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DOCTRINE: Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favour, the same being self-serving. FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the registration of 2 agricultural lands located in Rizal. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing that the property applied for, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662, have a total area of 26,015 sq.m.; that these lots originally belonged to one Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property was involved in a litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza and that the lots were given by the latter to former Justice de Joya as the latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold the said lots to the herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes due thereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the two parcels surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955. On the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) Rizal Cement Company, claims to be the owner of the subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have been in continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate its claim, Rizal Cement Co. submitted documentary evidence, the most important of which are the following: (a) Plan Psu-2260 which covers the survey of a big tract of land for the company designated as Lots 1, 2 and 4 of the Plan with a total area of 210,644 square meters (survey made in 1911 while plan was approved in 1912); (b) A sketch plan of the geographical position of the real proparties of Madrigal and Company; (c) Tax Declaration No. 1066 secured in 1949 from the Rizal Provincial Assessor which is a consolidation of all lands of the Rizal Cement Company located in Darangan with a total area of 2,496,712 sq.m. and which includes the land in litigation; (d) Tax Declaration No. 10570 which cancels Tax Declaration No. 1066; and (e) Real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal and Company, covering among others the land applied for. After trial, the CFI denied the application for registration of respondents and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co, after finality of said decision. Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the CFI’s decision in favour of the respondents. The CA denied Rizal’s MR, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question. HELD: YES. As to who had been in actual possession of the land in question, the CA gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants, namely: 1. Santiago Picadizo (one of the tenants of the land); 2. Isaac Reyes (worked on ½ of the 2 parcels of land since 1934 to the present); 3. Mr. Valentin Marqueza (rebuttal witness who averred that he began to live in Rizal since 1910 after buying a portion of the property from Maria Certeza and avers that Rizal Cement intended to make a factory by building a small house which was later on removed, and that Rizal Cement did not take possession of the land and that it was Maria
Certeza who had the possession of the land until her death and that the tenants gave the harvest of the land to Maria Certeza. The right to possess flows from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of what belongs to him. Were the Rizal Cement Co. the rightful owner of the land in question, it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors. It would have opposed the survey for applicants' vendors on May 21 and 28, 1950 and July 31, 1955, but did not as shown in the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit E. If Rizal really bought Lot 2 from Maria Certeza in 1909 as claimed, it has not been explained how she could sell a portion thereof to Apolonia Francisco, married to Valentin Marquez for P100.00 on April 15, 1924 by deed, Exhibit R,-an ancient document -as confirmed by the husband in his deposition who as employee of oppositor would have known of its acquisition. On the other hand, applicants' vendors in mortgaging the two lots to Pedro Picones in 1952, Exhibits 0 and 01, for P11, 000.00, exercised a dominical act; and Aniano Bautista's testimony that the Cervos were not owners of the land challenges belief since Bautista was a witness to Exhibits 0 and 0-1, being uncle of Picones. Very significantly petitioner Rizal Cement did not present any witness in actual possession of the land in question. As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in the concept of an owner. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving. The only documentary evidence which the Rizal Cement may capitalize for its claim of ownership is the notation in applicants' plan Exhibit D that the lots in question are portions of a previous survey made in 1911 for oppositor, Plan Psu-2260. The survey plan however has no original record in the Bureau of Lands. Be that as it may, survey plans merely delimit areas sought to be registered. Besides, the annotation relied upon by the lower court in its judgm ent in favor of the oppositor is nothing more than what it imports - a previous survey.
Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition. ruled in favor of Manuel Mercado. LOT 3.500. Wong received a copy of Mercado's complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the Court. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. built a small farm house after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the land in litigation and nobody disturbed him. October 21. Giger.00. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to watch it. Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police blotter. Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. FACTS: In 1972. Giger again asked an additional amount of P2. the pacto de retro sale could not be registered. Sta. Davao del Sur for PHP 3. Maria.R. He knew defendants' laborers were in the land in suit as early as August. 1976. Mercado began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Wong placed laborers on the land in suit. 1976. it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. Hence. DOCTRINE: Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors. He also placed signboards. J. L-50264. Wong asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession the TCT in the name of William Giger. the CFI of Davao del Sur. So.00 from Mercado and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale. 2. In 1973.IGNACIO WONG v. 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them. 1991. Maria. Petitioner Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. Maria. in July. Instead plaintiff was happy that there were people and a hut on the land in suit. 122 . Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at Colongan. He tried to register the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee but due to some technicalities. Then on November 18. But on November 29. No. Sta. 1976. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession. On appeal. situated in Colonga. Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. That was the time the matter was brought to the attention of the police of Sta. this petition.500. Davao del Sur against plaintiff Mercado. ISSUES: 1. Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela. Whether or not petitioner Wong is liable to pay rent. 1976. HON. During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry. Private respondent Manuel Mercado and William Giger executed a deed of sale with a right to repurchase a parcel of land. LUCAS CARPIO and MANUEL MERCADO G. On September 27. 1976. Bidin. by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Maria. On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts. Before July. the Municipal found in favor of the petitioner. spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of Digos. Whether or not defendant Manuel Mercado established prior possession of the lot in question. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons.
the one who presents a title. the present possessor shall be preferred. YES. Accordingly. Accordingly.HELD: 1. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition. the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art." (Art. It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. 1976. 2. the one longer in possession. 135 SCRA 15 ). His good faith therefore ceased on November 29. and if these conditions are equal. or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. YES. 538. vs. Such interruption takes place upon service of summons. 1976. (Art. the computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from December. by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Rizal Cement Co. Civi l Code). 528. if the dates of possession are the same. or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. Inc. A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent's complaint for forcible entry with summons on November 29. 531. Villareal.1976. if there are two possessions. it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith.. 123 . In the instant case. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession. it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro. the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. Civil Code. It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. Civil Code). Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors.
ipil. Somodio immediately took possession of his portion and planted ipil-ipil trees. August 15. provided. the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved. COURT OF APPEALS G. in February 1958. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved. A forcible entry case was filed against Purisima. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. but the Court of Appeals set Aside the judgment. recognizing the right of Somodio over one-half portion of the lot. a geodetic engineer. 39 Phil. In 1976. stating that Somodio did not clearly and conclusively establish physical. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association. he allowed Ayco to enter the premises and construct a nipa hut thereon. independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 82680. on the other hand.R. did not present any evidence but merely anchored his right to possess the property on the evidence of Purisima.: DOCTRINE: In ejectment cases. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Director of Lands. J . coconut trees and other fruit bearing trees.ipil trees and fruit trees. During suit. Ebeneco Purisima entered the property and started constructing a structure. independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. and Somodio filed suit for unlawful detainer. had surveyed the parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. In ejectment cases. the latter refused. After they partitioned the property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. HELD: YES. FACTS: A piece of land in General Santo City was sold to Wilfredo Mabugat. Inc. prior possession over the lot. the MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Somodio. Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust. Quiasion. and that his father's survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1960. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: 124 . Ayco. Nicanor Somodio contributed one-half of the purchase price. On June 1983.NICANOR SOMODIO v. Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees. IN 1976. Purisima contended that his father. No. he started the construction of a building on the property. 175 ). ISSUE: Whether Somodio had prior possession over the lot in controversy. 1994. When the time came that he wanted to remove Ayco. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself.
when his father allegedly took possession of the land. is not synonymous with his right of ownership over the same. As earlier stated. That these two lots are distinct from one another was resolved by the ocular inspection conducted by a Senior Geodetic Engineer of the Office of the City Engineer. It should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals noted that none of the parties had produced tax declarations or applications as public land claimants. as the area where private respondents built their houses.. Petitioner's prior possession over the property. he still enjoyed priority of possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. resolution of the issue of possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership. what should have been scrutinized is who between the claimants had priority of possession." On June 13. however.Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. As such. Neither did he present proof that between 1958. respondent Purisima claimed possession over Lot No. Lot NO. 6328-X. Moreover. however. neither is the fact that respondent Purisima's father surveyed the property of help to his cause. and 1983. Although respondent Purisima now claims that Lot No. five other houses had been built on Lot No. or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will. He did not present any proof that his father had authorized him to enter the land as his successor-in-interest. The matter of identification of the land. In his answer to the complaint. 1985. or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. As the Court of Appeals found. as well as by two ocular inspections. respondent Purisima's father surveyed the land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Inc. who found that "south of lot 6328-H across a 10 meter wide road is lot 6328-Y and from thence to the south is lot 6328-X. priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession. when said respondent himself entered the land. not for himself. 6328-Y. Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing improvements on the land only in 1981. 6328-X. The Court of Appeals opined that petitioner had not properly identified the lot he had occupied. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the services of his father and that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area. had been resolved by respondent Purisima's admission in his pleadings. the Municipal Trial Court judge himself went to the premises in question and discovered that aside from the houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco. these facts do not mean that respondent Purisima himself had prior possession. Under these circumstances. 125 . while petitioner identified the lot adjacent to it. his father ever exercised whatever right of possession he should have over the property.
No.MAGLUCOT-AW v. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and that the respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition. Parties to a partition proceeding. respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition. Tomas and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted. Here.R. Kapunan. petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Subsequently. March 28. and who took possession of the portion allotted to them. and who took possession of the portion allotted to them. who elected to take under partition. FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that they are the owners of lot no. 1639 which was covered by OCT no. they stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding. J. Then in 1963. Bartolome Maglucot. This occupation continued until this action was filed. 2000. 132518. are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party. 126 . Anselmo Lara. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch plan. HELD: YES. are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis. the payment of rentals reveals that respondents' possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof. Petition was granted. MAGLUCOT G. in 1992. However. respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Pascual Olis. Also. and Tomas Maglucot. Hence. who elected to take under partition. They likewise built houses on their corresponding leased lots. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no.
They contend that she came into possession through force and violence. regardless of its character. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother. physical. as the latter also acquired it before 1985. contrary to Art 536 of the Civil Code.FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO v. father of respondent. However. 538 of the Civil Code. 127 . 2000. as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. FACTS: Before 1954. actual. may recover such possession. the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with the respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. The tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled. exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito). The trial court said that petitioners are the lawful owner of the property.R. We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985. J. Panganiban. The respondent was the occupant of that land. and subsequently placed the tax declaration under the name of Margarito. April 6. Indeed. possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive. the brother of petitioner and Honorata had a dispute over the ownership of the property. Actual. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent. a possessor. DOCTRINE: For all intents and purposes. During the cadastral survey of the land. Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. Before 1985. in a turn of events. as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. is still deemed the legal possessor. 26425. 538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious. However. The petitioners dispute this ruling. At the same time. Honorata had a better right over the property HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Art. a possessor even if physically ousted. respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot. 137944. Sinforoso died in 1930. HONORATA BOLANTE G. the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso). When Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were daughters of Margarito Mendoza. anyone who can prove prior possession. No. exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Art. To all intents and purposes. even if physically ousted is still deemed to be the legal possessor. the petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. the land in question was originally declared for tax purposes under the name of Sinforoso Mendoza. Possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.
that the water which spreads over the lot in question at high tide is of but little depth. one of the predecessors in interest of these applicants. though the receding waters left it completely bare at low tide. by relation to the ebb and flow of the tide. ARAGON v. The latter law defined shores as: "Shore" is understood to be that space which is alternatively covered and uncovered by water with the movement of the tides. it is noteworthy that in the year 1892 a possessory title to the land in question was duly registered in favor of Inocencio Aragon. DOCTRINE: In a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide. and that these adjoining lots would be in substantially the same physical condition. that with some relatively small expenditure by way of a "fill" or a "retaining wall" it would still be a valuable building lot for residential purposes. Thereupon. However. FACTS: Juan Aragon filed for their land for an application for registry. 128 . Where the tides are not perceptible the shore begins at the line reached by the water during tempests and ordinary storms. and that only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of the Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at high tide. J. objected to the application for registry on the ground that the land in question is a part of the public domain as defined in Article 339 of the Civil Code since the land lies on shores and also. or to the gradual sinking of the land along the coast. No. and would be wholly excluded by a very limited amount of "filling" materials or a low retaining wall.R. so as to become a part of the "playa" (shore of the sea). though it does not definitely appear whether this is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters in the bay. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Aragon will lose possession and ownership over the land in question. but for low retaining walls which protect them against the incoming sea. and was occupied by some of the predecessors in interest of the applicants in these proceedings. the Government of the Philippine Islands. 1911.JUAN M. the land in question was so located that at high tide it was completely covered by the waters of the Bay of Manila. that there are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and flow of the tide. Carson. through its proper representatives. "rada" (roadstead). alleged to have violated Article 1 of The Law of Waters (Ley de Aguas) on the same ground that it lies on the shore. INSULAR GOVERNMENT G. under and undisputed claim of ownership. At the time of the application. March 25. that it is located toward the center of one of the most valuable residential sections of the city of Manila. and perhaps from a time beyond which the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. L-6019. the applicant and their predecessors in interest have been in possession of the parcel of land in question. that for a long period of years. private property may not become "property of public ownership" where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed. or the like. Its interior or terrestial limit is marked by the lone reached by the highest tides and equinoctials. as lot in question. that the adjoining lots extend toward the bay to a line formed by the extension of the outer boundary line of the lot in question. and that for many years a house stood upon this land.
and should he be disturbed therein." as defined in article 339 of the code. or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless the owners in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make some relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall.By the possession of another. the Court ruled that the ownership of Aragon over the land cannot be disturbed and shall remain on the petitioner’s possession and ownership.Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession. But the actual condition of the property as it appears from the record makes a claim that it has been totally lost or destroyed preposterous and wholly untenable. 3.The possessor may lose his possession — 1. if the new possession has lasted more than one year.By the abandonment of the thing.By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration. and that keeping in mind its location and actual condition it can not be said to have been totally destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by them.By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable. if the applicants have not lost their right of possession. "rada" (roadstead). the Government's claim of ownership. 2. Article 460. even against the will of the former possessor. it can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property. so as to become a part of the "playa" (shore of the sea). it seems quite clear that if the Government is justified in disturbing the possession of the applicants. 4. 129 . In a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide. Under the above-stated provisions of the code. The Honorable Court’s ruling in this case is merely that it affirmatively appears that the owners of the land in question have never in fact nor in intent abandoned it. private property may not become "property of public ownership. Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action of the sea.HELD: No. necessarily falls to the ground. or the like. on the ground that this is a part of the playa (shore) of Manila Bay. The Court held that the facts above stated fully sustain a finding that there has been no such destructive or total loss of the property as would justify a holding that the owners have lost possession. so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the Bay of Manila. Furthermore. The following pertinent provisions on the Civil Code states that: Article 446. he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the laws of procedure. It is quite clear that applicants have never abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of this land. where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed.
it had been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven years. neither was it declared that they were not owners of the land. La Trinidad. with claim of ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951. DOCTRINE: The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. confirming the registrable title of VICAR to the said lots. When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962. the lots claimed by the two sets of oppositors in the land registration. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. After trial on the merits. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Benguet. The Decision of the Court of Appeals did not positively declare private respondents as owners of the land. On March 22. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it dec lared the lots for taxation purposes. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. which reversed the decision of the land registration court and dismissing the VICAR's application as to Lots 2 and 3. but it held that the predecessors of private respondents were possessors of Lots 2 and 3. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals. but when they allowed its free use. COURT OF APPEALS G.CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE v. They never asked for the return of the house. J. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.R. 1988. dated November 17. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years. FACTS: The documents and records presented reveal that the whole controversy started when the defendant Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain filed an application for registration of title over Lots Poblacion Central. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. No. and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Gancayco. the land registration court promulgated its Decision. The adverse claim comes when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. 130 . ISSUE: Whether or not a decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated a long time ago can properly be considered res judicata by respondent Court of Appeals in the present two cases between petitioner and two private respondents. they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. 1965. but always with just title. 1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition asserting ownership and title thereto. September 21. 80294-95. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum .
R. They seized the 120 books without warrant. EDCA sought the assistance of the police. Nevertheless. Art. In an entrapment operation. payable on delivery. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale. A person relying on the seller’s title who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person 131 . 559 provides: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. 1981. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. v. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered. Actual delivery of the books having been made.700. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank. 80298. EDCA having become suspicious over a second order by Cruz even before clearing of his first check. 1990. FACTS: On October 5. for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8. this petition. The lower courts and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. J. Private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof.995.65. One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase ―unlawfully deprived‖ were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by petitioner. On October 7. 1981. SPOUSES SANTOS G. and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. Cruz was arrested and in the investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the checks issued by the impostor in payment therefore was dishonored. DOCTRINE: If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it on good faith at a public sale. against which he had drawn the payment check. April 26. which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. may recover it from the person in possession of the same. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. after initial refusal. Cruz.EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. after verifying the seller’s ownership from the invoice he showed her. paid him P1. Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who. finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. HELD: NO. On the night of the same date. Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. made inquiries with the De La Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no suc h person in its employ. a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books. Hence. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner. No. Meanwhile.
Worse. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag.in fact. too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. By contrast. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this.claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid th e purchase price therefore. It bears repeating that in the case at bar. thereby vesting ownership in the buyer. so to speak. it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him. by printed terms thereon. that the books had been paid for on delivery. EDCA was less than cautious . Although it had never transacted with him before. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. 132 . it readily delivered the books he had ordered and as readily accepted his personal check in payment.
DOCTRINE: One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. while she was talking to Garcia. by his misplaced confidence. No. has acquired it in good faith at a public sale. the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.R. the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor. having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question. Between a common law principle and statutory provision. The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another. Guevarra made Garcia know that the ring was stolen from her place days before. in which case. Garcia refused to return the ring. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. Garcia averred that she bought it from her comadre. one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. It was ascertained the ring was indeed Guevarra’s but despite written demands. has enabled the fraud to be committed. COURT OF APPEALS G. an owner of a restaurant. J. Guevarra who was unlawfully deprived of the ring was entitled to recover it from de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. It was stolen from her house.DE GARCIA v. Yapdiangco. the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. the law imposes the loss upon the party who. L-20264 January 30. Guevara. Pahati. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. On a relevant date." Respondent Angelina D. the owner cannot recover without reimbursement. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. HELD: YES. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived. ISSUE: Whether a person who has been unlawfully deprived of possession of a movable may recover the same. The only exception provided by law is when the possessor acquired the property through a public sale. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale. It reads thus: "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. 133 . As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v." Hence. specifically Article 559. solitaire 2 karat diamond as well as 4 brills. FACTS: Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring with white gold mounting. Nevertheless. Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another. is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. Fernando. cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code. in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. she recognized the ring on the latter’s finger and asked how she acquired the same. was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. 1971.
The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides in part that one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. Dizon refused. He is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. with the defendant Dizon’s pawnshop for PhP 2. No. J. When Suntay found out about the pledge. September 29.DOMINADOR DIZON v. Turns out that the ring was pledged by Clarita’s niece. she filed a case against Sison and thereafter wrote a letter to Dizon asking for the delivery to her of her ring pledged. perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit. Neither can Dizon’s defense of estoppels stand. SUNTAY G. LOURDES G. If no such care be taken. 134 . Estoppel has its roots in equity with good faith as its basis. he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.00. evidently in connivance with her. DOCTRINE: One who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. How then can petitioner in all seriousness assert that his appeal finds support in the doctrine of estoppels? Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his rescue. The CFI granted the action and declared Suntay as having the right of possession of the ring in question. Suntay made demands on Sison. an action was filed with the CFI of Manila for the recovery of the ring. HELD: YES. Fernando. FACTS: Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring which was delivered to Clarita Sison for sale on commission. hence. L-30817. After the lapse of a considerable time without Sis on having returned to Suntay the latter’s ring. Suntay having been unlawfully deprived of the ring in question. is entitled to recover it from Dizon who was found in possession of the same.R. 1972. 600. ISSUE: Whether Suntay has the right of possession over the diamond ring.
In the instant case. COURT OF APPEALS and CITIWIDE MOTORS INC. On appeal. purchased purportedly for his father. Citiwide reported the criminal act that transpired. Citiwide instituted an action for replevin for the recovery of the said motor vehicle. HELD: NO. FACTS: A person representing himself to be Jojo Consunji. the Court noted that there is a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide and the original vendee (Amando Suarez. In light of the foregoing. it turned out that the impostor Jojo Consunji was actually one Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa using his similar modus operandi. Citiwide cannot be said to have been unlawfully deprived of the motor vehicles as it had voluntarily transferred title to the same. 1992. and (3) possession is in the concept of an owner. When Citiwide deposited the said checks. The lower court ruled in favor of Ledesma. Ledesma. Consequently. Based on the findings of the Constabulary. Under Article 559 of the Civil Code. one Pedro Neyra. DOCTRINE: The three requisites so that acquisition of movable property would be equivalent to title are: (1) possession in good faith. September 1. ISSUE: Whether Citiwide Motors was unlawfully deprived of the cars when it sold the same to the purported father of the impostor Jojo Consunji. he has not voluntarily parted of it and thus possessor cannot validly acquire title to the said thing.R. 86051. Davide. Jr. two brand new motor vehicles from Citiwide Motors – an Isuzu Gemini and a Holden Premier Model.000. G. a party who has (a) lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has therefore title thereto. (2) owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. Ledesma interposed that he purchased the same in good faith from its registered owner. Hence. when one had been unlawfully deprived of a thing. this petition. J. one Rustico Consunji. a buyer in good faith and for value cannot be deprived of the motor vehicle. 135 . Citiwide delivered the motor vehicles to Consunji and the latter in turn issued two manager’s checks as full payment of the two motor vehicles. No. Thus. the same were dishonored by the bank on the ground that it was tampered with the correct amount of P101. The Court noted that there are three requisites to make possession of movable property equivalent to title: (1) possession should be in good faith. The Holden Premiere was recovered by Citiwide when it was found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City while the Isuzu Gemini was already transferred by Suarez to herein petitioner Jaime Ledesma. and (3) possession is in the concept of an owner. or Jojo Consunji).00 having been raised to P101.00. the CA ruled that Citiwide had been unlawfully deprived of the vehicle and hence Ledesma is bound to return the same.JAIME LEDESMA v. (2) owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing.
that Azarcon had occupied the land since 1941 with interruption during the war and again in 1950 up to the time of the filing of the action. containing an area of about 349 hectares. April 29. If at the time the good faith ceases. V-79). Various petitions were submitted by the parties. known as lot No. HELD: YES. 1955. No. The conflict between the lessee and the homesteaders was ordered to be investigated on May 25. 2807. Victor Eusebio filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. by lease from the Bureau of Lands (lease application No. 3807. and to a part of the net harvest. No. a writ for the execution of the judgment of the lower court was issued on October 3. The evidence shows that in spite of the receipt by the defendants of the notice of the writ of execution of October 3. for a parcel of land known as lot No.R. No. 1955 by the Director of Lands and again on August 3. both in proportion to the time of the possession." defendantsappellants nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending harvest. unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. J. that while he was in possession thereof defendants occupied a portion. the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation. A portion thereof was occupied by petitioners herein. that the lease application of plaintiff is subsequent to said homestead application of Leonardo Azarcon. V-79. 545. Defendant Leonardo Azarc on answered the complaint alleging that he is in actual possession of a portion of 24 hectares since 1941 by virtue of a homestead application. Labrador. 1955 by the Secretary of Agriculture and natural Resources. FACTS: Respondent Victor Eusebio and petitioners herein had a dispute over the possession of a certain parcel of public land in the year 1954. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest. alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land. Leonardo L. under a homestead application. there should be any natural or industrial fruits. 1955. 1954. L-11977.LEONARDO AZARCON. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals. Before the dispute could be settled and on April 28. and among them was that of defendants-appellants asking for the lifting of the writ of execution. Victor Eusebio had filed a lease application. which writ of execution commanded defendants "to forthwith remove from said premises and that plaintiff have restitution of the same. 1959.: DOCTRINE: A person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking with him his own effects and possession. containing an area of six hectares more or less. VICTOR EUSEBIO G. MANUEL AZARCON and ESTEBAN ABOBO v. 349 hectares in area. xxx xxx xxx 136 . ISSUE: Whether the defendant-appellants had a right over the palay. as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code. has the right to a part of the net harvest. Azarcon and his companions. V-42995. ART.
prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to leave the land. which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land. a motion to set aside the said order of execution. but not of one prohibiting them from removing anything therefrom. a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking with him his own effects and possession. Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but was not expressly prohibited by the court's order. no open. and this motion to stay execution was granted. It was perhaps in expectation of this resolution of the court setting aside the order of execution that defendants -appellants may have felt justified in entering the land and harvesting the fruits existing thereon. We are not ready to conclude that the defendants-appellants can be held to have committed a clear defiance of the order of the court. clear and contumacious refusal to obey a definite order of the court such as would constitute contempt. Such technical violation of the order cannot be considered as one amounting to a defiance of the court's authority. and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the execution. No such. 137 . unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. it cannot be said that the defendants-appellants committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order.As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from gathering the pending fruits. Defendants furthermore presented a bond in accordance with the order of the court and had it approved by the Court of First Instance. There was. Besides. after receipt of the order of execution. Furthermore. punishable as contempt. therefore. There may have been a technical violation of an order not to enter the premises. the defendants-appellants had presented.
July 25. They filed a civil case against defendants Victoria Cabral. such was due to Ocampo’s mere toleration. are possessors in bad faith. MAURO OCAMPO. HELD: YES. or from the moment facts exist that they are unaware that their possession is improper or wrongful. DOCTRINE: Possessors in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received from the time their good faith ceased.e. On appeal. 181 square meters located at Meycauayan.R. This is so since their predecessor. this petition. No. Hence.al. DALMACIO MONTAOS and CA G. are the successors in interest of Gregorio Ocampo. ALEJANDRO BERBOSO. It is a clear fact in the case at bar that the respondents are in possession of the land. It ruled that the disputed land is included in the original title issued to the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs. FACTS: Plaintiffs herein Felipa Cordero et. 138 . the defendant denied the allegations of the plaintiffs arguing among other things that they are the true owners of the 4.303 square meter land and that there was an error in the inclusion of the said land in the title of the plaintiffs. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court ruling on one hand that the disputed land was part of the land originally registered in the name of the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest but the said title cannot be used to defeat the personal agreement between the parties’ predecessors in interest. 1983. As much as there is no evidence that they are possessors in bad faith. i. CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO v. VICTORIA CABRAL. Consequently. There was no error or fraud attendant of such inclusion. ISSUE: Whether Cabral. Bulacan. al. Abad Santos. The Court resolved first the issue of ownership in the case at bar. It thus held that such agreement should be binding upon the plaintiffs as much as it is binding upon their predecessor in interest. the Court ruled that they shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received from the time that their good faith ceased. acknowledged.00 per cavan from the harvest time of 1958 up to the time of their filing of the case. It held that CA erred in its finding that Ocampo orally sold the land in question to Rodriguez.303 square meter rice land included in the aforementioned property they inherited from Ocampo. late Antonio Rodriguez and Gregorio Ocampo had an oral sale regarding the disputed land and from then on Ocampo admitted. Ocampo. et. On their reply. and recognized their possession of the same. If their predecessors were in possession of the said land before. J. L-36789. al. the Court noted that their good faith ceased when the respondents were served with summons to answer the complaint filed by herein plaintiffs. et. who owned a parcel of land. they averred that they were deprived of harvesting at least 10 cavans of palay at the rate of P10. measuring 78. as possessors in bad faith. The trial court dismissed the said complaint of the plaintiffs. These contentions were rebutted by the plaintiffs saying that the oral sale they were referring to never materialized.FELIPA CORDERO. due to their alleged illegal possession of a 4. from the time of service of summons. Due to such illegal possession.
seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant has the right to be indemnified. DOCTRINE: In as much as the one who intend retention. 1928. J. necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor but only those in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed and useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. rents or even crops he had gathered from it. An action was filed requesting the court to determine the value of necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel De Guzman in introducing the improvements. 139 . M ANUEL DE GUZMAN G. October 5. when de Guzman obtained the writ of possession and since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land. 1924. Martin Mendoza was put in possession of the disputed property. rents or even crops he had gathered from it. Under the law. as well as Manuel de Guzman who was working on the land. require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses. FACTS: By virtue of a court order.R. In as much as the one who intend retention. In the case at bar. it is only just that he should account to the owners of the property any fruits.28721. the plaintiff have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation. it is only just that he should account to the owners of the property any fruits. without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost and those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. etc. In a cadastral proceeding. upkeep.MARTIN MENDOZA v. The amount of the indemnification is the amount of the expenditures which is the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. one who is not actually a possessor in good faith within the meaning of the law. one who is not actually a possessor in good faith within the meaning of the law. seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures. From the time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis. Malcolm. Martin Mendoza possessed it until June 25. L. were ejected from the disputed land. said lot was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro diviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel De Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. production. HELD: YES. Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the thing.
4 on Iznart Street. the person who has defeated him in his possession having the opinion of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof. if she did not agree to the new rate of rent. since before the death of her mother Anastasia de la Rama. that said value be noted on the certificate of title as an encumbrance. and that. Lizarraga Hermanos. and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment. surnamed Robles. nor prove in the first instance the bad faith characterizing Evarista Robles' possession. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS and the REGISTER OF DEED OF ILOILO G. Evarista. Romualdez. FACTS: Anastasia de la Rama died. L-16662. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house." Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege. by virtue of which the competent court awarded to said partnership the properties left by the deceased. and Purificacion. No. Zacarias. supra. 4 on Iznart Street. the value of which is fixed at P4. later on by the consent of her coheirs. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to recover the value of the improvements. Lizarraga Hermanos. is inevitable. and afterwards by considering herself the future owner of the building by virtue of the contract with the present owner. and some properties. and lastly by agreement with the partnership. her mother Anastasia de la Rama. DOCTRINE: Necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor. at the beginning. and to retain the building until the same is made. Evarista Robles. Article 434 provides that "good faith is always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the person alleging it. in another action. who. among which is house No. to whom it had been awarded. Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to retention. December 21. and demanded. Felix. Magdalena. If the improvements are useful and Evarista Robles' possession was in good faith. the conclusion set out in article 453 of the Civil Code. as shown in the records and heretofore stated. she might vacate the house. has been with her husband occupying the aforesaid house No. including the aforesaid house No.500. concerning which a controversy arose which developed into the three cases now under consideration. 1916. and continued later in the occupation by the consent of her coheirs. Lizarraga Hermanos notified Evarista Robles that beginning April next the rent of the upper story of the house would be raised to P60 a month. The evidence shows that said improvements were begun about the end of December. leaving six children. Evarista Robles is the owner of such improvements. one of the aforesaid heirs. to wit. after the agreement with Lizarraga Hermanos for the sale thereof to Evarista Robles. ISSUE: Whether Evarista Robles and Enrique Martin has the right to retain the property until she is paid for the value of the improvements. and entitled to reimbursement therefor. began to occupy the house by permission of the former owner. and paying to said partnership P40 monthly as rent of the upper story. The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and settlement of their accounts. having made some improvements on the house. 4 on Iznart Street in the city of Iloilo.EVARISTA ROBLES and ENRIQUE MARTIN v. 140 . HELD: YES. 1921. by permission of her mother. J.R. Jose.
do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements. MWSS appealed to the Court arguing that the pertinent laws on the subject. ISSUE: Whether MWSS has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System.R. provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession. plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another. planted or sown without right to indemnity. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership. notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith. NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity. No.METROPOLITAN WASTE AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. L-54526. COURT OF APPEALS G.A. HELD: NO.000." As a builder in bad faith. particularly Articles 546. the right given to a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed. provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession. Thus. J. August 25. Feria. It is provided under Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that "he who builds. 141 . DOCTRINE: The right given to a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. Under Article 546 of same law. 1986. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. FACTS: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvem ents amounting to P255. for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. loses what is built. Article 547 provides that only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.00. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R. 547 and 549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
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