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Britishjournalof Psychology (2010). 101. S45-562 2 0 / 0 The British Psycho/og/co/Society

H O U M ^ ^

The British Psychological c ,, bOCiety

www,bpsjournals,co,uk

Individual differences and reasoning: A study on personality traits

Luca Bensi*, Fiorella Giusberti, Raffaella Nori and Elisa Gambetti
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Italy
Personality can play a crucial role in how people reason and decide. Identifying individual differences related to how we actively gather information and use evidence could lead to a^better comprehension and predictability of human reasoning. Recent findings have shown that some personality traits are related to similar decision-making patterns showed by people with mental disorders. We performed research with the aim to investigate delusion-proneness, obsessive-like personality, anxiety (trait and state), and reasoning styles in individuals from the general population. We introduced personality trait and state anxiety scores in a regression model to explore specific associations with: (I) amount of data-gathered prior to making a decision; and (2) the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence. Results showed that all our independent variables were positively or negatively associated with the amount of data collected in order to make simple probabilistic decisions. Anxiety and obsessiveness were the only predictors of the weight attributed to evidence in favour or against a hypothesis. Findings were discussed in relation to theoretical assumptions, predictions, and clinical implications. Personality traits can predict peculiar ways to reason and decide that, in turn, could be involved to some extent in the formation and/or maintenance of psychological disorders.

Stable individual characteristics can play an important role in how people think and reason (e.'g., Stanovich & West, 2000). Personality traits have been associated with distinct decision-making patterns across several domains (e.g., Maner et al, 2007). Delusional ideation and anxiety proneness present a relationship with a reasoning style, in the general population, similar to that exhibited by deluded patients, which refers to a potentially dysftmctional data-gathering strategy in order to arrive at a conclusion (e.g., Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991). How such traits separately contribute to reasoning style, as well as if other relevant personality traits are involved with amount of information requested' prior to decide, is not clear. The aim of the present sttidy was to show links between subclinical personality traits and decision-making behaviour, studying more in depth data-gathering and use of information in order to better understand how interpersonal variations can predict peculiar ways in which people tend to reason.
* Correspondence should be addressed to Luca Bensi, Department of Psychoiogy, University of bologna, 40127 bologna, Italy (e-mail: luca.bensi@unibo.it). DOI: 10,1348/000712609X471030

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Individual differences and reasoning: Personality traits and psychopathology

Recent findings suggest that the impact of individual differences on reasoning is both profound and pervasive (e.g.. Bacon, Handley, & McDonald, 2007; Stanovich, Sa, & West, 2004), though, in general, literature on this topic is quite scattered and does not form a coherent research paradigm (e.g., ShUoh, Koren, & Zarkay, 2001). In particular, the relationship between personality traits and thinking is an issue that certainly requires more attention (e.g., Franken & Mris, 2005). Stable individual differences are found to be significantly associated with decision-making deficits (e.g., Davis, Patte, Tweed, & Curtis, 2007), decision and framing effects (e.g., McElroy, Seta, & Warring, 2007), decision and risk (e.g., Gambetti & Giusberti, 2009). Noticeably, some models of mental iUness advocate a relationship between personality traits and psychopathology (e.g., Tackett & Krueger, 2005): these should lie on a continuum, such that they are dimensionally related to one another (e.g.. Beech & Claridge, 1987; Siever & Davis, 1991). Relevant to such arguments is the evidence that some stable individual characteristics are associated with specific ways to think and decide akin to those found in clinical samples, that is, peculiar reasoning styles potentiaUy involved in the formation and/or maintenance of psychiatric symptoms. Some studies have investigated the relationship between individuals with jjroneness to delusions and reasoning under uncertainty, namely, circumstances that concern the gathering and use of evidence and probability in deciding whether a hypothesis is true or not. Those who score high on delusion-proneness measures are considered to have schizotypal traits and may demonstrate some of the features of people with delusions (e.g., Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris, 2008; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). Specifically, delusional people appear to be characterized by a particular reasoning bias: compared to control groups, they tend to gather a lesser amount of evidence in order to draw^ a conclusion in simple probabilistic inferential tasks (as the bead task; PhUlips & Edwards, 1966), a tendency that has been called 'jump to conclusions' OTC) style (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). This finding has been replicated on a number of different paradigms by a number of different studies (for a review, see Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999). Furthermore, some studies investigated how delusional people respond to pieces of evidence in favour or against a focal hypothesis, that is, how they adjust their hypothesis according to each new datum. In this case,findingsare mixed: some works showed that they show a tendency to greatly modify a hypothesis following potentially discotifirmatory evidence (e.g., Peters & Garety, 2006), while others evidenced a bias against disconfirmatory evidence as weU as a strong confirmatory reasoning style (e.g.. Freeman, Garety, McGuire, & Kuipers, 2005; Moritz & Woodward, 2006). This said, while subclinical delusion-prone individuals have shown to JTC akin deluded patients, albeit at a much lower rate (Colbert & Peters, 2002; Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008; Linney, Peters, & Ayton, 1998; but see Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & Haudenschield, 2007; Warman & Martin, 2006), to date no studies have dealt with delusion-proneness and the revision of a hypothesis on the basis of confirmatory/discotifirmatory information in the general population. A recent theoretical account proposes that JTC style reflects a 'threat confirmation' goal that, in turn, is part of a general confirmatory reasoning style (Dudley & Over, 2003). According to this, people with delusions perceive danger and threat where others do not (e.g., across neutral probabUistic tasks), hence confirmatory reasoning style is applied to non-threatetiing situations (thus jumping to conclusions). Noticeably, some studies showed that individuals affected by obsessive-compulsive disorder exhibit a cautious way to make a decision, characterized by an 'excessive'

Individual differences and reasoning 547

data-gathering bias under uncertainty, an opposite pattern of that showed by delusional people (e.g.. Fear & Healy, 1997; Volans, 1976). This is not surprising, considering that lots of rtirninations and doubts about possibilities could make difficult to arrive at a decision without gathering plenty of evidence. Accordingly, people affected by obsessive-compulsive disorder showed a tendency to greatly revise their hypothesis in the light of disconfirmatory evidence as compared to controls (Fear & Healy, 1997). Anyway, individuals with generalized anxiety disorder, who present symptom proximity with obsessive-compulsive disorder, do not seem to request a greater amount of evidence (Plissier & O'Connor, 2002). This suggests that anxiety, a common factor of people wifh generalized anxiety disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder, cannot explain the excessive data-gathering pattern showed by the latter. Indeed, there is evidence that high levels of anxiety are even related to a sort of JTC style. Bensi and Giusberti (2007) performed a study attempting to analyse more deeply whether t:rait anxiety (i.e., individual's general disposition to become anxious; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) influences reasoning processes under uncertainty. Results showed that the high trait anxiety group requested fewer pieces of evidence in order to reach a decision in a simple probabilistic task compared to the low trait one, thus showing a sort of JTC style. Suchfindingswere expected by the authors, whose assumption was that anxious individuals would have been particularly motivated to gather few information as a way to end the task, remove uncertainty and reduce the high emotional uneasiness (i.e., anxiety). Bensi and Giusberti (2009) performed another study and found that state anxiety (i.e., a person's current level of anxiety) niediated the trait anxiety effects. The present study As cited above, delusional ideation and anxiety are associated with a similar datagathering pattern, though they underlie distinct constructs and features. As such, they should be I associated with a JTC-like style for different reasons and should provide a specific and peculiar contribute in predicting the amount of information to be requested. Nevertheless, anxiety is a core feature of obsessive-compulsive disorder, but people affected by such disorder exhibit an extremely prudent data-gathering style opposite to the JTC-like pattern found in anxious individuals (e.g., Plissier & O'Connor, 2002). In such terms, taking into account not only anxiety but also obsessive-like personality trait (i.e., obsessiveness), that includes maladaptative ruminations and excessive worry, could shed more light on the distinct contribution that each variable brings upon data-gathering. To date, no works have dealt with obsessive-like personality trait and reasoning style in the general population. Furthermore, no data are available as regards delusional ideation, anxiety, obsessiveness, and the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence in probabilistic tasks. In other words, it is not yet assessed if these personality traits can predict peculiar tendency to adjust and revise a hypothesis on the basis of pieces of evidence iri favour or against it. As such, the use of information should be strictly linked with one's way to gather data and arrive at a conclusion (e.g.. Fine et al, 2007). To sum up, a list of what has been found and what has not yet been investigated is provided in Table 1. In the light of such considerations, we decided to perform a study in order to analyse the relationship among delusional ideation, anxiety, and obsessivenes, information gathering, and the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence in individuals of

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Individual differences and reasoning 549

the general population. There are some points, in our opinion, which could justify such deeper exploration. First, at a more general level, the possibility to identify stable individual differences related to how we actively gather information and revise our hypotheses could lead to a better comprehension and predictability of human reasoning (e.g.. Chater & Oaksford, 2001; McElroyetal, 2007). Second, it is unclear why delusionproneness and anxiety share the same reasoning behaviour, thus it could be important to evaluate how and if they specifically contribute to reasoning processes. Third, it could be relevant to investigate obsessive traits separately from anxious symptoms in order to assess the specific contribute of maladaptative ruminations and excessive worry to decision-making styles and better discriminate the role of anxiety. Fourth, both jumping to conclusions and gathering an excessive amoutit of information could be dysinctional ways of reasoning. The former, coherently with a strong confirmatory strategy, could contribute to a premature and inaccurate acceptance of a hypothesis (e.g., Garety et al, 1991); the latter could lead to extreme rumination and exaggerate procrastination of a decision (e.g., Plissier & O'Connor, 2002). As such, it seems important to explore personality traits in the general population that can predict JTC and excessive data-gathering decision-making styles. According to our theoretical assumptions, we expected that delusion-proneness and anxiety (trait and state) would predict an opposite reasoning pattern of that predicted by obsessiveness: the former would be related (though for different theoretical reasons) to a tendency to decide in a hasty manner and to strongly accept a hypothesis, whereas the latter with a proneness to procrastinate the decision and to be cautious about the acceptance of a hypothesis. Specifically, we predicted that: (1) delusion-proneness, trait anxiety, and state anxiety would be negatively related to the amount of data gathered in order to rtiake a decision and positively related to weight assigned to confirmatory evidence and/or negatively to weight assigned to disconfirmatory evidence when evaluating a hypothesis; and (2) obsessiveness would be positively related to the amount of data gathered in order to make a decision and tiegatively related to weight assigned to confirmatory evidence and/or positively to weight assigned to disconfirmatory evidetice when evaluating a hypothesis.

Method
Participants

A sample of 14O Italian participants (63 males, mean age = 26.54, SD = 4.60; 77 females, mean age = 25.10, SD 4.35) were enrolled in the study. All participants volunteered to take part in a 'decision-making study'. No participants had formal training in^ probabilistic reasoning and none of them was currently being treated for any psychiatric disorder They were individually assessed.
Materials
Twenty-orie-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory

The 21-item Peters et al Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; e.g., Peters et al, 2004) was designed t:o measure, in a multidimensional manner, delusional ideation, to examine various experiences and to understand unusual thinking (e.g., 'Do you ever feel people are reading your mind?') in the general population. PDI-21 has shown to possess a more than adequate internal reliability (a = .82) and test-retest reliability (r = .78-.81) as

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Luca Bensi et ai

well as construct validity (r = .61; Peters et al, 2004). The PDI-21 has not yet been validated in the Italian population thus the version employed in our sttidy was a translation of the original inventory. Its accuracy was checked by a back-translation from Italian to English, done by a native English speaker. Afterwards, the original and back version were compared to refine the Italian form. The internal reliability of the inventory in our sample was adequate (a = .77).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al, 1983) comprise descriptive statements to w^hich individuals respond by indicating how they feel at that moment and the intensity ofthat feeling (state anxiety) and how they generally feel (trait anxiety). An Italian version of the STAI was employed in the present study (Pedrabissi & Santinello, 1989). These scales have a good internal consistency (a = ,79- .90) and the trait scale has good test-retest reliability (r = .82 - .86). In our sample, the internal reliability of both trait and state forms of the inventory was adequate (a = .84, a = .81, respectively).
OBS scale

Obsessiveness (OBS) scale from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (Hathaway & McKinley, 1989) was developed to identify people with maladaptative ruminations, indecision and, in general, obsessive thoughts. Higher scores on the OBS scale are associated with decision-making difficulty and a tendency to excessive worry about problems and compulsive behaviour (e,g., counting objects, collecting irrelevant items, and finding changes very upsetting). The Italian version of OBS scale possesses a good internal reliability (a = .80). The internal reliability of the scale in our sample was adequate (a = .78).
Bead tasks

In order to explore the amount of data gathered prior to a decision and the probability estimates assigned to data, we employed some modified versions of the classic bead task, the probabilistic paradigm that has been thoroughly used in data-gathering and use of information assessments across clinical and non-clinical population (e.g., Bensi & Giusberti, 2007, 2009; Fine et al, 2007). Usually, participants are shown pairs of containers with different ratios of beads; the containers are then removed from view, and beads are drawn one at a time from one of the containers in a seemingly random (actually pre-arranged) sequence and shown to the participant until they reached a decision as to which jar the beads were being drawn from. In order to investigate data-gathering across conditions that vary as regards ratios and number of hypotheses, we used tasks in which participants had to choose an alternative between two mutually exclusive hypotheses, and another one in which they h^d to decide among three alternatives less distinct as regards probability. Materials for the two hypotheses head task included two pairs of jars, each containing 100 beads, differently colotired and in equal but reversed proportions: Pair 1 (jar A: 80 white/20 black, jar B: 80 black/20 white) and Pair 2 (jar A: 60 orange/40 green, jar B: 60 green/40 orange); for three hypotheses bead task we used two jars, each containing 100 beads in the following proportions: jar A (70 yellow/30 cyan) and jar B (60 red/40 blue); for the effect of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence task we used two pairs of jars.

Individual differences and reasoning 551 !

each containing 100 beads, differently coloured and in equal but reversed proportions: Pair 1 (jar : 80 blue/20 white, jar B: 80 white/20 blue) and Pair 2 (jar A: 60 red/40 green, jar B: 60 green/40 red).
Procedure
Two hypotheses bead task

The experimenter selected one of the two pairs of jars (e.g.. Pair 1),randomly,and out of sight, chose one of the two jars (e.g., jar 1, with jar 2 taken away) and began drawing out one bead at a time; after each extraction, the experimenter replaced the bead in the jar Subjects were informed about the two pairs of jars and their respective proportions of beads; furthermore, they were told that the a priori estimate (probability of jar 1 or 2 to be chosen) was equivalent (50:50). Participatits had to decide from which jar of the chosen pair the experimenter was drawing the beads (jar 1 or 2). They could ask to see as many beads as they wished before providing the answer (thus ending the task). In this way, it was possible to investigate the amount of data (drawings) required by participants in order to make the decision. This procedure was the same for both the pairs of jars. The drawings were pre-arranged: beads were taken out following a fixed sequence. In this way, each subject could decide how much information was necessary but, data being equal, he/she provided a judgment on the same evidence received by all the participants. The two planned series for the two hypotheses bead task were: Pair 1 (80:20) = 'WWWBWWWWBWBBB'WBBBBWB Pair 2 (60:40) = OOGOGOOGOGGOGOOGOGOO W = white; B = black; O = orange; G = green

Three hypotheses bead tasi<

In this case, participants had to decide which proportion of differently coloured beads was more likely among three options. For the jar A condition, actual distribution was 70/30 (options: 90:10, 70:30, 50:50), while for jar B one, it was 60/40 (options: 70:30, 60:40, 50:50). Subjects could ask to see as many beads as they wished in order to provide the answer, just like the two hypotheses version of the task. Sequences of information (drawings) were fixed for each condition so that each participant was presented, evidence being equal, with the same pieces of information. The two planned series were: Jar A (90/70/50) = CYCCYCCYCCYCCCYCCCCY Jar B (70/60/50) = RBBRRBBRRRBRRBRBRBRR C = cyan; Y = yeUow; R = red; B = blue

Effects of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence tasks

Material was the same of bead tasks, but the procedure was different. In this case, the trials were' not terminated when participant made a decision, but continued to 20 draws for aU subjects. After each bead, participants indicated from what jar it was drawn and the relative probability that it actually could have come from that jar Once a participant provided aU 20 answers, the task ended. In this way, it was possible to evaluate how participants adjusted their hypothesis estimates on the basis of confirmatory and disconfirmatory pieces of evidence (i.e., effects of evidence).

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Again, the drawings were pre-arranged thus each participant received the same pieces of evidence. The two planned series were: Pair 1 (80:20) = BBBWBBBBWBWWWBWWWWBW Pair 2 (60:40) = RRGRGRRGRGGRGRRGRGRR B = blue; W = white; R = red; G = green We calculated the relative effect of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence as follows: Confirmatory evidence effect. The weight assigned to a confirmatory piece of evidence, calculated as the estimate provided facing a piece of a confirmatory evidence (colour bead in favour of a stated hypothesis) minus the estimate provided just before that piece of evidence. Disconfirmatory evidence effect. The weight assigned to a confirmatory piece of evidence, calculated as the estimate provided facing a piece of a disconfirmatory evidence (colour bead against of a stated hypothesis) minus the estimate provided just before that piece of evidence. We subtracted 50 (i.e., the base probability that a jar could be chosen against the other) from the estimate provided on the first drawn bead. Finally, confirmatory and disconfirmatory weights of all beads were separately added. The overall confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence effects were analysed using as measures, respectively, the sum of each confirmatory evidence weight and the sum of each disconfirmatory evidence one.
Presentation of materials

The presentation order of the tasks as well as of their conditions was countei'balanced. Participants filled out the STAI trait form, the PDI-21, and the OBS scale (in a counterbalanced manner) either before or after the completing of bead tasks; anyway, the STAI state form was always the last test to be administered before the beginning of the bead tasks.
Experimental design

We used a within-subjects design with all participants completing all tasks in a counterbalanced order to assess the relationship between personality traits (delusional ideation, trait/state anxiety, obsessiveness) and decision making (amount of datagathered and confirmatory/disconfirmatory effects).

Results
Means and correlations

Means and standard deviations of all variables (independent and dependent) are reported in Table 2. Correlations among age, gender, PDI-21, OBS, STAI-T (trait form), STAI-S (state form), and the dependent variables are reported in Table 3. PDI-21 and STAI-T are related only with one task variable, while STAI-S and OBS correlates, respectively, with five and four task variables. Age and sex result associated, respectively, with STAI-S and OBS, as well as with four task variables each.

Individual differences and reasoning

553

Table 2. Means and standard deviations for the independent and dependent variables Mean STAl-S STAI-T PDI-21 OBS DG 80:20 DG 60:40 DG 90/70/50 DG 70/60/40 CE effects DE effects ' 39.03 43.70 51.30 29.71 11.54 20.22 16.89 18.48 80.91 63.91 SD 11.56 10.25 31.66 6.08 6.34 11.55 7.84 8.81 92.51 72.97

Note. DG, data-gathering task; CE, confirmatory evidence; DE, disconfirmatory evidence.

Regressions

Several hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to assess if the factors under analysis were predictors of our dependent variables. In each analysis, given their correlations with independent and dependant variables, gender and age were entered in Step 1 to control for tbeir effects; PDI-21, OBS, and STAI-T (personality traits) were entered simultaneously in Step 2; STAI-S (current level of anxiety) on Step 3.' Multicollinearity diagnostics suggested adequate independence of predictors (all toleratice levels < .80; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Results! of analyses performed on bead tasks are reported iti Tables 4^ and 5. Independent for gender and age, PDI-21 and STAI-T were negatively associated with mean number of pieces of evidence requested in order to decide, wliile OBS was positively associated with it. Furthermore, we found that the association between STAI-T and the dependent variable was no longer statistically significant after entering STAl-S ( = - 0 . 0 3 , p = .82). Thus, the variance of STAI-T was better accounted by the STAI-S variable. Further analyses showed that OBS and STAI-S were predictors of the amount of data collected in aU of our data-gathering tasks, while PDI-21 was a predictor solely in the two hypotheses bead tasks. Moreover, after entering STAI-S term, STAI-T was no longer related to the amount oif data-gathered (60:40 task, = - 0 . 0 5 , p = .69; 90/70/50 task, = -0.04, p = .70; 70/60/50, = - 0 . 0 3 , p = .82; in the 80:20 one STAI-T was not a predictor). Results of regressions conducted on effect of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence are illustrated in Tables 4 and 6. Independent for gender and age, OBS was negatively associated with overall weight attached to confirmatory evidence, while STAI-T was positively associated with it and negatively associated with overall weight attached to disconfirmatory evidence. After entering STAI-S, the relationships between STAI-T and both dependent variables were no longer statistically significant (overall confirmatory evidence effects, = 0.23, p = .09; overall disconfirmatory evidence

' It should be noted that we also tested the interaaion term between STAI-T and STAI-S variable (defined as the products of STAI-Tand STAI-S raw scores) on a fourth step. Given that trait anxiety and state anxiety are strialy linked (Spielberger et al., / 983), their interaaion could have shown a specific association with our dependent variables thus eventually bringing a unique contribute to the model. Results showed that STAI-T X STAI-S interaaion was not related to the amount of data gathered or to the use of evidence in any of the conditions. ^ We reported all the variables under analysis at each step only on Table 4. Tables 5 and 6 show only the new variable(s) introduced atieach new step.

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Table 4. Summary of hierarchical multiple regression analyses for data-gathering, confirmatory evidence effects, and disconfirmatory evidence effects (overall)

Data-gathering (overall)

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Disconfirmatory evidence effects (overall)

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Discussion Findings on probabilistic data-gathering tasks are in accordance with our predictions: delusion-proneness and anxiety (trait and state) are negatively associated with the (general) amount of data gathered in order to make a decision in probabilistic situations, while obsessiveness is positively associated with it. Noticeably, delusion-proneness is negatively associated with the amount of evidence requested in the two hypotheses tasks but'not in the three-hypotheses ones. Such findings do not seem to support a general confirmatory reasoning strategy, whereas it seems more in line with a recent proposal, the liberal acceptance account (Moritz, Woodward, & Lambert, 2007). According to this, delusional patients are characterized by a lower threshold of acceptance of a hypothesis comparing to controls: they possess lax criteria for judging hypotheses, thus they can jump to a conclusion because an alternative surpasses their lower threshold of acceptance. Extending such account to delusion-proneness, it appears to be negatively related to the amount of data requested prior to a decision only

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in less ambiguous situations, as the two-choice tasks, where hypotheses are mutually exclusive and only one alternative stands out from others. When more hypotheses are less distinct in probabiUty, greater ambiguity is produced (as the three-choice tasks): in such cases, no alternatives surpass the even lower threshold of acceptance, thus more data have to be gathered in order to decide. As regards trait anxiety, the negative association found in the model becomes nonsignificant after state anxiety is taken into account. By definition, trait anxiety is the proneness to experience state anxiety (Spielberger ei /., 1983), thus it is not surprising that the level of momentary anxiety was the actual predictor of the amount of data gathered. According to appraisal-tendency theory, each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to appraise future events in line with the central-appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion (e.g.. Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Fear-like emotions, such as attxiety, are generaUy defined by high uncertainty and low personal control over a situation (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984). We can argue that the probabiUstic tasks employed in our study could have increased the distress perceived by high anxious individuals because they requested reasoning under uncertain circumstances: according to this, gathering less itiformation and ending the tasks as quickly as possible could remove the feeling of uncertainty that resulted from the experimental situation and reduce the further anxiety (cf. Greco & Roger, 2001; Keinan, 1987). Results on confirmatory and disconfirmatory weight tasks only partiaUy support our hypotheses. Only two of our variables were predictors of weight attributed to evidence, namely, obsessiveness and trait anxiety. Obsessiveness is negatively related to overaU confirmatory effects: although this is in Une with our assumption of increased cautiousness about the acceptance of a hypothesis, this finding is not in accordance with the results of Fear and Healy (1997) on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. We argued that whUe high obsessiveness scores are associated with a cautious tendency to underestimate the relevance of confirmatory data, obsessive-compulsive disorder could be related to an even more prudent strategy of overestimating disconfirmatory evidence. According to this, while attributing less weight to confirmatory evidence can aUow to accept one hypothesis by just gathering more information, assigning more weight to disconfirmatory evidence (as for obsessivecompulsive disorder) can make it difficult to accept such a hypothesis even with lots of confirmatory evidence. On the other hand, trait anxiety is positively associated with overall confirmatory effects and negatively with overall disconfirmatory effects. As such, anxiety seems related to a rapid acceptance of a hypothesis because a datum in favour of it is overestimated and evidence against it is underrated. However, trait anxiet)' emerges as a predictor of confirmatory and discotifirmatory evidence effects only if it is considered without separating the specific trait and state anxiety contributions. Delusion-proneness does not result to be related neither to an overvaluation or an underrating of the dominant hypothesis. Again, such results could be explained by the Uberal acceptance hypothesis (Moritz et al, 2007). Participants could not end the reasoning tasks because tbey were requested to provide probabUistic estimates after each bead draw. As such, it can be more difficult to over-accept a hypothesis because each piece of disconfirmatory evidence hinders from over-weighting the confirmatory one: this increases ambiguity and an alternative cannot so easily prevail as disconfirmatory beads are drawn. In our opinion, the relevance of the present study is twofold. First, in accordance with previous studies (e.g., Bensi & Giusberti, 2007), we found a relationship between personality traits and reasoning processes. Stable individual differences can help to

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understand how individuals behave towards uncertainty, gather information, revise their beliefs and, ultimately, make decisions. Personality, as a complex organization of interrelated trait dispositions, is generally believed to directly influence behaviour (e.g., Matthews & Deary, 2001): our results show that personality traits can to some extent predispose to different sort of reasoning and predict decision-making behaviour Second, our findings are in line with the possibility that features of psychopatihological disorders are dimensionally continuous with naturally varying characteristics in the general population (e.g.. Khan, Jacobson, Gardner, Prescott, & Kendler, 2005). Indeed, some idiosyncratic decision-making styles seem not only related to mental illness but to personality traits associated with specific disposition to reason and decide in the general population. In such terms, stable individual characteristics could be especially informative for mental disorders as potentially subclinical manifestations of psychiatric features; at the same time, psychopathology can provide valuable data as regards personality traits whose variations can be associated with reasoning patterns found in clinical conditions. Indeed, given that JTC style can limit the amount of information necessary for a hypothesis to be accepted, we can argue that higher the delusional ideation, higher the likelihood of inaccurate beliefs (even psychotic-like) being formed hastily This same line of reasoning can be extended to obsessiveness: higher the doubts and ruminations, higher the amount of data to be collected (and the tendency to underrate pieces of evidence in favour of a hypothesis), thus increasing a counterproductive style that can ftiel obsessionality. Furthermore, we can suggest that higher the level of anxiety, higher the need to reduce emotional uneasinesjs by arriving at a conclusion at the expense of alternative (eventually, more functional) hypotheses. As such, personality traits associated with specific reasoning styles could be potential underlying vulnerability factors for the development and/or maintenance of psychological disorders.

Limitations and future directions

We can identify some limitations in our current research. First, the actual level of anxiety experienc:ed during the tasks could have affected participants' perception of their levels of trait arixiety, thus results for those who received the STAI trait form following the tasks could have been biased. Second, though we considered three personality measures that could be presumably be related to data-gathering and use of information, the present study did not explore other potentials factors. Indeed, general measures of psychopathology and cognitive ability as well as other personality traits (e.g., need for closure; Kruglanski, 1989) could be taken into account in ftiture research. Third, it would be interesting to assess the actual level of anxiety during and after reasoning tasks: if alleviation of emotional discomfort hypothesis is correct, we would expect a particular)reduction in state anxiety when tasks are put to an end and uncertainty is no more present. Fourth, it should be possible to explore the relationship between individual! differences and reasoning by considering the differences in the use of information. According to this, it is possible that the amount of data gathered prior to decide would be predicted by individual differences in the use of information (e.g., greater weight assigned to confirmatory evidence could be associated with stopping information search sooner). Finally, the present study investigated decision making in neutral probabilistic conditions, thus it should be relevant to improve the generalizability of our findings using more realistic tasks. Future works should address these issues.

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Received 7 April 2008; revised version received 28 July 2009

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