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Lauren Paulson, Pro Se 827C Ransom Ave Brookings, OR 97415 503 470 9709 Plaintiff-Appellant

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

" LAUREN PAULSON,

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) No. 13-35672 ) ) Civil Case No.: Plaintiff, ) ) 6:13-cv-00175-AA ) v. ) District of Oregon, Eugene ) OREGON STATE BAR, ) ) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S SUPREME COURT OF OREGON ) ) OPENING BRIEF CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS BALMER ) ) No. 13-71718 and JEFF SAPIRO, Defendants ) ——————————————————) ) LAUREN PAULSON ) ) Petitioner ) ) THIS IS A CLASS ACTION v. ) ) U.S. District Court For The ) District of Oregon, Eugene ) ) Respondent, , ) Oral Argument Always Requested But Never ) Granted ) ) OREGON STATE BAR; et al., ) ) Real Paries in Interest )

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1. RECORD

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The Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner designates the Entire Record of Proceedings INCLUDING THE JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST HON. ANN AIKEN AND THE JUDICIARY OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

The pregnant unaddressed issue in the Ninth Circuit is whether of not this case requires a Visiting Out-of-Circuit judge under the previously submitted Certificate of Necessity. It is a class action on behalf of 14,000 lawyers in the State of Oregon who bring suit to determine if the Oregon State Bar Regulatory system violates the Oregon and United States Constitution. It is clear that under 28 USC Sec. 291 et seq., that Oregon Chief Judge Ann Aiken and the Ninth Circuit do not have authority to make that decision. Federal law requires that the appointment, vel non, of an Out-of-Circuit Visiting judge be made by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 USC Sec. 292 (NEW EVIDENCE) The newly hired 2013 Regulatory Counsel for the Oregon State Bar, John Gleason, (replacing Jeff Sapiro) has recently quit after less than a year on the job. It is likely, from his official reports (which the Plaintiff requests this Court take Judicial Notice) he quit for the same reasons that underpins this lawsuit——-Oregon State Bar’s Disciplinary system is unconstitutional. Regulatory Counsel Gleeson had called for an American Bar Association intervention in his “Proposal for Discipline System

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Review” on Oregon’s Disciplinary System dated January 10, 2014 and he was departed shortly thereafter. Discovery is required to determine whether or not he confirms the implacable determination by the Oregon Supreme Court and the Oregon State Bar to violate the constitutional rights of Oregon lawyers. His early termination as Regulatory Counsel is not a good sign for the Bar, for extant lawyers in Oregon and for the Bar’s prospects here.

THE COMPLAINT This class action case enumerates twenty three (23) specific denials to Oregon lawyer’s constitutional due process rights under the present Oregon State Bar’s lawyer disciplinary system. This denial of substantive due process results in a consequent denial of their right to earn a living. Since 2008, Americans have a new awareness of the problem of earning a living. It is also a constitutional free speech case. This case seeks to rectify prosecutorial misconduct. It is a denial of equal protection of the laws case. Finally, it is a civil rights case. These wrongs commenced subtly in early 1980‘s and are ongoing to the present day, resulting from a misguided “Regulatory/ prosecutor at the Oregon State Bar, Jeff Sapiro and a misguided process enabled by an ignoring Supreme Court of Oregon. Finally, it is a pathetic case of Judicial Misconduct as is fully discussed below. Hon. Ann Aiken plagiarized the Oregon Supreme Court’s Motion to Dismiss in a blatant and unattributed Opinion as discussed below. That alone justifies her removal from the case AND the appointment of an Out of Circuit Visiting judge because Judge Aiken is

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the chief judge of Oregon federal court and is on the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit. 3. SUMMARY OF OPENING BRIEF Oregon Department of Justice attorney Mr. Marc Abrams begins his Motion to Dismiss for his client, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with the sentence: “Lauren Paulson was disbarred almost four years ago.” This is a metaphor for what this misguided process does to real people. Disciplined Oregon lawyers subsequent lives always begin with the scarlet letter on their forehead -- “D” for being disciplined or ‘disbarred’; which might as well be “Death” by an uncivil and illegal hanging. Statute of Limitations: -- In sum, the statute of limitations does not apply to this class action and certainly ORS 12.110 has no application. Moreover, there is no statute of limitations applicable to federal due process violations. Finally, the

constitutional wrongs visited on Oregon lawyers are ongoing and snare multiple lawyers every month as we speak, so to try to fix an artificial date in connection with twentythree (23) enumerated constitutional violations on 14,000 Oregon lawyers is a fool’s errand. The Rooker-Feldman: -- The narrow Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because this case does not seek to overturn a simple, single judgment otherwise required to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. To the contrary, this class action seeks to stop constitutional violations on a massive scale perpetrated on thousands of Oregon lawyers, now and in the future.

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Immunity: -- Applying the four criteria cited below, the class action is not about Chief Justice Balmer’s actions with his judicial robes on, but rather his regulatory/ administrative actions or inaction as the head of a state agency over which he has inherent power according to ORS 9.529 ——-with his robes off. Judicial Misconduct: —

4. A Summary of The Extant Judicial Misconduct in the Ninth Circuit!

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! Summary of Issues: The Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Oregon, Portland, Division, the Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, and other Ninth Circuit and District Court judges are illegally truncating cases and appeals and are engaged in rampant judicial misconduct using the following artifices:!

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A. IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS IS BEING DENIED: First, Pro Se Appellant’s are being denied In Forma Pauperis (IFP) status without the Ninth Circuit following the IFP law. Poor people in Oregon and the Ninth Circuit are being refused poor litigant (Pro Se) status and are being refused pro bono lawyer help. In Short, legal leadership is refusing self-represented victims of foreclosure their due process in Oregon and Ninth Circuit Courts. B. OVERUSE OF ‘FRIVOLOUS’ DESIGNATION: Second, these judges are not following the Ninth Circuit Standards nor the law deviously by Ninth Circuit judges are declaring appealed cases “frivolous” upon those cases being appealed from the U.S. District Courts. This is happening in foreclosure cases where an appeal is hardly frivolous when the appellant is homeless and we all know lenders are engaging in massive fraud at all levels. C. SPURIOUS APPEAL DISMISSALS BECAUSE ‘Fees not paid’: Third, those subject cases are then dismissed because the putative appellate filing fee has not been paid; even when it has been paid or IFP status approved. This is the devious way these

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judges are getting rid of appeals on foreclosure cases without addressing the merits of the foreclosure defenses, which are manifold. D. MOTIONS FOR EN BANC GO INTO A ‘BLACK HOLE’: When an En Banc filing is made, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then unilaterally interprets the filing as a Motion for Reconsideration then denies the Motion as late and dismisses the appeal. No mention is made in the docket that the pleading is actually a request for a hearing En Banc when that is exactly what the pleading says. Proceedings En Banc are wholly different than Motions for Reconsideration. See Ninth Circuit Annual Report on this subject. F. PLEADINGS FILED ARE ILLEGALLY RETURNED ‘UNFILED’ OR ‘LOST’: Court Clerks are unlawfully being instructed to send lawfully filed pleadings back to the filer in order to avoid lawful foreclosure cases being litigated in local and Ninth Circuit cases. They then attempt to cover-up the fact of the filing in those foreclosure cases. G. PRO BONO PROGRAM UNUSED IN NINTH CIRCUIT: The U.S District Court of Oregon and the Ninth Circuit have a pro bono attorney program, but in a denial of the equal protection of the laws, do not appoint pro bono attorneys for pro se litigants while the Oregon State Bar gets free supplicant Bar Counsel from some of the biggest law firms in Oregon. H. THE NINTH CIRCUIT IGNORES THE RULE OF LAW: The threshold issue in foreclosure is STANDING. The issue of STANDING could have been and should have been addressed by Judge Ancer Haggerty in District Court in 2010 and Judge Dunn in 2010. See discussion on Natache’s case below at Page 13. I. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES RULE WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OF ‘THE RECORD’ : In the entire Judicial Misconduct area and in the entire universe of Ninth Circuit Court rulings, it is striking that judges never identify upon what record they have ruled. Even when specifically asked. J. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES FAIL TO MAKE THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURES UNDER THE LAW: U.S. District Court Judge Haggerty and U.S. District Court Chief Judge Ann Aiken failed to disclose that he was formally a partner in the law firm for which he has made favorable rulings here for five

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years and she has numerous professional affiliations with law firms adverse to the Plaintiff including Paulson’s former office manager who has the computer hard drive for that ten (10) year Paulson law office tenure. K. Certificate of Necessity: — See Pleadings and Record

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5. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES BY THE NUMBERS Statute of Limitations I. It is the settled doctrine of the U. S. Supreme Court that a state legislature may

prescribe a limitation for the bringing of suits where none previously existed, as well as shorten the time within which suits to enforce existing causes of action may be commenced, provided in each case a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances into consideration, be given by the new law for the commencement of suit before the bar takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 95 U. S. 632; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668, 104 U. S. 675; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 110 U. S. 643. However, the

Constitution of the United States forbids a state to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts or to the clause declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law. A statute of limitations may not deprive one of property without due process of law, if, in its application to an existing right of action, it unreasonably limits the opportunity to enforce the right by suit. Wheeler v. Jackson 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890) Defendant Balmer claims that ‘each’ of the (23) claims brought by the Plaintiff are subject to a state-two year statute of limitations, citing ORS 12.110. (Mot. at Page 5). ORS 12.110 is the two year statute of limitations applicable to torts and nuclear accidents and says nothing about being applicable to the Oregon State Bar,

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constitutional matters or even due process affiliated matters. Rather, ORS 12.110 bears on personal injuries like torts, not constitutional violations. Oregon’s disciplinary system is described by the Supreme Court (In re Barber, 322 Or 194, 206, 904 P2d 620 (1995)), by statute (ORS 9.529) and by Bar Rule (BR 1.3) as “sui generis.” As such there isn’t any statute of limitations bearing on this matter. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sui generis” as “of its own kind or class”. Therefore, there is no applicable statute of limitations to this constitutional due process class action case. This is confirmed by ORS 12.250 which states:

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12.250 Actions by state, county or public corporations.

“Unless otherwise made applicable thereto, the limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or any county, or other public corporation therein, or for its benefit.” The Oregon State Bar is a state agency and a public corporation which, by

means of ORS 9.010(2) and other applicable laws, may sue and may be sued. Thus, these rights are reciprocal. Where federal matter or federal cause of action is involved, time for commencement of action is not governed by this state statute, but by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Wells v. City of Portland, 102 FRD 796 (1984)

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Defendant Balmer cites Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir 2002 )

which was actually a ‘tolling’ case, for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit applies the two year statute of limitations of ORS 12.110 to section 1983 civil rights actions. What he fails to tell the Court is that the statute of limitations defense lost in Sain. In Sain,

the district court had dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations defense and

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that dismissal was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit in Sain discussed tolling in terms of whether the state or federal rules apply: “......that because plaintiffs filed their suit in federal court, and because plaintiffs' underlying cause of action is federal, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tells us when the action ‘commences’ for purposes of the statute of limitations, and that Rule 6(a) tells us how to compute the time for purposes of Rule 3.“ Sain is inapposite here because the holding in the case was about tolling, not

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about what statute of limitations applies in due process cases. The holding in Sain stated: “We now join our sister circuits and hold that Rule 3 provides the tolling rule for a borrowed state statute of limitations in § 1983 actions. That is, we hold that a § 1983 action is commenced in federal district court for purposes of the statute of limitations when the complaint is filed. The Sain decision says nothing about the applicable statute of limitations for this

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case, nor for federal cases, nor for due process cases. II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine -- It makes sense, at first blush, that a disappointed litigant should not be able to appeal an adverse state court result to a federal district court. Or does it? Viz.: The U.S. Supreme Court gets about 9,000 cases for review each year, but only takes about 1% of those cases for consideration, argument and decision. Therefore, 99% of disappointed state court litigants never get a day in court beyond a state court decision. Perhaps, for that reason the U.S. Supreme Court has had a recent track record of narrowing the scope of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. ! In 2005 the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280. The Court affirmed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was statutory (based on the certiorari jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257),
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and not constitutional, holding that it applies only in cases "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." This class action is not inviting this district court to review and reject past specific disciplinary judgments. The U. S. Supreme Court has continued to narrow the doctrine, as in Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006), and seems to want to minimize the use of the doctrine. For a mock obituary of the doctrine, see Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006) 9 Green Bag 2d 317. The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable here since this action is not inviting district court review of the over 5,000 Oregon lawyer’s disciplinary cases that have been subject to discipline under the Jeff Sapiro reign of terror. Rather, it seeks to stop the unconstitutional reign of terror on extant and future matters. Paying it forward. Chief Justice Balmer cites Marshall v. Washington State Bar Ass’n 2012WL 188680, *4(WD Wash 2012) in support of his stand on Rooker-Feldman. Except, Mr. Marshall filed two federal district court cases while his disciplinary case was pending as a collateral attack on that matter. It is interesting to note that Mr. Marshall, and Paulson here, alleged that the powers that be in the Washington Bar had ex parte discussions about him and his case. Paulson has concrete documentation these ILLEGAL ex parte discussions took place with former Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, Wallace Carson and William Carter about Paulson’s pending disciplinary case THEN PENDING

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BEFORE THE OREGON SUPREME COURT, because Justice Carson has Admitted to the illegal conduct in his affidavit in that matter, but only after being caught by Paulson. See the Record in Paulson’s disciplinary cases. A PAGE OF HISTORY and AN UNMAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR -Chapter One by Lauren Paulson at bulletinsfromaloha.org A PERSONAL JOURNEY THROUGH THE OREGON STATE BAR'S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM -- I had been gone from Oregon for ten years, but was happy to return. Serendipity intervened and an old friend offered me a job at his local law firm before my employment quest even began. At the same time, I began reading the advance sheets and stumbled upon a strange disciplinary case published there. It seems a lawyer had been found guilty of a minor traffic offense and the major decision to be decided by our stalwart courts was whether the offense constituted "moral turpitude" such that the lawyer should also be found guilty of an ethical lapse. Weird. First, it struck me as double jeopardy. Second, it struck me as asking how many angels dance on the head of a pin. Then my own personal odyssey began with the fun and good times at the Oregon State Bar. You see, I had been a lawyer for a good long time, but had never practiced law on the ground. I had been counsel to several insurance companies which took me across the United States to Wall St. and now I was returning to the fold. My good buddy nurtured my rough beginnings in the private practice of law and all was well. Until that first disciplinary complaint came rolling in. For the fourteen years in corporate life, I had been called a good many things, but never unethical. My record was fourteen years of
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spotlessness in the ethical realm. This was all to change when I became a lonely private practitioner of the law in Oregon. Oh, how it was to change. My ethics haven't changed, but subjugation to a Bar that enjoys retaliation is what is of moment. Let me fast forward ten years. About 1997, after about ten years in private practice, I was starting to get weary of these eight month investigations by Mr. Sapiro, our good disciplinary counsel at the Oregon State Bar, of "ethical" complaints either by my clients who didn't want to pay their attorney fee bill or by opposing lawyers as part of their advocacy strategy. So, one day I asked the Bar to assemble all these spurious bar complaint files and I examined each one to determine what exactly took an average of eight months to determine no ethical violation had occurred. What I found was disconcerting. There were no time constraints on the Bar's disciplinary department to do anything!! The final straw occurred in 2001. Up until that time I had no formal (meaning that the Bar actually files 'criminal' charges against you) complaints against me. Mr. Sapiro's department had dismissed two ethical overtures by my opposition in ongoing litigation, but the third would be investigated by him. After a three year 'investigation' that went nowhere and was assigned to two outside investigators, I had had it. I filed an ethical complaint against Mr. Sapiro for neglect. Well, I don't have to tell you the "rest of the story" do I? Since 2001 Mr. Sapiro has filed eight (8), that is right, count them......eight more formal disciplinary complaints against me and the next year, the Oregon Supreme Court, without reading the record, or

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even having the trial panel record, suspended me from the practice of law for an indeterminate time period until I become moral enough to sit on the group W bench. Paulson DID appeal that case to the U.S. Supreme Court: Case, In re Paulson, 341 Or 13, 136 P3d 1087 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1116 (2007). And the next one; No. 06996. Paulson moved to have the Oregon Supreme Court Reconsider the 2009

disbarment proceeding to the U.S. Supreme Court when a group of lawyers notified the Oregon Supreme Court that their opinion was wrong on the law. The Supreme Court of Oregon then withdrew their decision and issued another. Paulson then Moved again for the Oregon Supreme Court to Reconsider that Opinion. This sequence pushed back Paulson’s time for appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court past May 24, 2010 when without warning, on May 24, 2010, the Portland Schwabe law firm arranged to change all my locks on my law office and evicted me into the cold of the night. Without my stuff. Without this file or his law office. Without his law library. Without his life as he knew it. Now, a homeless man. Judge Ancer Haggerty was a former Partner in the Schwabe law firm, yet was assigned to the federal court litigation; but failed to disclose that information as required. It is almost important to know that this very same Schwabe law firm had been hired by Paulson to stop Oregon’s condemnation of the property where he had his law firm. Paulson then formally moved this Court for a Master to facilitate the return of his property including his file to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This Court ignored that motion for the appointment of a master so I could retrieve these files and could file my appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on the 2009 disbarment. I have not

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seen any of these files (including over 2,000 client files) since 2010 and my eviction. If you think this couldn’t happen, note that this Court has ignored Paulson’s Motion for appointment of a pro bono attorney here. It happens all the time. Ignored, just ignored. Notwithstanding the filing of bona fide pleadings. IMMUNITY OR NOT

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III.

States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, but local governments and some state agencies have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability. The Oregon State Bar is a public corporation and an instrumentality of the Judicial Department of the government of the State of Oregon. ORS 9.010 (2) The Oregon State Bar has perpetual succession and a seal, and may sue and be sued. ORS 9.010 (5)

State law sovereign immunity and state law limitations on damages do not protect local governments from liability under section 1983, and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply. Therefore, local governments are left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity. Generally, private individuals who perform state functions may not be entitled to qualified immunity. State and local legislators and judges are protected by certain immunities when sued in their individual capacity for damages or injunctive relief, while prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacities for

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damages only. In any event, as discussed above, all individual capacity defendants are generally entitled to qualified immunity. However, here: The Chief Justice of Oregon leads the state judicial branch and is administrative head of its unified state court system of almost 200 judges and 1600 staff. It is a separate and independent branch of government. Administrative Authority The chief justice is the administrative head of the Judicial Department and, as such, exercises administrative authority over and supervises the appellate, circuit and tax courts. The chief justice makes rules and issues orders to carry out necessary duties and requires appropriate reports from judges and other officers and employees of the courts. As head of the Judicial Department, the chief justice appoints the chief judge of the Court of Appeals and the presiding judges of all state trial courts from the judges elected to those courts. The chief justice adopts certain rules and regulations respecting procedures for state courts. The chief justice also supervises a statewide plan for budgeting, accounting and fiscal management of the judicial department. The Chief Justice can act as a Justice in court with his robes on and would be entitled to the full panoply of immunities while so acting. Or he can act as an administrator of a state agency WITHOUT HIS ROBES ON; as top administrator of Oregon’s Judicial Department subject to whatever immunity he can find there, but it ain’t absolute immunity as we shall see. After taking over in May, Chief Justice Balmer outlined his shift from being a ‘judge’ to being an administrator as follows:

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“Being a member of the Supreme Court and then becoming Chief is something like being a player on a sports team, then suddenly being hired as general manager and head coach. All the things that you took for granted as ‘just happening’ are now your responsibility. Before, I worried about writing the opinions that had been assigned to me – now I worry about who I can assign them to . . . and about getting our budget through the legislature, and bomb threats phoned in to 28 courthouses, and judges getting sued for doing their jobs, and magnetometers for trial courts.” State of the Courts, 2013

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Chief Justice Balmer is not entitled to judicial immunity for the acts complained of “Judges generally have no

here where he is acting as a regulator/administrator.

judicial immunity for their administrative, legislative or executive functions. It is sometimes called the ‘discretionary function exception’ ”. Not all acts by one bearing the title “judge” are judicial. Mylett v. Mullican (CA 5 Tex) 992 F2d 310, 114 S Ct 345 (What Constitutes a Judicial Act for purposes of judicial immunity 53 For L Rev 1503 (May 1985) In order to enjoy judicial immunity the judge has to have jurisdiction over the subject matter and be performing a judicial act. 46 Am Jur 2d Section 68 (1994) ‘Judges’. If the acts involve both judicial and non judicial conduct, the unprotected behavior must be separated from the shielded behavior such that judges may be held liable for their non-judicial acts. Am Jur at Pg 186 It is the judges actions alone, not the motives which must be considered. Neither absolute nor qualified immunity insulates a judge from the reach of a court’s equity power. A court is not precluded from granting either prospective injunctive relief or declaratory relief against judicial officers acting in their judicial capacities. Judicial immunity does not extend to civil rights actions under 42 USCS Section 1983 seeking prospective injunctions over inferior or rival courts. Thus state judges are, as a matter of federal law, subject to the authority of federal courts on issues governed by federal constitution or federal statutory law. Such cases

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are called Bivens suits. Page v. Grady ND Ga 788 F supp 1207 Bivens v. Six Unknowns, 403 US 388, 29 L Ed 2d 619 91 S Ct (1999). The U. S. Supreme Court has taken a functional approach to immunity. They make a distinction between the character of the act rather than the judicial character of the officer. The Oregon Revised Statutes make clear that the Oregon Supreme Court is the administrator in chief over lawyer discipline. 9.529 Status of proceedings relating to discipline, admission or reinstatement. Bar proceedings relating to discipline, admission and reinstatement are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are sui generis and within the inherent power of the Supreme Court to control. *** [1983 c.618 §3; 1997 c.249 §9]

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Judicial immunity has been held not to extend to certain causes of action seeking

injunctive or declaratory relief or to an award of attorney fees under 42 USC 1983 even though the damages are barred or limited by it. Federal courts in determining whether a judges actions are judicial in nature so that absolute immunity applies generally consider four factors: 1. whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function 2. whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or adjunct spaces such as the judges chambers 3. whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the courts 4. whether the parties dealt with the judge or the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his or her official capacity. Mireles v. Waco 502 US 9 116 L ed 2d 9 112 S Ct 286 91 DJ DAr 12907 While only persons can be sued under the civil rights laws, a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief despite the fact that an

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suit against a government official in his official capacity represents nothing more than a suit against the government entity itself! Despite this logical inconsistency, the current state of the law is that generally a state may not be sued for damages, but may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief. As the Rodney King case so forcefully asserted,

there is a private right of action against the individual state employees for their official deviant actions. Here the Oregon State Bar has waived sovereign immunity through statute. Former Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Paul De Muniz stated in his 2009 ‘State of the Court’s annual report that he regarded Oregon’ Judicial Department as fully accountable to the public. to be fair and guided by the constitutional mandates.

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6. CONCLUSION

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Chief Justice Balmer through his lawyer, Marc Abrams, tries to make this case and his arguments about Paulson and his story at OSB. That is not the story in the complaint. This class action complaint is about 5,000 earnest lawyers who regularly appear on the pages of the Oregon State Bar Bulletin under the heading: ‘Discipline’. In Mr. Abrams stretch to cast the fish eye, Mr. Abrams misleads. For example, on Page 3 of the Motion to Dismiss, Mr Abrams states: “Paulson, however, contends that his disbarment was retaliation for his positions on various issues, including advocating for judicial performance evaluations.” Mr. Abrams cites the ‘Complaint at 2’. That contention by Paulson is NOT on Page 2 of the Complaint. The Complaint at Page 2 is only about why this Court should appoint a visiting judge. The actual discussion about ‘retaliation’ is on Page 15-16 of

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the complaint. There at #8, the Complaint contains factual support for the class action and discusses the OSB Disciplinary Task Force of 2002 where their survey produced over forty lawyers who wrote letters to the Bar pointing out specific instances of retaliation by Oregon’s Disciplinary Counsel. One of the letters is by Bill Williamson, then the current President of the Oregon State Bar. This egregious retaliation by Mr. Sapiro against ordinary Oregon lawyers went unexamined by the Chief Justice of Oregon and unchecked by the Bar for almost thirty (30) years. Take Judicial Notice of the disciplinary cases of Sally Leisure and Charles Isaacs for two small examples. Both got a ‘Not Guilty’ verdict by their trial panels and both were subsequently raked over the hot disciplinary coals of Oregon’s Regulatory/Disciplinary Counsel in retaliation for winning their first ‘war’ with the Oregon State Bar . There are many, many other examples. Hundreds. The Disciplinary Task Force uncovered forty (40) in just their seven month study. This case is really about the 5,000 unwashed lawyers who have been the subject of a dysfunctional process for over thirty years that has denied these lonesome souls fundamental due process; the vanguard of what lawyers and judges should be about anyway. It is not JUST about Paulson. CONFLICT OF INTEREST ALERT

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Marc Abrams, counsel to Hon. Balmer is also a member of the Oregon State Bar (OSB) House of Delegates (HOD). The House of Delegates has certain statutory responsibilities for discipline at the OSB. ORS 9.139 outlines the “Powers of house of delegates” as follows:

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9.139 Powers of house of delegates. (1) The delegates at a meeting of the house of delegates may, by a vote of the majority of the delegates attending the meeting, do either of the following: (a) Modify or rescind an action or decision of the board of governors. (b) Direct the board of governors as to future action. (2) The board of governors is bound by a decision of the house of delegates made in the manner prescribed by subsection (1) of this section. (3) The power of the house of delegates to direct, modify or rescind an action or decision of the board of governors under subsection (1) of this section does not include the power: (a) To invalidate payments previously made at the direction of the board; (b) To direct, modify or rescind any assessment by the board for contributions to a professional liability fund established under ORS 9.080; or (c) To direct, modify or rescind any other action or decision by the board that is subject to control, approval or review by the Supreme Court. (4) Subsection (3)(c) of this section does not affect the ability of the house of delegates to formulate disciplinary rules under ORS 9.490. [1995 c.302 §8] (Emphasis Supplied)

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Therefore, Mr. Abrams has direct formal affiliation with the Oregon State Bar and

is on the very OSB organization charged with regulating disciplinary matters. [See Abrams E-mail dated February 26, 2013 to Paulson where Mr. Abrams stated: “In response to your inquiry, I am not (and never have been ) a member of the OSB Board of Governors. However, I have been a member of the House of Delegates for over a decade. Given that my clients interests here are not adverse to the bar’s, and given that the HOD does not get involved in disciplinary matters, I do not believe there is any conflict of interest.” (Emphasis Supplied)]

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Therein lies the problem. Like most OSB HOD members, Mr. Abrams

doesn’t even know the parameters of his responsibilities at the Oregon State Bar for disciplinary matters through HOD. Indeed, the 2002 Disciplinary Task Force was a product of James Hennings, a HOD member. HOD voted favorably on his 2001 HOD resolution calling for a complete OSB review of discipline at the September 2001 OSB HOD meeting. (See #18 at Page 21 of the Complaint) (Also see the 2002 Disciplinary Task Force Study cited above)

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Therefore, aside from the OBVIOUS HOD conflict of interest, Mr. Abrams will likely be a witness on this subject for the problem manifest in his E-mail of February 26, 2013, ie. that he is unaware of HOD’s involvement in OSB disciplinary matters —- even now. 8. CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY

Plaintiff’s original Motion for the Appointment of a Visiting Judge dated January 28, 2013 (Docket #5) was for an Inter-circuit visiting judge. Judge Aiken denied that Motion, inter alia, on March 11, 2013 in her Opinion & Order of that date. (Docket #13) Judge Aiken had no legal authority nor jurisdiction to rule on that Motion. Only the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has the authority to rule on the appointment of an Inter-circuit Visiting Judge. 28 USC Sec. 291 et seq. RELIEF SOUGHT The Writ of Mandamus filed three times by the Plaintiff in this matter, yet unaddressed, requests the Ninth Circuit to Issue a ‘Certificate of Necessity’ for the Appointment of an Inter-circuit Visiting Judge for the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s Motions for a Visiting Court Judge dated January 28, 2013 (Docket #5) and March 27, 2013 (Docket #21) along with the entire record herein. 28 USC Sec. 291 et seq.

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THE LAW Assignments outside a circuit require a higher level of authority than the District Court or this Court for inter-circuit visiting judge assignments. Only the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has the authority to designate active and senior district and court of appeals judges to serve in courts outside their circuits. Viz. (d) The Chief Justice of the United States may designate and assign temporarily a district judge of one circuit for service in another circuit, either in a district court or court of appeals, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises. 28 USC Sec. 292

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INTER-CIRCUIT VISITING JUDGE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE The chief circuit judge must submit a request for assistance on behalf of a specific court within the circuit and must certify that assistance is needed. This request is made to the Judicial Conference Committee on Inter-circuit Assignments, which processes the paperwork and submits the request to the Chief Justice. See: The Use of Visiting Judges in the Federal District Courts: A Guide for Judges & Court Personnel, Nicholle Stahl-Reisdorff, Federal Judicial Center 2001 (Note: This guide has been updated to reflect Judicial Conference policies on visiting judges as of 2006.) (The Plaintiff could find no other versions after 2006.)

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The Plaintiff presently has pending his Certificate of Necessity sent to Hon. Royce C. Lamberth upon instructions of Judge Motz staff on February 10, 2014, so this Court’s March 6, 2014 Order to construe that matter “….as a request that another district court judge be assigned if the case is remanded….” is inapposite. Only an Out-of-Circuit judge may be neutral enough to rule for lawyers instead of judges.

ISSUES on OUT-OF-CIRCUIT VISITING JUDGE 1. The Plaintiff and Class Action Plaintiffs hereby move the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or his surrogate to issue a Certificate of Necessity to Appoint a Visiting Judge from outside the District of Oregon and Outside the Ninth Circuit for, inter alia, the reason that those judges are members, in most instances pertaining hereto, the Oregon State Bar or professionally affiliated with members of the Defendants including the Oregon State Bar through the Ninth Circuit. The Defendants herein and the Ninth Circuit judiciary should not be put in the conflicted position of judging their own members in professional mandatory organizations and of closely affiliated professional organizations through the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. 2. Judicial Misconduct: Moreover, there may be numerous instances of judicial misconduct by the aforementioned judiciary that are likely to be
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part of the proofs of the Plaintiff’s case; thus Plaintiff’s proof could not be judged by the instant judiciary because of that conflict of interest. See Attached Table of Contents on the multitude of Judicial Misconduct previously filed in the Ninth Circuit. 3. It should be noted at the outset that, contrary the ruling of the U.S District Court dated May 3, 2013 enclosed, Defendant Balmer DOES NOT enjoy judicial immunity here because the Oregon Supreme Court, administratively, has total and complete authority over the entire Oregon State Bar disciplinary process: Oregon statutes, ORS 9.529 states: -- “Status of proceedings relating to discipline, admission or reinstatement. Bar proceedings relating to discipline, admission and reinstatement are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are sui generis and within the inherent power of the Supreme Court to control.” *** [1983 c.618 §3; 1997 c.249 §9] (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the discussion in the Complaint in #1 thru #23 is entirely subject to the inherent authority of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon as the state agency’s top administrator (sans judicial robes). Thus, Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Balmer wears two hats: 1.) He is a robed Oregon Supreme Court Justice deciding cases; 2.) He is the administrative head of an Oregon administrative agency known as the Oregon Judicial Department. The Oregon Blue Book describes Justice Balmer’s administrative duties as follows: “Administrative Authority”
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! The chief justice is the administrative head of the Judicial Department and, as such, exercises administrative authority over and supervises the appellate, circuit and tax courts. The chief justice makes rules and issues orders to carry out necessary duties and requires appropriate reports from judges and other officers and employees of the courts. As head of the Judicial Department, the chief justice appoints the chief judge of the Court of Appeals and the presiding judges of all state trial courts from the judges elected to those courts. The chief justice adopts certain rules and regulations respecting procedures for state courts. The chief justice also supervises a statewide plan for budgeting, accounting and fiscal management of the judicial department. ! The chief justice and the Supreme Court have the authority to appoint lawyers, elected judges and retired judges to serve in temporary judicial assignments.”

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This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Oregon lawyers against the chief

justice with his administrative hat on and under his administrative authority; NOT against the chief justice with his judicial robes on. The law is clear. Defendant Balmer enjoys no judicial immunity when he has his robes off. Just as he is not immune from tort liability if he has a traffic accident. Chief Judge Aiken fails to address the issue that judges do not have judicial immunity when they are exercising non-judicial administrative matters as here. Nor does she discuss the required four factors in that analysis discussed in Paulson’s Response to Hon. Balmer’s Motion to dismiss at Page 20-21. It is exactly this sort of Opinion & Order dated May 3, 2013 (Docket #32) rendered by the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of
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Oregon, by and through Defendant Thomas Balmer’s ‘buddy’, brethren Ann Aiken, that requires a visiting judge from another circuit. Through obvious judicial legerdemain, Chief Judge Ann Aiken seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire case and render it stillborn; without discovery, without leave to amend, without evidence, without legal analysis, without The Rule of Law ,without Due Process while denying Paulson’s request for appointment of pro bono counsel; required in a class action such as this. This is the pattern of denial of due process in the Ninth Circuit for over thirty (30) years. Plaintiff’s Response (Docket #25) to Defendant Balmer’s Motion to Dismiss is twenty -six (26) pages long citing case law and Oregon statutes. Chief Judge Ann Aiken does not mention a single argument, does not mention a single case, does not mention a single Oregon statute, AND DOES NOT MENTION A SINGLE WORD OF THAT 26 PAGE RESPONSE in her seven (7) page Opinion and Order. This is a familiar pattern in the Ninth Circuit over thirty (30) years. There is no due process if a parties’

arguments are not ‘considered’, read, analyzed fairly and discussed by the judge in her written opinion. (Docket #32) What if some of Plaintiff’s arguments have merit in those twenty-six pages? This is but a single example of the wholesale abandonment of The Rule of Law in the Ninth Circuit for over thirty (30) years.
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4. It is well known that Paulson has been an activist for change in the legal community/profession in Oregon since his election to be the President of the Washington County Bar Association in 1996. Unpopular with the judiciary, he has been advocating for the adoption of a statewide, formal system of judicial performance evaluations in Oregon since he was on the Oregon State Bar Board of Governors in 2004: For judicial

compensation tied to performance instead of political pitches to the powers that be. Paulson has written extensively on these subjects in Oregon since 2007 including on his blog, bulletinsfromaloha.org. Is the public aware that chief judge’s law partners serve on the very public pay commissions that set judicial salaries that Paulson has written about? Of course, Oregon’s judiciary is not abundantly happy about Paulson. Paulson has made presentations to the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar, to the Oregon legislature and to other professional organizations on the subject of a formal statewide judicial evaluation program in Oregon. Such a system of judicial performance evaluations have been recommended by the American Bar Association in 2005. It is also well known that former Chief Judge Wallace Carson, former Chief Judge of the Oregon Supreme Court, Paul De Muniz and Defendant Balmer are against a formal statewide system of judicial performance evaluations in Oregon. Further, it is known that Chief Judge of this Court,
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Ann Aiken has had formal overtures made to her by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System about judicial evaluations in Oregon District Court to which she refused to entertain. Moreover, Chief Judge Aiken does not follow The Rule of Law in this District on the subject of disqualification. See her July 28, 2010 ruling in Case # 3:08-cv-00982PK where she erroneously believes that an “extrajudicial source” is required in order to secure judicial disqualification. Notwithstanding the aforementioned patently obvious extrajudicial source, she simply is wrong on the law, as enunciated in Liteky v. United States, 510 US 540 (1994). Judge Aiken steadfastly refuses to admit that error. He failure to follow the straightforward Ninth Circuit standard on judicial disqualification and recusal continues to prejudice Paulson’s prosecution of this case and other cases, thus she is objectively prejudiced against Lauren Paulson, the initial Plaintiff herein. 5. Any appeal of this matter necessarily would go to the Ninth Circuit where there are numerous judges who are members of the Oregon State Bar or so affiliated who could not be fair to the Class Action Plaintiffs or at the least most of the Ninth Circuit judiciary would have a conflict of interest. 6. It is well-known that the Ninth Circuit is otherwise dysfunctional, having the worst reversal record before the U.S. Supreme Court than any

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other Circuit in the United States. (Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates, ABA Journal 2010) It has a reversal rate of 81%. It is so bad in the Ninth Circuit that there is a “....9th Circuit Watch.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is regarded as a Rogue Court. Recently, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon honored Ninth Circuit Court Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain. Judge O’Scannlain has written about this problem where he “.....ponders ten years of reversals” by the Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law & Policy Review (September 27, 2010) 14 Lewis & Clark Law Review 1558 (2010) 7. The Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit is known to be bewitched by pornography and has been subjected to certain recusal proceedings accordingly. That Chief Judge is patently biased against the Plaintiff. (See his Judicial Complaint Opinion dated June 25, 2012.) 8. It is well known that the Ninth Circuit does not follow The Rule of Law in Civil Rights cases. For thirty years, all of the cases in the Ninth Circuit use the wrong standard for civil rights cases as demonstrated in Greg Lang v. Intel Corporation, 112 F3d 516(9th Cir 1997). 9. The Ninth Circuit has a history of administrative black holes that precludes due process for litigants. See Paulson v. Fairway, et al. Case No. 3:08-cv-00982-PK. In accordance with the chart attached, in three years of litigation in the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit judiciary has refused
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to address the one issue favorable to the Plaintiff in those cases--the issue of Legal Standing. That black hole implicates over twenty (20) Ninth Circuit judges and U.S. District Court judges in patent, open judicial misconduct because they have failed to address the singular issue of legal standing which precedes all others. See:(Natache D. Rinegard-Guirma v. Bank of
America, et al., U.S. District of Oregon Civil Case No. 10-1065- PK )

10. The Rule of Law and decisions of the Ninth Circuit do not address the issues raised by the Appellant nor do those decisions reflect that the Ninth Circuit judges have read the record, case law or even obtain the trial court record upon appeal. See Legal Rot Out West. 2013 That again is patent open judicial misconduct in the Ninth Circuit. 11. Upon information and belief the aforementioned Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit and other members of the judiciary in the Ninth Circuit are objectively prejudiced against Paulson per his declaration. 12. The U.S. District Court Chief Judge of Oregon, Ann Aiken failed to supply relevant disclosures as required by federal law (5 USC Sec. 101-111) in this case and across all of her cases in Oregon. Moreover, in this case Chief Judge Aiken failed to disclose the following as outlined in an excerpt of Plaintiff Paulson’s April 4, 2013 letter to her: “Dear Hon. Ann Aiken: ***
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It has just come to my attention that you also have an internecine business relationship with the Cosgrave law firm that is representing several defendants in the captioned matter and was not disclosed. I had previously pointed out that you are on the Board of Directors of the U.S. District Court Historical Society with Hon. Thomas Balmer the other Defendant here and that was not disclosed.

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I have learned that your law clerk, Jolie Russo is the President-Elect of the Oregon Federal Bar Association. You serve as a Director on the Board of the Oregon Federal Bar Association along with Robert Sabido, a member of the Cosgrave law firm. The Cosgrave firm represents several Defendants here. You apparently are speaking there this month.”

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********* Therefore, Judge Ann Aiken serves on two boards, one with Hon

Thomas Balmer, a defendant here--The U.S. District Court Historical Society and one with a member of the Cosgrave law firm -- representing the other Defendants here -- the Oregon Federal Bar Association and did not disclose either affiliation in this case. In denying Plaintiff’s Motions for a Visiting Judge, Chief Judge Aiken makes no reference to the absence of disclosures regarding these affiliations with the Defendant Party who she then dismisses from this law suit. Therefore, Hon Aiken may have other

affiliations with these Defendants, undisclosed; which may further invoke the objective bias standard outlined in Liteky.

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RECUSAL The U.S. District Court of Oregon and the Chief Circuit Judge should note that these inter-circuit visiting judge procedures are specifically approved for Recusal circumstances as are relevant here: Viz. “In addition to helping with heavy caseloads, judges visit to assist in recusal situations, judicial illness or disability, or where judgeship vacancies exist.” The Use of Visiting Judges in the Federal District Courts, Page v. (Emphasis supplied)

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EPILOGUE Any lingering doubt about the objective bias of the judges in the U.S.

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District Court of Oregon is easily dispatched thusly: • It is well known that class actions require a lawyer. Accordingly, Paulson filed a Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel. Seventeen (17) of the finest law firms in Portland, Oregon have signed up to do their obligatory pro bono service. LAW FIRMS! Seventeen. Combined there are hundreds of Oregon lawyers elbowing their way to do for the poor, the meek and the downtrodden what they are trained to do. • Therefore, Judge Aiken well knows that without legal counsel, Paulson’s fine idea to come to the aid of the poor, the meek and the downtrodden lawyers in Oregon ----- is toast. But, she contradicts herself and is without stealth in doing so:

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• Judge Aiken (Opinion & Order 3/12/13) Denying Paulson’s Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel for the Class: (Docket #20) AIKEN: “Plaintiff (Paulson) has demonstrated sufficient ability to articulate his claims. The facts and legal issues involved in this case are not of substantial complexity.”

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• Judge Aiken (Opinion & Order 5/03/13) Granting Balmer’s Motion to Dismiss the case as to Defendant Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Balmer: (Docket #32) AIKEN: Balmer.” “(Paulson’s) Complaint is difficult to comprehend (and) alleges very few allegations pertaining to defendant

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Indeed. The Complaint articulates twenty three (23) allegations

against Defendant Balmer since he has inherent authority over Oregon’s lawyer disciplinary administration statewide. ORS 9.529
On July 11, 2013, the USCA, in a one sentence decision by and through the Honorable Judges Kozinski, Canby and Tallman erroneously declared the Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus as moot “.… because the district court entered judgment on June 07, 2013 This was error because the Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus was timely filed on May 17, 2013, well BEFORE the said District Court’s judgment. As is pointed out in Paulson’s pleading filed on July 31, 2013 (see Clerk’s date stamp on said document NOT Found ON EITHER DOCKET
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NUMBER ABOVE), Judge Ann Aiken had no authority to deny Paulson’s Motion for an OUT-OF-CIRCUIT judge. The matter of a Certificate of Necessity is currently pending before Judge Lamberth, Chairman of the Committee on Inter-Circuit Assignments of the Judicial Circuit of the Conference of the United States upon instructions by Judge Motz’s staff. There are a whole series of timely pleadings filed by Paulson NOT considered nor ruled on in the USCA under either number above: Plaintiff’s Motion for Mediation Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Motion En Banc Plaintiff’s Pleadings for a Certificate of Necessity to Judge Motz and Judge Lamberth Plaintiffs Pleadings regarding Judicial Misconduct in the US District Court regarding USDC Chief Judge Ann Aiken and others and in the USCA involving Judge Kozinski and others all of which should have been in the hands of the Judicial Council since filed in July, 2013 yet mysteriously missing in the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel

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CONCLUSION Accordingly, the U.S. District Court’s Orders denying the appointment of a visiting inter-circuit court judge must be vacated since only the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has the authority to act on the temporary appointment of inter-circuit court visiting judges. 28 USC Sec. 291 et seq. Pursuant to that statute and Federal Judicial Center procedures, the Chief Judge of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals or his surrogate should issue a Certificate of Necessity for the appointment of a visiting inter-circuit court judge to preside over this class action. No judge in the Ninth Circuit can be unbiased against the class since this matter is against the very organization to which most of them belong as pertains to Oregon litigation.

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Thursday, March 27, 2014 /S/Lauren Paulson

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DECLARATION I, Lauren Paulson, do swear and affirm under the penalties of perjury that the above facts are true and correct and that the judiciary in the Ninth Circuit is objectively biased against me or that said judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned such that neither I nor the class could obtain a fair trial before any of the Ninth Circuit judiciary. I, further certify this brief is 10,336 words in Arial 14. Thursday, March 27, 2014 /S/ Lauren Paulson

TABLE OF CONTENTS —BRIEF (Body Above) Record…………………………………………………………… 1. Preliminary……………………………………………………. 2. Summary……………………………………………………….. 3. Analysis…………………………………………………………. 6. Conclusion….………………………………………………….17. Conflict of Interest Alert………………………………….19. Certificate of Necessity……………………………………20. Out-of-Circuit Visiting Judge…………………………..20. Epilogue………………………………………………………..31. Hon. Ann Aiken Judicial Complaint…………………38.

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LAUREN PAULSON’S NOTICE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT (See Record) TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL Lauren Paulson, 827 C Ransom Ave. Brookings, OR 97415 503-470-9709 laurenjpaulson@gmail.com November 6, 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS —JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT (See Record for the Body of this Outline)

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I. PRELIMINARY..................................................................1. II. NINTH CIRCUIT COMPLAINT FORM...........................3. III. ISSUES -- DETAIL........................................................6. IV. BACKGROUND 2005 to 2010......................................8. V. ANALYSIS......................................................................16. VI. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT...........................................18. Judge Haggerty ..Conflict 2009..................................18. Judge Randall Dunn -- Banko April 2009.................19. Judge Papak -- Delay July 2010................................20. Judge Ann Aiken.—(See her Complaint below) Judge Michael Mosman -- Removal March 2010......25. . CHART OF DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS........26.

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Judge Clifton Bybee and Ikuta.....................................28. NATACHE’S CASE.......................................................29. and the issue of STANDING Judges Pappas Hollowell Jury and Markell................30. FEES.............................................................................30. Judges Leavy and Bybee..............................................35.

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Judges Canby Gould and Tallman...............................36. V. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT (Continued) Judges Rawlinson Bea and Murguia...........................37. Judge Dunn (Redoux).................................................38. Embezzlement in Bankruptcy Court...........................38. The Record/Judicial Notice…………………..……………..38. U.S. District Court/Bankruptcy/9th Circuit...............41. Judge Anna Brown.......................................................43. Judge Mosman (Redoux).............................................43. VI. BANKRUPTCY COURT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE.....45. VII. SUMMARY...................................................................47. VIII. COINCIDENCES........................................................54. IX. CONCLUSION--TOP SHEETING JUDGES............... 59. ===========================================

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ABA MISCONDUCT MODEL RULES (1994)

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http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ model_rules_judicial_disciplinary_enforcement/preface.html ==================================================

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OREGON JUDGE ANN!AIKEN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT !COMPLAINANT! --! LAUREN PAULSON! PO BOX 2236 NEWPORT, OR 97365 503 470 9709 laurenjpaulson@gmail.com Judicial Misconduct Complaint v. U.S. District Court Chief Judge Ann Aiken !This Complaint concerns multiple matters and cases including No. 6:13cv-175-AA.! Please take judicial notice of the U.S. District Court case cited and U.S. Ninth Circuit Case No.#13-71718 and No. 13-35672 along with the complete record in both cases including dockets and filings. !! Facts:! The underlying case!is a class action by Oregon lawyers against the Oregon State Bar, the Supreme Court of Oregon Chief Justice, Thomas Balmer and Jeff Sapiro. ! -- A. ! VISITING JUDGE>> Upon the initial filing of the complaint, a visiting out-of-circuit judge was requested by motion because the Defendants including Ninth Circuit judges are a member of the Oregon State Bar with a potential conflict of interest against Plaintiff’s including Lauren Paulson, a former member of the Oregon State Bar.! There are specific guidelines to be followed when requesting intercircuit visiting judges and Judge Aiken refused to follow those requirements.! Only the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court may decide such matters and
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Judge Aiken refused to follow those guidelines and the federal statute by ruling on these matters herself. ! ! --B. JUDICIAL PLAGIARISM ! In reviewing Judge Aiken’s written opinions in this case, Plaintiff has discerned that these written opinions are directly lifted from the Memorandums submitted by the Defendants without attribution.! viz. ! In her Opinion and Order dated June 4, 2013 (Docket #51) she has plagiarized Defendant Attorney Brown’s legal memorandum (Docket #28) dated April 5, 2013 as follows:

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ATTORNEY BROWN “Complaints filed by litigants appearing without counsel are generally construed liberally and pleadings by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than pleadings crafted by lawyers.” citing Erickson JUDGE AIKEN page “Complaints filed by 3 pro se litigants are generally construed liberally and pleadings by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” citing Erickson

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Page 41 ! of 43 !

“However, if a pro se plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory, dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6)” citing Balistreri “And courts may decline to liberally construe pleadings offered by pro se plaintiffs that are attorneys.” See Smith v. Plati !

“Although if a pro se 4 plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6)” citing Balistreri “Further, courts may 4 decline to liberally construe pleadings drafted by pro se plaintiffs that are attorneys.”! Smith v. Plati

This summary just covers the first four (4) pages. The rest of Judge Aiken’s Opinion and Order is similarly copied from Defendant Balmer’s document. ! Moreover, in Judge Aiken’s Opinion and Order dated May 3, 2013 (Docket #32) which is seven (7) pages long, pages 2, 4, 5 are copied almost exactly (See items 1-12 attached) from Defendant Balmer’s Legal Memorandum dated March 14, 2013. Without attribution.! No part of either decision even mentions the Plaintiff’s twenty-six page Plaintiff’s Response to those Defendant documents. !

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In sum, Judge Aiken is not writing her own opinions, she is copying them directly from Supreme Court Balmer’s and defendant Oregon State Bar’s documents.! But she is not telling anybody she is doing that. !

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C.! --! NONDISCLOSURE! --! (See Plaintiff’s Writ of Mandamus [Docket # 35] for further details) ! The U.S. District Court Chief Judge of Oregon, Ann Aiken failed to supply relevant disclosures as required by federal law (5 USC Sec. 101-111) in this case and across all of her cases in Oregon.! Moreover, in this case Chief Judge Aiken failed to disclose the following as outlined in an excerpt of Plaintiff Paulson’s April 4, 2013 letter to her: ! !

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“Dear Hon. Ann Aiken: *** It has just come to my attention that you also have an internecine business relationship with the Cosgrave law firm that is representing several defendants in the captioned matter and was not disclosed.! I had previously pointed out that you are on the Board of Directors of the U.S. District Court Historical Society with Hon. Thomas Balmer the other Defendant here and that was not disclosed. ! ! ! I have learned that your law clerk, Jolie Russo is the President-Elect of the Oregon Federal Bar Association.! You serve as a Director on the Board of the Oregon Federal Bar Association along with Robert Sabido, a member of the Cosgrave law firm.! The Cosgrave firm represents several Defendants here.! You apparently are speaking there this month.”! ! *********! [ Oh, and Judge Aiken -- by-the-by did you know that my former law office office manager works for the Cosgrave law firm. With the hard drive of my former law office computer......!!] ! *************
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Therefore, Judge Ann Aiken serves on two boards, one with Hon Thomas Balmer, a defendant here--The U.S. District Court Historical Society and one with a member of the Cosgrave law firm! --! representing the other Defendants here! -- ! the Oregon Federal Bar Association and did not disclose either affiliation in this case.! In denying Plaintiff’s Motions for a Visiting Judge, Chief Judge Aiken makes no reference to the absence of disclosures regarding these affiliations with the Defendant Party who she then dismisses from this law suit.! ! Therefore, Hon Aiken may have other affiliations with these Defendants, undisclosed; which may further invoke the objective bias standard outlined in U.S. Supreme Court decision in Liteky. !!--! CONFLICT OF INTEREST! --! Since both Judge Aiken and Chief Judge Kozinski sit on the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, the Complainant here asks both to recuse themselves from this Complaint. Dated this 27th day of July, 2013 ! S/! LAUREN PAULSON

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