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Their impacts are wrong, they rely on a totalizing account of biopower democratic welfare states check.

. Dickinson 4[Edward Ross Dickinson, University of Cincinnati. Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some
Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity". Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148. 2004. Cambridge Journals.] The need to theorize the place of the

democratic welfare state in biopolitical, social-engineering modernity built in the course of the 1950s and 1960s in almost every European country in which people had meaningful political choices, virtually regardless of which political party was in government, and has survived ever since without a single major political upheaval, and certainly without significant episodes of internal violence. (The only modern regime form that comes remotely close and not very
is, however, obvious. This is a state form that in local variations was close, for that matter to this record is the liberal parliamentary regime form installed in much of Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century.) The German case offers perhaps the most extraordinary example of the almost monolithic stability of this political system. It hardly needs to be said that the Third Reich, in contrast, survived for

twelve years, and was effectively dead after eight. I want to stress that my point here is not that the
democratic welfare state is a "good" thing. There is plenty about it that is reprehensible and frightening. It does wonderful things the things it was built to do for people; but it also coerces, cajoles, massages, and incentivizes its citizens into behaving in certain ways. It "engineers" their lives, so to speak. It aims at achieving national power (now more often defined in economic rather than military terms, a discourse on skilled labor rather than on cannonfodder); it pathologizes difference; it disciplines the individual in myriad ways; it is driven by a "scientistic" and medicalizing approach to social problems; it is a creature of instrumental rationality. And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the c ontinuities between early twentieth-

century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the
National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because

it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of selfdirection and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is
the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

Their impact claims are overgeneralized, non-causal assertions modern biopolitics includes economic pluralization and democracy that inhibits the rise to totalitarianism OKane 97 (Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics, Economy and Society, February,
Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not intrinsically capable of genocidal action

Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalins USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each
(Bauman 1989: 106). case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies

have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method.
By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ordinary and common attributes of truly modern societies. It is

these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

Biopolitics key to prevent global overpopulation Newland 2 (Lynda, 2002 The Deployment of the Prosperous Family: Family Planning
in West Java Ph.D. on family planning and reproductive practices; gus MUSE) women's reproductive health increasingly became conflated with the interests of the family and the health of the nation-state's economy. While the first birth control clinics had been opened by doctors concerned with individual women's health after World War II (Mass 1974), population discourses were rationalized on the basis of the good of the state, where a growing economy was considered the most accurate indication of a prosperous civilization. An empirical example of Foucault's biopower (which he describes as being constituted by the anatomo-politics of the human body and the biopolitics of the population [1990]), this combination of medical and population discourses was now being globalized through the institutions of the U.N. By the end of the 1960s, many of the U.N. agencies became involved in the global
These demographic projections triggered the international debate in such a way that population discourses and family planning. Two reports went so far as to describe the U.N.'s role as being to assist governments to determine the size of their populations and assess population trends; understand how these trends affect economic and social development; formulate population policies; and carry out and evaluate measures which affect fertility. WHO (World Health Organization) was expected to aid in the establishment of family-planning services, in the training of medical and paramedical personnel, and in research into reproduction; the U.N. [End Page 26] Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) responsibilities were to be in communication, the training of demographers at universities, and education programs at schools and in adult education classes; U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) was to support WHO programs and other agencies with supplies and equipment; the International Labour Organization's (ILO) role was to be in workers' education and the health services in industry; the Food and Agricultural Organization of the U.N. (FAO) was to work through its home economic programs; and, lastly, the World Bank "would provide loans to finance the establishment of family planning clinics and the local manufacture of contraceptives" (Symonds and Carder 1973, 190). Thus, at the highest level of international government, a grid of programmatic power was created with the techniques, procedures and apparatuses of control laid in place, although it took the founding of the Population Trust Fund (with capital provided by the United States) for its effects to be felt. Continues. While this global

web of connections has resulted in the distribution of reliable methods of contraception, abortion, and obstetrical care,

Ginsberg and Rapp also emphasize the "increasingly effective methods of social surveillance and regulation of reproductive practices" (1995, 315). Because the surveillance and regulation of reproductive practices have ramifications regarding who is permitted to reproduce and which offspring may be privileged to survive, it underscores the politics of biopower. For an ethnically diverse nation like Indonesia, where political power sits with the most populous ethnic
group, the Javanese, anxieties about potential privileging are reflected in the reluctance of the rural NU Sundanese to take up family planning. In Western nations, contraceptive technology has played a significant part in the lives of women and is now commonly viewed as an essential condition through which women feel they can own their own bodies. Yet,

women who use contraception are vulnerable to side effects and the accompanying alterations of embodiment and to the claims of pharmaceutical companies whose interests may not coincide with their own. They are also vulnerable to the way reproduction is regulated by medical institutions and governments, albeit in vastly different and frequently ironic ways. For instance, while many middle-class women in nations like Australia
and the United States have grown up with notions regarding female responsibility for contraception, delayed marriage, the two-child family, and the importance of health and education institutions, they may find themselves vulnerable to the conservative backlash of the Right to Life faction, the influence of which is strong in conservative parties of government and which threatens to limit women's access to abortion and the access of certain kinds of women to In-Vitro Fertilisation. Clearly, while the notion of biopower--of administering life--has become globalized, it works in specific ways according to the class, ethnicity, and nationality of the women involved in relation with the government [End Page 43] in operation. As

a central strategy of biopower, the management of female fertility and reproduction requires extensive government regulation of everyday life. In developing nations, this surveillance and intervention is further reinforced by the justifications of the need for population control, a progressive economy, and obedience to the state in the effort to maintain the face
of nationhood.

Opop kills bioD guarantees warming Posner 2006 (October 15, Richard, United States judge, founder of the law and economics movement, professor
at University of Chicago, author of several books on assorted topics such as law, philosophy, and economy)

The greatest costs of further population increases are likely to be costs external to individual countries and therefore extremely difficult to control by taxation or other methods of pricing "bads," because most of the benefits of these measures would be reaped by other countries. These are environmental costs, mainly global warming and loss of biodiversity, about which I have written at length in my book Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford University Press, 2004). Of course, population growth per se does not increase global warming, but the burning of forests and, most important, of fossil fuels does, and these activities are positively correlated with population. Not only is it now the scientific consensus that global warming is a serious problem, but its adverse effects are appearing sooner than expected; it is by no means certain that a technological fix will be devised and implemented before the effects of global warming become catastrophic.

Extinction Warner 94, Paul American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life
Sciences, , p 177

Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no

one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.

Biopower is key to nuclear deterrence Bogard 91(William, Prof at Whitman, Social Science Journal, Discipline and
deterrence: Rethinking Foucault on the question of power in contemporary society, Volume 28, Issue 3, P. 325-346,

what Foucault had in mind was indeed what we commonly mean by "deterrence," the general context remains one of discipline, expanded to encompass the issues of bio-power and the control over life. But
Although there are many places in the History of Sexuality that might indicate there are a number of reasons to believe that such developments raise problems for the economy of power relations that, while related to those of discipline, are nonetheless conceptually distinct. The following appear to me to be the most relevant of those distinctions. With discipline, the problem of power is that of producing and finalizing functions within a human multiplicity, to maximize utility through the strategic ordering of spatial and temporal relations, ultimately to foster or disallow life itself. With deterrence, on the other hand, we might say that the problem is one of reintroducing an asymmetry between opposing forces which have evolved too close to a point of equivalence or parity, or to a saturation point where it is no longer possible to increase their respective utilities. We need to be clear on this point, for it is easy here to confuse the ideology of deterrence with its practice, and it is the latter in which we are most interested.(n60) As an ideology, deterrence claims as its goal the strategic balance of power relations, which translates into a form of mutual restraint. Here deterrence represents itself as a logic of equivalence, and as a means of insuring peace and stability by the threat of mutual retaliation. But the actual practice of deterrence is something entirely different and follows not a logic of equivalence, but one of expansion and contraction--the expansion of opposing forces asymtotically to a point where each threatens to disappear, followed by an indefinitely prolonged "laying down of arms." The equivalence of forces is not a goal, not even a practical goal, but a problem of the economy of power relations for which deterrence becomes a general solution. What must be deterred (prevented, delayed) is not, as the ideology of deterrence would suggest, the exercise of power but, somewhat paradoxically, the inability to exercise power. (For deterrence never really aims for a balance of power. The reproduction of deterrent practices is only possible given an asymmetry of power relations, no matter how small.) The paradigm case, of course, is 40 years of the arms race which has culminated in the current policy of the Superpowers with regard to nuclear weapons. In one way, the issue here does concern the "end" of power, at least in the sense of asking the question how power can be exercised in a situation where its actual exercise would lead to mutual annihilation. Since reaching a point of parity in the 1960's, the problem of Superpower relations has increasingly become one of finding ways to recapture the utility of these weapons. (Paul Virilio has called deterrence the "last ideology" since the threat of nuclear retaliation in kind as a means of insuring general peace and security is no longer perceived as credible or realistic.)(n61) Hence, it should come as no surprise that today the question of how power can be exercised is articulated today, at least in the sphere of international relations, in terms of disarmament rather than the endless multiplication of forces which have lost their capacity to be used.(n62) If the abstract formula of discipline is to impose a form of conduct on a human multiplicity, the formula for deterrence is to dissuade through the use of simulations of impending harm or risk (e.g., the scenario of nuclear holocaust, environmental impact assessments, profiles of the "typical" or potential criminal, disease carrier, etc.).(n63) Deterrence is a technology of signs and information (though this does not exclude its operation on bodies or species); of the reproduction of models (which does not discount its effect on conduct). There are other differences. Where discipline aims at certainty (Bentham's "inspection house" was also a house of certainty), deterrent strategies aim at the randomization of potential outcomes, the calculation of probabilities, and the assessment of risks--certainty, even as an ideal, is ruled out from the beginning. If discipline serves as a "corrective" for behavior--i.e., to align conduct more closely to the norm--deterrence serves as a disinclination to depart from a norm already embodied in action: it is not, for example, the criminal who must be deterred, but the law-abiding citizen. Where discipline sets forces in motion, deterrence indefinitely postpones the equivalence of forces. Here again,

the case of nuclear deterrence serves as a paradigm, but this is only because it is the most concentrated and extreme form of a whole multiplicity of tactical maneuvers--of postponement, disinclination, destabilization, etc.--that, like the disciplines in the 18th century, have evolved into a general mechanism of domination, and which today pervades the most diverse institutional settings.

Nuclear annihilation Lee 93(Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, P. 39-40)

(P3)What would be the consequences if nuclear deterrence were abandoned mutually instead of unilaterally? Negative consequences, such as those outlines in (P2), would still follow.

Nuclear deterrence deters not only nuclear

war, but also conventional war between nuclear superpowers. Without nuclear deterrence,
conventional war between superpower opponents would be more likely. Moreover, in one of the ironies of the nuclear age, the mutual

abandonment of nuclear deterrence would actually make nuclear war more likely. For, in the midst of any conventional war that occurred after this abandonment, the erst-while nuclear powers are likely to race to re-arm themselves with nuclear weapons making it very possible that the
conflict would become nuclear. In the midst of conventional war, each side would be likely to try and rebuild its nuclear weapons, first, because it would believe that a few such weapons would provide it with a decisive advantage in the war

Each side would rearm in the hopes of gaining an advantage in the war and out of the fear that the other side might be trying to achieve that very advantage. The potential for or the actualization
and, second, because it would suspect that the other side, believe this as well,was already secretly rearming. of this dynamic could lead other nations to behave in ways suggested in (P2). Instability would infect international relations weather the abandonment of nuclear deterrence were unilateral or mutual. (C) A consequentialist argument for some policy needs to show not only that a policy would have good (or not so bad) consequences, but that alternative policies would have consequences that are worse. (P1)-(P3) allows this comparative evaluation in the case of nuclear deterrence. On the positive side, mutual vulnerability and the stability it creates makes nuclear deterrence a reliable way if keeping the peace, with the beneficial consequences for all persons that this entails. On the negative side, the alterative to nuclear deterrence- its abandonment whether unilateral or multilateral, would result in

instability that would have consequences that are worse no only prudentially, but morally as well. Many nations would
become less sure of their ability to avoid aggression or coercion on the part of other nations and so would make moves that would increase the likelihood of war. Part of this dynamic would be that nations fears of the potential for other nations to arm or rearm themselves with nuclear weapons would make their own nuclear armament or rearmament more likely. So the risk of nuclear war would also increase. The result would be a set of expected consequences of great disvalue for people all over the world. Thus, nuclear superpowers are morally required, in consequentionalist terms, to maintain their policies of nuclear deterrence.

2NC Impact Defense Extensions

Not all politics lead to Nazism each situation has different complexities biopolitcal control has become too expensive and time consuming for most states to attempt Rabinow and Rose 3 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @
the London School of Economics, Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today, December 10,2003, pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, pg. 8-9)

The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors take their concept
and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower to Foucaults remarks on sovereignty as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its characteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain paroxysmal moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non continuous. The totalization of sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial

power sought to operationalize it ,but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form. The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania under Hoxha, North Korea. But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the extravagance displays of the

sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master

Not all biopolitics results in bodies modern liberal democracies especially dont Foucault fails to make the distinction Rabinow and Rose 3 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @
the London School of Economics, Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today, December 10,2003, pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, pg. 8-9) Agamben takes seriously Adornos challenge how is it possible to think after Auschwitz? But for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to apply Schmitts concept of the state of exception and Foucaults analysis of biopower to every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command

under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this is not to say that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or under pinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Unlike Agamben, we do not think that : the jurist the doctor, the scientist, the expert, the priest depend for their power over life upon an alliance with the State (1998: 122). Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyze every contemporary instance of thanato-politics from Rwanda to the epidemic of AIDS deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgment and action

Biopower is inevitable Wright 8 (Nathan, Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy, Camp as
Paradigm: Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben, 2008
Perhaps the one failure of Foucaults that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem

At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to state-sanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem. It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucaults failure to solve the problem of state racism and to elaborate a
of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. unitary theory of power (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism.

Biopower is strategically reversibleit can become a tool of resistance and empowerment Campbell 98 (David, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle,
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 204-205) The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the bio-power discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being

and forms of life such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government the ongoing agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation,
human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a

consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the strategic reversibility of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the history of government as the conduct of conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting counterconducts.39 Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of the political has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective
action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, the core of what we now call citizenship consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war. In more recent times, constituencies associated with womens, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These

resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed,
expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of the political has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policys concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.