War and the State in Africa Author(s): Jeffrey Herbst Source: International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring, 1990), pp.

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Warand tfie State in

Afnica

Jeffrey Herbst

MIostanalyses assume thatin Africa, as elsewhere, stateswill eventually becomestrong. But this maynot be truein Africa, wherestatesare developing in a fundamentally new environment. Lessons drawnfrom thecase ofEuropeshow thatwar is an important cause of stateformation thatis missing in Africa today.The crucial rolethatwarhas playedin theformation ofEuropeanstates has long been noted.SamuelP. Huntington arguedthat"warwas thegreatstimulus to statebuilding," and CharlesTillywentso faras to claimthat"warmade "I Similarly, the state,and the statemade war. two of the mostsuccessful statesin theThirdWorldtoday,SouthKoreaand Taiwan,are largely "warfare"statesthathave been molded,in part,by the near constant threat of external and state aggression.However,studiesof politicaldevelopment in Africa consolidation World and manyother partsoftheThird have all but ignored theimportant rolethatwar can playin political development. The roleofwar has notbeen examined becausethevastmajority ofstates in Africa in the worldgainedindependence and elsewhere without having to resort and have notfaceda security threat to combat sinceindependence.2
I am grateful to Henry Bienen, Aaron Friedberg,Elizabeth Hart, Dave Rawson, the International Relations Discussion Group at PrincetonUniversity, and two anonymous readers for helpful comments.

and International Jeffrey Herbst is Assistant Professor Woodrow Wilson of Politics Affairs, School, Princeton University.
1. Samuel P. Huntington,Political Orderin Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 123; and Charles Tilly, "Reflectionson the History of European State-Making,"in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation ofNationalStatesin Western Europe(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975), p. 42. An important recentaddition to this literature is Brian M. Downing, 'Constitutionalism,Warfareand Political Change in Early Modern Europe," Theory and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January1988), pp. 7-56. The general literature on warfare'seffect on societyis voluminous. An early work which concentrateson some of the themes examined here is Hans J. Renfroe,Jr.(Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). 2. For instance, in MorrisJanowitz'sclassic study of the military in the developing world, the political,social, and economic functionsof the military are studied extensively but the potential effectsof war, or of peace, are not analyzed. Morris Janowitz, The Militaryin the Political

Delbruck, History ofthe ArtofWar within the Framework Vol. III, trans. ofPolitical History, Walter

Development ofNewNations: An Essayin Comparative Analysis (Chicago:University of Chicago
Press, 1964), p. 12.

International Security, Spring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4)

? 1990bythePresident and FellowsofHarvard Collegeand oftheMassachusetts Institute ofTechnology.

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TheSociology ofWar andPeace (London: Macmillan. 1 (October Politics.3 Studying the military and studying warfare are not the same.and the development of nationalism. 4. it forced caused the stateto become more efficient leadersto dramatically improve administrative capabilities. A useful A. I concludethatthey peace what war enabled Europeancountries and probably cannotbecause fundamental changesin economicstructures are difficult."ArmedForcesand NationalModernization: Continuing theDebate. or undersevereexternal The nextsectionof thisarticle outlines how war affected stateformation in Europe.No. "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure States 5.p. pp. theirdevelopment 3.WhileAfrican stateshave benefited from peace.TheFormation ofNationalStates.140. and it createda could climate and important aroundwhicha disparate symbols population the Whilethere unify. This content downloaded from 170. relationship withthe statethathave verylittle to do withthe military..26.180 on Sun. Gabriel ofModern andNations. War in Europe played an important role in the consolidation of many now-developedstates:war in revenuecollection. The literature is reviewed by HenryBienen.administrative and thecitizenry's structures. 1987). especially in the area of stateconsolidation. ifnotimpossible. The questionof whether it is only possible to createa nationout of "blood and iron" is apparently one thatmanyanalysts findtoo disturbing to examine. I then comparethe Europeanexperience of state-building to the relative has experienced sincethe through warfare peace thatAfrica 1960s. in Tilly.eds.4 Finally. is little reasonto believethatwar would have exactly same domestic in Africa effects todayas it did in Europe severalcenturies can accomplish in times countries ago." Ardent." in ColinCreighton and Martin Shaw. itis important to ask ifdeveloping of to do. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .5 of the Europeancase withthatof Africa is therefore crucial Comparison to understanding whetherthe analogyholds. beyond the usual problem of trying to studytheimpactof a factor thatis missing.withparticular to twocrucial attention thecreation developments: of centralized and efficient structures to collect taxes. 1-16. "Warand theRise corrective to theconventional viewis provided byJohn oftheWest. Hall. 16.International Security 14:4 1118 Thosescholars who have analyzedthemilitary in thedeveloping worldhave studiedthe armedforces' rolein economic and political processesbut have not examinedthe changes thatwar could potentially effect on a state. thereis a less excusablenormative bias which has sometimes prevented studentsof politicsfromexamining the effects of war. aboutwhencountries societal beliefs to bring are notbeingdisrupted threat. because warfare has independent effects on economic policies."Comparative Vol. 1983). 89.

and even in the same periodstatesreacted of ways to external threats. toexamine thepotential ofexternal important impact threat to better stateconsolidation in theThird understand World. damageorevencomplete one oncehe had to taxhad been successfully appropriated byany sovereign.j 119 WarandtheState inAfrica has been stunted by theveryproblems thatwar helpedEuropeancountries to solve. of course. Accordingly. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This content downloaded from 170. is dramatic.180 on Sun. The contrast between thisevolutionary and thecurrent in theThird development situation aid will World.At themostbasic level.where even statesthatare largelydependenton foreign It is. "Once thepower destruction.war did affect in many increase taxation and contributed to theforging ofnational identities Itis therefore countries. thosestatesthatcouldraisemoney quickly witha warthat lead to significant threaten their successfully neighbors might Richard Beanwrites.Otherstates.140. perceiving that peace locksthem intoa permanently weak position. notto generalize important too muchbecausewarhad manydifferent effects in a variety overtime. I conclude thatsome stateswill probably be unsuccessful in finding ways of building the statein timesof peace and will therefore remainpermanently weak.war in Europehelped alleviatesome of the problems that affect African countries today. continueto existforthe foreseeable future. Effects ofWaron State Consolidation: TheEuropean Case It is instructive to lookat war'simpact on Europeansocieties because.Weak statesdo in Europetoday-Belgium exist is one example-butthenear-constant threat of war did prompt moststatesto becomestronger to survive.26. I thenevaluatethe possibilities thatAfrican statesmight develop strategies to solvethesefundamental problems in times ofpeace. the international will community have to develop non-traditionalpoliciesforhelpinga new brandof states:thosethatwillcontinue to exist butthat willnotdevelop. TAXES effect ofwar in Europeanhistory was to cause Perhapsthe mostnoticeable the state to increaseits ability to collectsignificantly more revenuewith and less publicresistance. maybe tempted to use war as a means ofresolving their otherwise intractable problems ofstateconsolidation.as will be notedbelow. theability ofEuropeanstatesto However. ofEuropean greater Giventhefreedom efficiency states to attack could each other.war in Europeacted as a filter whereby weak stateswere eliminated and political arrangements thatwere not viableeither were reformed or disappeared.

p. 1 (Exeter.Statesthat sufficient revenuewas a necessary did not raise sufficient revenueforwar perished.he findsthattherewere six majorjumpsin staterevenueand thateach corresponds withthebeginning ofa war." 1130-1815: in Mann.: University ofExeter. TheMilitary Revolution and theState. 9. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . citizensare muchmorelikely to their willoverwhelm whenthenationis at war.Whilerulers may recognize thattheirtax system is inadequate. manyfactors including technology. 7. because a smallincrease 6.. 1980).8The association the need to fight and theneed to collect between revenue is perhapsclearest in Prussia. "Warand theBirth of theNationState. States. strains on leadersto findnew and moreregularsourcesof income. butit mustalso pay a considerable in revenue morethanthe current leveloftaxation. No Europeanstates to escape the conclusion thata were continuously at peace.1986).of Saxony. MichaelMann. This content downloaded from 170. raising condition to prevent defeat. 1 (March1973). ofBavaria in [theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries]. 5. (Oxford: 1988)."6 and morale ofthetroops.As MichaelMann notes." Revolution ed. 109.K.14:4 | 120 International Security thatstate intoacquiescence.First. used thatpowerto bribeor coercehis nobility could face all neighboring stateswiththe choiceof beingconqueredor of Whilesuccessin war dependson centralizing authority and raising taxes. Warand Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology Basil Blackwell.180 on Sun. No. in Mann's study of taxation in Englandbetween1688and 1815. MichaelMann. MichaelDuffy. "Stateand Society.26.a war maybe the only thing that forces them to expendthenecessary political capital and undertake the coercion required to gain morerevenue. 1500-1800.because a threat survival In fact."7 Waraffects itputstremendous statefinances for tworeasons. TheSources ofSocialPower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.9 to acquiesceto increased taxation Second. An Analysis of English StateFinances. It is impossible thanthemilipeaceful statewould have ceased to existeven morespeedily tarily inefficient actually did.p.Those thatdid notwould be crushed on the battlefield and absorbedintoothers-thefateof Poland.1500-1800. in MichaelDuffy. 220.p. Vol.140. p." Journal ofEconomic History. 486. "The Military and theState. theymight fora war can be thought collective ofas a "lumpy" good: notonlymustthe amount population pay to get thegood. U. 8. Exeter Studiesin History No. tactics. "A statethatwishedto survive had to increase to pay itsextractive capacity forprofessional armiesand/or navies. 33. Richard Bean.taxation otherconcerns have about increasedtaxation.For instance. wherethemaintaxcollection agency was calledtheGeneralWarCommissariat.

3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .140. "Lumpy" goodsare products whicharenotuseful ifonlypartis purchased.1987). 13.1988). 12. Margaret Levi.The permanent requirement to mobilize humanand material resources for military purposes [i.p. Migdal.1977).war in othersocieties playedthe same kind of role thatwar did in Europe. 483-490. 56-57.The samepointis madeby Richard L. 20.13 A highly extractive statealso could cloakdemandsforgreater resources in appeals fornational in thefaceofa determined unity enemy.180 on Sun.1988).Strong Societies andWeak States: State-Society Relations andState Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press.WarandtheState inAfrica | 121 In this threat thestate. 274.10 is often notenoughto meetthenew security facing a bridge: must fora war is liketaxation forbuilding way. 139.12 ofauxiliary the SouthKoreanand Taiwanesestateshave been able to extract Similarly. This content downloaded from 170. Joseph in his study Smaldone oftheSokotoCaliphate writes (inwhatis now Nigeria) between1500and 1800: and extension War was the principal forthe establishment of instrument and for the politicalauthority over subjectpeopte and foreign territory.p. the sectorsof mands of perennialwar evoked institutions to subordinate crucialto the interests of thesemilitarized society polities. pay to buildthebridgeand a smallincrease halfa war. at other timesoften Whileit is nota universal rule. OfRuleandRevenue (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press. Joel S. taxation] intensified tendencies towardthe monopolization of power and theelaboration institutions of socialcontrol. of that authority. Mann. 11. JosephP. Roberts in his Warriors.e. Merchants.. The deand reinforcement organization.the marginal costs of continuing thatwill are quitelow and theresources collect can be used for they projects enhancetheruling group'ssupport.pp. war oftencauses a "ratchet effect" wherebyrevenue increases level butdoes notdeclineto theante bellum whena nationis fighting sharply have invested thesunken whenhostilities have ceased.26.11 Once governments the collection and routinized of costs in expandingtax collection systems those structures new sourcesof revenue. pp.For instance. 10.Sources ofSocial Power. so manyresources theirsocieties in partbecause the demandsto be from the stateintodeveloping constantly vigilant provoked efficient mechanisms for and controlling collecting resources dissident groups.taxation everyone in revenue willnotbe enough. Smaldone. likefighting Thus.p. andSlaves: TheState andthe Economy inthe Middle Niger Valley.Warfare in theSokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. becausehalfa bridge.is useless. maintenance. 1700-1914 (Palo Alto:Stanford University Press.

Materialism (Berkeley: University Press. II ofA Contemporary 14. Anthony Giddens. 235.180 on Sun. humanrights and large-scale forceful of ethnic crushing challenges.1985). Critique of Historical andViolence. at the same time. MichaelHoward. Austerlitz and Jena: military triumph settheseal on thenew-found it had been a nationfor nationalconsciousness.1978).15 of 1812. memories components Fighting it is possibleto have people pay moretaxes maybe the onlyway whereby withthestate. vol.War andthe in theoriginal. abuses. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The Nation-State ofCalifornia Press. and at thesame timefeelmorecloselyassociated Warin the Era TheAbsence Modern ofInterstate the Whiletrying to studythechaos causedby administrative disintegration.p. This content downloaded from 170. Britain was Trafalgar-but battles Russia fourhundredyears."'14 Similarly. Emphasis Nation State (Oxford: Clarendon 15. External threats have such a powerful effect on nationalism because people thatthey realizein a profound manner areunderthreat becauseofwho they are as a nation.the population wars thatwere important of nationalism.Germany wasGravelotte In Europe therewas an almostsymbiotic relationship betweenthe state's extractive war increasedboth as the population capacityand nationalism: threat thatthey and was convinced shouldpaymoreto thestate.thepresenceofa palpableexternal threat maybe thestrongest way to generatea commonassociation betweenthe stateand the population.sincethoseearlier Crecyand Agincourt. Anthony Giddensrecounts ofstates'sovereignty. Waralso had a majorimpacton thedevelopment ofnationalism Indeed. wasthetriumph and Sedan.14:4 j 122 International Security NATIONALISM in Europe. 9.140. the visceral of nationalism impactof wars on the development throughout Europe: from Self-identification as a Nationimpliesalmostby definition alienation in thegroup-memory other and themostmemorable communities. Francewas Marengo.26. ofWorldWarI: "The Warcanalizedthedevelopment tying thisto citizenship and to nationalism in sucha profound way thatany otherscenario[ofhow the international would be ordered] system came to MichaelHoward notes appear as little morethanidle fantasy.p. by external unitedaroundcommonsymbols and as. incidents in conflict consisted withand triumph overothercommunities.theyare forced to recognize thatit is onlyas a nationthat theeffects they can successfully defeat thethreat.

one involuntary era boundary changesincethe dawn of the independence in thelate 1950s.140. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . destinedforwar giventhe coloEven in Africa.16 sincetheend oftheSecondWorld fewThird World War. survival has been a real consideration are exceptional and even thesecountries have survived intact.not to conquerUganda. This content downloaded from 170.wars of conquestthatthreatened the existence of other butconflicts wereresolved states.1971). defeated Somaliain 1978. "Penetration: A CrisisofGovernmental Capacity.or Taiwan.p. theEthiopians. Crisesand Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press." in LeonardBinder. Chad andthe Central Sahara (London:Hurst. nota conflict between independent states. not. 17.SouthKorea..DavidD. the continent seemingly there nially-imposed boundaries and weak political has notbeen authorities. Tanzaniainvaded Uganda in 1979to overthrow Idi Amin.g. The Libyanmilitary presence gradually expandeduntila dramatic seriesof conflicts withtheChadiangovernment (heavily supported theLibyans by Franceand the UnitedStates)in 1987forced to agreeto an end to hostilities. 126-146. in nationalpolitics."invaded Ethiopia in the hope of annexing the Ogaden. Samatar. China-Vietnam) thevastmajority ofThird World do notfacesignificant states mostofthetime external Stateslike Israel.and veryfewcountries faceeven theprospect ofa conflict in Africa withtheir thathave occurred were Mostoftheconflicts neighbors.very stateshave fought wars of thetypethataffected theevolution interstate of Europeanstates. Somalia: Nation in Search ofa State (Boulder. the war in theWestern Saharais a colonial question. forces invadedChad by moving forces intothedisputed Aozou strip. In 1973Libyan 1987). pp.: Westview.as in Europe. et al. 1989).WarandtheState inAfrica 1123 manyscholars have generally assumedthatpoor countries todayfaceeven moreexternal challengesthanEuropeanstatesdid in their formative periIn fact. Iran-Iraq. forinstance. Colo.26. India-Pakistan.wherenational threats.17 African stateshave seldomfought interstate wars and the continent has not witnessedsignificant boundary changes. ods. not to changethe bordersof the region. 222. 140-143. In 1977 Somalia..180 on Sun.as part of its irredentist projectto create"Greater Somalia.Even South Africa's destabilization efforts againstits neighbors are primarily attempts to influence the policiesof the majority-ruled countries. conflicts thatdid have thepotential to threaten theexistence fundamentally ofstates-Somalia'sattempt in the1970sand Libya'swar to invadeEthiopia againstChad in the 1970sand 1980s-the aggressor did notsucceed. overlesserissues that without threatening the existence of anotherstate.The few ThirdlWorld interstate wars thathave occurred have obscured thefactthat (e. See. withsignificant help from the Soviet Unionand Cuba.For instance. Joseph LaPalombara.because independent leaders 16. Libya. Laitin and Said S.Lesothoor Swazilandwould not existtoday if South Africa In the few had any real territorial ambitions. John Wright. Similarly.pp.

Biafra.have independence weakadministrative and consist that aresplintered ofpopulations structures. Vol. 673-692.Yet. Tillyestimates. No. lines. strengthen The stability in Africa. Eritrea) even wheretheprinciple ofself-determination might have led themto do so.theyare precisely statesthatbefore1945were routinely invadedand takenoverby stronger in theThird statesin their or by external fewstates region powers. In order toprevent from beingthrown intothe chaos of large-scale boundarychangesin whichthe stability and integrity of any statecould be threatened.very evident and political faceany sigWorld. thecontinent (Nigeriaand Zaire).14:4 1124 International Security havecontinued thesystem ofboundary maintenance that thecolonial powers first developedto regulate thescramble for Africa in thelate1800s. In contrast.19 Thepsychology ofEurope populations regularly byforeign in its formative centuries. 4 (Fall1989). weak stateswere routinely and as forcenturies defeated absorbed rulers.g. secessionist threats (from Ibo and Kataganese respectively) and therefore worked resolutelyto thenormthattheborders shouldnotbe changed.pp." International Organization. 43. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .140.especially developmentgiventhatthevast majority of theoverone hundred countries in the ThirdWorldthathave gainedtheir since1945are poor. Thisargument is developedin Jeffrey Herbst. 38. "Reflections on theHistory ofEuropean State-Making.180 on Sun. despitetheir military weaknesses. This content downloaded from 170. colonialboundaries Most of the continent has. the "enormous majority" of statesin Europe failed.In other thekindof alongregional or ethnic words." p. nificant external threat. theycreated a system of explicit norms. accordingly. "The Creation and Maintenance ofNational Boundaries in Africa. The system thatmaintained the inherited borders as inviolate was because two of thelargest somewhat stateson strengthened inadvertently. is a remarkable of new states. tojoin others create entirely thecontinent new ones. Tilly.whichcould conceivably have threatened their muchsmaller facedsignificant the neighbors.propoundedby the Organization of African Unityin 1963.. refusedto recognizeboundary changes(e.which declaredany changein the inherited to be illegitimate.18 African leadersrecognized in theearly 1960sthat a potentially large number ofgroups wouldwantto secede from thestatestheyare presently or in. 19. Thissystem in preserving has been successful African national boundaries and has so far deterred almost all countries from initiating the kind of conquestwars thatwere so commonin European history. and longperiods withno majorfighting Peace was theexception were almostunknown.26. where state survivalwas a veryreal issue of 18.

Callaghy. 22.20 Problems ofState Consolidation inAfrica in their African statesfacenumerous problems efforts to consolidate power.is so different from the outlookfacingThird World leaderstodayas to suggest thatthere has been a fundamental change in the survival prospects of weak statesand thatcontrol of territory is no longer correlated withmilitary power. although compared small(as measuredby government of grossdospendingas a percentage 20. thatare societies often fragmented and have little orientation to the stateas a whole.1988).1984). mostextreme of thecontinent and thefragility giventhe poverty of the states. 82.p.An Introduction to thePolitics ofTropical Africa (London: Allen and Unwin. This content downloaded from 170. Colo.26.. Ibid. p.elitesmayfeelthat because of theircountry's to exogenousshocks(e. 95. in Africa: "The Stateand theDevelopment ofCapitalism Theoretical.their arealmost efforts inevitably clumsy.: Westview. 81. heavy-handed.p..or are prevented from have no other gaining it.ambitious politicians opportunity to accumulate wealthor powerbecausethestatecontrols thebadges of statusand manyofthefree-floating in theeconomy.21Even when theydo control the apex of the state.180 on Sun. sudden vulnerability raw material and the presenceof sharpdropsin the priceof their exports) and well-connected multinational sophisticated enterprises minority groups in in Indians East in Lebanese West are not (e. Africa.g." and NaomiChazan. these"lame Leviathans"' try to control everdesperately greater partsofsociety through outright ownership or regulation.g. theaveragestatein Africa to other statesis Therefore. they really and therefore control oftheir own destiny arevulnerable. eds. RichardHodder-Williams. in Donald Rothchild Historical. However. Elites can come to power but.WarandtheState inAfrica 1125 constant concernto leaders. Africa).140.. ThomasM. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . As a result oftheir grossinsecurities. Theyare poor.. given the precariousness of in countries control whererulesgoverning leadership and successionhave notbeen institutionalized. 21. resources suchas they are. and Comparative Reflections. and authoritarian. theymaybe displaced.Once theylose power. The Precarious Balance:Stateand Society in Africa (Boulder. Many other ThirdWorld nations facethesesame problems are often although they in Africa. sincethey areweak. shortof trained and confront manpower.

p.5 percent. LarryDiamond.1978).180 on Sun. This content downloaded from 170. forinstance.) International Monetary Fund (IMF). 115.. D."24 The problems can be illustrated confronted by statesin Africa by comparing their experience withEuropeanstatesin twoareaswherewar had a significant impact: thestate'sability to extract resources through taxes.Government revenueposes a majorproblem forall African states and manyothersin the ThirdWorld.Third World countries taxsystems because theprocessofdevelopment requires largeexpenditures and on infrastructure to promote economic the country activity throughout to handle the ramifications of development.p. Arthur Lewis. Arthur Lewis.: IMF.pp. thanthe developing country averageof 25. 74. W.1966).1987). 26.p. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1988 (Washington."Class Formation in the SwollenAfrican State. when defense(2. A classicexampleof how weak statepowercauses the stateto institute desperate and self-defeating economic policiesis in thearea of government revenue. The shareof totalgrossdomestic product of sub-Saharan African statesis smaller."The Crisisof the Statein Post-Colonial Africa.Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1988. Vol. W. buy books forschools.140. and statistical structures Due to the weaknessof administrative and manygovernments of foreign relyon taxation trade. 94.4 percentof the averageAfrican GDP) are subtracted. 85. 25.7 percent ofitsGDP on all government are onlyrough functions. Revolution and Ntalaja.These statesare desperately shortof revenueto fundeven minimal stateservices (e.26 However. 27. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Arthur incurred byurbanizing countries.6 are from percent." Counter-Revolution inAfrica (London:Zed Books. Thus arises the image of so many African statesas "overdeveloped" or "swollen.supplytransport foragricultural extension that services) theirpopulations have long been promised.23 itappearsto be too largebecauseitsclumsy extractiveefforts cause so muchdamagecompared to thebenefits thatit delivers. in Nzongola-Ntalaja. pay nurses'salaries.1988).pp. theydo illustrate theextent ofthefiscal facing in Africa.C.Development Planning: TheEssentials ofEconomic Policy (New York: Harper and Row. and thedegreeofnationalism in thecountries southoftheSahara.because imports 23.5 percentof GDP) and debt repayments (3.g. estimates given the problemsassociatedwithAfrican African crisis states. (Bothfigures 1984. 4 (December 1987). See. 25.27 Whilethesefigures economicstatistics. and 94. 592-596.In additionto theserecurrent and moreefficient arein need ofmoreextensive costs. country spends only15. the largeexpenses especially W.25 Lewisestimates that thepublic in Third sector World countries shouldbe spending on theorder of20 percent of GDP on services. 24. at 21. No. Calculated from IMF.p. exclusiveof defenseand debtrepayment. 58.26.14:4 1 126 International Security mestic product [GDP]). 39. The Evolution of theInternational Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press."The and NzongolaJournal ofModern African Studies.

pp.3 percent oftotalrevenue. See Rothchildand Chazan."thereare fewsignsof nationalism countries despitethenow pro forma exhortations from propaganda organsto in engage state-building. Alex Radian.28 indirect trade the statethrough taxeson foreign Unfortunately. of slow and steadyincreases These countries need guarantees in orderto accomrevenueabove therateof economic government growth and communications plishthetaskscrucial to development: buildtransport establish and createeducational systems. utilities. ulationis encouragedto become dependenton imported food. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . funding damages nationaleconomiesbecause leadersare compelledto erectevergreater administrative controls on imports.26.Thus. mostimportantly. systems.31 Twenty-five yearsafter "thenationalist in mostAfrican period.1981). over-valued becausegovexchange rates.on average.30 Another majorproblem facing leadersin Africa is theabsenceofa strong consensus withthestate. authoritarian elite. See World Bank.comparedto all developing countries which.and certainly notwilling to pay moretaxesto it. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An AgendaforAction(Wash30. 24-30.1980). 54. the picture ofAfrican societies is ofpopulations widely accepted today trying desperately to escape the clutches thanbecoming of the state.gain 12. 31. 13-17.and black markets quickly developto takeadvantageofdistorted prices.rather moreinvolvedin it.180 on Sun. NJ: Transaction Books.. ington. The Precarious Balance. smuggling and. D.Indeed.p.Overvaluedexchangeratesin turnlead to wide-spread damagewithin poorereconomies as exporters are universally thepophurt. and industrialized countries wheretariffs accountforonly1.C. the majority of statesstillhave difficulty viablesymbols creating to attract theloyalties oftheir citizens. Resource Mobilization inPoorCountries: TaxPolicies Implementing (New Brunswick.The lackofa popular overnational popularidentity resources and the state'sclumsy efforts to extract purposeboth aggravates is itself exacerbated by an insecure. Calculated from ibid.thistype inappropriate in countries. Indeed.: World Bank. ernments rather thanthemarket to growto relyon administrative controls regulateimports. the averageAfrican statedepends on revenuefrom tariffs for20. 29. Thesetariffs promote corruption.inAfrica WarandtheState 1127 exports mustphysically pass through a relatively smallnumberof border posts thatcan be easilymanned.29 Beyondthe immediate damage caused by a tax system dependent on imports and exof tax system is particularly forThirdWorld ports. This content downloaded from 170.pp.9 percent of their revenue from tariffs.5 percent of totalrevenue.140. 28.

1985). the traditional rulerof the Bugandapeople. pp.33 Moreover.Nimeiri Sudan.Often governments findit too politically subsidiesto thosetheywant difficult to providedirect to favor. Forinstance. in nationalidentity. 234-240. 33.pp. However. Horowitz.muchless a national countries to forge identity.President which Sudaneffectively abrogated theAddisAbabaagreement had given autonomy toSouthern in a civilwar eversince.MansourKhalid.However. forinstance. no matterhow well accommodationist formulas of intra-societal conflict in Africa in the ThirdWorldwould and elsewhere work. therefore.1985).formulas where nationalinstitutions are not strong.almosteveryone agreethata morebasic national loyalty by all societal groupswould stillbe desirable.was the country's first president.Federalist solutions countries brokedown in Sudan and Uganda. sincetaxesare so consequential to every a largenumber ofpolitical businessdecision.pp. 149-156.ThePolitics ofCultural Pluralism (Madison:University of Wisconsin GaafarMohamedNimeiri of the Press.Crawford Young. thetaxsystem overtime reflects madebythestate withdifferent interest bargains groups. Donald L. 1976). narily difficult. Bugandahad a degreeof autonomy whenUganda gainedindependence and theKabaka. This content downloaded from 170.the means by whichto induce a disparatesocietyto identify morewiththe nation-state are unknownin Africa and fewin the current era are even attempting to speculateon how to developa national consensus. The Sudan has been embroiled and theRevolution ofDis-May (London: KPI. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press.because theincentivesforleadersto attempt to gaintotalcontrol weremuchgreater thanthe barriers posed by recently adoptedinstitutional arrangements.140. a national consensus on majorissues.amongother places. so thetaxsystem is a convenient backdoor to aid politically impor32.International Security 14:4 1128 in African thereare todayveryfewattempts Not surprisingly.26. For instance. this Minister theKabaka arrangement fellapartin 1966whenthenPrime Milton Oboteoverthrew and invadedBuganda. such as the meansof taxation. partsofthegova real change ernmental or to effect system.180 on Sun. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . mostformulas to decrease inter-ethnic tension concentrate onlyon ameliorating the negative aspectsof ethnic conflict by accomit through structures and preferential modating decentralized government in are inappropriate such as federalism often policies. 563-680. Difficulties ofState Consolidation without War Warin Europeplayed such an important role in the evolution of the state and society's withthe statebecause it is extraordimechanism relationship elemental to reform outsidetimesofcrisis.In 1983.32 However. See.

180 on Sun. and fewothersituations would impelcitizens to acceptthosedemands. may Domesticsecurity threats.. 1954). the statedoes not necesAs a result."in Alan T. as theUnitedStatesand mostWestern or shifts European tremendous have made in the last few years. Greater changesin thenature taxsystems that "last difficult. Indeed. Tilly.or at least not resistthem as strongly mighthave.26. its cultural level. in thetaxburden.Joseph disincentives and claimedthat"thespirit ofhard."3 in theleveloftaxation even minor changessuch as alterations Therefore. EdwardAmes' and Richard Rapp's conclusion untilthe end of the government thatinstituted them"and thattax systems in someEuropeancountries from thethirteenth and survived "almost intact" fourteenth until thelateeighteenth century maybe an exaggeration. It is as theyotherwise that"the formation of standing therefore hard to counter Tilly'sargument to extraction and the largest armiesprovidedthe largestsingleincentive overthelongrunofEuropean meansofstatecoercion state-making.In addition. segments achievethegreater revenue byan external efficiency gainsengendered sarily 34. No. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Peacock."TheBirth and DeathofTaxes:A Hypothesis. "Reflections on theHistory ofEuropean State-Making. thesecrisesare almostnever as graveas the typeof external threat theEuropeanstateshad to confront. "The Crisisof the Tax State.p.." Journal ofEconomic History. Rapp. ofthetypeAfrican countries force the stateto increaserevenue. EdwardAmesand Richard T. Vol. International Economic Papers. 37. 35. 36.no revenuecan developovertime.et al.35 collecting government typeof crisisdemandsthatthe stateincreasetaxeswithsuch forcefulness. centuries a particular for system but their conclusions suggestjust how muchinertia Otherthanwar. 1 (March1977). its social structure. strippedof all prepare-all this and more is written phrases. 6-7. JosephA.pp. eds. 4 (London:Macmillan. This content downloaded from 170.Not onlythe previously will forcefully followedthe signalssentout by government oppose simply are even more ofthetaxsystem fiscal reform. 73. 177.140." p."36 single faceso often. because theydo not threaten the veryexistence domestic conflicts resultin fragmentation and considerable hostility among different of the population. in its fiscalhistory. of the state.inAfrica WarandtheState 1129 The political bargainsthatconopprobrium.nakedfacts" fiscal system "a collection the deeds its policymay of a people. Schumpeter.however. tantgroupswithout incurring ownbecauseindividuals oftheir stitute thetaxsystem developa momentum and and businessesbase theirfuture economic decisionson the incentives in theexisting calledthe Schumpeter taxcode.engender political countries groupsbut all thosethat favored political battles. No.

C.p. For instance.pp. 105. Raja J. 39. as measured byfinances.39 Nor has therebeen any successin developing meansto cause the poputhanfighting a war. 14-15. levels of taxation were affected primarily by political constraints facedby rulers. see Levi. 19 (Washington.1987). other which was nevernearly outside themajor as strong orwidespread (especially in Africa as manyhad thought."37 The obstaclesposed by largepeasant populations. and the population's to be taxed-issues administrative ability.Indeed. been no "relevant difficult to other"to oppose. so it has been extremely createnation-wide of identity."thegrowth ofthe modern state.38 For instance. p. D. 490. theseproblems do notfully explain whypoorstates do notextract greater resources from society in a manner thatis less economically harmful. was palpablein thelatecolonial cities) period because there was a "relevant other"-thecolonialists-who couldbe easily identified as oppressors and aroundwhicha nominal national identity could be built. "Trends Countries. Vol.Chelliah. eighteenth-century and twentieth-century Britain. Of Rule and Revenue. sinceindependence countries.important contributorsto therevenuecrisis oftheAfrican state.140. in a civilwar-as in Nigeriain the late 1960s-partsof the stateare fighting in tax againsteach other. Therehas therefore been no way of symbols in Africasuch as wars forgedin Europe. Englandin the Middle Ages. p. The importance of the "relevant other" concept groupcohesion is explored This content downloaded from 170.see Dennis Anderson. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .Nationalism. whichhardly promotes efficiency in allowing collection.No. shows Margaret thatin such diversecases as republican France and Rome. by Young.On thepossibility ofchanging fiscal arrangements in Africa. despitethe factthatmostof theseeconomies also posed significant barriers to increased taxcollection. p. 2 (July 1971). SourcesofSocial Power. is explained primarily notin domestic terms butin terms ofgeopolitical relations ofviolence. significant nonmonetarizedsectors." Monetary Staff Papers. World BankDiscussion PaperNo.However.willbe a much Europeanstatesto extract greater resources morecomplicated issue in civildisputes. 18.As Mann notes.a crucialfactor in timesofwar. in developing 40.40 in mostAfrican there has However. lation to identify morewiththestate. in Taxation in Developing International Fund 38.: World Bank. Public acceptanceof tax increases. 312. willingness in thatcan be affected by the decisionsof political leaders-are also crucial level of taxunderstanding why statesare unableto achievetheir potential Levi successfully ationin a benignmanner. ThePoliticsofCulturalPluralism. of course. 42.180 on Sun. Mann. Australia.26. Factors such as political will.International 14:4 j 130 Security crisis. a nationalidentity generating 37. and widespreadpoverty are. ThePublicRevenue and Economic Policyin African Countries.

p.Instead. and thatit would be much more motingstate consolidation difficult forstatesto accomplish thesame tasksin peacetime.not all wars led to the strengthening of administrative institutionsand greater For example. ed. to sacrifice forimefficiency "42However.Therewas a tendency development to postponestructural to solve problems on an ad hoc basis rather reforms. Thisis whyeven in Europe.the HundredYears War was exceptional mediateresults. than [to create]new agenciesof government. 258. "thecentral difficulty of'nation-building' in muchof Africa and Asia is thelack of any sharedhistorical mythology and memory on whichstateelitescan setabout'building' thenation. Joseph R. 60. thegoal ofthosewho wantto create thenation-state is to convince different groupsthattheydo.. is theanomiein mostAfrican countries today. Hall.The 'nation'[is built up] from thecentral fundofculture and symbolism and mythology provided "41 The result by sharedhistorical experiences. It couldbe arguedthatthelackofnationalism simply reflects thefact that African countries are artificial groupings of disparate peoples and therefore are notreally nation-states. This content downloaded from 170. HundredYears War "was so exhausting forbothsides thatit discouraged thenormal oftheapparatus ofthestate. 1986). 41. Strayer. States in History (Oxford: BasilBlackwell. sharea common identity.26. the symbiotic relationship taxcollection and nationalism is absentin Africa.no "natural" are mature nation-states atbirth with that populations havereadily agreedtoa central identity.140. Anthony D." in John A. However.p. 42. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . thatwar fostered in Europebetween Indeed. Smith.180 on Sun.the historical in Europe. Of course.the African state'sclumsy efforts at greater extraction are metby popularwithdrawalrather a united a thanby populace around common identity. Rather. and no challengethat causes themto respondas a nation. because thereis precisely no external threat to encourage people to acquiescein the state'sdemands.JosephStrayer notes thatthe nationalism."State-Making and Nation-Building. because of its lengthand it therefore did not allow rulersto consolidate the gains usuallyachievedafter facinga shortperiodof external danger.Yet in prorecordsuggeststhatwar was highly efficient overall.WarandtheState inAfrica j 131 Anthony Smith writes. in fact.whichtoday seems to have nation-states thatare more "natural" thanAfrica's. On the Medieval Origins ofthe Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press.1970). war had such a crucial roleto playin theforging of common identities.

Peter Bachrach and Morton S. unfortunately. 56. as it has in African countries. and Morton whichmight hurtpowerful systems. 44. to interstate war.was in notingthe dimensions crucial of Africa's economic crisis. No.g. values. someAfrican countries (e. Angola)did makemassivechanges political economy theseparticular were nationalization. quicklyossifyso thatcrucialissues. groups. Indeed. The one clearchanceAfrican statesare operating did have to institute was at independence.came from 43.43 the current signifiinside African countries to disrupt fiscalarrangements thatthereis currently a significant cantly. Baratz. such as fiscal Thereappearsto be no impetus from reform. Giventheevidence ofEuropean when it is clearthatit willbe even moredifficult to institute majorreforms in normalcircumstances. and institutions rituals. myths. up" thestate'sextractive ability. including arrangements. outsidethecontinent. reforms socialist distorted economies even ruinous becausetheir economically policies becomesthenormorethanin mostAfrican countries. 950.26. Mozin their (e. cultfor ofpolitical suchas fiscal leadersto makebasicreforms arrangements. ambique.180 on Sun. because countries majorreforms at thatmoment thatsignificant new political arrangements werein suchflux initiatives could be undertaken. betweensociety national to reducethedivisions identities revenuebecause the Once again it is interesting to focuson government are sucha good issue is so decisivein itsown right and becausetaxsystems In an age withreducedlevels of reflection of the basic bargainsin society. For instance.it set the agenda forreform of African economies. much of the argument economic and thatthiscrisiswas caused by malfunctioning crisisin Africa.. "TwoFacesofPower. the World Bank's report. Indeed. African countries are faced withthe problemof trying increase the capacity of the statewithout beingable to use wars to "ratchet fiscal inertia.. Accelerated in Sub-Saharan Development Africa." American Political Science Review. collectivization). 4 (December 1962).140.44 government policies. avenueofwarto aid butdo nothave thetraditional to promote nationalism. This content downloaded from 170. are noteven on theagenda.p.theimmediate questionis whether theycan follow thatadopted by Europe to consolidatestate power and to develop new and thestate. Vol.g. a pathother than them.International 14:4 1132 Security AreThere Peaceful Routes toState Consolidation? need to transform ThirdWorldcountries and other SinceAfrican important their fiscal and parts oftheir governmental systems. Once independence itbecomesextraordinarily diffimal situation.As PeterBachrach Baratznotedin the context dominant of American politics. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .

and Monetary bilateral donors. The IMF will never cause a state to a statecan simply disappear. to taketoo fartheanalogy between of war.26. Nordoes external ofthetypetheFundexerts pressure produce anychange in national Whileleaderscan occasionally identity.WhileEurope'sleadersin previous economic centuries treated their wellby modern it was hardly populations standards. pp. Jeffrey Herbst. in thata leadercan legitimately argueto itspopulation thatithas no choicein asking themto makeverydifficult because it is undertoo muchexternal sacrifices pressure. 67-85." TheJournal ofModern African Studies.butfallsfar failing adjustment program shortof what war would threaten. opt forthehighcostofbreaking off relations withtheIMF.45 to adopt a structural can be severe. cannotproducethat actor. has been leastsuccessful when it has feeling.structural adjustment triedto addressthe issues of how the stateitself operatesin areas such as The cost to the stateitselfin public enterprises or fiscalarrangements. Vol. pressedon African countries by the International Fund (IMF). 27. As external actors and of theway the state dedicated to fundamental reforms of the economy to thesamerigidities operates. itcouldbe arguedthatstructural adjustment. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .Demands froman external actorare similar to war. however. couldservemanystate-making functions. country intosucha spectacular debacle.or any other threatened. No." usually betweeninterlasting because the population maybe unableto distinguish national actorssupposedly draining away thenation'sfundsduring a structuraladjustment and thosenational leaderswho led their exercise. the WorldBank. The prospects ofstructural adjustment somekindofnationalism fostering based on resisting is also limited because theIMF is not reallya foreigners 45."Political Impediments to Economic Rationality: WhyZimbabweCannot Reform its PublicSector. The IMF and otheractorswho insiston fundamental reform African for in their couldpressure states significant changes tax system. 1 (March1989). thatpeople would be better usuallyunambiguous offiftheywon the war thaniftheylost.At worst. indeed. This content downloaded from 170. For instance.WarandtheState inAfrica 1133 However.180 on Sun. theIMF and other donorsare notsubject that paralyzedomestic reformers. pressure from actorssuch as the IMF and the effects warproducedsuch spectacular becausethe gainsin governmental efficiency stateitself felt The IMF. It wouldbe a majormistake. rallypeople againstthe external threat thesesentiments arenotlongposed by"imperialists.140.

180 on Sun.Instead.Unlike a war wherethe entirepopulationwas threatened because of its national identity. the extreme states. and cannot inducechanges in national consciousness of thetypethatwarsin Europeproduced. peasantswho growexport crops). butmayfind maynotbe concerned particularly thattheircountries have suffered economicdeclineforso long that the their for own personal enrichment havebecomeseverely possibilities limited. situation wheresovereignty or considerable territory might in the context of decades of economic especially decline. willbe battles betweenAfrican nations as theybuildtheir African continent in a new imageis as certain in history. That there This content downloaded from 170.. ambitions.140. the intensity in shared experience that a war generates cannotbe replicated simply by.clearly hurtsome (e.International Security 14:4 1134 "relevant other" to a largely peasantpopulation.hopes. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and therefore will seek to seize the assets of othercountries. structural adjustment willhelpcertain groupsunambiguously (e. Others withnation-building.26..Further.g..However.the questionbecomeswhether at some pointin thefuture African leaderswillbeginto see war as a potential avenueforstate-making.. TheLikelihood ofWarin Africa Ifinternal reform seemsimprobable and there is no other external threat that can perform quite the same role as war.g. say. as anything For each country there and numbersall rise must come times when wealth.theymaytryto increasetheir tractive and divert their citizens from inter-ethnic ability squabbles byseizing a fight with ofprovocations.and have ambiguous effects on many others. theurbanpopulationdependenton imported food).it is possiblethat someAfrican thebenefits leadersmayrecalculate ofa peace thatlocksthem intoperpetual state'sexweakness.. Some leadersmaylookto warsimply becausethey are truly concerned about the fateof the nationand see no otheroption.Paul Colinvauxpresents case forthe prosneighboring war in Africa: pectsofinterstate Africaholds the greatestpossibilitiesforthe aspiringgeneral.protracted overthe IMF's negotiations Extended Fund Facility.the thathas preserved boundaries has not been signifithe continent's system itobviousthat tested becausemostleadersconsidered werebetter cantly they offwith theirinherited boundariesthan theywould be in a chaoticwar be lost. to provoke upon themultitude alwayspresent. So far.

219.Butler. theMan and theStatesman: BeingtheReflections and Reminiscences ofOtto.46 Ifsignificant interstate warsbreakoutwhenprovocations are smallbutelites realizewhat war could do forthe stateand the nation. over all Germanpeoples. so desperatethattheytryin some fundamental way to alterthe political rulesunderwhichtheir shouldnotbe ignored. as a glanceat themap willshow. Otto. This content downloaded from 170.J. realway to unitea fragmented people: Prussia. we shouldbe unable to avoid a seriouscontest.Princevon Bismarck.WarandtheState inAfrica 1135 an aggression together. nationsfunction are the that could bringabout significant Many possible provocations interstate war in Africa. thatdouble everytwenty populations yearsprovidemanyotherpotential leadersmight reasonsforwar in Africa. 1899)..140. 48. We should getno nearerthe goal by speeches. dominaof ethnic fragments groupsthatneed to be rescuedfrom "foreign tion"toprovide for hostile action other African enoughrationalization against versusFrench). 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .47 countries. betweenlanguageblocs (e. Written andDictated byHimself hisRetirement after from translated Office. English Conflicts disputesover controlof crucialriversand railroads(especiallygiven the or the simpleneed to have moreland for number ofland-locked countries).. It thenneeds onlyaccessto high-quality weaponsfor to be an attractive undertaking." on theonly agreewithBismarck. Prince vonBismarck.it would not be a in Africa increasedinterstate warfare new development. I (New York: Harperand Brothers.associations. thereare plenty of borderdisputesand Certainly.g. the growing differential in force projection capabilities have led some to suggestthatAfrica willexperience muchgreater resort to force in the future. underthesupervision ofA. p. Inventories of tanksand otherarmored vehiclesas well as 46. More thana fewAfrican someday a brilliant consolidator ofa "new nation.Whether todaywould actually bringabout the same kind of changesthatit did in butthepossibility that leadersmight become Europecenturies ago is unclear. Vol. decisions ofmajorities. 219-220. .180 on Sun. war in Africa would simplybe a return to the Europeannorm. 313. 1980). a contest whichcould onlybe settled by blood and iron.26. TheFates A Biological ofNations: Theory ofHistory (London:Penguin.couldno longer wearunaided on its long narrowfigure the panoplywhichGermany forits serequired it mustbe equallydistributed curity.. strikingly Rather. 47.18 Although African countries had moreor less equal defensecapabilities at independence. Paul Colinvaux.p. pp. . Ibid. Bismarck.

"Changing Africa's International Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press. 2 Henry Bienen. becomesclear.p. No. AfricanArmies:Evolutionand Capabilities in Black Military Capabilities Westview. 101.the assuranceof stability thatis the central advantage ofthecurrent African statesystem has almostalwaysbeen more attractive than whateverreasons African leaders may have had to begin conflict withtheirneighbors. it be that another class ofstates However. just in the periodbetween1966and 1981. and navalcraft have increased considerably throughout the continent. Thom. statesystem. Vol. Whilethetiming ofthesewarsis notpredictable.International Security 14:4 1136 artillery. A NewDevelopment ThePermanently Weak State: Muchofthisdiscussion for African has focused on thepotential opportunities statesthat.In the future. Armsand theAfrican: This content downloaded from 170.26. MilitaryInfluence and Africa. 176. should recognized inBruce 49.180 on Sun.in a European-type have engagedin battle.and Security. the number withlightarmorwentfrom thirteen to thirty-six. peace.and thereby statebuilding.: haus and Pauline H.. 1986). economic reform cannot and they progress cannotgettheir to unitearoundnational it is conceivable citizenry symbols. 120. itshould be obviousthatthe incentives thatAfrican leadershave to incitewars for and maybecomemuchstronger thepurposesofstate-making are significant in the future reform timesofbusiness when the futility of domestic during as usual. William G.140. For instance. "African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors. thatis. See also Walter L.49 Countriessuch as Nigeriaand Zaire have developedmilitary thatare fargreater capabilities than theirneighbors'.theywould lose all meaningthroughout the African continent. 99 and p. the number wentfrom withfieldartillery seven to thirty-six. Barrows.the number ofcountries in sub-Saharan Africa withtanksincreased from twoto eighteen. However. Colo. eds.p. Arling"Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Capabilities. eds.even strong proponentsofAfrican norms can be driven to interstate conflict ifthey believethat thecostsof not actingare highenough."in William Foltz and Henry Bienen. So far. Baker." International (Fall1980). and the number possessingjet aircraft went fromsix to twenty-one. might used warin order to further won (orat leastnotlosttoobadly).." (Boulder.Ifthesenorms no longer provided protection to a large numberof states.1985).as President Nyerere of Tanzania showedwhen he invadedUganda to depose Idi Amin. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . despiteall their efforts. 5. African leadersmay find that. jet fighters.p. E. thatthenthe deterrent value of the normsof sovereignty may seem much less powerful thanthey do now.

control adequate naturalresources. thatsomehowthe nation-states as theycurrently existare viable arrangeifonlytheyfollow theproper ments and receive fordevelopment." thePolitics ofProtest. Weak statesthatwere defeatedthenbecame the poorerregionsof richer had a chanceto shareintherevenue countries.or Rwanda and Burundi lack significant resources fordevelbordering Zaire).WarandtheState inAfrica 1137 in Africa is directly affected by thecurrent absenceofwar:thosestatesthat wouldhave lostbadlyand wouldhavebeen absorbed These bythewinners. and construct of a significant of their gain the support portion populations. disintegration ofweak stateslikethesewas a regular occurrence. structures to ever develop. for whose states Africa. states theEuropeancontext wherecenturies ofwarhad eliminated priate for thatsimply havenotbeen werenotviable. The Gambia.50 African Affairs. Mauritania).no matter opmentchallenges. and StateConsolidation "Migration. to those thatsimply In Europeduring theformative or defense(e. left statesrangefrom thosethatare just geographic anachronisms by colonialism (e. Perhapstheonlytaskof state consolidation that theseotherwise weakstates can accomplish is tophysically within the stableboundaries of the African state capturetheirpopulations The presenceof permanently weak statesthatwillnotbe eliminated is a in international and one thatposes noveldevelnew development relations so far. See Jeffrey Herbst. testedby an international thatseverely system punishespolitical weakness. Mali.. This content downloaded from 170.g. 50. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .. strategies Thisassumption was approtheinternational enoughhelp from community.All theoretical workon development what the ideologicalpredisposition has implicitly assumed of the authors.However.180 on Sun.these strongadministrative statesmaydisappearifinterstate warsfinally do breakout in Africa.g.140. what is to be done with statesthatexistbut cannot We have been develop?It is fartoo earlyto writeoff any state'sprospects. In the long term. Benin and Togo.. system. ofmanystates aboutthedevelopment bothin Africa wrong prospects (where in Africa.Djibouti). and verysmallstates in theshadowof giants(e. thereis littlereason to believe thatmanyof themwill be able to have a favorable enough geographic position. opment centuries.g.26. In the meantime.Yet the absence of a truly statesystemthat competitive penalizesmilitary weaknessmeansthateven thosestatesthathave no other prospects than long-term dependenceon international aid will survivein their crippled form fortheforeseeable future. close to Nigeria. forthcoming. butat leastthey and resources of a viable state.

thought mustbe givento nontraditional alternatives foraid to states thatin previous times would simply have been defeated and absorbed by stronger neighbors in a war. mustbe examined. 1989. 52. September 23. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . June15. Yet it is undeniablethat out of this destruction emergedstronger and moreunified political arrangements No one wouldadvocate populations. the stateand develop nationalidentities.It is doubtful that. 12. cannotdevelop.52 The Westcould consider providing additional aid to thosecountries willing to engagein some kindofregional integration to mitigate the problemsof unchanging boundaries.The warsthat Europewentthrough caused immense suffering forgenerations and wholesaledestruction of some societies. At thesame time.The worldmay simply have to recognize thata certain number of countries are lockedintonon-viable and developa long-term positions. war as a solutionto Africa's and economicproblems. theinternational community might consider rewarding those countries in the ThirdWorldthathave takenin economicmigrants from non-viable states. much as countries that have adoptedmorerational economic policies haveattracted greater aid from donors. In the 1950sAmerican administrations debatedwhether SouthKorea could achieveany increase in livingstandards and ifAmerican aid shouldbe devotedto simply preventing the country from getting poorer.140." TheEconomist. 1988.26. p. or manyothers In particular. approachto their welfare rather thanacting surprised timetheinevitable every famine or ecological disaster occurs. suchas EastAsia. CliveCrook.5' It would also be morally unacceptable simplyto allow these countries to gradually slide from the world'sview intoa twilight of perpetual poverty because natureand history have been unkindto them.if African countries do start fighting wars. Conclusion It is important notto glorify war. 4. where the political costsof interstate war could be even higher thanin Europe. theywill undergoexactly the same processesof stateconsolidation in Europe. willbe able to findpeaceful countries. that there is very that African little evidence in the ThirdWorld."Migration Helps Poorestof Poor. p.International Security 14:4 1138 scholars weretoo optimistic) and elsewhere in theworld.Forinstance. This content downloaded from 170. that we mustrecognize thepossibility 51. See Jeffrey Herbst.However. thatwar engendered itshouldbe recognized However. ways to strengthen theprospects but simply forstatesthatwillnot disappear. "Trial and Error.180 on Sun."WallStreet Journal.

WarandtheState inAfrica 1139 some African leaders in the future may come to believethatthe costs of peace-limits on reform possibilities and a fragmented population-are so IfAfrican highthatwar maynot seem likesuch an undesirable alternative. This content downloaded from 170. leadersdo indeed make thiscalculation. the suffering thatAfrica has seen in thelasttwenty-five yearsmayonlybe a preludeto muchmoredangerous developments. 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .180 on Sun.26.140.