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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR.

(2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 1


Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

A THREE-FOLD ANALISYS OF PASSENGER TERMINAL SECURITY:


MOTIVATIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF ILICIT INTERFERENCES

Lucineide M. Gomes, M.Sc. a, Orlando N. Cosenza, D.Sc. b,


and Respicio A. Espirito Santo Jr., D.Sc. 1 c
a
Doctorate student – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ/Brazil)
b
Associate Professor – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ/Brazil)
c
Associate Professor – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ/Brazil)

ABSTRACT

The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington brought to light several concerns regarding
airport terminal security. This paper represents the start of a research which intends to discuss these questions
based on a three-fold analysis: the motivations for illicit interference in airport terminals; the opportunities to
accomplish it; and the risks involved, herein called the M-O-R approach. Moreover, knowing that non-
aeronautical revenues have become fundamentally important for a healthy airport business anywhere in the
globe, this paper discusses the question of “cost-rising” and “revenue-depletion” for the airport administration,
trying to avoid an adverse environment inside airport terminals which could be harmful to airport shops and
other non-aeronautical services. A brief discussion on air cargo security is included, recently appointed as one of
the major concerns throughout aviation security worldwide. This paper also point the need and the extreme
relevance of multidisciplinary teams of experts working continuously through the suggested M-O-R approach,
then combined with future scenario, strategic intelligence exercises. There are also Brazilian cases reported in
this paper in order to set comparisons to some of the Brazilian airport security problems. A major Brazilian case
occurred in September 1988 is highlighted due to its similarities with the September 11 events in the United
States.

KEYWORDS: Airport Passenger Terminals, Airport Security, Illicit Interference, Intelligence.

1. INTRODUCTION

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States triggered a worldwide movement
towards tightening the security procedures of airport passenger terminals. Since then, massive
efforts and resources have been shifted towards these new sets of security procedures,
including the federalization of airport security personnel in the U.S., the limiting of some
popular terminal areas from circulation of non-passengers, several better screening
techniques, and even personal and group profiling. All of these efforts have led to a huge
pressure upon the ordinary passenger, as he or she must arrive at the airport well before he or
she used to, not to say that delays in check-ins lines, x-ray screeners and personal profiling
have become, in fact, true nightmares for the travelling public.

In this regard, while protecting the airside of the airports in order to try to impede any
individual of entering an aircraft with weapons, devices and objects that could be used as
such, airport, airline and government officials are, unfortunately, creating multiple reasons for
passengers, their companions and the ordinary public to view the airport terminal as a non-
pleasurable environment. In view of this, since non-aeronautical revenues have become
fundamentally important for a healthy airport business anywhere in the globe and, in turn, to
airlines, passengers and the airport catchment area, creating a terminal environment that is not
1
Authors’ contacts: luci@pep.ufrj.br OrlanCsnz@aol.com respicio@momentus.com.br Complete address on page 18.

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 2
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

comfortable and oppressive is the same that signing a commitment for “cost-rising” and
“revenue-depletion” for the airport itself. This will directly impact airlines’ costs and, in turn,
impact ticket prices.

Meanwhile, following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Brazil has taken some new security
procedures as well. In fact, in the last fifteen years the country has witnessed various kinds of
illicit interferences which occurred practically in the same modus operandi as several
incidents in Europe, Asia and the U.S. involving aircraft hijacking, bomb usage and threats,
and robbery.

In this regard, the actual oppressive approach of the new security procedures and the
reviewing of the Brazilian events that highlighted several sequences of security flaws
prompted the authors to view the problem of maximizing security procedures through the
lenses of a three-fold analysis: the motivations for illicit interference in airport terminals; the
opportunities to accomplish it; and the risks involved in doing so.

In this regard, the main objective of this paper is to identify and discuss some relevant issues
based on the motivations-opportunities-risks tripod that may lead to an illicit interference in
airport passenger terminals. A further, more detailed continuation of this research will, in turn,
form the basis of a series of suggestions in the quest for maximizing airport security and
minimizing the hassling procedures upon the ordinary individual, and thus trying to maintain
a comfortable and non-oppressive environment inside the terminals.

2. MOTIVATION, OPPORTUNITY AND RISK (M-O-R)

We begin our study bringing to light the definitions for the three core issues of our discussion:
motivation, opportunity and risk. By pursuing a better understanding of these terms, we intent
to collaborate with intelligence agencies, policymakers, decision makers, security experts and
officials so that they can re-focus, through new lenses and in a concrete basis, the “outside”,
off-site complexity of possible illicit interferences against airport terminals.

2.1. Defining “Motivation” (M)


Motivation n. 1. act or process of motivating; being motivated. 2. that which
motivates. (Macmillan Dictionary, 1973)
Motivation n. 1. the act or an instance of motivating. 2. the state or condition of
being motivated. 3. that which motivates; inducement; incentive [motive + -
ation] (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1996)

Bringing to the surface the need to pursue definitions for the term “motive”:
Motive n. 1. mental state; internal need, or outward goal which causes one to act;
motivation. 2. motif. [Medieval Latin motivum that which causes an action; from
motivus moving, from Latin movere to set in motion] (Macmillan Dictionary,
1973)

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 3
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Motive n. 1. something that prompts a person to act in a certain way that


determines volition; incentive. 2. the goal or object of one’s actions. [syn.
comments: Motive is, literally, that which moves one to action. Motive is
applied mainly to an inner urge that moves or prompts a person to action, though
it may also apply to a contemplated result, the desire for which moves the
person.] (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1996)

These simple definitions lead to several questions, each with complex or, at least, multiple
answers: “What are the probable motives behind an illicit interference in an airport terminal?”
and “What kind of motivation or what set of motivations will lead to one committing a
terrorist attack to an airport?”, just to present two of the several possible questions.

The reality is that the motivation, or the motive, is the driving force behind all kinds of illicit
interference (in fact, all human acts are produced by and/or are a consequence of some sort of
motivation). From individuals with mental disorder, with evil character, to religious-
ideological extremists, all of them have their own motivations to engage him/herself in a
criminal activity. In view of this, security managers should team with psychologists,
anthropologists and sociologists to better understand the diversity of motivations (as seen, the
causes, the forces or motives necessary for an action!) behind several individuals and the
various organized groups within the modern world society. This partnership of technical
personnel and cultural-behavioral specialists would then be responsible for elaborating
specific tactics and techniques to counter criminal-motivated individuals to take action inside
airport terminals. But there are exceptional challenges to face, made up by individuals bearing
the extreme edge of motivation: the radical, the extremist of any kind, mainly the ideological-
religious fundamentalists.
“Whatever the motivation for criminal attacks against civil aviation – very often
is political – there is an ever present need for airports to be on constant alert in
order to frustrate any such acts.” (Ashford, Stanton & Moore, 1997)

A better understanding of the diversity of motivations behind criminal minds would give
authorities a better knowledge of the “whys” nested in their behavior and their actions.

2.2. Defining “Opportunity” (O)


Opportunity n. 1. time or circumstance that is favorable or suitable for the
achievement of some purpose. 2. good chance, as to advance oneself. [syn.
comments: Opportunity is an advantageous combination of circumstances
suitable or propitious for a particular activity in accord with one’s ambitions or
desires.] (Macmillan Dictionary, 1973)
Opportunity n. 1. an appropriate or favorable time or occasion, goal. 2. a
situation or condition favorable for attaining of a goal. 3. a good position, chance
or prospect for advancement. (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary,
1996)

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 4
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Criminals, ranging from robbers and thieves to terrorists, plus mentally disturbed individuals
wishing to attack anyone who can fill a void within their troubled minds, will be on the watch
for a good opportunity to act. In crowded public places, such as museums, shopping-centers,
mega-stores, amusement parks, university campuses and airport terminals, just to list a few,
they can walk in and out looking like an ordinary individual, just waiting for “an
advantageous combination of circumstances suitable or propitious” for their offensive action.

In contrast, by detailed mapping and thoroughly discussing the critical and/or weakest points
in an infrastructure or a given location, can pinpoint the “wheres” and “whens” that would
make up an opportunity. By better understanding these gaps (possible targets of
opportunities), security experts teamed with other specialists would be in place to counter the
“hows” (the opportunities themselves!) behind possible criminal actions.
“You should look for all the potential risks you could have at airports and then
define the gaps you have. (...) airports are right now focusing on the checkpoint,
but we are really eager to do the whole diagnostic study all over the airport.”
(Hakimi, in Aviation Today, 2002)
“(...) airports were historical targets of terrorists (...) immediate attention [was
called] to vulnerabilities at Logan [Boston-Logan Airport], including at security
checkpoints (...)” (Murphy, 2002)

2.3. Defining “Risk” (R)


Risk n. 1. exposure to loss or harm. 2. person or thing with reference to the
problem of loss from insuring or relying on him or it. [syn. comments: Risk
suggests both a probability of harm and a voluntary acceptance of the chances.]
(Macmillan Dictionary, 1973)
Risk n. exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance.
(Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1996)

By analyzing the definitions above and by trying to view the problem from a new perspective,
we suggest that risks are totally linked and derived from the motivations. We suggest that the
stronger (or the more extreme) the motivation, the less sense of risk is perceived by the
criminal. This points in the direction of the “willing to die to fulfill the mission”, commonly
associated with extremists, but seldom associated with robbers, thieves and mentally disturbed
criminals.
Example 1: the risks associated to a group of robbers with a plan to assault an exchange
kiosk or ATMs located inside an airport terminal (such robbery has been committed at
least once in the last year in Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão/Tom Jobim International Airport,
Terminal 1) are: to be caught in action, to be wounded, to be killed; if caught and after
undergoing a public trial, to be sentenced and imprisoned. In view of this, the
motivation is driven by the chances of being successful, getting away freely and being
able to “enjoy” the materials results of the action. The worst scenario, in these cases,
comprise the loss of freedom, either by being caught and imprisoned or by being killed.

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 5
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Example 2: the risks associated to a terrorist cell planning for a suicide bombing of a
terminal building or planning for a suicide action aboard an aircraft are not only those
associated with the conventional robbers. In fact, these “conventional” risks (being
caught, imprisoned, wounded and then caught) are probably of the least important issue
being considered by the extremist. The worst scenario for this kind of terrorist is not
being caught or deprived from freedom, but to be killed without completing the mission.

From these brief examples, comes the confirmation that is far more complex and difficult to
cope with or intercede in a terrorist action than is to handle or counter a robbery situation,
even when dealing with the most crime-motivated robbers. One probable exception is when
some highly motivated robbers make bystanders their hostages, turning them into hijackers.

3. CRIMINAL ACTION IN AIRPORTS: FACTS AND CASES IN BRAZIL

This paper will not address the relevant issues arising from the differences between “safety”
and “security”. Trying to build a case for the need to view both the intelligence and the airport
terminal security issues from new perspectives, we will also consider any attempt to put an
aircraft, its passengers and crew (and cargo) in danger by a criminal-minded group or
individual as started as an airport security issue. Of course, there are exceptions: commercial
aircraft being shot down by rebel forces, friendly forces or by other military action; any kind
of sabotage to an aircraft while inside a carrier’s hangar or any other airline-controlled
maintenance area; and unruly passengers due to alcohol abuse (from alcoholic beverages
served in-flight) and/or due to drug abuse (not used or carried by the individual on board the
aircraft).

3.1. Recent Robbery Cases in Brazil


In November of 1997, in the apron of Congonhas Airport (São Paulo downtown airport, the
second in passenger volume and the first in aircraft movements in the country), 15 robbers
assaulted a Piper Seneca from Sul América Táxi Aéreo while it awaited instructions to taxi for
take-off. The aircraft was on a charter flight for a bank and carried about R$4.06 million
(circa US$3.15 million at the time). Just two months later 4 heavily armed robbers assaulted
TAM’s cargo terminal in the same Congonhas Airport, carrying about R$500,000 that were
going to be shipped to the northeastern cities of Fortaleza and Recife.

In June 2000, again in Congonhas, heavily armed men opened fire towards two armored bank
vehicles and a Piper Seneca. Their robbery action resulted in the loss of R$3 million. Two
months later, a VASP 737 on a flight from Foz do Iguaçu to Curitiba was hijacked. VASP
flight 280 with 66 passengers and a crew of 6 was carrying R$6 million in cash, which was
the target of the criminals.

3.2. Aircraft Bombing Case in Brazil


In June 1997 a home-made explosive device was detonated aboard a TAM Fokker F100
flying between the city of São José dos Campos and São Paulo. The device was being carried
by a passenger aboard the aircraft, who did not die in the explosion. The single casualty of
this incident was a passenger sitting next to the bomb-carrier who was jettisoned from the

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 6
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

aircraft through a fuselage failure due to the sudden cabin decompression. The supposed
bomber died several months later in a car accident, while still being investigated by Brazilian
authorities.

3.3. Hijacking Case in Brazil: Similarities with September 11 2


The worst case of all, still not very much known by the foreign press, took place in 1988. In
September 29, 1988, a man hijacked a VASP Boeing 737-300 with 97 passengers on board
and its crew of 7. Alone, armed with a 32-caliber revolver and with plenty of ammunition, the
man managed to dominate the cabin crew of VASP flight 375 en route from Belo Horizonte
to Rio de Janeiro.

A solitary, quiet and recluse individual that had spend a few years in Iraq as a construction
worker for the Mendes Junior Engineering Company, Raimundo Nonato Conceição became
severely disturbed by several months without a job. The insanity was such that from the very
beginning he considered to die in the name of his own delusions. With all his economies
gone, he impersonated himself as a vindicator in the name of all the other jobless and
homeless in the country and hijacked the aircraft to slam it over the Presidential Palace
(Palácio do Planalto), in the country’s capital, Brasília. His intentions were clear: kill the
President and his aides, in his opinion the direct responsibles for the country’s ever-rising
inflation rates, jobless rates and corruption, not to say his own miserable situation.

The man studied, premeditated and carried out his plan very carefully: he decided that he
needed a commercial airplane flying a conventional, unsuspicious route between the city he
lived (Belo Horizonte) and Brasilia, or, maybe, Rio de Janeiro. On August 8, 1988, he flew
from Belo Horizonte to Rio de Janeiro to start observing the screening procedures at both
airports. To save money, he returned from Rio by bus! Two weeks later he traveled by bus to
Rio de Janeiro and then flew from Rio back to Belo Horizonte. Again on September 10, with
the last amount of his money left, he traveled by bus to Rio de Janeiro and boarded a flight
back to Belo Horizonte, again observing in detail the screening procedures being routinely
done at both airports.

He realized that in Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão/Tom Jobim International Airport, screeners were
much more severe and detailed searches were common and, the most important of all,
passengers and their carry-ons had to pass through X-ray machines before entering the
departure gate. On the other hand, in Belo Horizonte’s Confins International Airport screeners
did not perform such a detailed search and, counting on his favor, not a single X-ray machine
was in place at that time. He then defined his plan: board a flight from Belo Horizonte to Rio
de Janeiro, divert it to Brasília and force the pilots to crash the aircraft into the Presidential
Palace.

On September 29, 1988, 10:52h local time, VASP 737-300 registered PP-SNT, then referred
to as VASP flight 375, took-off from Belo Horizonte’s Confins International Airport on a
what should have been a routine flight to Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão/Tom Jobim International
Airport. Unfortunately, insanity and confusion was continuing to mount inside Raimundo

2
Source for this section: Sant’anna, 2000.

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 7
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Conceição’s mind, who was aboard that aircraft with a 32-caliber revolver and a box full of
ammunition. The hours that followed would probably become one the worst moments in
Brazilian commercial aviation history.

After the in-flight meal was served, the hijacker left his seat (3C) and calmly walked in the
direction of the cockpit door. He was argued by a flight attendant standing in the front galley:
“Sir, this is not the toilet entrance door. The toilet is right to your left.” Continuing in his
attempt to open the cockpit door, the flight attendant tried to intervene, but was shot in the
face. Seconds later, the man opened fire against the cockpit door knob, injuring a guest VASP
captain flying in the jump seat at that opportunity and hitting several parts of the instrument
panel. With the chaos starting on board, with passengers shouting and hiding between their
seat rows, the man calmly reloaded his revolver to start shooting again towards the cockpit
door. A passenger seating in the first row (1C) could have thought of teaming with the man
seating right next to him to jump together over the criminal while he was reloading. But the
businessman looked at the man by his side and saw a dark-skin man, probably from the
Middle-East, and he thought: “This man may well be a hijacker partner! I am not going to
talk to him.” Indeed, the man sitting beside him was an Iranian-born businessman, but had
absolutely nothing to do with that terrible ongoing plot! If it were not for this racial profiling
error, the man sitting on 1C could have taken action along his neighbor and attempted to
jump over and dominate the criminal while he was reloading...

When the shooting started again, the captain decided to open the door to try to handle the
situation, but he, the first officer and the injuried guest captain were dominated by the armed
criminal. Just after letting the injuried officer leave the flight deck to seat in the passenger
cabin, the individual shot the first officer in the head at point blank range, while he just tried
to reach his microphone that fell to the floor during the first rounds of shooting. First officer
Sebastião Evangelista died instantly.

Captain Murilo set the transponder to 7500 to alert the CINDACTA air traffic control in
Brasília that his flight was being hijacked: “Copy, 375” was the prompt reply from the
military air traffic controller. A few moments later, the hijacker ordered Captain Murilo to fly
directly to Brasília, while keeping his gun swinging between the captain’s head and the
opened cockpit door to discourage any attempt from the flight attendants and passengers to
reach the cockpit. Realizing a total diversion of the flight path originally set for Rio de
Janeiro, the CINDACTA controller radioed: “VASP 375, confirm flight plan.” The reply was
whispered a few moments later through the captain’s microphone: “He killed my first officer.”

Several high-rank military authorities including the Commander-in-Chief of the Brazilian Air
Force, plus VASP’s president, the Director of the Brazilian Federal Police, and the President
himself were called instantly as the latter message echoed in the CINDACTA main control
room. Within minutes a Mirage fighter based at Anápolis Air Force Base near Brasília was
scrambled to intercept the 737. The combat alert was sounded in Anápolis AFB because the
situation involved an aircraft heading towards the capital of the country with, at that time, an
unidentified number of hijackers aboard.

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 8
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

With clouds covering Brasília, Captain Murilo managed to convince the hijacker that was
impossible to land or fly at lower altitudes. He again was successful in convincing the
criminal that they would have to land either in the nearby Anápolis Air Force Base or in
Goiânia Airport, also near Brasília, due to their lack of fuel to continue anywhere else.

While in his approach towards Goiânia Airport, Captain Murilo performed several radical
maneuvers trying to knock out the hijacker, including a controlled spin dive. Very few times a
passenger-loaded 737 had experienced such controlled high-stress maneuvers. Unfortunately,
none was successful in bringing the criminal unconscious nor it permitted any crewmember or
passenger to leave their positions and try to grab the insane man.

The plot ended in Goiânia Airport, where the aircraft landed with a little more than 250 lbs of
fuel remaining. The hijacker was shot and dominated by Federal Police officers after leaving
the 737 towards a Brazilian Air Force Bandeirante he demanded to get away from the airport.
The individual died several days later in the hospital.

3.4. Major Weaknesses in Downtown Airports: Santos Dumont and Congonhas


Rio de Janeiro’s downtown Santos Dumont airport and São Paulo’s downtown Congonhas
airport together have an annual movement of nearly 20 million passengers. Both airports rely
almost completely on executive high-yield traffic from the so-called “pontes-aéreas” between
both cities and between the cities and other important industrial and economic centers such as
Curitiba, Belo Horizonte, Ribeirão Preto, and Brasília.

Unfortunately, both airports are extremely vulnerable to an extremist or a terrorist attack. This
is mainly due to their particular design and lay-out characteristics and not to any major
security procedure failure. In the case of Santos Dumont airport, part of the site must be kept
opened to road traffic, as the road right adjacent to thresholds 02L/R is the only possible
access to the Villegagnion Island where the Brazilian Navy Academy is located. The airport
site has no fences or security guards to block anyone from sneaking in at night or early
morning, for example, through this opened road access. The danger to anyone walking or
driving in the road is such that this road/runway intersection has sirens and light signals to
alert pedestrians and vehicles when an aircraft is on its final approach or when an aircraft is
prepared to take-off! In fact, due to the spectacular view of the Guanabara Bay, the Sugar-
Loaf, the Corcovado, and with aircraft landing and taking-off, several parts of this access road
have become observation spots for parents with children, aviation enthusiasts, tourists and
enamored couples! When a major soccer team from Rio won the national championship,
hundreds of rooters and fans invaded the airport through this access road and surrounded the
aircraft arriving with the soccer team. In 2000, a general aviation aircraft parked in the airport
was stolen and security officials claim the intruder managed to sneak in the aircraft parking
areas by entering through the Naval Academy access road. The individual then checked if the
airplane had enough fuel for its journey and simply flew away with it!

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 9
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Figure 1: Santos Dumont Airport in Rio de Janeiro’s Guanabara Bay. The


famous Sugar-Loaf tourist landmark is seen in the background. Both the
access road adjacent to threshold 02L/R and the Naval Academy are signed
with arrows.

Together with Santos Dumont, Congonhas airport has a very crowded terminal that is easily
accessed by any pedestrian walking in the streets they are located. In Santos Dumont and
certain parts of Congonhas the entrances are not equipped with doors.

In view of the above and mainly because of their importance as the two major sites for
business air travel in the country, these two downtown airports are extremely vulnerable to
illicit interference, from conventional robbery, stealing of aircraft and even extremist actions.

4. STUDYING POSSIBLE EXTREMIST ACTS: THE “M-O-R” SCENARIO


APPROACH

In the Brazilian hijacking case illustrated above, the individual had clear intentions: crash the
aircraft over the Presidential Palace, killing the President and his aides. Although not being a
“conventional” religious-ideological terrorist, his motivations were indeed extremist:
desperation of months without a job, near-future poverty situation, delusions of being a
“vindicator for the poor”, mental breakdown, social and political reasons. Acting just as true
fundamentalist terrorist, he simply did not care to die while carrying out his plan.

Publilius Syrus in the 1st century said: “The wise man avoids evil by anticipating it.” Born in
this same 1st century, Plutarch, a Greek philosopher and essayist said some complementing
wise words: “If one knows how to listen, will take advantage even when listening to the worst
speakers.” What does this mean? In the modern world, terrorist actions, no matter how cruel
or carefully planned it may be, it can be at least previously imagined possible by intelligence
agencies and law enforcement authorities!

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 10
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Human kind has long been using scenario research, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In
the issues been dealt with or that could be dealt with by both nationwide intelligence agencies
and senior airport security officials regarding terrorist activities, why haven’t a
comprehensive, multiple scenario approach been used to literally “imagine” the worst
possible criminal and extremist actions? If public and private organizations all around the
world routinely use qualitative scenarios to explore possible futures, sometimes 10-15-20
years ahead to plan their future budgets and to allocate resources to technology and human
development, why can’t intelligence agencies, security officials and authorities do the same?

If U.S. intelligence agencies had paid attention and studied in detail the “ordinary” case of
September 1988 in Brazil, and had summed up with all the extensive data and information
they had about radical groups and terrorist cells operating in the U.S. and throughout the
world, couldn’t they have just “imagined possible” a sole terrorist or maybe a fundamentalist
organization that could try to carry out the same type of “hijack-and-make-a-commercial-
aircraft-into-a-manned-missile” plot?

The very relevant question is: Since it has already happened before (YES! It was
demonstrated in the previous section that this kind of plan had been carried out before, but it
failed just prior to its completion!), why intelligence agencies were not aware of a possible re-
enactment?!? Moreover, for the sadness of human kind but counting in favor of the
intelligence agencies all around the world to gather information and learn how to counter
them, dozens of commercial flights had been hijacked since the 50s and the terrorists did not
use them as manned missiles because they simply did not want to! The possibility was there
all the time and should have been noticed and considered as possible before, if not by
imaginable scenarios, then mainly due to the Brazilian case of September 1988! In view of
this, it is unacceptable to consider such acts as carried out on September 11 as “totally
unpredictable”, since a very similar plan had been carried out almost exactly 13 years before,
simply in the largest country of Latin America!

As the former few lines point out and as several aviation and security experts have stated, the
September 11 attacks were not primarily a direct result of an overall airport security failure,
but, in fact, a result of a widespread intelligence failure and a gap in sensitive information
sharing.
“Sept. 11 was not a security failure. It was an intelligence failure.” (Leo Boivin,
former top security manager at the FAA, in Hilkevitch, 2002)
“The real failure on Sept. 11 was one of information. Federal security agencies
failed to share with airlines information that should have singled out some of the
hijackers as high-risk passengers.” (Poole, 2001)
“(...) airport-security workers did not know that 2 of the 19 [hijackers] were
already being hunted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as suspected
terrorists (...) the hijackings also showed the need for agencies to share
intelligence and computer information. In late August [of 2001], the Central
Intelligence Agency told the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it
should place (...) on its list of people who should be denied entry into the United
States. (...) But [both hijackers] were already in the United States and being hunt

10
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 11
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Even so, they used their real names in
buying airline tickets and did not raise alarms.” (Stout, 2002)

With the Motivation-Opportunity-Risk (M-O-R) approach functioning as the core for


discussions between behavioral, cultural, social, and political experts teamed up with
intelligence agencies and security authorities, qualitative scenario exercises could and should
be routinely run by this multidiscipline task force in order to put everyone in the latter two
groups in a constant alert to frustrate catastrophic plots.
“We can’t stop at just screening for explosives at our airports. We’ve got to do a
much better job screening out the terrorists. This new breed is calm and resolute.
They aren’t going to stand there sweating at the security checkpoint waiting to be
picked out.” (Jerrold Post, psychologist at the George Washington University, in
Hilkevitch, 2002)
“(...) despite the best efforts to keep the screening process for baggage and
passengers secret, terrorists will learn how to defeat the machines. The
predictors we use today lose their predictive value. Sophisticated terrorists can
plan for the pilots being armed or for air marshals being on board.” (Richard
Bloom, anti-terrorism expert at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in
Prescott, Arizona, in Hilkevitch, 2002)

In fact, in a worldwide international air transport scenario research exercise conducted in


1998/1999/2000 to explore possible futures for the international air transport market in Brazil,
a great number of aviation officials, aviation authorities and experts not only in the country
but in the U.S., Europe and Latin America were interviewed and answered to specific
questionnaires. Several pointed out the extreme negative consequences to the aviation
community of a possible outbreak of what was labeled as “growth of international violence”.
From localized conflicts and unstable government situations to terrorist activities, these
aviation professionals expressed their fears in several possible “negative scenarios” (Espirito
Santo Jr., 2000).

Innumerous public and private organizations such as NASA, Royal/Dutch Shell, British
Airways, Southwest Airlines, Global Business Network, Petrobras, and Gerdau Steel, just to
name a few, know the strategic importance in developing and carrying out routinely their
“possible futures” exercises, as they may plan in advance for the great variety of positive,
neutral or negative outcomes that may arise in the economic, political, social, cultural, and
technological fields.

In its correct use and qualitative nature, scenarios are not intended to predict or forecast
anything, but to better prepare organizations and individuals for possible future events and
their consequences (Schwartz, 1996; van der Heijden, 1996). Thus, if not used as “crystal
balls” or not intended to exactly point out what will happen, these “possible-futures” scenario
exercises have the great advantage as being as dynamic and multi-spectrum in nature as
would be the criminal minds themselves. In fact, when routinely and carefully elaborated and
correctly run, scenarios are extremely powerful weapons to better prepare for whatever

11
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 12
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

“unpredictable” event may happen, even if they are mind disturbed, religious-ideological,
political or extreme terrorist actions.
“Much of the attention in the legislation is focused on looking for “things”
among the billions of bags, packages and people we carry. (...) That “needle in
the haystack” can be found if the haystack is small enough but not so long as the
haystack stretches beyond the horizon.” (Merlis, 2001)
“The methodology we use is, first, we think not of only what just happened, but
we think of what will be the next target. Currently we are looking for knives,
when maybe we should be looking for other things.” (Hakimi, in Aviation Today,
2002)

5. NON-AERONAUTICAL REVENUES: ANOTHER REASON TO MAINTAIN AN


ATTRACTIVE AND A COMFORTABLE TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT

During the last decade, airport managers materialized and extensively explored what was a
continuous and positive trend in the 70s and 80s: airports could be much more explored as
comfortable malls, business centers, recreational sites and family programs. The immediate
outcome was a substantial rise in the so-called non-aeronautical revenues, exactly those
coming from these non-transportation activities for so long overseen.

Passengers, their companions, occasional or constant visitors/users, airport and airline


employees, all can contribute directly to the ever growing non-aeronautical revenue numbers.
In fact, the first three groups are not only the most numerous in a medium/large airport
ordinary day, but they are the most important source of these revenues. They look for the
shining stores of the airport mall areas, they look for comfortable and good-looking
restaurants and food-plazas, they look for beautiful places inside the airport terminal where
they can take pictures, they may even look for a recreational area for their children or a
observing deck to enjoy the airplane ballet-like activity on the ground or the take-offs and
landings. Even not being an airport official or an airline employee, one day or the other each
of us may be part of the passenger group, the companion group or the occasional visitor/user
group.

After all, being in any of these groups, we may see the airport as a nice, comfortable and
secure place. But when delays start to mount, hassling procedures are seen almost
everywhere, armed guards and camouflaged soldiers are seen on foot patrolling the
concourses, and if our sense of security suddenly weakens, not surprisingly the moments
inside an airport will become a true nightmare, no mattering how comfortable, modern,
attractive and beautiful its installations and architecture may be.

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States triggered a worldwide movement
towards tightening the security procedures of airport passenger terminals. Since then, new
legislation has been signed and massive efforts and resources have been shifted towards new
sets of security policies and procedures in several countries. These include the creation of the
TSA (Transportation Security Administration) in the United States, the federalization of

12
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 13
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

several airport security roles (also in the U.S.; in Brazil screeners are from the Federal Airport
Authority, who work along Federal Police officers at airport checkpoints), the limiting of
some gate areas from circulation of non-passengers, limiting of curbside check-ins, limiting of
vehicle parking along passenger terminal curbside, several better screening techniques,
developing and commissioning of new state-of-the-art technologies and security equipment,
and even personal and group profiling. All of these efforts have led to a huge pressure upon
the ordinary passenger, as he or she must arrive at the airport well before he or she used to,
not to say that delays in check-ins lines, head-to-toe searches and x-ray scanning, not to
mention personal/racial profiling, have become, in fact, true nightmares for the travelling
public.

The nightmare may get even worse when grandmothers, infants and handicapped people
become the “randomly selected” passengers to be extensively questioned about her/his “real”
motives to take that particular flight or to be separated for a complete head-to-toe searching,
or even a “strip-search”.
“Hour-long lines to confiscate nail clippers from grandmothers don’t increase
aviation security.” (Poole, 2001)
“(...) airport operators, airlines and governments must also expand existing
airport capacity, by increasing efficiency and expanding the use of automated
services. Facilitation and quality of service must be improved. (...) Convenient
and expedited travel should always be considered an essential “core value” (...)
Airports are an integral part of the entire travel chain.. Air passengers should
have a seamless travel experience.” (ICAO, 2001 – Working Paper A33-WP/130,
September 29, 2001)

Another nightmare may prove real when someone travels with that old friend from high-
school, a daughter/son of Middle-East-born parents. Although she/he may posses your
country’s citizenship, passport, driver’s license, etc., she/he could be easily stopped by
security personnel due to racial profiling. Unfortunately, these examples have been reported
and witnessed in the U.S., Europe, Latin America and everywhere else.

In a more and more technologically and economically bonded, multi-cultural and


globalization-driven world, racial profiling or simple “random-selection” 3 cannot be used as a
means of countering extremist or terrorist groups and their criminal activities. Moreover, two
things are certain: 1) to adopt racial profiling and spread out racial explanations for it are far
more easier and cost far less than it is to adopt a M-O-R multi-discipline, multi-team approach
with routine scenario exercises, such as herein suggested; and 2) adopting racial profiling is
far less efficient than a broad M-O-R teamwork effort.
“So now airlines are removing passengers for no reason other than that they look
Middle Eastern. That's the charge against four carriers made by the American
Civil Liberties Union in a lawsuit filed last week, a case that has unsettled, if not
surprised many travelers. (...) Just ask Hassan Sader (...) the Moroccan-born

3
In fact, several “random selection” procedures include a completely useless selection of an individual in a 10-
to-10 count, no matter the individual’s age, sex and physical condition.

13
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 14
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

U.S. citizen reportedly noticed a female passenger and a flight attendant talking
and looking in his direction. Minutes later, an airline agent asked him to leave
the plane. (...) Or talk to Arshad Chowdhury, who was taken off a (...) flight and
denied passage on any of the carrier's flights even after being cleared by the
airport police, airline security officials and the FBI. (...) Stories of travelers with
dark skin and foreign-sounding names being denied transportation for no valid
reason. We've seen this before, in the internment of Japanese civilians during
World War II, in the hysteria of McCarthyist witch-hunts, and even in the Jim
Crow laws of the late 19th century. (...) In a free society, we don't just have the
luxury of public introspection. We have an obligation to look at ourselves and
ask: are our actions justified? Is our policy reasonable? Or are we reacting now,
as we have in the past, in a way we'll later regret?” (Elliot, 2002)

Since non-aeronautical revenues have become fundamentally important for a healthy airport
business anywhere in the globe (see Figure 1) and, in turn, to airlines, passengers and the
airport catchment area, creating a terminal environment that is oppressive and unfriendly is
the same as committing to a “cost-rising” and “revenue-depletion” future for the airport itself.
This will directly impact airlines’ costs and this in turn will directly impact ticket prices,
prompting a slower recovery for several troubled carriers all around the world.
“According to a survey conducted by ACI-NA, airports lost US$84 million
between September 11 and September 15 when airports were either shut down or
severely impacted. In addition, the ACI-NA economic estimate projects that
airports will lose US$2.3 billion in revenues. ‘What happened on September 11
for airports was an economic tsunami’ said American Association of Airport
Executives’ President Charles Barclay. ‘(...) Revenues fell off a cliff, cost shot
through the ceiling and the shock to the system has been enormous’.” (Travis,
2001)
“FAA said that concerns over security and the occurrence of delays due to
security clearances have reduced the attractiveness of commercial travel,
especially over shorter distances. (...) If these lengthy check-in times are allowed
to continue, much of the shorter distance scheduled air travel could be shifted to
other transportation modes or travel alternatives, such as teleconferences. The
loss of this traffic, mostly high price business travel, would be devastating to the
profitability of U.S. commercial airlines.” (Cook, 2002)
“Another aim is to reduce the “hassle factor” that new layers of security have
added to air travel since Sept. 11. Airlines are particularly eager to lure back
their best customers – frequent business travelers who don’t want to arrive at the
airport two hours in advance.” (Griffin, 2002)

While trying to build more security throughout terminal operations, the majority of
oppressive and hassling procedures now in place in several countries are creating an
atmosphere of discomfort, while not truly enhancing the effectiveness of security, as
demonstrated in events occurred in the previous months in Europe, the U.S. and Latin
America. In this regard, while protecting the airside of the airports in order to try to impede
any individual of entering an aircraft with weapons, devices and objects that could be used as

14
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 15
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

such, airport, airline and government officials are, unfortunately, taking a very dangerous way
towards creating even more reasons for passengers, their companions and the ordinary public
to view the airport terminal as a non-pleasurable environment at all.
“(...) if you let people stand in a line for 40 minutes, instead of 30 seconds, is that
you have lost 39.5 minutes during which these passengers could be spending
money in the restaurants and shops. So it means that in the long run you will
decrease the security because these people will spend less money in the airport,
and the airport will have less money for spending in security.” (Hakimi, in
Aviation Today, 2002)

Figure 1: Percentage of Non-aeronautical Revenues over Total Airport Operational Revenues


60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15

t
A

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rth

is
a
d

o
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an

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an


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BA

A
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id

an

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Sa

Sa

Sources: Auckland Int´l Airport (Annual Report 1999); Brisbane Airport Corporation
(“Annual Report 1997/98”); Perth Int´l Airport. (“Annual Report 1997/98”); BAA – British
Airports Authority (BAA Annual Report 1999/2000); Hartsfield Atlanta Int´l Airport (“The
Economic Impacts of Hartsfield-Atlanta International Airport 1997”); Aeroportos de Chicago
O´Hare e Midway (Annual Report 1997); MWAA – Metropolitan Washington Airport
Authority (MWAA Annual Report, 1997); Memphis (Gillen, 1998); San Francisco (website)
and Infraero (website).
Figure as presented in Palhares and Espirito Santo Jr., 2000.

6. ANOTHER REASON TO ADOPT THE “M-O-R” APPROACH: CARGO

Security for cargo carried on passenger planes is being cited as one of the high priorities,
since cargo, due to its multiple-origin-chain, does not yet have the detailed screening and
searching procedures implemented for passengers and their luggage. In fact, the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration has warned that security for cargo being carried on
commercial airplanes can be “easily circumvented”. 4

4
Main source for the data contained in this section: Schneider, 2002.

15
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 16
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

TSA staffers and consultants have pointed out that the risk of a terrorist bomb in air cargo has
increased because the government has focused almost exclusively on screening passengers
and luggage, but not necessarily the belly cargo. The present air-cargo system all around the
world does not yet include routine screening of packages, neither are explicit sets of security
regulations that shippers could easily, efficiently and reasonably follow.
“’Cargo is likely to become – and may already be – the primary threat vector in
the short term’, one of the internal TSA reports said. There is a 35% to 65%
likelihood that terrorists are planning to put a bomb in cargo on a passenger
plane, another TSA document said, citing year-old intelligence reports. The most
obvious solution is to physically inspect all cargo as it comes into an airport, but
both the inspector general and the TSA determined that would be impossibly
expensive and time-consuming. According to TSA computer models, breaking
down all containers, inspecting and reassembling them would allow airports to
process only 4% of the freight they receive daily. The TSA documents and the
inspector general's report also caution that any changes causing expense or
delay in the air-cargo system could cause widespread disruption to U.S. business,
which has grown dependent on moving goods rapidly” (Schneider, 2002)

Counter actions from law enforcement and security authorities throughout the world could
include audits to main shippers, forwarders and transportation/logistics companies operating
with air cargo. Moreover, detailed random searches could also be performed during these
audit visits. Field inspectors and experts would be either hired or contracted by federal
governments. All of this is very costly, but not so efficient.

Unfortunately, even if implemented, these measures will not look for the causes nor would
counter the possible outcomes of a criminal action using air cargo. As herein suggested for
other issues involving intelligence and security, the M-O-R approach could be used along
scenario exercises to better track, evaluate and foresee possible criminal actions that could use
air cargo as an instrument. Using the M-O-R approach, the huge existing gaps in cargo
security are the opportunities (O). The existance, the nature, the amount and how and where
the motivation (M) resides, plus maximizing the risks (R) for any individual or group wishing
to attempt an illicit act using air cargo, are the primary targets for intelligence agencies and
security officials teamed up with the multidisciplinary professionals previously mentioned.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this paper was to start a broad discussion on the issues based on a
motivation-opportunity-risk tripod that can be used as a tool to better understand illicit actions
against commercial aviation, through airport passenger terminals. This better understanding of
the diversity of motivations behind criminal minds would give authorities a better knowledge
of the “whys” nested in their behavior and their actions. It can be extremely useful to elaborate
more complete and efficient sets of security actions, techniques and strategies towards
motivation profiling and simply person or group profiling, both of which may easily lead to a
widespread racial and religious profiling and unfair prejudice. An infrastructure or a given
location can pinpoint the “wheres” and “whens” that would make up an opportunity.

16
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 17
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

In Brazil, due to their layout and location characteristics, both Rio de Janeiro Santos Dumont
and São Paulo Congonhas downtown airports are extremely vulnerable to illicit interference,
from conventional robbery, stealing of aircraft and possible terrorist actions.

It is a known fact that the majority of oppressive and hassling procedures now in place in
several countries are creating an atmosphere of discomfort for airport users, while not truly
enhancing the effectiveness of aviation security. Thus, while protecting the airside of the
airports in order to try to impede any individual with criminal intentions of entering an aircraft
with weapons, devices and objects that could be used as such, security officials are creating
several reasons for passengers, their companions and the ordinary public to view the airport
terminal as a non-pleasurable environment at all. Together with the drop of business traffic
and leisure traffic, the reduction in non-aviation revenue may cause severe trouble to airports
worldwide. In view of this, aviation/airport security issues must be addressed from new
angles, new perspectives that can point towards new and effective ways to counter criminal
actions in airport passenger or cargo terminals.

The Motivation-Opportunity-Risk (M-O-R) approach may function as a central point of


discussions between behavioral, cultural, social, and political experts teamed up with
intelligence agencies and security authorities, in order to constantly better understand the
possible reasons behind the criminals and the possible existing gaps in the infrastructure. In
turn, intelligence agencies, law enforcement officials and airport security personnel would be
better prepared to frustrate catastrophic plots.

Combining the M-O-R approach with scenario exercises run by a multidisciplinary task force
may lead to a much better preparation for any criminal attack, no matter disproportional it
may intent to be. The “possible-futures” scenario exercises have the great advantage as being
as dynamic and multi-spectrum in nature as would be the criminal minds and intentions.
When the scenarios are routinely and carefully elaborated and correctly run, they become
powerful tools to better prepare for the various “unpredictable” events, no mattering if these
futures are encrusted with multiple economic, social, political, and technological issues, or
even extreme terrorist actions.

Being the first part of a broader research in order to study this field from a different
perspective, this paper will be followed by further studies involving questionnaires and
interviews with Brazilian and international aviation professionals and their views regarding
developing and implementing the M-O-R approach along future scenario exercises.

17
GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 18
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

REFERENCES

Asford, N., H. P. Martin Stanton and C. A. Moore (1997) Airport Operations. 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, USA.

Aviation Today (2002) Eliminating Risks Takes Effective Layers: An Interview with Ronen Hakimi –
AMCG/USA. Aviation Today Special Reports, February 15, 2002. As obtained via the Internet at:
www.aviationtoday.com/reports/eliminating_risks.htm

Cook, B. (2002) FAA: Security-Related Delays Have Reduced Attractiveness of Commercial Air Travel.
American Association of Airport Executives, Security Central, March 15, 2002. As obtained via the Internet at
www.airportnet.org/security/exclusive.htm

Elliot, C. (2002) Have We Learned Nothing? Elliot Newsletter. As obtained via the Internet at:
www.elliot.org/vault/oped/2002/nothing.htm

Espirito Santo Jr., R. A. (2000) Cenários Futuros para o Transporte Aéreo Internacional de Passageiros no Brasil
[Future Scenarios for the International Air Transport in Brazil]. Doctor Science thesis, Transportation
Engineering Program, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Griffin, G. (2002) Air Security Seeks High-tech Solutions: Industry Tries to Balance Safety, “Hassle Factor”.
The Denver Post, January 28, 2002. As obtained via the Internet at www.denverpost.com

Hilkevitch, J. (2002) U.S. Plan for Airport Security Flawed, Experts Say. The Chicago Tribune, April 19, 2002.
As obtained via the Internet at
www.chicagotribune.com/news/printedition/chi0204190297apr19.story?coll=chi%2Dprir

ICAO (2001) Facilitation and Quality of Service at Airports. Economic Commission Working Paper A33-
WP/130. September 21, 2001.

Merlis, E. A. (2001) Federal Regulations Needed to Ensure Air Security. Statetment of the Air Transport
Association of America’s Senior Vice-President before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee of
Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, November 27, 2001. As obtained via the Internet at
www.airlines.org/public/testimony/pda.asp?nid=4813

Murphy, S. P. (2002) Logan Security Head Issued Warning: April Memo Noted Terrorist Activity. Boston Globe,
March 7, 2002. As obtained via the Internet at: www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/066
...Logan_security_issued_warningP.shtml

Palhares, G. L. and Espirito Santo Jr., R. A. (2000) Desafios para uma Nova Realidade em Administração de
Aeroportos no Brasil [Challenges for a New Reality in Airport Management in Brazil]. XIV ANPET Congress –
National Association for Research and Teaching in Transportation. Gramado, Brazil.

Poole, R. W. (2001) For Real Airport Security. New York Post, November 13, 2001. As obtained via the Internet
at: www.rppi.org/opeds/111301.html

Sant’anna, I. (2000) Caixa Preta: O Relato de Três Desastres Aéreos Brasileiros [Black Box: The Narrative of
Three Brazilian Aviation Disasters]. Editora Objetiva, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.

Schneider, G. (2002) Terror Risk Cited for Cargo carried on Passenger Jets: Two Reports List Security Gaps.
The Washington Post, June 10, 2002. As obtained via the Internet at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A22431-2002Jun9.html

Schwartz, P. (1996) The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World. Revised 2nd
edition (1st edition in paperback). Currency-Doubleday, USA.

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GOMES, L. M., O. N. COSENZA and R. A. ESPIRITO SANTO JR. (2002) “A Three-Fold Analisys of Passenger Terminal 19
Security: Motivations, Opportunities and Risks of Illicit Interferences”. 6Th Annual Air Transport Research Society
Conference, Seattle, USA.

Stout, D. (2002) Nine Hijackers Drew Scrutiny on Sept. 11, Official Say. New York Times, March 3, 2002. As
obtained via the Internet at: www.nytimes.com

Travis, E. (2001) Airport Security: An Uphill Battle On the Hill. American Association of Airport Executives,
Airport Magazine. As obtained via the Internet at www.airportnet.org/depts/publications/
AIRMAGS/am111201/secure.htm

van der Heijden, K. (1996) Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. 1st edition, John Wiley & Sons. Ltd.,
U.K.

Authors’ contact:

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO


Att.: Lucineide Monteiro Gomes / Prof. Orlando Nunes Cosenza
Ilha do Fundão, Centro de Tecnologia, Bloco F – sala F108
Programa de Engenharia de Produção, PEP/APIT – COPPE/UFRJ
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 21945-970
Brasil
luci@pep.ufrj.br lumgomes@yahoo.com

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO


Att.: Prof. Respicio A. Espirito Santo Jr.
Ilha do Fundão, Centro de Tecnologia, Bloco D – sala D209
Departamento de Engenharia de Transportes, DET/EP–UFRJ
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 21945-970
Brasil
respicio@momentus.com.br
respicio@pet.coppe.ufrj.br

19