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The term "law" defined. 58. Judgments of state courts not conclusive either as to the non-existence or non-impairment of contracts. 59. The obligation of a contract defined. 60. Legislation as to remedies. 61. The term "contracts" defined. 62. State insolvent laws. 63. Judgments as contracts. 64. Municipal taxation. 65. History of the prohibition. 66. State grants. 67. Express contracts of exemption from taxation. 68. Express grants of peculiar privileges. 69. Contracts between a state and its political subdivisions. 70. Implied contracts in charters of incorporation. 71. Implied corporate exemption from taxation. 72. Implied grants of peculiar privileges. 73. Exemption from the operation of the police power. 74. Contracts as to matters of public concern. 75. The withdrawal by a state of its consent to be sued. 76. The force and effect of the prohibition as construed by the Supreme Court. The prohibition affects only state laws. 56. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. This prohibition d oes not in terms affect the exercise of legislative power by the government of t he United States, and not only is there not in the Constitution any similar proh ibition with regard to the United States, but by the grant of power to Congress, "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," (1) authority is expressly conferred to impair the obligation of contr acts between debtors and creditors; (2) and under the doctrine of the implied po wers, as construed by the court, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts by authorizing the issue of notes which shall be a legal tender in satisfaction of antecedently contracted debts.(3) The constitutional prohibition is likewise inoperative with regard to the acts of any political organization which at the time of the adoption of the act in question is not one of the United States; thu s, the Constitution having, under the resolution of the Convention of 1787 and t he Act of Congress of February, 1788, gone into effect on the first Wednesday of March, 1789, a statute enacted by the state of Virginia in 1788 was not affecte d by the constitutional prohibition.(4) So, also, a statute enacted by the repub lic of Texas before its admission into the United States as the state of Texas c ould not be held to be void for repugnancy to this clause of the Constitution.(5 ) The term "law" defined. 57. The prohibition of the passage by a state of any "law impairing the obligati on of contracts," would, if strictly construed, include under the word "law" onl y statutes enacted by state legislatures, but it has been determined that the wo rd "law " comprehends, in addition to acts of legislation, state constitutions a nd constitutional amendments;(6) judicial decisions of state courts of last reso rt, rendered subsequently to the making of the contract in question, and anteced ently to the suit in which the court determines the invalidity of the contract, and altering by construction the constitution and statutes of the state in force when the contract was made;(7) and, in general, any act or order, from whatever source emanating, to which a state, by its enforcement thereof, gives the force
of a law; as, for instance, a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation(8) or a statute enacted by the congress of the Confederacy, and enforeed during th e war of the rebellion by a court of a state within the insurgent lines.(9) Obvi ously the law, which is alleged to have impaired the obligation of the contract must have been enacted subsequently to the making of the contract, for a law ena cted antecedently to the making of the contract can be said to have entered into , and become part of, the contract.(10) The judgment of the state court in the c ause, determining the particular contract to be invalid, cannot be said to be a law impairing the obligation of the contract, for otherwise the federal court of last resort would be called upon to "re-examine the judgments of the state cour ts in every case involving the enforcement of contracts." As Harlan, J., said, i n L. W. Co. v. Easton,(11) "The state court may erroneously determine questions arising under a contract, which constitute the basis of the suit before it; it m ay hold a contract to be void, which, in our opinion, is valid; it may adjudge a contract to be valid, which, in our opinion, is void; or its interpretation of the contract may, in our opinion, be radically wrong; but, in neither of such ca ses, would the judgment be reviewable by this court under the clause of the Cons titution protecting the obligation of contracts against impairment by state legi slation, and under the existing statutes defining and regulating its jurisdictio n, unless that judgment in terms, or by its necessary operation, gives effect to some provision Of the state constitution, or some legislative enactment of the state, which is claimed by the unsuccessful party to impair the obligation of t he particular contract in question." (12) It must, therefore, appear in any caus e in which it is sought to reverse in the Supreme Court of the United States, a decree or judgment of a state court for contravention of the constitutional proh ibition of the impairment of contracts, that in the particular case the state co urt enforced to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error some act of state, eithe r in the form of a state constitution, or an act of the state legislature, or a judgment of a court in another case, or an act of an extrinsic authority to whic h the state by its adoption thereof gave the force of law, and that the act of s tate, whatever its form, was, as affecting the contract, put into operation subs equently to the making of the contract. Judgments of state courts not conclusive either as to the non-existence or non-i mpairment of contracts. 58. In questions under this clause of the Constitution the courts of the United States do not accept as conclusive upon them the judgment of the state court eit her is to the non-existence of contracts or as to their nonimpairment,(13) for, if the decision of the state court were to be accepted without inquiry or examin ation, the constitutional probibition would be nugatory. The obligation of a contract defined. 59. The obligation of a contract is the duty of performance which the law impose s on one, or other, or both, of the parties to the contract.(14) As Marshall, C. J., said in the case cited, " Any law which releases a part of this obligation must in the literal sense of the word impair it." The application of the constit utional prohibition is not dependent on the extent of the impairment of vested r ights."(15) Legislation as to remedies. 60. A state may, without impairment of the obligation of a contract, regulate, o r even limit, the remedies for the enforcement of that contract, provided that i t does not take away all remedies therefor, and that it leaves in force a substa ntial remedy.(16) Thus a state may, in the case of a corporation whose charter r equires that service of process on the corporation shall be made only at its pri ncipal office, provide by subsequent legislation that such process may be served on any officer, clerk, or agent of the corporation.(17) A state may abolish imp risonment for debt as a remedy f or breach of contract; (18) it may validate tec hnically defective Mortgages, (19) or conveyances by femes covert ;(20) it may b y statute grant new trials and create new tribunals to set aside grants or rever
cannot take away all. (37) So also where the laws of a state permit coupons of state bonds to be received in payment of state taxes.(26) it may reduce the limita tion of time for bringing suit provided that a reasonable limit elapses after th e enactment before the limitation bars a suit upon existing contracts. by a late r statute. reduce the rate of interest thereafte r to accrue on that judgment.(31) it may free sharehol ders of a corporation from individual liability for debts of the corporation to an amount greater than their shares. and having by a subsequent statute provided for the fundi ng of those bonds on certain terms at a reduced rate of interest. may. cannot forbid its courts-to entertain jurisdiction of a suit to enfo rce. if made. a state. the obligation of the contract was not impaired by a s ubsequent statute which required. f or the original remedy of the bondholder is not thereby impaired . (23) it may change the rate of interest to be paid to the purchaser in the case of the redemption of mortgaged premises sol d under foreclosure. an appeal to court.(36) So also. for such legislation does not impair the di rect liability of the corporation.(32) it may. pr ovide that the only remedy for taxpayers whose tender of such notes may be refus ed shall be to pay in legal money and within a time limited to bring suit agains t the tax collector. shall be made within a limited time. after the abolition of slavery.(35) A state . thereupon. authorize that party to set off against the judgment ci rculating notes of the bank procured by him after the entry of the judgment. change to the prejudice of either .(41) no r can a state. in case of the refusal of the tender of the co upons. a disseised tenant for years being entitl ed to sue on the landlord's covenant for quiet possession and also on a statutor y remedy for forcible entry and detainer. after a state bank has obtained j udgment against a party. in acting upon the remedy.(21) it may provide speedy and equitable m ethods for determining the title to lands under patents granted by the state.(22 ) it may authorize at the request of all parties in interest the discharge of te stamentary trustees of real estate .se judgments alleged to be fraudulent. and if judgment should be rendered in favour of the holder of the coupo ns that he could then have forthwith a peremptory writ of mandamus for the recov ery of damages and costs. after the making of a contract. a class of contracts legally valid whe n made. prohibit the funding of a specified class of those bonds until by jud icial decree their validity shall have been determined. after the restoration of peace. which has con tracted to receive its taxes in the notes of a certain bank. provided that a reasonable period be allowed before the law goes into e ffect. and that. or obtain damages for the breach of.(33) it may. before taking a tax deed. if any there be. (28) it may require holders of tax sale certificates to give notice to th e occupant of the land.(38) On the other hand. the scheme shall be bound thereby. and the subsequent framing of an i ssue to determine whether or not the coupons were genuine and legally receivable for taxes. with a right of appeal to the state court of last resort. provided that in case of the refusal of such coupons when tendered the holder thereof might enforce his rights under the contract by suing out an alternative mandamus against the officer refusing the coupons. (24) it may repeal usury laws which unrepealed would have a voided the contract. or a substantial part. t o take jurisdiction of actions upon contracts made before that abolition and the consideration for which was the price of slaves. and do n ot dissent from.(34) and. (40) nor could a state. judgment against whom shall be a preferred claim against th e state.(27) it ma y require registration as a prerequisite to the legal enforcement of existing mo rtgages. It.(39) nor can a state forbid its courts. a state. declare void a contract made between its citizens duri ng the war of the rebellion stipulating for payment in confederate notes. (25) it may prescribe a scheme for the reorganization of an embarrassed corporation and provide that creditors who have notice of. having issued bonds. by statute. therefore. of the power for the enforcement of a contract. (29) it may r equire registration with municipal officials of judgments against a municipal-it y. may. provided that the action on the covenant be left unimpaired. after judgment has been obtained. and a lodging of the coupon s in a state court of competent jurisdietion. a payment of the state taxes in lawful money.(30) it may provide that a city shall not be sued until the claim has been pre sented to the city council and disallowed by it. the state may take away the statutory remedy.
(67) State insolvent laws. (54 and municipal contracts for the payment of the salaries of their employees (55) and. that he never bore arms in support of. for some time. within the latter class.(52) corporate bonds. The term "contracts. Moreover a state cannot enter into an irrepealable contract by a conveyance of property in disregard of a pub lic trust under which it is bound to hold and manage that property. a statute imposing taxation on national banks to an extent not per mitted by the National Banking Act.(68) the a ction being brought in a federal courtwithin the state of Massachusetts. generally. all legally enforcible contracts to do. and. for instance. as.(51) comprehending.party the measure of damages for its breach. the defendant's loss of property resulting from the war of the r ebellion. and the defendant a citizen of New York. materially in crease the debtor's exemption. (60) or by a repea l of the statute.(66) On the same pr inciple.(44) nor can a state. or not to do. as in the ca se of a conveyance of soil under navigable waters. (59) Thus a vote of the majority of the qualified voters of a countr y at an election held under a statute incorporating a railway and authorizing an issue of the bonds of the county in payment for the stock of the railway. 61.(49) nor materially change the rules of evidence which were in existence when the contract was made. a subsequent state statute i mposing on national banks a taxation which. does not bind the state as a contract. th e rebellion against the United States.(43) or that he has paid certain taxes. if th e qualified voters so decide it. a controversy as to the effect of the constitution al prohibition upon state insolvent laws. does not constitute a contract whose obligation would be impaired by an amendment of the state constitution.(48) nor repeal a statute in force at the time of m aking the contract which renders the stock of a shareholder liable for the debts of the corporation. any particular act. that he who seeks to enforce that right shall prove an extrinsic and independent fact that has no necessary connection with the right to be enfor eed.(47) nor take away the right to compound interest. for instance." as used in the constitutional prohibition. no r can it permit the defendant to set off damages not caused by the plaintiff. if granted in violation of the constitution of the state. and the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts. it was held that discharge under an insolvent law of New York. statutory exemption from state taxation.(65) On the same principle.(50) The term "contracts" defined. a lso bondswhich are fraudulently put into circulation by a state treasurer after they have been declared void by the state constitution cannot impose any liabili ty upon the state. after a judgment has been enrolled. 62.(58) There can be no impairment of the obligation of a contract which has not been le gally made. a state statute which is void by reason of repugnancy to the Constitution of the U nited States cannot constitute a contract of exemption from state taxation. In Sturges v. includes bo th executory and executed contracts. does not impair the obligation of any contract. as . There was. if given by the law existing at the time o f the making of the contract. for instance. (56) but not judgements founded upon torts.(42) nor can a state. or never aided. (46) nor forbid a sale in foreclosure at which less than two-thirds of the value of the mortgaged premises as fixed by appraisement shall be realized .(45) nor can a state after the making of a mortgag e enlarge the period of time allowed for the redemption after foreclosure .(53) municipal bonds .(61) before the subscription be made or the bonds issued. though a heavier burden than that im posed by the earlier statute.(57) nor is marriage a co ntract which may not be impaired by divorce legislation.(62) And a contract which is void because its execution is bey ond the powers of the municipality(63) or county (64) attempting its execution c annot irrevocably bind the municipality or county. and. therefore. as. So. enacted sub sequently to the making within that state of a contract to be performed within t . within the former class. by subsequent legis ation. is yet within the limits permitted by the National Banking Act. Crowminshield. promisory notes and bills of exchange. grants and judgements founded upon contracts. impose as a condition precedent to the legal enforcement of a cont ractual right.
and although the contract was made and to be performed i n the state in which the discharge has been granted. first: when the law under which the discharge has been granted has been enacted subsequently to the making of the contract. In McMil lan v. Saunders . Zacharier(73) Story. it was held that a judicial declaration of the insolvency of a decedent's estate under the terms of an antecedently-enacted statute of Alabama was powerless to discharge a contrac t made by the decedent in his lifetime in New York and stipulated to be performe d in that state. In Boyle v . an d both plaintiff and defendant being residents of that state. it was held that a discharge under an antecedently-enacted in solvent Iaw of the state of New York was no bar to the action. are as to the effect of the discharge as regards creditors. as yet not concluded by the authority of the court. the plaintiff and defendant both being citizens of South Carolina. the action upon the contract is brought in another state. In Baldwin v. it was held that a discharge under an antecedently -enacted statute of Maryland was no bar to the action. to be performed in t hat state. it was held that a discharg e under a subsequently enacted insolvent law of that state was no bar to the act ion. the contract was made in another state to be per formed in that other state. the contract having been made in New York to be performed in that state. and who has no t made himself a party to the proceedings in insolvency. C. & M. and the co ntract having been made and stipulated to be performed in that state. J. the action being brought in a court of the state of Ohio the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts.(78) t he action having been brought in a federal court in the state of Massachusetts. Moffat. (80) third: when. who. and the contract h aving been made. In Ogden v. the action upon the Contrac t is brought in the state granting the discharge by one who is not a citizen of that state. Saunde rs.(69) the action being brought in a court of the state of Louisian a. and(75) Marshall. so largely discussed in that case. Ro bbins. when. and as no bar to its enforcement. and to be performed.(76) the action having been brought in a court of the state of Alabama. and the contract having been made in Massachusetts. the defendant a ci tizen of New York. Smith (70) the action being brought in a court of the state of Pennsylvania. it was hel d that a discharge under an antecedently -enacted law of Louisiana impaired the obligation of the contract. Justice Johnson in th e case of Ogden v.(72) the same ruling was made. In F. In Cook v. McNeill. volnntarily become parties to the insolvency .(79) second : when. so far as it is covered by the antecedent decisions made by this court. expressed the same view as to the effect of the judgment in Ogden v.(74) was concurred in and adopted by judges. J.. Saunders(71) the plaintiff being a Citizen of Kentucky and the defendant a citizen of New York. The ultimate opinion delivered by Mr. The result of the cases is. although the discharge has been granted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract. the plaintiff being a citizen of New York.he state. the plaintiff being a citizen of Vermont a nd the defendant a citizen of Massach usetts. Bank v.. said. although the discharge has been granted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract. that a discha rge under the insolvent laws of a state is not a bar to an action on a contract for the payment of money. action having been brought in a federal court in the s tate of Louisiana. and who has not made himself a party to the proceedings in insolvene y. and the contract having been made in New York t o be performed in that state. in that state. (81) and fourth. and the discharge set up being one that had been obtained und er an antecedently-enacted insolvent law of the last-mentioned state. by a party who is not a citizen of the state granting the discharge.(82) The questions. "The effeet of the discharge 'Under the insolve nt act is of course at rest. the plaintiff being a citizen of New York and the defendant a citizen of Maryland. who we re in the minority upon the the three general question of the Constitutionality of state insolvent laws. and althou gh the contract was made and to be performed in the state in which the discharge has been granted. was void as an impairment of the obligation of that contract. although the discharge has been gr anted under a law enacted antecedently to the making of the contract. Hale. it was held that a discharge under an antecedently-enacted statute of Massachusetts did not bar the action. In Sudyam v. Broadnax.(77) the action being brought in a federal co urt in the state of Maryland. though not citizens o f the state granting the discharge. and in Shaw v.
whose obligation cannot be imp aired by a subsequent legislative repeal of the statute authorizing the subscrip tion.(90) but a state cannot d issolve an existing municipal corporation having a bonded debt.(89) On the same principle. Hamilton's. but it was formerly a matter of grave doubt whe ther or not contracts to which a state was a party were likewise entitled to pro tection.(86) Municipal taxation. who.(92) A statutory pro hibition of the issuing by the courts of the state of a mandamus to compel the l evying of a tax for the payment of the interest upon. the statutory authorizati on of the contracting by a munieipality of an extraordinary debt by the issue of negotiable securities therefor conclusively implies a power in the municipality to levy taxes sufficient to pay the accruing interest upon. Contracts f or the payment of money being within the protection of the const itutional prohibition of the impairment of their obligation. express or implied. or the principal of. lt has never been doubted that contracts between individuals were protected by the constitutional provision."' Nor can a state withdraw or restrict the taxing power of a municipality so as to impair the obl igation of contracts which have been made on the pledge. This restriction on the power of the states is not to be found in either Mr. impairs the contract betwee n the municipality and the bondholder.(88) But where public officers are by statute authorized to issue b onds in aid of railway construction only upon the fulfilment of a condition prec edent which is not fulfilled before the adoption of an amended state constitutio n prohibiting the issue of such bonds there is no eontract whose obligation is i mpaired by the adoption of the state constitution. judgments upon such contracts are equally entitled to protection. and that the prohibition wa s not intended by its originators to interfere with the exercise of state sovere ignty in cases of other than private contracts. neglect or refuse to become pa rties thereto. and b eing duly notified of the insolvency proceedings. . The history of the Constitution shows clearly that the mischiefs whieh the framers of the Constitution intended to remedy by this prohibition were. a judgment against a municipal corporation founded upon a breach of contract is not affected by a subsequent legislative abolition of the municipality's power to levy taxes for t he payment of its debts.(85) nor are judgments founded upon torts contracts whose obli gation will be protected against subsequent legislation. those caused by state legislation enabling debtors to discharge their de bts otherwise than as stipulated in their contracts. or.(93) In general. unless the statute conferring the authority. or Mr.(83) Therefore. A state cannot take away from a municipality existing powers of taxation so as to deprive of his compensation an officer who has served his term. a statutory authorization of borrowing of money by a municipality is not a contrac t between the state and the municipal creditors whose obligation can be impaired by the subsequent exercise by the state of the power of modifying the rate of t axation or of exempting certain property from taxation.(84) But the rights of a judgment creditor are not impai red by a state statute reducing the rate of interest thereafter to accrue upon e xisting judgments. and the matured pri ncipal of. clearly manifests a contrary legislative intent.(87) County bonds issued by public officers under authority of law either upon the subscrip tion. 65. for 'Whose payme nt powers of taxation have been granted and specifically pledged. Pinckney Is.proceedings. pri marily. or some general law in f orce at the time. Mr. 64. the debt.(94) History of the prohibition. or the constit ution of the state. munic ipal bonds. or upon the agreement to subscribe. Judgments as contracts. or by a subsequent amendment to the state constitution prohibiting such a subscription. tha t that taxing power shall be exercised for their fulfilment. for that disso lution interferes with the exercise of such power of taxation. being citizens of the state granting the discharge. whose issue had been legally authorized. to the stock of a railway constitute a contract between the county and the bondholders. 63.
This. 1787. Gerry."' with reference to the Com mittee of Revision's report. declares "No state shall . Bancroft states. so far as is k nown. The Committee of Revis ion reported on 12th September. was thought neeessary as a security to commerce. 1787. and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. to the more enlightened part of the community. neverth eless. The sober people of America are weary of th e fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. Rutledge. Mr.(101) "Bills of attainder. " Mr. and objections to i t by Messrs.(100) "The Constituti on of the United States interdicts the states individually from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. in which the i nterest of foreigners. but omits all reference to Mr. to Pres ident Washington on the subject of the resolutions of Congress with regard to th e arrears of pay due to certain soldiers of the Revolution. ex po st facto laws. Bancroft also quotes from the official report to the Governor of Connect icut made by Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth. . as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoub ted interests of their constituents."( 99) Mr. Rutledge's motion. Section 10. . Mr . King's proposition. 1790. no debate on the subject. in relation to private con tracts were extensively felt. said in his memorandum of 28th May. have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in fav our of personal security and private rights. Very p roperly. The t oo frequent intermeddlings of the state legislatures. was not one of the least recommendations of that Constitution. are contrary to t he first principles of the social. Madison said in the Federalist. if they hav e not. . with the mention of declarations of opi nion in favour of it by Messrs. there being. and ought not to be prohibited. The journal of the convention menti ons Mr. and to every principle of sound legis lation. and seriously lamented. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the state constitutions. was. to the convention their revised draft of t he Constitution. by those who felt and thought in that manner. in so doing. King's proposition." but. w hen Secretary of the Treasury. 14th September.' (98) he of himself added the words . therefore. 1787. King's resolution.(95). Mr. the clause was finally amended and put in to the form in which it appears in the Constitution. King "moved to add in the words us ed in the ordiance of Congress establishing new states." In conve ntion on Friday. the deputies from that state to the Federal Convention. or impairing the obligation of contracts by ex post facto laws. in which Article 1. making anything but mon ey a tender in payment of debts.compact. save by Mr. on motion of Mr. who "entered into observation s inculcating the importance of the public faith and the propriety of the restra int put on the states from impairing the obligation of contracts. Wilson and Madison. there was adopted a prohibition of state bil ls of attainder and ex post facto laws. . a prohibition on the sta tes to interfere in private contracts. and a Constitution which p romised a prevention. "The restraint on the legislatures of the several states respecting emitting bills of credit. Sherman. 6 Mr. as well as of the citizens of different states. that "Gouverneur Morris retained the clause forbidd ing ex post facto laws . laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts.and resolute not to countenance the issue of paper mone y and the consequent violation of contracts. Madison reports Mr. Our own experience has taught us. but when Article XIII of the report of that committee was uncler consideration on 28th August. wherein they say." The clause does not appear to have been made a subject of discussion in any of the state conventions called to ratify the Constitution. pass any . nor does it appear in the draft reported by the Committee of Five on 6th August. on the ground that state laws limiting the times within which actions might be brought necessarily interfered with con tracts. "No state shall pass laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts. and all of them are prohibited by the spirit an d scope of these fundamental charters. eagerly embraced." and unavailin gly endeavoured to obtain the insertion in the Constitution of a similar restrai nt upon congressional action. and I am much deceived. nor is it implied in Mr. Hamilton. They have seen with . that additional fences against these dangers ought not be omitted. as a sub stitute for Mr. and that there might be other cases in w hich such interference's would be proper. may be af fected. There does not seem to be any record o f any other discussion of this subject in the convention. Gouverneur Morris and Mason. Mad ison's resolutions.Paterson's projets as presented to the convention.
every subsequent interferen ce being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. ex post facto law. They have seen. and on 13th January. and that the states being prohibited from passing "any bill of attainder. and to acts which enabled the debtor to discharge his debt otherwise than as stipulate d in the contract. been settle d that the term "contract-" includes not only contracts between individuals. and give a re gular course to the business of society. too. we think. and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. which will banish speeula tions on public measures. On 14th May. but to prohibit the use of any means by which the same mischief might be produced. that contracts should be inviolable. It is probable that laws. who had purchased for value and without notice of any matter which could invalidate the title of the state's grantees. or law impairing the ob ligation of contracts. as well as contracts executory. was particularly directed to paper money. that some thorough reform is wanting.regret and with indignation. that the constitutional prohibition comprehends contracts executed. were most immediately felt. become jobs in the hands of enterprising a nd influential speculators. " It has. "for a tract of and in that state.'" State grants. that sudden changes. that one legislative interference i s but the first link of a long chain of repetitions.(102) Mar shall. " In Sturges v. declares that no state shall pass 'any law impairing the obligation of co ntracts. A general dissatisfaction with that lax system of legislation which followed the war of our revolution undoubtedly directed the mind of the convention to thi s subject. P eck. F letcher demurred. includ ing grants. therefore.(104) that a state cannot deprive of his right to recover mesne profits from a . By sundry mesne conveyances before 1796 title in fee to a part of the tract ves ted in Peck. etc. that the statute of 1796 was enacted by reason of fraud practiced i n securing the enactment of the statute of 1795 and was an impairment of Peck's title. the necessary construction of the sentence requires that we should give these words their full and obvious meanin g. between the stat e and individuals. Following in the line of Fletcher v. and. Had nothing more been intended. They very rightly i nfer. 1803.. the patent was issued. it was necessary not only to prohibit the use of particular means by wh ich it might be effected. inter alia. an exception in favour of the right to impair the obligation of those contra cts into which the state may enter. inter alia. Peck conveyed to Fletcher. produced the loudest complaints. private and corporate. there is not to be implied "in words which import a general prohibition to impair the obligation of contrac ts. the ground of decision b eing. pri vate and corporate. 66. Peck pleaded that he was a purchaser for value and without notice. therefore. In 1810 the judgment in Fletcher v. The convention appears to have intended to establis h a great principle. covenanting. a grant of land by a state to a railway corporation is a contract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent act resuming the land . nothing would have been expre ssed. 1795. but also contracts. in the opinion of the convention. and legislative interferences . C. The facts in that case were these: in 1795 the state of Georg ia enacted a statute authorizing the issue of a patent to " the Georgia Co. in cases affecting personal rights. since 1810. ther efore. that his title had been "in no way constitutionally or legally impaired by virtu e of any subsequent act of any subsequent legislature of the state of Georgia. such as those which have been stated in arg ument. said " The fair. But. In 1796 the state of Georgia enacted a statute repealing the Act of 1795 and annulling the patent to the Geo rgia Co. The same mischief might be effected by other means." and the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post fa cto laws being a restraint upon governmental action." Fletcher brought covenant sur deed against Peck in the Circuit Court. inspire a general prudence and industry. and the court entered judgment thereon for Peck. it has been held that. therefore. To restore public confidence com pletely. The attentio n of the convention. much more remained to be done. declaring. executed and executory. which judgmen t was affirmed in the Supreme Court on a writ of error. The Constitution. Peck(103) established the doctrine that contracts to whieh a state is a party are within the protection of the constitut ional prohibition. J . Crowninshield.
(119) or voluntary gra nts exemption of the real property of a charity from taxation. do not constitute irrepealable contracts of exemption. in the contributio n of funds to the corporation for the accomplisliment of its benevolent purpose. constitute con. contained in corporate charters."(110) nor can the gross receipts of a co rporation be taxed when its charter exempts the corporation from taxation. when its charter exempts from taxation all prope rty of whatever kind or description belonging to... or owned by.. and that contracts of exemption from state taxation. which it did not exercise. the corporation..(108) Thus. Wilson(107) came before the Supreme C ourt.."(109) nor can the shares of th e capital stock of a corporation be taxed in the hands of the shareholders.(1 16). but are subject to modification repeal in the exercise of legislative discretion. declared that the land so purchased "shall not hereaf ter be subject to any tax.tracts so binding upon the state that t heir obligation cannot be impaired by a subsequent repeal of the charter. the line and rolling stock of a railway cannot be taxed when its charter exempts from taxation its "property" and "shares.(113) Nor can a municipal corporation. divest religious corporations of their title to land acquired under colonial laws antecedently to the revolution. and which. or stipulated by subsequent agreement.disseisor one whose title vested under a compact between that state and another state. havi g been exempted before the adoption of the constitution prohibition. cannot constitute a contract whose obligation is impaired by a s ubsequent imposition of taxation. the doctrine of Fletcher v. or. if made in express terms and supported by an adequate consideration.(106) Express contracts of exemption from taxation. bounty laws offering such an exemption as a inducement for the o rganization of corporations develop a particular industry. in the exercise of authority delegated to it by statute. 67.(111) nor can a corporation be taxed in excess of the limits specifically designated i n the charter. and relieves it fr om liability for betterments. when the charter requires the corporation to pay to the state a tax on each share of the stock "in lieu of all other taxes. a statutory consolidation of two railways works the dissol ution of the original corporation and subjects the consolidated corporation to t . though accepted in good faith by the exempt ed corporation. and who under that compact was entitled to recover mesne profits. (117) So also the building by a railway corporation of its line. and that that contract forbade the subsequent taxat ion of such lands.(120) If the constitution of a state prohibits legislative grants of exemption from Estate taxation. it followed that a similar contract with regard to corporate franchises or assets was entitled to the like protection.(105) an d tliat a state cannot. The legal inviolability of a state's contract to exempt lands from state taxatio n having been thus established. or from the e xempted corporation.(112) or other contract.(118) Statutory exemptions from state taxation not incorporated in charters and un-supported by a consideration moving to the state. assess a street railway fo r a new paving of a street. as . for instance. to b uild the line.consent. though the orig inal charter granted a power to the corporation.(114) nor can property held by a charitable corpora tion as an investment be taxed. in the case of corporations for charitable purposes. constitutes a consideration for the exemption. after their sale to other parties with the state.(121) Such a constutional prohibition operates to extinguish an exemption made by contract in the case of a railway which. had been af ter the adoption thereof so under foreclosure to reorganize the corporation (122 ) the same principle. under the terms of a statute amendatory of its charter and granting in express terms an exempti on from taxation. by statute.( 115) An adequate consideration for a charter exemption from taxation is to be fo und in the exercise by the corporation of the powers conferred by the charter. When in I812 the case of New Jersey v. for the acceptance of that contract limits by ne cessary implication the obligation of the railway to repairs. Peck necessarily required the eourt to hold th at the state was bound by the express contract contained in a statute which auth orized the purchase of certain land for the remnant of the tribe of Delaware Ind ians. when the railway has contracted with the municipalit y to keep the street in repair. such a grant. in terms. or by an imposition of a rate of taxation inconsistent with the state's contract.
that that charter shall not be alterable in any other manner t han by an act of the legislature. a nd. though one the original corporations was by charter protected ag ainst such legislative regulation. and p rivileges. and incorporated with. J. prescribe rates for the transportation passengers by the consolidat ed corporation.(128) which is cited by Miller. modify.(132) So a provision in the charter of a ferry company that it shall be subject to the same taxes as are now or hereafter may be imposed on oth er ferries. reserving the right to impose t axes on the gross earnings of the corporation and stipulating that the above sev eral taxes shall be in lieu of other taxation. operates as a reserved power authorizing a sta tutory amendment of the charter. operates to extinguish the limited exemption contained in t he original charters.(137) A charter granting to a corp oration all the rights. subsequently granted charters. and subject to the disabilities and restrictions that have been confe rred and imposed upon" another railway company." does not exempt the corporation from liability to pay an annual lic ense fee on each of its boats.(135) And the exemption of t he capital of a corporation from taxation does not necessarily exempt its stockh olders from taxation on their shares of stock. therefore. not in the c harter to whieh reference is made.(138) So a state may make a contract conferring the exclusive right of building a toll bridge by reference to a previously enacted statute.(123) General statutory prohibitions of the ex emption of corporations from state taxation are not binding on subsequent legisl atures. The first suggestion of any such reservation is to be found in the judgment o f Parsoms. or repeal that charter. the consolidated corporation cannot claim as to property acquired from the first mentioned corpo .he operative of an amended state constitution. without impairment of the obligation t he contract.(133) So the charter of a street railway requiring the payment to the municipality of semi-annual license as is now paid by other railway companies. powers. (125) In the case of a statutory consolidation accepted by two railway s. or a general statute incorp orated therewith. C. in Gre enwood v. but in a statute amendatory thereof. does not confer that exemption on the former eompany .(139) On the other hand.(130) Express contracts of exemption from state taxation are to be strictly construed. confers an exemption from state taxation contained.(124) unless referred to in. but not used in the construction or opera tion of its line. if the state in the charter reserves the r ight to alter. whose charter contained an expre ss exemption from taxation. that reservation authorizes any s uch amendment of the charter granted as will not defeat nor substantially impair the obligation of the grant or any rights that may (127) an be vested thereunde r. which took effect subquently to t he incorporation of the original corporation but prior to their consolidation..(140) So in the case of the merger of a corporation having an exemption from st ate taxation for a limited period with another corporation having an unlimited e xemption.. in Wales v. Freight Co. a reserva tion by a general statute bef ore the enactment of the consolidating act and inc orporated therewith. is not a contract whose obligatio n is impaired by a subsequent statute taxing lands owned by the railway and mort gaged as security for its bonded debt.(126) Of course. the consolidating statute not granting any exemption. under the requirements of a municipal ordinance e nacted under due legislative authority. Stetson. the incorporation of a railway by a charter investing the company " for the purpose of making and using the said road with all powers.(134) So a general exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation is construed as referring only to the property held for the transaction of the business of the company. is to be construed to mean that the company shall no t at any future time be required to pay a greater license than that then require d to be paid by other companies. and privileges "granted by the charter" of anoth er corporation. J. each of whose charters contained a limited exemption from taxation.(131) Thus a charter of a railway imposing an annual tax assessed on the cost of the line.(136) Nor does a statute by which lands granted to a railway company are exempted from taxation until such lands s hall be sold and conveyed by that company remain operative after the full equita ble title has been transferred by the railway. and the exemption thus conferred constitutes a contract whose obligation cannot be impai red by a subsequent repeal of the statute conferring by reference the right of e xemption. the state legislature may. rights.(129) A provision in a charter.
(147) or gas.(145) on the same principle. and grant chattels and effects of what kind soever. does not impair the oblig ation of any contract. a legislative charter of a railway.(150) or of o ther debts due to the state. whose sole shareholder is the state. or other evidence of debt. thus. and are subject to revocation at the state's pleasure" Therefore." with perpetual succession. payable by it to county of the state f or its failure to locate the railway on a certain line.division(152) and by the contracts of a corporation. and the facts in which were that. There can be no contract between a state and political subdivision of a stat e. and to receive deposits and discount notes.(159) judgment in which was rende red in 1819. the royal governor of th e province of New Hampshire. a provision in the charter of a toll bridge company that it shall not be lawf for any person to erect another bridge within a specified distance of the b ridge thereby authorized.(157) An d a grant to a township of tlie power of taxation is always subject to revocatio n. a statute forbidding the transfer by any bank of a ny note. stipulating that coupons of state bonds should be receivable for taxes(149) or that the cir culating notes of a bank should be receivable in payment for taxes.(144) So. (146) by its grants of franchises and exclusive privileges. constitutes a contract binding the state not to author ize the construction of such other bridge. nor infringe upon the rights of the municipality. The leading cas e is Trustees of Dartmouth College v. not including appointments to publie. Woodward. Contracts between a state and its political subdivisions. a state is bound by its express con tracts. such as a municipality giving to the municipality a vested right to property. by its contracts co nceeding peculiar privileges to state obligations. of appointing and removing tutors . for all such property rights are held by the municipality in trust for the stat e. of fixing their salaries. or interest upon. does not constitute a co ntract between the county and the railway whose obligation is impaired by subseq uent repeal of the statute. and w ith "the whole power of governing the college. Express stipulations in a charter as to the privilege thereby conferred on t he corporation are also within the protection of the constitutional prohibition. Whee lock and eleven other persons a charter. granting to it power to appropriate public wharves erected by a muni cipality under a prior legislative grant of authority.office. and control by the legislative authority of the state.(143) but the authorization by the sta te of the construction of a railway viaduct does not impair the obligation of su ch a contract. The next mooted question under this clause of the Constitution was whether o r not a charter of incorporation granted by a state constituted an implied contr act on the part of the state. as. of directiDg the course of study to be pursued by th . a statute i mposing pecuniary penalty upon a railway.(148). 68. modification. impairs the obligation of a contract created by the grant in a charter of a bank of power to receive. granted to Dr.(151) by contracts made by a political subdivision o f the state for the payment of the principal of. such as the privileg e of supplying a municipality with water.(141) So also a grant of immunity from taxation will not pass merely by a co nveyance of the property and franchises of a railroad company. the public de bt of that sub. for the payinent of the corporate debt. hold.(158) Implied contracts in charters of incorporation. whose obligation the state could not be permitted to impair by a subsequent repeal or modification of the charter.ration any exemption beyond the limits contained in the charter of that corporat ion. for instance. in 1769. acting in the name of the king. between the state and an i ndividual for the performance of special services for a stipulated compensation.(156) On the same principle. 69. whereby they were incorporated under th e title of "The Trustees of Dartmouth College. under whicli private rights have vested. also. bill receivable.(153) Contracts between two or more states.(142) Express grants of peculiar privileges.(154) are s o far protected that neither state can annul or modify such contracts to the pre judice of the private rights so vested. 70. although such com pany may hold its property exempt from taxation.
and accepted by. of whom twenty-one are also appointed by the executive of New Hampshire. lSl6. and of filling vacancies created in their own body. to consist of twenty-five persons." with power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees. Prior to the enactment of these statutes. the corporation.. ought to vary with varying circumstances. that. and certain chattels belonging to the corpor ation. by the revolution. c onstituted a contract between the colonial government and the corporation as the representative of the donors of those funds. in 1816 the trustees removed him from office. the duties. as he refused to surrender to the original corporation the property which was in his hands. or some object of value. in terms. unlimited sense. which had been contributed for the benefit of the college." put his judgment on the ground that the charter of the colleg e constituted a contract as hereinbefore stated. that its char ter. corporate seal. adopted f or internal government. C. he had in his possession th e charter." and that "the provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts. and the obligations im posed by the charter were the same under the state government as they had former ly been under the colonial government. (1 61) that "the positive authority of a decision is coextensive with the facts on which it is made. that the grant by a state of a charter of incorporation for private purposes unconnected with the administration of government constitutes a contract betwee n the state and the corporation." After the chart er had been granted to. and." and created "a board of overseers. records. or its system of administration. that corporation brought an action of trove r in a court of the state of New Hampshire against special verdict. and that the effect of the statutes of wa s to substitute the will of the state for the will of the donors. " expressly conceded. and by force of the donations of funds made on the faith of it. Applying to the Dartmouth Colle ge Case. one Woodward was the secre tary and treasurer of the corporation.(160) after acce pting the suggestion. and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed. that it was an implied. would unnecessarily and unwisely embarrass its legislation. and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. than those which respect property. J. "property both real an d personal. judgment was entered in favour of the defendant by the state court of last resort.. which were established for purposes of intern al government. but essent ial. was conve yed to and vested in the corporate body. in every such charter it is an implied condition of the c ontract. as made by the charter. in Ogden v. condition of that contract that that charter should not be so modified. and the c ause was removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. C. as well as the power s.e students." gave "the appointment of the additional number to the executive of the state. passed on 27th June. and that. the test so clearly stated by Marshall. that " the f ramers of the Consti tution did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil in stitutions. as such. and so repugnant to its general spirit the term 'contraet ' must be understood in a more limited sense. and." it is obvious that the case is an authority for the propositi on. to impair the obligation of the contract between the state and the corpor ation. whose obligation is not to be permitted to be i mpaired by a material modification of the terms of the charter. as to substitute governmental control for t he will of the donors. in his judgment. in 1817 he was appointed se cretary and treasurer of the now board of trustees.." Acts of the legislature of the state o f New Hampshire. of government devolved on the people of New Hampshire." and "that as the framers of the Constitution could never have i ntended to insert in that instrument a provision so unnecessary. and. to that e xtent. to subserve those purposes. Saunders. either expressed or implied. so mischievous. and rejader i mmutable those civil institutions. increased "the nu mber of trustees to twenty-one. the clause woul d be an unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a state. . J. and 18th December. and which. the ground of decision being that t he college as incorporated was a private eleemosynary corporation. which was organized under th e statutes of 1816. that "taken in its broad. Marshall. that the state shall not by subsequent legislation change either the pu rpose of the corporation. whi ch reversed the judgment of the state court. wit hout the consent of the corporation.
(172) and a municipality whieh has granted to a company the right to erect and operate an electrie lighting plant does not impair the obligation of the contract by erecti ng a plant for itself.(168) Implied grants of peculiar privileges. Billings. some of whom were appointed by the company. also. Co. v.(165) and Tucke r v.(182) A state which.(174) nor may a vendee which is exempt from such regulation claim exemption as to property which it ac quires from a company which was not exempt.Implied corporate exemption from taxation.(176) The granting. stations and the stoppage of trains at those stations. Maguire. and this principle has been re-asserted in the later cases of M. and do not vest in the grantee any powers other than those expressly grant ed. either toll or f ree . In Providence Bank v. or to operate a ferry.(180) or for injury to pro perty in the construction of its road. or property.(179) Nor can a state by implication exempt a railway company from lia bility in damages for fires caused by its locomotives.(167) and that the grant to a cor poration of the right to sell its franchises does not entitle the vendee to exem ption from taxation granted to the vendor.(170) So.(163) N. Maguire. on the states granting them. either with the corporation or with the creditors thereof. in 1830. Shelby County. M.(169) Thus. may forbid its future cons olidation with competing roads.(162) it was dec ided. from state taxa tion. in the ca se of a railway whose charter authorizes the company from time to time to fix. G. Ferguson. The later cases have narrowed the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case wit h regard to the implied contracts created by charters.(184) It may.(175) Exemption from the operation of the police power.(183) A state may place reasonable limitations up on the rates of fare and freight charged by its railways. There is no implied contract in a charter that the state will exempt the cor porate franchises and property from the operation of such legislation as the sta te may deem necessary to secure the welfare of its citizens. in the interests of the public.(186) And it ha . it has bee held that the imposit ion in a charter of a specific form or rate of taxation is not to be construed i n the absence an express contract of exemption from other taxation to constitute an implied exemption from such other tax tion. of a charter to an insurance company does not invalidate a subsequent statute which requires that company to make a full return showing its business condition to the proper officers of the state. by charter. On the same principle. the creation of a corporation with the power to ere ct a toll bridge. vest in a commission by a subsequent stat ute the power of fixing those rates. v.(171) The grant to a contractor of the sole privilege of supplying a municipali ty with water -from a designated source is not impaired by the grant to another party of the privilege of supplving it with water from another source.(181) On the same principle. that the grant corporate privileges does not carry with it any im plied exemption of either the corporate franchise. R. 73.(185) It may by statute regulate the rates o f a water corporation whose charter vested the power of fixing the rates in a bo ard of commissioners. does not impliedly bind the state not t o license the establishment of a competing bridge or ferry. t hat the corporation shall not subsequently be dissolved after due legal proceedi ngs founded upon a forfeiture of the corporate franchises either for misuser or for non-user.(166) Following in the same line. the charter of a corporation by a state does not constitute a con tract by the state. 72. and thereby made obligato ry. to be strictly const rued.(164) Bailey v. r egulate and receive tolls and charges.(178) nor to require by such legislation the fencing of all tracks used by railway companies within the state.(177) Nor can a state surrender by implication the right to regulate by subsequent legislation the location of rai lway. it has been held that legislative grants of special o r exclusive privileges are.(173) Nor does the grant to a quasi-public corporation of the right to sell its franchises by implication extend to the vendee any exempti on from rate regulation which was possessed by its vendor. has a uthorized a railroad to consolidate with other roads. 71. the grant of a franchise to a railway does not preclude a municipality from making reasonable regulations as to the use of its streets. therefore.
(197) Nor can a state legislature bind subsequ ent legislatures as to the exercise of the powers of sovereignty over the politi cal subdivisions of the state. 74. The learned judge said: "I t cannot be doubted that the XI Amendment to the Constitution operates to create an important distinction between contracts of a state with individuals and cont racts between individual parties. to secure the safety or to protect the health or the morals of it s citizens.(206) In this connection. I t is different with contracts between individuals and a state. such as water w orks." That obligation .(192) or manufacturing and selling liquors. authorize others to conduct the same busine ss.(202) but after the duties have been performed by th e appointee of a municipal corporation during the tum of his office there is a c ontract whose obligation is impaired by a subsequent statute abolishing the powe r of taxation for the payment of his compensation. and over its municipal corporations with regard t o subject-matters of public and not of private interest.(199) or the sale of property held by a municipality for public purposes. in the case of an officer appointed under a statute which in terms defines the tenure of the office to be according to law...(207) may well be borne in mind." On this principle. Under such circumstances the state may. while a state may. that which was forcibly said by Mathews. withdraw its consent to be sued. in the judgment of the court in the case of In re Ayers. J. for instance. th ere ca n be no implied contract on the part of a state that it will not amend it s constitution. upon this principle. suc h as a water-supply (189) or street railway (190) company.(193) or selling lottery tickets and drawing lotteries.(188) bind itself not to regulate the rates charged by a quasi-public corporation.(204) The withdrawal by a state of its consent to be sued. 75. cannot be impaired by any subsequen t legislation. in derogation of a previous grant of the exclusi ve privilege of slaughtering cattle. the state may by subsequent statute authorize the commissioners to reduce the rates below that point. but also the substance of the original remedies for its enforcement. The state's consent to be sued being voluntary and of grace. that consent do es not constitute a contract whose obligation can be impaired by a subsequent re peal of the statute permitting such suit. and constitute a substantial part of its obligation. in so far as that constitution deals with the administration of the public concerns of the state. in existence at the time they were entered into. are a part of the agreement itself. (203) Of course. C. bargain away its right to enact such legislation as may.s been said that where a water company was organized under a statute which provi ded that the commissioners should not reduce the rates below a given point..96 Marshall. by an express agreement. the l ocation of a county seat. Thus. by su bsequent legislation. the remedies for their enforcement or breach. not only the covenants and conditions of the contract are p reserved. be necessary.(187) Indeed. it ha s a lso been held that a state may. In respect to the .(194) And.. It may amend statutes which regulate the construction of railroads w ithin its limits.(198) or the boundaries of its municipalities.(191) It may forbid the continued prosecution of their respecti ve trades by corporations chartered by it for the purpose of rendering dead anim als into fertilizers. even by an express contract.(195) Contracts as to matters of public concern. a subsequent statute removing him is not an impa irment of the contract. J. as. In Dartmouth College v.(200) or the appropriation under state authority of municipal obligations b y their holders as a set-off against municipal claims against those holders.(205) especially where the statute auth orizing the suit has provided no means for the enforcement of any judgment that may be rendered against the state. Woodward. a state cannot.(201 ) It nor does the appointment by the state of a public officer for a fixed term for a stipulated compensation constitute a contract between the state and the ap pointee whose obligation is impaired by either the reduction of his compensation or his removal from office. In the case of contracts between individuals. conceded that "the fram ers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain a state from the regulation o f its civil institutions adopted for internal government.
184 id. 662. Speed. II. 96 U. County of Pike. G. 176. Kearzey. Jeffersou Police Jury. J. S. (3) Supra. 646. 1. 544. 243. ibid. between individuals. 1 Bl. 203. H. Hanford v. Chicag o v. Co. (2) Sturges v. McGehee. or obtaining compensation for the breach of. D. an express contract. A. c. as then expounded by all the departments of its government and administered in its courts of justice. Section 9. as construed by the court. Texas. The City v. v. altering the construction of the law.. 454. v. except that which arises out of the honour and good faith of the state itself. Cole. N. 594." (8) Walla Walla v. G. De Young. Rockingham T. that if the contract when ma de was valid by the laws of the state. 30 Stat. Knopp. S.Smart. Stevens v. Debolt. Surget. they ca nnot wantonly be invaded. Bennett. 1 Wall. St. Co. 131. Denny v. Whilst the state cannot be compelled by suit to perfor m its contracts. 650. Douglass v. S. 472. 194. S. Clark. 180 id. 148 (13) State Bank v. deprive a party of the legal right of enfor cing. 148 id. without any violation of the obligation of its contract in the constitutional sense. Brown v. 797. 477. 631. 388. it may subsequently withdraw that consent and resume its original immunity. 172 U. Dubuque. v . 115 id. I. L. Co. Chap. 137. 163 id. (6) R." The force and effect of the prohibition as construed by the Supreme Court. 416. Jones. 181. A. Co. Ill id. J. St. 728. White v. County of Moultrie v. 273. or between a state and individuals. 677. 492. Ins. 678.. Olcott v. Co. 5 How. v. 96 id. Barry. any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts may be judicially resisted. Paul. under which such property or rights are held is void and powe rless to affect their enjoyment. at the inception of the contraet. and d eclared it to be "the law of this court. 116. 13 id. 5 Wheat. R. Hart." and in Gelpc ke v.. 432: "The sound and true rule is. 206. Bridge Proprietors v. 1 Wall. Swayne. & T. quoted the dictum of Taney. 487. 185. 436. by virtue of the XI Amendment to the Constitution.. 1. Wilkes County v. gives the force of a law. Coler. C . as was pointed out by Bradley. W. 9 id. 129 id. I. 186 U.. S. Pleasant Township v. S. 130 id. 0. Columb ia Township Trustees. 48. (5) League v. in O. C. Bier v. Sheldon. (7) Gelpcke v. W. Iowa Countv. 142. 181 id. 97 id. Gunn v. 50."(2 09) Yet. 3 id. S. and any law impairing the obliga tion of contracts. 3 78. v.. 4 Wheat. 489. Davies. 67. 97 id. Bank. M oyses. Co . 188. Co. J. L. 610.. v. 541. (10) L. Co. Loeb v. Bruffy. & T. 175. 10 Wall.se. L. See also Scott v. executed or executory. Co. County of Ralls v. Ford v. 16 How. 1 Wall. 368. 128 id. 32 Stat. Rollins. (4) Owings v.. 122. Lamson. v. 511. C. 454. McClure. Fisk v. S. & T. 36. 343. who said. Detroit v. 16 How. 1 5 id. 16 id. Skel ly. Doug lass. (1) Article I. P. Bier v. that a state may not. L. c. 121 U. . J. 369. 76. C. Keith v. Bank v. Havemeyer v. 138 id. 0. 391. 11 How. 101 U. Jefferson Branch Bank v. 420. 595. Gri ffith. is. Delmas v. Pleasant Township v. 67. Easton. 116 id. by its enforcemen t thereof. Edwards v. Although the state may. W. Crowninshield. Dubuque. provided that it leaves in force a substantial part of the legal remedies which subsisted at the time of the making of the contract. but a st ate may regulate or limit the remedies of the contracting parties. Lak e County v. L. Co. Debolt. Hoboken Co. The Supervisors . 92 U. (9) Williams v. Ry. and the se are not subject to coercion. See also Hanover Nat. 105 id. L. 294. McGehee. The force and effect of the prohibition.. 179 id. 506. 138 id. W. there being no remedy by a suit against the state. have consented as one of its conditions to subject itself to suit. I. L. in Hans v. ibid. 145 id. the contract is substantially without sanction. Shreveport v. 170 id. Co. Thi s doctrine was first suggested by Taney. Louisiana.'(210) 'where p roperty or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a state. its validity and ob ligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature of the stat e or decision of its courts.. C. by any law or by any act to which the state.
S. Knox. Ry. K. Co. L. Palmes. S. v. & T. 651. v. 21 Wall. R. Harris. v. Oshkosh.. 661. Brahan . CG. 102 id. 661. Turner v. Minnesota. ibid. 104 id. 109 id. 280. v. v. Co. 109 U. v. P. v. 336. & Q. G. 486. L aidley. See also Wilson v. Burton. Ass n. 12 id. P. Mtge. Assn. 159 id. 791. 273. 646. 611. 137. Nelson. 383. H. 113 id. Iseminger. N. 4 VV-heat. 244. New Orleans. Co. Delmas v. U. 162 id. Nagle. 150 id. R. I. 135 id. 635. 185 id. C. v. W. 194 id. 14 id. (20) Randall v. 185. Hooker v. R. C. Wilson v. I. & L. 108 U. Henderson City. Paul. M. Suydam. (19) Gross v. 13 Wall. 3 Pet. 673. New York. 181. C. Co. S. But where a charter authorizing the consolidat ion of railways was modified by a statute prohibiting the consolidation of compe ting roads before such consolidation had been attempted. 11 How.. B. Ry.. McCullough v. W. 587. (11) 121 U. 401. 66. 125 id. 51. & N. G. N. 469. 193 id. 170 id. M. 14 id. Tennessee.. Ins. 103 id. 388. S. (18) Mason v. 99 U. Oshkosh. Wright v. Biddle. v. S. 392. 6 Wall. 176 id. P. 514. (14)Sturges v. Co. 95 U. 1 83 id. L. Wagonner v. 437. People. Co. . v. 399. 67. Miller. 335. 173 id.. L. the power so conferred. A. Crowninshield. 184 id. Co. 511. Texas... S. v. 241. Ry. v. v. S. 177 id. 309. (28) Vance v.. Haile. Vance. v. Virginia. Co. (29) Curtis v. 665 . Jackson. 345. Wagonner v. R. 1. C. St. ibid. Co. 189. L. Board of Liquidation v. G. 137. 399. R. 173. Spratley. 102. 0. 39. Louisiana. 66 . B. Needles. Todd County. v. is within the control of the legislature and may be treat ed as a license. 183 id. 10 id. Anderson. R. 1. Freeport City. W. 161 id. 0. 185 id. H. S. Penniman's ('age. See also C. S. (21) League v. L. R. Daggs. Walsh v. 179 id. 143.. 646. C. 144 id. 23 Wall. 144. S. 219 . M. S. S. of course. 161 U. (12) See also R. v. Wilkes County v. Union & Planters' Bank. & L. 679. ibid. 319. 602. Co. (17) R. See also A. 177. D. 437. ibid. & M. Tennessee. 138 id . Nebraska. Woodruff v. C. E. Lamphire. S. 188 id. 477. v. 133. 370. 1 51 id. Burr. Douglas v. L. Missouri v. 108 U. P. (16) And it may. 437. 187 id. Flack. 0. v.. New Orleans. and not directly and immediately within the contemplation of the parties thereto. W. B. 461. 1. v. Holmes. Blackstone v. 639. 193. Flack. 4 Wall. 103." "We cannot recognize a vested right to do a manifest wrong: " Pearsall v. 103 U. 668. Co. (22) Jackson v. Mississ ippi. N. Bryan v. See also Wilson v. 102 U. F. 149. 181 id. v. 55. 574. 227. 187 id. In re Brown. S. Co. 1. v. Shelby County v. Cushman. Co. W. Co. De Young. Co. Oshkosh. 434. S. 675. Stan defer. Co. 282. Hewes. 210. (27) Terry v. 180 id. Wood v. v. Whitney. 5 15.. Bridge Co. Pinney v. R. Kentucky. W. 249. 1. 141 id.. Kreiger v. 57.. cf. Barrett v. Solan. 415. (33) Blount v. 714. Board of Education. G. v. 628. 187 id. 189 id. Co. S. Wilkes County Com rs. Exchange Bank. S. Koshkonong v. 2 45. M. McClure. v. 172 id. Ry. St. Knoxville. M. grant an additional remedy: N. I.. 188 id. U. U. 169 id. S. L. 622. Co. 915) Green v. L. v. 488. 108 U. 595. 197. 0. & A. University v.. S. M. if a possible exercise of such power is fou nd to conflict with the interests of the public. Hecht. S tearns v. 8 Wheat. 137 id. Louisiana. Windley. R. id. Louisiana. Kreiger. v. v. the court said: "Where the charter authorizes the company in sweeping terms to do certain things which are unecessary to the main object of the grant. Co. 168. 153 id . N. Co. 203. Brady. Coler. 1. & S. 18. Hanford v.. 223. 172 ia. 0. S. C. 1 42. (26) Gilfillan v. (24) C. 161 id. (32) Ochiltree v. Chicago. & S. Co. 17 6 id. 180 id. 68. C. 157 U. 95 U.. 6 37. H. (25) Ewell v. (30) Louisiana v. See also Bedford v. v. 142 id. 187 U. Willia ms v. Shelby R. 379. & 0. 723. (23) Williamson v. 108 U. R. Rock. Wheeler v. v. 701. G. 12 Wheat. and may be revoked. W. W. 18. 181 U. C. R. 506. Co. Davies. V. 163 id. 188 id. (31) 0. 168 id. v. 595. & L. Pleasant Township v. 101 U. 291.. Hewes. & S t. v. so lon g as it is unexecuted. Standefer. 95 U. 66. Co. 184 id. St.
. (51) " Contract " is. 116 i d. Barry. 173. Far mers & Mechanics' Bank v. 415. 91 id. 136: "A contract is a compact between two or more parties .. Hayward. 103 id.102 id. Quincy. But see Meriwether v. Campbell v. 631. 402. Lightcap. Morley v. Maynard v. Saunders. Broadnax. J.. and since the Constitution us es the general term 'contracts. 107 U. 610. (49) Hawthorne v. 2 Wall. certain. S. J. Whitehead. 1990. as Field. 311. Gantly v. 105 id 278. Pilsbury. Crowninshield. v.. 93 U. 16 Wall. 566.. Ralls County Court v. ibid . L. New Orleans v. (46) Barnitz v. 195 id. Daviess County. 131.(34) Morley v. 289. S. McCracken v. fixed. Crowninshield. 67. v. 685. Wadsworth v. Ma rshall. 1 How.S. J . 217 . S. cf.C.. 79. 10 How. 622. 358. A. 15 Wall. 162. Wade. the obligation of which still continues. 146 id. in FI-etc her v. 314. 22 How. Williams. ifid. (41) Delmas v. said. 285. C.& M. 116 U. 5 How. L. Mobile v. 405. Memphis v.S. S. 629. (36) Guarantee Co. Baldwin v. (57) Louisiana v.S. ibid. 1 Wall. Moffat. Carskadon. W. U. Louisiana v. Hunt. 1. (45) Guinn v. 162. Ry. 132 id. Burr. Ogden v. 295. 3. Watson . Pleasant Township v. & M. New Or leans. St. Hamilton City. Pennsylvania. Insurance Co. Woodward. 209. 8 Wall. 479. 131 id. 3 id. Windley. King. U. Louisiana. 92 U. L.S . definite. 69. and this. 288. cf.. 12 2.S. 95 U. 142 id. 118. 67. 293. 96 U. " used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense as ignifying the agreement of two or more minds for consideration proceeding from one to the other to do or not to do certain acts.. 16 Wall. Kenney. Co.S. or not to do. W. An executory contract is one in wbich a p arty binds himself to do. See also Bradley v. Co. (56)Blount v. 223. said in Louisiana v. 131 U. 4 Wheat. 1. 162. 129 id... & M. S. (40) White v. differs in nothing from a grant. Marshall. S. S. Nelson v. C. 146 U. & W. said. 197. in Butler v. Hart. 0." Marshall. (53) State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds Case.. in fact. (43) Pierce v. 105 U. N. 163 U. 2 id. Ewing.. 4 Wheat. (35) Drehman v. Stifle. 34. C. 130 id. 135 U. 234. 472. 114 id. J. 14 id.. Morgan v.. G. McNeill.. Suydam v. of Brownsvill e. 338. (44) Walker v. (39) Van Hoffman v." (52) Sturges v. Ry. L. W. 116 id. 552. Peek.Since then. 6 Pet. 146 i . Freeland v. 416: "The contracts designed to be protected . 6 id. Lake County v. (54) County of Moultrie v. 138 id. 102 id.S. 285. 87. Kinzie. Smith. S.are contracts by which perfect. 194 id. S. 115 U. J.' without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed. Burton.A contract execute d is one in which the object of contract is performed. says Blackstone . 661(42) Effinger v. Bank. L. a grant is a contract executed.. Supervisors. Beverly. Greenhow. Calef. 289. 364.. 10. New Orleans. Morley v. Virginia. S. 534. 646. (58) Hunt v. Rollins. Ry. 13 Wall.. 668 . said: "The provision of the Constitution never has been understoo d to embrace other contracts than those which respect property or some object of value and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice.. (47) Bronson v. 131. R. v. 769." In Dartmouth College v. Mobile v. S.S. (55) Fisk v. Board of Liquidation. 14 Wall. Garrett. 15 Wall. Jefferson Police Jury. Hooker v. S. Rockingham T. said: " A contract is an agreement in which a party und ertakes to do or not to do a particular thing. Hill." In Sturges v. (38) Antoni v. Hale. 4 Wall. a particular thing. 707. Sneed. Martin's Parish." Daniel. 4 Wheat. Zacharie. 146 id. 6 Cr. priva te rights of property are vested. Board of Comrs. 111 id. (37) Tennessee v.S. Watson. Moore v. Mayor of New Orleans. 109 U. Cook v. Lake County v. 662. 213. 716. it must be construed to comprehend the l atter as well as the former. Greenhow. 300. McMillan v. 733. 104 U. 122. Boyle v. 0 9 U. S. S. Graham. 608.S. Norton v. 125 id. 595. 635. 674. (48) Koshkonong v. 97 id. and is either executory or executed. (59) Aspinwall v. clxv. (50) Bryan v. H.. 12 id. of. Wolff v.
S. Co. 97 U. 22 How. 173 id. 184 id. 140 id. 213. 358. 137. cf. v." And see L. 187 id 479. (65) I. 1. (72) 12 Wheat. S. 177 id . note. 2 91. R. Co. S. (80) McMillan v. & T. In Pearsall v. v. Morgan v. M. (60) Aspinwall Daviess County. 131. 103 id.& N. Board of Comrs. (82) Baldwin v. v. Mobile. 177 id. (61) Wadsworth v. 132 id. (69) 4 Wheat. C. New Orleans. Assn. 5 How. Hamilton County. C. before any such consolidation had been attempted. U.& T. 173 id. (68) 4 Wheat. 387. S. Martin's Parish. 133 . 152 i d. S. Weber v. 95 U. note. (83) Blount v. 602 . (62) Bier v. S. 116 U. Rollins. 293. 1. & M. R. 370. 6 d. Zane v.S. 364. S. Rollins. A. 105 id 278. U. 102 U. Saunders. Bennett. Shields v . Rockingham T. 4 Wheat.N. 18 Wall. (74) 12 Wheat. (92) Memphis v. Gunnison County Comrs. (91) Mobile v. St. where a charter authorizing the consolidation of railways was modified by a statute proh ibiting the consolidation of competing roads. McGehee. But see Meriwether v. 223. Seib ert v.. Scotland County Co urt v. 285. Lake County v. 122 id. 1 Wall. 131. C.. Hewes. Supervisors. P. Pilsbury. Gaines. (81) Ogden v. (78) 1 Wall.S. 66. 140 id. See als o Denny v. (66) People v. 821. K. Mobile v. S.R. S. Nelson v. See also I. ibid. Bank v. 643. (90) Gilman v. Co. the court said: "We cannot recognize a vested right to do a mani fest wrong. 95 id. 169 id. U. 213. 4 Wheat. Louisian a v. 66. McNeill. Graham. T. 130 id. 116 id. 162. 122.S. (87) Fisk v. 646. v. v. 472 . 301. I. Watson. 716. Rogan. I. Martin's Parish. Illinois. H. 558. v. 733. Woodruff v. 692. Los Angeles v. (76) 14 Pet. Sheboygan.534.. R. Ralls county court v. 183 id. C. 479. Cos. Wade. Ill id. U. U. 223. H. Co. Santa Cruz.. 109 U. Pleasant (63) Norton v. R. S. 146 U. 97 id. 148 id. 510. Robbins. 146 U. (77) 5 How. 217. 631. ibid. 733.. Shaw v. 183 id. 674. Williams. Ralls Cou nty Court v.. 358. L. (85) Morley v. 66. W. Wolff v. 105 id. 284.Ry. 130 County. S. Rollins. C. S. 489. v.. R.. 129 U. Ry. (84) Memphis v. S. Two justices took no part in the decision and three justices dissented. S. Windley. 161 id. U. v. C. S. (70) 6 Wheat. Pleasant Township v . ibid. U. 116 U. (71) 12 Wheat. 2 Bl. 131 id. 370.. (93) Louisiana v. S. & M. Kentucky. (86) Louisiana v. Campbell v. Maguire. 289. 278. 255. 391. Pale-oner. 41. S. R. cf. L. Moffat. 255. cf. Illinois. 161 id. Lewis. cf. L. (67)Trask v. M. S. 213. Tennessee. Perry County. Smith. McGehee. R. 405.. of Brownsville. 93 U. 635. Co. (73) 6 pet. R. (94) Ralls County Court v. 293. Co. Spratley. 162 id. 12 Wheat. Jefferson Police Jury. & St. R. (88) County of Moultrie v. (64) Lake County v. 172 id. 193 id. Texas. New Orleans. 416. Waite v. 138 id. City of New York. 77 . 34. A. 358. Wolff v. 128 U. Crowninshield. v. Commissioners of Taxes. S. Bier v. 111 id. S. 209. 92 U. L. 184 id. v. M. 148 U. 102 id. v. v. Nelson v.. Watson. Missouri. 67. v. 177 id. v. (79) Sturges v. 697. 193. St. 137. Ry. New Orleans. 122. Scotland County Court v. Texas. & L. 173.S. C. Cook v. 258. Pilsbury. v. F. 289. S. & S. 105 U. 295. 387. 518. (89) R. 319. v. 479. 105 . 716.d. S. 369. 1. U. 103 id. 369. 94 U. C. 189 id. G. S. 41. P. 67. Gunnison County Comrs. Mississippi. Ohio. Louisiana. 295. Bank. v. 103 U. 131. 415. 209. (75) P. 10.. Solan. Garrett. G. 188 id. v. 460. Citizens' S. S. & W. 503. Freeland v. Hale. 97 U. 156 id. Illinois. 189 id.
& S. Shelby County v. R.& R. People v. 217. v. 149. (104) Davis v. cf. Philadelphia. 557. v. 13 Wall. 16 Wall. S. (99) Gilpin. S. of the Constitution. 1 Bl. C. Looker v . S. 183 id. W. (118) Humphrey v. S. 99 U. C. Cook. & R. 20 Wall 36. Tennessee. S. (119) Salt Co. State. 43. Welch v. v. (123) Shields v. N. 134 . Y. Peg ues. (100) Works of Hamilton. Tennessee. Lymarn. 19o. H. Gaines. Mobil e. Tomlinson v. 97 U. Taylor. 5 W. Minnesota. G. v. v..205. 657. Maynard. E. S. 105 id. v. (106) Terrett v. R. 146 id. 143. 187 id. Ry. S. Hewes. 73. P. RY. See also Pearsall v. 679. 362. 9 Cr. 151 id. 1. S. & M. 173 id. 95 U. 279. 146 id. Co. Co. C. & W. 223. v.P. 101 id. 15 id. People. Shelby County v . v. 143 id. ibid. R. H. ibid. 183 53. S. 478. 179 id. 323. 98. 327. S. (112) R. 98 U. Sheldon.244. 231. Jessup. IR. (115) University v. 436. (107) 7 Cr. S. cf. New Orleans. & S.. 161 i& 149.(96) Madison Papers. (102) 4 Wheat.. v. Maguire. L. 319. Asylum v. Bristol. XLIV. v. 546. S. (121) R. M. 97 U. Albrook. Owensboro. 146 id. p. New Orleans. W. University v. 239. 486. Stearns v. Co. (130) Pennsylvania college Cases. 279. 309. 359. 50. v.164 (108) Jefferson Branch Bank v. Humphrey v. Ry. See also Memphis city Bank v. miller v.. 639. (105)Green v. C. (116) C. R. Mary 66. Gaines. 13 Wall. I 91 id. (126) R. Co. Wright. R. Cook. V. ibid. v. Ry. N. 99 U. S. (103) 6 Cr. W. 397. 244. 186 id. R. 16 Wall. 264. 146.R. v. R. v. 309.1552. Cook. Thomas. Sheldon. Ferguson. Co. S. v. L. 214. Ry. 183 id. Grand Lodge v. Cos. Texas. Citizens' Savings Bank v. 105 id. & M. C. Hol yoke Company v. 269. Stearns v. Stearns v. v. Co. Ry. Ry. Morris. Union & Planters' Bank. Citize ns' Bank v. 97 U. by Sparks. R. C. C. 300. 373. Tennessee. 637. 66. 179 id. Glenwood Cemetery. Reid. 416. M. R. v. v. Maguire. S. Minnesota. 176 id. Skelly. 19. L. v. Yard. 13. 15 Wall. Yard. 9 Wall. 243. 269. 95 U. & G. People. Ry. 391. 46. v. Minnesota. 697. B. Lodge's Edition. S. Co. 8 Wheat. (114) Chicago v. Georgia. 397. Maryland. E. ef. & W. 161 id. People v . Louisiana 93 U. 161 id. 192 id. New Jersev v. New York. 646. 164 U. Picard v. 556. 104. (124) New Jersey v. Kentucky. 335. G. (125) Greenwood v. (131) Tucker v. R. R. East Saginaw. & 0. Asylum v. v. 203. 557. v. 148 id. II. Freight Co. 528. Co. v. 1. 1581. Parker. W. Ohio. v. 454. S. 161 id. Reid. (111) P. N. Tennessee. Reid. People. Hamilton City. S. 362. Board of Education. Pegues. 309. 636.. New Orleans. Tennessee. & B. Brya n v. S. P.186. 95 U. & T.(95) U. (128) 2 Mass. S. 105 id. R. 379. 193. 166 U. (127) Close v. Reid. Maguire.S. 66. 50 . & St. 258. A . 13 Wall. Covington v. 212. III. C. 130 id. R. (98) G. (129) 105 U. 697. 193 id. Ry. 500. 258. 148id. R. & S. G. Union & Planters' Bank. Bank of Commerce v. (120) Christ Church v. ibid. 166 id. S. R. Wright v. & G. 16 id. N. (113) New Jersey v. 132 id. I. Y. 104. T. 24 How. ibid. 18 Wall. Hewes. Biddle. Co. G. (97) Hist. G. Asylum v. Chicago v. Philadelphia. 95 U. M. 170 U. W. 22 Wall. 166 U. Lodge's Edition. (109) W. 1. Alsbrook. Orleans. V. v. IL47. 87. 13 wall. Clark. Ins. L . Powers. 161 id. 153 id. R. (101) No. Vol. R. 2 58. 163 id. & N. 264. v. v. 99 id. 1. 105 U. 179 id. 223. 5 Elliot's Debates. (110) Farrington v. 223. Ry. 36.. Morgan v. (122) Trask v. 527. I. cf. S. S. v. 138 id. R. Gray. v. W. 2 187 id. 179 id. (117) University v. 466. Sioux City. 9 Wall. Yard. COL v. v. & G. v. Hewes. 174. 13. 104. 13 id. 362. 20 id. 107 U.
Road Board v. Binghamton Bridge. 397. Bridge Co. S. V.Co. P.. ibid. 462. 637. Sharp. Pord v. citizens' Bank. T. Union Planters' Bank.628. (146) Hall v. Co. St. 10 How. (157) R.. 5 Wall. & W. & L. 105 U. & P. Cook. S. I. C o. 192 id.Co. v. Pendleton. 3 id. E. Barings v. I. 371. 19 Wall. W. 130 U. Co. S. 121 id. Drew. 148 id. & 0. & B. (147) N.. 587. P. Hewes. 172 id. Co. Paup v. 662. East St. S. v. Minnesota. v. 279. 558. L. Hoboken Co. & M. G. Orr v. 161 id. 460. R. Virginia. 173 id. Cos. 22 Wall. 159 U. See also G. R. Co. S. 327. pp. & W. Co. 115 U. 365. L. 194 id. (164) 20 Wall. 181 id. 206. (142) Picard v. S. 96 U. 115 U. Co. 518. 3 How. 167 id. C. S. D. 125 id. S. Co. 531. 149. & L. v.. v. Freeport. ibid. 177 id. (144) Bridge Proprietors v. v. 102 U. & 0. (162) 4 Pet. Co. S. (133) W. W. 116 S. Mc Cullough v. R. Co. S. R. W. (138) Humphrey v. 180 id. C. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Cook. W. (149) Hartman v. W. 154 (155) Maryland v. (148) N. 534. 102. 44. Virginia. Nichol. See also Los Angeles v. R.. 156 id. W. Picard v. 6 How. C. East Hartford v. Ci tizens' Savings Bank v. ibid. (156) Maryland v. 697. 572. Ro yall v. 149. S. (167) License Tax Cases. 79. 15 H-ow. Rivers. 8 Wall. S. S. 492. Pegues.. L. 1 Wall. Union & Planters' Bank. Greenbow. v. Sandford. Biddle. R. (154) Green v. 650. Trigg v. ibid. 93 U. 172 id. V. H. C. Virginia Coupon Cases. Louis. Walla Walla v. 46.. 183 (141) Tomlinson v. S. Virginia. L. & C. Gilman. 39 7. W. 224. Co. 64. W. 301. 192.. v. 3 Wall. v. v. Wingo. Shelby Co. S. 161 id. 101 U. Kentucky. S. R. Co. (153) Curran v. 161 id. Illinois. 1 Wall. N . of.. D.Co. 130 U. W.. v. 637 . cf. v. See also P.. Gaines. 218. & C. (132) Tucker v. Charleston. 278. Ferguson. 371. 526. N. 454. v. C. & W. 629. S. 662. Co. 18 id. 116 id. 188 id. Delaware R. Alsbrook. 189. 636. Citizens. Chicago. (158) Williamson v. 215. N.G. 183 id. 97 U. (139) Binghamton Bridge. 114 id. Arkansas. S. W. Skinkle. v. S. 190. Ry. Eri Ry. 167 U. (159) 4 Wheat. B. Tennessee. McGahey v. T. 130 id. 534. Owensboro. v. D. (151) Woodruff v. 527. Co. 0. 528. v. 164 U. v. Dabney. (136) New Orleans v. T. Philadelphia. v. 73. Williams v. Co. v.G. P.. W. 164 id. 334. v. 304. 10 id. Savannah. W. Skaneateles . W. L. 146 id. (160) Wheat. 159 id. New Or leans v. & P. 672. v . Home Ins. 662. 135 id. 0. (145) Planters' Bank v. 432. Essex Pub. 187 id. 140 id. 98.G.. 21 id. 166. S. 244. Co. (168) People v. Bank v. 116. 174. v. 97 U. 578. New Jersey. 398. 674. (134) Ry. 5.S. Bridge Co. 0. W. R. Alsbrook. W. R. & G. 142 id. 105 U.. v. & G. See also Ford v. (140) R. Tax. (135) Ford v. Hoboken Co. (150) Furman v. F. Citizens' Bank. Pe nnsylvania. 16 Wall. 177 U. 601. cf. 279. 662. 146 U. A.116. L. 1. & P. W. (163) 109 U. Branach. cf. 164 id. 148 U. (166) 22 Wall. 5 1. R. Augusta. (143) Bridge Proprietors v. Co. Minnesota.. Trapnall. 8 Wheat. N. 138 id. Clark. Drew. 333. 354. (137) W. 66 2. v. 15 Wall. Parker. See aw N. 1. 270. C entral R. W . Wells v. 0. v. Ellerman. 258. People v. 511. New Orleans 143 id.. (161) 12 Wheat. East T. 683. Maryland. (165) 22 Wall. Wright. Ellerman. S. 667. L. B. Missouri v. Keith v. S. v. New Orleans v. 102. C. Wisconsin. Shelby County v. 1. 166. cf. 164 U. 107 U. S ioux City. 3 How. 51. 120 id .. Walker. (152) Murray v.. 184 id. 527. 103 U. Ry.0. 339. 1. F. Co. Co. R. & S. S.L. 514. 526. & St.. v..
581. v.. F. S. & K. E. R. B. 134 i d. B. 17. (169) Rice v. Freeport. 109 id. 418. v. 167 id. 646. Co. J. & Q. & St. v. v. W . S. v.. M. Co. C. Ry. L. & Q. Co.. 193. Bridge Co. & St. The Potomac Co. 51. 362.. L. R. I. S. Co. F. W. 191 id. 141 U. 167 id. R. 116 U. 503. B. S. Pearsall v. C. v. B. 287. J. R.. Needles. 153 id. S. & St.. A. Q. & N. v. 172. & B. G. B. & L. See also Owensboro v. Co. 128 U. 14 5 id. Sandford. F. 13 id. v. H.. F. N. 0. ibid.. W. C. Blake. Ry. G. v. 164. R. S. 673. C. Perrine v. C. S.. 645. Turnpike Co. 166 U. (173) Joplin v. 113 U. Mille 132 U. v. 191 id.Co. v. ibid. L. & S. 75. 6 49. L. Jefferso Branch Bank v. Massa chusetts. Pennsylvania. Co. v.W. Squire. 1. W. Co. L. (179) M. Defiance. Gill. G. R. 116 id. 154 id. 332. 13. Spratley. Ry. 95 U. Newburyport. 226. S. ibid. 8 How. Kentucky. Minnesota. Debolt.. v. v. 44 6. ibid. S. Hyde Park. Illinois. v. N.. Ry. 1 28 id. C. Hamilton City. v. ibid. E. v. v.. P. 174. R. Missouri. Ry. 132 id. N. & W. the court sug gested. 685. G. Smith. 418. Freeport. & N. W. Smith. 335. 174. 544. 183 id. W. 358. 1 Bl. the state constitution had reserved to the legislature the power to amend or repeal the law in question. Fertilizing Co. &. Chicago. 319. L. 201. 165 id. Co. L. S. 602. Co. 149 U. 503. 526. & S. 161 U. v. Ry. S. M. 150. T. N.. (187) Stanislaus County v. 436. 347. v. 584. & B.R. 9 id. v. R. 677. Mathews. New York . 446.. C.. 16 id. v. & B. 161 id. B. Minnesota. Ry. Co. G. P. Co. 57. Ry. (175) P. Nebraska. (182) Baltimore v. Ruggles v. & St.. S. R. (170) Mumma v. L. Stanislaus County v.. 95 id. R. 287. Harbison. 503. v. ibid. Pendleton. In Reagan v. R. W. & B. In this cas e. however. L. 1 Bl. 152 id. 307. 0. R. 659. 172 id. 75. F. v. 601. 81. Co. v. v. v. L. v. 194 id. (171) Panning v. 191 id. 97 id. 57. R. Ohio. 561. 155. 94 U. S.. C. Stanislaus County v. 1. & C. C. C. P. 1. 1.. v. 1. S. State. 183 id. 281. R. Nagle. Gardner. 3 Wall. but did not decide. Stone v. St. 138 id. Ohio. L. P. Smith. 175. 358. & I. Co. P. L. G. (174) Shields v. Nebraska. Alabama. ibid. B. v. Co. 193 id. G.. Ohio. & W. (183) Pearsall v. & M. v. N. v. 138 id. Co. 210. 149 id.. & K. Defiance. 11 Pet. Gregoire. W. M. R. 286. Co. & B. P. S. cf. 134 id. Brooklyn. F. 141 id. Tennessee.. S. 166 id. & W. S. M.. L. v. v. Co. 128 id. St. St. v.. & Q. G. N. & K. 587. (178) R. & W. I. Shaw v. Co. 174. 526. 110 U. 1.. 170 id. 319. 1. 307. Stone v. P. R. & T. R. 646. Peik v. Iowa. Mills v. 177 id. 1. M. L. S. 578. 150. New York v. See also Owensboro v. Murphy. 301. Co. 467. See also C. 156 id. J. R. v.. Gill. L. Co. Kentucky. 201. Co. . 165 U. 574. 3 Wall. S. C. S. & N. & T. Emmons. 78.S. & N. Mathews. (176) C. & P. & I.. (184) C. S. v. Ry. C. v. Pendleton. Beer Co. v. (181) P. Tennessee 161 id. Miller. (186) S. S. Clair County. F. v. C. S. Skelly. Kentucky. 364. W. 628. 667. 6 7. 156 id. 153 U. 393. & S. v. v. Schottler. T. R. 146 id. Boyd v. Ry. Co. W. (185) Stone v. Co. I. W. R. Ry. 134 id. Warren Bridge. Y. ibid. & S. 108 id. Co. Joplin v. W. v. 88. v. I. Iowa. Wrig ht v. 191 U. Covington. 67. v. (172) Stein v. Ry. v. v. & St. 667. L. Co. & T. 201. Co. that 'there might be an implied grant to the railway of the right to reasonable tolls. 194 U. Co. 104 U. 156 id 649. 258. Bee al so Shields v. & Q. V. ibid. 524. Osborn. Charles River Bridge v. 0. 41 6.. Memphis City Bank v. W. 180 id. L. Co. Ruggles v. S. The Binghamton Bridge. See also N. 187 id 258. M. Hamersley. 192 U. 1. 1.. Bridge Co. v. ibid. G. L. 176 id. M. L. M. 94 U. R. L. Willia ms v. W. B. 791. 186. & St. (180) St. R. v. v. Co. 25. 174. C. 183 id. 180. v. K. Ohio. R. 164 id. W. L. 155. R. 8 Pet. E. 347. 170 id. Co. 101 U. v. v. L. 358. & T. ibid. 192 id. Bridge Co. W. F. v. L. ibid. 192 id. 75. Co. R. L. & D. R. v. 16 How. Ry. W. (177) E. R.. aft er admitting that a state has the general power to regulate rates. v. Wingo. P. 364. Illinoi s. & I. Stein v. Maryland. Kentucky. 5 93. Co. S. & 1 . Ry. St. K. B. Ry. Co. & N.. v.. Co. Tennessee.. F. C. 88. S. Co. Chicago. Ry. Tennessee. v. L. 153 id. Minnesota. 177 id. R. cf. 193 id. R.
(206) R. E. Ohio. D. Jefferson Police Jury. . (202) Butler v. 10 How. 53 0. S. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall . The constitutional provisions.S. Osborn. Illustrations of ex post facto Iaws. 503. L. Ex post facto laws defined. 156 id. 527. Ex post facto laws relate to criminal. 116 U. W. The constitutional provisions. 558. Kentucky. (2) State laws which operate retrospectively. Crenshaw v. Co. 121 U. (197) Church v. C. Co. Arkansas. & N. Shelby County. R. may. 177 U. S. 78. 488. 105 U. v. Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties." The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws. Co. & S. 79. See also McGahey v. theref ore. Memphis. (193) Beer Co. 1. 77. v.S. Tennessee. Tennessee. 57.. S. 284. Gill. procedure. v. 659. 649.. (199) U." Section 9 of Article I of th e Constitution. 527. 184 U. 10 1 U. Ry. R. (192) Fertilizing Co. C. 97 U. v. 97 U.(3) A state legislature. S. 100 U. Co. B. (204) Head v. S. 667.. 194 id. (210) 134 U. Co. The distinction between retrospective and ex post facto laws. 368. S.(188) Even an express grant of exemption from regulation does not by implication extend to a purchaser from the grantee: Shields v. C. T. 102 U. 814. 80. 526. 387. S. G. 25. Alabama. F. (209) Beer v. 203. (198) Newton v. St. cf. Ry. R v. unless restrained by the constitution of t he state. Pendleton. S. 168 id. 402. Cleveland v.S. are not prohibited by the Constitution of the United State s. if they are not ex post facto laws. C. S. Hyde Park. S. 101 U. L.. CHAPTER VI. Douglas v. Virginia. & C. R.S. 1 61 id. Cleveland v. (208) Louisiana v. (189) Los Angeles v. 578. 746. 95 U. L. v. 434. 132 id. restricting the powers of Congress. 78. and granting a rehearing by the cou . v. Arkansas 20 How. Sandford. (196) 4 Wheat. & I. Knoxville. (191) C. (201) Amy v. Reis. 548. S. 538. 114 U. pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law. 518. Ill U. and if they do not impair the obligation of contracts. Co. 77. v.(1) They are necessarily retrospective. 'v. v.. (200) New Orleans v.. Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto. 180 id. 282. 193 id. R. Morris. Freeport. declares that no bill of att ainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 662. (194) Stone v. M usetts. Co. or which divest antecedently veste d rights of property. A. 20 I-low. 99. Nebraska. 194 id. Baltzer v. 131. C. North Carolina. Arkansas. v. G. R. 183 id. 1. 101 U. enact statutes setting aside a decree of a court of p robate. 600. C. ibid. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER. ibid.S. 832. 19 Wall. 464. N.. Kentucky. (205) Beers v. Pe nnie v. S. C. S.. 18 9 id. and not to civil. of. 51 7. (190) Detroit v. 81. K. v. Chicago. 337. 134 U. Ry. Commissioners. ibid. 337. v. 629. New Orleans. Co. R .587. 135 id. S. University. ibid. F. 17. U. refusing to allow probate of a will. & Q. and see P. 240. W. v. 170 U. (207) 123 U. & L. S. Co. v. 504. but all retrospective laws are not ex post facto. 97 U.. Bank of Washington v. M ppi. Ry. 164 id. Ry. cf. (195) Butchers' Union v. S. Pennsylvania. 82. S. Kelsey. & W. S. 319. (203) Fisk v. W.
as a general rule. at . as.. second. fou rth. or make it great er than it was when committed. to take oath.(5) curing defective acknowledgments of deeds b y femes covert. and punish sueh action. that he lns not done an act for the doing of which the deprivation of the righ t to sue in courts of justice was not by law antecedently imposed as a penalty.(13) So also Conngress may by statute impose a ta x retrospectively. those that alter the legal rules of evidence and receive less or different testimony to convict the offender than that required at the time of the commissi on of the offense. deprivation of office was not a legal penalty.(4) declaring that the relation of landlord and tenant exists between parties as to whom the courts of the state have decided t hat that relation does not exist. for such legislation is remedial. for the doin g of which. and which was innocent when done.(11) Upon the same principle. after the death of a dec edent.(15) in Marshall. alter the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. J. C. or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.(24) In the case la-st cited it was pointed out that while. after the commission of an a ct.. when done. those that aggravate a crime. b y a transf er of its proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for examina tion and determination de novo. Congress having passed an act for the admission of a territory as a state." In Calder v." in Cummings v." That classification has been repeatedly quoted with approval . defines an Ex Post facto law to be' one "which renders an act punisbable in a manner in which it was not punish able when it was committed. Laws have been held to be ex post facto. the withold ing from the convict of all knowledge as to the date of his execution and the ke eping of him in solitary eonfinement until that time. eriminal . Peck.(8) directing the imposition of a tax according to an as sessment theretofore made. the accused has no vested rights in particular m odes of procedure.(7) directing a county court to se t aside an inquisition condemning certain land for the use of a railway and t o order a new inquisition. existing tax laws so as to subject to a collateral inheritance tax the di stributive shares of nonresident distributees. yet he cannot be deprived of any right that was regarded. the law having been at the time of the commission of the crime that such a plea was a defense. (19) or by r equiring a clergyman. by providing that the plea of autrefois convict should not at a second trial be a def ense in the case of a prisoner convicted of murder in the second degree unde r an indictment charging murder in the first degree..(14)' Ex Post facto laws defined. those that make an actio n. classified ex post facto laws as follows:-"first. and having in that ac t omitted to provide for the disposal of causes pending in the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal from the territorial courts. Bull. which.(20) or a lawyer (21) as a condition precedent to the pract ice of his profession. done before tlie passing of a law. (12) and it may provide for a review of the actions of a commission ereated by it. or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different tes timony is sufficient to convict than was required. and. J.(16) Field.(18) Illustrations of ex post facto laws. J. to take an oath that he has not done an act. ln Fletcher v. defines an ex post facto law.rt of probate with liberty of appeal therefrom.(17) Chase .(23) or by reducing from tw elve to eight the number of jurors necessarv for the trial of felonies committed before the enactment of the law. for instance. Missouri. as one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not pu nishable at the time it was committed. after the time limited by existi ng laws for an appeal has passed. as a condition precedent to his obtaining the desired relief . third.( 22) or by adding to the death penalty for murders already committed. (10) and establishing new remedies for the colle ction of taxes already delinquent. (9) authorizing the sale of lands on which the state has a lien for debts due to it. may by a subsequent act properly make provision for such causes.(6) construing by a declaratory statute. 79. or by requ iring one who applies to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in abse ntia. 80. those that change the punisbment and infli ct greater punishment than the law annexed to the erime when committed.
sound judgment and fair character. the oath being offered to the party incriminated as a means of compelling ala admission of guilt. shall render criminal and punishable by imprisonment the obtaining of goods wit h intent to defraud at any time within three months before the commission of the act of bankruptcy.(25) So also. and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him. and others of which were inno cent acts. e tc. and without judicial investigation..(26) Illustrations of laws which are not ex post facto.(28) or which enlarges the class of persons who may be competent to testify as witnesses at the trial. and not upon a past offense. "If the punishment be less than death. 82. upon conviction of a felon y committed after the passage of the act. Within the meaning of the Constitution. as a condition precedent to the exercise of his profession. by legislative action. i t is. A bill of attainder is defined by Field.(35) or which excludes from the practice of medicine those who have been convicted of felonies prior to its enactment." (34) nor is a law unconstitutiona l which prohibits the continuance of the practice of medicine by those who do no t register them selves in accordance with its provisions. for "the disfranchisement operates upon the existing state and conditio n of the person.(42) constituted in each case a bill of pains and penalties and was. as. to take oath that he had not c ommitted certain designated public offenses. and he a dds. 81. that an act. as vital for the protection of lif e and liberty.(3 1) or which lessens the number of judges in the appellate court.(37) W hile a law which endeavors to reach acts already committed and which provides a like punis hment for the same act in the future is void in so far as it is retrospective. requires that the persons selected for jury service shall possess good i ntelligence.(38) Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties. On the other hand.. and such writings and the evidence of witne sses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of t h e genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute. or poly gamists.(40) and that a state statute requiring one who applied to a court to open a judgment rendered against him in absentia."(30) or which allows to the prosecution an appeal from the superior to the supreme court of the state. for in stance.(39) as "a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judieial trial. for instance. the act is termed a bill of pains an d penalties. subject to the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder. J.(33) nor is a law ex post facto whicb denies the exercise of the right of franchise to bigamists. as. that subsequent bankruptcy. though passe d subsequently to the Commission of the offense.(41) and that an act of Congress req uiring a lawyer. a law changing the venue in a criminal case.(32) or which li mits the number of spectators at executions for murder. by statute.(29) or which provides that "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine. however. shall b e permitted to be made by witnesses. to take oath that they had not committed certain designated acts. to take an oath that he had not voluntarily borne arms against the United States. is not ex post facto. in Cummings v. therefo re. (36) nor can constitutional objection be raised to a law which p rovides that whoever has been twice convicted of crime shall. be deemed to be an habitual c riminal. inasmu ch as. 27 nor is a law open to that objection. the statute im posed a punishment for an act done before the enactment of the statute. which is not an offense against the law at the time of its doing. by repealing a statutory prohibition of the admission of the testimony o f convicted felons. . which. and be punished by imprisonment for twenty-five years. as a condition precedent to the exercise of their profession. bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties " It has been held that a state constitution requir ing clergymen. Missouri.the time of the adoption of the Constitution. may becom e such by a subsequent independent act with which it has no necessary connection . some of which wer e at the time offenses subject to legal penalties. valid as to offens es which are committed after its passage. though passed after the commission of an o ffense. Congress cannot provide. either voluntary or involuntary.
S. 395. Peck. 10 How. 88. S. 3 Dall. 456. Mercer. Cook v. Fletcher v. Texas. Bull. (17) 3 Wall. (3) Calder v. (12) Freeborn v. Bull. S. New York. Missouri. 386. 10 How. 107 U. New York. 386. S. 333. (2) Calder v. 2 Pet. 16 Wall." Bills of Credit within the meaning of this constitutio nal provision are promissory notes issued by a state government on its credit "i ntended to circulate throughout the community. Bills of credit defined. 395. (25) P. Mallett v. 156. 184 U. (31) Mallett v. 469. (29) Hopt v. 188 U. Utah. (14) Stockdale v. But see Hawker v.(1) Calder v. 2 Pet. (38) Jaehne v. (13) Stephens v. 8 Pet. 162 U. 311. League v. Carpenter v. 352. Missouri. for its ordinary purposes as mone . (30) Thompson v. 17 How. 6 Cr. 505. Carskadon. 152 id. L ivingston v. What axe. Moore. 172. (35) Reetz v.. 456. Matthewson. Pennsylvania. R. Nesbit. 138. 110. 325. Mercer. S. (10) Livingston v. v. S. 152 U. 20 Wall. THE PROHIBITION OF STATE BILLS OF CREDIT. 1. 1 10. 181 id. 83. S. 266. Bills of credit defined. 386. Missouri. 380. 3 Dall. S. Pennsylvania. Ramsey. Massachusetts.. and what awe not. S. North Carolina. 88. 7 Pet. Gibson v . 377.Ogden v. Petitioner. Minnesota. 17 How. 83. . (24) Thompson v. S. (23) Medley. 343. 12 Wheat. 134 U. 277. R. Watson v. Missouri. 189. (42) Ex parte Garland. (19) Kring v. (37) McDonald v. 7 Pet. (20) Cummings v. S. 184 U. 8 Pet. S. 160. 323. (4) Calder v. 170 U. 4 Wall. (28) Gibson v. 333. S. S. & S. (34) Murphy v. CHAPTER VII. S. 88. bills of credit. (36) Hawker v. 3 Dall. v. 4 Wall. (27) Gut v. 107 U. 565. B. S. Moore. (21) Ex parte Garland. 4 Wall. Nesbit. 234. 170 U. S. (16) 4 Wail. 380.. 2 Wall. (8) B. 445. Mississippi. 456. 157. 469.. Michigan. 128 U. Carskadon. Matthewson. New York. 589. 138 U. 180 U. S. v. 565. 8 Pet. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall . 380. Fox. 110 U. (11) League v. 84. 162 id. Missouri. (18) Kring v. (9) Locke v. Bull. 221. 'Satterlee v. Smith. 670. S. 3 Dall. Utah 170 U. (5) Satterlee v. (22) Pierce v. North Carolina. 15. 189. 160. New Orleaas. 95 U. Duncan v. Cherokee Nation. 589. Texas. 277. 35 . Pennsylvania. 181 U. 377. 234. 17 How. 16 Wall. S. (32) Duncan v. Watson v. 171 U. (7) Carpenter v. Texas. Bull. Mercer. (26) U. 156.Saunders. 9 Wall. 4 Wall. 386. 189. 137 U. S. 483.386. S. emit bills of credit. (41) Pierce v. 184 U. Mississippi. Cos. 174 U. & S. 574. League v. S. (33) Holden v. (15) 6 Cr. 4 Wall. 114 U. 156. Carpenter v. Missouri. 221. U. S. (6) Watson v. The State. (40) Cummings v. Missouri.138.
id. bills of credit. Poole v. and payable to officers of the stat e in discharge of salaries and fees of office. 83. 89. 459. (1) Craig v. Missouri 8 id. v. may not issue interest-bearing certificates in denominat ions "not exceeding $10. P. (4) Virginia Coupons Case. 114 U. payable up on presentation if there be funds in the treasury. (5) H.. U. Alabama v. Keehler. "and redeemable on demand. 11 Pet. 540..he consent of Congress does not necessarily have to be given by congress ional legislation expressly assenting to each of the stipulations of the agreeme nt between the states. without contravening the constitutional prohib ition. 478. Virginia v. without the consent of Congress . V. enter into agr@ents touching confficting boundaries. and what are not. but on the credit of the capital and assets of the bank. 594. STATE COMPACTS. Wise. 7 How. 660." (2) Nevertheless. 545. S.. 8 id. 13 How. 85.(1) What are. (3) Briscoe v. 9 Wan.(4) The prohibition of sta te compacts does not invalidate agreements entered into before the adoption of t he Constitution. 40. alliance. (4) Virginia v. Virginia v. L. Flo rida v. & T.B e iv. R. 85. nor less than 50 cents" receivable by the state in paym ent of taxes..(1) It al so forbids a governor of a state to enter into an agreement with a foreign gover nment for the extradition of a prisoner. cf. 562.(2) But states may. for they are not intended to circulate as money. Bruffy. 11 id. . Miswuri v. 724. It is. Briscoe V. a state may incorporate a bank. Ry. Bank of Kentuay. 84. t. 148 U." This coiastitutional prohibition forbids compacts between a state and foreign nations. West Vi rginia. (2( Craig v. in such c ases. and issued to individuals in payment of debts due to them. 185. (2) Holmes v. (5) Wharton v. enter into any agreement or compact with another state . 16. No state shall. Missouri 4 Pet.411. to which the as sent of Congress has not been given. and what are forbidden. Sprott V. 257. 17 id. or at a day certain in the future. Iowa.. or confederation . and what are forbidden. Darrington V. James. 177 U. 4 Pet. Missouri. 410 . 40.(3) and.(4) and warrants drawn in payment of appropriations made by the legislature. (3) Rhode Iidand v.(5) cannot properly be called bills of credit. 503. Jennison. west virginia. S.(5) (1) Withams v. 39. 505. 11 Wall. 12. 155. 97 U. S. U. 20 Wall. 284. therefore. St. 96 U. Fleeger 11 Pet. 269. 39. What compacts are permitted. 14 Pet. and also compacts between states of the United States. 176. with the consent of Congress. though negotiable and receivable for taxes due to the state. Mas*achusetts. Georgia. of which that state shall be the sole shareholder.y. Missouri. decisive against the vali dity of the confederation entered into by the insurgent states in 1861. A state. 12 Pet. S. 257.(3) Coupons of state bonds. 66. C. Byrne v. v. S. S. and redeem-able by the state unde r an arrangement that there shall be withdrawn "annually from circulation one-te nth part of the certificates. Ford v. therefore. Georgia. the distinction being that such notes are issued. What compacts are permitted. Tennewee. & S. 23 id. Bank of Kentucky.. but that consent may be inferred from the legislation of Congress touching the subject-matter of the agreement. 11 wall. The Bank of Alabama. Texas. S. and of debts due to the state. Surg et. S. 153 U.. CHAPTER VIII. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution declares that "no state shall en ter into any treaty. not on the credit of th e state. and it may authorize that ba nk to issue notes as eirculation.
therefore." The words "treason.CHAPTER IX. not as complete as might have been required. felony. as wel l as in their legal and technical sense. who shall flee from justice an d be found in another state. 86. 99. and the agent of the state demanding the surrender of the alleged fugitive is in no senp e an officer of the United States. from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses. Dennison. a court of the United States will not discharge th e fugitive upon the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus because. 87. though satisfactory to the executive. 114 U. (2) See also Ex parte Reggel. in its judgmen t the proof that the prisoner is a fugitive from justice is. The constitutional provision. to use any coercive means to compel him.. be delivered up. will not issue a mandamus to compel the perfor mance by a goveriaor of a state of his constitutional duty of surrendering to an other state a fugitive from the justice of that state.(10) (1) 24 How. and this duty has been recoignized by the act of Congress of 12th February. 642. 87. he will be discharged upon the hearing of the writ. either through the judicial department or any other department. The eonstitutional provision. Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution declares that a person charged i n any state with treason. t o a court of the state within which he is detained in custody of the purpose of being delivered to the justice of another state. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE. or other crime. and upon proof made that he has be en legally charged with crime. embrace every act forbidden and made pu nishable by a law of the state. "there is no power del egated to the general government. and includes what ar e called 'misdemeanors. 1793. 86. C . S." as Taney."(2) This constitutional provision imposes on the executive of the state in which the fugitive has taken refuge the duty of surrendering the fugitive upon demand made by the executive o f the state from whieh the fugitive has fled. The concurrent juriodictiou of the federal and state courts. felony. nor otherwise exempt from the process of the courts of the states. shall on demand of the executive authority of the s tate from which he fled. without violating any right or immunity secured to the accused by the Constitution of the United States.(3) but if the governor of the state to which th e fugitive has fled refuses to deliver him up to justice.(6) And a fugitive from justice who has been abduc ted from the state to which he fled may thereafter be tried in the state to whic h he has been forcibly carried. rests upon the executive of the state to which the fugitive has fled.' as well as treason and felony. it is shown conclusively that the accused was not within the state at the time the crime was committed. by petition for a writ of habeas corpus. for the jurisdiction of the cou rts of the United States over such petitions for writs of habeas corpus is not e xclusive of the jurisdiction of the courts of the states in such cases. or other crime. however .J."(4) The Supreme Court of the United States. to be removed to the state having juri sdiction of the crime.(8) When. .(5) This provision of the Constitution does not give to the person extradited any constitutional right to insist that he shall not be tried for any offense other than that set forth in t he requisition papers without first having an opportunity to return to the state from which he was extradited.(7) The concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts. said in Kentucky v.(9) The alleged fugitive may also apply. but as the responsibility of determining whether or not the alleged fugitive from just ice be in fact a fugitive from justice.(1) "in their plain and obvious import. An alleged fugitive from justice may petition a court of the United States f or a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of his detention. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offens e.
Stat . (7) Mahon v. 302. Ill U. S. S.. 116 id. 691. 5278. 148 U. S. DeniLison. Pearce v. (8) Ex parte Reggel.. in Kentucky v. 174 i& 64. 127 U. 624. 114 -[T. (4) Per Taney. 537. (5) Kentu&y v. 700. Texas. 146 id. 642. 24 How. (6) Lascelles v.See also Cook v. 183. 5279. 311. Georgia. S. People. Roberts z7. 188 U. 66. Reilly. Cosgrove v. WixLney. C. 109. cf. Whitten v. 80. Rev. Tomlinson. 160 id. Hart. (9) Hyatt v. Justice. 24 How. (10) Robb v. 15 5 id. Connolly.(3) I Stat. . De@n. S. 231. J. secs.