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Examining the Roles of Race and Propaganda in the Vietnam War and Rwandan Genocide

Connor Kincheloe Political Science 437 Dr. Scott Bennett, The Pennsylvania State University December 5, 2013

Introduction War is common place among world history as seemingly decade after decade offers new examples of violent outbreaks. As time moves on, each war offers a new example for analysis; historians and political scientists look into the root causes and motivations behind these acts of aggression. One area of focus is how a leader can motivate and bring about his or her people to engage in warfare. Two tools that a leader has at his or her disposal are propaganda and race. To help examine the roles of race and propaganda, I will be analyzing the Vietnam War and the Rwandan Civil War. Specifically, I will be focusing on the how the United States used race and propaganda against the North Vietnamese, and how the Hutu used theses tools against the Tutsi. The Vietnam War, a highly controversial and contentious war in American history, lasted from the mid 1950s until 1975, while US boots were on the ground between 1961-1973. The U.S. was forced to wage two different wars at the same time; one of conventional fighting against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and one of guerilla warfare against the Vietcong (Bennett, The Vietnam War, 9/26/13). Many Americans did not fully understand the reasons for the U.S. being in Vietnam, as Vietnam itself did not pose any direct security threat to the U.S. (Page, 1996). The governments official reason for involvement was to stop the domino effect the spread of communism from North Vietnam to the South, while protecting the South from Northern aggression. The outcome of the war, meaning a U.S. victory, is not apparently clear, but the outcome is not important for the analysis, as the paper focuses on the motivations rather than the results.


The Rwandan Civil War, also known as the Rwandan Genocide, was a 100-day civil war amongst the Rwandan people that lasted from April 7 to July 15, 1994. Over the course of these 100 days, the Hutu slaughtered Tutsi civilians, with estimates of the dead ranging up to 800,000 civilians (Prunier 1995, 265). The Hutu were driven by the idea of Hutu Power and that the Tutsi were trying to retake power and kill the Hutu population (Prunier, 1995; Berkeley, 1994). The events leading up to these 100 days, and the messages transmitted during the violence, are key to understanding the roles of race and propaganda in inciting the outbreak. Race and propaganda were important elements of both conflicts. Race and propaganda incited widespread killing in Rwanda. In Vietnam, race was not as important of an issue as one would expect, but propaganda certainly helped to frame the conflict. In examining these issues, I will first discuss general theory and ideas related to race and propaganda. The following sections will apply each of these topics to Vietnam and Rwanda, respectively, and will examine the interconnection between the two. Finally, I will compare the roles of race and propaganda in Vietnam and Rwanda, highlighting how the different audiences and political goals can affect their usage.

Race and Propaganda Race is something that people are constantly surrounded by whether or not they consciously observe it. However, during wartime, race can be brought to the forefront of peoples minds if the leaders choose to do so. Leaders of a country can use race to help illustrate the enemy as the other; they are different from us (Dower, 1986). Dower(1986) additionally shows how race was manipulated during World War


Two(WWII) to help the U.S. and its soldiers see the Japanese in a completely different light. Racial differences, specifically in physical appearance, allowed the U.S. to negatively exaggerate the images of the enemy. The citizens of the United States were continually showed images of the Japanese beasts taking the forms of apes and monkeys, and exaggerating their distinctive facial features. See Appendix A for examples of these images. Dower(1986) also demonstrated how it was easier to highlight the racial differences of the Japanese rather than the Germans. In terms of their portrayal, images of Germans were not as exaggerated because someone could not necessarily distinguish an German American from any other Eastern European American. This idea helped promote that there was a difference between a good German and the Nazi. Where the goal in Japan was the destruction of the entire nation, the goal in Germany was the destruction of the Nazi regime, a political party. Race is a tool that can be manipulated by a countrys leaders in order to help his or her cause. It can be used to help highlight the fact that the enemy is not one of us, and it can be used to help differentiate between whom a nation is truly fighting (Bennett, Portrayals in War, 11/21/13). Race goes hand in hand with propaganda, as subsequent sections will show how race had varying levels of influence on propaganda. Propaganda, as defined by Alleyne(1997) is the systematic attempt through mass communications to influence the thinking and thereby the behavior of the people in the interest of some in-group (37). The term propaganda does not carry a positive connotation as it is most often associated with malicious intent (Alleyne, 1997). Over the


next few paragraphs, propaganda will be broken down into its various types, which will help in the following analysis. Propaganda can be a very powerful tool for a leader or political institution to help mobilize the people in the pursuit of what they perceive to be a common goal. Propaganda can take on two different forms; integrative and agitative. Integrative propaganda aims to bring the population together, united behind a common cause. Agitative propaganda does help to bring people together for a common cause, but it does so by playing on peoples fears. (Bennett, The Psychological Aspect of Killing, 10/22). In addition to these two types, propaganda can fall under more sub-categories and all of which are important to understand in the proceeding analysis. The categories deal with the truthfulness of a claim. Propaganda can be white (true), gray (questionable), and black (false). The selection of the type of propaganda will largely depend on the target audience, as well as the intended result. (Bennett, The Psychological Aspect of Killing, 10/22) Propaganda is largely undesirable, as it can be either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and all distortion and falsification of news through whatever channelssince such activities can only promote misunderstanding and mistrust between the peoples of the world (Alleyne 1997, 46). As will be seen in both Rwanda and Vietnam, the propaganda campaign had different goals, but ultimately the same aim to gain support for a leaders cause. After the type and category have been established, the actual mechanism and technique for getting across the message can take on different forms. The three main


techniques are juxtaposition, dehumanization, and fear appeals. Juxtaposition involves putting an image of the peoples world, the good world, against that of the enemys, the bad world. Dehumanization involves making the enemy appear less human, as the name would suggest (Bennett, The Psychological Aspect of Killing, 10/22). The psychology behind dehumanization is that it is easier to kill an animal than it is to kill a fellow human. Lastly, fear appeals play on the fears of the people. Fear can be a powerful motivator, as will be seen in Rwanda. Overall, propaganda is all around, whether people always acknowledge that it is there or not. As people listened and observed propaganda in Rwanda and the United States, the goal was not to get people thinking about the message, rather the message must go straight to the stomach to connect [people] with specific emotions involving fear, health, money and safety. (Kimmelman 2010, 2). As will be demonstrated, the use of propaganda in Rwanda and Vietnam was meant to play on the existing fears and images within the target audiences minds. Propaganda helped to bring out the entrenched images and ideas people had about the opposing side. However, to motivate people to take action, the propaganda was inflated to raise those feelings to actions.

Race and Propaganda in Vietnam Going into the war with Vietnam, the U.S. could have fallen back on the racial images and exaggeration that was used against the Japanese in WWII. Dower(1986) most likely would have suggested that the large physical differences would allow the U.S. to exaggerate the enemys features to reinforce the enemys image as the other. In WWII, as Dower(1986) discusses, Japanese Americans were much easier to distinguish


amongst the American public than a German American. As a result, the U.S. was able to exaggerate the features of the Japanese more so than the Germans. This pattern, however, was not repeated in Vietnam, as race was not the main determinant in distinguishing the Vietnamese. The emphasis was placed on a party, rather than the people as the propaganda will show. Additionally, in American culture, there was the predominant Orientalist imagery of Asia and Asian people This Orientalist imagery depicted Asians as childlike, passive, and easily susceptible to control by outside forces (Wiest et al, 2010). This view of the Vietnamese people would become clear in the rhetoric used by Washington regarding the conflict. This image would help to promote the idea that the U.S. was intervening for humanitarian reasons. The propaganda during the Vietnam War was mostly the rhetoric coming from Washington, and how the government framed the conflict. Although there was a film, Why Vietnam?, which will be discussed, the main source of propaganda came in the form of the spoken word. The stated goals of the U.S. government helped to frame the initial perspectives of the Vietnam War. The U.S. entered the war for a multitude of reasons, but two jump out in particular: improving the quality of life for the South Vietnamese, and stopping the spread of communism. When the U.S. stated its goal was to improve the quality of life for the South Vietnamese, it made the first important distinction. In the U.S., there was a heavy emphasis placed on portraying the North Vietnamese as its own nation, fighting a separate state in South Vietnam (Page, 1996). The U.S. was not supplying an internal rebellion within a countrys own borders, but rather trying to help it resist an external


enemy (Kail, 1973). This would allow the population to understand the U.S. involvement more easily as it was helping an ally resist a foreign invader, rather than trying to resolve a countrys internal issues. Additionally, I would argue that with placing an emphasis on distinguishing Vietnam into two nations, using race would be problematic. If someone were to see a picture of a person from Vietnam, he or she would not be able to say if they were from the North or South. Race was a unifying feature between the two countries, rather than something that made them different, and the U.S. wanted them to appear different. To help reinforce this image as two different countries, the U.S. connected the North Vietnamese to communism. The U.S. was fighting the Communist Party that was infiltrating North Vietnam and directing the Vietcong (Kail, 1973). Springer(1986) examined the Defense Department war films, specifically the film Why Vietnam?, modeled after Frank Capras Why we fight series of WWII. As the movie showed, the only enemy was not a section of people in North Vietnam, but ultimately it was the Communists, which brought along all of the negative associations already embedded in the public imagination, (Springer 1986, 156). The propaganda played on the fear of the American public that communism could spread if the U.S. did not step in. The U.S. reinforced this message by connecting images of the enemy with Mussolini, only further playing on the publics fears (Springer, 1986). Given that Vietnam occurred during the Cold War, it is not surprising that this message resonated with the civilian population. Going back to the Orientalist imagery, the propaganda films portrayed the Vietnamese as simple minded and mired in tradition, and thus the good Vietnamese were dependant on American aid (Springer, 1986). This reliance on goodwill rhetoric, as


noted by Springer(1986), helped to reinforce the fact that the U.S. was there to help a country in need, rather than to fight a internal uprising. The U.S. citizens would find it difficult to uphold the U.S. Administrations claim that [Vietnam] was an area vital to Americas national security, (Page 1996, 2). This is why the U.S. had to make people feel that they needed to be there to help the South Vietnamese and stop the spread of communism. Vietnam was not a threat to the U.S.s direct security, so the government had to find a larger goal that the people could get behind. It was important for the Johnson administration that America be presented as united a front as possible, (ibid). While the U.S. government did not make a large deal about the differences in race, it was clear that were racial tensions and racist feelings from the military toward the Vietnamese. Best representative of this was the term gook, a slang term that developed from goo-goo eyes (Jung, 2011). Referring to the Vietnamese as gooks was the staple of the U.S. military occupation in Asia (Jung 2011, 234). The military highlighted the problem of not seeing the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese differently, as the military referred to all the Vietnamese as gooks. It is well known that there were many illegal actions and war crimes carried out by the U.S. military, and many were against the South Vietnamese as well. I would argue that this generic term gook for all of the Vietnamese blurred the lines for the U.S. soldiers as to whom they were actually fighting. Certainly the issue was in large part because the Vietcong were hiding amongst the civilian population, but it would seem that military may have just viewed all of the Vietnamese as the same. It was important for the U.S. to differentiate the two, and the term gooks brought them back together.


Race and Propaganda in Rwanda Race in Rwanda pitted the two ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, against one another in a constant fight for power. However the traditional assumptions of race and ethnic groups are not quite fitting in Rwanda. The Hutu and Tutsi spoke the same language and respected the same traditions; it was tough to find any cultural custom that was distinctly Tutsi or distinctly Hutu (Destexhe 1995, 36). The origins of race in Rwanda were largely a social construction generated by European colonists, most notably the Belgians (Destexhe, 1995; Prunier, 1995). The Belgians categorized the Hutu and Tutsi according to their degree of beauty, pride, intelligence, and political organization (Destexhe, 1995). The Hutu and Tutsi, as discussed, were largely a similar people that lived amongst one another and intermarriage was common. However, there were slight differences in the people that allowed the Belgians to separate them into two groups. The Hutu accounted for a vast majority of the population, and were largely agrarian working the fields. In addition, their physical appearance mirrored neighboring Uganda, with darker complexion and shorter stature. The Tutsi, by contrast, were largely cattle herders, whom were tall and thin with a lighter complexion (Prunier, 1995). The Tutsi were the lucky ones, as they were judged to be the superior race by the Belgians due to their physical characteristics and economic status. Under Belgian rule at the end of 1959, 43 out of 45 chiefs who governed the country were Tutsi, and 549 out of 559 sub-chiefs were Tutsi as well (Destexhe 1995, 40). In addition to their advantage in power, they were given priority in educational enrollment (See Appendix B) (Prunier,


1995). These facts go to show that the Tutsi were elevated in society, based largely on an arbitrary decision by the European colonists. Race in Rwanda was a product of years of European harping on Superior race, and as one can imagine, the Hutu felt slighted (Prunier 1995, 46). The seeds of hate had been planted in the minds of the Hutu against the oppressive Tutsi (Destexhe, 1995; Prunier, 1995). After the Belgians had a change of philosophy and a shift in power, the Hutu began to elevate in society, while dropping the Tutsi to the lower classes. This change in power would trigger many of the events that would lead up to the Rwandan Genocide. With the Tutsi now being the minority, as well as sporadic fighting and violence, the Tutsi began to move out of Rwanda and take up refuge in neighboring countries, like Uganda. In Uganda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was born, at it would serve as the main resistance group for the Tutsis to stand behind (Prunier, 1995). Although the Hutu had the power in the country, the memories of Tutsi rule could not easily be forgotten, and fear grew amongst the Hutu as masses of Tutsi were right outside the borders. The question remains how small scale violence, oppression, and racial divisions could lead to genocide. Even more perplexing was how and civilians could mass murder their Tutsi neighbors and friends just days prior to the outbreak (Berkley, 1994). The answer lies in the influence of propaganda and the inflation of racial differences. As these divisions were socially constructed, the Hutu government was able to easily manipulate the differences in the pursuit of increasing their power. The leaders easily


manipulated public opinion, as Rwanda was a largely uneducated country (Berkley, 1994). To influence the minds and actions of the Hutu, the leaders made extensive use of the radio to reach its vast amount of listeners. The government controlled radio station, Radio Milles Collines (RTLM), became the main source of information the people received. The RTLM used agitative propaganda to dehumanize the Tutsi and strike fear into the Hutu. Most of the messages transmitted by the stations were false, i.e. black propaganda, which distorted and exaggerated stories to further spread fear amongst the Hutu. The RTLM was founded in 1993 by Hutu extremists within the government in order to combat the growing number of moderate government officials (Metzl, 1997). The RTLM took on a talk-show format that was meant to deliberately target young Hutu gangs, such as the Interahamwe (ibid). The radio must have had some effect on the young Hutus who listened in, as the Interahamwe were some of the most notorious killers during the genocide (Prunier, 1995). The RTLM would go on to give endless speeches, songs, and slogans all meant to demonize the Tutsi, blurring the lines between the actual Tutsi Militia (RPF) and regular Tutsi civilians (Berkley, 1994). Blurring the lines was important for the Hutu as they were not just inciting violence against the RPF, but the goal was entirely to eradicate all persons of Tutsi decent. The RTLM was purely an agitative source of propaganda as its main function was to help incite violence on the Tutsi. According to B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the RTLM played a pernicious role in instigating several massacres, (Metzl 1997, 631). Kimani(2007), additionally, supports


this claim with his study on the type of messages transmitted by the RTLM. The table can be found in Appendix C, and it helps to highlight the inflammatory nature of the broadcasts. Of the top 4 messages, 3 were agitative: Allegations of RPF atrocities (16%), encouragement of the Hutu to fight and kill (14%), and direct calls for extermination (9%). That means that nearly 40% of the RTLM broadcasts were directly stirring up antTutsi sentiment amongst the Hutu population. As alluded to above, the RTLM relied upon fear appeals and dehumanization to get its messages across. An interview with convicted Interahamwe killer Alfred Kiruhura shows how the fear appeals generated support from the Hutu. Kiruhura states, I did not believe that the Tutsis were coming to kill us, but the government radio continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutu I began to feel some kind of fear, (Berkley 1994, 1). The actions of the Hutu were not driven by hate, but fear that had been instilled in them by the government that they trusted (Berkley, 1994). The largely uneducated population relied on the government for information, as Kiruhura explains, We believed what the government told us to do, (Berkley 1994, 1). An 18-year-old Interahamwe member, Emmanuel Kamuhanda, also supports this sentiment of trusting the government as he acknowledges that the people listened to the government without question (ibid). The Hutu government clearly manipulated the publics trust to feed them false stories; the Hutu population falsely felt they were protecting themselves from harm. In addition to the play on the fears of the people, the RTLM dehumanized the Tutsi people into the image of cockroaches as discussed by Metzl(1997). They juxtaposed this term for the Tutsis with the term Rwandans for the Hutu (Metzl 1997,


632). The Hutu were portrayed as the true Rwandan people, while the Tutsi were vermin trying to infiltrate their country. The message of extermination does not tend to go along easily with people. However, the idea of exterminating a cockroach, a bug, is a lot easier to swallow. Lastly, the propaganda administered by the RTLM was largely black as it made many claims that were unsubstantiated. The RTLM routinely claimed that the RPF and Tutsi were committing atrocities as they advanced on their return to Rwanda (See Appendix C). They even claimed that these facts were confirmed by international sources, but there was no credible evidence to back their claims (Berkley 1994, 2). The RTLM was just a weapon of genocide that demonized the Tutsi (Dallaire, 2007). Its goal was not to distribute credible information, but to incite neighbors and friends to turn on each other in a mass genocide.

Comparison of Race and Propaganda in the two cases The roles of race and propaganda were very different between Rwanda and Vietnam. Race and propaganda are tools of leaders and they can choose how to implement as they best see fit. Determining how a leader uses them is largely dependant on the audiences of the intended message and the underlying political goals. There is not a formula that can be applied on how to use these tools to a specific case. It varies from situation, and Vietnam and Rwanda highlight this issue. There are three major differences in the roles of race and propaganda in the Vietnam War and Rwandan Genocide: the emphasis on the other, the creation of a personal connection, and the style chosen to get the message across.


In Rwanda, the Hutu needed to portray the enemy as the other, an outsider, who was not like them. This was difficult given that the Tutsi were not that different from the Hutu, besides some subtle physical differences. As discussed before, race was largely a social construction, but the Hutu gave it new life. The Hutu used the coexistence of different social groups or casts and turned it into an ethnic problem with an overwhelmingly racist dimension, (Destexhe 1995, 47). Race gave the Hutu a distinguishing characteristic, and it became the primary way to differentiate the Hutu and the Tutsi. It allowed the Hutu to portray the Tutsi as foreign invaders, rather than native Rwandans like them. It is easier to make people think they are defending themselves from an invader, rather than arbitrarily killing a neighbor based on small physical differences. The U.S. also had the issue of emphasizing the idea of the other in conflict, but selected a different path than Rwanda. Instead of emphasizing race, it emphasized the political party of communism. As discussed earlier, it would make it difficult for the U.S. to use race; they were fighting a group of Vietnamese, and helping another. Between these two groups, North and South, there were not any physical or distinguishable differences. The government instead focused their attention on creating North Vietnam as its own entity based on a political ideology. It was intervening not in an intrastate conflict, but a war between two separate entities (Page, 1996; Kail, 1973). Race was a unifying factor between the two countries, and not one that could make them appear different. The next major difference between the two cases is how the Hutu and U.S. government created personal connections. In Rwanda, the Hutu needed to narrow the


focus of the conflict, and get the citizens to react out of fear. As discussed, the Rwandans were largely an uneducated group of people who took what the government said at face value (Berkley, 1994). The Hutu created a personal connection by emphasizing race and the past. Propaganda, as shown in the chart in Appendix C, reminded the Hutu of how they were once oppressed by the Tutsi. They had been slighted and were victims of many years of oppression. By emphasizing these ideas, the Hutu created a direct connection to the people. Instilling the fear that if they do not act, they will be returned to subjugation. Some abstract concept or philosophy was not on the line, but rather their own lives. In Vietnam, the U.S. population was approximately 8,000 miles away from Vietnam (Page, 1996). The U.S. needed to create a personal connection while allowing for people to see the conflict in a larger context because Vietnam did not represent a direct security threat to the United States. That is why the U.S. government emphasized the domino effect and the spread of communism as discussed by Gustainis(1993) and Kail(1973). The theory behind the domino effect is that if one country fell into communism, then the surrounding countries would fall creating a chain reaction. The U.S. entered Vietnam for a multitude of reasons, but the government surely played up the fact that they were holding back the spread of communism to Southeast Asia (Kail 1973, 85). The U.S. used this idea to help give Vietnam a degree of importance that it did not deserve, (Gustainis 1993, 16). The domino theory evolved into a condensation symbol which was meant to stir vivid impressions involving the listeners most basic values, (Gustainis 1993, 5). The U.S. did not focus on race and minor details of the war, rather it deflected attention to


communism. The fear of communism was entrenched in the American people during the cold war, and the U.S. used this fact to their advantage. A 1966 poll by the National Opinion Research Center found that 81% of those surveyed opposed U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam because it would be a communist victory in the country (ibid, 117). This shows the U.S.s success in pushing the attention of the war on to communism. Lastly, the styles of the propaganda were largely different, and once again that was due to the audience and political goals. In Rwanda, the Hutu relied on largely false, agitative messages and fear appeals to incite violence. Rwanda was a largely uneducated population that took what the government said at face value. This offered the Rwandan government complete freedom to write its messages without fear of dispute. Radio was essentially the sole way to get a message out in Rwanda, and the Hutu controlled the RTLM, which gave them complete control over the broadcasts. The U.S., on the other hand, had to deal with Vietnam being the first TV War, where journalists were in the field and able to relay what was going on quickly back to the public (Bennett, Vietnam War, 10/1/13). Additionally, the population was largely educated, therefore the messages could not be as easily manipulated. Instead of manipulating the messages, the U.S. used communism to simplify and distort the message (Page 1996, 299). The U.S. sought to use propaganda to integrate the society behind the larger ideal of fighting communism.

Conclusion After examining the roles of race and propaganda in Vietnam and Rwanda, it is clear that influenced the conflicts to varying extents. Following along with ideas of


Dower(1986), it would have made sense for the U.S. to manipulate the differences in race more so than in Rwanda. Where the U.S. and Vietnamese were very different, the Hutu and Tutsi were very similar people as the major differences were generally created by arbitrary decisions of the Belgians. With propaganda, the U.S. attempted to turn the attention to a greater cause that the American public could agree upon the fight against the spread of communism. The U.S. turned to integrative propaganda, hoping to gain a united front. Rwanda needed propaganda to mobilize the young and misinformed Hutu population to engage in the genocide of the Tutsi. Rwanda largely relied upon fear appeals and dehumanization by spreading misinformation to the ill-informed public to divide the public into two races. To understand a leaders decision on how to use the tools of race and propaganda, one most observe and understand the intended audience as well as the political goals of the country. Leaders choose which strings to pull to achieve the desired results. Whether they actually achieve them or not is not of consequence. Propaganda and race are powerful tools, and it is important to always remember them as such. They can be used in a subtle message or overtly. It is important for the audience to understand when they are seeing these messages, and how they are intended to influence them.


Appendix A Examples of Japanese portrayal during WWII


Appendix B The Astrida College enrollment Year 1932 1945 1954 1959 (Prunier 1995, 33) Tutsi students 45 46 63 279 Hutu students 9 3 19 143 Percent Tutsi 83% 94% 77% 65%


Appendix C Inflammatory content of broadcasts Category

Allegations of RPA atrocities Encouragement to Hutus to fight, kill No inflammatory content Direct calls for extermination Allegations that RPA wants power and control over Hutu Allegations that Tutsis in the region are helping those within Insults to Tutsis and RPA Description of how the past influences present events Congratulations to FAR Allegations that the Tutsis plan to subjugate the Hutu Allegations that the RPA killed Habyarimana Allegations that political parties are supporting RPA Broadcast insults/slurs against Hutus sympathizing with the RPA Tutsis, RPA are social deviants, abnormal Allegations that Tutsis are exterminating Hutus Attack or harm Belgians or UNAMIR personnel Threats to Hutus sympathizing with RPA, fleeing war Allegations that invalids, women, old men armed, support RPA Broadcast justifies massacres Not all Tutsis are enemies; should live together with Hutus Allegations that Tutsis killed Habyarimana

294 252 238 165 106 127 88 70 60 57 50 45 41 41 39 36 24 24 20 16 8

% of Total
16.32 13.99 13.21 9.16 5.89 7.05 4.89 3.89 3.33 3.16 2.78 2.50 2.28 2.28 2.17 2.00 1.33 1.33 1.11 0.89 0.44

TOTAL 1,801 Table 9.5 Inflammatory content of broadcasts (Kimani 2007, 119)



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*Note - Retrieved from e-class reserves for PLSC437, Professor Scott Bennett, The Pennsylvania State University Note Cited lectures from Dr. Scott Bennett, Department of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University, give the title of the lecture and the date that it was given at the University Park campus.