General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic.

The result to be extracted from the foregoing analysis is in effect this: that everything runs up into the concept of taste as a critical faculty by which an object is estimated in reference to the free conformity to law of the imagination. If, now, imagination must in the judgment of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions . !nd although in the apprehension of a given object of sense it is tied down to a definite form of this object and, to that extent, does not enjoy free play (as it does in poetry , still it is easy to conceive that the object may supply ready"made to the imagination just such a form of the arrangement of the manifold as the imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely protect in harmony with the general conformity to law of the understanding. #ut that the imagination should be both free and of itself conformable to law, i.e., carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. $here, however, the imagination is compelled to follow a course laid down by a definite law, then what the form of the product is to be is determined by concepts% but, in that case, as already shown, the delight is not delight in the beautiful, but in the good (in perfection, though it be no more than formal perfection , and the judgment is not one due to taste. &ence it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective harmoni'ing of the imagination and the understanding without an objective one ( which latter would mean that the representation was referred to a definite concept of the object ( that can consist with the free conformity to law of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness apart from an end and with the specific character of a judgment of taste. )ow geometrically regular figures, a circle, a s*uare, a cube, and the like, are commonly brought forward by critics of taste as the most simple and un*uestionable examples of beauty. !nd yet the very reason why they are called regular, is because the only way of representing them is by looking on them as mere presentations of a determinate concept by which the figure has its rule (according to which alone it is possible prescribed for it. +ne or other of these two views must, therefore, be wrong: either the verdict of the critics that attributes beauty to such figures, or else our own, which makes purposiveness apart from any concept necessary for beauty. +ne would scarce think it necessary for a man to have taste to take more delight in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in an e*uilateral and e*uiangular *uadrilateral than in one that is all lopsided, and, as it were, deformed. The re*uirements of common understanding ensure such a preference without the least demand upon taste. $here some purpose is perceived, as, for instance, that of forming an estimate of the area of a plot of land, or rendering intelligible the relation of divided parts to one another and to the whole, then regular figures, and those of the simplest kind, are needed% and the delight does not rest immediately upon the way the figure strikes the eye, but upon its serviceability for all manner of possible purposes. ! room with the walls making obli*ue angles, a plot laid out in a garden in a similar way, even any violation of symmetry, as well in the figure of animals (e.g., being one"eyed as in that of buildings, or of flower"beds, is displeasing because of its perversity of form, not alone in a practical way in respect of some definite use to which the thing may be put, but for an estimate that looks to all manner of possible purposes. $ith the judgment of taste the case is different. ,or, when it is

to the condition that there is to be nothing for understanding to take exception to . however. in all kinds of furniture that shows good taste. and lavish. This determination is an end in respect of knowledge% and in this connection it is invariably coupled with delight (such as attends the accomplishment of any. where it has neither cognition nor some definite practical end expressly in view. observes that the free beauties of nature so surround the beholder on all sides that they cease to have much attraction for him. +n the other band he found a pepper garden full of charm. the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non of grasping the object as a single representation and giving to the manifold its determinate form. in fact. however. as it there is. anything that gives the imagination scope for unstudied and purposive play is always fresh to us.pure. it imposes an irksome constraint upon the imagination: whereas nature subject to no constraint of artificial rules. and thus to be richer for taste. a building.arsden. for if exactly imitated by man (as has been sometimes done with the notes of the nightingale it would strike our ear as wholly destitute of taste. in its luxuriant variety can supply constant food for his taste. is only pleasing as a change to one whose eyes have become surfeited with regular beauty. which consists in symmetry. seems to have more freedom in it. &ere. regularity in the shape of constraint is to be avoided as far as possible. $ith a thing that owes its possibility to a purpose. . Thus -nglish taste in gardens. in his description of /umatra. push the freedom of imagination to the verge of what is grotes*ue the idea being that in this divorce from all constraint of rules the precise instance is being afforded where taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to the fullest extent. its regularity. The regularity that conduces to the concept of an object is. and in its appearance *uite irregular beauty. #ut where all that is intended is the maintenance of a free play of the powers of representation (subject. in ornamental gardens. we have merely the value set upon the solution that satisfies the problem. this relation is reversed. -ven a bird0s song. !ll stiff regularity (such as borders on mathematical regularity is inherently repugnant to taste. even problematical. In the latter case. in that the contemplation of it affords us no lasting entertainment. understanding is at the service of imagination. and not a free and indeterminately purposive entertainment of the mental powers with what is called beautiful. and belongs with it to cognition. . etc. . +n the other hand. or even an animal. purpose . Indeed. in the decoration of rooms.rom all this he infers that wild. than the human voice singing in accordance with all the rules that the art of music prescribes% for we grow tired much sooner of fre*uent and lengthy repetitions of the latter. $e do not grow to hate the very sight of it. 1et here most likely our sympathy with the mirth of a dear little creature is confused with the beauty of its song. instead of the object diverting him any longer. we get heartily tired of it. and fantastic taste in furniture.. it combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any end. must express the unity of the intuition accompanying the concept of its end. which we can reduce to no musical rule. in the former. #ut he need only have made the experiment of passing one day in his pepper garden to reali'e that once the regularity has enabled the understanding to put itself in accord with the order that is the constant re*uirement. on coming across it in mid"forest with its rows of parallel stakes on which the plant twines itself.

Instead. In the latter case. 3ant then needs to ask the *uestion of how such judgments are possible. that is not how we act. taste appears to fasten.e. in other words. . and are such judgments in any way valid (that is. because they sustain its free play. we debate and argue about our aesthetic judgments 4 and especially about works of art "and we tend to believe that such debates and arguments can actually achieve something. for example. although no particular purpose can be found. The initial issue is: what kind of judgment is it that results in our saying. as when I say 2I like doughnuts0. as on the incentive it receives to indulge in poetic fiction. 2That is a beautiful sunset0. #ut 3ant insists that universality and necessity are in fact a product of features of the human mind (3ant calls these features 2common sense0 . 2. /econd and third..irst. meaning that we take pleasure in something because we judge it beautiful. Indeed. &aving identified the major features of aesthetic judgments. that they should affect us as if they had a purpose. The latter type of judgment would be more like a judgment of the 2agreeable0. are they really universal and necessary . beautiful objects have to be distinguished from beautiful views of objects (where the distance often prevents a clear perception . in the peculiar fancies with which the mind entertains itself as it is being continually stirred by the variety that strikes the eye. it appears to have been made or designed. who invented the modern use of the term . they are disinterested. . rather than judging it beautiful because we find it pleasurable. This means roughly that it is an intrinsic part of the activity of such a judgment to expect others to agree with us. such judgments are both universal and necessary. !n object0s purpose is the concept according to which it was made (the concept of a vegetable soup in the mind of the cook.. i. not so much on what the imagination grasps in this field. and that there is no objective property of a thing that makes it beautiful. &utcheson. as with 3ant0s epistemology and to a certain extent his ethics also. 3ant argues that such aesthetic judgments (or 2judgments of taste0 must have four key distinguishing features. beautiful objects appear to be 2purposive without purpose0 (sometimes translated as 2final without end0 . !lthough we may say 2beauty is in the eye of the beholder0. through aesthetic judgments.urther. for example % an object is purposive if it appears to have such a purpose% if. 2beauty0 behaves as if it were a real property of an object. Kant’s Aesthetics a.ourth. but they convey a charm to the imagination. &ume and #urke and 5ontinental rationalist aesthetics (especially #aumgarten. The Judgment of the Beautiful +verview: The Critique of Judgment begins with an account of beauty. for many purposes. like its weight or chemical composition. It is just as when we watch the changing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook: neither of which are things of beauty. It is useful to see the aesthetics here. as being a leap over the terms of the debate between #ritish (and largely empiricist philosophy of art and beauty (/haftesbury. 3ant argues. #ut it is part of the experience of beautiful objects.

because I derive pleasure from it 4 but that pleasure. despite his great admiration for #aumgarten. The key ideas of the former group were (i the idea of a definite human nature. beauty is also by no means non"cognitive. The main disagreement with rationalist thought on the matter was in the second of these ideas. following 8eibni'. habits and customs. and thus to interest. for #aumgarten. and thus that desire. rather than with the physiological. the real existence of the beautiful object is *uite irrelevant. it is impossible for 3ant to agree with #aumgarten0s account of aesthetic experience. etc. In addition. 3ant is thus the founder of . within limits. in order to ask as precisely as possible the *uestion 2how are judgments about beauty possible0. or an animal 2beautiful0. $e will now describe those features using 3ant0s conceptual language. The First Moment. and not in 3ant0s original usage of the term in the Critique of Pure Reason to mean the domain of sensibility. and by way of concepts in the good. Taking up roughly the first fifth of the Critique of Judgment. 3ant needs to clarify the basic features of such judgments. Interest is defined as a link to real desire and action. not sensible content (color. Therefore. +n 3ant0s analysis. or cognition by way of sensible images. In the aesthetic judgment per se. does such a judgment mean. #aumgarten. 3ant asserted the basic distinction between intuitive or sensible presentations on the one hand. has more to do with rational ideas such as harmony. . and they are structured in often obscure ways according to the main divisions of 3ant0s table of categories (/ee article on 3ant0s . +nly aesthetic judgment is free or pure of any such interests.etaphysics . such that studies of beauty could. 3ant begins to analy'e the experience of beauty. etc. (#y 2aesthetic0 here we mean in #aumgarten0s sense of a philosophy of the beautiful and related notions. Thus. There are two types of interest: by way of sensations in the agreeable. . 3ant0s initial focus is on judgments about beauty in nature. (/ee 23ant0s Transcendental Idealism0 in the article on 23ant0s . rhythm. The judgment results in pleasure. since the latter has a deep connection to the agreeable. is distinct from and parasitic upon the aesthetic judgment (see sect%. $hat. 3ant holds that aesthetic experience. 3ant discusses four particular uni*ue features of aesthetic judgments on the beautiful (he subse*uently deals with the sublime . 5ertainly. argued that all sense perception was merely 2confused0 cognition. although beauty certainly appears to our senses. and thus also to a determining connection to the real existence of the object.aesthetics0 in the mid"67th century . as the #ritish tradition had held. I may wish to own the beautiful painting. These he calls 2moments0. and the conceptual or rational on the other. arrangement. for example. is inexplicable without both an intuitive and a conceptual dimension. a sunset. as when we call a flower. and were not cognitive% (iii that any 2natural0 responses to beauty were generally overlaid by individual and communal experiences. like natural experience leading to determinate judgments. Thus. !esthetic judgments are disinterested. this by no means demonstrates that beauty is non"cognitive9 #eauty. in the object presented. be universal in scope% (ii the assertion that beautiful objects and our responses to them were essentially involved in sense or feeling. 3ant accordingly and famously claims that the aesthetic judgment must concern itself only with form (shape.etaphysics0. tone. Thus. and how does it take place as a mental act: In order to begin to answer these *uestions. aesthetic judgments are still more strange even than ordinary reflective judgments. or at least a copy of it. and must have a number of peculiar features which at first sight look like nothing other than paradoxes. at bottom. rather than pleasure resulting in judgment.

#eauty in nature. and therefore can only behave as if they were objective. that is. /econd. it is not purposive with respect to determinate cognition. 3ant argues. To pick three examples.all formalism in aesthetics in modern philosophy. or the internal purpose (what the thing was simply meant to be like . although I may be perfectly aware that all kinds of other factors might enter in to make particular people in fact disagree with me. #eing reflective judgments. then. pleasure is defined as a feeling that arises on the achievement of a purpose.arxism % by those for whom all art is a *uestion of affective response expressionists . will appear as purposive with respect to our faculty of judgment. The way that my aesthetic judgments 2behave0 is key evidence here: that is. In the case of the judgment of the beautiful. 3ant introduces the idea of the 2free play0 of the cognitive faculties (here: understanding and imagination . !n object0s purpose is the concept according to which it was manufactured% purposiveness. The Third Moment. these faculties no longer simply work together (as they do in ordinary sensible cognition but rather each 2furthers0 or 2*uickens0 the other in a kind of self"contained and self"perpetuating cascade of thought and feeling. In the former case. This claim of the disinterestedness of all aesthetic judgments is perhaps the most often attacked by subse*uent philosophy. but without any definite purpose. <I . rather than agreement as involving mere coincidence. insofar as the tendency is always to see 2beauty0 as if it were somehow in the object or the immediate experience of the object. especially as it is extended to include fine art as well as nature. If I judge a certain landscape to be beautiful then. the success of the process of making is judged according to utility% in the latter. but is still purposive. 3ant argues that such a relativist view can not account for the social 2behavior0 of our claims about what we find beautiful. never"the"less I at least implicitly demand universality in the name of taste. 3ant claims that the beautiful has to be understood as purposive. nor do we expect it to be % and second from the strict objectivity of judgments such as 2honey contains sugar and is sweet0. . /uch a belief. The econd Moment. In order to explore the implications of 2apart from a concept0. is the property of at least appearing to have been manufactured or designed. first of all can not account for our experience of beauty itself. !esthetic judgments behave universally. The third introduces the problem of purpose and purposiveness (also translated 2end0 and 2finality0 . This universality is distinguished first from the mere subjectivity of judgments such as 2I like honey0 (because that is not at all universal. 3ant is *uite aware that he is flying in the face of contemporary (then and now9 truisms such as 2beauty is in the eye of the beholder0. somehow. according to perfection. and the related idea of communicability. . $e will return to these notions below. but its beauty will have no ascertainable purpose 4 that is. 3ant argues that beauty is e*uivalent neither to utility nor perfection. be universal 2apart from a concept0 (sect%. 3ant0s argument is rejected by those ()iet'sche.reud for whom all art must always be understood as related to will% by those for whom all art (as a cultural production must be political in some sense (. Indeed. this is why beauty is pleasurable since. then. aesthetic judgments of taste have no ade*uate concept (at least to begin with . ! 2definite purpose0 would be either the set of external purposes (what the thing was meant to do or accomplish . or at least the recognition of a purposiveness (Introduction. he argues. involve an expectation or claim on the agreement of others 4 just 2as if0 beauty were a real property of the object judged. because the aesthetic judgment must. . I tend to see disagreement as involving error somewhere.

3ant reaches the core of the matter. The !eduction of Taste +verview: There are two aspects to 3ant0s basic answer to the *uestion of how aesthetic judgments happen. . These were concepts and intuitions (2intuition0 being 3ant0s word for our immediate sensible experiences 4 see entry on 23ant0s . &ere. as in: 2. we don0t even notice that this assumption is being made.0 In theoretical cognition of nature. Thus 3ant can even claim that all four . and its basis in a priori principles are all related. &ere. $ith the notion of condition. -verything interesting and fundamental happened in the formation of concepts. its objectivity. It is not just that the purpose for the beauty of the beautiful happens to be unknown. In other words. 3ant wants to claim that the universal communicability. 3ant is attempting to show that aesthetic judgments must pass the test of being 2necessary0. !s judges of art. 3ant also suggests that common sense in turn depends upon or is perhaps identical with the same faculties as ordinary cognition. the universal communicability of a representation. which effectively means. by which he means the a priori principle of our taste. the exemplary necessity and the basis in an a priori principle are all different ways of understanding the same subjective condition of possibility of aesthetic judgment that he calls common sense. #ut in the case of the beautiful. This principle asserts the purposiveness of all phenomena with respect to our judgment. determinative experience. This is because the . without having a definite purpose. The Fourth Moment. #ut now 3ant argues that judgment itself.The purposiveness of art is more complicated. it assumes in advance that everything we experience can be tackled by our powers of judgment. -veryone must assent to my judgment. what does it say about those who judge: 3ant calls the ground 2common sense0. much more fundamental mental presentations. (!s we shall see. or in the receiving of intuitions. /imilarly. or communicate a certain idea . /till. as a faculty. 3ant means that the judgment does not either follow or produce a determining concept of beauty. 2according to principle0. those features of humans which (as 3ant showed in the Critique of Pure Reason make possible natural. .or a busy restaurant. these can not be sufficient for the object to be beautiful. some of 3ant0s earlier work seemed to suggest that our faculty or ability to judge consisted of being a mere processor of other. it0s just common sense to reserve a table in advance. has an fundamental principle that governs it. the faculties are merely in a harmony rather than forming determinate cognition.oments of the #eautiful are summed up in the idea of 2common sense0 (5= sect. this subjective principle corresponds to the principle of the purposiveness of nature. any such knowledge we do have about these real purposes can inform the judgment as background.etaphysics0 . and be done with it. &e is asking: what is it that the necessity of the judgment is grounded upon% that is.irst. but that it cannot be !no"n. !lthough such works may have had purposes behind their production (the artist wished to express a certain mood. we are left with the problem of understanding how a thing can be purposive. #y exemplary. because it follows from this principle.>> . #ut this necessity is of a peculiar sort: it is 2exemplary0 and 2conditioned0. nevertheless. we just apply concepts. that is of our feeling for the beautiful. but exhausts itself in being exemplary precisely of an aesthetic judgment. but must be abstracted from to form the aesthetic judgment properly. ()ote: by 2common sense0 is not meant being intelligent about everyday things. however. )ormally. that is. on the side of the beautiful object. we do notice.

we have had no decent argument for the existence of common sense as a principle of taste. it will be both universal and necessary. because related to the same cognitive faculties which enable any and all knowledge and experience. !nd yet. the tendency to universality observed in aesthetic judgments. since also 3ant claims that the sublime does not need a Ceduction. !sking what this new and uni*ue way is takes us to the second aspect. /uch a demand for universality could be accounted for nicely if we assumed an a priori principle for taste. however. &e returns to beauty in sect. representing a different problem within aesthetic judgment.or such a harmony. 3ant has dropped many important clues as to the transcendental account of the possibility of aesthetic judgment: in particular. and rather than being subject to one concept. what does 3ant think is going on in such 2harmony0. Instead. 8astly. so that we cannot just apply a concept and be done with it. and does he have any arguments which make of these idea more than mere metaphors for beauty: ?p to now. (!s 3ant admits in sect. or in common sense for that matter. common sense was plausible as a possible explanation of. because of the self"contained nature of this harmony. will be purposive. !t best. /o. The idea of a harmony between or among the faculties of cognition is turning out to be the key idea. The faculties of the mind are the same: the 2understanding0 which is responsible for concepts. is rather weak. Throughout the . it is pleasurable. all that different from ordinary cognition about things in the world. .6@ .beautiful draws particular attention to its purposiveness% but also because the beautiful has no concept of a purpose available.oments of the #eautiful. 3ant argues that the kinds of 2cognition0 (i.our .oments% we will treat them as such here. 3ant believes common sense also answers the *uestion of why aesthetic judgments are valid: since aesthetic judgments are a perfectly normal function of the same faculties of cognition involved in ordinary cognition. which forms the transition to the passages tantali'ingly called the Ceduction. but in a new and uni*ue way. they will have the same universal validity as such ordinary acts of cognition. we have talked about communicability. . 3ant then cuts off to turn to the sublime. for example. because based upon universal common sense. This account of common sense explains how the beautiful can be purposive with respect to our ability to judge. The principle of purposiveness is satisfied. and yet have no definite purpose. This argument. but without purpose. it must be disinterested. thinking characteristic of the contemplation of the beautiful are not. the beautiful forces us to grope for concepts that we can never find.oreover. in fact. 3ant claims. It is this ability of judgment to bring sensibility and understanding to a mutually reinforcing harmony that 3ant calls 2common sense0. which might also explain the idea of universal communicability. or again. intuition is allowed some 2free play0. . it instead acts in 2harmony0 with the lawfulness in general of the understanding. The difference between ordinary and aesthetic cognition is that in the latter case. Instead. common sense and the harmony of the cognitive sub"faculties.our . there is no one 2determinate0 concept that pins down an intuition. nevertheless. 3ant believes he has an ingenious route to proving the case with much greater certainty. the beautiful is not an alien and disturbing experience 4 on the contrary. and the 2sensibility0 (including our imagination which is responsible for intuitions.AB. These transitional passages feel much like a continuation of the .e.

and >6 being the first% sect. while at the same time it is not clear at several points whether the first and third Critiques are fully compatible. #oth explicitly are attempting to demonstrate the universal communicability and thus intersubjective validity of judgments of taste. (In ordinary cognition of the world. sect. It would be nonsense to judge whether a particular thing was a sofa without restricting my judgment to that particular thing.or example.e. they are mental acts which bring a sensible particular under some universal (3ant0s Introduction.or one thing. It is just that. #riefly. or any concept. . etc. they can be assumed present a priori. The presence of the cognitive sub"faculties in their various relations is e*uivalent with the principle of the universal communicability and validity (i. &ere. the notions of common sense and communicability are closely akin to key political ideas. no particular determination of either sensible intuition. % all these 3ant summari'es by saying that the judgments are formal only. $hich for 3ant is the same as saying that there is a 2common sense0 4 by which he means that humans all must have a kind of sensing ability which operates the same way. or understanding forms a necessary part of the judgment. presented with the beautiful. Therefore. in all human beings. rather than simply as an expression for certain capacities: &owever.or another. . lacking all 2matter0.g. regardless of its object (as 3ant claims to have proven in the first Critique . our cognitive faculties are released from the limitations that characteri'e ordinary thought. +r again. we will discuss only the second. . leading several commentators to propose that what 3ant is really writing about are the foundations of any just politics (see e. as really existent things in the mind that act.FB . The four moments of the beautiful are then explicitly seen as being limitations on the conditions under which this judgment can take place (no interest. It is difficult to know what to make of this argument (with the various other versions of it scattered throughout the text and the hypothesis it purports to prove. and produce what above we called a cascade of thoughts and feelings. does not all this talk about the faculties 2in general0 seem as if 3ant is hypostatising these faculties. an aesthetic judgment must be seen to be an expression of this principle. the argument begins by asserting that aesthetic judgments must be judgments in some sense% that is.The Ceduction in fact appears in two versions in 3ant0s texts (sect. considered in general (that is. purposive without determining purpose. This means that 3ant is describing the 2proportion0 between understanding and intuition as something like the always present possibility of the faculties being freed to mutually enact their essence.EE"E7 .. The key move is obviously to claim that the aesthetic judgment rests upon the same unique conditions as ordinary cognition. I< . this lack of restriction would be entirely out of place. in the same form and in the same way. the 2freedom0 of the imagination is explicitly linked by 3ant . 3ant0s work here is so heavily reliant upon the results of the first Critique as to not really be able to stand on its own. and to the concept of a sofa. #ecause such faculties in general are re*uired for all theoretical cognition whatsoever. #y this. with further important clarification in the 2Cialectic0 sect. there is no doubting the fascinating and profound implications of what 3ant is proposing. and thus that the former must have the same universal communicability and validity as the latter. in their essence as sub" faculties the faculties of imagination and understanding are li!e"ise not restricted to any presentation or kind of sense. &owever.AB"DB the second. he means that although the judgment is a judgment of the presentation of a particular (singular object. common sense of any mental states in which these faculties are involved a priori.

the sublime appears to be 2counter"purposive0. /econd. The problem for 3ant here is that this experience seems to directly contradict the principle of the purposiveness of nature for our judgment. in some way. 3ant notes. of course. because of the magnitude of their si'eGheightGdepth (e.g. #lanc is large0 usually . Instead. /ince the ideas of reason (particularly freedom are also important for 3ant0s moral theory. there is 3 c.or 3ant. The Su lime +verview: . $hereas. the sublime may even be (or even especially be formless. the sublime can be a pleasurable experience. force (a storm . .g. the ocean. . !nd yet. That is. that while the beautiful is concerned with form. one would expect the feeling of being overwhelmed to also be accompanied by a feeling of fear or at least discomfort. it is nothing compared to absolute freedom. we feel we 2cannot get our head around them0. the ideas of absolute totality or absolute freedom.irst. !ll this raises the *uestion of what is going on in the sublime 3ant0s solution is that. 2get our head around it0. we apply some kind of standard of comparison. it turns out that the sublime experience is purposive after all 4 that we can. The mathematical sublime is defined as something 2absolutely large2 that is. the storm . the sublime presents some uni*ue pu''les to 3ant. what is properly sublime are ideas of reason: namely.g.to the freedom characteristic of the moral will. the pyramids of 5heops . particularly our will .inally. . Three in particular are of note.inally. or transcendence (our idea of Hod .t. ?sually. the other basic type of aesthetic experience is the sublime. in fact the sublime does still involve pleasure 4 the *uestion is 2how:0. 3ant divides the sublime into the 2mathematical0 (concerned with things that have a great magnitude in and of themselves and the 2dynamically0 (things that have a magnitude of force in relation to us. Traditionally. although from the above one might expect the sublime experience to be painful in some way. does 2violence0 to. Thus. The sublime names experiences like violent storms or huge buildings which seem to overwhelm us% that is. 2. we know it is puny compared to absolute totality% however powerful the storm. the storm or the building is not the real object of the sublime at all. our faculties of sense and cognition. #is$%$vis the beautiful. the sublime has been the name for objects inspiring awe. that while the beautiful indicates (at least for judgment a purposiveness of nature that may have profound implications. the object appears ill"matched to. there seems to be an interesting connection between the sublime and morality. &owever huge the building.>E . although this need not be explicit (e. The sublime feeling is therefore a kind of 2rapid alternation0 between the fear of the overwhelming and the peculiar pleasure of seeing that overwhelming overwhelmed.E. This 3ant discusses under the heading of 2moral culture0. allowing 3ant to construct a deeply rooted link between beauty and the moral (sect. in fact. 2large beyond all comparison2 (sect. . This is either mainly 2mathematical0 4 if our ability to intuit is overwhelmed by si'e (the huge building 4 or 2dynamical0 4 if our ability to will or resist is overwhelmed by force (e. arguing for example that the whole sublime experience would not be possible if humans had not received a moral training that taught them to recogni'e the importance of their own faculty of reason.

why and how is pleasure associated with it: In other words. in the . !s we saw above with respect to the beautiful. however. . but characteristically demands that its ideas be presented. such presentations of reason are necessarily unexhibitable by sense. are called 2sublime0 only by a kind of covert sleight"of"hand. The overwhelmingness of sensible objects leads the minds to these ideas. no less a mountain on -arth. /o. a strangely purposive layer in which this very failure constitutes a 2negative exhibition0 (2Heneral 5omment0 following sect.>@ . #ut 3ant then argues that measurement not merely mathematical in nature (the counting of units . the !ntinomies. with more familiar objects . . 3ant claims that the relation of the overwhelming sensible object to our sense is in a kind of 2harmony0 (sect. whether it be a millimeter or a kilometer.means 2compared with other mountains (or perhaps. &owever. there must be a limit to the number of such units that can be held together in the imagination and thus 2comprehended0 (sect. I$Je express ourselves entirely incorrectly when we call this or that object of nature sublime K for how can we call something by a term of approval if we apprehend it as in itself contrapurposive: (sect. The absolutely large. In fact. . Cealing with a unit of measure. etc. there must be an absolute unit of measure.oreover. is a two" layer process.>F . re*uires a number (how many units but also a sense of what the unit is.oreover.>@ 4 i. such that nothing larger could be 2apprehended0% in the second place. if the sublime presents itself as counter"purposive. but fundamentally relies upon the 2aesthetic0 (in the sense of 2intuitive0 as used in the first Critique grasp of a unit of measure. In the first place. human faculties of sensibility. pyramids. . what is actually sublime. /econd. a contrapurposive layer in which our faculties of sense fail to complete their task of presentation. pleasure lies in the achievement of a purpose. and importantly. then.>. where is the purposiveness of the sublime experience: 3ant writes. for example.irst. the faculty of reason is not merely an inert source of such ideas. )ow. This means that there will be absolute limits on properly aesthetic measurement because of the limitations of the finite. !s 3ant will later claim. !n object that exceeds these limits (regardless of its mathematical si'e will be presented as absolutely large 4 although of course it is still so "ith respect to our faculties of sense. of the ideas of reason (which could not otherwise be presented . is not the result of a comparison )ow. we must return to the second and third peculiar pu''les of the sublime.>A This problem constitutes 3ant0s principle argument that something else must be going on in the sublime experience other than the mere overwhelmingness of some object. #lanc is large0 . it also provides a new and 2higher0 purposiveness to the faculties of sense themselves which are now understood to be properly positioned with respect to our 2supersensible vocation0 (sect.e. The sublime experience. or at least in the recognition of a purposiveness. of course. (This same demand is what creates all the dialectical problems that 3ant analyses in. 3ant argues. what he calls a 2subreption0 (sect.>@ or analogy to the relation of the rational idea of absolute totality to any sensible object or faculty. This 2exhibition0 thus also provides a purposiveness of the natural object for the fulfillment of the demands of reason. any object is measurable 4 even the si'e of the universe. objects of sense (oceans. are ideas of our own reason.t.

3ant writes that such objects 2raise the soul0s fortitude above its usual middle range and allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is of a *uite different kindK0 (sect. #eyond simply comprehending individual sensible things. that is proper to its vocation0 (sect. The context is to ask about the modality of judgments on the sublime 4 that is. between a rational religion and mere superstition. conceives of human beings as having a dimension which in some way transcends nature. the sublimity belongs to human freedom which is (by definition unassailable to the forces of nature. Interestingly. one of 3ant0s examples here is religion: Hod is fearful but the righteous man is not afraid.>. (sect. aesthetics in general is not an isolated problem for philosophy but intimately linked to metaphysical and moral *uestions. we might say. to they have the same implicit demand on the necessary assent of others that judgments on the beautiful have: 3ant0s answer is complicated. he says. /o. This is the difference. now knows what it is for. a 2might0 or power is observed in nature that is irresistible with respect to our bodily or sensible selves. for this was the grand problem he raised in his Introduction. this 2link0 has an even greater significance for 3ant: it shows reflective judgment in action as it were relating together both theoretical and practical reason. on 3ant0s description. (Importantly. neither of these feelings wins out 4 instead. because these conditions are (as in the case of the beautiful the same as for theoretical and practical thought in general. 3ant claims. In particular. our faculty of sensibility. even above nature.>A for which we had be searching. .>@ . In particular. Thus we can begin to see the intimate connection between the sublime (especially here the dynamically sublime and morality This connection (for the sublime in general becomes even more explicit in 3ant0s discussion of what he calls 2moral culture0. The initial displeasure of the 2violence0 against our apparent sensible interests is now matched by a 2higher0 pleasure arising from the strange purposiveness 3ant has discovered. The sublime. !gain. we are justified in demanding from everyone that they necessarily have the transcendental conditions for such moral culture. but demanding action upon that order. In this case. /uch a conception of freedom as being outside the order of nature. This is one more reason why it is important not to assume that the Critique of 'esthetic Judgment is a book merely about beauty and sublimity. more generally. . /uch an object is 2fearful0 to be sure. but (because we remain disinterested is not an object of fear. may reciprocally contribute to the strengthening of that culture . the sublime is subjected to an empirical contingency. is the core of 3ant0s moral theory. nature is called 2sublime merely because it elevates the imagination to the exhibition of those cases wherein the mind can be made to feel Isich f&hlbar machenJ the sublimity. The conse*uence of this purposiveness is exactly that 2negative pleasure0 (sect. &owever. the sublime feeling consists of a uni*ue 2vibration0 or 2rapid alternation0 of these feelings (sect. The claims about moral culture show that.oreover. and this can only happen in a culture that already understands morality as being a function of freedom or. and thus for the sublime. 3ant sometimes suggests. is possible only for members of such a moral culture (and. There is an empirical factor which is re*uired for the sublime: the mind of the experiencer must be 2receptive0 to rational ideas. $e will return to this point shortly. The dynamically sublime is similar.>7. properly speaking.>7 . translation modified . for 3ant.ultimately moral hierarchy of the faculties. the sublime is a two"layered experience.

!n aesthetic idea is a counterpart to a rational idea: where the latter is a concept that could never ade*uately be exhibited sensibly. nature is seen 2as if0 purposeful. +n the other hand. fine art seems to 2borrow0 its beauty or sublimity from nature. Fine Art and Genius +verview: Thus far.oreover. Thus. but to reach something like the same excited yet harmonious state of mind that the genius had in creating /tarting in sect. 3ant stands right in the middle of a complete historical change in the central focus of aesthetics. in being judged aesthetically. agree with aesthetic judgment and yet be 2soulless0 4 lacking that certain something that would make it more than just an artificial version of a beautiful natural object. 3ant0s main focus for the discussion of beauty and the sublime has been nature. the mode of expression must also be tasteful 4 for the understanding0s 2lawfulness0 is the condition of the expression being in any sense universal and capable of being shared. 3ant gives an interesting account of how magnitude is estimated in discussing the mathematical sublime. . and in their relation to 2moral culture0. The genius must also find a mode of expression which allows a viewer not just to 2understand0 the work conceptually. both in themselves as experiences. but skips the parallel problem in the dynamically sublime (how does one estimate force: . #ut unlike the investigation of beauty in nature. borrowed directly from art. philosophical aesthetics was largely content to take its primary examples of beauty and sublimity from nature. . 3ant will introduce the notion of genius. !gain. in this case at least. . . )ow.inally. 3ant argues that art can be tasteful (that is. it is clear from a number of comments that 3ant . 3ant assumes that the cognition involved in judging fine art is similar to the cognition involved in judging natural beauty. the problem that is new to fine art is not how it is judged by a viewer. 3ant0s work thus forms an important part of the historical change mentioned above.irst. of course. only the dynamically sublime has any strict relationship to the moral idea of freedom.DA. This raises the *uestion of whether the mathematical and dynamically sublime are in fact radically different. what is properly sublime and the object of respect should be the idea of reason. &e now turns to fine art. !n aesthetic idea. d.3ant0s treatment of the sublime raises many difficulties.ine art is therefore a secondary concept. /o. designed. the former is a set of sensible presentations to which no concept is ade*uate. after 3ant the focus is placed s*uarely on works of art. the focus shifts from the transcendental conditions for judgment of the beautiful object to the transcendental conditions of the making of fine art. but that is not all. The solution revolves around two new concepts: the 2genius0 and 2aesthetic ideas0. In other words: how is it possible to make art: To solve this. rather than nature.or example. is as successful an attempt as possible to 2exhibit0 the rational idea. then. $hat provides soul in fine art is an aesthetic idea. in 3ant. . but how it is created. or a product of an intelligence. It is the talent of genius to generate aesthetic ideas. the notion of 2nature0 itself can be seen as secondary with respect to the notions of design or production. $hile formerly. The notion of aesthetic judgment already developed remains central. many readers have found the premise of the whole discussion implausible: that in the sublime experience. !ccordingly. #ut that is not the only shift. the relation between nature and art is much more complex than it seems at first. 3ant addresses himself particularly to fine art for the first time.

nature as itself an object has several meanings for 3ant. never"the"less are controlled by some definite concept of a purpose to be produced. This can either be an empirical claim or. !rt (not surprisingly. -*ually. a priori. (D )ature is also the object of reflective judgments and is that which is presupposed to be purposive or pre"adapted with respect to judgment. 2the nature of human cognition0 . 3ant begins by giving a long clarification of art. $e distinguish art from nature because (though we may judge nature purposive we know in fact there is no prior notion behind the activity of a flower opening. and so forth. art refers to the activity of ma!ing according to a preceding notion. $e feel reasonably secure that we know how it is possible for. #ut. it means those properties which belong essentially to L. in advance.th 5entury. there can be no such thing as a scientific genius. although subject to training to be sure. 3ant will later claim. art is distinguished from labor or craft " the latter being something satisfying only for the payoff which results and not for the mere activity of making itself. although not handicrafts. This includes things in space outside of us. it is not a *uestion of simply expressing oneself using whatever means come to hand. /ee sect. since such productions might well lack taste. in expressions like 2the nature of L0 (e. /o. 3ant distinguishes between agreeable and fine art. his discussion of the concept contributed to the escalation of the concept in the early 6. for example. !rts are subdivided into mechanical and aesthetic. for example. like beauty is free from any interest in the existence of the product itself. and what art production is. If I make a chair. The latter are those wherein the immediate object is merely pleasure itself. +n the other hand. The former produces pleasure through sensation alone. which are *uite simply not made or influenced by human hands. otherwise all art critics would be artists. then.DF. what does 3ant mean by 2nature0: (6 +n the one hand. .g. all musicians composers. but also aspects of sensible human nature that are the objects of sciences such as psychology. irreducible to determinate concepts. impassioned artist characteristic of the 2 turm und (rang2 movement. which is distinct from a mere comprehension of something. the emphasis on the individual. The flower doesn0t have an idea of opening prior to opening 4 the flower doesn0t have a mind or a will to have or execute ideas with. it is a s!ill distinguished from a type of !no"ledge. in order to understand how art is possible. what a chair is.irst.inally. we have to first understand what art is. 2goes on0 in the mind of the artist: It is clearly not just a matter of applying good taste. (Thus. The latter can be fully taught% the former. !rt involves some kind of practical ability. -specially: (> If I say 2nature as opposed to art0 I mean that realm of objects not presented as the objects of sensible will 4 that is.makes about 2genius0 that he is an aesthetic conservative reacting against. The former are those which. then. clockmakers . the latter through various types of cognitions This taxonomy of fine art defines more precisely the issue for 3ant. because a scientific mind can never be radically original. again. .urther. I must know. relies upon native talent. vis$)$vis natural objects and natural 2production0. !rt also means something different from science 4 as 3ant says. historically. $hat. more commonly in 3ant. !s a general term. . (A If I say 2nature as an object of cognition0 I mean any object capable of being dealt with 2objectively0 or 2scientifically0.

Henius is the talent (natural endowment that gives the rule to art. in viewing a work of art we must be aware of it as art. 3ant must overcome these paradoxes and explain how fine art can be produced at all. we understand it . That is. $here 2natural0 here stands for the appearance of freedom from conventional rules of artifice% this concept is derived from the second sense of 2nature0 given above. because it is made% art in general is production according to a concept of an object. while all fine art is a beautiful 2presentation0 of an object (sect. fine art as aesthetic (just like nature as aesthetic can have no definite rules or concepts for producing or judging it. This means also that fine art properly is never an imitation of previous art.ourth. #ut fine art can have no concept ade*uate to its production. 3ant expresses this point by saying that. /econd. . /ince talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature. because of this. not a productive one (sect. Taste. he will distinguish between supplying 2material0 and elaborating the 2form0. is an evaluative faculty. and not be. 3ant sums up the problem in two apparent paradoxes. concrete instance. . this partly obscures the fact that genius is involved in the original creation of the object to be presented. #ut genius supplies a rule.D7 . nor (we should add through his or her culture. fine art gets made. The 2how0 is usually heavily informed by training and techni*ue.DF. we could also put it this way: Henius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenium through which nature gives the rule to art. fine art is produced by individual humans. the rule supplied by genius is more a rule governing "hat to produce. . 3ant notices that we have a problem with the over"rought 4 that which draws attention to itself as precisely an artificial object or event. is 2natural0 in sense one . that which makes it possible to produce (fine art is not itself produced 4 not by the individual genius. an art in general. history.DF In other words.D@. rather than ho". 3ant claims. originality is a characteristic of genius. . on the side of production. the end of sect. Third. 2+ver"the"top0 acting is a good example.ine art therefore must both be. not by human nature in the empirically !no"n sense. else any judgment on it will fail one of the key features of all aesthetic judgments: namely purposiveness without a purpose. &e writes. in initially defining 2genius0. The paradox is that art (the non"natural must appear to be natural. #ut it is not yet clear how. . but not as contingent individuals. the first step is taken when 3ant. but it must never"the"less appear natural.irst. education. . . $e have also investigated how it is for someone loo!ing at a work of beauty to judge it. Thus.rom the definition of genius as that talent through which nature gives the rule to art follows (arguably9 the following key propositions.to make clocks. or glass"blowers to blow glass (which doesn0t mean that we can make clocks or blow glass. precisely by way of the universal structures of the genius0 mental abilities (which again. though it may 2follow0 or be 2inspired by0 previous art (sect. To introduce the second paradox.ine art is a type of purposeful production. but that as a kind of activity. etc. Thus. and is governed by taste. In sect. (sect. fully applicable only in the one. conflates 2nature0 in the first sense above with nature in the third sense.ifth.D7 .D@ . The first of these is easy to state.

such that each furthered the extension of the other. Henius provides the matter for fine art. or a harmony which happens on the experiencing of a beautiful form that itself is the expression of something yet higher but that cannot in any other "ay be expressed. such that genius might be re*uired: $hat genius does.D.g. cannot be imitated ."EB &aving made the various distinctions between the matter and the form of expression in genius0 work. !nd yet we can distinguish between such a harmony which happens on the experiencing of a beautiful form simply. of techni*ue and education. etc. but it is not very interesting (pure beauty. There can also. sect. This peculiar idea seems to be used in a sense analogous to saying that someone 2has soul0.. Henius inspires art works 4 gives them spirit 4 and does so by linking the work of art to what 3ant will call aesthetic ideas. as we have already discovered. fine art is 2natural0 in sense two. again. means that which makes something alive rather than mere material.D.E6"EA . meaning to have nobility or a deep and exemplary moral character. or again between the object and its presentation. Thus. &owever. The last pages of this part of 3ant0s book are taken up with a curious collection of comments on the 2gratifying0 (non"aesthetic but still relatively free activities . This is because the rule of its production (that concept or set of concepts of an object and of the 2how0 of its production which allows the genius to actually make some specific something is radically original. he divides all fine arts into the arts of speech (especially poetry. -ach is excessive. as opposed to being shallow or even in a sense animal"like% but 3ant also. mentioned above. 3ant is now saying: certainly that is true for all judgments of taste. !esthetic ideas are seen to be 2straining0 after the presentation of rational ideas 4 this is what gives them their excess over any set of ordinary determinate concepts. This is a 2counterpart0 to rational ideas (which we encountered above in talking of the sublime . the role of culture.as we mentioned above. 3ant warns. we had a harmony between the imagination and the understanding. The beautiful is always formal. whether of natural or artificial objects. may be an example . in that it lies outside the cycle of production and re"production within which all other arts in general are caught up (and thus. sect. which are thoughts to which nothing sensible or imagined can be ade*uate. to what would otherwise be uninspired. be inspired nonsense. is to provide 2soul0 or 2spirit0 (2 eele2. but on different sides of our cognitive apparatus. what distinguishes one 2matter0 from another. (/ee e. This is defined in the third paragraph of sect. fine art must have the 2look of nature0 (sect.DE . !ccording to the manner of presentation. following the !ristotelian tradition. 3ant says. we have not yet clarified what kind of thing the 2rule0 supplied by genius is% therefore we have not yet reached an understanding of the nature of the 2talent0 for the production of fine art that is genius. comments about artistic influences and schools.D. but never fully worked out. (The notion of . taste provides the form. which is also not very interesting. the arts of visual form (sculpture. /o. and the arts involving a play of sensible tones (music . which 3ant ranks the highest of the arts . we might say. especially humor. There can be an uninspired fine art. In the judgment of the beautiful. This leads 3ant to make some suggestive. The aesthetic idea is a presentation of the imagination to which no thought is ade*uate. 3ant applies these to a brief if eccentric comparative study of the varieties of fine art (sect. architecture and painting .

creating the same kind of self" sustaining and self"contained feeling of pleasure as the beautiful. there must always be a mis"match between the idea and the portrayal of the character. Inspired fine art is beautiful. +f course. 3ant seems to have two different manners in which aesthetic ideas can be the spirit of fine art. . Indeed. the supposed purposiveness of nature looks like nonsense. The relevant passages in sect. but in addition is an expression of the state of mind which is generated by an aesthetic idea. &ere the aesthetic idea is not presenting a particular rational idea so much as a general function of reason: the striving for a maximum. arguably there is an analogy here to the concept of 2negative exhibition0. <iewed from the position of our knowledge of nature. the aesthetic idea is not merely a presentation. That is. !nd again. the radical separation of the aesthetic genius from the scientific mind% the emphasis on the near"miraculous expression (through aesthetic ideas and attributes of the ineffable. but many and perhaps all beautiful natural objects can be accounted for on purely scientific terms. the aesthetic idea can be an impossibly perfect or complete presentation of a possible empirical experience and its concept (death. excited state of mind% the link of fine art to a 2metaphysical0 content% the re*uirement of radical originality% the raising of poetry to the head of all arts 4 all these claims (though not all of them entirely uni*ue to 3ant were commonplaces and wide"spread for well over a century after 3ant. envy. are both confused and compressed. the effect is an associated 2expansion0 of the concept beyond its determinate bounds. an important part of our moral being transcends the world of phenomena. . Indeed. In particular. but one which will set the imagination and understanding into a harmony. rather than a process of understanding something with concepts. In practice. !n obvious example might be a novelist or playwright0s attempt to portray a morally upright character: because. any principle of purposiveness can only be understood as ideal. /econd. for the most part. a totality or the end of a series (as in 3ant0s account of the mathematical sublime . "dealism# $orality and the Su%ersensi le +verview: 8et us return to the notion of beauty as tackled in sections !6 and !>. In either case.irst. intermediate images: 2Thus =upiter0s eagle with the lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven0. fame are 3ant0s examples . Thus. and then communicating that understanding. we know that there is no such ade*uate presentation. when modernists protested (often paradoxically against the concept of the artist by using 2automatic writing0 or 2found objects0 it is. love. )ot only does our scientific knowledge seem to have no room for the concept of a purpose. 3ant0s theory of genius 4 for all its vagueness and lack of philosophical rigor 4 has been enormously influential.D. this concept of the artist"genius that they are reacting against. &ere the aesthetic idea seems to function by prompting an associated or coordinated surplus of thought that is directly analogous to the associated surplus of imaginative presentations demanded by rational ideas. e. the aesthetic idea is a presentation of a rational idea (one of 3ant0s examples is the moral idea of cosmopolitan benevolence . for 3ant. ($e saw a similar relation between the demand of rational ideas and imaginative activity in 3ant0s analysis of the sublime.2expression0 is important: what 3ant is describing is an aesthetic process. this will often involve what 3ant calls 2aesthetic attributes0: more ordinary.

EE"E7 . #ut nature. he 3ant solves the problem by way of an appeal to the rational idea of the supersensible.etaphysics0. !bove. (/ee Introduction > above. understood scientifically. then it is to be seen as the principle of the purposiveness of all nature for our judgment (see sect. it could be the case that nature as the object of scientific laws (2nature0. ! similar dialectical problem will arise in the 25riti*ue of Teleological =udgment0 where we will resume our discussion of these issues.or the moment it is enough to observe that the !ntinomy of Taste seems to involve two contradictory claims about the origin of beautiful objects. This possibility demonstrates the idealism of the principle of purposiveness. &owever. #ut where the principle is taken to be functioning like a concept of an ob*ect (the beautiful thing . and the entry on 23ant0s . so we must presuppose an idealistic interpretation of purposiveness in judging the beautiful in nature and in artK (sect. we saw 3ant claim that his whole account of the transcendental possibility of judgments on the beautiful could be summed up in the notion of common sense. Iit isJ not nature that favors us0 (sect. the *uestion is valid as to how this natural purposiveness is to be explained. where the principle is taken as a rule governing the conditions of aesthetic judgments in the subject. understood perfectly through the science of chemistry .E7 . This in turn means that. for judgment. is not purposive. at the end of section !6. is itself responsible for the beautiful forms in nature (3ant0s example is the formation of beautiful crystals. 2we K receive nature with favor. This principle of common sense is the form that the general a priori principle of the purposiveness of nature for judgment takes when we are trying to understand the sub*ective conditions of aesthetic judgments of beauty.such a principle says more about the particular nature of our cognitive faculties than it says about what nature really is. =ust as we must assume that objects of sense as appearances are ideal if we are to explain how we can determine their forms a priori. The only possible account is that the appearance of purposiveness in nature is conditioned by the supersensible realm underlying nature. 3ant thus writes. This particular form of dialectical problem involves two contradictory.etaphysics0 . according to the 2immanent0 principles of the understanding . Cialectical problems. That is. for 3ant. . always involves a confusion between the rational ideas of the supersensible (which have at best a merely regulative validity and natural concepts (which have a validity guaranteed but restricted to appearances . but apparently necessary.E7 . 3ant adds a series of important analogies between the activity of aesthetic judgment and the activity of moral judgment. #ut the principle of purposiveness is still valid from the point of vie" of the activities of *udgment. These analyses lead 3ant to claim that beauty is the 2symbol of morality0. truth claims 4 3ant calls such a situation an 2antinomy0. &e writes. This strange situation gives rise to what 3ant calls a 2dialectic0 4 merely apparent knowledge claims or paradoxes that arise from the misuse of a faculty. #ut this means that beauty is a kind of revelation of the hidden substrate of the world. To this. as 3ant is fond of saying. and that this substrate has a necessary sympathy with our highest human projects. then it is properly called 2common sense0. =ust as in the 2dialectic0 sections in the first two Critiques (see the entry on 23ant0s .

E6 . we must assume the legitimacy of the rational concept of an underlying supersensible realm in order to account for that purposiveness. The last major section of the Critique of 'esthetic Judgment famously considers the relation between beauty and morality. /econd. This is a claim that is often rolled out even today. 3ant claims that beauty is the 2symbol0 of morality (sect. $e shall return to this in section #D. he argues. a natural concept is ade*uate to grasping the beautiful object as beautiful. and thus is certainly not a matter of knowledge.E. The 2presentation0 in *uestion is an analogy between how judgment deals with or reflects upon the idea and upon the symbolic intuition. no other concept (e.rom the point of view of judgment. it is not because all judges are blind9 Mather. everything happens as if the unfolding beauty of the natural world is like the product of a genius. and (as we shall see ultimately to suggest the unity of all the disciplines of philosophy. This assumption is valid only within and only for that judgment. which recalls the earlier treatment of the sublime and moral culture. and (3ant hopes bring unity to philosophy. &ere. Thus. this idealism also necessarily raises the *uestion of what conditions beautiful appearances: if we are asking for a concept that accounts (on the side of the ideal object for this purposiveness. 3ant can borrow the notion of aesthetic idea from his account of fine art and. historically. in forming an aesthetic judgment. as it were. found phenomenal evidence of the reality of reason0s more far"reaching claims about the supersensible (see #A below .g. . is to be defined as a kind of presentation of a rational idea in an intuition. it must be what 3ant calls the realm of the 2supersensible0 that is 2underlying0 all nature and all humanity.irst aesthetic judgments (both the sublime and the beautiful . . In showing how beauty in general is the symbol of morality. if 2justice0 is symboli'ed by a blind goddess with a scale. 3ant lists four points: (6 #oth please directly and not through conse*uences% (> #oth are disinterested% (A #oth involve the idea of a free conformity to law (free conformity of the imagination in the case of beauty. ! symbol. which judges a beautiful object as purposive without purpose. and then teleological judgments will form the bridge between theoretical and practical reason. 2blindness0 and 2weighing0 function as concepts in judgments in a way analogous to how the concept of 2justice0 functions. The importance of this section is two"fold: first. The profundity of beauty.#ut at the same time. !s we know. . . 3ant is giving a philosophical underpinning to the notion that taste should be related to and. This pi*ues the interest of reason 4 for judgment has. also promotes morality. consists of precisely this assumption by judgment% it allows him to make further connections between beauty and morality. Thus. for 3ant. speaking from the point of view of reflective judgment. say that beauty in general is always the expression of aesthetic ideas (sect. of the will in the case of morality % (D #oth are understood to be founded upon a universal principle. through cultivation. /o. the link to morality is a detailing out of the basic link between aesthetics in general and the pure concepts of reason (ideas .

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