The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency Approaches since 1945 Stephen Pampinella Based on the case selection

discussed at the end of this document, 47 conflicts include the universe of relevant cases for this study. These are:

Case # Case Name 1 ' + 4 * 7 & % 10 11 1' 1+ 14 1* 117 1& 1% '0 '1 '' '+ '4

Year Started 1%7& 1%*4 1%%' 1%-1 1%71 1%%1 1%4& 1%%1 1%%4 1%%% 1%-4 1%%1%*+ 1%7* 1%74 1%-0 1%-' 1%&0 1%&% 1%41%71%*& 1%-1 1%*'

f!hanistan "anti#Soviet$ l!erian (nde)endence l!eria ",( $ n!olan (nde)endence Ban!ladesh Yu!oslavia Burma./yanmar Burundi Chechnya ( Chechnya (( Colom1ia "2 3C$ 4aire "anti#/o1utu$ Cu1a 5ast Timor 5ritrea ,uatemala ,uinea#Bissau (nde)endence (ndia "Na6alites$ (ndia "7ashmir$ (ndochina (ndonesia " ceh$ (ndonesia "8aru (slam$ (ra9 "7urdistan$ 7enya "/au /au$

3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency


'* ''7 '& '% +0 +1 +' ++ +4 +* ++7 +& +% 40 41 4' 4+ 44 4* 447

<aos /alaya /o=am1i9ue "35N />$ /o=am1i9ue (nde)endence Nami1ia Ne)al Nicara!ua "Contras$ Nicara!ua "Somo=a$ Ni!eria "Ni!er 8elta$ ;a)ua Ne? ,uinea ;eru ;hili))ines "@uA 3e1ellion$ ;hili))ines "/N<2$ ;hili))ines "/(<2$ Sene!al Somalia "anti#Barre$ Sri <anAa "<TT5$ Sudan "S;< $ Ti1et TurAey B!anda "<3 $ Cietnam 4im1a1?e

1%-0 1%4& 1%71%-' 1%7+ 1%%7 1%&1 1%7& 1%%1 1%&& 1%&0 1%*0 1%71 1%77 1%&0 1%&0 1%71%&+ 1%*1%&4 1%&7 1%-0 1%7'

Belo?, each of these cases is coded for si6 counterinsur!ency )ractices. These are the Boolean conditions for DC .

1. Afghanistan anti!Soviet"# start $ 19%&
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-c,Ef A . /assacres present"0 Soviet military o)erations attem)ted to a))ly conventional maneuver ?arfare tactics to fi6 the locations of enemies and then a))ly massive fire)o?er to destroy those )ositions ",rau '00', +0-#+07$. Tried to drive f!hans from countryside in ;anEshir, )ril 1%&0
' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

"2eifer '00', 10'#10+$,@elmand in 2all 1%&1 "(1id. 1--$, @erat in )ril 1%&+, @elmand in 1%&+ "4aeef '00%, '+#'4$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 3e!ular use of intimidation, torture, and murder of ordinary f!hans "2eifer '010, 104$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Soviet Bnion did ne!otiate ?ith s)ecific commanders "such as /assoud$ to declare cease#fires in s)ecific areas. Fhile conducted in !ood faith initially, hostilities resumed over time and these ne!otiations did not ever lead to counterinsur!ent victory. Soviets and 83 en!a!ed in a reconciliation initiative after Ganuary 1%&7 that sou!ht ne!otiations ?ith the mujahideen durin! the Soviet ?ithdra?al. These ne!otiations led to the Bilateral !reement 1et?een f!hanistan and ;aAistan, ?hich the BS and Soviet Bnion si!ned as interested )arties ",rau '00', +04#+0*$. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The Soviets )rovided si!nificant economic assistance to the 83 in su))ort of the military effort to su))ress the mujahideen. These efforts at forced moderni=ation ?ere consistent ?ith the socialist ideolo!y of the Soviet Bnion and military. Soviet develo)ment )ersonnel conducted mass )roEects aimed at im)rovin! infrastructure "7alinovsAy, '010$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence found.

5. Algerian 'ndependence# start $ 1954
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,E2 A . /assacres present"0 ccordin! to @orne, mass murder and the elimination of entire villa!ers did ha))en, althou!h it ?asnHt official !overnment )olicy. Fhen Soustelle comes to )o?er, he says ITo send in tanA units, to destroy villa!es, to 1om1ard certain =ones, that is no lon!er the fine com1J it is usin! a sled!ehammer to Aill fleas.K "Duoted in @orne 1%77, 107$ The SaAiet massacre "2e1ruary 1%*&$ a))ears to 1e the ?orst case, ?here 2rench 1om1ers ?i)ed out the villa!e after a near1y am1ush and then shots fired at overhead aircraft "@orne 1%77, '4%# '*0$. @o?ever, 8e ,aulle ?as adamantly o))osed to all forms of such 1rutal o))ression and reiterated in 1%*& that no such atrocities ?ere to taAe )lace. 3etaliatory, not official )olicy, 1ut no )unishment a))ears to follo? massacres. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 Servan#Schrei1er "1%*7$ discusses the Aillin! of l!erians drivin! a trucA sus)ected of su))ortin! the 2<N, and then coverin! u) the murder 1y claimin! self#defense from their attacA. 2rench )aratroo)ers commanded 1y /assu durin! the Battle of l!iers re!ularly used torture a!ainst sus)ected insur!ents and em)loyed summary e6ecution a!ainst )risoners. ,alula once a))roved of forcin! a )risoner to stand in an oven to scare him into talAin!. lthou!h ,alula demonstrated some ?ariness ?ith this ty)e of L)olice ?orAH, he felt
+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

it ?as nonetheless effective. This method effectively com1atted the 2<NHs indiscriminate terrorism ?ith terrorism 1y the 2rench army and ?as consistent ?ith !uerre revolutionairre. C . *esettlement present"0 The 2rench rmy did em)loy civilian resettlement to se)arate the )eo)le from insur!ents durin! the l!erian ?ar. This )ro!ram ?as actively administered 1y S S and monitored 1y the (ns)ection ,MnMrale des 3e!rou)ements de la ;o)ulation "(,3;$. 3esettlement 1e!an under a )ro!ram of recasement, in ?hich isolated rural villa!es ?ere consolidated into more defenda1le )ositions. SuttonHs descri)tion su!!ests this 1ecame ?ides)read in the conflictHs second )hase. lar!er )ro!ram of re!rou)ement ?as first mentioned in late 1%*7 ?hich sou!ht to )ur)osely deny the )eo)le interaction ?ith insur!ents. By late 1%*%, re!rou)ement had 1een articulated as a four#ste) model of resettlement that su))orted the maneuver o)erations of ;lan Challe. 3e!rou)ement ?as em)loyed into ;hase 2our ?hen the lar!est num1er of civilians resettled )eaAed in late 1%-0. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Fhile the )ossi1ility of reconciliation and ne!otiation ?as 1roached 1y the civilian !overnment in 2rance, this ?as out of the 9uestion for the 2rench rmy and the colons. Ne!otiations are o)ened 1y 8e ,aulle in 1%*& ?hen he discusses a )ai6 de 1raves, he o)ens the )ossi1ility of self#determination in late 1%*%, and the colons and rmy resist 1itterly, com)romisin! the )olicy and leadin! to Barricades FeeA in Ganuary 1%-0 "@orne 1%77$. E . Economic ,evelopment present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as common throu!hout the )eriod. Soustelle develo)ed the S S to reconnect ?ith the )o)ulation after his a))ointment in 1%**, also aimed to im)rove lives of l!erians 1y dou1lin! school#1uildin! 1ud!et, initiatin! land a! reform, and startin! )u1lic ?orAs )roEects "@orne 1%77, 10&$ The 2rench rmy su))lanted the state as a )rovider of services to the )o)ulation. ,alula himself o)ens schools and health clinics throu!hout his command, staffs them ?ith soldiers from his o?n com)any ?ho act at teachers and doctors for the )eo)le. ",alula 1%-+$ The Constantine ;lan is im)lemented startin! in 1%*%, aims to im)rove lives of l!erians 1y startin! industrial enter)rises, !ivin! land to l!erian farmers, increasin! school attendance, 1uild more housin! to ease the stru!!les of re!rou)ment. "@orne 1%77, +40#+41$ 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships present"0 2rench colonial administration ?as overstretched in l!eria at the start of the re1ellion ?ith Iareas half as 1i! as 2rance ?ere left in char!e of one 2rench administrator and a handful of !enarmes "@orne 1%77, 107#10&$ ,alula descri1es o1servin! 7a1yles )ayin! the 2rench ta6 collector out of custom, as he ?as the only endurin! )resence of the 2rench state in l!erian villa!es. ",alula 1%-+$ @o?ever, military )resence does create more coo)erative relationshi)s. ,alula also descri1es creatin! self#!overnment 1y holdin! elections for mayors and councilmen ?ithin villa!es. S S ?as also intended to create more relationshi)s ?ith local )o)ulace and connect 2rench state to l!erians. @o?ever, 2<N attacAs ?ere intended to erode trust 1et?een 2rench and loyalist l!erians : S S officers ?ere al?ays a tar!et of 2<N "@orne 1%77, 10%$ Com1ined ?ith escalation of colons. rmy alliance, l!erians
4 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

lose faith in the 2rench over time. Fhile the )rotests callin! for the end of the 2ourth 3e)u1lic in 1%*& include loyalist l!erians, the riots at Barricades FeeA includes no l!ierans "@orne 1%77$.

6. Algeria 7'A"# start $ 1995
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in" a-c,E2 A . /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are re)eated lar!e#scale massacres durin! the 1%%-#%7 )eriod, these are attri1uted to ,( and the (slamist re1els "7alyvas '000$. There is some sus)icion that re1els committin! massacres may in fact have 1een colludin! ?ith the re!ime since the military did not intervene. Yet there is no direct evidence that the re!ime did actually direct or commit such atrocities "3o1erts '00+, '07, +11$. 2or e6am)le, 7ervyn and ,N=e "'004, 4+$ discuss massacres committed 1y the army, 1ut do not )rovide any s)ecific e6am)les. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 there are re)eated instances of e6traEudicial murder, torture, and intimidation 1y the re!ime "see 3o1erts '00+, +1* for an e6am)le$. This re)ressive )olicy ?as )ushed 1y one faction in the military Ano?n as Othe eradicatorsO, they included smaller#scale massacres of 10 to 14 )eo)le "3o1erts '00+,1*0#1*7$. C! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement of civilians. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ;resident 4eroual and other moderates did seeA to ne!otiate ?ith the (slamist re1els and find some ?ay to reincor)orate 2(S 1acA into the )olitical system. These talAs and other initiatives lead to some o)enin!s for )eace includin! the 1%%% Civil 8iscord <a? ?hich did allo? for amnesty for ,( fi!hters "3o1erts '00+, 7hati1 '00-$. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 the re!ime did use aid )rovided 1y the Forld BanA to launch economic develo)ment and Eo1 creation )ro!rams under the la1el O)u1lic interest ?orAsO "/artine= 1%%&, 1-1$. The re!ime also launched a construction )olicy to overcome its housin! shorta!e, and a!ain to )rovide service#sector Eo1s to reduce youth unem)loyment "/artine= 1%%&, 1-%$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 the re!ime allied closely ?ith veterans from the l!erian ?ar of inde)endence, ?ho al?ays su))orted national soverei!nty and the decision to cancel the elections of 1%%'. These Oe6#com1atantsO ?ere local leaders ?ho formed militias to su))ort the re!ime in fi!htin! the re1els "/artine= 1%%&, &4#%1$. *eferences /artine=, <uis. 1%%&. The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998. Ne? YorA: Colum1ia Bniversity
* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

;ress. 3o1erts, @u!h. '00+. The Battlefield Algeria, 1988- 00 . <ondon: Cerso. 7ervyn, Geanine and 2rancois ,N=e. '004. IThe or!ani=ation of the forces of re)ression,K e6tract from a re)ort )resented 1y !ustice Commission for Algeria, at +'nd Session of the ;ermanent ;eo)leOs Tri1unal on @uman 3i!hts Ciolations "1%%'#'004$. ;aris, 2rance. 7hati1, Sofiane. '00*. IS)oiler /ana!ement 8urin! l!eriaOs Civil Far.K "tanford !ournal of #nternational $elations -"1$: htt):..???!rou).sEir.-.1.0-PAhati1.html. <ast accessed 2e1ruary 1+, '014. 7alyvas, Stathis. '000. IFanton and SenselessQ The <o!ic of /assacres in l!eria.K $ationalit% and "ociet% 11"+$: '4+#'&*.

4. Angolan 'ndependence# start $ 1991
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-CdEf A . /assacres present"0 3einforcements arrivin! in summer 1%-1, then 1om1 and strafe areas indiscriminately, even those unaffected 1y re1ellion, destroy ;ortu!uese credi1ility, create refu!ees that flee to Con!o. '0A die "Cann 1%%7, '&$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 ,ovHt forces res)ond indiscriminately after initial /;< attacAs in 2e1 1%-1 in <uanda, Ailled several hundred fricas, 1odies left in streets. "Cann 1%%7, '7$ Sou!ht to Aee) insur!ents in rural areas throu!h many means, includin! torture, curfe?s, dra!nets, all to !ain intelli!ence from detainees. ";ahlavi and li '01', 4&$ C . *esettlement present"0 (n 1%-7, ;ortu!al re!rou)s civilians in the east into strate!ic hamlets to )revent contact ?ith insur!ents. "Bender 1%7', ++4$. Three ty)es, aldeamentos "run 1y military in fi!htin! =ones$, reordenamento rural "run 1y civilian !ovHt in rural areas and )romote socioeconomic develo)ment$, and colonatos de soldados "settlements of e6#soldiers in strate!ic areas$. 3ural resettlements 1e!an in 1%-' 1ut little done 1t?n -' and -7, motivated 1y those ?ith altruistic intentions ?ho are very clear in distin!uishin! them from strate!ic resettlement. "Bender 1%7', ++*$ But, in terms of La))earance and resultsH, rural and strate!ic settlements are not distin!uisha1le. "Bender 1%7', ++-$ Fithin settlements, some civilians are coerced into 1ein! informers 1y intelli!ence )olice. "Bender 1%7', ++-$ Settlements affect '0 )ercent of entire frican )o)ulation 1y 1%7' "Bender 1%7', ++7$. @o?ever, socioeconomic structures or locations never considered 1y )ro!ram or!ani=ers. "Bender 1%7', ++7$ Settlements of the north unsuccessful, too disru)tive of social.residential )atterns, and not
3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

enou!h to I)roduce any marAed chan!e in the 9uality of life.K fricans are really chea) la1or for coffee )lantations. "Bender 1%7', ++&$ (n 5ast, none of the services )romised 1y the !ovHt ?ere )rovided, at least 1y 1%70. "Bender 1%7', ++%$ , . Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 No evidence of ne!otiations. @o?ever, ;ortu!uese sou!ht to turn ca)tured insur!ents and recruit them into their military forces. This is offered as an alternative to )unishment, not as a form of for!iveness follo?in! voluntary surrender, so ( do not code this as amnesty. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;ortu!uese seeA to moderni=e n!ola throu!h resettlements and )rovide health and educational services. rmy em)loyed as teachers in many cases, su))orted 1uildin! schools, health clinics. ccordin! to Cann "1%%7, RR$, ;ortu!al ado)ts F@> standards for doctor.)o)ulation and meets them. @o?ever, accordin! to Bender "1%7'J 1%7&, 1-7$, economic develo)ment )ro!rams fail 1.c of social disru)tions to ordinary life. fricans livin! in settlements faced declinin! standards of livin!, not im)rovn!. So, efforts at develo)ment ?ere incom)lete at 1est. 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 lthou!h ;ortu!uese incor)orate fricans into military forces, there is no evidence that they ally or su))ort local indi!enous leadershi) amon! tri1es contested 1y insur!ents. @eavy#handed tactics involvin! mass use of air)o?er as ?ell as resettlements a))ear to )revent any move to?ard elite coo)tion.

5. -angladesh# start $ 19%1
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ 8in:override;") *A+, $ loss" A-cdef
A . /assacres present"0 ;aAistani rmy committed multi)le massacres of unarmed civilians. These include massacres at 8haAa Bniversity and at villa!es ?hich had 1een the site of insur!ent attacA. The latter involve the Aillin! of all men from some villa!ers, ?hose 1odies are then immolated. "Bose '00*$. These acts of violence are considered !enocide 1y some scholars " Amam '00'$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;aAistani rmy and sym)athi=ers use e6traEudicial murder, torture, and harassment a!ainst sus)ected )ro#inde)endence Ben!alis. These uses of e6em)lary force also include se6ual violence a!ainst ?omen "/ooAherEee '00-$.

C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear )olicy of resettlement. , . Amnesty3+egotiations0 a(sent"0 no evidence durin! the conflict, althou!h military and ?ami <ea!ue of Ban!ladesh are in ne!otiations 1efore the ?ar starts. >f course, these 1reaA do?n. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance.
7 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ?hile there ?ere ;aAistani loyalists in Ban!ladesh, the ;aAistani rmy failed to cultivate these relationshi)s amid the massacres of Ban!ali civilians and conventional com1at ?ith the (ndian rmy and ir 2orce.

9. <ugoslavia# start $ 1991
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft :Ser(ian *e(ellion; $ loss) *A+, :-osnia; $ mi1ed" A-c,ef A . /assacres present"0 Yu!oslavian military "GN $ and militias committed massacres and ethnically cleansed villa!es throu!hout the conflict, culminatin! ?ith !enocidal attacA on Sre1renica, Aillin! &,000 /uslim men and 1oys "/aass 1%%7$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 GN and militias re!ularly intimidated and attacAed attacAed civilians from all three ethnic !rou)s, includin! ethnic Ser1s. Shellin! cities liAe SaraEevo as a re!ular feature of the ?ar "/aass 1%%7$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 Ser1ian forces drove /uslim and Croatian civilians a?ay from villa!es and to?ns in Ser1ian#held territory, forcin! them to resettle as refu!ees in other )laces. No )lan for resettlement, Eust forced evacuation "/aass 1%%7$. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Ser1s en!a!ed in ne!otiations throu!hout the conflict ?ith Bosnia, Croatia, and the Bnited Nations on different cease#fires, attem)ts at limitin! violence. ll of these eventually failed ho?ever "/aass 1%%7$. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no develo)ment assistance offered to tar!eted )o)ulations. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 Ser1ians ally ?ith other Ser1s in Bosnia and 7raEina, 1ut never form any local alliances ?ith /uslim and Croatian elites. 5n!a!e in total ?ar. *eferences /aass, ;eter. 1%%7. &ove Th% 'eigh(or) A "tor% of War. Ne? YorA: Cinta!e.

%. -urma3/yanmar# start $ 194&
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +A) *A+, $ 8in" A-Cde2 A $ /assacres present"0 Burmese military attacAed villa!es and carried out lar!e#scale massacres early in the conflict, and this has continued into 1%%0s and '000s.

& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

- . E1emplary 2orce present"0 Burmese forces have re!ularly )ressed the )o)ulation into service as )orters. Beatin!s and intimidation of civilians are common, as ?ell as ra)es and se6ual crimes a!ainst ethnic minorities. C . *esettlement present"0 Burmese military begins to forcibly resettle ethnic minorities in 1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive Party, continues for several years with thousands resettled. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Burmese military is constantly negotiating with different rebel groups, leading to many cease-fires. Yet, many of these fail (like the cease-fire prior to the 1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences. E – Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance or civic action to win over ethnic minorities. F – Elite Local Relationships (present): The Burmese military has co-opted some rebel groups to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State Army. References Cline, Lawrence, E. 2009. “Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 20(3-4), 574-591.

&. -urundi# start $ 1991
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed"
A . /assacres present"0 follo?in! @utu massacres of Tutsis ?ho ?ere an!ry that the Tutsi#dominated army held a cou) a!ainst the first democratically elected )resident in 1%%+ "a @utu$, the army Ailled 1et?een *0,000#100,000 @utus to restore order "Bvin 1%%%, '-'$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 liAely to 1e )resent !iven e6treme nature of violence in the civil ?ar. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear attem)ts at resettlement, 1oth sides o)t for very lar!e massacres instead com1ined ?ith ethnic cleansin!, liAe the clearin! out of @utus 1y Tutsis around the ca)ital. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Ne!otiations 1et?een loyalists of the elected @utu )resident and the army continued follo?in! the )ost#cou) massacres. But ?hen ne? @utu )resident dies in )lane crash ?hich also Ailled @a1yarimana, ne!otations follo? re!ardin! a ne? !overnment, and ca1inet )ositions are s)lit 1et?een @utu and Tutsi factions "Bvin 1%%%, '-'$. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence of elite local relationshi)s, althou!h elite factions of each ethnic !rou) mo1ili=e their o?n militias. % 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

*eferences Bvin, ;eter. 1%%%. I5thnicity and ;o?er in Burundi and 3?anda: 8ifferent ;aths to Ciolence.K Com*arative +olitics +1"+$: '*+#'71.

9. . Chechnya '# start $ 1994
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft :*usso!Chechen; $ loss) *A+, $ mi1ed" A-c,ef A . /assacres present"0 Russian used of heavy firepower (artillery) against Chechen communities, attacking civilian targets. Led to widespread civilian casualties, eventually alienated the civilian population as well (Kramer 2005, Renaud 2010). B – Exemplary Force (present): Russian forces treated Chechen civilians harshly. MVD used cordon-and-sweep ops to harass Chechen civilians, even kidnapping some for ransom (Kramer 2005). C – Resettlement (absent): No active policy of resettlement of entire regions, although refugees were created by the fighting. , . +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 7hasav#Yurt ccord si!ned 1et?een 3ussian and Chechen re1els in u!ust 1%%-, )rovidin! for a cease#fire and the end of the ?ar, 1ut also allo?ed for de facto inde)endence until ne? deli1erations in '001 "3enaud '010$. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 No maEor )olicy of develo)ment assistance or civic action. 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 1%%4 3ussian invasion of Chechnya alienates e6istin! Chechen allies and leads all Chechens to turn a!ainst the !overnment "3enaud '010$. References Kramer, Mark. 2005. “Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict,” Europe-Asia Studies 57(2), 209-290. Renaud, Sean. 2010. “A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications.” Massey University, unpublished Master's Thesis.

10. Chechnya II, start = 1999
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override $ *ussian state 8in;" A-cdE2

10 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

A . /assacres present"0 3ussian military attacAs ,ro=ny in >ct 1%%% and nearly levels the entire city ?ith air and artillery 1om1ardments, taAes full control in 2e1ruary '000. 3ussian military re!ains control over most of Chechnya 1y mid#'000, 1ut causin! immense destruction ?ith indiscriminate violence "3enaud '010$. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;ro#3ussian Chechen !overnment esta1lished after 3ussian invasion ruled mainly throu!h violent coercion, re!ularly 1rutali=ed the )o)ulation "3enaud '010$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 Fhile refu!ees ?ere created durin! the ?ar, no evidence of a focused resettlement )olicy. , . Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 Several amnesties occur durin! 3ussian attem)ts to esta1lish !overnance. 7,000 taAe amnesty 1y '00*. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 3econstruction occurred durin! the initial second invasion in '000, 1ut slo?ed after this. reas in southern Chechnya that ?ere destroyed in the fi!htin! ?ere necessarily re1uilt. So, this is incom)lete reconstruction "3enaud '010, 7ramer '00*$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 3ussia identifies ne? )ro#3ussian allies ?ho successfully 1uild local su))ort, )articularly the 7adyrov family. 8es)ite the assassination of the father, the son tooA over as the re!ionOs )ro#3ussian leader and !uided the end of the counterinsur!ency "3enaud '010$. *eferences 7ramer, /arA. '00*. I,uerrilla Farfare, Counterinsur!ency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The /ilitary 8imension of the 3ussian#Chechen Conflict,K ,uro*e-Asia "tudies *7"'$, '0%#'%0. 3enaud, Sean. '010. I Cie? from Chechnya: n ssessment of 3ussian Counterinsur!ency 8urin! the t?o Chechen Fars and 2uture (m)lications.K /assey Bniversity, un)u1lished /asterOs Thesis.

11. Colom(ia# start $ 1994
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing) override . (y 5=14# 2A*C is very 8ea>" A-c,E2
11 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

A . /assacres present"0 /ilitary does not )ur)osely use mass fire)o?er to ?i)e out villa!ers or )o)ulation centers. @o?ever, air)o?er is used alon!side military o)erations, and there are incidents ?here air)o?er is used on individual homes. ;aramilitaries that ?orA closely ?ith the !overnment do commit lar!e#scale massacres in the 1%%0s, includin! the /a)ri)ian /assacre in 1%%7 involvin! +0 civilian deaths, the lto Naya massacre in '001 involvin! at least 40 civilians deaths, and others. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 56em)lary force is common throu!hout the ?ar. BS military advisors instruct Colom1ian military to develo) )aramilitary or!ani=ations in late 1%*0s to intimidate sus)ected insur!ents, includin! mem1ers of le!al )olitical )arties, unions, other civil society or!ani=ations "StoAes '00*$. /ilitary or )aramilitary forces re!ularly intimidate, torture, and murder civilians sus)ected of insur!ent su))ort. !ain, !ro?th of massacres due to )aramilitaries. 1' deaths at <a 3ochela massacre 1y / S in 1%&% "7irA '00+, 1'7$. /ulti)le deaths at <a Cristalinamassacre, includin! Eud!es investi!atin! )aras 1y / S in 1%&7 "7irA '00+, 1'1J @3F 1%%-, '+$. ;ara net?orAs conduct tar!eted Aillin!s and massacres throu!hout Chucuri re!ion in 1%%', Idetainin! and Aillin! sus)ects and threatenin! those they accused of har1orin! sym)athies for !uerrillas.K "@3F 1%%-, +4, +*$ Tar!eted Aillin!s in 1%%' of civil society or!ani=ers in Barranca1ermeEa "@3F 1%%-, +*$. (n Barranca1ermeEa, BC )aras force out the 2 3C throu!h the use of e6em)lary force, indiscriminate violence a!ainst civilians. Fave of violence on city residents 1y )aras starts in 1%%&, continues throu!h '00'. /ay 1-, 1%%&, *0#man )ara unit raid city, Aill 11, ca)ture '*, they ?ere later Ailled. /assacres liAe this occur throu!hout the year. "@3F 1%%-, 114$ fter late 1%%%, )aras shift Ifrom terrifyin! raids to silent, individual crimesK "@3F 1%%-, 11*$. ;aras ?ithdra? in '004, Aillin!s dro) dramatically "@3F 1%%-, 117$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 ?hile counterinsur!ency forces re!ularly create refu!ees, they do not force them to resettlement in a )articular !eo!ra)hic are controlled and maintained 1y the state. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /ulti)le ne!otiations taAe )lace throu!hout the conflict ?ith either the Colom1ian state or )aramilitaries and different insur!ent !rou)s. 2 3C and the !overnment o)ened ne!otiations in 1%&4, ho?ever violence from 1oth sides continued throu!hout these talAs and they eventually 1roAe do?n. This )eriod also sa? the formation of the first )aramilitaries tied to nacrotrafficAers in res)onse to insur!ent Aidna))in!s. Ne!otiations are o)ened a!ain 1et?een the 2 3C and the ;astrana administration in 1%%%, leadin! to the !rantin! of the demilitari=ed =one as a )re#condition for talAs. @o?ever, it a))ears the 2 3C used these ne!otiations merely to 1uy time and !ro?th its stren!th in the =ona, and they ?ere never conducted in !ood faith. Fhile ;resident ;astrana attended the o)enin! of the )eace talAs, /arin sent a su1ordinate. These talAs 1reaA do?n ?hen ;astrana reali=es he is maAin! no head?ay in '00' "7irA '00+$
1' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as common durin! the counterinsur!ency efforts s)earheaded 1y ;lan <a=o. ssistance and aid ?as )rovided to )easants to tie them to the Colom1ian !overnment and )rovide incentives for their loyalty. This assistance ?as administered in tandem ?ith military o)erations. These initiatives ?ere derided 1y /arin as a 1ri1e to tricA )easants into for!ettin! the armyHs )ast a1uses "7irA '00+$. 8evelo)ment assistance is intended as a Aey )art of Bri1eHs 8emocratic Security )lan, and ( have found evidence su!!estin! that such assistance is )rovided to civilians in areas of counterinsur!ency o)erations "FalAer '00%, '&#'%$. The National Consolidation ;lan ?as one as)ect of the 8emocratic Security )olicy that sou!ht to )rovide social services to areas recently retaAen from insur!ent control and inte!rated into the Colom1ian state. Fith su))ort for BS military civil affairs officers, 9uicA#im)act )roEects and lon!er#term service delivery )roEects ?ere im)lemented. "S)encer et al., '010, &7#&&, %0$. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 3elationshi)s 1et?een )rovincial elites and counterinsur!ency forces have 1een common throu!hout the conflict, 1ut have intensified in the last +0 years to )roduce ne? counterinsur!ent or!ani=ations. 5lites "includin! nacrotrafficAers$ formed their o?n )aramilitaries ?ith assistance from the rmy in the 1%&0s. These ties and relationshi)s continued throu!hout the follo?in! years amon! li1eral )arty elites led to stron!er )aramilitaries that )rovided security for lando?ners "some of ?hom ?ere )ara leaders$. s 3ichani "'00*$ notes, the ne6us 1et?een re!ional elites, the military, and the )aras contri1utes to the fra!mented soverei!nty of the Colom1ian state. *eferences 7irA, 3o1in, '00+. -ore Terri(le than .eath) .rugs, /iolence, and America0s War in Colom(ia. Ne? YorA: ;u1lic ffairs. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%-. Colom(ia0s 1iller 'et2or3s) The -ilitar%-+aramilitar% +artnershi* and the 4nited "tates. Fashin!ton, 8.C: @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 3ichani, Na=ih. '00*. I/ultinational Cor)orations, 3entier Ca)italism, and the Far System in Colom1ia.K &atin American +olitics and "ociet%. 47"+$: 11+#144. ####. '007. ICaudillos and the crisis of the Colom1ian state: fra!mented soverei!nty, the ?ar system and the )rivatisation of counterinsur!ency in Colom1ia.K Third World 5uarterl%. '7"'$: S)encer, 8avid. 5., et. al. '010. Colom(ia0s $oad to $ecover%) "ecurit% and 6overnance 198 010. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: National 8efense Bniversity. FalAer, Games . '00%. A Com*arison of the .emocratic "ecurit% +olic% in Colom(ia and
1+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

*rovincial $econstruction Teams in #ra7. /asterOs Thesis. /onterrey: Naval ;ost!raduate School.

15. ?aire anti!/o(utu"# start $ 1999
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" a-cdef A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacres ?ere committed 1y the 3; and 28< a!ainst @utu refu!ees ?ho fled into Con!o from 3?anda follo?in! 3;2Hs defeat of @utu re!ime. 2urther, the 2orces rmees 4airoises "2 3$ is so 1ureaucratically ine)t that it is seen as not even fi!htin! the ?ar. >nly com)osed of 7*,000 troo)s. "10&$ @o?ever, /o1utu does hire merceneries to fi!ht that do commit atrocities. These include Ser1ian mercenaries ?ho commit atrocities a!ainst civilians at 7isan!ani, 1ut then they leave the country "no additional details )rovided$ "3eyntEens '00%, 11*$. No other evidence. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 4airean military does )rey on civilians, en!a!es in lootin! and harmin! civilians. (n ,oma at the end of >cto1er 1%%-, Tutsi ?ere Ivictims of a1use 1y certain LautochthonesH ?ith the a))roval, if not u)on the incitement of, local authoritiesK "3eynEtens '00%, 1+1$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement 1y 4airean re!ime. /ost (8;s created 1y 28< and 3?andan military ?hich attacA @utu refu!ees ?hich had )reviously fled 3?anda after their defeat 1y 3;2. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 BN and > B seeA to foster ne!otiations throu!hout the ?ar, 1ut these never really come to fruition. The /arch '7 ne!otiations that start follo?in! the <ome communi9ue never started # 28< reEected any )o?er#sharin! a!reement after they tooA 7isan!ani, ?hich the re!ime ?anted to offer "3eyntEens '00%, 1'*$. E . ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationship a(sent"0 no evidence of local relationshi)s. *eferences 3eyntEens, 2ili). '00%. The 6reat African War) Congo and $egional 6eo*olitics, 1998- 008. Cam1rid!e: Cam1rid!e.

14 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Thom, Filliam. 1%%%. ICon!o#4aireHs 1%%-#%7 Civil Far in the Conte6t of 5volvin! ;atterns of /ilitary Conflict in frica in the 5ra of (nde)endence.K The !ournal of Conflict "tudies R(R"'$. htt) rticle.4+*&.*01*, last accessed 2e1ruary 10, '014. /cNulty, /el. 1%%%. IThe Colla)se of 4aire: (m)losion, 3evolution or 56ternal Sa1ota!eQK The !ournal of -odern African "tudies +7"1$: *+#&'.

16. Cu(a# start $ 1956
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" a-c,ef A . /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres, mass atrocities, destruction of )o)ulation centers. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 BatistiaOs relatively un)rofessional army re!ularly harassed and 1rutali=ed civilians, ultimately alienatin! them "Goes '010, 141#1-4$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 No evidence of resettlement, the insur!ency ?as initially or!ani=ed in the already de)o)ulated Sierra /aestra mountain ran!e. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Batista does offer an amnesty early on in his rule to re1els includin! Castro in 1%**. @e himself is )ardoned, 1ut then 1ecomes an insur!ent yet a!ain "Goes '010, 141#1-4$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 No evidence that Batista !overnment ever offers civic action or develo)ment aid to ?in over rural Cu1an )easants. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 Batista never ?ins the loyalty of )easant leadershi) in Cu1a, leavin! them to 1e co#o)ted or controlled 1y Castro and the insur!ency. *eferences Goes, nthony Games. '010. /ictorious #nsurgencies) 9our $e(ellions that "ha*ed :ur World. <e6in!ton, 7Y: 7entucAy Bniversity ;ress.

14. East Timor# start $ 19%5
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ mi1ed" A-c,E2

1* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

A . /assacres present"0 Search#and#destroy o)erations Aill thousands of civilians from 1%77# 1%&1. /ore than 100 Ailled in Santa Cru= massacre at funeral in 1%%1. ;aramilitaries commit massacres leadin! u) to vote for inde)endence in 1%%% and after. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 (ntimidation, Aidna))in!, e6tra#Eudicial murder ?as common in the 1%%0s amon! )ro#!ovOt militias and )aramilitaries a!ainst anti#(ndonesian activists, )ro# 235T<(N su))orters. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 Fides)read resettlement of civilians 1y (ndonesian military from 1%&+ # 1%&%. /aEor civilian dis)lacement ?as common in )eriod )rior to 1%&+ as ?ell. <ar!e# scale dis)lacements after 1%%% referendum on inde)endence. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Cease#fire and ne!otiations 1et?een 235T<(N and TN( in 1%&+, 1ut talAs fail and (ndonesian military attacAs. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The military did enact a civil affairs )ro!ram that im)roved sanitation, health, created infrastructure, enhanced local !ovOt control. 2 ! Elite *elationships present"0 <ocal (ndonesian military leaders taAe )olitical control in areas of o)eration, 1ut do esta1lish local allies and su))ort elites liAe Tomas ,oncalves, conservative !rou)s liAe 7>T , )odeti and the B8T. *eferences 7ilcullen, 8avid. '000. The +olitical Conse7uences of -ilitar% :*erations in #ndonesia, 19;<1999. 8issertation. Syndey: Bniversity of Ne? South Fales. ####. '00-. I,lo1alisation and the 8evleo)ment of (ndonesian Counterinsur!ency Tactics.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. 17"1$. 44#-4. ####. '010. Counterinsurgenc%. <ondon: >6ford Bniversity ;ress.

15. Eritrea# start $ 19%4
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,ef A ! /assacres present"0 Town of Keren was bombed after local bridges were bombed by insurgents in 1970. Army committed many massacres, burned villages during 1967 and 1970-1 (Tareke 2002). B – Exemplary Force (present): Random arrests and arbitrary violence decreases after 1981, but exists in Ethiopian COIN prior (DeWaal 1991).

13esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

C – Resettlement (present): Civilians were cleared from a six-mile area running alongside the Keren-Asmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, cleared from other areas as well (Tareke 2002). D – Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Ethiopian military government held talks with the EPLF in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead launched a new military offensive. Negotiations between mid-level officers guided by Jimmy Carter also begin in 1989 (Pateman 1990). E – Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development assistance. F – Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of local relationships. References De Waal. Alexander. 1991. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine In Ethiopia. New York: Human Rights Watch. Pateman, Roy. 1990. “The Eritrean War.” Armed Forces and Society 17(1): 81-98. Tareke, Gebru. 2002. “From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of counter-insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980-82.” Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(3), 465-498.

19. 7uatemala# start $ 199=
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in" A-C,Ef A – Massacres (present): military resorted to annihilation of at least 450 villages and inhabitants in 1981-1983. B - Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, harassment, torture, and murder of individual suspects was common practice by military. C - Resettlement (present): More than 1 million Gualemalans forcibly displaced during the period from 1981-1983 in a deliberate policy of removal and displacement, then reorganized in 'model villages' controlled by gov't (Streeter 2006).
17 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Amnesty offered in 1982 for those returning from Mexico, or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty (Streeter 2006). E - Development Assistance (present): Much assistance available via USAID and the Alliance for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm policy of development to implement programs. Oligarchy always shirked from supporting socioeconomic reform. Military does implement its own civil affairs program known as the “National Plan for Security and Development”, offering both “guns and beans.” Elite Relationships (absent): Military doesn't build new alliances among local elites, 'model villages' enable complete surveillance and monitoring of the population. No move to use local elites for control. More direct form of intervention in civil society (Streeter 2006). References Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress.” Third World Quarterly 27(1): 5768.

1%. 7uinea!-issau 'ndependence# start $ 1995
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,Ef A ! /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese use heavy air)o?er in areas controlled 1y ; (,C, 1om1in! villa!ers and usin! na)alm a!ainst re1el#held villa!es "8hada 1%%&, *&'$. /ilitary under S)inola innovates heli#1orne attacAs in free#fire =ones, Aillin! scores of villa!ers and destroyin! villa!es, destroyin! livestocA "Cha1al 1%&0, &+$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 3e!ular use of violence a!ainst civilians in raids and o)erations. C . *esettlement present"0 <iAe ;ortu!uese C>(N in other countries, ;ortu!al uses aldeamentos to resettle )o)ulation and distri1ute economic assistance and develo)ment. These ?ere increased after S)inola came to )o?er, 1ut ?ere used in the first )hase as ?ell "8hada 1%%&, *&4$. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /ilitary and ; (,C ne!otiate inde)endence follo?in! the 1%74 cou) to end the conflict. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 Fhen S)inola 1ecomes ,overnor#,eneral.military commander in 1%-%, he enacts a develo)ment )ro!ram called O Better ,uineaO 1y increasin! food )roduction, 1uildin! infrastructures "hos)itals, schools$, etc. "Cha1al 1%&1, &+$. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0

1& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

lthou!h fricans are incor)orated into ;ortu!uese military forces, no evidence e6ists that the ;ortu!uese form allies amon! local elites. This is consistent ?ith direct rule throu!hout the colonial )eriod. *eferences 8hada, /, 1%%&. IThe <i1eration Far in ,uinea#Bissau 3econsidered,K !ournal of -ilitar% =istor%. Cha1al, ;articA. 1%&0. INational <i1eration in ;ortu!uese ,uinea, 1%*-#1%74.K African Affairs &0"+1&$, 7*#%%. Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The +ortuguese Wa% of War, 1981-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er.

1&. 'ndia +a1alites"# start $ 19&=
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) ongoing" a-c,E2 A! /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres. B - Exemplary Force (pgresent): Military has used extra-judicial killings, promoted use of violence by civilians and vigilante groups against Naxalites in retaliation for their violence. C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement. D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Multiple rounds of negotiations have occurred between the many Naxalite groups and India's federal and state level governments. E - Development Assistance (present): The Indian government has implemented development plans at the state level. For example, Uttar Pradesh state provided electricity to rural villages as a means of meeting peasant grievances. F - Elite Relationships (present): Local governments in India formed cooperative relationships with vigilante groups comprised of upper case Indians to put down Naxalite rebellions in different regions. References Ahuja, Pratul and Rajat Ganguly. 2007. “The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 18(2): 249-274.

1% 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Misra, Amalendu. 2002. “Subaltern and the civil war: An assessment of left-wing insurgency in South Asia.” Civil Wars, 5(4): 56-76. “Andhra Pradesh/Naxalite.”, accessed December 12, 2012.

19. 'ndia @ashmir"# start $ 19&9
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) ongoing" A-cdef A ! /assacres present"0 multi)le lar!e#scale massacres have 1een committed 1y (ndian forces follo?in! attacAs a!ainst them ?ithin )o)ulated areas. These include *0 deaths in So)ore to?n in Ganuary - 1%%+, +1 deaths in BiE1ehara to?n on >cto1er '' 1%%+, +* SiAh deaths in Chattisin!h)ura on /arch '0,'000. @o?ever, BS2 court of in9uiries have held some of those res)onsi1le for these attacAs. But not for all. 2ire has also 1een directed at cro?ds of mourners at funerals of those slain 1y security forces. Thus, the !ovHt Eust )unish all instances of massacres leadin! to char!es of state terrorism "Gafa '00*$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 security forces have used intimidation, ra)e, torture and e6traEudicial murder on civilians and sus)ected insur!ents re!ularly "Gafa '00*, Bhatt '00*$. C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 maEor dis)laced )o)ulations have included ;andits from 7ashmir, driven out 1y /uslim militants. "<ama '000$. No evidence of forced resettlement 1y (ndian rmy. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 an attem)t at )eace talAs occurs in Guly '000, ?hen @i=1ul /uEahideen announces a cease#fire and the desire for ne!otiations ?ith Ne? 8elhi. These talAs are held, 1ut colla)se ?ithout any a!reement 1ecause other insur!ent !rou)s reEect them and 1e!in to reEect @/ as ?ell ",an!uly '001$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 No evidence of develo)ment assistance. (ndian counterinsur!ency is !enerally seen as overly reliant on force and has 1een a)olitical. (na1ility to ?in hearts and minds su))orts this lacA of evidence "Telford '001$. Some BS2 units do esta1lish medical centers in 1%%1 in t?o nei!h1orhoods of Srina!ar "Gafa '00*$. But no evidence that this is a com)rehensive )olicy of )rovidin! assistance to civilians. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence that (ndia has formed relationshi)s ?ith local elites in 7ashmir. References
'0 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Bhatt, ShaAti. '00+. IState Terrorism vs. Gihad in 7ashmir.K !ournal of Contem*orar% Asia ++"'$: '1*#''4. Telford, @amish. '001. ICounter#(nsur!ency in (ndia: >1servations from ;unEa1 and 7ashmir.H The !ournal of Conflict "tudies RR("1$: htt)'%+.4&&&, last accessed 2e1ruary 14, '014. ,an!uly, 3aEat. '001. I(ndia, ;aAistan and the 7ashmir (nsur!ency: Causes, 8ynamics and ;ros)ects for 3esolution.K Asian "tudies $evie2 '*"+$: +0%#++4. Gafa, Yateendra Sin!h. '00*. I8efeatin! Terrorism: Study of >)erational Strate!y and Tactics of ;olice 2orces in Gammu S 7ashmir "(ndia$.K +olice +ractice and $esearch -"1$: 141#1-4. <ama, /ahendra ;. '000. I(nternal dis)lacement in (ndia: causes, )rotection and dilemmas.K 9orced -igration $evie2 &: '4#'-.

5=. 'ndochina# start $ 1949
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,e2 A . /assacres present"0 >ut1reaA of conflict features 2rench 1om1ardment and occu)ation of the city of @ai)hon! in Novem1er 1%4-, causin! si6 thousand civilian casualties ">OBallance 1%-4, 77$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 2rench use )unitive measures a!ainst the )o)ulation includin! food sei=ures, cordon#and#search of villa!es ">OBallance 1%-4, &7#&&$. C . *esettlement present"0 3esettlement does occur in Cam1odia in 1%*1#1%*', ?hen ?ar !oes conventional. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Ne!otiations ?ere sou!ht 1et?een the 2rench and @o Chi /inh, 1ut these ?ere not )ursued forcefully 1ecause the rmy sa? such action as a si!n of ?eAaness and undermined any chance of military victory ";orch '00&, %1$. rmy reEects ne!otiations in 1%47 ">OBallance 1%-4, &*#&-$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 No evidence of develo)ment assistance found. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 2rench leadershi) sou!ht to co#o)t 5m)eror Bao 8ai of nnam to lead Cietnam in the 2rench Bnion, @o?ever, Bao never fully a!rees to 2rench demands and a lacA of full soverei!nty, so he leaves Cietnam and never taAes control of )olitical events. No local elites ?ere thus co#o)ted ?ho could rival the Ciet /inh. 2rench do form

'1 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

alliances ?ith Cao 8ai and @oa @ao sects, they form militias to defend a!ainst Ciet /inh. But no local elites in North Cietna. ">OBallance 1%-4, &+#&4$ *eferences >OBallance, 5d?ard. 1%-4. The #ndochina War, 19;<-19<;. <ondon: 2a1er and 2a1cr, 1%-4

51. 'ndonesia Aceh"# start $ 19%9
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in" a-c,Ef A ! /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military. B - Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military used intimidation, rape, torture, murder against civilian population during 25 year conflict, about 20,000 civilian casualties. C – Resettlement (absent): Indonesian military establishes 'black' and 'gray' zones that are cleared of civilians who are forcibly resettled in 2003-2004. Civilians given no warning, forced to leave possessions, then become refugees. D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Negotiated settlement concludes with peace agreement and disarmament provisions in 2000, some fluctuations in violence but lowered. Most fighting truly ends with 2005 tsunami. E - Development Assistance (present): Indonesian gov't builds roads, television relay stations, but no other indications of civic action, development assistance, improvements in livelihood. F - Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence of local alliances with Muslim elites, local leadership. References Edward Aspinall, 2008. “Place and Displacement in the Aceh Conflict,” in Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia, (ed.) Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 119-146. Gunawan, Novarin. 2005. “Anti-Guerrilla Warfare in Aceh, Indonesia from 1980-2005.” Master's Thesis, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. Ross, Michael. 2005. “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesian,” in Understanding Civil War (eds.) Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 35-58.

55. ,aru 'slam"# start $ 195&
'' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in a-Cdef A . /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres by Indonesian military. B - Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military pressed civilians into militia service and participation in cordon-and-sweep operaitons known as pagar betis while under threat. C – Resettlement (present): Indonesian military does evacuate and resettle villagers who live in Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed. D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty or negotiations, DI insurgency ends with decapitation. E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence found. F - Elite Relationships (absent): Few elite relationships, Kilcullen (2000) argues that local military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de facto control over civil administration and civil society. References Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 19451999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales. ----. 2006. “Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 44-64. ----. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University Press.

56. @urdistan# start $ 1991
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" A-C,ef A ! /assacres present"0 (ra9i re!ime has a lon! history of indiscriminately attacAin! 7urdish civilians from 1%-1 on?ard. This includes 1om1in! of 7urdish villa!es follo?in! 1%-1 u)risin! ">HBallance '00', 1&*$. <ater on, (ra9i re!ime of Saddam @ussein re)eatedly used lar!e#scale massacres on 7urdish civilian )o)ulations, includin! the nfal cam)ai!n of 1%&&, in ?hich chemical ?ea)ons ?ere used to Aill +00,000 civilians ">H<eary '00', 17#1&$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 torture and e6traEudicial murder ?ere re!ular features of (ra9i cam)ai!ns a!ainst 7urds. Cou)led ?ith massacres, civilians still e6)erience )rofound )sycholo!ical trauma "Bolton et. al. '00'$. C ! *esettlement present"0 (ra9i counterinsur!ency a!ainst the 7urds created lar!e refu!ee flo?s, some civilians relocated to settlements alon! hi!h?ays in areas of (ra9i#controlled
'+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

7urdistan Ano?n as mujamma?at, or collectivities that (ra9is referred to as modern villa!es. "@3F 1%%'$ , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 (ra9i re!ime and 7urds si!n a cease#fire in 1%70 that !rants 7urdish autonomy in four years. @o?ever, a!reement doesnHt really hold as 1order dis)utes and conflicts are endemic. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance )rovided 1y (ra9 to 7urdish )o)ulations. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence that (ra9i re!ime 1uilds local 7urdish allies. *eferences >H<eary, Carole . '00'. IThe 7urds of (ra9: 3ecent @istory, 2uture ;ros)ects.K -iddle ,ast $evie2 of #nternational Affairs -"4$: 17#'%. ,unter, /ichael /. 1%%+. I de facto 7urdish state in Northern (ra9.K Third World 5uarterl% 14"'$: '%*#+1%. >HBallance, 5d!er. '00'. I(ra9.K (n Ara(s at War) -ilitar% ,ffectiveness, 19;8-1991.@ ed. 1y 7enneth >. ;ollacA. <incoln: Bniversity of Ne1rasAa ;ress. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%+. 6enocide in #ra7) The Anfal Cam*aign against the 1urds. Ne? YorA: @uman 3i!hts Fatch.

54. @enya /au /au"# start $ 1955
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" A-CdE2 A . /assacres present"0 /ass Aillin!s ?ere never )art of the tactical re)ertoire of British counterinsur!ency, 1ut they did ha))en follo?in! /au /au atrocities. fter the <ari massacre and the Aillin! of '00 loyalist villa!ers, the local @ome ,uard retaliated 1y Aillin! over 100 villa!ers also in <ari, /arch 1%*+ " nderson '00*, 1'*#1+%$. lthou!h other smaller !rou) Aillin!s tooA )lace, these tended not to 1e a!ainst civilians 1ut a!ainst sus)ected or ca)tured insur!ents. 5ither ?ay, there ?ere no lar!e#scale attem)ts at sim)ly Aillin! all the civilian )o)ulation. Cha))ell sho?s ho? British air)o?er ?as never used to 1om1 civilian tar!ets. "Cha))ell '011$

'4 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 Bennett "'007a$ ar!ues that 1rutality ?as re!ularly used indiscriminately a!ainst the civilian )o)ulation. These included 1eatin!s, torture, and murder. @e ar!ues that these )ractices ?ere mostly committed 1y the 7enya ;olice 3eserve "civilian settlers$, 7in!Hs frican 3ifles, @ome ,uard. 2ormer modeled on rmy 1attalions, latter used in Eoint o)s ?ith the rmy. "(1id., 1**$ British strate!y used )unitive force, fear and intimidation. <ess hearts and minds. "(1id., 1*7$ 5ven thou!h common la? still rei!ned, the result ?as Lsham le!alismH. "(1id., 1*&$ I/inimum force didn not )revail as often as is claimedJ intimidation of the )o)ulation, summary e6ecutions, torture and unrestrained violence ?ere )revalent for at least ei!ht months.K "(1id., 1*&$ This ?ould 1e from 10.*' to -.*+. "(1id.,, 1*+$ The /au /au <ari massacre of @ome ,uard families at <ari and su1se9uent mass intimidation occurs in +.*+. nderson confirms sham le!alism and sho?s ho? sham le!alism ?orAed throu!h the court system, ?ith mass arrests of 7iAuyu and confessions under duress resulted in mass e6ecutions. (ntimidation ?as even used a!ainst sus)ected insur!ent la?yers ?ho ?ere frican or sian. "(1id., 1*-#1*7$ (ntimidation continued throu!h >)erational nvil, startin! ;hase + on )ril '4 1%*4. I nvil e)itomi=ed an attitude of mind that )ervaded the security forcesK " nderson '00*., '0*$, led to screenin! of 7iAuyu in Nairo1i "(1id., '01$. Screenin! commonly involved 1eatin!s and torture "Bennett '0071, -4&$. @ome ,uard also re!ularly looted and )illa!ed 7iAuyu "'10# '11$. nvil 1ecomes the turnin! )oint of the British cam)ai!n and disru)ts /au /au 1ands "'1+#'14$. C . *esettlement present"0 The British re!ularly used resettlement throu!hout the conflict. Cilli!i=ation 1et?een 10.*' and 4.*+ led to as much as 100,000 7iAuyu dis)laced from the 3ift Calley and Central ;rovinces. <ancaster 3ifles LevacuatedH 7iAuyu throu!hout this )hase "Bennett -*', '0071J Bennett 1*+, '007a$ ;olicy reversed in mid#1%*+ ?ith overcro?din! and reali=ation of use of murder, torture, and 1eatin!s. "Bennett '007a, 1*+$ @o?ever, )o)ulation is )ut throu!h mass screenin! in >) nvil in 4.*4, and this results in detention and relocation of 70,000 7iAuyu. The cam)s ?ere atrocious, and all Nairo1i churches made outs)oAen criticism of !ovHt )olicy " nderson '07#'0&$. 3esettlements of loyalist 7iAuyu around 5uro)ean farms also tooA )lace throu!h 1%**#1%*- "Branch '007, +0-$, )resuma1ly for their security and for economic o))ortunities. They sou!ht self#mastery, and critici=ed /au /au for their lacA of it and use of violence a!ainst them. "Branch '007, +07$ , ! Amnesty3+egotiation a(sent"0 T?o offers of ne!otiation are made to /au /au, first ha))enin! in 4.*4 after ca)ture of ,eneral China. This ?as not honored and re1els ?ho aimed to surrender ?ere instead am1ushed, and those ?ho ?ent to trail ?ere han!ed. " nderson '00*, '7-#'77$. The settlers al?ays reEected ne!otiations as ?ell "(1id., '7&$, maAin! British commitments difficult to u)hold and caused )references to diver!e. Belief of /au /au as Lsu1# humanH 1locAed British from ever taAin! re1el )references seriously or seein! them as le!itimate, and instead they ?ere Eust seen as cra=ed and 1loodthirsty, a reEection of modernity "(1id. '&0# '&1$.
'* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance a))eared to 1e used selectively, and not all 7iAuyu received the same 1enefits from ne? schools, infrastructure, and other ne? services. !ain, )atrona!e ?as used to 1uild net?orAs of clients, and British assistance ?as funneled throu!h their loyalists. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 British ties to 7enyan loyalists ?ere dee), local chiefs had 1een incor)orated into self#rule throu!hout the colonial )eriod, they favored their clients. (n fact, these relationshi)s to local elites are ?hat drove the re1ellion, as many fricans ?ere e6cluded and 1ecame tenants ?ho lost their land and suffered under lo? ?a!es. /au /au led the cause of the dis)ossessed " nderson '00+, **$ These loyalists ?ere recruited into the @ome ,uard as ?ell, they ?ere the tar!ets of /au /au. @o?ever, British res)ond 1y )rotectin! and )rovidin! 7iAuyu loyalists ?ith resources to 1uild their o?n )atrona!e throu!h ne? local institutions: I lthou!h not usur)ed entirely, chiefs and headmen ?ere demoted and re)laced in the u))er echelons of )atron#client net?orAs 1y frican le!islators and administrators a))ointed as 7enya 1e!an to )re)are for decoloni=ation.K "Branch '007, +14$ Thus, there is the erosion of the old net?orA throu!h /au /au attacAs and the construction of a ne? one in the emer!in! edifice of the 7enyan state. *eferences nderson, 8avid. '00*. =istories of the =anged) The .irt% War in 1en%a and the ,nd of ,m*ire. Bennett, @u?. '007"a$. IThe /au /au 5mer!ency as ;art of the British rmyOs ;ost#Far Counterinsur!ency 56)erience.K .efense A "ecurit% Anal%sis. '+"'$: 14+#1-+. Bennett, @u?. '007"1$. IThe >therSide of the C>(N: /inimum and 56em)lary 2orce in British rmy Counterinsur!ency in 7enya.K 1&"4$: -+&#--4. Branch, 8aniel. '007. IThe 5nemy Fithin: <oyalists and the Far !ainst /au /au in 7enya.K !ournal of African =istor%. 4&: '%1#+1*. Cha))ell, Ste)hen. '011. I ir)o?er in the /au /au conflict: the !overnmentOs chief ?ea)on.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. ''"+$: 4%*#*'*. Thornton, 3od. '00%. I/inimum 2orceO: a re)ly to @u? Bennett,K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. '0"1$: '1*#''-.

55. 4aos# start $ 199=
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" A-C,E2 A ! /assacres present"0 BS su))ort to <aotian re!ime after 1%-' includes attacAs on areas of <aos used 1y China and N. Cietnam for o?n o)erations, )articularly those focused on S. Cietnam. BS 1om1s these areas heavily, destroyin! entire villa!es "Stuart#2o6 1%%7, 1+&#14'$
'3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 C( #funded and trained Lsecret armyH of @mon! troo)s ?orAed ?ith C( to neutrali=e ;athet <ao elements via assassination, torture to !ain intelli!ence and information. C ! *esettlement present"0 (n 1%-0, @mon! commander relocated '00 villa!es dee)er into the mountains south of the ;lain of Gars to Aee) )o)ulation from comin! under control of the ;athet <ao. This )o)ulation is then used to recruit irre!ulars for the Lsecret ?arH. "Stuart#2o6 1%%7, 117$. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Tri)artite ne!otiations occur after 1%-0 cou) amon! neutralists, ri!htists, and leftists "includin! !reat )o?ers$ that leads to the ,eneva !reement of 1%-' and the formation of a Second Coalition ,overnment. @o?ever, this !overnment does 1reaA do?n in 1%-4 and the ?ar resumed. "Stuart#2o6 1%%7$ E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 BS (8 ?as heavily involved in )rovidin! assistance to the <aotian !overnment, so much so that a BS (8 advisor ?as assi!ned to each ministry "Stuart# 2o6 1%%7, 1+0$ 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 <aotian !overnment and C( 1uild stron! ties to leaders of @mon! ethnic !rou) "Stuart#2o6 1%%7$. *eferences Stuart#2o6, /artin. 1%%7. A =istor% of &aos. Cam1rid!e: Cam1rid!e Bniversity ;ress.

59. /alaya# start $ 194&
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" a-C,E2 A . /assacres a(sent"0 no evidence that the British sou!ht to destroy the Chinese )o)ulation of /alaya. They a))ear to not have em)loyed any heavy fire)o?er or air)o?er a!ainst civilians. This is consistent ?ith Na!lOs discussion as the British as an im)erial, non#conventional army "Na!l '00', +*#*7$. >ne massacre of note did occur at Batan! 7ali, 1ut this ?as not official )olicy nor informally tolerated. 7omer "1%7', *1#*'$ claims no 1om1in!s of )o)ulation centers, very limited use of artillery at all. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 Bennett "'00%$ sho?s that the British re!ularly coerced Chinese civilians. Ciolence included shootin! those civilians ?ho fled counterinsur!ents and destroyed their )ro)erty. This ?as not halted 1y 2ar 5ast <and 2orces 1ecause it inter)reted the intel it !athered as sho?in! that these forms of coercion ?ere successful. British used collective )unishments a!ainst entire communities. 8idnOt codify this in directives, 1ut Icreated a )ermissive environment 1y encoura!in! a hostile attitude to?ards an entire )o)ulation, ?ithout
'7 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

initially settin! out s)ecific !uideliens on the use of force.K "Bennett '00%, 4+1$. 2orms of re)ression used descri1es sus)ects as Oshot ?hilst attem)tin! to esca)eO, liAe at the Batan! 7ali massacre in 8ecem1er 1%4&. lso mass arrests in cordon#and#s?ee) o)s. "Bennett '00%, 4+-$. Nonetheless,these actions alienated the )o)ulation from counterinsur!ents "@acA '007$. C . *esettlement present"0 1&,*00 resettled 1y /arch 1%*0. 8one in an adhoc 1asis. /aEor resettlement )ro!rams 1e!in after that "Bennett '00%, 4+&#%$. ,enerally occurred follo?in! insur!nt attacAs )re#1%*0, follo?ed 1y 1urnin! of homes, )ro)erty destruction "Bennett '00%, 4+%$. Bri!!s ;lan of )ril 1%*0 resettles over *00,000 s9uatters, re!rou)s -00,000 la1orers. Starts in Gune, done 1y 1%*1. 3esettlements involve food controls, denyin! resources to )o)ulation. By the end of the 5mer!ency, almost one#tenth of entire )o)ulation ?ere resettled in Ne? Cilla!es "7omer 1%7', *-#-1$. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 re?ard for defection )ro!ram e6ists after 1%4&, offers )ayment to /N< #/C; mem1ers for defection, inforamtion a1out others. Nets over ',000 defections durin! entire emer!ency. Ne!otiations do occur in 1%** as ?ell. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 2rom late 1%*' on?ard, Ne? Cilla!es "resettlements$ receive more 1asic schools, to?n halls, medical facilities, and 1etter infrastructure "@acA '00%$. Ne? Cilla!es ?ere I/alayaOs !reatest socioeconomic develo)ment )roEect durin! 1%4&#1%-0.K "7omer 1%7', -'$ 2 ! Elite *elationships present"0 Tem)ler tries to ?in over Chinese after comin! to )o?er, im)rovin! infratstructure in Ne? Cilla!es, )ermits enhanced administrative )o?ers 1y elected villa!e councils in /ay 1%*', citi=enshi) conferred on Chinese. "Smith '001, --$. Tem)ler also she)herds throu!h a ne? ;u1lic Service Commission in Nov 1%*+, ?hich )ermits non#/alays "Chinese$ to Eoin administrative service, and encoura!es Chinese recruitment "Smith '001, -7# -&$. lliance 1et?een Bnited /alays National >r!ani=aiton "BN/>$ and /alayan Chinese ssociation "/C , )reviously formed in 1%4% ?ith su))ort from ,urney and /ac8onald "Smith '001, -*J 7omer 1%7', -*$, ?hile the alliance itself ?as formed in 1%*' "Smith '001, 71$ ?ins elections in 1%**. 8emonstrates elite relationshi)s formed amon!st leaders of Chinese minority @acA "'00%$. 5lections 1ecame an incentives for these !rou)s, liAe /C , to challen!e /C; for )o)ular su))ort. "Smith '001, 71$. *eferences Bennett, @u?. '00%. I Cery Salutary 5ffect: The Counter#Terror Strate!y in the 5arly /alayan 5mer!ency, Gune 1%4& to 8ecem1er 1%4%.K !ournal of "trategic "tudies. +'"%$: 41*#444.
'& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

@acA, 7arl. '00%. IThe /alayan 5mer!ency as counter#insur!ency )aradi!m.K !ournal of "trategic "tudies. +'"+$: +&+#414. 7omer, 3o1ert F. 1%7'. The -ala%an ,mergenc% in $etros*ect. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: 3 N8 Cor)oration. Smith, Simon. '001. I,eneral tem)ler and counter#insur!ency in /alaya: hearts and minds, intelli!ence, and )ro)a!anda.K .efence and #ntelligence Anal%sis. 1-"+$: -0#7&. Na!l, Gohn . '00'. &earning to ,at "ou* 2ith a 1nife) Counterinsurgenc% &essons for -ala%a and /ietnam. Chica!o: Bniversity of Chica!o ;ress.

5%. /oAam(iBue *E+A/C"# start $ 19%9
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed" a-C,e2 A ! /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are many cases of e6traEudicial murder, no evidence found of lar!e#scale massacres. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 once in )o?er, 235<(/> 1uilt state )o?er 1y identifyin! internal enemies to 1e re)ressed in the defense of the nation. This re9uired the use of mass detention, torture, e6traEudicial murder of tar!eted /o=am1icans "/achava '011$. 7 C ! *esettlement present"0 ?hile 235<(/> did relocate individuals to )rison or ?orA cam)s ?ho sus)ected of or ?ere convicted of treason or some ty)e of crime a!ainst the state "/achava '011$, it did not relocate entire civilian )o)ulations as a means of controllin! them. Fhile a villa!i=ation )ro!ram ?as enacted 1y 235<(/> after the defeat of the ;ortu!uese, it ?as later used as )art of the res)onse to 35N />Hs re1ellion "<undstrom '00%$. D - Negotiations/Amnesty (present): FRELIMO negotiations with RENAMO culminate in the 1992 Rome Accords, a cease-fire which holds until 2013. E - Development Assistance (absent): although development assistance and humanitarian aid was provided by the United Nations, FRELIMO did not provide development assistance to civilian populations as part of a counterinsurgency strategy to win the loyalty of the people. F - Elite Local Relationships (present): FRELIMO establishes local militias throughout the country led by local chefes de quartierao (heads of residential units) to identify traitors of the state (Machava 2011). References
'% 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Lunstrom, Elizabeth. 2009. “Terror, Territory, and Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican ‘Civil’ War.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99(5): 884-892. Machava, Benedito Luis. 2011. “State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975-1983).” Journal of Southern African Studies 37(1): 593-609. @uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%0. =uman $ights Watch World $e*ort 1990. Ne? YorA: NY. htt):..???.hr?.or!.re)orts.1%%0.F3%0.inde6.htm#To)>f;a!e, last accessed 2e1. '1, '014.

5&. /oAam(iBue 'ndependence# start $ 1995
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,Ef A . /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese ado)t a Oscorched#earthO )arty alon! Tan=anian 1order in Ca1o 8el!ado ?ith simultaneous re!rou)in! in 1%-*. "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 100$. 3eferences are made in historical sources to the use of defoliants and na)alm /o=am1i9ue, 1ut these are often mentioned ?ithout reference to s)ecific incidents. nother e6am)le is the Isystematic a))lication of officially sanctioned violence a!ainst noncom1atants consisted of the strafin! of trails and ?ater holes and the na)almin! of !uerrilla forest 1ases.K "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. /issionaries leave (nhamin!a ;lateau to )rotest mass Aillin!s, '00 dead from u!ust 1%7+ to /arch 1%74 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. I2rom the 1e!innin! of the conflict there e6isted a marAed indifference to?ard /o=am1ican life.K "1+1$ Torture, intimidation, and mass Aillin!s used to com)el )o)ulation into aldeamentos. "(1id., 1+1$. lthou!h no s)ecific incidents are mentioned, ( assume these ?ere common)lace amon! ;ortu!uese C>(N. >ne noted massacre occurs in the villa!e of Firiyamu, south of Tete, ?here ;ortu!uese forces Ailled 400 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'0$. ;ortu!uese forces also attacAed civilians out of frustration follo?in! insur!ent attacAs, ?ith murders of sus)ected mine layers and su))orters in /ocum1ura in /ay 1%71 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'%$. lso thre? !renades into cro?ded huts as retaliation for allo?in! insur!ents to set u) attacAs "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'%$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 Torture, intimidation, and mass Aillin!s used to com)el )o)ulation into aldeamentos "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. ;ortu!uese used civilians as human mine detectors, forcin! them do?n sus)ect roads to clear them "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+'$. Civilian huts and cro)s destroyed ?hen they did not ?illin!ly move into resettlements "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+'$. ;ortu!uese )olice torture and use e6traEudicial murder a!ainst detainees "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+-$. ;olice also use ?ide dra!nets and mass detention re!ularly, lar!est ?as in 1%7' ?here 1&00 ?ere detained "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+7$. 5stimated 10,000 re!ime o))onenets ?ere arrested 1et?een
+0 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

1%-7#1%7+, ?ith ;(85 usin! torture on )risoners "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10+$. 9lechas "native frican s)ecial forces includin! turned insur!ents$ Ano?n to Itreat ?ith a a sava!e ruthlessness the villa!ers amon! ?hom they o) )rove their ne? commitmentK "@enriAsen 1%&+, 107$. C . *esettlement present"0 3esettlement schemes ?ere modeled after British in /alaya "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1*4$. s Bender "1%7'$ )oints out in n!ola, ;ortu!uese use three ty)es of resettlements, includin! military#run aldeamentos, reordenamento rural for socioeconomic develo)ment, and colonatos de soldados But, reordenamentos are used less in /o=am1i9ue, and more colnatos used in areas ?ith !uerrilla activity. "Gundanian 1%74,*'0$ Aldeamentos first )ro)osed in 1%-*, im)lemented south of Tan=anian 1order in Ca1o 8el!ado, usin! scorched earth )olicy "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 100J Gundanian 1%74, *'+$. 1 million resettled 1y 1%70. >fficals admit that )o)ulation not so involved in resettlement construction, and Ithe amenities of the villa!es are minimal.K (nfrastructure and services to follo? after ra)id re!rou)in! "*'-$. "Gundanian 1%74, *40$ ,eneral rria!a does too much too 9uicAly, 1uilt all settlements fast, vie?ed ne!atively 1y the )eo)le . "Cann 1%%7, 1*7$ 3esettlements often done forcefully, had hardshi)s on the )eo)le and didnHt account for frian desire to remain in their o?n lands. "Cann 1%%7, 1-1J @enriAsen 1%&+, 1-1$ , ! +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 ;ortu!uese did su))ort efforts to !et 235<(/> )ersonnel to defect, as military )u1lished offers of amnesty 1efore, durin!, and after lar!e cam)ai!ns, offerin! money for ?ea)ons. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 10+$. Fhen rria!as comes to )o?er, he orders that ?ounded 235<(/> troo)s !et flo?n out for medical care first to encoura!e defection. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 104$ Ne!otiations eventually leadin! to inde)dence 1e!in on * Gune 1%74. Bnofficial cease# fires emer!e throu!hout the ;ortu!uese rmy. ;ortu!ual si!ns handover of )o?er to 235<(/> on 7 Se)tem1er 1%74 "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'7$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 >nly s)oradic develo)ment )roEects in the a1sence of maEor reordenamento rural )roEects "*'0$. These )ro!rams IhavenHt 1een ?ell financed nor have they hel)ed a si!nificant num1er of fricans.K "*'1$ /aEor develo)ment initiatives centered around construction of the Ca1ora Bassa 8am "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1-*$. But, the dam ?asnOt intended so much for /o=am1ican develo)ment, 1ut to attract more settlers, foster mineral e6traction in Tete, and )rovide electricity to South frica "(ssacon and (ssacson 1&+, 104J /unslo? 1%&+, 114$. lso, ;ortu!uese settlers ?ant to use fricans as a la1or source, less em)hasis on actually )rovidin! develo)ment for them as o))osed to the 5uro)eans. frican cro) )urchases fell, indicatin! a declinin! standard of livin!, ?hile statistics sho? hi!her economic !ains for

+1 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

5uro)eans "Gundanian *+-#*+7 1%74$ Bisho)s also com)lain not enou!h schools, 9ualified teachers "Gundanian 1%74, *+&$. Social )ro!rams: Cann )rovides data su!!estin! increases in admitted students and teachers in n!ola "*6$, ,uinea "'6$, and /o=am1i9ue "1.&6$. "Cann 1%%7, 147$ rmy )layed Aey role, 1uildin! schools, 1ecame teachers if necessary. "Cann 1%%7 ,14&$ >n health, ;ortu!uese ado)ted F@> standards for )ro)er health care re!ardin! num1ers of )rofessionals . )o)ulation, military 1ecame )rime im)lementer. "(1id., 14%$ /ilitary ?orAed to ensure doctors.nurses.hos)itals ?ere availa1le to meet standards. "(1id., 1*0$. But military had to fill in a massive !a) since not enou!h teachers ?ere availa1le. ll these su!!est a mi6ed a))roach to?ard develo)ment. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ;ortu!al al?ays sou!ht to )it tri1es a!ainst each other, su!!ested 235<(/> ?as dominated 1y the /aAonde tri1e and an enemy of the /aAua tri1e., all in Ca1o 8el!ado "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'1$. (n Niassa, ;ortu!uese )it the ;ao and NyanEa, the latter ?as 235<(/> "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10'$. (n aldeamentos, local chiefs are mo1ili=ed to raise a 10#1' man militia, su)ervised 1y the army 1ut )aid 1y administration "/unslo? 1%&+, 1''$. But over lon!#term, the ;ortu!uese fail to develo) a Imoderate /o=am1ican constituencyK "@endriAsen 1%&+, 47$, limited efforts to include fricans in the colonial state 1ut are never serious "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10&$. No )ro!rams to train local leaders and youth to lead local !overnment "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10%$. (N the last )hase, ;ortu!uese do su))ort the emer!ence of the 6ru*o 4nido de -oBam(i7ue, ?hich advocated for continued ties to metro)ole, 1ut this is too little and too late to affect ?ar. "@endriAsen 1%&+, 110$. *eferences (saacman, llen and Bar1ara (saacman, 1%&+. -oBam(i7ue) 9rom Colonialism to $evolution, 1900 C 198 . Boulder, C>: Fesvie? ;ress. @enriAsen, Thomas @. 1%&+. $evolution and Counterrevolution) -oBam(i7ue0s War of #nde*endence, 198;-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ,reen?ood ;ress. Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The +ortuguese Wa% of War, 1981-19>;. Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er. /unslo?, Barry. 1%&+. -oBam(i7ue) the $evolution and its :rigins. <ondon: <on!man. Gundanian, Brendan 2. 1%74. I3esettlement ;ro!rams: Counterinsur!ency in /o=am1i9ue.K Com*arative +olitics.

59. +ami(ia# start $ 19%6
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" a-cdEf

+' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

A . /assacres a(sent"0 Ciolence used a!ainst civilians, 1ut no evidence of mass Aillin!s or massacres. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;olice tortured ca)tured insur!ents, res)onsi1le for C>(N from 1%--#1%74 "3ichard '007, 10$. Then South frican 8efence 2orces 1ecome involved. /istreatment of )risoners and civilians continues 1y S 82 )ost#1%74 "(1id., 14$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 No evidence of resettlement. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 No evidence of!otiations. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present" S 82 does em)loy civic action )ro!rams su))lyin! )u1lic !oods, indicatin! )rovision of develo)ment assistance, social services "(1id., 14$. 2 . 4ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 No evidence of elite relationshi)s. *eferences Baines, ,ary. '007. IBreaAin! 3anA: Secrets, Silences and Stories of South fricaOs Border Far.K ,rahamsto?n: 3hodes Bniversity. 8ale, 3ichard. 1%%+. I/eldin! Far and ;olitics in Nami1ia: South fricaOs Counterinsur!ency Cam)ai!n, 1%--#1%&%.K Armed 9orces and "ociet%. '0"1$: 7#'4.

6=. +epal# start $ 199%
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed" A-c,ef A ! /assacres present"0 in later )hase, state violence ?as more intense than insur!ents. fter failure of '001 cease#fire and use of military, more indiscriminate violence a!ainst civilians occur. (n u!ust '00+, 3; Aills t?enty /aoist sus)ects near the villa!e of 8oram1a "Norris '011, 14$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 3oyal Ne)alese rmy re!ularly Ailled civilians as )art of re)ressive strate!y a!ainst insur!ency. Caused more casualties than insur!ents throu!hout most of the conflict "Battacharya '01+$. C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of use of resettlements. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ne!otiations and successful cease#fire held after death of royal family in '001, 1ut fail later on as state )ushes more violence. +,000 deaths in '00'. /ost cease#fires thus lead to failed ne!otiations, e6ce)t for last ne!otiated settlement that leads to the dissolution of the monarchy "Battarcharya '01+$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence that develo)ment assistance ?as used 1y
++ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Ne)alese re!ime as )art of counterinsur!ency strate!y. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 state did try to co#o)t local )atrons.elites 1y )rotectin! their o?n economic interests "Goshi '01+$. But the Ne)alese re!ime !radually alienated most se!ments of the )o)ulation ?ith violence as /aoists rose in )o?er, eventually forcin! dissolution of the monarchy. No relationshi)s )resent or sustained. *eferences Norris, Gohn. '011. I@o? not to Fa!e a Counter#(nsur!ency: Ne)al, the /aoists, and @uman 3i!hts.K =uman $ights Bulletin, 11"'$: 1+#1*. Goshi, /adhav. '01+. I<ivelihood Co)in! /echanisms, <ocal (ntelli!ence, and the ;attern of Ciolence 8urin! the /aoist (nsur!ency in Ne)al.K Terrorism and +olitical /iolence '*"*$: &'0# &+%. Bhattacharya, Sro1ana. '01+. IStrate!ic (nteraction Bet?een 3e1els and the State: the /aoist Conflict in Ne)al.K "tudies in Conflict and Terrorism +-"7$: *7+#*&7. Study of

61. +icaragua Contras"# start $ 19&1
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed" a-C,E2 A ! /assacres a(sent"0 No clear evidence of massacres, more e6traEudicial Aillin! of small num1ers of sus)ected Contra su))orters. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 56traEudicial e6ecution ?as common amon! sus)ected Contras and dissidents. C . *esettlement present"0 fter out1reaA of conflict in 1%&0, re!ime removes &0 )ercent of /isAito )o)ulation and resettles them in strate!ic hamlets. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ne!otiations in 1%&% lead to )eace a!reement in ?hich Contras disarm and elections are held in 1%%0. Sandinistas lose elections 1ut remain stron! )arty. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 re!ime initiates 1road land reform that redistri1utes land to )easants. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 (n 1%&*, re!ime 1e!ins to incor)orate /isAito leadershi) into 2S<N )arty and !overnment throu!h decentrali=aiton, creation of t?o ne? de)artments in the east.

+4 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

*eferences Close, 8avid. 1%&%. I3es)ondin! to <o? (ntensity Conflict: Counterinsur!ency in Nicara!ua.K ;resented to the RC Con!ress of the <atin merican Studies ssociation, San Guan, ;uerto 3ico. BlaAe, Samuel F. 1%%'. ITotalitarianism in Sandinista Nicara!ua.K "tudies in Conflict and Terrorism. 1*: '01#''+. Fest, F. ,ordon. 1%%'. IThe Sandinista 3ecord on @uman 3i!hts in Nicara!ua.K .roit et "ociete. '': +%+#40&.

65# +icaragua SomoAa"# start $ 19%&
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" A-cdef A . /assacres present"0 Somo=a re!ime re)ressed civilians more than fou!ht Sandinistas 1y 1om1in! villa!es, 1om1in! /ana!ua durin! last 1attles of the re!ime in 1%7%. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 re!ime re!ularly used torture, e6traEudicial murder, and assassination to re)ress dissent and su))orters of Sandinistas. C – Resettlement (absent): no evidence of forced resettlement of civilians, although refugees are created through conflict. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 BS#s)onsored mediation of the conflict taAes )lace in late 1%7& throu!h 1%7%. These ne!otiations are ultimately unsuccessful as Somo=a refuses to a!ree to a )le1iscite to decide his rule. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 No evidence that Somo=aOs re!ime )rovides develo)ment assistance or civic action )ro!rams to increase the 1enefits of coo)eration to the )o)ulation. BS aid to Nicara!ua is also cut durin! this )eriod 1y the Carter administration in )rotest of human ri!hts violations, further limitin! resources that could 1e )rovided to the re!ime, and then to civilians. 2 ! Elite *elationships a(sent"0 No evidence that Somo=a ?ins over rural elites or )olitical moderates. 3ather, )olari=ation driven 1y the ?ar tends to )ull a?ay )otential allies and drives them to?ard the Sandinistas and the 1road#1ased o))osition. *eferences /ont!omery, 3o1in Navarro. 1%&0. IThe 2all of Somo=a: natomy of a revolution,K +arameters R"1$, 47#*7.
+* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Feathers, Bynum, 5. 1%&+. I,uerrilla Farfare in Nicara!ua,K ir Bniversity 8ocumentary 3esearch Study. /ont!omery, <: /a6?ell ir 2orce Base, BS ir 2orce. Seli!son, /itchell . and Cincent /c5lhinny. 1%%-. I<o?#(ntensity Farfare, @i!h#(ntensity 8eath: the 8emo!ra)hic (m)act of the Fars in 5l Salvador and Nicara!ua.K Canadian !ournal of &atin American and Cari((ean "tudies '1: '11#'41.

66. +igeria +iger ,elta"# start $ 1991
'ncum(ent stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) ongoing" A-c,E2 A ! /assacres present"0 Ni!erian state security forces Aill do=ens and 1urn villa!es follo?in! 7aiama 8eclaration )rotests in 8ec. 1%%&#Gan. 1%%% "2rynas '001, 4%$ /o1ile ;olice res)onds to anti#Shell )rotests in 1%%0 1y Aillin! &0 and 1urnin! hundreds of homes "2rynas '001, *1$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 >!oni anti#oil )rotests are met ?ith ei!ht e6traEudicial e6ecutions in 1%%* "2rynas '001, 4%$. C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 amnesty !ranted in '00% to all militants ever involved in 8elta insur!ency in e6chan!e for handin! over arms "5!?emi '010$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 in 1%%', the >il /ineral ;roducin! reas 8evelo)ment Commission is esta1lished to launch a!ricultural develo)ments in areas ?hile oil is e6tracted, mostly usin! oil revenues. 3e)laced 1y Ni!er 8elta 8evelo)ment Commission "2rynas '001, 4+$. 2 ! 4ocal Elite *elationships present"0 Ni!erian !overnment seeAs to co#o)t local actors in the 8elta 1y devolvin! local !overnmental res)onsi1ilities, ena1lin! access to state )atrona!e. *eferences 2rynas, ,eor!e GedrEeE. '001. ICor)orate and state res)onses to anti#oil )rotests in the Ni!er 8elta.K African Affairs. 100: '7#*4. 5!?emi, C. '010. I2rom /ilitancy to mnesty: Some Thou!hts on ;resident YarHaduaHs ))roach to the Ni!er 8elta Crisis.K Current $esearch !ournal of ,conomic Theor% '"+$: 1+-# 141.

+3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

64. Papua +e8 7uinea# start $ 19&&
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed" A-C,Ef A ! /assacres present"0 ;N, military forces fired !renades into villa!es, indiscriminately shot u) villa!es ?ith machine !uns, fired mortars at civilian areas usin! ?hite )hos)orous rounds "<asslett '01', 714$.

- ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;N, did use e6traEudicial murder and torture on sus)ected mem1ers of Bou!ainville re1ellion, as ?ell as se6ual assaults of ?ea)on in Lcare centersH "<asslett '01', 714$. C ! *esettlement present"0 ;N, forces drove civilians from conflict areas and held them in Lcare centersH, ?hich nominally ?ere created to )rovide them ?ith 1asic !ood 1ut functioned as concentration cam)s "<asslett '01', 714$. , ! Amnesty3+egotations0 present"0 )eace a!reement si!ned in '001 relyin! on local reconciliation traditions E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;N, !overnment ?ithheld food deliveries to Bou!ainville instead "<asslett '01'$, it did initiate the Bou!ainville 8evelo)ment ;acAa!e in 1%&%, )rovidin! 747,000 )er lando?ner to com)ensate for )ast creation of a co))er mine ?hich adversely affected the )o)ulation "Smith 1%%1$. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships a(sent"0 althou!h some civilians are )ro#!overnment and form Bou!ainville 3esistance 2orce to counter re1els, no evidence of any leadershi) from s)ecific )re# e6istin! social !rou)s. *eferences <asslett, 7ristian. '01'. IState Crime 1y ;ro6y: ustralia and the Bou!ainville Conflict.K British !ournal of Criminolog%. *': 70*#7'+. Carl, ndy and Sr. <orriane ,arasu. '00'. Weaving Consensus) The +a*ua 'e2 6uinea C Bougainville *eace *rocess. <ondon: Conciliation 3esources. 7err, 7atherine S. '000. I;a)ua Ne? ,uinea in 1%%%: Ste))in! BacA from the BrinA.K Asian "urve%. 40"1$: -1#--.
+7 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Felsey#Smith, Terence. 1%%1. I;a)ua Ne? ,uinea in 1%%0: +1"'$: 1&&#1%*.

Year in Crisis.K Asian "urve%.

65. Peru# start $ 19&=
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" A-cdE2 A . /assacres present"0 (n 1%&&, massacre at Cayara 1y ;eruvian army Aills -0 civilians " mnesty (nternational, 1%&&$. t ccomarca in 1%&*, -% civilians Ailled "Truth and 3econciliation Commission '00+, -*+$. >ther massacres 1y the rmy and death s9uads are sus)ected althou!h less hard evidence e6ists to demonstrate )roof they ha))ened. B – Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and harassment of civilians by Peruvian military and police was common throughout the conflict. C – Resettlement (absent): While refugees were created by COIN and insurgent operations, no systematic policy of resettlement. D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): amnesty is offered to Sendero fi!hts after the ca)ture of ,u=man in 1%%'. Thousands res)ond )ositively. E - ,evelopment Assistance present"0 lthou!h no detailed develo)ment )lan ?as ado)ted, ;eru successfully uses small#scale )roEects 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 in 1%%0s, ;eru ?ins su))ort of villa!e leaders of ;eruvian )easants to encoura!e formation of cam*esinos, local villa!e militias. >ccurs after 1rutal violence of Sendero and earlier indiscriminate violence 1y the ;eruvian state. *eferences Taylor, <e?is. 1%%7. ICounter#insur!ency strate!y, the ;C;#Sendero <uminoso and the civil ?ar in ;eru, 1%&0#1%%-.K Bulletin of &atin American $esearch. 17"1$: +*#*&. 7oc#/enard, Ser!io. '00-. IS?itchin! from (ndiscriminate to Selective Ciolence: The Case of the ;eruvian /ilitary.K Civil Wars &"+#4$, ++'#+*4. Truth and 3econciliation Commission. '00+. 2inal 3e)ort of the Truth and 3econciliation Commission, Colume C(. <ima: ,overnment of ;eru. htt):..???.cverdad.or!.)!les.ifinal.conclusiones.)h) last accessed /arch 1, '014. mnesty (nternational. 1%%4. IThe Cayara /assacre: the cover#u).K htt):..???.amnesty.or!.es.li1rary.asset. /34-.01* 4%4+71aee10-.amr4-01*1%%4en.)df last accessed /arch 1, '014.

+& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

69. Philippines Du> *e(ellion"# start $195=
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" A-c,Ef A . /assacres present"0 (n 1%*0, ;hili))ines rmy Aills 100 civilians in Bacalor, ;am)an!a and 1urn over 100 homes in retaliation for death of one of their officers 1y !uerrillas "8ou!las 1%*+, 11&$. *0 farmers Ailled in <a!una same year as sus)ected @uAs "/cCarren 1%--, '&$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Philippine forces, especially the Militar Police Command, absued villagers, intimidation and harassment, beatings were common. Some political opponents were summarily executed individually. C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement of civilians in new locations to enable separation from insurgents. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Economic Development Corps used to encourage Huk rebels to defect under amnesty. Rebels were promised land in exchange for turning to the government. However, less than 1,000 rebels took up EDC offer. E - Development Assistance (present): When Magsaysay becomes Defense head, he creates an Economic Development Corps within the military that performs civic action programs and provides aid to civilians to reduce dependence on Huks and increase ties with the government. F - Elite Relationships (absent): No evidence that local peasant leadership joins against Huk rebellion and with government. References Douglas, William O. 1953. North from Malaya: Adventure on Five Fronts. New York: Doubleday. McCarren, Edwin J. 1966. Personal Leadership: An Element of National Power. Carlisle: US Army War College. Dillon, Dana R. 1995. “Comparative Counter-insurgency Strategies in the Philippines.” 6(3): 281-303. Gohnson, Fray 3. and ;aul G. 8imech. I2orei!n internal defense and the @uA1alaha): counter#insur!ency.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies. 4"1$: '%#*'. model

6%. Philippines /+42"# start $ 19%1
incumbent win (Arreguin-Toft = win; RAND = win) aBcDEf
+% 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacre of )rotesters 1y Civilian @ome 8efense Cor)s unit does ha))en in 5scalante in 1%&*, 1ut they are tried for murder. Nonetheless, !overnment retains C@8Cs "van der 7roef 1%&-$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 ;hili))ine forces, es)ecially the /ilitary ;olice Command, a1sued villa!ers, intimidation and harassment, 1eatin!s ?ere common. /any )olitical o))onents ?ere summarily e6ecuted individually. ;aramilitary forces and !an!s allied ?ith re!ular military and )olice en!a!ed in re!ular e6traEudicial murder, e6tortion, and intimidation "van der 7roef 1%&-$ C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 No evidence of resettlement of civilians in ne? locations to ena1le se)aration from insur!ents. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Ne!otiations occur throu!hout the late 1%&0s and early 1%%0s, includin! the )ros)ect of su1stantial autonomy for /uslim areas. <eads to a!reement in 1%%- 1et?een /N<2 and !ovOt leadin! to creation of /uslim /indanao utonomous re!ion 1ut not /(<2 ?hich continues armed o))osition, althou!h !ovOt doesnOt 1other them if they do not launch attacAs. E !,evelopment Assistance present"0 rmy does initiate develo)ment )ro!rams, 1uildin! roads, im)rovin! /indinaoOs air)ort, 1uildin! mos9ues for /uslims, construction of schools, health facilities, su))ort for rural electric service. 2 ! Elite *elationships a(sent"0 after si!nin! )eace treaty, leader of /N<2, Nur /isuari, 1ecomes head of the Southern ;hili))ines Council for ;eace and 8evelo)ment, re!ional !overnor. @o?ever, ( consider this after the end of the conflict, so this is a1sent. *eferences Sales, ;eter /. '00%. IState terror in the ;hili))ines: the lston 3e)ort, human ri!hts and counter#insur!ency under the rroyo administration.K Contem*orar% +olitics 1*"+$: +'1#++-. Cline, <a?rence. '007. IThe (slamic insur!ency in the ;hili))ines.K "mall Wars and #nsurgencies 11"+$: 11*#1+&. Can der 7roef, G. /. 1%&-. ;rivate rmies and 56traEudicial Ciolence in the ;hili))ines. Asian Affairs) An American $evie2 1+"4$: 1#'1. Islam, Syed Serajul. 1998. “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines.” Asian Survey 38(5): 441-456.

40 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

6&. Philippines /'42"# start $ 19%%
incumbent win Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in" A . /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are cases of e6traEudicial murder, no cases found of lar!e# scale massacres. - . E1emplary 2orce present"0 ar1itrary arrests and torture of civilians occur on several occasions in late '000s " mnesty (nternational '00%$. C . *esettlement a(sent"0 ?hile (8;s are created 1y fi!htin! 1et?een military and /(<2, no evidence of resettlement of civilians in locations controlled 1y the !overnment. , . Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /alaysian#1roAered ne!otiations 1et?een !overnment and /(<2 1e!in in '00- seeAi2n! creation of ne? autonomous re!ion called the Ban!samoro 5ntity "Coronel '007$. TalAs are successful in early '014. These follo? from earlier )eace ne!otiations in '00', ?hich lead to relative cease#fire and set sta!e for !reater coo)eration in '00*. E . ,evelopment Assistance present"0 aid is )rovided to develo) /indanao throu!hout 1%%0s, es)ecially in 1%%7 ?hen )roEects are launched ?ith su))ort from BN8; 1ut in conEunction ?ith the !overnment to foster economic revival. ,overnment creates a Ban!samoro 8evelo)ment ;lan in /arch '014, 1ut this is after the ne!otiated )eace treaty in si!ned in Ganuary. Bnless fi!htin! resumes, this ?ill occur after the conflict. 2 . Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 !overnment had co#o)ted from /N<2 leadershi) into )olitical institutions. althou!h /(<2 does )rovide su))ort to ;hili))ine rmed 2orces to defeat Gemaah (slamiyah. @o?ever, considered se)arate conflict. *eferences StarA. Gan. '00+. I/uslims in the ;hili))ines.K !ournal of -uslim -inorit% Affairs '+"1$: 1%*# '0%. Forld BanA. /arch *, '014. I;hili))ines: Ban!samoro 8evelo)ment ;lan 2ormulation 7icAs off Today.K htt):..???.?orld1anA.or!'014.0+.0*.)hili))ines# 1an!samoro#develo)ment#)lan#formulation#AicAs#off. <ast accessed /arch 1', '014. @edman, 5va#<otta 5. IThe ;hili))ines in '00*: >ld 8ynamics, Ne? ConEecture.K Asian "urve% 4-"1$: 1&7#1%+.
41 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Bertrand, Gac9ues. '000. I;eace and Conflict in the Southern ;hili))ines: Fhy the 1%%- ;eace !reement is 2ra!ile.K +acific Affairs 7+"1$: +7#*4.

69. Senegal# start $ 19&=
incum(ent stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mi1ed" A-c,e2 A ! /assacres present"0 military violently dis)erses t?o 1%&' )rotests 1y firin! indiscriminately into cro?ds, in Aillin! many civilians "@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*, '*0$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 violence and harassment used a!ainst civilians as )art of e6tortion for economic !oods "5vans '00+$. Torture ?as also common throu!h the late 1%&0s "@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$. C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement found. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 multi)le ne!otiations throu!hout conflict, includin! the Bissau ccord of 1%%1, resultin! in shaAy )eace treaty si!ned on '00* 1et?een Casamance re1els and state re)resentatives "de Gon! and ,asser '00*$. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence found. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 Bissau ccords led the 2ront Nord ?in! of the re1ellion to maintain )eace 1ut Aee) ?ea)ons, en!a!e in elicit trade, 1ut ultimately su))ort the !overnment. "/um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$. They ?ere effectively co#o)ted 1y )ermittin! their o?n access to the ?ar economy. *eferences @um)hreys, /acartan and @a1aye h /ohamed. '00*. ISene!al and /ali.K (n 4nderstanding Civil War, /ol #. 5d. 1y Nicholas Sam1anis and 8avid Collier. Fashin!ton, 8.C.: The Forld BanA, '47#+0'.

4' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

5vans, /artin. '00'. INi )ai6 ni !uerre: the )olitical economy of lo?#level conflict in Casamance.K @;, BacA!round ;a)er. <ondon: 7in!s Colle!e <ondon. htt):..ds)!ili1rary.or!.Es)ui.1itstream.1'+4*-7&%.''-70.1.NiT'0)ai6T'0niT'0!uerre T'0theT'0)oliticalT'0economyT'0ofT'0lo?T'0levelT'0conflictT'0inT'0the T'0Casamance.)dfQ1, last accessed 2e1ruary '+, '014.

4=. Somalia anti!-arre"# start $ 19&=
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" A-cde2 A ! /assacres present"0 in fi!htin! over the to?ns of @ar!eisa, Burao, and Ber1era, !overnment forces 1om1 areas of the to?ns held 1y re1els and Aill *0,000, many ?ere civilians. ,overnment forces ?ere ?idely Ano?n for such 1rutal acts. The (sa9 clan ?as a s)ecific tar!et of such massacres "Bon!art= 1%%1, '+$. - ! E1emplary 2orce present"0 !overnment forces re!ularly en!a!ed in e6traEudicial murder, torture, and ra)e of civilians in conflict areas "Bon!art= 1%%1, '+J Com)a!non 1%%'$. C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement. , ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 no evidence of amnesty or ne!otiations. E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment assistance. 2 ! Elite 4ocal *elationships present"0 the re!ime em)o?ered allied clans in refu!ee cam)s to attacA rival clans, namely the (sa9, "Bon!art= 1%%1, '+J Com)a!non 1%%'$ there1y cementin! local ties ?ith tri1al leaders. *eferences Bon!art=, /aria. 1%%1. The Civil War in "omalia) its genesis and d%namics. B))sala: NordisAa friAainstitutet. Com)a!non, 8aniel. 1%%'. I ;olitical 8ecay in Somalia: 2rom ;ersonal 3ule to Farlordism.K $efuge 1'"*$: &#1+.

41. Sri 4an>a 4TTE"# start $ 19%1
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ loss :paper pu(lished (efore 8ar ends 8ith incum(ent
4+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

8in;) *A+, $ ongoing :8ar ends in 5=1=;" A-C,ef A . /assacres present"0 ,overnment forces shelled densely )o)ulated areas in Northern Sri <anAa durin! the last months of the conflict in '00%. Tar!ets included hos)itals. /unitions included cluster 1om1s, ?hite )hos)horous. Civilians had 1urn marAs from )hos)horous and na)alm. "Shahne?a= '010, -#7$. <ar!e civilian massacres have 1een common thorou!hout the ?ar, includin! *+ Tamil detaintees at FeliAade ;rison and -0 civilians in Gaffna in Guly 1%&+, 70 at a church in )ril 1%&4 in Gaffna, 100 Tamil civilians at (ra)eriyaAulam army cam) and 100 Tamil civilians at /annar, 1oth in 8ec 1%&4. ttacAs common e6ce)t for 1%&-#1%&%, 1ut lar!e massacres a!ain in 1%&% and 1%%0 of Tamils "(1id., 7#&$. 2e?er attacAs in mid#%0s, cou)le in late#%0s, mid#'00s, and then the final assault ?ith massive num1ers of civilians, in 10s thousands "(1id., &#%$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and summary execution have been common throughout the conflict. Intimidation occurred through arbitrary arrest, and disappearances of insurgents or civilians suspected of supporting the insurgency. From 19881994, at least 20,000 disappeared. (Shahnewaz 2010, 9) “Extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, forced recruitment and other human rights violations are persistent and widespread.’ (Ibid., 10) C – Resettlement (present): Over 100,000 Tamils were displaced from the country post-1983, starting with a mass displacement at the outbreak of the conflict in 1983. Areas around Trincomalee have been depopulated of Tamils. Same happened to Manal aru Tamils in 1985, and in Vanni in 2009. COIN strategy appears to keep Tamil civilians out of some areas to prevent LTTE infiltration Sri Lankan military forces created internment camps called ‘welfare centers’ in March 2008 for civilians fleeing conflicted areas, these were still used in late 2009 after the final offensive crushing the LTTE had ended despite mass overcrowding (Shahnewaz 2010, 7-8). D - Amnesty and Negotiations (present): Peace treaties and cease-fires were common thoroughout the conflict. The first led to the introduction of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987, but this collapsed in renewed violence in 1990, 1995, and 2002. However, In 2004, Colonel Karuna, commander of 6,000 troops, defected with his forces to the Sinhalese military. This greatly diminished LTTE forces and reduced recruitment in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Provinces, increasing its vulnerability. (Jalal 5-6, 2011). DeSilva says it was 3,000 troops that defected, and then 500-600 became gov’t troops (DeSilva 2010, 3). E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of the provision of development assistance to civilians. Instead, the origins of the conflict are due the denial of social services to Tamils. After the 2004-5 tsunami, aid was actually prevented from reaching civilians in LTTE areas. F - Elite Relationships (absent): None, this appears to be total war.
44 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

References DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. 2010. “Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's CounterInsurgency Operations.” Strategic Analysis Paper, Future Directions International. Jalal, Malik Ahmad. 2011. “Think Like a Guerrlla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka.” Harvard Law School National Security Journal. June: 1-10. Shahnewaz, Abdullah. 2010. “Military Solution of Political Crisis in Sri Lanka: Questions to be Asked.” Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs Working Paper.” Smith, Neil. '010. IBnderstandin! Sri <anAaOs 8efeat of the Tamil Ti!ers.K !oint 9orce 5uarterl%. *%"4$: 40#44.

45. Sudan SP4A"# start $ 19&5
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" A-C,ef A . /assacres present"0 Sudanese military seeAs to destroy much of civilian )o)ulation 1y attacAin! villa!es, 1om1in! civilian tar!ets liAe schools ?ith air)o?er, re)eated massacres. B - Exemplary Force (present): Brutality against civilians is common, including rape, forced conscription, mass arrests, assassination of Nuba intellectuals (Meyer 2005). C – Resettlement (present): Population was relocated en masse using 'peace villages' which were nominally protected by the government (Meyer 2005). D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Multiple rounds of negotiations occur, which end in a 2005 peace treaty that promises a future referendum on the status of South Sudan. E - Development Assistance (absent): Development assistance is made available and promoted by the United Nations, but it is not clear that these development efforts are tied to Sudan’s government or its counterinsurgency. Generally, development assistance provided by multilateral institutions would strive for neutrality. Also, development assistnace provided to Nuba who moved to 'peace villages' was offered conditionally in exchange for converting to Islam (Meyer 2005). F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of any relationships with local elite allies. References /eyer, ,a1riel. '00*. War and 9aith in "udan. ,rand 3a)ids, /(: Filliam B. 5erdmans ;u1lishin! Com)any.
4* 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

46. Ti(et# start $ 1959
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in" A-c,ef A . /assacres present"0 Chinese 1om1ed villa!es and monasteries to su))ress re1ellions from 1%*-#1%*% "Tha)a 1%&', &%$. 3e)eated mentions of atrocities leadin! u) to and durin! the mass u)risin! in 1%*%. Chinese then shell and assault <hasa on /arch '0, 1%*% to )ut do?n u)risin!, fire on demonstrators "(1id., 100#101$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Chinese used coercion and intimidation of civilians regularly to deter cooperation with insurgents (Thapa 1982). C – Resettlement (absent): No evidence of resettlement found. D – Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Chinese are in constant discussions with Dalai Lama about Chinese rule in first phase, counts as negotiations (although forceful) (Thapa 1982). E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development assistance. F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships. References Tha)a, ,yan Gun!. 1%&'. IThe Chinese (nvasion of Ti1et and Sino#(ndian 3elations.K /asterOs Thesis, B.S. rmy Command and ,eneral Staff Colle!e, 2t. <eaven?orth.

44. Tur>ey# start $ 19&4
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A :8ar continues after pu(lication# P@@ is mostly defeated# so incum(ent 8in;) *A+, $ 8in" a-C,E2 A . /assacres a(sent"0 /any small scale killings, but no hard evidence of large-scale massacres. B - Exemplary Force (present): Government forces would sweep through villages and beat and torture civilians to extract confessions about PKK collaboration. Military sought to intimidate the population to gain loyalty, thereby countering PKK intimidation and terror with that of the state (McDowall 2000, 425). In the early 1990s, targeted assassinations were conducted against leaders of newly-formed Kurdish political parties (HEP, DEP, HADEP), journalists, and human rights workers. These murders peaked in 1993 when 510 persons were killed that year. (van Bruinessen 1996, 20). C – Resettlement (present): Military embarked on a campaign of forced evacuation and village destruction at the end of the 1980s through the mid-90s, leading to 1,779 villages/hamlets and
43esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden 2001, 80). Systematic ‘cleansing and evaculation’ occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages emptied by July 1995 (McDowall 2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in village-towns, which were constructed along urban planning models but did not accommodate the agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 80-84). D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Turkish military adopts purely military approaches toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political reforms of alleviate causes of the rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the rebellion, and negotiations were never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish initiative in 2009, which presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 251-252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish names of villages and cities, has amnesty for low-middle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish language in education, campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252). E - Development Assistance (present): Military controlled all large constructed projects and military enterprises by 1990 employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no consideration was given about how to connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56; McDowall 2000, 434). In the course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into village-towns, hospitals and clinics were constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few civilians returned to live in such village-towns and utilize the available social services. F - Elite Local Relationships (present): Following the initial PKK offensives, the government passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These militias were organized against tribal clans led by elders, these tended to identify with the rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also, aghas (local landowners) collected salaries for village guards and controlled distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall 2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security forces, these were used to obtain construction contracts to build things like police complexes and schools. References Bacik, Gokhan, and Bezen Balamir Coskun. 2011. “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's Failure to Develop a Political Solution.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 34(3): 248-265. McDowall, David. 2000. A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris. Morgado, Andrew. 2006. Turkish Culture and its Influence on the Counterinusrgency Campaign Against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Thesis manuscript, US Army Command and General Staff College. Leavenworth, KS: Department of Defense.

47 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Jongerden, Joost. 2001. “Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The case of the Kurds in Turkey.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 1(1): 80-86. Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. “Forst burning as a counterinsurgency strategy in Eastern Turkey.” Paper presented at the Kurdish Studies Conference, organized by the Kurdish Instite of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, September 6 to September 9, 2006. Can Bruinessen, /artin. 1%%-. ITurAeyOs 8eath S9uards.K -iddle ,ast $e*ort. )ril#Gune: '0# '+.

45. Eganda 4*A"# start $ 19&9
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override# 4*A driven out of Eganda" A-C,E2

A . /assacres present" 8urin! resettlement )ushes, B!andan military forces fired artillery at villa!ers and villa!es that did not leave their homes "Branch '00*, 2innstrUm '00&$. /any deaths follo? from such attacAs and other massacres, includin! 40 civilian deaths at NamoAora in 1%&- ">tunnu 1%%&, -$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Acholi were regularly harrassed intimidated by Ugandan forces, leading to human rights violations, tortured, extrajudicial murder (Branch 2005, Finnström 2008). C – Resettlement (present) Ugandan military forced the Acholi to leave their homes for “protection camps” in late 1980s (Utunnu 1998, 6). In 2002, forces civilians into IDP camps, eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming IDPs (Branch 2005). D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): LRA and Ugandan government engage in negotiations from 2006 – 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for safe areas in the DRC, however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South Sudan (Finnström 2008). E - Development Assistance (present): Ugandan government under Museveni initiates Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new livelihoods and opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and coordinated with bilateral and multilateral donors (Finnström 2008). F – Elite Local Relationships (present): Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government, including as members of parliament. The lack of a political program by the LRA has driven many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive arrangements with the government.

4& 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

References Otunnu, Ogenga. 1998. “The Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda.” Refuge 17(3): 4-13. Branch, Adam. 2005. “Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern: Uganda, 1986-1998,” African Studies Quarterly 8(2): 1-31. 2innstrUm, SverAer. '00&. &iving 2ith Bad "urroundings) War, =istor%, and ,ver%da% -oments in 'orthern 4ganda. 8urham, NC: 8uAe Bniversity ;ress.

49. Fietnam# start $ 199=
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss" A-C,Ef A . /assacres present"0 BS rmy conce)t of achievin! victory throu!h fire)o?er is dominant, sa? the conflict as a 7orea#style conventional ?ar. This creates many o))ortunities for the destruction of )o)ulation centers, civilians. 2ire)o?er ?as used Oas a crutchO for a counterinsur!ency strate!y and alienated the )eo)le from the army "7re)enevitch 1%&-, 1%&$. rmy destroys hamlets to remove CC from )o)ulation "7re)enevitch 1%&-, 1%%$. B#*' 1om1ers made availa1le in >)eration rc <i!ht in 1%-*, fle? 1+'0 sorties in that year, "i1id., '00$. 8esire to run u) 1ody counts to sho? 9uantitative evidence of the destruction of the enemy "meet 9uotas$, led to looser 3>5s. "(1id., '01#'0'$. I>n occasion, the !unshi)s mistooA civilians for the enemy.K "i1id, '04$. Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas (2011) show that US military did use airpower against civilian targets, often resulting in mass civilian casualties. ROE for air bombing permitted attack of civilian targets if deemed necessary: “even direct bombardment of populated areas was not prohibited, although restricted” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5) They quote Race (1972, 233), who states “despite these rules, however, heavy casualties still occurred.” (Kocher et. al. 2011, 5). Further, their highly specific data show that areas which were targeted of air bombing later turned to insurgent control. B - Exemplary Force (present): US Army repeatedly used indiscriminate force against the population. Emphasis on heavy firepower in fight insurgents and body counts leads to widespread attacks on civilians. These were part of standard operating procedures (Turse 2013). C – Resettlement (present): Based upon Thompson's advice and British example in Malaya, 'strategic hamlet' program of resettlement began in January 1962 by Diem, but influenced by MAAG, and its desire to fight the enemy. But military was used inside hamlets, not to surround them (Hunt 191, 21) Diem and MACV choose Ben Cat and resettle many civilians and alienated them. Diem's brother tries to exploit the peasants through the resettlement program, Operation Sunrise (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). 8,000 hamlets created in two years, but “no attention was paid to their purpose; their creation became the purpose in itself.” (Krepenevitch 1986, 68). According

4% 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded too quickly by Diem's brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly located, and failed to adequately develop them over time and spread successfully. D – Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Alongside Strategic Hamlets was an anmesty program called 'Open Arms', or Chieu Hoi, but it had a small budget, and money wasn't actively spent, but organized under ARVN. 11,000 communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership never expressed any interest, only “draining enemy manpower,” didn't see the political potential of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power, including former enemies into political system. E - Development Assistance (present): US policy-makers conceived of development as a tool to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966, Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb. William Porter, unties all civilian agencies under one chain of command but still doesn't include military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a single manager, and CORDS is created in May 1967 with Westmoreland as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al. 2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations occurs with AB 143, combined campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't integrate with new Ministry of Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD never has any capacity to implement to address development priorities or implement US-provided aid programs (Hunt 1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building initiatives by SVN. But, US creates more destruction than development: “The alleviation of social and political dislocations which were the inevitable result of military operations in populated areas was impossible” (Cable 1991, 130).

F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): From 1961 to 1962, Special Forces and CIA do close pop-centric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 7071). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and Yarborough reform Special Forces program. New Army-led Special Forces execute Operation Switchback in 1962 for offensive operations against VC, no longer building local militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)Elite relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the political instability following it. Each time a new ruler came into power, adminstrative turnover was the result as they promoted their own loyaltists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could develop among SVN pacification cadres. References Cable, Larry. 1991. Unholy Grail: The US and the wars in Vietnam, 1965-8. New York: Routledge.
*0 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Hunt, Richard A. 1991. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kocher, Matthew Adam; Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2011. “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” American Journal of Political Science. Latham, Michael E., 2006. “Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the failure of nationbuilding in South Vietnam.” Third World Quarterly. 27(1): 27-46. Krepenevitch, Andrew F. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Turse, NicA. '01+. 1ill An%thing That -oves) The $eal American War in /ietnam. Ne? YorA: /etro)olitan BooAs.

4%. ?im(a(8e# start $ 19%5
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss" A-Cdef A . /assacres present"0 3hodesian military forces re!ularly committed atrocities, focused e6clusively on an enemy#centric C>(N strate!y that )rioriti=ed Ohi!h#1ody countsO at the tactical level "Cilliers 1%&*$. B - Exemplary Force (present): Rhodesian military forces regularly beat and intimidated civilians, regularly executed prisoners (Cilliers 1985, De Boer 2011). C - Resettlement (present): In July 1973, Rhodesian government initiates Protected Village programme, resettling Africans in new locations, eventually becomes key part of Rhodesian COIN, leads to establishment of the Guard Force, local militias to police Protected Villages (De Boer 2011). D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Amnesty was announced twice in 1979, about 6,500 insurgents accept, but not fully implemented by Rhodesian military. Rhodesian military was worried that the war effort would be undermined by amnesty for rebels and this drove executions of prisoners, which ultimately cancelled any amnesty policy at the tactical level (Cilliers 1985). E - Development Assistance (absent): Proposals for farms, bakeries, even a national pension plan for Africans were floated but never funded. (Cilliers 1985). F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite relationships. References Cilliers, J.K. 1985. Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia. London: Croom Helm.

*1 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

8e Boer, /arno. '011. I3hodesiaOs ))roach to Counterinsur!ency: -ilitar%-$evie2 Novem1er#8ecem1er '011, +*#4*.

;reference for 7illin!.K

*' 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

*+ 3esearch ))endi6 : Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency ;am)inella

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful

Master Your Semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master Your Semester with a Special Offer from Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.