G.R. No. 124062. January 21, 1999]COMETA vs CA FACTS: Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc.

(SITI),formerly State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI), is aninvestment house engaged in quasi-banking activities.Petitioner Reynaldo Cometa is its president. Privaterespondent Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI), on theother hand, is a corporation engaged in the businessof developing, constructing, and selling townhousesand condominium units. Private respondent ReynaldoGuevara is president of HBI and chairman of the boardof directors of Guevent Industrial Development Corp.(GIDC).An information for Falsification of Public Documentwas thus filed against private respondent Guevara int h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t o f M a k a t i . A f t e r t h e pr osecution presented its evidence, Guevara filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted.Following the dismissal of the criminal case againsthim, private respondents Reynaldo S. Guevara and HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution againstp e t i t i o n e r s C o m e t a a n d S I T I i n t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l Court of Quezon City.Petitioners SITI and Cometa filed their respective answers.After the pretrial of the case, they filed a joint motion to dismiss with alternative motion to drop respondent HBI asa party plaintiff, upon the following grounds: The complaints t a t e s n o c a u s e o f a c t i o n ; S e c r e t a r y D r i l o n , Undersecretary Bello and the prosecutor, not impleadedherein, are the real parties in -interest-defendants, which again makes the complaint lack a cause of action. At theleast, the above public official are indispensable parties,a n d t h e i r n o n i n c l u s i o n r e n d e r s t h i s c o u r t w i t h o u t jurisdiction over the case; The action seeks to impose ap e n a l t y o n t h e r i g h t t o l i t i g a t e a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n i s uncon stitutional and against settled public policy.T r i a l c o u r t a f t e r a t h o r o u g h p e r u s a l o f t h e c o n t e n t s embodied in said pleadings, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion finds that there are sufficient allegationsof cause of action in the Complaint. The defense of lack of c a u s e o f a c t i o n , a n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t t h e r e a l parties in interest, in the considered opinion of this Court,are matters of defense, which will be considered, after thecontending parties thru counsel shall have rested their cases, and the case submitted for Decision.P e t i t i o n e r s , i n s e p a r a t e m o t i o n s , a s k e d f o r a reconsideration but their motions were denied. C A rendered its decision denying the petition for certiorari andp r o h i b i t i o n o f p e t i t i o n e r s . P e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r reconside ration but the appellate court denied their motion.Hence, this petition. The principal question for decision iswhether the complaint filed by private respondents againstpetitioners in the Regional Trial Court states a cause of a c t i o n . F i r s t , p e t i t i o n e r s m a i n t a i n i t d o e s n o t

as thea l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t a n d i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t i e s w e r e n o t i m p l e a d e d i n t h e c a s e . Secondly, they contend that private respondent HBI shouldhave been dropped as a party plaintiff upon petitioners’ motion therefor. Both contentions are without merit. First . A complaint for malicious prosecution states a causeof action if it alleges: 1. that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the prosecution;2 . t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n f i n a l l y t e r m i n a t e d i n t h e plaintiff’s acquittal;3. that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and 4. that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives. Whether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitleplaintiff to a judgment. Otherwise stated, can a judgment be rendered upon the facts alleged and deemed admitted,i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r a y e r i n t h e c o m p l a i n t ? T o resolve this, the allegations of the complaint must beexamined.T h e m e r e a l l e g a t i o n i n a c o m p l a i n t f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n t h a t a n i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d a f t e r preliminary investigation and that a warrant of arrestw a s t h e r e a f t e r i s s u e d d o e s n o t b y i t s e l f n e g a t e allegations in the same complaint that the prosecutionw a s m a l i c i o u s . A l l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s a r e b y d i r ection and control of the public prosecutor. Tos u s t a i n p e t i t i o n e rs’ stand that an allegation in ac o m p l a i n t f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n t h a t t h e information in the criminal ca se was filed after appropriate preliminary investigation n e g a t e s a contrary allegation that the filing of the c a s e w a s malicious would result in the dismissal of every actionfor malicious prosecution.In contrast, the decision of the criminal court in the present case indicates that there was not even primafacie evidence to prove the alleged guilt of thea c c u s e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a t r i a l w a s i n f a c t unnecessary and the criminal court dismissed the caseagainst private respondent Guevara on the basis of ademurrer to evidence. Second . Petitioners contend that the Secretary andthe Undersecretary of the Department of Justice and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor should have beenincluded in the case for malicious prosecution becauseit was they who found probable cause against privater e s p o n d e n t s a n d u n d e r t h e l a w t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f criminal actions is vested in the public prosecutor.A c c o r d i n g t o p e t i t i o n e r s , t h e y d i d n o t c o n d u c t thepreliminary investigation or order the filing of aninformation a n d t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n w a s l i m i t e d t o initiating the investigation in the NBI and testifying.There is no merit in this contention. The issue in thosecases was not whether the complaint stated a cause of action against defendants who were

complainants inthe criminal cases which led to the filing of civil casesf o r d a m a g e s b u t w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e l i a b l e t o t h e plaintiff s. The Court merely ruled in those cases that the complainant in the criminal case is not necessarilyliable simply because he initiated the criminal casewhich eventually was dismissed. It is noteworthy that,i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s d o n o t o n l y allege that petitioners initiated the filing of the criminalcase against them but that because of the evidence they (petitioners) presented, the Department of Justicec o u l d h a v e b e e n i n d u c e d t o o r d e r t h e f i l i n g o f a crimin al case in court. Third . It is contended that HBI is not a real -party-in-interest, whatever interest it may have being purelyspeculative. On this point, we think the Court of Appealscorrectly ruled.It is true that a criminal case can only be filed against theofficers of a corporation and not against the corporation i t s e l f . I t does not follow from this, however, that t h e c o r p o r a t i o n c a n n o t b e a r e a l - p a r t y - i n - i n t e r e s t f o r t h e purpose of bringing a civil action for malicious prosecution.

Reynaldo Cometa is the president of State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI), a lending firm. Reynaldo Guevara is the president of Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI), a real estate developer. Guevara is also the chairman of the board of Guevent Industrial Development Corp., (GIDC). GIDC took out a loan from SITI and secured the loan by mortgaging some of its properties to SITI. GIDC defaulted in paying and so SITI foreclosed the mortgaged assets. GIDC later sued SITI as it alleged that the foreclosure was irregular. While the case was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement where GIDC accepted HBI’s offer to purchase the mortgaged assets. But SITI did not approve of said proposal. GIDC then filed a request for clarification with the trial court and the latter directed SITI to accept the proposal. Meanwhile, HBI filed a request with the HLURB asking the latter to grant them the right to develop the mortgaged assets. HBI submitted an affidavit allegedly signed by Cometa. The affidavit purported that Cometa and SITI is not opposing HBI’s petition with the HLURB. Cometa assailed the affidavit as it was apparently forged as proven by an NBI investigation. Subsequently, Cometa filed a criminal action for falsification of public document against Guevara. The prosecutor initially did not file the information as he finds no cause of action but the then DOJ Secretary (Drilon) directed the fiscal to file an information against Guevara. The case was dismissed. In turn, Guevara filed a civil case for malicious prosecution against Cometa. Guevara, in his complaint, included HBI as a co-plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not HBI is appropriately added as a co-plaintiff. HELD: Yes. It is true that a criminal case can only be filed against the officers of a corporation and not against the corporation itself. But it does not follow that the corporation cannot be a real-party-in-interest for the purpose of bringing a civil action for malicious prosecution. As pointed out by the trial judge, and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the allegation by Cometa that Guevara has no cause of action with HBI not being a real party in interest is a matter of defense which can only be decisively determined in a full blown trial. Urban bank vs pena In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Peña had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Peña. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Peña to negotiate with the tenants. Peña had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Peña then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Peña explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Peña asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Peña also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or ( P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Peña should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Peña also asked that said authorization be put into writing. The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI). Peña was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally under the possession of UBI, Peña began sending demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million. But UBI refused to make payment hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery against UBI. The trial court ruled in favor of Peña as it found there indeed was a contract of agency created between and UBI and that Peña is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28 million. The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Peña is entitled to payment but applying

RAMNANI.5 million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1. Total of P4.5 million for his legal services. The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business. DECISION DEL CASTILLO. P1. Respondent. G. SP No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. he is entitled to receive P1. the principle of quantum meruit should be applied. Also . In dealing with the tenants. Absent any such agreement. In the first place. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. it is a profession in which duty to public service. Peña is entitled to receive what he merit for his services. other than the self-serving testimony of Peña. 24858. In this case. is the primary consideration. HELD: No. Peña didn’t have to perform any extraordin ary acts or legal maneuvering. vs. 2010 JOSE DELOS REYES. 87972. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. Hence. 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.: A judgment debt is enforced by the levy and sale of the debtor’s property.R. Branch 159 in Civil Case No.R. Peña should only be paid P3 million. which affirmed the August 19.5 million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants.1 The issuance of the final certificate of sale to the purchaser at the execution sale is a mere formality upon the debtor’s failure to redeem the property within the redemption period. 20044 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Peña should be paid.5 million. 169135 June 18.the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million. This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the May 13. not money. Peña is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank. Petitioner. or as much as he has earned. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property. No. but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. 20043 and November 10. to wit. J.

On March 8. Thereafter. respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6. 1978. the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 2004. Consequently. and this Court hereby directs the Branch Sheriff of this Court to issue the corresponding Final Certificate of Sale in the above-entitled case in accordance with the rules immediately upon receipt hereof. however. Thus. premises considered.assailed is the August 3. 480537. Factual Antecedents On October 11. the motion is hereby GRANTED. Thereafter. 1977 Decision. 1978. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court In its August 19. 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription. Ramnani. 1990. 1990. a writ of possession was issued by the trial court. 24858 in favor of respondent Josephine Anne B. SO ORDERED. respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. On November 17. 480537 only on March 8. On June 6. petitioner did not exercise his right to redeem the subject property within one year from said registration. 1978. 2004 Order. what remains to be done is the issuance of the final certificate of sale which was. the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. Although the certificate of sale was annotated on TCT No. not promptly accomplished at that time due to the demise of the trial court’s sheriff. 2001. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11. 480537 (subject property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. 1977.6 The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. 2005 Resolution5 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. the trial court granted the motion: WHEREFORE. the taxes due on the sale of the subject property were paid on September 26. a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on even date. then Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Less than a year from the October 11. 1avvphi1 On February 17. .

2004. 2004 and November 10. 2004 of the RTC. Petitioner thereafter sought review via certiorari before the CA. 2. 2005 Decision: WHEREFORE. 24858 are hereby AFFIRMED. Branch 159. The orders dated August 19. Issues 1. 2004 filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of hearing. hence. Pasig City in Civil Case No. laches or estoppel. Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion and the subsequent issuance of the Orders dated August 19. Whether respondent is barred by prescription. it agreed with the trial court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription.7 In affirming the ruling of the trial court. premises considered. He further claims that the subject motion seeks to enforce the trial court’s October 11. 1978. laches or estoppel because the October 11. 2004 Order. 1977 Decision which can no longer be done because 27 years have elapsed from the finality of said Decision. 1977 Decision was already executed through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6. Further. She also points out that said motion is not barred by . Respondent’s Arguments Respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. the petition is hereby DENIED.Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in its November 10.8 Petitioner’s Arguments Petitioner contends that the motion dated February 16. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because petitioner failed to redeem the subject property. SO ORDERED. 2004 and November 10. the three-day notice rule does not apply. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA denied the petition in its assailed May 13. the CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion.

the CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. validly claim that he was denied his day in court. argues that the October 11. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right. The expiration of the one-year redemption period foreclosed petitioner’s right to redeem the subject property and the sale thereby became absolute. This is erroneous. all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4. the subject property was sold on execution sale. excepted from this rule are nonlitigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. thus.prescription. a certificate of sale was executed by the sheriff in her favor on the same day. 1977 Decision was already enforced when the subject property was levied and sold on June 6. At any rate. As to petitioner’s claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing. as a general rule. It is not disputed that shortly after the trial court rendered the aforesaid judgment. Petitioner cannot. The issuance thereafter of a final certificate of sale is a mere formality and confirmation of the title that is already vested in respondent. in essence. While. Petitioner. laches and estoppel considering that the levy and sale of the subject property was conducted on June 6. . likewise. 1977 Decision was not timely executed because of respondent’s failure to secure the final certificate of sale within 10 years from the entry of said judgment. 2004 before the trial court.12 As already discussed. not disputed that petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within one year from the annotation of the certificate of sale on TCT No. 1978.13 Hence. On June 6. therefore. the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. It is. respondent moved for execution which was granted by the trial court. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. 480537. 1978 which is within the five-year period for the execution of a judgment by motion under Section 6. the October 11.10Thus. the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/ Opposition14 on March 1. As correctly held by the trial court. the trial court properly granted the motion for issuance of the final certificate of sale. Respondent emerged as the highest bidder.9 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 1978 and petitioner failed to redeem the same.11 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

The instant case originated from a complaint for collection for a sum of money which petitioner filed against Unified Capital Management Corporation (UNICAP) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati – Branch 135. accounts receivables and collectibles" arising from the aforementioned policies. Respondents. 2003 and January 12. Petitioner. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth division) AND INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.: Petitioner Leoncio S. SP No. (Insular). Ltd. Insular is not a party to the case and cannot avail of the writ of certiorari. shares. On July 9. The May 13. which gave due course to the petition for certiorari of private respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. he went after UNICAP’s debtors. SOLIDUM. 2004.. Sheriff Artemio Cruz served upon Insular the first Notice of Garnishment2 which ordered Insular not to dispose of "all sums of money. G. . 1997 two (2) Deeds of Relative Assignment1 to UNICAP. 161647 June 22.R. 1999. 2005 Decision and August 3. DECISION PUNO. credits. Petitioner avers that there are other plain.R. LTD. The Deeds assigned to UNICAP "all moneys that may be payable to [Susan Yee Soon] and [her] beneficiary/ies from the basic proceeds" of life insurance policies No. Petitioner obtained favorable judgment on May 20. 2006 LEONCIO S. 1999 but was not able to get full payment from UNICAP. Solidum appeals via petition for review on certiorari the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 29. vs. adequate and speedy remedies available to Insular under the ordinary course of law.WHEREFORE. No. He further contends that being a mere garnishee. respondent court should have dismissed the petition. A second Notice of Garnishment3 dated August 23. executed on September 17. 1999 reiterated the first Notice. Hence. It appears that one of the debtors. interest. the petition is DENIED. A001122777 issued by Insular. 87972 are AFFIRMED. J. respectively. 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Susan Yee Soon. A001122766 and No. Thus.

000. charge or indebtedness that Insular may have on the policies.. He testified that Susan Yee Soon obtained a P550. the trial court conducted a summary hearing to resolve the motion for reconsideration. 1999. petitioner moved for the issuance of an Order directing the sheriff to collect the proceeds of the policies. The Manifestation and Motion was granted on January 4."7 In a letter8 dated August 7. shares. 2001 which petitioner opposed. 2001. On June 1.12 the trial court.e. 2000.10 Insular filed an Omnibus Motion11 dated January 24.64.5 In a letter6 of the same date.18 On September 18. Insular filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 on August 21. 2000. Atty. Renato S.616. and further. It did not include dividends arising from the policies. 2001. 2000 praying that the trial court issue an Order directing Insular to comply with the Order of July 18. Padilla. account receivables and collectibles of xxx Susan Yee Soon under [the policies]. Insular again hedged in complying with the Order.In a letter4 dated August 30. in an Order13 dated February 19. the sheriff wrote Insular requesting for the release of the garnished credits but this time. Insular averred that the "basic policy proceeds" may only be paid upon the occurrence of the risk subject of the insurance – i.00 loan from each of the subject policies . 2001 requesting for a clarification of the issues and a reconsideration of the Order dated July 18. credits. the court issued its questioned Order16 on August 7. Insular refused to release the garnished amounts. Insular presented the sole testimony of its Customer Servicing Department Head." Again. 2001. 2000. credits. denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Insular refused. account receivables and collectibles of the subject policies. the trial court ordered Insular to release to petitioner "the annual dividend xxx due and payable on 17 September 1999 and the subsequent dividends payable every anniversary date of the policy xxx and such all money. 2001. de Jesus from the Legal Affairs of Insular gave the assurance that it "shall hold the release of any sums (sic) of money. Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and Motion9 dated December 7. interest. A001122766 and A001122777 xxx in the total sum of PhP1.900. Petitioner filed a Motion in the trial court to direct Insular to comply with its Orders and Notices of Garnishment. On July 18. Jose A.15 Acting on the motion. Mr.14 Insular opposed. 2001 directing the sheriff "to xxx collect xxx from the garnishee Insular xxx the proceeds of [P]olicy Nos. shares. the death of Susan Yee Soon. It argued that what was assigned in the Deeds of Relative Assignment was limited to the total face value of the policies. After comment by the petitioner." On April 17. depending on any lien. Still. 2000. 2000. interest.

A001122777.22 Insularformally offered its evidence on November 16.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 12. the movant has no basis to withhold the proceeds of the policy. she assigned to UNICAP her policies taken from Insular. "E-1" and "F" leaves the movant with no evidence of the loan agreement between the policyholder Susan Yee Soon and the movant. Such debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor. 2002 Orders of the trial court. It cites some stranger to the litigation who is debtor to one of the parties to the action. Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a judgment debtor which may be found owing to such debtor by a third person. the exclusion of Exhibits "E". 2001 and June 7. In its Order dated June 7. having acquired jurisdiction over his person by means of citation. It then annulled and set aside the August 7.21 and the Statement of Loan Transaction for Policy No.20 the Deeds of Relative Assignment of the subject policies. viz. the issues raised therein are mere rehash of the arguments previously considered and resolved by the Court. 2004. the Court hereby orders the reiteration of the Order dated 07 August 2001.25 We grant the petition. Hence. As security for the loans. and the court. 2001 and all the documentary evidence was admitted by the trial court.23 Insular filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Moreover. However. this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND/OR COMMITTTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT GARNISHEE INSULAR DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT SAID GARNISHEE IS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE.from UNICAP. 2002. A001122766.19 He presented photocopies of the Policy Loan Agreement for Policy No.: On the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition. Thus. it denied Insular’s Motion for Reconsideration. requires . A001122777 was inadmissible for lack of proof of due execution and authenticity. upon Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner that the Policy Loan Agreement for Policy No. BUT A THIRD[-]PARTY CLAIMANT. There being no such evidence. It alleged that the judge gravely abused his discretion when he issued the questioned Order despite its adverse claim on the garnished amounts. the court excluded the questioned document.

did not avail any of the remedies provided by the rules. as garnishee. the filing of such bond shall not be required. the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. . files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the thirdparty claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. not to his former creditor. Later on. and the garnishee. it is plain that private respondent Insular. and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy. on demand of the officer. and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee. to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. it changed its stance and resisted payment by filing an Omnibus Motion . Proceedings where property claimed by third person. or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.26 Garnishment involves at least three (3) persons: the judgment creditor. In the case at bar.: Section 16. but to the new creditor.him to pay his debt. who is creditor in the main litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another. When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. or the person cited who in turn is supposed to be indebted to the judgment creditor. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. however.If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent. and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof. the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose. initially not contesting petitioner’s right to the basic proceeds of Susan Yee Soon’s insurance policies. he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor. In case of disagreement as to such value. Section 16 of Rule 39 provides the remedies. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action. the officer shall not be bound to keep the property. the judgment debtor. or any officer duly representing it.27 In case the garnishee asserts his own rights over the garnished property. The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property. viz. it wrote letters to the trial court. After it was impleaded as garnishee. unless such judgment obligee. stating the grounds of such right or title.

Inc. Inc. petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be unavailing because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge cancelling the indemnity bond. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. v. held: .28 We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-party claim. thru Mr. in denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court quashing the third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee. a third-party claim which was denied by the respondent judge in the disputed resolution. Northern Motors. 1955. Coquia. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action to determine the ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff. May 10.31 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court]. Bayona. ruled: From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor.30 the petitioner filed. nor any plain. neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. an action for damages against the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond. Rodriguez. a third-party claimant has two remedies. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. the Court held: Pursuant to [Section 17.29 In the case of Northern Motors.and Motions for Reconsideration of the orders of the trial court. thru Mr. this Court. In Lara vs. and aseparate and independent action to vindicate his claim to the property. It even appealed to respondent court via a petition for certiorari. Justice Makasiar. Trite to state. In resolving whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's third-party claim. It is filed when a tribunal. thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution and order of the respondent judge. certiorari is an extraordinary remedy when there is no appeal. Justice Concepcion. Such an order as well as the order denying a motion to reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims. xxx this Court (First Division). L-7920. among others. later Chief Justice. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. What then would the remedy be of the third-party claimants? In the recent case of Serra vs. such as. In the case at bar.

strictly speaking. [January 16. REYNATO S. he could not.34 IN VIEW WHEREOF. 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution. hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition. are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.R. SO ORDERED. 185064. 2003 and January 12.32 (Emphases supplied. SP No. if the term "appeal" may be properly employed.R. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. respectively. for purposes of exemption from execution: First.Pursuant to this provision. PUNO DE MESA V. is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. 2012] DOCTRINE: Rules on constitution of family homes. the petition is GRANTED. the appeal that should be interposed. In short. he has another "plain. . In fine. nothing contained therein shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action. 72637 dated September 29. family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or before August 3. 2004.33 The rights of a third-party claimant should be decided in a separate action to be instituted by the third person." and. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G." Neither does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by appropriate proceedings.) The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action. No. but should file a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. appeal from the order denying its claim. ACERO G.

but were existing thereafter. A year after. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Third. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.000 from Claudio Acero. are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such. 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Acero demanded . This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan. FACTS: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.Second. family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemptionmerely alleges that such property is a family home. A house was contracted in the said property. family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100. it must be claimed not by the sheriff. which became their family home. Bulacan.

which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and. RTC dismissed the complaint.P. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B. 22 in the RTC. the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff. the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued. giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. ISSUE: . CA affirmed RTC’s decision. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100.payment. could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed. The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property.000 plus legal interest. Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property. However. thus. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a family home. The MTC rendered a Decision.

Second. 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. may be subject to execution in this case. . family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. HELD: YES.distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. RATIO: For the family home to be exempt from execution.In general.Whether or not the subject property. for purposes of exemption from execution. the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes. the family home is exempt from execution. could be summarized as follows: First. family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3. 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution. the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. However. as a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA. are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. J. No. v. JR. Here. however. 185064. 16 January 2012.. the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. G.R. but were existing thereafter. Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.Third. that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. should have been exempt from execution. Still. SECOND DIVISION (Reyes. et al. when the Family Code took effect on August 3. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D.) . et al. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home. 1988. family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. ACERO. thus. the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. There was no showing.

The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. seeking to nullify TCT No. is generally exempt from execution. However. Indeed. However. and thus.. this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time . Acero Jr. the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family home within the prescribed period. respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). being the highest bidder. Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Thereafter. forced sale or attachment. the RTC dismissed their complaint. Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. inalienable and free from attachment. In their defense. Unable to collect the rentals due. FACTS: Claudio D. which is gratuitous. The family home is a real right. otherwise laches will set in. from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution HELD: Petition DENIED. It is likewise without dispute that the family home.

July 27. respondent. complainant. 2011] FACTS: Respondent was charged of negligence and grave misconduct for levying a Honda Civic Sedan by virtue of a writ of execution. ALBANO. Albano [A. P-11-2888. RICARDO R. the respondent asked for the SUN FINANCE CORPORATION represented by Rachelle L. 2011] 03OCT GOLDEN vs. Metropolitan Trial Court. It claimed that the respondent was negligent when he levied upon the motor vehicle and proceeded with the auction sale without looking into the car’s Certificate of Registration to determine whether it was encumbered or not. Makati City. the respondent contended that he had no knowledge that the car was encumbered because the Certificate of Registration was never shown to him. Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the charges against him. the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned.M. it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. The complainant averred that the levy and sale of the motor vehicle by the respondent was illegal. Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. July 27. Marmito.thereafter. Thus. the complainant posited that its claim should have priority over the former’s claims. P-11-2888. . For all intents and purposes. The encumbrance on the motor vehicle having been made prior to the suit filed by the Royal Makati Credit Resource. waived or declined to assert it. He also had no knowledge that the car was the subject of a writ of replevin in another Civil Case.M. [A. Sheriff III. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right. Branch 62.

MAXIMO CARPIO MORALES. stressing that he had acted within the scope of his duty as sheriff when he enforced the writ of execution. Petitioners. No.* VELASCO. 169541 Present: .dismissal of the complaint.R. SPOUSES VICENTE MAÑOSCA andLOURDES MAÑOSCA. the respondent should have required. GERMAN CAYTON and the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE CECILIA CAYTON. Thus. the production of the certificate of registration. [the Court] cannot hold the respondent liable on the ground that the complainant cites. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states the manner by which judgments for money may be satisfied by levy. as a matter of sound established practice. G.versus - CARPIO. RULINGS: Remedial Law (1) No. and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules of Court and no more. but this is an altogether different matter that [the Court] do not here pass upon. ZEONNIX TRADING CORPORATION.. Chairperson. It is to emphasize that a sheriff’s duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial. Section 9(b). ISSUES: Remedial Law (1) Whether or not the recommendation of the OCA is proper on the ground of negligence on the part of the respondent. J. Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a judgment is the third party’s responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. JR.. The OCA recommended that the respondent be charged administratively. . If at all. The Court failed to find sufficient basis to declare the respondent administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.

: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated September 27. 71294. J. CV No. NACHURA. JJ. Ex-Officio Sheriff. 2009 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA.CONTRERAS. 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. and PERALTA. SY. Senior Sheriff for Makati. . Promulgated: October 9. and PABLO L. Respondents.R. 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated September 5. Metro Manila.

a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage[6] was executed between the Mañoscas and the spouses German G. Cayton (Caytons) over the subject house and lot for the amount of one hundred sixty thousand pesos (P160. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. As part of the consideration. a case for recovery of a sum of money. S-90836 in favor of Zeonnix Trading Corporation (Zeonnix) pursuant to a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City in Civil Case No.000. married to Lourdes Mañosca (Mañoscas). Cayton and Cecilia R. 1981.00) that they obtained from Family Savings Bank (FSB). The Caytons also paid the real estate taxes on the . Phase III. Mañosca. a levy on attachment was annotated on TCT No. 1980.” The case was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and re-docketed as Civil Case No. doing business under the name and style of Vic D. entitled “Zeonnix Trading Corporation v. 2173. Sucat. Mañosca Brokerage. On June 2.00). 1981. 1980.000. S-90836.At the heart of the controversy is a three hundred fifty-seven (357) square meter residential house and lot located in BF Homes. the Mañoscas executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the house and lot as security for the loan of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150. due to the judicial reorganization in 1983.[3] On May 24. S-90836 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of Vicente Mañosca. 9225-P. the real estate mortgage was annotated on TCT No. Vicente D. Parañaque.[4] On July 21.[5] On September 1. the Caytons assumed payment to FSB of the real estate mortgage amortizations on the property.

the Vendee agrees to assume as [he] hereby assumes.00) PESOS. Book No. the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS and SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P118. That Vendors hereby warrant that save to the restrictions annotated in the Transfer of Title. said installments shall be covered by postdated checks of the Vendee.[7] The Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage contained the following stipulations: 2. That the Vendee shall pay Vendors the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160.436. 3. V. That as part of the consideration of this sale.84) to be paid by the Vendee unto the Vendors within six (6) months in six equal monthly installments commencing December 7. 388. 1981 and every 7th of the month thereafter until fully paid.563.property beginning in 1982. the said property is free from any lien . penalties and charges that have accrued before said date shall be borne and paid by the Vendors. all the duties and obligations of the Vendors imposed upon the latter on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by the Vendors in favor of Family Savings Bank denominated as Doc.16) of which have been paid by the former unto the latter and the balance of FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS and EIGHTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P41.000. xxxx 7. Series of 1980 of the Notarial Registry of Notary Public Fe Tengco Becina. 79. that Vendee’s assumption of the mortgage obligation shall be limited only to the amortization that will fall due [in] September 1981 and that all arrears in the amortizations. Page No.

until fully paid.and encumbrance and that Vendors undertake to defend title to the same from whatever claim. 1984.00. 2173. a Decision[10] was rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. Mañosca.00 as and for attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.[9] Meanwhile. with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 12. 1981. on February 3. SO ORDERED.[11] . S-90836 was in the possession of FSB in view of the loan of the Mañoscas wherein the property was used as security.000. Defendant is likewise ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P20. judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant Vicente D. Mañosca Brokerage” to pay plaintiff [Zeonnix] the amount of P167. doing business under the name and style “Vic D.[8] The Caytons failed to register the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage because the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.037.

offered to redeem the property by tendering to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati one hundred six thousand four hundred pesos (P106. 1984. On April 23. as judgment creditor of the Mañoscas in Civil Case No.000. A Certificate of Sale[12] was issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff.00) through Manager’s Check No. 2173. all the rights. the Caytons defaulted in the payment to FSB of the monthly amortizations. in the amount of ninety-five thousand pesos (P95. and the property was extrajudicially foreclosed. 1985. S-90836 on April 25. The Caytons were declared as the highest bidder. the property was sold at public auction. 1984.00). 1985. in which they impleaded the Mañoscas and the then Clerk of Court and the Senior Deputy Sheriff of MakatiCity.[14] The Caytons claimed that. with the execution of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. Thus. 10316.Subsequently. interests and participation over the property had been transferred to them by the Mañoscas. including the right of redemption. the Caytons filed before the RTC of Makati a civil case for quieting of title and/or removal/prevention of cloud on title against Zeonnix. the Caytons filed an amended complaint. 1985.[13] On April 15. and the same was annotated on TCT No.[15] On April 17. as additional defendants. DV008913 dated April 15.400.[16] On April 18. Zeonnix. The amount tendered represented the purchase price of the property and interest that had accrued thereon. Zeonnix had no more right of redemption to speak of. 1985.[17] . The case was docketed as Civil Case No.

holding that: 1) defendant Zeonnix Trading Corporation has no right of redemption over the property in question as against the plaintiffs [Caytons].00 to cover the real estate taxes paid by the Caytons. maintained that the tender of the deficiency amount representing the real estate taxes did not cure the defect because the payment was done beyond the period of redemption. 1985. the Caytons filed a supplemental complaint in which they alleged that assuming that Zeonnix had the right of redemption. Zeonnix tendered to the Clerk of Court of Makati the additional amount of P2. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. .[18] On June 4. in view of the foregoing.175. 2001.On May 7. 10316. however. 1985. still the amount it tendered was insufficient to effect a valid redemption because it failed to include the amount of real estate taxes paid by them. the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs [Caytons] and against the defendant [Zeonnix]. the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No.175. 2) plaintiffs [Caytons] are the legitimate owners of the property in question. which lapsed on April 26. 1985. amounting to two thousand one hundred seventy-five pesos (P2.[19] On March 20. The latter.00).

(3) the RTC erred in not finding that Zeonnix had a superior or better right. and (5) the RTC erred in not ruling that Zeonnix was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees. the appeal [is] GRANTED and the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and ordering the ex-officio Sheriff of Makati to accept and receipt for the redemption price paid and to issue the corresponding certificate and other papers of redemption to Zeonnix. (2) the RTC erred in ruling that Zeonnix was not entitled to redeem the property. which was foreclosed by FSB.[20] Zeonnix filed an appeal with the CA. 2004. than the Caytons who were negligent in buying it despite the recorded or existing attachment lien thereon by Zeonnix. assigning the following errors of the trial court: (1) the RTC erred in considering the Caytons as owner-bidders in the foreclosure sale of the property and not as ordinary bidders or buyers. the CA rendered a Decision. In its place judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint.[21] On September 27.SO ORDERED.[23] .[22] the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. by virtue of the prior attachment/lien on the subject property. (4) the RTC erred in ruling that the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not spurious or fictitious in character.

.

The registration of the levy created a constructive notice to the whole world and served to protect the interest of Zeonnix.] while the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was executed on September 1. The Caytons therefore could not raise their mere childlike reliance on the real estate agent to justify their ignorance of the recorded levy for they should have checked the title with the Register of Deeds (tsn Oct. p.[24] The Caytons filed a motion for reconsideration. 3. 2005. Hence. 1981.In reversing the decision of the trial court. However. however it did not fully recognize them as the new owners. this petition. 1981[. the CA ratiocinated that: The levy on attachment was duly annotated and registered in the title of the property on July 21. This means that the bank while it received payments from the Caytons. Notable too are the payments of the monthly amortizations by the Caytons with FSB wherein the bank in its receipts simply acknowledged payments in the following manner: “Paid by Cecilia Cayton for the account of Vicente Mañosca” x x x. the CA denied the same in a Resolution[25] dated September 5. The Caytons submitted the following grounds in support of the petition: . The Caytons did not even cause the registration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. 28). 1986.

.[26] The petition is without merit and must be denied. Who may redeem real property so sold. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. I Section 27.I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GERMAN CAYTON AND DECEASED SPOUSE ARE NOT SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST WHO HAVE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY THAN A REDEMPTIONER WHOSE RIGHT TO CLAIM AROSE FROM A MONEY JUDGMENT. 27. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PAYMENT OF THE INSUFFICIENT REDEMPTION PRICE BY ZEONNIX AS REDEMPTIONER DID NOT RESULT IN ITS FAILURE TO PERFECT ITS RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

or on some part thereof. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure unless the mortgagee is a bank. subsequent to the lien under which the property was sold. judgment or mortgage on the property sold. one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold.Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section.[27] An attaching creditor acquires the right to redeem the debtor’s attached property subsequently foreclosed extrajudicially by a third party. (b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment. by the following persons: (a) The judgment obligor. succeeds interest of the debtor by operation of law. It exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided. one who of one a to judgment whom to the the debtor includes one to whom the debtor has transferred debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for of redemption. or any part thereof sold separately. Right of redemption is the prerogative to reacquire a mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale.[28] A “redemptioner. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.” on the other hand. or his spouse or heirs. The his the statutory purpose “successor-in-interest” right of redemption. is a creditor with a lien subsequent to the judgment which . or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property.

the Caytons aver that as successor-in-interest of the Mañoscas by virtue of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. The levy on attachment of Zeonnix on the subject property was duly recorded on TCT . This stance deserves scant consideration. A deed.[31] The unregistered sale of the house and lot to the Caytons by the Mañoscas cannot prejudice the right of redemption granted by law in favor of Zeonnix. except a will. the same cannot affect third persons. However. their supposed title or right over the property is unregistered and. since any purchase at public auction of said property takes the same subject to such prior lien which he has to satisfy.[30] In the instant case. to he the is judgment not a under which the and. they have a better right than Zeonnix to redeem the property.was the basis of the execution sale. shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority of the Register of Deeds to make registration. redemptioner therefore. as such. a redemptioner must prove his right to redeem by producing the documents called for by Section 30. or other voluntary instrument. cannot redeem because his interests in his lien are fully protected. lease. Rule 39[29] of the Rules of Court. Indeed. purporting to convey or affect conveyance involving registered land. If the lien of the creditor property is was prior sold. This is because it is registration that is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. mortgage. Unlike the judgment debtor. they are successors in interest of the Mañoscas.

The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses.[35] as amended by Act No. Thus. the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. 2173. The rule must be absolute. Otherwise. such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests.No. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Under the rule of notice.[33] When a conveyance has been properly recorded. it had the right to redeem the property. 3135. Such presumption may not be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains. This presumption may not be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. included therein. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. All persons dealing with the land so recorded. 4118. S-90836. which provides: . legal and equitable. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Act No.[32] The record is notice to the entire world. Such presumption is irrefutable.[34] Zeonnix has acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the foreclosed properties. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts that the public record contains is a rule of law. the levy on attachment created a constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registration. or any portion of it. By virtue of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. must be charged with notice of whatever it contains.

in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale. The writ of attachment entitled the attaching creditor to exercise the right to redeem the foreclosed properties. A writ of attachment that has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution.[36] . of the Code of Civil Procedure. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to. inclusive. the debtor. his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor. and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six.SECTION 6. or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold.

and in addition. redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption. with interest. together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase. with two per centum thereon in addition. and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed. The judgment obligor. and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon. on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption. and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner. Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption. successive redemptions. the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own. with interest. with interest. with two per centum thereon in addition. or redemptioner. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner of payment in redemption: Section 28. notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry . other than the judgment under which such purchase was made. and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made. by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase. and amounts payable on. at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own. Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place. and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him. with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition. notice to be given and filed. may redeem the property from the purchaser. and interest on such last named amount at the same rate. Time and manner of. the amount of such lien.II Section 28. with interest on such last-named amount. up to the time of redemption. with interest thereon. The property may be again.

the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the purchase price. viz. (2) with one percent per month interest on the purchase price in addition. be Accordingly. if such notice be not filed. v. In exercising the right of redemption. In Estanislao. Otherwise. The Court ruled in this wise. and (5) if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner. to constitute valid redemption.of deeds.[38] the Court relaxed its rules on the redemptioner’s failure to pay the taxes paid by the purchaser. Jr.[37] The amount tendered by Zeonnix may be considered sufficient for purposes of redemption. (4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at the rate of one percent per month. (3) together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase. Court of Appeals. other than the judgment under which such purchase was made. although it failed to include the amount of taxes paid by the Caytons. the amount of such other lien. the property may redeemed without paying such assessments. The payment of the full amount of the purchase price and interest thereon should be deemed as substantial compliance. considering that Zeonnix immediately paid the amount of taxes when apprised of the deficiency. the amount tendered must comply with the following requirements: (1) it should constitute the full amount paid by the purchaser. up to the time of redemption. to allow payment by installments would be to allow the indefinite extension of the redemption period. taxes. up to the time of the redemption. or liens.: . with interest.

However. the latter must give notice to the officer who conducted the sale of the assessments or taxes paid by him and file the same with the Registry of Deeds. Basco. §30 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Inc. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: . an employee therein. Respondent Hi-Yield Realty. failed to comply with certain requirements. Neither was such statement filed with the Registry of Deeds. may have paid. Inc.There are additional amounts to be made in order to effect a valid redemption required by law. As provided in Rule 39. the notary public who had conducted the sale.[39] Likewise. However. such statement of account. Yboa. claimed that a statement of account (Exh. petitioners' failure to pay these additional amounts may be considered excused. but. as received by Elizabeth Roque. xxxx Petitioners were not furnished by respondent Hi-Yield Realty. Petitioners were therefore justified in not paying any assessments or taxes which respondent Hi-Yield Realty. Atty. Inc. x x x. as respondent Hi-Yield Realty. This is in consonance with the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. Basco denied having received the statement. the redemptioner must also pay the assessment or taxes paid by the purchaser.[40] the Court ruled that the failure to pay the delinquent real estate taxes on the property will not render the redemption void. 8-D) was furnished the office of Atty. Inc. 8-C and Exh. in Rosales v.

CV No. No. We hold that the failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to tender the amount of P745. RESPONDENTS.47 representing the delinquent real estate taxes of the subject property. 2011] SPOUSES FRANCISCO D. will not render the redemption in question null and void. in light of the foregoing. Costs against petitioners. YAP. SPOUSES ZOSIMO DY. INC.In fine. with his tender of payment of the purchase price and the interest thereon within twelve (12) months from the date of the registration of the sale. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS ORIENTAL AND DUMAGUETE RURAL BANK. This ruling is in obedience of the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. and the deficiency interest on the purchase price of the subject property.00 and the interest thereon of P0.R.82.04. the Sheriff's Commission in the sum of P99. it having been established that he has substantially complied with the requirements of the law to effect a valid redemption. the Decision dated September 27. July 27.. SO ORDERED Spouses yap vs spouses dy [G. 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. 71294 are hereby AFFIRMED. AND NATIVIDAD CHIU DY. SR. 2004 and the Resolution dated September 5. WHEREFORE. 171868. the registration fee of P3. VS. SPOUSES MARCELINO MAXINO AND REMEDIOS L. PETITIONERS. YAP AND WHELMA S. . MAXINO.

5. 4. 4. Yet. From these provisions is excepted the case in which. in this case.FACTS: The subject parcels of land designated as lot 1. De los Reyes. 8 as well as lot 846 are originally owned by spouses Tirambulos. the rule on the indivisibility of mortgage finds no application to the case at bar. Therefore. each one of these guarantees only a determinate portion of the credit. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible. The particular provision of the Civil Code referred to provides: Art. The Court held: The parties were accordingly embroiled in a hermeneutic disparity on their aforesaid contending positions. to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid. . 6.6. 3. and 8 and sold at public auction. DRBI was the highest bidder. As held in the case of Philippine National Bank v. shall have a right to the extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each thing is specially answerable is satisfied. Lots 3 and 8446 were also mortaged in favour of the same bank.4. there being several things given in mortgage or pledge. Later. predecessor of Dumaguete Rural Bank Inc. 2089. 3. 6. and 6 to spouses Yap. the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied. DRBI sold lots 1. Tirambulos failed to pay their loans so DRBI foreclosed lots 1. They executed a REM over Lots 1. Subsequently. and 8 in favour of the Rural Bank of Dumaguete.[44] the doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage does not apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof as in the instant case. 5. even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor. 5. Neither can the creditor's heir who received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage. the Tirambulos sold all & mortgaged lots to spouse Dy without consent and knowledge of DRBI. The debtor. ISSUE: Is Lot 3 among the foreclosed properties? May persons to whom several mortgaged lands were transferred without the knowledge and consent of the creditor redeem only several parcels if all the lands were sold together for a single price at the foreclosure sale? RULING: We cannot subscribe to the Yaps' argument on the indivisibility of the mortgage. (DRBI). Later.

notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. with the full payment of the debt. it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied. it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation.From the foregoing. specifically refers to the release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus. there is nothing more to secure. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof. which is actually intended for the protection of the mortgagee. said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since. That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.[45] (Emphasis supplied. The aforesaid doctrine. secured has been fully paid. Hence.) . There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of.

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