaliate for what it would doubtless see as an act of economic warfare by imposing steep tariffs on all products from 0hina. 8%ually troubling from @ei1ingPs perspective is the prospect that a sudden shift in e>change rates would greatly diminish the value of its remaining assets, most of which would still be denominated in dollars. @ecause any attempt to use it would risk unleashing something akin to mutually assured destruction, 0hina is widely assumed to be constrained from e>ploiting its position as AmericaPs banker.6" U 0linton downplayed disputes over human rightsU #his assessment is basically correct, but with two caveats. Potential leverage does not necessarily have to be e>ercised in order to be effective. #he behaviour of :( officials is already being shaped to an unprecedented degree by their concern over the possibility of 0hinese action -or inaction. in global financial markets. While this is surely not the only reason, the current administration appears to have adopted a more conciliatory tone towards 0hina in part because of its desire to ensure future purchases of AmericaPs ballooning debt. #hus, during her first visit to @ei1ing in )44B, (ecretary of (tate 9illary 0linton publicly downplayed disputes over human/rights issues while at the same time taking the unusual step of publicly asking 0hinese officials to continue to buy :( #reasuries.6) U Whatever the Gbama administration intends, its conciliatory posture is widely perceived to be a direct result of straitened financial circumstances. Prior to the presidentPs 2ovember )44B visit to 0hina, a piece in the 2ew Sork #imes argued that :( indebtedness had \changed the core of the (ino/American relationship. \#he result! unlike his immediate predecessors, who publicly pushed and prodded 0hina H Er. Gbama will be spending less time e>horting @ei1ing and more time reassuring it. 66 #his is a change that many in 0hina clearly welcome and, indeed, have come to e>pect. As one high/ranking banking official put it in an interview with 1ournalist James Dallows! \your economy is H built on the support, the gratuitous support, of a lot of countries. (o why don t you come over and H I won t say kowtow Kwith a laughL, but at least be nice to the countries that lend you money. 65U Even t/ose ./o are sce$tica" that @eiKing can use 2inancia" "everage to com$e" t/e

0nited States to c/ange its 8e/aviour on s$eci2ic issues agree t/at it is no. in a muc/ 8etter $osition to deter overt (merican in2"uence attem$ts . In a careful analysis of this issue $aniel $re;ner notes, for e>ample, that by spring )44B, :( government officials had decided that their financial position made it too dangerous to risk a showdown with 0hina over e>change rates. $re;ner concludes that \although C/ina could not compel the :nited (tates, it cou"d deter Was/ington 2rom trying to a$$"y its o.n 2oreign $o"icy $ressure .6FU #he assumption that deep financial interdependence will lead to stable, mutual deterrence is more comforting than it ought to be. It may well be true that economic .ar2are, like nuclear war, .ou"d do terri8"e damage to a"" invo"ved but, as with nuclear weapons, t/is does not mean t/at suc/ a con2"ict is im$ossi8"e. =eaders may miscalculate the e>tent of the damage they would suffer, conclude that the stakes in a given confrontation are so high that they 1ustify
running e>traordinary risks, or feel compelled to act in potentially self/destructive ways by domestic political pressure. As risky as a confrontation between two nuclear/ armed nations might be, there are also special dangers of unintended escalation in the financial arena where \panics are always possible and relevant decisions are made not merely by a handful of \national command authorities , but by large numbers of independent investors.


&ec"ine War()* #8 &is$roves

)/e economic recession in #8 doesn6t dis$rove our c"aims. 'sti"" 2ee"ing e22ects 'structura" c/anges 8et.een 0S4C/ina Iried8erg 1# M Ph$, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton :niversity
Aaron, A/)"/"4, +Implications of the Dinancial 0risis for the :(M0hina Rivalry, (urvival! &lobal Politics and (trategy <olume F), Issue 5

)/e 2u"" e22ects o2 t/e 2inancia" crisis /ave yet to 8e 2e"t 8ecause , in many respects, t/e crisis is not yet over. We do not yet no. i2 t/e mix o2 $o"icies $resent"y in $"ace in the :nited (tates, 0hina and elsewhere .i"" 8e su22icient over t/e next severa" years to restore steady g"o8a" economic gro.t/ and /ead o22 2urt/er resort to $rotectionism. Nor is it c"ear /o. Was/ington and @eiKing .i"" address t/e structura" im8a"ances in trade and 2inance 8roug/t so $"ain"y into vie. 8y t/e current crisis. With that said, let us close with some speculative thoughts on the three sets of issues analysed above! the impact of the crisis on the capacities of the two Pacific powers, their bilateral relations and their dealings with the rest of the world. U At least 2or t/e next severa" years1 and possibly for much of the coming decade, t/e )4#8M4B crisis .i"" ma e it more di22icu"t 2or t/e 0nited States to generate t/e 2inancia" resources necessary to .age an esca"ating arms com$etition .it/ C/ina . Gn the other hand, 0hinaPs seemingly rapid recovery from the recent downturn may be illusory and could prove fleeting. 0n"ess t/ey are su$$"emented 8y more e22ective measures aimed at increasing domestic consum$tion1 t/e $o"icies used to revive aggregate demand cou"d end u$ /astening a dee$er and more .ide'ranging systemic crisis. Dinally, it is $ossi8"e t/at concern over t/e conse>uences o2 a $rotracted economic s" 2or socia" sta8i"ity cou"d introduce an e"ement o2 un$redicta8i"ity and variance into C/ina;s "eaders/i$ $o"itics1 as .e"" as its de2ence and 2oreign $o"icies. (mong t/e more negative conse>uences , from a :( perspective, .ou"d 8e a succession strugg"e in ./ic/ t/e .inners used extreme nationa"ist a$$ea"s to /e"$ discredit t/eir o$$onents and gain $o.er1 8oosted mi"itary s$ending to $um$ u$ t/e economy and ado$ted a more con2rontationa" stance to.ards t/e rest o2 t/e .or"d. = 8ven without such dramatic shifts in @ei1ing, economic issues are "i e"y to 8ecome a source o2 increasing 2riction in Sino'(merican re"ations over t/e next severa" years. )/is .i"" ma e it even more di22icu"t 2or eac/ country to ado$t t/e inds o2 $o"icies necessary to re8a"ance t/eir overa"" economic re"ations/i$. Instead of helping to damp down underlying geopolitical and ideological impulses towards competition, economic factors could become an accelerant. #/e recent crisis may a"so 8e s$eeding a degree o2 se$aration 8et.een t/e 0S and C/inese economies , as
American imports of 0hinese manufactured goods drop, 0hinaPs surpluses shrink and @ei1ing begins to diversify its investments and increase its reliance on domestic demand and internally generated capital.U Wea ening interde$endence across t/e Baci2ic cou"d 8e accom$anied 8y a more o$en

and direct attem$t 8y C/ina to 8ui"d an East (sian economic and $o"itica" Ucommunity6 centred on itse"2 and margina"ising t/e 0nited States. -(uch a tendency would be intensified if the :nited (tates adopts a more protectionist stance towards others in the
region, as well as toward 0hina.. While reports of the imminent demise of the dollar and of AmericaPs soft power relative to 0hinaPs are e>aggerated, both developments have been made more plausible by the events of the past two years. #he belief that 0hinaPs rise is inevitable and may be accelerating is generating respect, but also an>iety, and this is likely to intensify impulses toward balancing that are already present across Asia. #he inclination of others to bet on the :nited (tates and to follow its lead will be determined, at least in part, by perceptions of its willingness and ability to meet the economic challenges it now confronts.


&ec"ine War()* No Resources

Resources aren6t a c/a""engea8undance o2 .ea$ons Reg/r 1% M (enior Dellow in Arctic (ecurity at #he (imons Doundation 8rnie, )/5/"6, +Intrastate 0onflict! $ata, #rends and $rivers,

Even t/oug/ $o"itica" and economic conditions may 8e in $"ace to t/reaten t/e onset o2 armed con2"ict in a particular conte>t, generating t/e ca$acity to underta e armed con2"ict is not easy. It is signi2icant"y c/a""enging to assem8"e t/e financial, combat, and political/psychological resources needed to mount a sustained e22ort to c/a""enge existing aut/orities 8y means o2 vio"ence.U 0n2ortunate"y, however, t/at c/a""enge is mitigated 8y t/e a8undance o2 .ea$ons in most regions o2 $ro"onged con2"ict. #hus, many non'state grou$s1 as well as states, /ave t/e means to 8ui"d t/e ca$a8i"ity 2or armed con2"ict G ./ic/ doesn6t mean t/ey /ave t/e ca$acity to $revai" . #hese ubi%uitous small arms and light weapons -from assault rifles to
locally fashioned e>plosive devices. employ relatively simple technologies that are not only widely available but are readily useable by non/military combatants, including the children that are forced to become child combatants.K)QLU &emogra$/ic 2actors can 2urt/er add ca$acity and o$$ortunity. 9alf of the population of the Arab world is under 64 years of age.K)AL In 8gypt, with two/thirds of the population under 64, educated, urbani;ed, and unemployed young people were key to the e>traordinary revolution there.K)?L (ub/(ahara Africa is even younger, with some countries like :ganda with A4 percent of the population under 64.K)BL #he advent of liberal democracies is associated with older populations, meaning that as Arab and African populations age, the prospects for less combat and for more stability and accountable governance increase, but in the meantime a large, young, male population adds an e>tra layer of volatility. U In a sense, small arms facilitate what can be described as the demilitari;ation of war M without any particular e>pertise or training re%uired, small arms and light weapons have helped to transform armed combat from the +profession of war,, carried out by professional military organi;ations and soldiers, or even volunteer soldiers trained and commanded by professionals. Eost armed conflicts involve the armed forces of a &overnment on one side, but some don t and in many cases antigovernment forces are civilian or citi;en fighters rather than trained soldiers. 0ivilians are the primary victims of contemporary war,K64L but they have also become the principle combatants. #he :2 (ecretary &eneral reports regularly on the plight of civilians in combat situations, and the most recent report concluded that +civilians still account for the vast ma1ority of casualties and continue to be targetedH,,K6"L and at least part of what lies behind this is the fact that the distinctions between civilians and civilian combatants is blurred.U In addition to 8asic mi"itary ca$a8i"ities1 organi9ationa" ca$acity and governance structures .it/in

a22ected communities 8ecome im$ortant means o2 mo8i"i9ing and retaining $o$u"ar consent 2or armed strugg"e .
Access to media, including of course modern social media to influence an international constituency, comes into play, as does foreign assistance -sometimes through diaspora communities.. What are referred to as +opportunity structures, -that is, the environmental or conte>tual opportunities or restraints. can play a ma1or role. (uch factors as terrain on which to battle -e.g. mountains available for hideouts., opportunities to +loot, or commandeer resources, a supportive diaspora, sympathetic foreign governments or rebel groups M all of these and other factors contribute to or restrain the military option. U In advanced armed cam$aigns t/ere

inevita8"y emerge 8ene2its t/at 2"o. to actors in .ar t/at are not avai"a8"e in $eace -employment, spoils of war.. In that sense, does not re$resent anarc/y1 8ut an a"ternative order 2or o8taining and distri8uting $ and $ro2it.V = )/e $resence o2 strong identity grou$s can a"so 8e understood as a con2"ict WresourceV or Wo$$ortunityV inasmuc/ as an identity grou$ o22ers an a"ternative to t/e state 2or a socia" com$act.