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2. Award of damages has no legal basis. CA awarded damages based solely on the fact that original plaintiff incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the premises. However, mere fact that plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to right to recover damages. To recover damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant, and damage resulting to plaintiff therefrom. Injury is different from damage. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation for the damage suffered. There can be damage without injury, when loss is not the result of the violation of a legal duty. These are known as damnum absque injuria. Underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In order that the law will give redress for the act causing damage, it must not only be hurtful, it must be wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. In the case, there was damage but no injury. It is within the rights of the owners of the property under Art. 430 to enclose and fence their property. At the time of enclosure of the passageway there was no existing easement, as proven by the court granting one. Thus, prior to the decision, the petitioner was well within his rights to fence his property since no easement existed yet. The proper exercise of a legal right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie.

FACTS: Plaintiff (herein private respondent survived by his spouse and children) Mabasa purchased an apartment with tenants occupying the premises. When sometime one of the tenants vacated the apartment, Mabasa went to his property and saw that one of the neighbors built an adobe fence in her property, in effect closing one of the two passageways connecting the apartment to the main road. The remaining tenants vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos defended the fence on her property, since there were several incidents with the tenants that inconvenienced her and her daughter. Thus, Mabasa filed for an easement of right of way against defendants. Lower court: Easement granted, defendants will provide plaintiff with permanent access to the public street, and the plaintiff will pay the defendants an indemnity for the use of the passageway. Mabasa was not satisfied with the decision and she raised the error that the lower court did not award damages in her favor. Upon appeal Court of appeals: Affirmed trial court decision but additionally awarded P65,000 actual damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages. Defendants appealed decision to the SC. ISSUE: 1. W/N right of way granted is proper 2. W/N award of damages is in order HELD: 1. Yes 2. No. RATIO: 1. Petitioners are barred from raising this issue as they did not appeal the judgment of the lower court on this ground, hence they are presumed to be satisfied.

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Facts: 1. Gatchalian boarded a mini-bus owned by DeLim from Aringay to Bauang, La Union. 2. While on the road, the passengers heard a snapping sound which the driver dismissed as normal.

3. Subsequently, the bus went off the road and turned turtle, causing injuries to the passengers including petitioner lacerated wound on the forehead, abrasions to other body parts. 4. Gatchalian and the other passengers were visited by DeLims wife in the hospital. The latter: a. Paid for their medical expenses b. Gave transportation allowance to Gatchalian c. Asked all the victims to sign a waiver which they did: !we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil, against the said driver and owner because it was an accident and the said driver and owner!have gone to the extent of helping us be treated upon our injuries Action: Extra Contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. 1. Grounds: Her injuries left an obvious scar which generated mental suffering and inferiority complex. Also, that she was denied employment opportunities. 2. Amount: P10K for loss of employment, P10K for cost of plastic surgery to remove scar, P30K for moral damages, and P1K for attorneys fees. Issue: 1. WON the waiver was binding so as to relieve the bus company of liability. 2. WON damages were appropriate. Held: #1 Bus Company Liability 1. The Court applied the ruling in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit in holding that the waiver was not couched in clear and unequivocal terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the waiver was signed leave doubt as to the intention of Gatchalian to sign it (she was still dizzy from her injuries and signed without reading it entirely). 2. Bus company is required to exercise extraordinary diligence of a common carrier a. Waiver must be construed strictly against the company b. Statutory presumption that the bus company was at fault if injuries or death were caused by the accident. Even if no express finding of fault or negligence, bus company is liable. c. Bus company must overcome presumption by showing proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence, which in this case it did not (driver ignored the unusual sound). #2 Nature of Damages (main issue for this section of the syllabus) 1. Loss of employment Gatchalian failed to prove that she had lost employment opportunities because at the time of the accident, she

was unemployed and only had occasional jobs as a substitute teacher. 2. Plastic Surgery a person is entitled to physical integrity of the body, actual or compensatory damages are assessable if there is injury thereto. Gives rise to an obligation to restore to the prior condition (conditio ante). 3. Moral damages awarded when there is gross negligence on the part of the common carrier, which was shown in this case. Amounts awarded Actual and compensatory: Surgery P15K (Gatchalian estimated P10-15K, doctor witness estimated P5-10K). Moral damages: P30K (considering extent of pain and anxiety, and the permanent scar suffered) Attorney Fees: P1K as requested (Court considered this modest) 6% interest from date of judgment

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FACTS: " Doing business under the name and style of N.N. B. Lighterage, Nestor N. Barretto is the owner of the Barge "Antonieta" (last licensed and permitted to engage in coastwise trading for 1 year expiring on Aug 21 98) " Nov 27 97: Barretto and Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.), Inc. entered into a Time Charter Agreement whereby, for P306,000, the latter hired the aforesaid barge for a renewable period of 30 calendar days, for transporting construction materials from Manila to Ayungon, Negros Oriental. " Brokered by freelance ship broker Manuel Velasco, the agreement included Oceaneering's acknowledgment of the seaworthiness of the barge as well as the ff stipulations: # a) Barreto shall be responsible for the salaries, subsistence, SSS premium, medical, workmen's compensation contribution and other legal expenses of the crew; # b) Oceaneering shall be responsible for all port charges, insurance of all equipments, cargo loaded to the above mentioned deck barge against all risks (Total or Partial), or theft, security and stevedoring during loading and unloading operations and all other expenses pertinent to the assessment, fines and forfeiture for any violation that may be imposed in relation to the operation of the barge;

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f) Delivery and re-delivery be made in Pasig River, Metro Manila; g) Damage to deck barge caused by carelessness or negligence of stevedores hired by Oceaneering will be Oceaneering's liability. Upon clear findings by owners or barge patron of any damages to the barge that will endanger its seaworthiness and stability, such damage/s shall be repaired first before loading and leaving port. Under such conditions, the Barge Patron has the right to refuse loading and/or leaving port; # i) Barreto reserves the right to stop, abort and deviate any voyage in case of imminent danger to the crew and/or vessel that may be occasioned by any storm, typhoon, tidal wave or any similar events. In accordance w/ the agreement, Oceaneering's hired stevedores who loaded the barge with pipe piles, steel bollards, concrete mixers, gravel, sand, cement and other construction materials in the presence of and under the direct supervision of the broker Manuel Velasco and Barretto's Bargemen. In addition to the polythene ropes with which they were lashed, the cargoes were secured by steel stanchions which Oceaneering caused to be welded on the port and starboard sides of the barge. Dec 3 97: barge left Manila for Negros Oriental, towed by the tug-boat "Ayalit" w/c was likewise chartered by Oceaneering from Lea Mer Industries, Inc. Dec 5:Barretto's Bargeman, Eddie La Chica, executed a Marine Protest, reporting the ff circumstances under which the barge reportedly capsized in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas: # While underway on or about 0245 Dec 4, 1997 encountered rough sea at the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas and made the barge roll and pitch which caused the steel pipes and various construction materials to shift on the starboardside causing the breakdown of the steel stanchions welded on the deck of the barge leaving holes on the deck that caused water to enter the hold. (nagkabutaskasinaguloyung pipes) # 1529 Dec 5:, w/ the continuous entrance of sea water on the hold, the barge totally capsized touched bottom (i think lumubognasiya) Dec 9 97: Barretto apprised Oceaneering of the mishap caused by the incompetence and negligence of the latter's personnel in loading the cargo and that it was going to proceed with the salvage, refloating and repair of the barge. Oceaneering caused its counsel to serve Barretto a letter (Mar 12 98), demanding the return of the unused portion of the charter payment amounting to P224,400 as well as the expenses in the sum of P125,000 it purportedly incurred in salvaging its construction materials contending that the barge tilted bec. of the water which seeped through a hole in its hull

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Mar 25 98 letter: Barretto's counsel informed Oceaneering that its unused charter payment was withheld by his client who was likewise seeking reimbursement for the P836,425 he expended in salvaging, refloating and repairing the barge. In response to Barretto's 29 Jun 29 98 formal demand for the payment of the same expenses, Oceaneering reiterated its demand. Oct 6 98: Barretto commenced the instant suit with the filing of his complaint for damages against Oceaneering, in RTC Las Pias City. Barretto sought indemnities for expenses incurred and lost income in the aggregate sum of P2,750,792.50 and atty's fees equivalent to 25% of said sum # accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence which attended the loading of the cargo by Oceaneering's hired employees Oceaneering prayed for the grant of its counterclaims for the value of its cargo in the sum of P4,055,700, salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000, exemplary damages, atty's fees and litigation expenses. # accident was caused by the negligence of Barretto's employees and the dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy Barettos witnesses and their testimonies: # Barretto: to prove the seaworthiness of the barge as well as the alleged negligent loading of the cargo by Oceaneering's employees. # ToribioBarretto II: VP for Operations of N.B.B. Lighterage: effort exerted to salvage the barge; # Manuel Velasco: his participation in the execution of the Time Charter Agreement as well as the circumstances before and after the sinking of the barge # Recalled as a rebuttal witness, ToribioBarretto: the hull of the barge was not damaged and that the sinking of said vessel was attributable to the improper loading of Oceaneering's construction materials Oceaneeringstestimonies of the following witnesses: # (a) Engr. WenifredoOracion: its Operation's Manager, to prove the value of the cargo and the salvage operation it conducted # (b) Maria Flores Escao: Accounting Staff at Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices, to prove its claim for atty's fees and litigation expenses. # To disprove the rough sea supposedly encountered by the barge as well as the negligence imputed against its employees: (a) Rosa Barba, a Senior Weather Specialist at the PAGASA, (b) Cmdr. Herbert Catapang, Officer-in-Charge of the Hydrographic Division at the Natl Mapping Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA); and, (c) Engr. Carlos Gigante, a freelance marine surveyor and licensed naval architect.

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Upon the formal offer respectively made by the parties, the pieces of documentary evidence identified and marked in the course of the testimonies of the witnesses were, accordingly, admitted by the RTC. RTC (Dec 27, 2005): dismissed both complaint and counterclaims for lack of merit. # Barretto failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove that the accident was due to the negligence of Oceaneering's employees # brushed aside Oceaneering's claim that the barge was not seaworthy as acknowledged in the Time Charter Agreement # Alongside its claim for reimbursement of the sums expended for the salvage operation it conducted w/c was denied for lack of evidence to prove the same, Oceaneering's claim for the value of its cargo was likewise denied $ not included in the demand letters it served Barretto $ it has no one but itself to blame for failing to insure its cargo against all risks, as provided in the parties' agreement # Oceaneerings claims for exemplary damages and atty's fees further denied for lack of showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto Oceaneering motion for partial reconsideration - denied for lack of merit (Apr 28, 2006) Oceaneering perfected its appeal from the aforesaid 27 December 2005 decision CA (Dec 12, 2007): appeal partially granted # agreement executed by the parties, by its express terms, was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by Barretto # the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged w/ extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him # the sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which Barretto failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for Oceaneering's lost cargo despite the latter's failure to insure the same. # Applying the rule, however, that actual damages should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, CA denied Oceaneering's claim for the value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the P306K it paid for the time charter, with indemnity for atty's fees of P30K. MR (by both) denied for lack of merit (Aug 11 2008) Hence, this petition.

(1) W/N there was no valid documents showing the real value of the materials lost and those actually recovered? No, there were vouchers and receipts (2) W/N Oceaneeringss counterclaims for actual damages (amounting to (a) P 3, 704, 700 representing the value of the materials it lost due to the sinking of the barge and (b) P125, 000 representing the expenses it insured for salvaging its cargo should awarded? Yes to materials but only P2,226,620. No to salvaging expenses (3) W/N Oceaaneerings award for attys fees was correctly reduced to P30,000 only?No, there should be none HELD: We find the modification of the assailed decision in order. RATIO: " Oceaneering: having determined Barretto's liability for presumed negligence as a common carrier, CA erred in disallowing its counterclaims for the value of the construction materials lost as a consequence of the sinking of the barge. # Alongside the testimony elicited from its Operation's Manager, Engr. WinifredoOracion, Oceaneering calls attention to the same witness' inventory which pegged the value of said construction materials at P4,055,700 as well as the various sales receipts, order slips, cash vouchers and invoices which were formally offered before and admitted in evidence by the RTC. # it should be indemnified the sum of P3,703,700 for the value of the lost cargo, with legal interest at 12% PA, from the date of demand until fully paid considering that it was able to salvage only nine steel pipes amounting to P351,000 # Barretto should be held liable to refund the P306,000 it paid as consideration for the Time Charter Agreement and to pay the P125,000 it incurred by way of salvaging expenses as well as its claim for atty's fees in the sum of P750,000 " Actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were intended. " Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they areintended to put the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured. Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. " There must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered.

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In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. " The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, imposed on the party claiming the samewho should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof, like sales and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature. " In the absence of corroborative evidence, it has been held that selfserving statements of account are not sufficient basis for an award of actual damages. " Corollary to the principle that a claim for actual damages cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and insubstantial proof, courts are, likewise, required to state the factual bases of the award. (1 and 2): Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages or, more specifically, the portions thereof which were duly pleaded and adequately proved before the RTC. " While concededly not included in the demand letters dated Mar 12 and Jul 13 98 Oceaneering served Barretto, the former's counterclaims for the value of its lost cargo of P4,055,700 and salvaging expenses of P125,000 were distinctly pleaded and prayed for in the Jan 26 99 answer it filed a quo. " Rather than the entire P4,055,700 worth of construction materials reflected in the inventory which Engr. Oracion claims to have prepared on Nov 29 97, based on the delivery and official receipts from Oceaneering's suppliers, we are, however, inclined to grant only the ff items which were duly proved by the vouchers and receipts on record # (a) P1,720,850 worth of spiral welded pipes with coal tar epoxy procured on Nov 22 97 # (b) P629,640 worth of spiral welded steel pipes procured on Oct 28 97 # (c) P155,500 worth of various stainless steel materials procured on Nov 27 97 # (d) P66,750 worth of gaskets and shackles procured on Nov 20 97 # (e) P4,880 worth of anchor bolt procured on Nov 27 97 " The foregoing sums all add up to of P2,577,620 from which should be deducted the sum of P351,000 representing the value of the nine steel pipes salvaged by Oceaneering, or a total of P2,226,620 in actual damages representing the value of the latter's lost cargo. (OMG! MATH! :)))) " Excluded from the computation are the ff items w/c, on account of the dates of their procurement, could not have possibly been included in the Nov 29 97 inventory prepared by Engr. Oracion:

(a) P1,129,640 worth of WO#1995 and PO#OCPI-060-97 procured on Dec 9 97 # (b) P128,000 worth of bollard procured on Dec 16 97 " Likewise excluded are the anchor bolt with nut Oceaneering claims to have procured for an unspecified amount on Nov 3, 1997 and the P109,018.50 worth of Petron oil it procured on Nov 28 97 which does not fit into the categories of lost cargo and/or salvaging expenses for which it interposed counterclaims a quo. " Although included in its demand letters and pleaded in its answer, Oceaneering's claim for salvaging expenses of P125,000 cannot, likewise, be granted for lack of credible evidence to support the same. Tested alongside the twin requirements of pleading and proof for the grant of actual damages, on the other hand, CA also erred in awarding the full amount of P306,000 in favor of Oceaneering, as and by way of refund of the consideration it paid Barretto for the Time Charter Agreement. " Aside from not being clearly pleaded in the answer it filed a quo, said refund was claimed in Oceaneering's demand letters only to the extent of the unused charter payment in the reduced sum of P224,400 which, to our mind, should be the correct measure of the award. INTEREST: Having breached an obligation which did not constitute a loan or forbearance of money, Barretto can only be held liable for interest at the rate of 6% per annum on said amount as well as the P2,226,620 value of the lost cargo (instead of 12%) " Although the lost cargo was not included in the demand letter, said interest rate of 6% PA shall be imposed from the time of the filing of the complaint which is equivalent to a judicial demand. " Upon the finality of this decision, said sums shall earn a further interest of 12% PA until full payment in accordance with the ff pronouncements handed down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA # "2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, CC) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under par. 1 or par. 2, above, shall be 12% PA from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit." ATTYS FEES: NO For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we find that the CA, finally, erred in granting Oceaneering's claim for attorney's fees, albeit in the much reduced sum of P30,000 " In the absence of stipulation, after all, the rule is settled that there can be no recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. " Being the exception rather than the rule, attorney's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, in view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. " Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where, as here, no sufficient showing of bad faith can be reflected in the party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CAMODIFIED: (a) to GRANTOceaneering's claim for the value of its lost cargo in the sum of P2,226,620 with 6% interest PA computed from the filing of the complaint and to earn further interest at the rate of 12% PA from finality of the decision until full payment; (b) to REDUCE the refund of the consideration for the Time Charter Agreement from P306,000 to P224,400, with 6% interest per annum computed from Mar 12 98, likewise to earn further interest at the rate of 12% PA from finality of this decision; and, (c) to DELETE the CA's award of salvaging expenses and atty's fees, for lack of factual and legal basis. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.

2. After the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted and concluded its investigation, the Philippine Cost Guard determined that it was the Petroparcels fault. 3. After unsuccessful demands, private respondent sued Luzon Stevedoring as well as the captain of the Petroparcel, praying for the award (P692,680.00) of the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment, and cargo of the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. The complaint was successively amended, including revising the actual value of the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. 4. The lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondent, ordering PNOC to pay P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat from the date of the filing of the complaint with interest at 6% per annum. The valuation was based on the testimony and evidence presented by private respondents sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. The lower court mentioned that PNOCs senior estimator did not provide documentary evidence to support herein petitioners position. 5. After the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the PNOC elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the lower courts ruling, saying that there is no need to qualify Del Rosario as witness since it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel. Issue: WON the valuation for damages was correct and proven. Held: No, the testimony of private respondents sole witness, Del Rosario, who also owns the company, was not backed up by the preponderance of evidence required by law. The high court determined that the evidence presented by Del Rosario was inadequate to grant private respondent the actual damages confirmed by the lower court. Nonetheless, the SC agrees with the lower court that private respondent is entitled to damages. But for lack of evidentiary bases, the SC modified the lower court ruling, awarding private respondent with P2,000,000.00 as and for nominal damages. Ratio: Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).

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Facts: 1. On September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp., was navigating the waters in Batangas when it collided with the Petroparcel, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corp (later substituted by the PNOC).

To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

WON the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art. 194 of the Labor Code applies in determining the compensation claimed by the heir of the deceased employee against the employer under Art. 1711 of the civil code HELD: Yes. Petition is denied. CA is affirmed. The remedy availed by Florentina in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. Floresca v. Philex Mining Company declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy except on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. This doctrinal rule is rooted on theory that the basis of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code. In this case, Florentina instituted a civil suit for indemnity under the New Civil Code. The employer shall be liable for the death of personal injury of its employees in the course of employment as sanctioned by Art. 1711 of the Civil Code. The liability of the employer for death or personal injury of his employees arose from the contract of employment entered into between the employer and his employee which is likely imbued with public interest. Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer automatically attaches. The indemnity may partake in the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be. The provisions on damages of the New Civil Code must be transformed into a more tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the purpose of the law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned by his employment under article 1711 may be realized. In regard to this, the formula for loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v. Court of Appeals, in computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded to the claimant under article 1711 of the New Civil Code is adopted in this case.
Source: http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/cases/2007/March/Candano_Shipping_Lines_v._Sugata_ on.pdf

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! FACTS: On March 27, 1996, M/V David Jr., owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together with its cargo in Surigao del Sur. Melquiades Sugata-on employed by Candano Shipping Lines as third marine engineer in the cargo vessel was one of those missing. Florentina Sugata-on (respondent and widow of Melquiades Sugata-on), went to the office of Candano Shipping in Manila to claim the death benefits of her husband but it refused to pay. Thus, Florentina filed an action before the RTC of Manila. She prayed that actual, moral, and exemplary damages including attorney's fees, be awarded in her favor in view of the provision of Art. 1711 NCC. The RTC decided in favor of Florentina. Candano Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. It then elevated the RTC decision to the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of RTC. The award for actual damages was reduced from P998,400 to P608,400, while the awards for moral and exemplary damages including attorney's fees were deleted for lack of sufficient basis for their allowance. In arriving at the sum of P608,400, the CA applied the standard prescribed by Art. 194 of the Labor Code. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Candano Shipping in a resolution issued on April 1, 2004. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE:

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G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993, 2nd Division, Nocon, J. FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. ISSUE: WON TWA breached its contract of carriage entitling Petitioners to damages? HELD: YES. In accordance with Article 2201, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of its obligation. Ruling. That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented

as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. SOURCE: http://www.scribd.com/doc/139188530/Zalamea-Vs-CA

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Sept. 10, 2009

5 year old AAA was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo with her cousin and two other playmates, when Richard Sarcia invited her to go with him to the backyard. AAA's cousin followed them though Sarcia didn't know about it. In the backyard, Sarcia removed AAA's shorts and underwear, ordered her to lie down on her back, removed his trousers and brief, lay on top of her, inserted his penis into her private organ, and made an up-and-down movement. AAA felt pain in her private part and stomach, and said "aray." Her cousin told AAA's mom about the incident but she only said that they were too young to talk about such things. When she bathed AAA later that day, AAA felt a grating sensation in her private part. AAA's cousin told her aunt again what appellant did earlier that day but the mom didn't say anything. Appellant denies molesting girls, and claims that Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu whose death was imputed to him, concocted and instigated the rape charge against him to make their murder case against him stronger. Appellant turned 18 in 1996, but since the exact date of the rape case could not be determined, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years old in 1996. Issue: 1. w/n the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence of 1 the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time the offense was committed 2. what damages must the accused pay to the victim? Held: 1. NO. "Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing 2 on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case.

In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating 3 circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua. It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00. 2. The increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount ofP30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00. NOTES ON DAMAGES from the case: Moral damages Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed tocompensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Exemplary damages

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Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. 2 Art. 107: Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
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Art. 2204: in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances!
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Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

1. WON Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del Rosario. 2. WON the award for damages was proper. HELD: 1. Yes. Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the employer of the latter. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercise the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury failed in both respects. In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didnt take driving tests and psychological exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition, Mercury didnt present Del Rosarios NBI and police clearances. Next, the last seminar attended b the driver occurred a long 12 years before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didnt have a backup driver for long trips. When the accident happened, Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours. 2. Yes. With regard to actual damages, Art 2199 of the NCC provides that: Except as provided b law or b stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered b him as he has duly proved. In the instant case, the actual damages claimed b Respondents were supported b receipts from hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies and nursing care services. Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. For the rest of his life, Stephen will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal cord injuryrelated conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care and support of his family. The Court therefore affirm the award of P23,461,062 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of P10,000,000, as reduced by the trial court, for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident.

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FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario as driver. Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents of the respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a Sedan. The two vehicles got into an accident as they were traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its left and slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car was wrecked and Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed. The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC found the petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The damages awarded b the RTC are: 1. 2,973,000 for actual damages. 2. As compensatory damages: a) 23,461,062 for life care cost of Stephen b) 10,000,000 for lost of impaired earning capacity of Stephen 3. 4,000,000 as moral damages 4. 2,000,000 as exemplary damages 5. 1,000,000 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Petitioners went to the CA for appeal but were denied. However, CA reduced Moral damages to 1,000,000. Hence this appeal to the SC. ISSUES:

The Court likewise upholds the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. The records show that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also shows that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is therefore justified. With the award of exemplary damages, we also affirm the grant of attorneys fees to Respondents. In addition, attorneys fees may be granted when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.

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Original 40k moral damages award by TC was reduced to 33k because of receipts CA held that there was no accurate way to determine earnings since certification by employer only indicated range and not specific amount But since heirs are still entitled to reasonable amount, amount for loss of earning capacity was increased from 45,420 (TC) to 200k CRIM ASPECT: Melendres was buying cigarettes from a store when Lopez shot him with a gun from behind

Issue: (What was raised was the issue regarding evidence pointing to his guilt. I think the court modified the award of damages motu propio) Held: Award for loss of earning capacity modified. The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. Employers certification that his monthly salary ranges from 1,780 to 3,570 on per story basis while honoraria and transportation amounted to 24,990 (7 months) is sufficient. Defense did not object to the presentation of the certification; hence, deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the courts. Also established was Melendres age when he died 41 years old. Earnings derived from salary and honoraria and transporation allowance NET EARNING Capacity Expenses ] = Life Expectancy x [ Gross Annual Income Living

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Facts:

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Indemnity for murder CA ordered accused to pay as follows: 50k civil indemnity; 50k moral damages; 33k actual damages; 200k loss of earning capacity Wife presented receipts as follows: 33k burial and interment; 7,500 wake She also presented certification from Tanod Publishing, Inc. (employer) as to his monthly salary range, honoraria and transportation allowance

= [ 2/3 (80 age of death) ] x [ GAI ( 50% of GAI ) ] = [ 2/3 (80 age of death) ] x [ (min + max)/2 + (7-month allowance/7) ( 50% of GAI ) ] = [ 2/3 (80 41) ] x [ (1780 + 3570)/2 + 24990/7 37470 ] = [ 2/3 (39) ] x [ 74940 37470 ] = 26 x 37470 = 974,220 NOTE: Please take note of brackets in red. Wala yan sa original decision. Hindi sumunod sa EMDAS si J. Carpio lels

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February 6, 2010 Ponente: J. Peralta Facts Vivian Tan Lee filed against Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. Philippine Hawk denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila. RTC ruled in favour of Lee. CA affirmed RTC decision with modification in the awarded damages. Issues (1) whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent; (2) whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and (3) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are proper. Ratio (1) Yes. Petitioners bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court.Margarito was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

(2) Yes. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. (3) Yes. CA correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondents husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. a. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. It is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. Documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage

under current labor laws. In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses.In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses). b. Actual damages Must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. c. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. d. Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycles repair amounting to P17, 829.00 In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the circumstances. e. Moral damages to respondent who sustained physical injuries- CA also correctly awarded respondent moral damages for the physical injuries she sustained due to the

vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

Civil indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The award is proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code

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2004 1995 (AM) head-on collision bet. PRBL bus headed north, and Lancer car, headed to Manila. According to a witness (a bus pssgr), bus driver Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle in front of it but hit tricycle instead. Pleyto then swerved to the left lane where Lancer was traversing, smashed the latter, instantly killing driver Arnulfo and front passenger Ricardo Lomboy; Carmela (daughter of Sps Lomboy) and a friend on the backseat suffered injuries. Maria, wife of Ricardo, filed an action for damages against PRBL and driver. RTC: PRBL and Pleyto negligent. Award: 50K death indemnity; 1.6M Ricardos lost earnings; 59K actual damages; 500K moral damages for other heirs, 50K for Carmela CA affirmed, with modification: Actual damages 39K; loss of earning capacity 1.15M PETITION: questioning 1) finding of negligence; 2) award of damages SC: 1. The issue of negligence is factual, so SC not to disturb RTC and CA findings. 2. Re damages and loss of earning capacity: Petitioners argue that: 1) CA pegging monthly expenses at 50% of gross earnings is wrong/ contrary to Villa Rey; 2) respondents failed to prove gross income. Petitioners misread Villa Rey. CA right in pegging necessary expenses at 50% of GAI. Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)]

= [2/3 x (80 44) x (96,000 48,000)] =P1,152,000 Re no proof shown to prove gross income, SC said that failure to present documentary evidence is not fatal to lost earning capacity claim. Testimonial evidence suffices. CA DECISION AFFIRMED (except moral damages to heirs reduced to 100K)! ISSUE: W/N the civil indemnity is proper HELD. Yes RATIO ! Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. The case law also requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity. The reduction of civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 is proper because the crime committed by the appellant is only simple rape. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to AAA is likewise proper in order to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their own daughters.

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GR No. 169873 / 8 June 2007 / J. Chico-Nazario FACTS ! CA affirmed the decision of RTC finding Norberto Astrologo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed his daughter. o RTC-Penalty was set at reclusion perpetua and payment of ! Civil indemnity of P75,000 ! Moral damages of P75,000 o CA-Penalty was set at reclusion perpetua and payment of ! Civil indemnity of P50,000 ! Moral damages of P50,000 ! Exemplary damages of P25,000 ! The facts of the case are as follows: o AAA testified that she is the daughter of the appellant. o she went home after watching television from their neighbors house o she slept beside her two siblings, namely: BBB, nine years old; and CCC, seven years old. o At around 11:00 p.m., while she was sleeping inside a room she woke up when she felt someone kissing her lips. o She opened her eyes and recognized that it was her father, herein appellant. She struggled in refusal. o The appellant started mashing her breasts, and when she resisted, he pointed a knife at her. Then, the appellant touched her vagina, lifted her skirt and succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina despite her continuing refusal, thereby causing her so much pain. ! SC affirmed the conviction of the accused. ! Aggrieved by the decision of the court, the appealent filed a notice appeal to the SC.

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(2011) VELASCO, JR., J.: FACTS: Accused was charged in four (4) separate informations of raping his 10 year-old daughter, AAA in Cagayan. AAA testified that sometime in 2001, while she was sleeping with her sisters, the accused pulled and positioned her just below the feet of her siblings, and right then and there, succeeded in molesting her. AAA was just seven (7) years old then. It was repeated in 2003 where the accused also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident to her mother. When AAA finally told her mother on June 13, 2003 that she was being abused by her own father, her mother whipped her for not telling her about it immediately. Thereafter, they went to the DSWD office in Peablanca, Cagayan, where AAA was interviewed by DSWD personnel. Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station where AAA executed a sworn statement narrating what happened. Dr. Simangan subsequently conducted a physical examination on AAA and discovered that the latter had a healed hymen laceration at 4 and 7 oclock positions, and that her vagina admitted the tip of the fifth finger easily. She stated that the laceration could have been caused by a blunt object. The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he has a mistress.

The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of three (3) counts of rape and imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case. Apattad was further ordered to pay AAA the amount of P150,000.00 Pesos as civil indemnity. Accused is acquitted in one of the criminal cases for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction by the trial court with the modification that the civil indemnity awarded should be P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, moral damages and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00 respectively, for each count of rape were awarded. ISSUE with regard to DAMAGES: WON the C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DAMAGES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. HELD: NO. As modified, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA for each count of rape, PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. RATIO: In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-lawspouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000 racionating that this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted without need of pleading or proving them. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.

Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances, to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good. MAIN ISSUE: WON THE C.A. GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APATTAD GUILTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. HELD: S.C. sustained accused-appellants conviction. The appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. RATIO: Accused-appellants defenses of alibi and denial cannot prosper. Alibis and denials are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so because said defenses can be easily fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability. An alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving, and, thus, cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. In the present case, AAA positively identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against her. As correctly observed by the trial court, a distance of three (3) kilometers does not make it physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Calimag himself admitted during cross-examination that the house of accusedappellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly, even if accused-appellant indeed stayed in Calimags house on the dates that he committed rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home and commit the said crime at the time it was said to have been committed. After a careful examination of the records of this case, the S.C. is satisfied that the prosecutions evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. AAA was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy of AAAs birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct. Pertinently, it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a childvictim is given full weight and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth

and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.

Hence, in addition to the 50,000 moral damages, Banago is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of 75,000 by way of civil indemnity. DICTA: In rape cases, the court may, in its discretion, award moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the rape victim without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense.

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FACTS: RTC Malolos convicted Reynaldo Banago of raping a thirteen-year old girl named Dolores Jaurige one evening in the bodega of Bauer Company in Marilao Bulacan. He poked a gun at Dolores, removed her shorts and underwear, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. He was seen coming out of the bodega zipping his pants by the victims sister, Dorotea. Medico-legal report confirmed that Dolores was in non-virgin state physically. It took nine months before the criminal complaint was filed against Banago because Dolores and Dorotea initially decided to keep the incident to themselves but Dolores during an altercation was compelled to tell her mother about the rape incident. Banago, welder at Bauer, offered an alibi that he was in his residence that evening. His companion Delfin Castillo corroborated this alibi bay testifying that he spent the night at the bodega but he did not see Dolores there. RTC sentenced Banago to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the victim the sum of 50,000 as moral damages ONLY (without civil indemnity). ISSUE: Whether or not civil indemnity should have been awarded to private complainant in addition to moral damages HELD: YES. Civil damages should have been awarded to private complainant RATIO: Moral damages is SEPARATE AND DISTINCT from the civil indemnity awarded to rape victims. The moral damages cannot take the place of the civil indemnity. While the award of moral damages is discretionary on the part of the court, the civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is MANDATORY upon the finding of the fact of rape.

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! Facts: Bartolini was convicted with 3 counts of qualified rape of his two underage daughters. CA on appeal modified judgment and convicted him of 2 counts of qualified rape and 1 count of simple rape because of failure to allege minority in the Information. As to damages: RTC (x3) 75,000 civil indemnity 50,000 moral damages CA I. x2 75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages II 50,000 civil indemnity 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages Issue related to the course: How much should the damages be? Holding: Where the special qualifying circumstances of age and relationship, although not alleged in the information, are nonetheless established during the trial, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in a conviction for simple rape should equal the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in convictions for qualified rape (BBB).

Rule set in in Rule 100 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should only affect criminal liability, and should not affect civil liability, which is for the benefit of the injured party. Section 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a) Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a) SC I. x2 75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 30,000 exemplary damages II 75,000 civil indemnity 75,000 moral damages 30,000 exemplary damages
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jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered." Petitioners: John Quirante Dante Cruz Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court Manuel Casasola Estrellita Casasola Facts: - Dr. Indalecio Casasola (Father of Respondent) contracted with Norman Guerrero (Respondent), a building contractor, with Philippine-American General Insurance, Co. Inc. (PhilAmGen) as bondsman. Guerrero failed to make good with his contract with Dr. Casasola so with the help of Atty. John Quirante (Petitioner), Dr. Casasola sued Guerrero and PhilAmGen for damages. - CFI of Manila (RTC of Manila) entered a decision on October 16, 1981 rescinding the contract and ordering Guerrero and PhilAmGen to pay Dr. Casasola Actual Damages (AD) of P129,430, Moral Damages (MD) of P50,000, Exemplary Damages (ED) of P40,000, and Atty.s Fees (AF) of P30,000. Also, the RTC ordered Guerrero alone to pay Dr. Casasola P300 per day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979 and ordered PhilAmGen the amount of surety bond for P120,000. A Motion of Reconsideration was submitted but was denied on November 4, 1982. PhilAmGen filed a notice of appeal but was not given due course because it was filed out of time. - RTC issued a writ of execution. A petition was filed in the IAC for the quashal of the writ of execution but was dismissed so the case was elevated to the SC. During this period, Dr. Casasola died so he was substituted by his wife and children. - On June 18, 1983, Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his AF that was provided in the oral agreement between him and Dr. Casasola. The agreement was confirmed by the widow and 2 daughters of Dr. Casasola. The agreement stated the following: A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00. B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. - RTC granted the motion for confirmation on March 20, 1984. Issue: WoN the motion for confirmation of AF as damages was properly granted?

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[GR 73886/ January 31, 1989] Ratio: Attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel. Therefore, the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Important Portion of the Decision: Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the

Held: No. Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered." What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. The SC agrees with the IAC that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PhilAmGen in this Court (G.R. No. 64334) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. Since the main case from which the Atty. Quirantes claims for his AF may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. It was ruled that: ". . . an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid."

4. After being informed of the mix up by Vergons manager, Sps. Macabagdal demande the petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. 5. Petitioners refused. Thus, respondent-sps filed an action to recover ownership and possession of Lot No. 2-R. 6. As their defense, petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed the house was the lot pointed to them consistently by Vergons agents over the seven year period they were paying for the lot, hence, they were buyers in good faith. 7. Petitioners impleaded Vergon as third party defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided against them. 8. RTC ruled against the Sps. Briones with the following judgment: a. That Sps. Briones demolish the house or pay the Sps. Macabagdal the prevailing price of the lot involved. b. That Sps. Briones pay Sps. Macabagdal P50,000 as moral damages for shattering the latters dreams of having their own house on their own land. c. That Sps. Briones pay Sps. Macabadal P30,000 as attorneys fees. d. Pay the costs of the proceedings. e. Sps. Brioness third-party complaint against Vergon is dismissed for lack of cause of action. f. That Sps. Briones pay Vergon P20,000 as compensatory damage and P10,000 attorneys fees. 9. CA affirmed.

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August 3, 2010 Villarama, J. Fox of the case: 1. Sps. Macabagdal (respondent spouses) purchased from Vergon Realty Lot. No. 2-R. 2. Sps. Briones are the owners of Lot No. 2-S which is adjacent to 2-R. 3. In 1984, with the approval of Vergon, Sps. Briones constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was 2-S.

ISSUES: 1. WON petitioners should demolish the house they built in good faith on the lot owned by the respondents. [not really related to the course but determination of this question will be substantial to the answer to the question on damages] 2. WON petitioners should pay moral and compensatory damages as well as attorneys fees. Ruling: Case was remanded but must be decided accordingly: 1. NO. Petitioners are builders in good faith. As per Art. 448, the builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between

appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land if its value is considerably less than the value of the building. The choice belongs to the owner of the land. 2. NO. Petitioners acted in good faith hence, the award of moral damages has no basis. Compensatory damages to Vergon are also improper since it was not specifically prayed for. Under Article 2208, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation (compensatory damages) are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs, hence, must be specifically prayed for and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable. Attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.

4. Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated check. Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between petitioner and IMRDC. 5. Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a letter reminding petitioner of their agreement. 6. Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent. 7. Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money. 8. Respondent alleged that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owners copy of TCT No. 168173, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy. 9. Respondent prayed for P100,000.00 moral, corrective and exemplary damages. 10. RTC issued a decision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and exemplary damages: The fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to her loaned money!entitled respondent to moral damages. 11. CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification, in the sense that the rate of interest is reduced. Issue: WON respondent is entitled to moral damages. Petitioner claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony filed by respondent against her. Held: Yes. Ratio: 1. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. 2. While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner.

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April 4, 2007 | Austria-Martinez Facts: 1. Petitioner FRIAS is the owner of a house and lot in Ayala Alabang. 2. Petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra. Flora SAN DIEGO-SISON (respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement over the property. 3. For THREE MILLION PESOS, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY: a. The SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months within which to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the aforementioned parcel of land. b. In the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months within which to pay the sum. c. The amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage.

3. We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. 4. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 5. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud. 6. Petitioners actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages is in order. 7. The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is proper. 8. Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction for the public good.

NLRC and CA denied appeals by Nacar. CA opined that since Nacar did not appeal the October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter which already became final and executory, a correction9RECOMPUTATION) is no longer allowed and that there is nothing left to do except to enforce the said judgment. Only clerical errors may be modified. Issues: 1. W/N a recomputation on Nacars back wages is allowed. 2. W/N Nacar is entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of the decision until full payment by Gallery Frames. Ruling & Ratio: 1. Yes, the backwages to be computed from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed on Jan. 24, 1997 up to May 27, 2002 and the separation pay computed from August 1990 up to May 27, 2002 at the rate of 1 mo pay per year of service. Based on the case of Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. CA, the decision of the Labor Arbiter on a complaint for illegal dismissal consists of essentially 2 parts: First part is the finding of illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, attorneys fees, and legal interest. This is the part of the decision that cannot now be disputed since it has been confirmed with finality. Second part is the computation of the awards made. This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the decision established and declared, can by its nature, recomputed. A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction as expressed by Art. 279 of the Labor Code. The computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or

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13 August 2013 (Please note. Latest jurisprudence on rate of interest) J. Peralta Facts: Nacar won an illegal dismissal case against Gallery Frames and was awarded separation pay worth Php158,919.92 in lieu of reinstatement. Amount was computed only up to the promulgation of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on October 15, 1998. Respondent Gallery Frames appealed the ruling on the illegal dismissal but eventually lost when SC rendered a decision in favor of Nacar on April 17, 2002. The Entry of judgment was issued which became final and executory on May 27, 2002. Nacar, after the entry of judgment, filed a Motion for Correct Computation which prayed that his back wages be computed from date of his dismissal (January 24, 1997) to date of finality of the SC decision on May 27, 2002 (originally computed until October 15, 1998 as per the Labor Arbiters decision) which totalled to Php471, 320.31. He also posits that he is entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of the decisions until full payment by Gallery Frames. Respondent assert that no recomputation can be made to the originally awarded sums as the decision was already final and executory.

amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgements. When separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the reckoning point. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point. 2. Yes at the interest of 12 p.a. of the total monetary wards, computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction. Note that the 2002 to June 30, 2013 rate is under the old guideline while the Juli 1, 2013 is subject to the modification of the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 effective July 1, 2013, as follows: I. When an obligation is breached, the contravener can be held liable for damages under Title XVIII on Damages of the Civil Code. With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists of the payment of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% p.a. to be computed from default. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, and interest may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% p.a! 3. When the judgement of the court awarding a sum of money becomes

final and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 6% p.a. from such finality until its satisfaction.

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II.