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BRIBERY AS A NON-TARIFF BARRIER TO TRADE

A CASE STUDY OF EAST AFRICAN TRADE CORRIDORS

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We express our heartfelt gratitude to the Transparency International chapters in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the Transparency Forum in Tanzania for supporting and facilitating the survey across the region. The sacrifices both in terms of staff time and other resources greatly made the initiative a success. Further, we kindly acknowledge the selfless contribution of different stakeholders in the trade and transport sectors across the region who took their valuable time to grant interviews and attending forums on the survey. The insights drawn from them added valuable dimensions to the report. The field survey was ably supported by a team of dedicated technical research assistants across the five countries. To them, we extend our unreserved gratitude. Lastly, we register our appreciation to Trademark East Africa (TMEA) for their kind financial grant that made the project possible. We are further grateful to TMEA for the constant support and guidance in the various aspects of the survey.

Samuel Mbithi Kimeu Executive Director Transparency International-Kenya

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 10 1.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................... 10 1.2 SURVEY TASKS.................................................................................................................. 10 1.3 METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................. 11 1.4 EXPECTED SURVEY OUTPUTS.................................................................................... 12 2 SURVEY FINDINGS.......................................................................................................... 14 2.1 STRUCTURE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS................................................................ 14 2.2 RESPONSES BY TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS.................................................... 15 2.3 RESPONSES BY CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENTS.................................. 46 2.4 CUSTOMS AND POLICE OFFICERS RESPONSES TO 4 CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS...................................................................................... 65 RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRADE FACILITATION SERVICES ALONG THE MAJOR EC TRANSPORT CORRIDORS.............................................. 79 3 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................... 76

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LIST OF CHARTS, TABLES AND ANNEXES


MAP 1: Major EAC road transport routes................................................................................... 3

List of Charts

Chart 1: Structure of respondents by country and category.................................................... 15 Chart 2: Structure of transport respondents by size of operations ........................................ 16 Chart 3: Frequency of interactions with revenue authorities.................................................. 21 Chart 4: Transporters interaction with police office................................................................. 21 Chart 5: Frequency of interactions between drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations ................................................................................. 22 Chart 6: Transporters / Drivers interactions with the customs officers ................................ 23 Chart 7: Compliance to revenue authority laws........................................................................ 25 Chart 8: Compliance with weighbridge laws............................................................................. 26 Chart 9: Compliance with laws at police checkpoints ............................................................. 26 Chart 10: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery by revenue authorities......................... 30 Chart 11: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at weighbridge stations ....................... 30 Chart 12: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at police checkpoints/roadblocks....... 31 Chart 13: Bribes payment to transit staff by transporters........................................................ 33 Chart 14: How bribery expenses appear in transporters books of account........................... 33 Chart 15: Means through which drivers account for bribery expenses to employers.......... 33 Chart 16: Amount of bribes paid by transporters to Regulatory Authorities in 2011 (US Dollar) ................................................................................ 34 Chart 17: Bribes paid by the drivers to regulatory authorities in 2011 (US Dollars) .......... 35 Chart 18: Problems likely to prompt transporters to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities.................................................................................................. 36 Chart 19: Problems likely to prompt drivers to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities..................................................................................................................... 37 Chart 20: Factors that determine the size of bribe.................................................................... 37 Chart 21: Reporting of corruption by transporters ................................................................. 38 Chart 22: Institution to which bribery was reported by drivers............................................. 38 Chart 23: Why corruption was not reported by the transporters........................................... 39 Chart 24: Whether transporters are ever engaged in policy decisions relevant to transport sector........................................................................................................ 40 Chart 25: Transporters rating of engagement in policy-making forums.............................. 41 Chart 26: Whether transporters have ever complained to authorities................................... 42 Chart 27: Transporters satisfaction levels with how complaint was addressed.................... 43 Chart 28: Period of business operations..................................................................................... 47 Chart 29: Whether C& F services are involved in corruption ................................................ 48 Chart 30: Corruption as a problem at transit points................................................................ 48

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Chart 31: Problems likely to prompt a clearing agent consider offering bribe..................... 49 Chart 32: Given or required to give bribe in the last 12 months............................................. 50 Chart 33: Average bribe paid in last 12 months........................................................................ 51 Chart 34: How did you know a bribe was expected from you................................................ 52 Chart 35: Point of bribe payment................................................................................................ 53 Chart 36: Consequences of not paying bribes........................................................................... 54 Chart 37: Institutions where bribe was paid.............................................................................. 54 Chart 38: Reporting of bribery incidences................................................................................ .55 Chart 39: To whom bribe was reported...................................................................................... 55 Chart 40: Reasons for not reporting bribery incidence............................................................ 56 Chart 41: Rank of officers most likely to demand / expect bribe............................................ 57 Chart 42: Perception of bribery across different ranks of custom officials............................ 58 Chart 43: Determining factor in the size of the deal................................................................ 59 Chart 44: Expectation for year 2012 on corruption levels at customs.................................... 59 Chart 45: Reasons for delays in clearing goods at customs ................................................... 60 Chart 46: Whether CFAs are engaged in any policy decisions made for the transport sector............................................................................................................ 61 Chart 47: Effectiveness of the transport sector policy making forums as perceived by CFAs....................................................................... 62 Chart 48: Years of service for customs and police officers who responded to the survey... 66 Chart 49: Responses by Customs and police officers on whether allegation that operations at transit points and weighbridge stations involves corrupt practices is a fair perception....................................................................................... 67 Chart 50: Problems that prompt users to pay bribes perception by customs officers........................................................................................................................... 68 Chart 51: Problems that prompt bribery payments as perceived by police officers........................................................................................................................... 68 Chart 52: Awareness about bribery attempts and whether bribes are actually taken.............................................................................................................................. 69 Chart 53: Rating of speed of delivery of service at customs transit stations and police checks at weighbridges.................................................................................... 70 Chart 54: Whether corruption reporting mechanisms exist at weighbridge stations/ police checkpoints and customs transit stations................................................................. 71 Chart 55: Perceived effectiveness of corruption reporting mechanisms................................ 71 Chart 56: Perceived capacity of Customs transit stations to serve customers....................... 72 Chart 57: Perceived efficiency of Customs systems used to serve the public at transit stations.............................................................................................. 73

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Target survey respondents.......................................................................................... 14 Table 2: Contributions by category of respondents and EAC countries to the bribery incidences survey................................................................................... 15 Table 3: Structure of drivers and transport respondents by country .................................. 16 Table 4: Structure of drivers and transporters respondents by years in operations.......... 17 Table 5: Frequency of transporting goods............................................................................... 17 Table 6: Weight of goods handled by the transporters and drivers per month.................. 19 Table 7: Time (hours) taken at weighbridge stations............................................................. 28 Table 8: Bribery costs incurred by drivers and transporters as a percentage of monthly value of goods transported......................................................................... 35 Table 9: Institutions that have previously invited transporters for engagement in policy making.............................................................................................................. 41 Table 10: Reasons for poor ratings on effectiveness of policy-making forums.................... 42 Table 11: Key suggested improvements by transporters ........................................................ 44 Table 12: Key suggested improvements by drivers................................................................... 45 Table 13: Distribution of CFAs respondents to the survey..................................................... 46 Table 14: Institutions that have previously engaged CFAs in discussion forums................. 61 Table 15: Key suggested improvements by CFAs..................................................................... 64 Table 16: Distribution of Customs Stations/ Transit points and Weighbridge Stations/ Police checkpoints covered by survey....................................................... 65 Table 17: Key suggested improvements by Customs Officers ................................................ 74 Table 18: Key suggested improvements by Police officers ...................................................... 75

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LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex 1: Most preferred transport routes by transporters..................................................... 81 Annex 2: Most preferred transport routes by drivers ............................................................. 85 Annex 3: Detailed suggested improvements by transporters to enhance efficiency in the transportation of goods within EAC ............................................................. 90 Annex 4: Detailed suggested improvements by drivers to enhance efficiency in the transportation of goods within EAC......................................................................... 92 Annex 5: Detailed suggested improvements by CFAs to enhance efficiency in the transportation of goods within EAC............................................ 94 Annex 6: Customs station/ transit stations covered by survey............................................... 97 Annex 7: Weighbridge station/ police checkpoints covered by survey................................. 97 Annex 8: Detailed suggested improvements by police officers to enhance efficiency in the transportation of goodswithin EAC............................................................... 98 Annex 9: Detailed suggested improvements by customs officers to enhance efficiency in the Transportation of goods within EAC.......................... 100

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BCI CET CFA EABC EAC EU GVM ICD KAM NTB SEA SWS USD UNRA OECD TABOA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Business Climate Index Common External Tariff Clearing and Forwarding Agents East African Business Council East African Community European Union Gross Vehicle Mass Inland Container Depots Kenya Association of Manufacturers Non-Tariff Barriers South East Asia Single Window System United States Dollars Uganda National Roads Authority Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Tanzania Bus Owners Association

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The East African Common Market Protocol that came into force in 2010 provides for the free flow of goods, labour, services and capital across the EAC bloc. To achieve this, members undertook to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. While progress has been made on the removal of the former, doing away with the Non-tariff barriers along the main transport corridors of the region has remained a challenge. Taking cognizance of this, Transparency International-Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi in conjunction with the Transparency Forum in Tanzania conducted a survey along EACs main corridors the Northern and Central corridors- that form a vital trade link in the region between August and November 2011. The survey objectives were to measure the impact of bribery practices and create public awareness on the vice. The survey covered 1731 respondents sampled across key players including drivers, clearing and forwarding agents, regulatory bodies; customs and police authorities. Almost all private sector players interviewed (drivers, transporters and clearing and forwarding agents) cited the likelihood of unnecessary delays as the major reason that prompts bribery payments. This, it was noted, was a result of numerous documentation, slow pace of services, poor understanding of clearing procedures and high tax levels. The survey further reveals that bribes were mainly demanded to speed up the service at various points, avoid full verification of goods and to avoid paying full tax and other charges payable. Bribes were also offered to avoid investigation especially on fraud attempts, contraband and illegal goods or excess weight carried by the trucks, expired import licenses and speeding on the roads or parking offences. In determining the size of bribe payable, negotiations came top. The value of consignment and the urgency were some of the other factors sighted by the despondents. According to the survey, truck drivers have devised various means of accounting for bribery expenses to their employers. The most common is road trip expense. These are anticipated regular amounts given prior to the start of a journey and ad hoc miscellaneous expenses. In the transporters books of accounts, the bribes are normally disguised either as anticipated regular amounts or as ad hoc miscella neous expenses. The survey also established that regulatory authorities in Tanzania took the highest amount of bribes paid at USD12,640, Kenya (USD6,715), Uganda (USD3,672) Rwanda (USD679) and Burundi (USD293) in 2011. In the case of Tanzania, bribery costs per year consisted of about 18.6% of the value of goods transported. The survey recommends various interventions to respond to the business environment to reduce opportunities and motivations for bribery. First, the bloc should harmonize such practices like custom codes, valuation standards and import clearance. Harmonization will significantly reduce delays occasioned by imports and exports standards not allowable in member states. Partner states need to strengthen the advocacy capacity of their business associations that deal with transport and CFA issues, to enable such institutions to engage regulatory authorities in effective policy dialogue that would facilitate efficient and corrupt-free transportation within the region. Such capacity building could be facilitated with the support of donor resources since most business associations lack requisite financial resources to address the needs of their clients Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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to relevant regulatory authorities (especially with respect to CFAs and transporters associations). The member states should devise education programmes targeting the key players along the corridors on issues touching on the rules, regulations and standards. The same should also include ethical practice, sanctions and penalties for non-compliance.

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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The East African Common Market Protocol came into force in July 2010. It provides for the free flow of goods, labour, services and capital across the EAC Partner states. To achieve this goal, the Partner states committed themselves to facilitate the removal of all tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) to intra-EAC trade. While progress has been achieved on the removal of tariff barriers, doing away with the NTBs has remained a key challenge. This is evidenced by the findings of the 2004, 2006/07, 2008, and 2011 Business Climate Index Surveys, which track improvements and/or deterioration in the general business climate and NTBs in the EAC countries. Bribery along the transport corridors has been identified as one of the key NTBs in the EAC region. As part of efforts to facilitate the elimination of NTBs, Transparency International with support from TMEA, conducted a survey on bribery incidences experienced along the EAC transport corridors between August and November 2011. The main objectives were: a) To trace and measure the impact of bribery practices along the major transport arteries in the East African Community region. b) To create public awareness and evidence about bribery practices necessary to facilitate advocacy on requisite legal, policy and administrative reforms. The survey was conducted through a series of interviews covering respondents from the transport and trade sector in all the five EAC partner states. These included; police officers, customs officials, clearing and forwarding agents (CFA), truck drivers and transport companies who are involved in trade transactions along the Central and Northern transit corridors. The draft findings were presented and validated in workshops in all the partner states between April and May 2012.

1.2 Survey Tasks


The key tasks of the study were: a) To trace the prevalence, magnitude and trends of bribery practices along the main transport arteries in the East African region. This information is expected to provide necessary evidence for Transparency International advocacy activities. The country rating is also expected to prompt Partner states into responsive action. To study the efficiency of cargo clearance at the customs and weighbridges stations, and at police checkpoints along the major transport corridors in the region. This is because delayed cargo-clearance adds to storage and transport costs, and also provides opportunities for bribery practices in order to speed up the process.

b)

TI-Kenya in partnership with key civil society and private sector stakeholders across the region will use the findings of the study to advocate for the identified challenges to be addressed. The expected outcomes of these advocacy campaigns are legal, policy and administrative reforms that address the transportation bottlenecks and related bribery practices experienced while

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transporting goods along major transport corridors within the EAC.

1.3 Methodology
The survey was coordinated in the five East African partner states by researchers from TI-Kenya, focusing on establishing personal, first-hand experiences of bribery practices in 2011. It targeted key players involved in transport activities along the Northern and Central corridors in EAC. The respondents included (i) private sector players; drivers, and clearing and forwarding agents; and (ii) regulatory bodies covering customs and police authorities. The survey interviews were conducted between August and November 2011 using questionnaires that had both openended and closed questions. The questions were tailor-made for each category of respondents and administered through face-to-face interviews, focusing on among other issues, key factors perceived as being the driving force behind bribery practices, existing mechanisms to deal with bribery, and recommendations on measures that need to be taken to combat the bribery practices. On account of the sensitivity of information sought, the researchers gave firm assurance that any information given would be treated with strict confidentiality. The survey employed different strategies to collect the information. Key stakeholders in transport and facilitation services were identified prior to commencement of fieldwork. The researchers conducted initial mapping meetings through formal and informal interactions with key stakeholders, including transporters associations, drivers associations, and representatives of police and revenue authorities, aimed at identifying relevant issues and concerns that informed the design of the questionnaire. These initial meetings also served as an avenue to get a buy-in for the survey. The sampling framework for the transporters, clearing and forwarding agents (CFAs) and drivers was derived from a list of members of the trade associations where available, while in cases where such lists were not comprehensive enough, respondents were identified at the various interview points. The survey thereafter selected a target of one respondent per station among the CFAs and transporters. However, given the varied experiences between checkpoints and transit stations along the transport corridors, some of the companies were interviewed more than once at different points along the corridors. The revenue authorities in the respective countries provided lists of custom stations that cover the transport corridors from which relevant respondent officers were selected. At least two custom officers were targeted in the survey in each of the selected customs stations. Police authorities helped to identify relevant stations from which at least two respondents were selected at random. Based on initial meetings with those in the transport sector, the survey identified 2,111 target respondents; 197 from Burundi, Kenya (683), Rwanda (239), Tanzania (707), and Uganda (285 ) respondents. The distribution of these respondents was; 1,518 truck drivers,CFAs(267),transporters (190), Customs Officers (68 ) and Police officers (68). Data was then collected through face-to-face interviews with the selected transport companies, truck drivers and CFAs; and with customs and police officers manning the selected checkpoints and transit stations. For the drivers, the sampled respondents were interviewed at different transit points, weighbridges, roadblocks and other authorised stops, while for the transport companies and CFAs, interviews were conducted in their offices. The customs officers were interviewed from the precincts of their offices in the different transit stations. In isolated cases, some respondents were interviewed from discrete points to ensure confidentiality. The interviews were conducted in close proximity to the work or operation sites so as to maintain relevance and credibility

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of the responses, using pre-prepared questionnaires with open-ended and closed questions. In addition, the research team made observations on actual practices taking place at the customs transit points, weighbridges and police roadblocks. The survey also sought to compare the findings with those that have emerged from similar ones, particularly the 2011 Business Climate Index (2011 BCI) survey. TI-Kenya hopes that the information gathered will inform statutory authorities and policy-makers about the extent and depth of bribery and corruption practices along the EAC transport corridors and consequently guide the design of reforms aimed at making the transport industry competitive and efficient.

1.4 Expected Survey Outputs


The key expected outputs of the survey were: a) An analytical report with clearly documented bribery practices along the EAC transport corridors, and indications of how the factors that underpin the practice are interlinked. b) Sufficient evidence of bribery practices that would form the basis of TI-Kenya advocacy campaign strategy, and facilitate the design of a proactive approach by key institutions involved in trade facilitation aimed at streamlining their service operations. Key trade facilitation institutions include EAC Customs Authorities, Weighbridges and EAC police authorities. c) Established contacts between TI-Kenya and key players in the respective trade facilitation institutions d) Documented bribery experiences by inland transport operators along major transport corridors in the region.

SURVEY ACHIEVEMENTS
The survey covered 1,731 respondents or 82% of the target number; transporters (19), drivers (1,185), CFAs (190), customs officers (98) and police officers (68). Kenya and Tanzania achieved a 100% success rate, while Uganda achieved 86% success rate. Burundi and Rwanda responses on the other hand, were quite dismal, with Burundi achieving 24% and Rwanda 21% response rates respectively. However, based on the overall success rate of 82%, the survey is considered successful, and its findings can therefore be used with confidence to demonstrate the bribery practices that take place along the major transport corridors in EAC, namely the Northern and Central Corridors, and additionally the Nairobi-Arusha link. The Dar-es-Salaam-Moshi-Arusha corridor is also an important transport route. The major road transport routes covered in the survey are shown in Map 1 below.

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Map 1 : MAJOR EAC ROAD TRANSPORT ROUTES

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2 SURVEY FINDINGS
2.1 STRUCTURE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS 2.1.1 TARGET RESPONDENTS
As pointed out in the methodology, the survey targeted 2,111 respondents; Burundi (68), Kenya (683), Rwanda (239), Tanzania (707), and Uganda (285) respondents. These target respondents were distributed into truck drivers (1,518), CFAs (267), transporters (190), customs officers (68) and police officers (68 ) as shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Target survey respondents
Respondent category Truck Drivers Clearing & Forwarding Agents Transporters Custom officials Police Total Target Total Achieved Percent success rate Kenya 509 67 69 18 20 683 683 100% Uganda 196 52 11 13 13 285 244 86% Rwanda 193 27 5 7 7 239 49 21% Tanzania 469 101 99 20 18 707 707 100% Burundi 151 20 6 10 10 197 48 24% Total Target 1,518 267 190 68 68 2,111 1,731 82%

Source: Survey Data

2.1.2 ACTUAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS


Truck drivers constitutted the largest proption of the sample at 68%, followed by transporters and CFAs each at 11%, Customs Officers at 6%, and Police officers at 4%. Overall, 44% of the respondents came from Tanzania, Kenya (39%), Uganda (14%), and Rwanda and Burundi each 3%. Based on the large number of respondents, the equally large number of business representatives (transporters, drivers and CFAs), and the high responses by both Tanzania and Kenya respondents (in which the Central, Northern Corridors and Nairobi-Namanga-Arusha corridors are located), the findings on bribery incidences therefore largely represent the bribery bottlenecks experienced while transporting goods along these routes. The distribution of the survey respondents by countries and respondent categories is presented in both Table 2 and Chart 1 below.

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Table 2: Contributions by category of respondents and EAC countries to the bribery incidences survey
Country Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Total respondents Percentage contribution Transporters 6 69 5 99 11 190 11% Drivers 6 509 5 469 196 1185 68% CFAs 6 67 5 101 11 190 11% Customs Officers 20 18 27 20 13 98 6% Police officers 10 20 7 18 13 68 4% Total respondents 48 683 49 707 244 1731 100% Percentage contribution 3% 39% 3% 41% 14% 100%

Source: Survey Data Chart 1: Structure of respondents by country and category

Source: Survey Data

2.2 RESPONSES BY TRANSORTERS AND DRIVERS 2.2.1 INTRODUCTION


Some 190 East Africa transport businesses responded to the survey, with 52% from Tanzania, Kenya (36%) Uganda (6%), and Burundi and Rwanda each 3% as shown in Table 3 below. The largest percentage of respondents were from medium-scale transport companies with between 100-250 employees at 57%, followed by small-scale companies with between 10-99 employees at 30%, large-scale companies with more than 250 employees (11%), and micro-companies with 1-9 employees (3%) as shown in Chart 2 below. Those firms which have had more than five years of operations made up 59%, of the respondents followed by those with between 1-3 years at 21%, those with between 3-5 years at 12%, and those with less than one year in the transport business at 7% as shown in Table 4 below.

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The survey covered 1,185 drivers; 509 or 43% from Kenya, Tanzania (469 or 40%), Uganda (196 or 17%). Rwandas and Burundis was negligible. Out of the total, those with more than five years operational experience took the largest percentage of drivers respondent category at 47%, followed by those with between 3-5 years and between 1-3 years experience each taking 24%, and those with less than one year experience at 6% as shown in Table 4 below. The responses by transport companies largely represent the views of Tanzanian and Kenyan transporters in the SME category that have been in operation for more than three years (i.e. 3-5 and more than five years experience).
Table 3: Structure of drivers and transport respondents by country
Drivers Country Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Total Number of respondents 6 509 5 469 196 1185 Percentage contribution 1% 43% 0% 40% 17% 100% Transporters Number of respondents 6 69 5 99 11 190 Percentage contribution 3% 36% 3% 52% 6% 100%

Source: Survey data Chart 2: Structure of transport respondents by size of operations

Source: Survey Data

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Table 4: Structure of drivers and transporters respondents by years in operations


Respondent category Country Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda Burundi Total Percentage share of total respondents Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Total Percentage share of total respondents Less than 1 year 17 2 49 0 0 68 6% 0 0 0 14 0 14 7% 1-3 years 125 44 110 1 2 282 24% 2 1 4 32 1 40 21% 3-5years 120 42 114 1 4 281 24% 4 5 1 12 1 23 12% More than 5 years 247 108 196 3 0 554 47% 0 63 0 41 9 113 59% Total 509 196 469 5 6 1185 100% 6 69 5 99 11 190 100%

Drivers

Transporters

Source: Survey Data

2.2.2

FREQUENCY OF TRANSPORTING GOODS

The survey sought to find how active the transporters and drivers have been in the transport business, and by implication the level of exposure to bribery practices. As can be seen in Table 5 below, an average of 82% of transporters either make daily, weekly or 2-5 trips per week. This shows that most drivers who participated in the survey were involved in long-haul trade (that is; journeys taking up-to a week). On the other hand, an average 80% of the drivers make either weekly or monthly trips an indication that the two groups rubbed shoulders with the regulatory authorities thereby raising the chances of being engaged in bribery.
Table 5: Frequency of transporting goods
Respondent category Frequency of transporting goods Kenya Tanzania Uganda Rwanda Burundi Total respondents Percentage contribution

Drivers

Transporters

More than once a day Once a day Weekly Monthly Occasionally Total respondents Percentage contribution to total drivers covered Daily Twice to five times a week Weekly Monthly Occasionally Never Total respondents Percentage contribution to total transporters covered

3 32 321 111 42 509 43% 17 15 17 7 5 8 69 36%

1 3 116 40 36 196 17% 8 2 1 0 0 0 11 6%

15 71 211 148 24 469 40% 39 20 28 3 9 0 99 52%

3 1 0 1 0 5 0% 3 1 0 1 0 0 5 3%

0 0 5 1 0 6 1% 0 0 5 1 0 0 6 3%

22 107 653 301 102 1185 100% 67 38 51 12 14 8 190 100%

2% 9% 55% 25% 9% 100%

35% 20% 27% 6% 7% 4% 100%

Source: Survey Data

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2.2.3

VALUE OF GOODS TRANSPORTED ALONG THE EAC CORRIDORS

The value of goods moved through the EAC region totaled USD54.84 million per month an average of USD 553,914 per company per month. The task of customs officers is to check whether goods have been correctly declared in the import/export documents, and if wrong declaration is detected, this becomes an avenue to solicit for bribery so as to give clearance. On the other hand, part of police officers responsibilities is to check whether drivers carry the correct transport documents including those relating to goods being ferried, and if such documents are missing, this increases the chances for bribery incidences.

2.2.4

WEIGHT OF GOODS HANDLED BY THE TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS PER MONTH

The 1,185 drivers who participated in the survey, excluding the ones from Rwanda, transported a combined haulage of 255,984 tons per month , with most of it transported through Tanzania (237,635 tons), Kenya (12,665 tons), Uganda (4,844 tons) and Burundi (840 tons). Rwanda drivers did not give the required data on the weight of goods transported. The total tonnage for the 182 transport companies that participated in the survey is 834,514 tons per month, with Kenya taking the lead at 445,374 tons or 53% of the total weight, followed by Uganda (302,369 tons), Tanzania (81,491 tons), Rwanda (4,860 tons) and Burundi (4,230 tons) as shown in Table 6 below. While there are discrepancies between drivers and transporters data, the volume of goods transported in a given period is huge. Given that one of the major reasons for police roadblocks is to check whether transport vehicles have exceeded the allowed weights on both the Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) and axle load limits, the large volume of goods transported along EACs major corridors is an indication that there could be high levels of bribery practices taking place. This problem is compounded by the fact that EAC countries apply varying measures for checking truck weight. Kenya applies the GVM (the weight of the goods and the truck) while Uganda and Tanzania use axle load limits (allowed weight on each axle). Rwanda and Burundi both have weighbridge regulations that specify trucks should not exceed a maximum of 53 tons. However, Rwanda enforces weight limits for customs revenue purposess, while Burundi does not have weighbridges to enable enforcement of the regulations. Trucks originating from Kenya could get approval for conforming to required weight specifications, but when they cross into Uganda, they get charged for exceeding axle load limits especially because some of the goods ferried may tilt towards some axles during vehicle movement thus indicating excess weight on such axles despite the truck conforming to the required GVM. As a result, drivers are charged in Ugandan courts for overloading. To avoid going to court which results in a lot of time wastage and delayed deliveries drivers offer to pay bribes after which they get clearance to proceed with their journey. This problem is especially cited as prevalent at the Busitema and Mbale weighbridges stations (about 40 km from Malaba Border Station). Based on the large number of commercial trucks that ply the major transport routes in the region, including trucks that lack required documents to prove that their trucks are within the allowed weight limits, bribery ends up as a serious problem thus contributing substantially to the high cost of doing business. A casual glance at the vehicles stopped at all EAC roadblocks would indicate that they are commercial vehicles (whether passenger or goods-type vehicles). In the mean time, EAC partner states have agreed to harmonise their weighbridge regulations at a maximum of 56 tons.

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Table 6: Weight of goods handled by the transporters and drivers per month
Respondent Category Weight of goods per month (Tonnes) Lowest weight transported per month (tonnes) Drivers summary weights of goods transported Highest weight transported per month (tonnes) Total weight transported per month (tonnes) Average weight transported per month (tonnes) Lowest weight transported per month (tonnes) Transporters summary weights of goods transported Highest weight transported per month (tonnes) Total weight transported per month (tonnes) Average weight transported per month (tonnes) Kenya 4 Uganda 2 Tanzania 2 Burundi 50 Rwanda no data Total weight

3,780

648

100,000

420

no data

255,984 (Excl. Rwanda)

12,665

4,844

237,635

840

no data

25 8

25 4

516 2

70 50

no data 10

400,000

300,000

20,000

120

3,000

445,374

302,369

81,491

420

4,860

834,514

6,748

27,488

867

70

3,353

Source: Survey Data

2.2.5 MOST FREQUENTLY USED ROUTES


For Burundi, the most important route used by transporters is the Central Corridor, starting from Dar-es-Salam-Muyinga-Ngozi-Kayanza-Bujumbura; this corridor carries up to 83% of exports and imports into land-locked Burundi. The Northern Corridor, which stretches from Bujumbura -Kigali-Kampala, takes the balance, an indication of the importance of the Central Corridor. For Kenyan transporters, the Northern Corridor that starts from Mombasa passing through Nairobi and onwards to other inland and neighbouring countries towns (such as Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu, Malaba, Busia, Kisii, Kampala, Juba, Kigali), was cited as the route most frequently used. This route is used by at least half (59%) of the respondents to the survey. The importance of the route to the regional traffic cannot be overemphasized. It links Uganda, most parts of Rwanda and South Sudan with the outside world. For Rwanda, the most popular route cited by the five transporters is the Central Corridor that starts from Dar es Salaam-Rusumo-Kigali, taking 80% of the countrys outgoing and incoming cargo; while the Northern Corridor starting from Mombasa to Kigali takes the remainder. The significance of this finding is that transporters opt to use the longer Central Corridor as opposed to the shorter Northern Corridor route, which was the previously preferred route of choice. This is probably because the Northern Corridor has numerously been cited as a difficult route to transit through due to the numerous police roadblocks and weighbridges where each truck has to make a stop. Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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This could be the main reason why the Northern Corridor route is avoided by Rwandan transporters leading to loss of economic opportunities for Kenya (such as hotel and food business services and business sales by fueling stations). The consequences of corrupt practices, including the increased operational costs and indirect economic losses to Kenya is staggering. Almost half of the Tanzanian respondents (44%) said the most frequently used route is the Dar es Salaam-Moshi-Arusha-Namanga-Nairobi. This route links with both the Central and Northern Corridors through Arusha, but is not indicated as a significant route. The other transport routes covering the Central Corridor from Dar es Salaam to Tanzania inland towns and linking Tanzania with Zambia through Tunduma and Mbeya take 56% of the countrys volume of goods. For Ugandan transporters, the most frequently used route is the Northern Corridor from Mombasa-Nairobi-Malaba/Busia and vice versa, which takes an average 78% of the countrys incoming and outgoing cargo. Other transport routes are the Kampala-Kinshasa, KabaleKaluma, and Kampala to Kigali and Southern Sudan.

2.2.6
2.2.6.1

NATURE OF INTERACTIONS WITH REGULATORY AUTHORITIES


INTERACTIONS WITH REVENUE AUTHORITIES

As shown in Chart 3 below, most transporters and drivers interact with revenue authorities on a daily or weekly basis with revenue authority officers as they move goods within the region. At least 71% of the total EAC transporters and 53% of drivers have either had daily or weekly interactions with the officers while 35% of the drivers indicated that they had monthly interactions with revenue authorities. The average frequency of interactions with the authorities is similar to country level responses. These interactions occurred during the declaration of incoming or outgoing cargo, payment of relevant taxes, applications for and cancellation of transit bonds, movement of cargo from customs bonded warehouses and Inland Container Depots (ICDs) and other customs documentation processes relating to the transport of goods. These responsibilities are usually handled by the cargo owner or the transporter rather than the driver, and the latter only gets necessary documentation from the transporter just before the start of a journey. On the other hand, transporters and drivers have almost equally significant weekly interactions with the officers, which occur when cargo is either on transit or in the process of being moved to an ICD or to the market. In such cases, customs officers periodically check to reduce cases of diversion of the goods into the domestic market. Transporters and drivers also reported high monthly interactions with revenue officers when transit bonds are being retired, and when goods for which customs duty had not been paid are being accounted for. All these different interactions between drivers and transporters with revenue authorities present opportunity for bribery, especially when the transporters or drivers have not complied with mandatory customs requirements, or when they want the clearance process speeded up.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 3: Frequency of interactions with Revenue authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.6.2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS WITH POLICE OFFICERS


The frequency of daily and weekly interactions between transporters and drivers with the police officers is quite high as shown by Chart 4 below. At least 96% of all transporters and 69% of the drivers have either daily or weekly interactions with police officers during the transportation of goods. In theory, it is only the drivers who should constantly be on the road, but in reality, the transporters also maintain their presence to ensure smooth running of their businesses by cultivating a good relationship with the police. This creates a perfect situation for bribery. This is similar to the country-level interactions although for Burundi, all interactions between transporters and police officers are indicated as taking place on a weekly basis.
Chart 4: Transporters interaction with police officers

Source: Survey Data

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2.2.6.3 INTERACTIONS WITH POLICE OFFICERS AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS


Out of the 1,152 drivers interviewed, at least 77% indicated they interacted with police officers at weighbridge stations either on a daily or weekly basis, while a lower frequency (18%) had monthly interactions as shown in Chart 5 below. The regional picture is not much different from the country-level responses, except in the case of Rwanda where indications are that all interactions between drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations took place on a monthly basis. The overall picture however, is that there are constant interactions between the drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations during the course of transporting goods especially because the officers task is to check that trucks conform to the allowed Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) and axle load limits. This provides fertile grounds for bribery to take place, based on the varied and axle load limits within EAC Partner states.
Chart 5: Frequency of interactions between drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations

Source: Survey Data

The 2011 BCI survey supports the survey findings on the frequency of interactions between transporters/ truck drivers and weighbridge stations officers. The survey found that Kenya and Tanzania each have 12 and 13 weighbridges along the Northern and Central Corridors respectively. The weighbridges are used to check for compliance to allowed GVM, and axle load specifications.

2.2.6.4 INTERACTIONS WITH CUSTOMS OFFICERS


The frequency of interactions with customs officers among the transporters and drivers is very high as evidenced by Chart 6 below. Ninety three percent of the transporters and 53% of drivers registered daily or weekly interaction. In addition, 37% of drivers said they interacted with customs officers on a monthly basis. While the regional picture is not much different from country-level responses, there is some slight difference for monthly interactions given by drivers from the country-level responses, where 44% of Tanzania, 77% of Rwanda and 49% of Burundi drivers indicated they interacted with customs officers on a monthly basis. Interaction with customs officers include during manual presentation and declaration of import consignments and checks on goods being ferried across the borders. This presents opportunities for bribery.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

In countries such as the European Union (EU) and South East Asia where the Single Window System (SWS) has been implemented, interactions between importers or their representatives and customs officers are minimal. This is because import processes are made electronically; including declarations, Harmonised System (HS) classification and payment of applicable duty, classification/coding and payment of applicable duties. In addition, the EU and South East Asian (SEA) countries have separated the physical release of goods from customs fiscal control functions. That means customs can release goods prior to completion of all documentation formalities and final settlement of tax accounts. The availability of full-time automated processing at the customs entry ports together with SWS has replaced manual processes and greatly increased the speed of clearing an import consignment. Consequently this has reduced the interactions between importers or their representatives with customs officers and also with officers of other trade facilitation bodies . In turn, this has reduced incidences for bribery practices.
Chart 6: Transporters / Drivers Interactions with the customs officers

Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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2.2.7 COMPLIANCE WITH REVENUE AUTHORITIES LAWS


Transporters and drivers complied with the revenue authority laws, with 81% of transporters and 84% of the drivers saying they always or sometimes complied (see Chart 7). This scenario is similar to the country-level responses. However, where non-compliance to revenue authority laws is noted, the survey indicated that it might be due to ignorance about existing and newly introduced laws. This is supported by the 2011 BCI findings, which found that many had a limited knowledge about customs documentation and administrative procedures, with 21% of EAC businesses (importers/ exporters, CFAs and transporters) indicating that they were not aware about the relevant customs, port and border stations regulations for importing and exporting in their home country, and an average 23% indicating they were not aware about customs regulations for importing and exporting in other EAC countries (through border stations and sea ports).

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 7: Compliance to revenue authority laws

Source: Survey Data

2.2.8

COMPLIANCE TO LAWS AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS AND POLICE CHECKPOINTS

Obedience of the law at the weighbridge stations by the drivers closely follows the same pattern as that for revenue authority laws, with 70% of the drivers confirming that they always or sometimes complied with the relevant laws as shown in Chart 8 below. The category that indicated that the law was rarely or never obeyed, stands at 28% of all drivers interviewed across the region. The scenario is much the same with that of the country-level responses. All Burundi and Rwanda drivers indicated nil non-compliance. At least half (55%) of the transporters and 60% of the drivers indicated that they always or sometimes complied with the relevant laws as shown in Chart 9 below. The regional picture is similar to the country-level responses albeit with some few variances, where for example, a much higher percentage (84%) of Rwanda drivers indicated that they always, or sometimes, complied with the relevant laws. None of the Rwanda transporters responded on this issue. Like in the case of customs laws, non-compliance by drivers of relevant laws at weighbridge stations and police checkpoints is often not done intentionally, but occurs due to ignorance about existing and newly introduced laws although it is often cited as the cause of bribery practices at the weighbridges.

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Chart 8: Compliance with Weighbridge laws

Source: Survey Data Chart 9: Compliance with laws at police checkpoints

Source: Survey Data

2.2.9

AVERAGE TIME TAKEN AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS, POLICE CHECKS AND CUSTOMS STATIONS

2.2.9.1 TIME SPENT AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS


Truck drivers spend enormous time at some of the weighbridges, with the Magerwa weighbridge in Rwanda taking an average of 28.7 hours or an average of 1.2 days per truck per trip. However, weighbridges in Rwanda are used for customs revenue purposess but not to check for weight limits. But even the process of weighing trucks for revenue purposes in Rwanda ends up having the same adverse effects as the checks for weight limits (see Table 7 below). The least time spent on weighbridge checks within the region is at Busitema weighbridge in Uganda and Makambako weighbridge in Tanzania where drivers spend 0.2 hours or an average 13 minutes per truck per trip. The Central Corridor on the whole seems to take much less time for the weighing process than the Northern Corridor, where trucks spend 3.6 hours at Mariakani according to Kenya Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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truck drivers and 2.4 hours according to Uganda truck drivers. Weighbridges are non-existent in Burundi. The survey findings are close to the 2011 BCI findings that indicated that an average 85% of EAC businesses spend between 30 minutes to 2 days to get clearance at the weighbridges. Transit trucks, which have customs seals, experience hiccups at intermediate weighbridges due to calibration and intolerances between different weighbridge stations. Lack of harmonized weight requirements across EAC makes administration of the process even more challenging. The inefficiency and corruption that takes place at weighbridges has elevated them to non-tariff barriers.

2.2.9.2 TIME TAKEN AT POLICE CHECKS (HOURS)


There have been complaints from businesses about delays at roadblocks likely to create bribery opportunities. There is a strong positive correlation between the average time spent at police roadblocks and other tell-tale signs of sources of corruptive practices such as frequency of interactions with police and levels of obedience to laws related to police checks. The longest time is spent at Jinja in Uganda, where trucks spend an average 3.4 hours during police checks as indicated in Table 7 below. Trucks spend the least time is at Isebania, where an average of 0.12 hours or 7.2 minutes is spent to get police clearance. The 2011 BCI closely ties with the surveys finding on time taken, with indication that between 30 minutes to more than one hour was indicated as the average time taken to complete the police. Delays at police checks is therefore a concern for the region since it induces drivers to offer bribes to police officers manning such roadblocks to speed up the checking process.

2.2.9.3 TIME TAKEN AT CUSTOMS STATIONS


Delays at customs in the region are higher compared to weighbridge stations and police roadblocks as indicated in Table 7. The worst customs stations in terms of the time spent to get clearance is between the Kenya and Tanzania borders. Relevant stations in this respect are Namanga, Taveta,Holili, Horohoro,Lunga Lunga,, and Loitoktok. At these border stations, truck drivers spend an average of 68 hours to get customs clearance. This provides a good opportunity for drivers to offer bribes in order to speed up the process. On the other hand, the least time for customs clearance in the region was reported at the Tanzania - Burundi border (namely Kobero station (Burundi side), alternatively known as Kabanga on Tanzania side), where trucks spend an average of 0.8 hours or 48 minutes. Burundi drivers report the least time spent on customs clearance within their national borders There are huge time variances for customs clearance between EAC border stations; KenyaTanzania 68 hrs, Uganda-Kenya 14.8 hrs, Tanzania-Burundi 0.8 hrs, and Rwanda-Tanzania 72 hrs).

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Table 7: Time (hours) taken at weighbridge stations

Kenya Station Name Selected Weighbridge Stations Gilgil Mariakani Mlolongo Selected Police checkpoints/ Roadblocks Namanga Mlolongo Mariakani Nairobi Nakuru Kisumu Highway 0.5 Isebania Customs Stations Within Kenya 29 Within Uganda 68 UgandaKenya 23.1 Customs within Tanzania 14.8 Tanzania -Burundi border points Kenya -Tanzania 33.5 0.3 Mabira 0.2 Jinja 1.1 Malaba 2.0 3.4 0.3 4 Busitema 0.4 Makambako Kibaha Iringa Chalinze 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.12 2.1 Busia 2.4 3.6 Busitema 0.2 Mikese Makambako 1.5 Mariakani 2.4 Kibaha 0.5 0.5 0.2 Average time taken per truck (hrs) Station Name Station Name Average time taken per truck (hrs) Average time taken per truck (hrs)

Uganda

Tanzania

Rwanda Station Name Rwanda Revenue Authority Magerwa Rusumo Rusomo Katuna Kigali Rusizi

Average time taken per truck (hrs) 5.3 28.7 0.1 1.3 1.7 2.1 0.4

Burundi

Station Name

Average time taken per truck (hrs)

Kayanza

2.5

Muyinga-NNgoziKayanza-Bujumbura

0.4

Uvira-GatumbaBujumbura

0.4

Ngozi-KayanzaBujumbura Mityana 0.12 Mla ndizi 0.18 Gisenyi 0.2

0.4

Kobero-NNgoziBujumbura

0.6

Within Rwanda 0.8 Rwanda -Tanzania

9.9

Within Burundi

1.6

72

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Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

No weighbridge stations

2.2.10 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY BY THE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 2.2.10.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY BY ALL REVENUE AUTHORITIES
Chart 10 below captures the drivers and transport companies views on perceived effectiveness of the customs rules. The proportion of the total number of responding transport companies and drivers who believe that customs rules are very effective was 24% and 17% respectively. About half (49%) of transporters believe the rules are effective with 43% of the drivers thinking the same. Sixteen percent of the drivers and transporters were non-committal observing that the rules were neither effective nor ineffective. The rest of the transporters and drivers indicated that the rules were ineffective, very ineffective or did not know. A notable percentage of respondents who were non-committal on the effectiveness of the rules combined with those indicating the rules were either ineffective, very ineffective or dont know33% for transporters and 31% for drivers are most likely the ones who abuse them by being non-compliant and consequently paying bribes to get clearance. The regional pattern on effectiveness of the rules is similar to the country-level indications except in the case of Uganda where 45% of the transporters indicated the revenue authorities rules were ineffective. Some of the respondents who were either non-committal or indicated the rules were either ineffective, very ineffective, supported their poor ratings with the following justifications: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) The officers do not follow the law The officers are unfriendly and harass people The officers work at a slow pace The procedures are very demanding The officers are indifferent to the demands of customers The officers lack suitable resources such as office equipments (scanners and computers) to perform their duties efficiently Some customs officials are corrupt and ask for bribes Customs departments are understaffed

With specific reference to service delivery by customs officers, the justification given for good ratings include: a) b) c) d) The customs officers always serve customers well as long as the documentation is correct and complete The customs officers are customer friendly The officers follow the law The officers deliver quick service

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Chart 10: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery by Revenue authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.10.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS


The survey results on effectiveness of rules for service delivery at weighbridge stations are similar to those on revenue authorities (see Chart 11 below). Only 44 % of the drivers indicated the rules were either very effective or effective, 31% were non-committal, while 24% indicated the rules are either ineffective or very ineffective. In a scenario where only 44% indicated the rules were either very effective or effective, there was a high likelihood for bribery practices to take place. The regional picture differs slightly from the country responses in the case of Burundi and Rwanda, with 99% of Burundi drivers indicating that the rules are either very effective or effective, while 100% of the Rwanda drivers were non-committal on effectiveness of the rules. The Rwanda responses are based on the fact that the country does not have weighbridges for overload control, since the existing stations at border stations are used only for customs revenue purposess.
Chart 11: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at weighbridge stations

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Poor ratings of effectives of weighbridge stations rules were justified by the following reasons: i. ii. The rules cause unnecessary delays Different weighbridges generate different weight results for the same load, implying some stations have faulty equipment iii. The stations do not give the drivers their rights iv. The weighbridge officers simply do not follow the regulations v. The weighbridge equipment is sometimes in poor condition, implying poor maintenance of the weighing equipment

2.2.10.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY AT POLICE CHECKPOINTS/ROADBLOCKS


Only 34% of both the transporters and drivers rated the rules for service delivery at police checkpoints/roadblocks as very effective or effective, while 42% and 28% of the transporters and drivers respectively, rated the rule as neither effective nor ineffective as shown in Chart 12 below. At least 23% of the transporters and 37% of drivers rated the rules as very ineffective, ineffective or indicated they didnt know. The above ratings resonate well with previous studies within the region that have showed traffic police as being highly corrupt. About 72% of Kenya drivers indicated that no checks were done after a truck was stopped at police roadblocks. This implies that no rules were applied, since the actual reason for such stops was actually to solicit for bribes that range between 1-5 USD for 100% of Burundi and Tanzania drivers and less that USD 1 for 100% of Kenya and 71% of Uganda drivers at every police roadblock. Thus trucks are stopped at police checkpoints not to check for compliance with the relevant rules, but as an avenue for extorting bribes.
Chart 12: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at police checkpoints/roadblocks

Source: Survey Data

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Various reasons were provided for the ratings on the rules being either very effective or effective, including: i. ii. iii. iv. When you comply with the rules and regulations, officers dont bother you Police officers at checkpoints boost security on the transport corridors Police officers deliver services quickly There are no cases of corruption

On the other hand, the following reasons were given for poor ratings on effectiveness of police check rules: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. Police officers always demand bribes Police officers harass truck drivers Police are very slow in their work, leading to delays Police officers do not follow the laid down rules and regulations The transport corridors have many checkpoints leading to delays since trucks are stopped at almost every check point The roadblocks lack suitable equipment

2.2.11 BRIBERY PAYMENTS TO TRANSIT STAFF


The proportion of transporters who admitted paying bribes in the course of transporting goods through the corridors was very high, with 86% of Kenya transporters indicating that they paid such bribes, followed by Tanzania (82%), Uganda (55%), Burundi (50%) and Rwanda (20%) as shown in Chart 13. In the transporters books of accounts, the bribes are normally disguised in a number of ways as shown in Chart 14. At least 70% of the respondents indicated the bribes were recorded as either anticipated regular amounts or as ad hoc miscellaneous expenses, while 28% indicated the cost was recorded as road trip expenses. Only 3% disguised such costs as drivers allowance. The regional picture is similar to the country-level responses among Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania transporters, while 100% of Burundi and 100% of Rwanda transporters respectively indicated the bribery expenses were recorded as ad hoc miscellaneous expenses and road trip expenses. Over time, transporters have accepted bribery as a normal cost of doing business, but have to find an appropriate means of accounting for such expenses. At both the regional and country level, road trip expenses take the major portion of how bribery expenses are accounted for to employers. (see Chart 15). Some of these reasons could actually be ways in which drivers cheat their employers in order to earn some extra income, but the burden is eventually borne by the employer thus raising the implications of bribery along EACs transport routes.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 13: Bribe payment to transit staff by transporters

Source: Survey Data Chart 14: How bribery expenses appear in transporters books of account

Source: Survey Data Chart 15: Means through which drivers account for bribery expenses to employers

Source: Survey Data

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2.2.12 AMOUNTS OF BRIBERY COSTS PAID BY TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS TO REGULATORY AUTHORITIES
On average, the highest bribes paid to the revenue authority officers were recorded by Tanzanian transporters, who incurred bribes amounting to US$2,656, followed by Kenya at US$ 1,250, Uganda at US$490 and Rwanda at US$100 (see Chart 16). Burundi transporters did not indicate the bribery amounts, probably out of fear that the answers could jeopardize their future relations with the respective authorities and thus affect business operations. Tanzania transporters also topped the list of bribes paid at weighbridge stations (USD5, 914), followed by Uganda (USD370), and Rwanda ( USD100). Kenya, like Burundi, did not indicate the bribery amounts at weighbridge stations, probably out of fear. Bribery amounts to customs officers are also quite high with Tanzania averaging USD1,776 in 2011, followed by Kenya (USD1,286), and Uganda (USD408). Like Burundi, Rwanda transporters did not give indication of bribes paid to customs. The amounts of bribes paid to the Police officers are not as high as those paid to revenue authorities, customs and weighbridge stations. This actually is expected as indicated by the 2011 BCI, which found that small value bribes were paid at police roadblocks. However, the smaller value bribes do not imply lesser bribery costs, since based on the numerous roadblocks25 on the Northern Corridor, 22 on Central corridors and 6 on the Nairobi-Namanga route as per the 2011 BCI the eventual amount incurred per annum is high. All Kenyan drivers surveyed indicated they paid less than one USD at every stop, All (100%) of Tanzania drivers paid between USD 1-5 at every stop, 100% of Uganda drivers paid between less than one USD and 1-5 USD at every stop, thus amounting to enormous bribery costs per annum for the transport industry. The highest amount of bribes paid to regulatory officials were to weighbridge officers in Kenya who pocketed USD1,597, Uganda Police officers received USD1,113 from truck drivers as shown in Chart 17 below. The highest bribery amount to customs officers was recorded by Uganda drivers who incurred an average USD432 in 2011. The survey findings show that bribery practices are more severe at weighbridge stations and police roadblocks. This is collaborated by the findings of 2011 BCI, which indicated that these are the two main points where bribery practices almost automatically take place during the course of transporting goods across the region.
Chart 16: Amount of bribes paid by transporters to Regulatory Authorities in 2011 (US Dollar)

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 17: Bribes paid by the drivers to regulatory authorities in 2011 (US Dollars)

Source: Survey Data

Tanzania takes the highest amount of bribes paid by transporters and drivers to all regulatory authorities at USD12,640, followed by Kenya (USD6,715), Uganda (USD3,672) Rwanda (USD 679) and Burundi (USD293) -see Table 8. When expressed as a percentage of the total value of goods handled by transport companies per month, bribery costs per month are 18.6% of the value of goods transported in Tanzania; in Kenya (1.4%,) Rwanda (0.5%,) and Uganda and Burundi each at 0.1%. If the bribe amounts were to be set against the net profits or the other operating costs of transport companies, the proportions would be much higher.
Table 8: Bribery costs incurred by drivers and transporters as a percentage of monthly value of goods transported
Country Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda Burundi Total amount of bribes per month (USD) 6,715 3,672 12,640 679 293 Average value of goods transported per month (USD) 491,713 5,268,367 68,081 145,188 263,903 Bribes per month a percentage of value of goods 1.4% 0.1% 18.6% 0.5% 0.1%

Source: Survey Data

2.2.13 PROBLEMS LIKELY TO PROMPT BRIBERY PAYMENTS


The transporters identified various problems that are likely to trigger bribery payments to officials of regulatory authorities. As shown in Chart 18 below, 46% of the transporters cited the likelihood of unnecessary delays as the major reason, followed by numerous documentation (20%), slow pace of services (14%), poor understanding of clearing procedures (9%), and high tax levels (8%). The regional picture is much similar to the country responses, except in the case of Rwanda where all (100%) of the transporters cited unnecessary delays as the major reason for prompting bribery payments.

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Regionally, the main issue why bribes are paid is to avoid harassment and payment of penalties as indicated by: i. ii. iii. 43% and 47% respectively with respect to bribes at weighbridges; 29% and 25% respectively regarding bribes to customs officers; and 63% and 26% respectively with respect to bribes at police checkpoints

At the country level, (See Chart 19) Rwanda and Burundi drivers did not respond on bribes to officers at weighbridge stations since weighbridges do not exist in both countries for overload control. At the same time, 100% of Burundi and Rwanda drivers indicated that they paid bribes to revenue authority officers to avoid harassment
Chart 18: Problems likely to prompt transporters to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities

Source: Survey Data

There is no clear correlation between the effectiveness of rules enforced by regulatory authorities and the amount of bribes paid, since although the highest amount of bribes are paid to revenue authorities/ customs officers, the indication by drivers and transporters is that the level of effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the rules under revenue authorities/ or customs stations is similar to that under weighbridges and police checks. This means that effectiveness/noneffectiveness of the rules is not necessarily the reason for the amount of bribes paid. Noncompliance to rules enforced by regulatory authorities is not cited as a major reason that prompts transporters to give a bribe and also is not cited as among the major factors that determine the size of a bribe shown in Charts 19 and 20 below.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 19: Problems likely to prompt drivers to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.14 FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE SIZE OF BRIBES PAID BY TRANSPORTERS


Negotiations were the key factor determining the size of a bribe. The value of the consignment at 23%, urgency of the consignment at 17%, expected penalties at 14%, number of public officers involved in the bribery deal at 5%, and fixed bribery amount per consignment at 4% were the other factors mentioned. This regional picture is much similar to the country responses, although for Rwanda respondents, the urgency of a consignment especially for perishable goods is given as the only reason for bribery payments.
Chart 20: Factors that determine the size of bribe

Source: Survey Data

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2.2.15 CORRUPTION REPORTING


Very few drivers and transporters reported bribery incidents as seen in Chart 21. All Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian transporters sampled never reported bribery incidences. In Kenya, (83%) and 93% in Tanzania indicated that they didnt report bribery incidences. Almost all (99%) of Uganda, Tanzania (92%), Kenya (89%), Burundi (87%), and Rwandan (83%) drivers did not report such incidences. Only 29% of all drivers indicated they reported bribery to the management authorities where such incidences took place, 27% reported to the police while 7% reported to the regulators oversight office. At least 24% of drivers reported such incidences to the employer. Only 11% of the drivers reported the incidences to anti-corruption authorities. (See Chart 22. )
Chart 21: Reporting of corruption by Transporters

Source: Survey Data

Chart 22: Institution to which bribery was reported by drivers

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

2.2.16 REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING CORRUPTION INCIDENCES


Chart 23 below captures the reasons why bribery incidences are never reported. At least half (52%) of EAC transporters indicated that bribery was a normal and acceptable practice in the region, while 28% stated that they knew no action would be taken against the wrong-doers. In addition, 21% said reported such incidents would be self-incriminating, while 20% did not see the need to report. This is similar to country-level responses. In Kenya, 65% of the transporters did not report corruption because to them, the vice was a normal and almost acceptable practice. With respect to drivers, their main reasons for not reporting bribery incidences is that they did not see the reason and they knew no action would be taken as indicated by 48% of the EAC respondents. This response is similar to country-level responses. Additionally, 21% of the EAC average responses indicated this would be a self-incriminating action. In Rwanda, 50% of the drivers gave this indication.
Chart 23: Why corruption was not reported by the transporters

Source: Survey Data

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2.2.17 ENGAGEMENT OF TRANSPORTERS IN POLICY-MAKING DECISIONS RELEVANT TO TRANSPORT SECTOR


Transporters are rarely engaged by regulatory authorities in the policy-making process relevant to issues in the sector. In Chart 24, 17% of the transporters are ever engaged. The rest have never been engaged and also do not know of any transporters who have ever been engaged. Uganda is the only country where majority of transporters were involved in policy-making as indicated by 82% of respondents giving an affirmative response.
Chart 24: Whether transporters are ever engaged in policy decisions relevant to transport sector

Source: Survey Data

2.2.18 INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY ENGAGED TRANSPORT COMPANIES IN DIALOGUE ON TRANSPORTATION ISSUES; AND EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY DIALOGUE
The transporters cited the institutions listed in Table 9 below as among those that have previously engaged them in dialogue related to transportation difficulties and requisite reforms. At a glance, it is quite clear that the key policy making institutions such as revenue and police authorities, ministries of transport, and weighbridge departments have ignored transport companies while making decisions that affect their operations. However, in Kenya and Uganda, the Kenya Urban Roads Authority and Uganda Revenue Authority respectively, have invited transporters for engagement in policy-making. This, to a large extent ,could explain the poor ratings given on the effectiveness of the engagements, with 24% giving a positive indication as shown in Chart 25 below. It is only in Uganda where transporters think highly of the effectiveness of the policymaking forums, with 44% of transporters interviewed rating the forums as very effective. Meanwhile, 27% and 36% of Tanzania transporters rated the forums as being either ineffective or very ineffective respectively. Specific reasons put forward to explain such poor ratings as shown in Table 10 below include: (i) Resolutions were never implemented; (ii) The institutions involved (that is, business associations) do not push for the needs of transporters; (iii) Issues raised are never taken seriously, and; (iv) The institutions involved have no power and mandate

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

to deal with allegations made by the transporters.


Table 9: Institutions that have previously invited transporters for engagement in policy making
Kenya Type of organisation Truck Owners Association Kenya Long Distance Truck Drivers Association Kenya Manufactures Association Communication Commission of Kenya Kenya Urban Roads Authority Kenya Transporters Association Total No of meetings 3 Uganda Type of organisation Kenya Transporters Association Kenya Long Distance Truck Drivers Association UCIFA Uganda Revenue Authority UNRA Uganda Shippers association No response 12 Total No of meetings 1 Tanzania Type of organisation Tanzania Transporter Association Kinondoni Municipal Council Chama Cha Mawakala Ubungo Tanzania Bus Owners Association (TABOA) No of meetings 5 Rwanda Type of organisation No of meetings Burundi Type of organisation

2 Private Sector (PSF)

No data given

1 Kenya Canvas Ltd 1

1 1 9

Total

11

Total

Source: Survey Data Chart 25: Transporters rating of engagement in policy-making forums

Source: Survey Data

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Table 10: Reasons for poor ratings on effectiveness of policy-making forums


Kenya Reasons for poor ratings Institutions take too long to meet for follow ups Resolutions never implemented Institutions do not push for our needs (transporters) Percent response Uganda Reasons for poor ratings Issues raised are not taken seriously Policies passed are never implemented Reliable Percent response Tanzania Reasons for poor ratings The forums are not powerful and lack the jurisdiction and mechanisms to deal with the allegations There is neither follow up nor cooperation No complaints Percent response Rwanda Reasons for poor ratings Customs have insufficient number of workers to deal with complaints Percent response

33%

20%

55%

100%

33%

70%

27%

17%

10%

18%

Source: Survey Data

2.2.19 COMPLAINTS TO THE REGULATORY/OVERSIGHT AUTHORITIES REGARDING CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED IN THE COURSE OF TRANSPORTING GOODS ACROSS EAC BORDERS
As indicated in Chart 26 below, only 10% of the transporters have ever complained about challenges encountered while transporting goods across the EAC borders. Despite experiencing transportation challenges, 74% of transporters indicated that they did not complain while the rest indicated they did not have a reason to complain.
Chart 26: Whether transporters have ever complained to authorities about difficulties faced in transporting goods across borders

Source: Survey Data

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For The nature of complaints raised by the transporters were diverse, including: a) There are numerous disputes between individual transporters, for example regarding transport malpractices b) Problems experienced at the port such as delays c) High charges and taxes for various services offered by the regulatory authorities d) Disputes related to licensing and regulations Institutions where disputes and complaints have previously been launched by transporters include (i) the Kenya Transport Association; (ii) Kenya Ports Authority; (iii) Police; (iv) Uganda Revenue Authority; (v) Uganda Shippers Association; (vi) Uganda Ministry of Transport and Works, and: (vii) Tanzania Revenue Authority. Only 26% of the transporters indicated their complaints were addressed satisfactorily, while 45% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied as shown in Chart 27 below. Some 11% indicated their complaints were never addressed. Only 38% of Uganda transporters were satisfied while the corresponding rating for Kenya and Tanzania was 20% and 17% respectively. Kenya had the highest proportion of dissatisfied transporters at 40% while 20% stated that the complaint was never addressed. A half of the transporters sampled in Tanzania were very dissatisfied.
Chart 27: Transporters satisfaction levels with how complaints were addressed

Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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2.2.20 SUGGESTIONS BY TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS TO IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ALONG MAJOR EAC TRANSPORT CORRIDORS
The five major suggestions by transporters and drivers for improving transportation along major corridors are presented in Tables 11 and 12 below, while the detailed tabulations are presented in Annexes 3 and 4 to this report. Key suggestions include the need to computerize paperwork and investment in ICT; improvement of the physical infrastructure (roads, parking yards, reduction of the number of weighbridges); and involvement of anti-corruption authorities in the fight against corruptive practices in the transport industry.
Table 11: Key suggested improvements by transporters
Kenya
Suggested improvements Percent response

Uganda
Suggested improvements Percent response

Tanzania
Suggested improvements Percent response

Rwanda
Suggested improvements Percent response

Burundi
Suggested improvements Percent response

Computerize all paper work

17%

Work faster to reduce backlogs and delays

19%

Punish Police, drivers and officials who break the law by asking for bribes Integrity to be instilled in custom officials so as to offer better services Increase processing to reduce backlogs and delays Presence of anti-graft authorities at border points Improve technology such as power generators and internet

16%

No idea

40%

Computerization of transport service systems

30%

Quicken cancellation of Custom security bonds

14%

Improve on ICT

13%

10%

Build modern infrastructure at Rusumo border (parking & electricity) Avoid unnecessary documentation and delays

20%

Reduction of administrative procedures

30%

Improve and or Invest in ICT Service Weigh Bridges Well in order to give standard measures

13%

Improve infrastructure e.g. roads

13%

10%

20%

Punish Corruption

20%

12%

Revenue authority to reduce taxes

13%

9%

No Response

20%

Abolition of slow pace of delivery of goods and services

10%

Improve Infrastructure

8%

Reduce the clearing procedures

13%

8%

Avoid unnecessary delays

10%

Source: Survey data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Table 12: Key suggested improvements by drivers


Kenya Suggested improvements Police Reforms e.g. should be more friendly 13% 11% Infrastructure should be improved (e.g. roads, security, parking yards, reduction of number of weigh bridges 11% Standardize the Weigh Bridges Measuring equipment to avoid disparity in weight for similar goods 10% Increase the speed of handling cargo at customs to reduce back log 10% Police Reforms e.g. should be more friendly Corrupt officials should be arrested and prosecuted Increase the pace of service delivery by reducing the number of checkpoints The government to formulate strict laws to ensure both drivers and officials act accordingly Empower the Anti-Corruption Authority to follow up on allegations of corruption 8% The weighbridge regulations should be reviewed and all weighbridges standardized to give similar weights 9% Infrastructure should be improved e.g. roads, security, Parking yards and number of weigh bridges 7% Percent response Suggested improvements Percent response Suggested improvements Uganda Tanzania Percent response Rwanda Suggested improvements Increase Services such as parking, hygiene 21%

Burundi

Percent response

Suggested improvements

Percent response

24%

Corrupt policemen should be arrested

27%

15%

Satisfied with services

16%

Provision of electricity

2%

13%

Reduce procedures at checkpoints

14%

Introduce 24 hour working border

11%

To reduce the number of Weighbridges and checkpoints

9%

Reduce the traffic while tanks discharge fuel

6%

Reduction of taxes

5%

Standardize the Weigh Bridges Measuring equipment to avoid disparity in weight for similar goods

7%

Increase the speed of handling cargo at customs to reduce congestion

7%

Improve the infrastructure especially roads and parking services

8%

Switch to 24 hours economy

6%

The government should change the working hours to facilitate speedy crossing of border stations

6%

Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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2.3 RESPONSES BY CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENTS 2.3.1 OVERVIEW


Clearing and forwarding agents are intermediaries between the shippers and other service providers involved in the supply chain logistics. The CFAs or customs agents as they are referred to in some countries, are logistics experts with good knowledge of the state of the import-export customs clearance, and are well informed about an individual countrys customs regulations and requirements. Specifically a clearing agent performs various logistics services that may include: a) b) c) d) e) Creating an invoice for international shipping; Making arrangements for shipment pick-up and cargo delivery; Arranging and coordinating customs function in warehousing; Completing all the customs documentation required for the shipment and; Confirming the delivery of the shipment to the importer.

2.3.2

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CFA RESPONDENTS TO THE SURVEY BY COUNTRY AND TOWNS

The survey covered 190 CFAs as shown in Table 2. From Tanzania there were 101 or 53% of the CFAs, followed by Kenya (67 or 35%), Uganda (11 or 6%), and Rwanda and Burundi each five and six or an average 3% of the total respondents as shown in Table 13 below. The most number of towns surveyed were in Tanzania, followed by Kenya. Respondents from the other three partner states were selected from the capital cities.
Table 13: Distribution of CFAs respondents to the survey
Kenya Towns Eldoret Nairobi Malaba Mombasa Total Number 3 18 6 40 67 Uganda Towns Kampala Number 11 Tanzania Towns Mikese/ Morogoro Dar-es-Salaam Moshi Holili Mbeya Namanga Longido Number 11 35 8 2 10 34 1 Rwanda Towns Kigali City Number 5 Burundi Towns Bujumbura Number 6

Source: Survey data

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2.3.3

PERIOD IN BUSINESS OPERATIONS

As shown in Chart 28 below, 72% of the CFAs had been in operation for more than three years. Kenya had the highest number at 84% of entities with more than five years operation, followed by Uganda and Rwanda with 82% and 60% respectively. Majority of Burundi CFAs had an average of 3-5 years in business.
Chart 28: Period of business operations

Source: Survey Data

2.3.4

PERCEPTIONS THAT CLEARING AND FORWARDING OPERATIONS HAVE IN THE PAST BEEN INVOLVED CORRUPT PRACTICES

As far as the CFAs are concerned, the perception that the clearing and forwarding of goods involves corrupt practices is true as indicated by 61% of all respondents as shown in Chart 29 below. Tanzania and Kenya leads the region on the perception that clearing and forwarding operations involve corruption with those responding affirmatively being 78% and 73% respectively, while the three other counties scored less that 50%. These ratings could also attributed to the fact that both Kenya and Tanzania have seaports, and therefore the two countrys CFAs experience firsthand experience with corrupt practices during the clearing and forwarding of imports into the region. Corruption at transit points is also a major concern with 67% of the respondents giving an affirmative response as indicated in Chart 30 below. In all the other countries, less than 50% indicated that corruption was a concern at transit points.

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Chart 29: Whether CFAs services are involved in corruption

Source: Survey Data Chart 30: Corruption as a problem at transit points

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

2.3.5

PROBLEMS LIKELY TO PROMPT A CLEARING AGENT TO CONSIDER OFFERING A BRIBE

There are many factors that prompt CFAs to consider giving bribes. Ranked at the top of the list is slow pace of services as indicated by 34% of all the CFA respondents, followed by unnecessary delays at 29%, and high taxation levels and too many documentation taking third and fourth positions at 16% and 14% respectively. The remaining 7% of CFAs cited poor understanding of the administrative procedures as shown in Chart 31 below. The EAC average is quite consistent with individual countries proportions except for Burundi where only 4% cited unnecessary delays as a trigger for bribery.
Chart 31: Problems likely to prompt a clearing agent considers offering bribe

Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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2.3.6

WHETHER CFAS HAVE EVER GIVEN OR BEEN REQUIRED TO GIVE A BRIBE IN THE COURSE OF CLEARING GOODS.

As Chart 32 shows, two-thirds (65%) of CFAs gave or were required to give a bribe in 2011. Kenya is at the top of the list with 82% having given or having been asked to give a bribe, followed by Tanzania with 76% and Uganda with 54%. Only 30% and 26% of CFAs in Burundi and Rwanda respectively, had given or been asked to give a bribe.
Chart 32: Whether CFAs gave bribes in the last 12 months

Source: Survey Data

2.3.7

SERVICES FOR WHICH BRIBES ARE PAID

The following is a list of services given to CFAs in return for bribe paid: a) Document processing: Bribes were paid to speed up document processing. The clearing of goods at the ports is a time-bound activity and failure to meet the deadlines attracts heavy penalties. Besides, if the goods are urgently needed, the bureaucracy involved at customs could compound the problem and so to cut the red tape, CFAs are forced to bribe customs officers so that their goods can be cleared speedily. b) To avoid investigation. There are many reasons that could prompt an investigation by customs officers such as fraud attempts, contraband and illegal goods. Customs officers are paid bribes to turn a blind eye to the problem. c) To change tax codes in order to lower the tax burden: In their quest to evade tax, importers and exporters take to under-declaration and miscoding of goods. Depending on the differences between various custom tariffs lines under which goods can be declared and the attendant import duties, miscoding can be manipulated to reduce the tax payable. Both under-declaration and miscoding of goods are offences that are prosecutable, since they both amount to tax evasion. d) To ensure less than full verification in order to guarantee speedy clearance: Verification is done before shipping in order to check the (i) quality and condition of goods; (ii) quality and condition of packaging; (iii) adherence to correct goods handling procedures; (iv) condition of the containers used to transport the goods including safety and cleanliness; and (v) correct loading of the goods and verification of documentation. On arrival at the

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

entry port, verification of goods is done again by customs officers. Importers will offer bribes to avoid going through the full verification at the entry port, which consequently guarantees speedy clearance. If there is a problem with any of the above requirements, the CFAs resort to bribery so that customs officers can ignore any sign of non-conformity. Other key reasons for bribery practices include: e) Excess weight: This accounts for almost all bribery cases at weighbridges. f) Expired import licenses: For various reasons import or export licenses expire before timely renewal, prompting rent-seeking to enable goods passing through Custom checks. g) Driving beyond the allowed speed limit: This is very common along the transport corridors. Bribes are given to avoid being taken to court or the vehicle being impounded which is very costly and time-consuming. h) Car inspections: All commercial vehicles are supposed to be inspected for roadworthiness at least once every year. i) Motor vehicle parking offences: This is a common reason for bribery by many motorists. Motorists prefer to pay small amounts of bribes instead of going through the prosecution process, which could be time-consuming and inconveniencing.

2.3.8

AVERAGE BRIBES PAID IN 2011

On average, the Uganda CFAs indicated that they paid USD14,683 as bribes to regulatory authorities (in Uganda and during transit through other EAC countries) in 2011 while Kenyan CFAs paid USD4, 972 during the same period. In Burundi and Tanzania, the bribes amounted to USD389 and USD318 respectively, while Rwandan CFAs paid the least bribery amounts of USD183 as shown in Chart 33 below.
Chart 33: Average bribe paid in the last 12 months

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.9

MEANS THROUGH WHICH CFAS KNOW A BRIBE IS EXPECTED

Chart 34 below shows that 19% of CFAs were explicitly requested to pay a bribe while 27% received an implicit request. Eleven percent received the request through a third party while 12% indicated they were not asked for a bribe which they nevertheless gave since it is normal to give an extra payment to officials, probably to guarantee that future clearances are given without undue delays. At country level, Uganda has the highest percentage of CFAs indicating that officials from the Regulatory Authorities explicitly requested for bribes with a rating of 39%, followed by Kenya (29%). Tanzania leads in officials who ask for bribes implicitly with 47%. A huge proportion of Kenyan CFAs offered bribes because they believed bribing is normal.
Chart 34: How did you know a bribe was expected from you

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.10 POINT OF BRIBE PAYMENT


The survey found that 45% of all CFAs interviewed paid the bribery before the service was delivered, while 27% paid after service delivery. At least 16% paid at the time the service was delivered, while 12% claimed to have paid partly before and after the service was delivered as shown in Chart 35 below. The regional averages are very consistent with Uganda and Tanzania where 56% and 60% respectively paid the bribe before the service was delivered. In Rwanda and Kenya, 57% and 40% of CFAs respectively, pay the bribe after service is delivered.
Chart 35: Point of bribe payment

Source: Survey Data

2.3.11 CONSEQUENCES OF NOT PAYING BRIBES


As Chart 36 below shows, failure to pay bribes can lead to dire consequences; from delays in getting services (48%) and disruption of clients operations to bad service and high administrative taxes (13%). Unfriendly customer service would inevitably translate to business loss for the importers/ exporters. Failure to pay bribes could also result in harassment by custom officials and to denial of services as indicated by 5% and 6% of the respondents respectively. Other consequences include payment of fines at 8% and loss of business according to 7% of the respondents. CFAs find themselves under great pressure from clients, and their efficiency is measured in terms of how fast they clear the goods, which forces them to employ unethical tactics to outdo competitors. Clearance delays appeared as the leading consequence of not paying bribes in all the five EAC countries except in Rwanda where respondents ranked payment of high administrative fees/ taxes at the top of the list.

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Chart 36: Consequences of not paying bribes

Source: Survey Data

2.3.12

INSTITUTIONS WHERE BRIBES WERE PAID

The highest amount of bribes paid went to Customs Officials according to 47% of all CFA respondents, followed by the Port Authority with 23% as shown in Chart 37. There was a tie between police and immigration officials with 15% of respondents indicating these as points of bribery payments. Among the five countries most of the bribes were paid to customs officers except in Tanzania where 52% and 35% of the respondents indicated that they paid bribes to port authority and immigration officials respectively.
Chart 37: Institutions where bribe was paid

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.13 REPORTING OF BRIBERY INCIDENCES


Almost all the CFAs interviewed (94%) indicated that they had not reported the bribery incidences, while only 6% stated they had reported such incidences as shown in Chart 38. Rwanda and Burundi made no attempt at all to report such incidences. In cases where bribery incidences were reported, an average 69% of the respondents reported such cases to the management of the institution where bribery took place as shown in Chart 39, while the rest of the incidences were reported to police officers.
Chart 38: Reporting of bribery incidences

Source: Survey Data Chart 39: To whom bribe was reported

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.14

REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING BRIBERY INCIDENCES

At least 31% of the CFAs stated that bribery was a normal and almost acceptable practice as shown in Chart 40 below, while 26% cited fear of denial of service. And 22% said they did nothing because the culprits went unpunished, while 17% stated that reporting bribery would have been self-incriminating. Only 5% indicated they didnt know where to report such incidences. The EAC average responses are closely similar to country-level indications except in Rwanda where 71% of respondents indicated that they would have incriminated themselves if they reported bribery incidences.
Chart 40: Reasons for not reporting bribery incidence

Source: Survey Data

2.3.15 RANK OF OFFICERS MOST LIKELY TO DEMAND / EXPECT BRIBE


As shown in Chart 41, junior officers are the most likely to demand/expect bribes as indicated by an average 46% of the EAC combined respondents. In Kenya, the junior and middle officers almost equally demanded bribes as indicated by 51% and 42% of the respondents respectively. In Uganda and Rwanda, junior officers are the most likely to demand bribes as indicated by 71% and 59% of the respondents respectively. Even though the number of respondents indicating that junior officers are the most likely to demand bribes, the value of bribes to junior officers is not necessarily higher because the size of the bribe corresponds with seniority level.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 41: Rank of officers most likely to demand / expect bribe

Source: Survey Data

2.3.16 PERCEPTION OF BRIBERY PRACTICES ACROSS DIFFERENT RANKS OF CUSTOM OFFICIALS


An average 27% of junior officers took bribes without the knowledge of the seniors as shown in Chart 42 below. However, 26% of the respondents indicated that junior officers took the bribes with the knowledge and most of the times, on behalf of senior officers. An average, 23% of the respondents indicated that the senior officers have more channels to solicit and take bribes in ways that the general public may not discern. Also, some senior officers were in competition for bribes with junior officers according to 3% of the respondents. Looking at the countries individually, Rwanda with 67% has the highest level of junior officers who took bribes without the knowledge of seniors followed by Uganda with 33%. In Kenya, 43% of junior officers took bribes with the knowledge and most times, on behalf of the senior officers. In Tanzania, 30% of CFAs indicated that the senior officers have more channels to take bribes.

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Chart 42: Perception of bribery across different ranks of custom officials

Source: Survey Data

2.3.17 DETERMINING FACTORS IN SIZE OF BRIBES


Chart 43 below captures the factors that determine the size of a bribe that flow from CFAs to Regulatory Authorities. On average, a quarter (25%) of respondents indicated that a CFA paid a bribe based on the value of the consignment. The urgency of the consignment comes second as the determinant of the bribe size at 23%, followed by negotiation at 17%, and the expected penalty with 13%. The number of officers involved in the deal, and fixed amount per consignment comes at the tail end with 7% and 5% respectively. In Uganda, the leading determining factor is the urgency of consignment while in the case of Tanzania it is the value of consignment according to 36% and 35% of the country respondents respectively. The leading determining factor for Kenya and Rwanda is negotiation while for Burundi it is a fixed amount per consignment.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 43: Determining factor in the size of the deal

Source: Survey Data

2.3.18 EXPECTATIONS FOR YEAR 2012 ON CORRUPTION LEVELS AT THE CUSTOMS


As shown by Chart 44 below, on regional average, the indication by 39% CFAs interviewed is that they expect corruption levels to remain the same as before, while 27% expect an increase in corruption levels. Only 22% of CFAs respondents expect a decrease. At the country level, the most optimistic country is Rwanda where 67% of the respondents expect corruption to decrease, followed by Uganda at 27% and Kenya at 25%. The most pessimistic countries are Kenya and Tanzania where 52% and 45% of the CFAs respectively expect corruption to remain the same. Meanwhile 38% of Tanzania and 33% of Uganda respondents expect corruption levels at customs to increase.
Chart 44: Expectation for year 2012 on corruption levels at customs

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.19 REASONS FOR DELAYS IN CLEARING CONSIGNMENTS


At least 41% of the respondents cite delays, winding procedures as the major reason for delays in clearance of consignments. This is followed by slowness of staff (21%) and inadequate physical and human resources (25%) as shown in Chart 45 below. These findings are consistent with the findings that prompt payment of bribes to customs officers shown in Chart 36 above, where poor understanding of the procedures and too much documentation were cited by CFAs as major reasons for bribes. The EAC average mirrors individual countries responses with the exception of Rwanda where 52% of CFAs attributed the delayed clearance to slowness of staff. In addition, delays are attributed to long and slow procedures by 56% of CFAs in Tanzania. The above reasons for delayed clearance are similar to those given by businesses in the 2011 BCI, where the need to speed up clearance, incorrectness of transaction documents on value, quantity and taxes declared, were cited as major reasons for payment of bribes by CFAs and transporters.
Chart 45: Reasons for delays in clearing goods at customs

Source: Survey Data

2.3.20 ENGAGEMENT OF CFAS IN POLICY DECISIONS RELEVANT TO TRANSPORT SECTOR


An average of 25% of the CFAs confirmed having been engaged in any policy decisions made for the transport sector as indicated in Chart 46. Three-quarters (75%) indicated they had never participated and did not know of any company that had been engaged. Kenya and Uganda scored the highest rating with 48% and 33% indicating that they had been engaged in policy decisions followed by Rwanda at 26%.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 46: Whether CFAs are engaged in any policy decisions made for the transport sector

Source: Survey Data

2.3.21 INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSION FORUMS WITH CFAS


Several organizations were listed as having initiated discussion forums with CFAs as shown in Table 14. Most of the engagements happened in Kenya, while in Burundi, no authorities were cited as having engaged CFAs in relevant dialogue forums.
Table 14: Institutions that have previously engaged CFAs in discussion forums
Tanzania a. b. a. b. a) b) c) Tanzania Drivers Association TABOA Kenya Association of Manufacturers Kenya International Freight Forwarders Association Kenya Ports Authority Kenya Revenue Authority Kenya Transport Association

Kenya

Uganda

a) Uganda National Roads Office b) Malaba Transporters Association a) ADR b) Private Sector (SDV Transami, Bonfide etc)

Rwanda

Source: Survey Data

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2.3.22 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORUMS BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES


At least a third (36%) of EAC CFAs believe that the engagement forums were either very effective or effective, while those who think they were neither effective nor ineffective, were 16%. On the other hand, 39% indicated that the forums were ineffective or very ineffective respectively, which outweighs the aggregate rating for effecive and very effective. All in all, the engagement of CFAs in policy-making forums by regulatory authorities were not effective as shown in Chart 47. Comparatively, Tanzania and Rwanda had the highest rating of very effective at 17% and 14% respectively, followed by Uganda at 6%. And 71% and 41% of CFAs in Rwanda and Uganda respectively, indicated that the forums were effective.Tanzanian and Kenyan CFAs who rated the forums as ineffective were 33% and 25% respectively. Only Kenya and Uganda had CFAs rate the forums as very ineffective at 31% and 6% respectively.
Chart 47: Effectiveness of the transport sector policy making forums as perceived by CFAs

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

2.3.23 HOW DELAYED CLEARANCE AFFECTS CFA OPERATIONS


The impact of delayed clearance: Loss of clients due to low customer satisfaction Delay in shipping time which leads to incurrence of heavy demurrage Failure to beat deadlines which could have serious ripple effects along the value chain Backlogs Heavy fines and penalties Working overtime and un-social hours Loss of clients confidence and trust Unnecessary expenditure as the agents are forced to spend their own money to facilitate quicker clearance of goods. Conflicts and tensions at place of work

2.3.24 SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS


The key suggested improvements made by CFAs aimed at reducing bribery incidences are summarized in Table 15 below. These include increasing the number of staff and thereby improve the speed of service delivery, computerization of clearance process, infrastructural facilities (for example, parking yards), and reduction in red tape involved in processing documents. The detailed tabulation of suggested improvements made by CFAs is presented in Annex 5 to this report.

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Table 15: Key suggested improvements by CFAs


Kenya Key suggested improvements No. Integrity in customs, border points and checkpoints Gover-nment to fight corruption in borders and customs 6 23.1% 3 11.5% Reduce checkpoints Increase clearing and forwarding in customs to reduce backlogs and traffic 11.7% Improve on ICT system 3 11.5% Increase officials at customs and border points 10 9.7% Reduce on procedures 2 7.7% Percent No. Percent Key suggested improvements Key suggested improvements No. Tanzania Uganda Percent Rwanda Key suggested improvements No.

Burundi

Percent

Key suggested improvements

No.

Percent

Employ Efficient Staff 16 15.5% Increase number of staff

Regulate meetings and engagement with stakeholders

15

12.4%

Educate people on services Improve on customer service 14 11.6%

16.1%

Computerization

15.2%

Improve on Infrastructure 15 14.6%

9.7%

Reduce tariff Barriers

15.2%

Reduce bureaucracy in documentation processing 12

13

10.7%

Improve infrastructure

9.7%

Employ more staff

12.1%

Anti - Corruption Officials to be Stationed at Freight Stations

10

8.3%

I dont know

6.5%

Reduce the amount required for documents

9.1%

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Improve on ICT

18

17.5%

Improve Infrastructure 7 26.9%

17

14.0%

Recruit more staff

12

38.7%

Staff Training

18.2%

2.4
2.4.1

CUSTOMS AND POLICE OFFICERS RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS


OVERVIEW OF CUSTOMS AND POLICE FUNCTIONS

Customs and police authorities play an essential regulatory role in the transport industry particularly along the main transport corridors that link EAC member countries with the rest of the world. Customs authorities in each country administer the collection of customs and duty on imports to raise government revenue and/or to protect domestic producers from more efficient or predatory foreign competitors. The departments enforce the provisions of both the national Customs and Excise Acts and the East Africa Custom Management Act. They also implement import duty related provisions under bilateral, regional and international trade arrangements, and support global enforcement efforts against smuggling, illegal importation and exportation of arms and drugs as mandated through various international legal instruments. Therefore, any interference with the smooth running of customs authorities inevitably leads to interference with bilateral and regional trading arrangements. The role of traffic police on the other hand, includes enforcement of laws and regulations relevant to the transport of goods, including those relevant to GVM and axle load specifications. Police officers are also required to respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons. The officers therefore, are not supposed to commit acts of corruption since this implies harassing the very people they are supposed to protect. The survey covered 98 customs officers and 68 police officers at various customs stations and police checkpoints/weighbridge stations respectively. The respondents were almost equally distributed amongst the five EAC Partner states as shown in Table 17. Details of the various customs stations/transit points and weighbridge stations/ police checkpoints covered by survey are presented in Annexes 6 and 7 to this report.
Table 16: Distribution of Customs Stations/ Transit points and Weighbridge Stations/ Police checkpoints covered by survey Country Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Total Number of Customs Officers interviewed 20 18 27 20 13 98 Number of Police Officers interviewed 10 20 7 18 13 68

Source: Survey Data

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2.4.2 PERIOD IN SERVICE The survey found that out of the 98 customs officers interviewed, 64% have been in service for more than three years and of the 68 police officers interviewed, 83% as shown in Chart 48, which means they have the necessary experience to deal with trade-related transactions including the cargo-clearance process. This experience gives the officers sufficient opportunity to interact with transporters, truck drivers and CFAs. All the interviewed police officers from Kenya had more than five years of service while the corresponding proportion for Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi is 62%, 67% and 70% respectively. Oddly, only 14% of the Rwandan police officers have more than five years of service while 57% have 1-3 years. The significance of the period that officers have been in service also indicates the extent to which the alleged bribery practices have been entrenched amongst officers working in the respective organizations.
Chart 48: Years of service for customs and police officers who responded to the survey

Source: Survey Data

2.4.3

CUSTOMS AND POLICE OFFICERS VIEWS ON PERCEPTION THAT WEIGHBRIDGES, POLICE CHECKS AND OPERATIONS AT TRANSIT POINTS INVOLVE CORRUPT PRACTICES

The customs and police officers were asked to respond to the perception that their institutions were engaged in corrupt practices is a fair one. At least 72% police officers and 63% customs officers shown in Chart 49 responded in the negative. Among the five countries, the customs officers that refuted the perception about corrupt practices ranged between 55% for Burundi and 77% for Uganda, while the corresponding proportions for police officers ranged between 62% for Uganda and 90% for Burundi.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 49: Responses by Customs and Police Officers on whether allegation that operations at transit points and weighbridge stations involves corrupt practices is a fair perception

Source: Survey Data

2.4.4

PROBLEMS LIKELY TO PROMPT USERS OF THE SERVICES TO CONSIDER OFFERING BRIBE

A quarter of all customs officers interviewed indicated that bribes were mostly prompted by the slow pace of service delivery and a similar proportion is prompted by poor understanding of the clearing procedures as shown in Chart 50. Unnecessary delays account for 12% of the bribery incidences according to the combined responses by all customs officers. The EAC picture is similar to the country level responses, with the most frequently cited reason for users of customs services to pay bribes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania being poor understanding of clearing procedures 36%, 35% and 41% respectively. In Burundi, the highest proportion of customs officials blamed the slow pace of service, while Rwanda cited high taxation levels at 50%, although the slow pace of service also took a substantial proportion of respondents in line with the other four countries. These findings resonate with those of Tax Compliance for Kenyas Manufacturing Sector study, undertaken by the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) in 2011. Too much documentation, red tape, and high taxation rates additionally feature in the current survey as serious issues, just like in the KAM study.

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Chart 50: Problems that prompt users to pay bribes perception by Customs Officers

Source: Survey Data

Chart 51 lists the problems that prompt the offering of bribes to police officers. The most distinctive is the need to maintain good informal relations, which accounts for 45% of the bribery incidences. Poor understanding of the rights of a motorist is responsible for 11% while getting overloaded trucks cleared accounts for 19% of the problems. The rest of the officers cited avoidance of inspection of the cargo (9%) and avoidance of unnecessary delays (8%) as problems that prompt payment of bribes. Comparatively, 43% of the bribes in Rwanda were attributed to the avoidance of inspection of cargo while in Burundi, overloading of trucks and avoidance of inspection took 25% each. Poor understanding of the rights of a motorist was 30% of the bribery cases in Tanzania. For Kenya and Uganda, avoidance of unnecessary delays accounts for 35% and 30% respectively of the bribes to the police by transporters and drivers.
Chart 51: Problems that prompt bribery payments as perceived by Police Officers

Source: Survey Data

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

2.4.5

AWARENESS ABOUT ATTEMPTS BY TRUCK DRIVERS AND TRANSPORT COMPANIES TO OFFER BRIBES

At least half of the police officers indicated that they knew of bribery attempts at police checkpoints or weighbridges as shown in Chart 52. Out of those who responded affirmatively, 62% stated that the bribe was taken when offered, which directly contradicts what the police officers had said earlier, that corruption does not take place at weighbridge stations and police checkpoints (refer to Chart 49 above). Majority of police officers in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda indicated awareness of bribery attempts in 2011. Only 22% of Tanzania police officers indicated awareness of bribery attempts.
Chart 52: Awareness about bribery attempts and whether bribes are actually taken

Source: Survey Data

2.4.6

SPEED OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN CLEARANCE OF GOODS AT TRANSIT POINTS AND WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS

Almost all (98%) of the customs officers and 89% of police officers indicated that service delivery was fast, efficient, or average as shown in Chart 53. In Kenya, 72% of custom officers rated their service as fast and efficient while Ugandas corresponding rating was the lowest among the respondents at 62%. Burundi and Rwanda customs officers did not respond. All (100%) of Rwandas police officers averred that services at weighbridge and police checkpoints were fast and efficient while 67%, 50%, and 46% of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda police officers respectively,

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stated that the speed of service delivery was average. On the extreme end, 15% and 12% of Uganda and Tanzania police officers respectively indicated that the speed of service delivery was either below average or very slow. Again, the very small percentages indicating that service delivery was below average or slow, shows denial of slow delivery of services.
Chart 53: Rating of speed of delivery of service at customs transit stations and police checks at weighbridges

Source: Survey Data

2.4.7

MECHANISMS FOR REPORTING CORRUPTION INCIDENCES TO POLICE

One of the pertinent pillars of the fight against corruption is an effective corruption reporting mechanism. The study sought to find out if there were mechanisms in place for reporting corruption incidences to the police and customs officers, to which 53% police officers and 65% customs officers responded affirmatively as shown in Chart 54 below. In addition, 72% of the police officers and 66% of customs officers responded that the mechanisms were either very effective or effective as shown in Chart 55. Meanwhile, both customs and police officers from Kenya (78%), Uganda (92%) and Rwanda (71%) responded affirmatively that there exist mechanisms to report corruption incidences at customs, police checkpoints and weighbridges. Tanzania and Burundi, however, had much lower responses with 45% Tanzanian customs and 28% police officers; and 40% Burundi Customs and 30% police officers respectively, indicating that mechanisms for corruption reporting do not exist.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Chart 54: Whether corruption-reporting mechanisms exist at weighbridge stations/ police checkpoints and customs transit stations

Source: Survey Data

Chart 55: Perceived effectiveness of corruption reporting mechanisms

Source: Survey Data

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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2.4.8

PERCEIVED CAPACITY OF CUSTOMS OFFICES

The perceived ratings of the capacity of customs offices on staff capacity, appropriateness of mechanisms to handle customers concerns and efficiency of service delivery are presented in Chart 56. Majority of customs officers (53%) interviewed either strongly agreed or agreed that such staff skills were available. Such skills include understanding customs rules, duties, appeals systems, CET issues, EAC rules of origin, permitted and non-permitted imports/exports, good judgment of situations, fast decision-making, effective communication, and non-biasness in clearing cargo. Individual countries mirror the regional average but notably, in Uganda, 53% of custom officers either disagreed or strongly disagreed that the transit stations had enough staff and necessary skills. Meanwhile, 90% of the customs officers interviewed either strongly agreed, or agreed that there were mechanisms to receive and deal with concerns of the clients. The regional picture is similar to country-level responses, with officers from amongst each of the five countries unanimously agreeing or strongly agreeing that transit stations have appropriate mechanisms to receive and address concerns of the clients. This finding is the opposite of the responses by transporters who indicated that the mechanisms were not effective. But it can be argued that the mechanisms exist, but the customs officers do not apply the mechanisms effectively in order to increase satisfaction levels amongst clients. This is perhaps what transporters infer when they cite fear of denial of services as the reason for not reporting bribery incidences. Regarding the capacity of customs offices to ensure fast and efficient service delivery, 86% of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that customs officers did everything at all times to offer fast and efficient services, while 10% disagreed. This regional picture is consistent with individual country responses. While 15% and 14% of customs officers in Tanzania and Rwanda respectively disagreed that there was capacity at customs offices to ensure fast and efficient service delivery.
Chart 56: Perceived capacity of Customs transit stations to serve customers

Chart 56: Perceived capacity of Customs transit stations to serve customers

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2.4.9

EFFICIENCY OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS USED TO SERVE THE PUBLIC AT TRANSIT STATIONS

The computer systems are always available and in working condition according to 96% and 78% respectively of the respondents as shown in Chart 57. In Uganda, only 31% of the officers indicated that the systems were computerized. Besides enhancing revenue collection, computerization of customs processes increases transparency of tax and customs administration processes, thus reducing avenues for corruption. It can also improve delivery of services to taxpayers, revolutionalise communication between tax authorities and the private sector, and enhance data exchange with other Government agencies involved in trade facilitation. The respondents indicated that the systems broke down either once, twice or thrice in 2011 as shown in Chart 57. Such breakdowns interrupted the speed with which customers could be served, leading to lenghty times taken during the clearance process. In such situations, CFAs, transporters and drivers are often tempted to offer bribes to customs officers in order to speed up service delivery instead of waiting to be served on a first-come-first-served basis.
Chart 57: Perceived efficiency of Computer systems used to serve the public at transit stations

Source: Survey Data

2.4.10

SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS BY CUSTOMS AND POLICE OFFICERS

Table 17 and 18 summarises the key improvements suggested by customs and police officers across the region, which include the need for increased staffing, improvement of physical infrastructure (for example, verification sheds and roads); computerization of the systems and increased investment in ICT systems; training of transporters, drivers and CFAs; and collaboration in harmonisation of transport systems amongst EAC countries. These suggestions closely tie with those made by transporters, drivers and CFAs, which call for public and private sector involvement in planning for reforms that aim to improve transport efficiency within the region. The detailed tabulation of all suggested improvements by the customs and police officers is presented in Annexes 8 and 9 to this report.

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Table 17: Key suggested improvements by Customs Officers


Kenya Suggested improvements No. Improve and invest in its infrastructures starting with IT 9 33% 9 Create public awareness regarding custom operations 4 15% Customs should be communicating with clients more often 3 Customs Officers needs to be trained more on customs Improvement of infrastructure. For example, verification shed 11% Transporters, drivers and their agents needs to be trained about customs services Percent No. Percent No. Suggested improvements Suggested improvements Percent Tanzania Uganda Rwanda Suggested improvements No.

Burundi

Percent

Suggested improvements

No.

Percent

Employ more staff 8 28%

38%

Hire more staff

27%

Employ more staff

31%

Improvement of infrastructure e.g. verification shed 4 14% Full computerization of the system 3 10%

21%

Improve on the facilities and infrastructure

18%

Provision of staff housing

25%

17%

Capacity building

18%

Computerized services

19%

Provision of staff housing 3 10%

Salary increment for workers

11%

Employ more staff

8%

Nothing/ None

18%

Collaboration in harmonisation of transport systems between EAC countries Full computerization of the system. That is; use of Internet

6%

Administration Police and custom officials need to work as a unit 2

7%

Importers should pay in advance for ease of operations

7%

4%

Salary increment

9%

Respect for rules and training of CFAs

13%

Source: Survey Data

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Table 18: Key suggested improvements by Police Officers


Uganda No. No. No. No. Percent Percent Percent Percent Suggested improvements Suggested improvements Suggested improvements Rwanda Burundi

Kenya

Tanzania

No.

Percent

Motorists should be trained on their rights and also on road safety and regulations 4 18% Motorists should be trained on their rights and also on road safety &regulations 4 14.3% Hire more staff 3 42.9 Salary Increment

Improve on infrastructure e.g. offices automated, parking areas 2 9% Provision of Police housing 4 14.3% 2 Improve on the facilities and infrastructure

Suggested improvements 3 28.6 The new office building will make service better 2 2 9% 4 14.3% 1 14.3 2

Suggested improvements

23%

Weigh bridge should be made fixed

21.4%

17%

Improve on infrastructure e.g. offices automated, parking areas

14.3%

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade


Improve on infrastructure e.g. offices automated, parking areas Capacity building for transporters & drivers 2 9% Increase police salary 4 14.3% Good customer relations 1 14.3

Increase the salary of the police

13%

Improve on lighting system

The government should introduce computerized system

14.3%

Training of Police Officers to avoid bribery practices

10%

Weigh machines need to be serviced to avoid any delays

Need to invest in weighbridges

14.3%

Source: Survey Data

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3 CONCLUSION
The Common Market Protocol provides free movement of goods, persons, labour, services and capital. Two years after the Protocol came into force none of the EAC Partner states have fully embraced the full application of the Common Market Provisions. Each of the Partner states has a number of legislations yet to be aligned with the EAC Protocols, making it difficult for customs, weighbridge, police and immigration authorities to operate as per the commitments already made. one of the main challenges facing the integration process is the continued existence of non-tariff barriers(NTB). Bribery is one such NTB. Bribes are paid at police checkpoints, Weighbridges and customs transit points are paid to avoid the harsh consequences of not paying, including the risk of getting bad service, harassment by the officers, delays or denial of service, payment of fines, risk of being charged high taxes and fees, and loss of business to competitors. Although mechanisms for reporting bribery exist within the regulatory authorities cited in this report, only a handful of incidences are reported. This is largely because of fear of denial of service, lack of action from law enforcement authorities or bribery being perceived as a normal and acceptable business practice, and fear that reporting might amount to self-incrimination. The survey finds that corruption takes place against the background of rules and regulations that are supposed to govern the interactions between regulatory institutions and the service seekers. Unfortunately, these rules are grossly violated. The survey paints an outlook where corruption is deeply entrenched amongst the regulatory institutions operating along the main transport corridors in the region. The region suffers from un-harmonised weight limits, perception of overloading, and overload control regulations used to check conformity to weight limits. Except for Tanzania, the other four EAC Partner states regard incidences of overloading as criminal offenses, which, however, results in very low conviction rates. As a result, there are few incentives by truck operators not to overload. The Partner states also have varied weight limits, which results in vehicles being weighed frequently whenever they cross borders, including at weighbridges located only a few kilometers apart but on different sides of a common border. These variances contribute to differences in perceptions of the integrity of the weight control systems, such that each Partner State has to weigh a vehicle as soon as it enters its territory despite the process having occurred just before crossing the border, resulting in time loss, prosecutions for overloading, or payment of bribes to avoid prosecutions. Partner states additionally, charge very little fines for overloading in comparison to the damage overloaded vehicles cause to the roads. Such fines are not a deterrent to overloading practices. Indeed, operators deliberately overload and pay relatively low fines on admission of guilt when convicted. Other variances between Partner states on overload control include different training curriculum for officers manning weighbridge stations, responsibilities of authorities in charge of enforcing overload control regulations, and responsibilities for overloading offences (that is; whether it is the drivers or tuck owners/transporters who should be blamed for such malpractices). As part of efforts to improve efficiency in trade transactions, Partner states should implement measures that have already been recommended through similar studies. The 2011 BCI, for example, recommends the introduction of electronic document submission so that traders can exchange information with customs and other control agencies electronically. This should incorporate filing, transferring, processing and exchanging of customs information between

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Partner states. This way, traders can submit their documents to customs authorities from any place, and also pay duties online. If implemented effectively, such a system will save time and money, and reduce interactions between traders (including CFAs) with officials in charge of imports and exports clearance processes, resulting to fewer opportunities for corruption. Governments should also enact legislation on the acceptance of electronic signatures in trade transactions, since manual approvals would still lead to redundancy and delays even though documents have been filed electronically and thus necessitating interactions between officials of regulatory authorities and traders. Electronic data interchange systems also needs to be regarded as an important pillar to the success of the Common Market, under which the Customs Union Protocol aims to facilitate free movement of goods. This calls for integration of the Kenya Simba system with the other Partner states ASYCUDA ++ import clearance systems. Kenya and Uganda have already integrated their systems through the Digital Data Exchange (RADDEx) system, which needs to be replicated across the region. A World Bank research Doing Business 2012 shows that investment of the Single Window System yields positive results quickly. Statistics from the Pakistani Government show that before the country implemented its electronic system in 2006, only 4% of imported goods were cleared within a day, and for a quarter of the goods, clearance took more than 6 days. In 2008, after installing the electronic clearance system, 93% of goods were cleared within a day. In the case of Singapore, the implementation of the TradeNet system in 1989 led to big gains in Government productivity, with the system enabling more than 35 border agencies to be linked resulting to Singapore Customs earning US $1 in customs revenue in return for every 1cent that it spends on a trade transaction. Introducing the electronic single-window system should aim to link all agencies involved in trade and transport processes, and not just linking traders with customs. In the best case scenario, such a system should allow traders to file standard information and documents from a single entry point, thus enabling completion of all import, export and transit-related regulatory requirements. Partner states should additionally introduce riskbased inspections as the norm so as to limit physical inspections to only a small percentage of shipments, thus reducing interactions between CFAs and customs and consequently minimizing avenues for bribes while increasing customs clearance time. This means that while it is necessary for imports and exports to undergo inspections for tax, security, environmental, border control, and health and safety purposes, an efficient system for selecting cargo to go for sampled or full inspection is necessary. This is because inspection procedures can be a serious obstacle to efficient and predictable trade. The adoption of scanners in this process would greatly limit the need to physically open outgoing and incoming containers, and in turn, contribute to the efficiency of the trade process as demonstrated by OECD high-income economies, where risk-based inspections are the norm; and by Guyana, where implementation of the Total Revenue Integrated Processing System (TRIPS) reduced average customs clearance time by 1 day for exports and 2 days for imports in 2009. Wide use of this system thus calls for EAC countries to draw upon best international practices, and to avoid duplication in inspecting incoming cargo, which has already been inspected as outgoing cargo in the EAC originating country. The survey also shows that improving customs transparency so as to minimize transaction costs is crucial to speedy and less costly transactions. Improving transparency in trade by providing easy access to documentation requirements and tariff schedules will reduce transactions costs incurred when importing and exporting goods. Where trading procedures and payment requirements are clear, customs brokers (such as CFAs) and trade consultants will become less necessary, thus saving on fees paid by the importers in the process. Among the 174 economies Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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benchmarked in the World Bank Doing Business 2012, the average customs clearance cost for exports was recorded at 25.3% lower in countries where documentation requirements are easily accessible than in those where they are not. EAC countries therefore need to publish customs documentation, tariff schedules and other trade-related information requirements (for example standards, SPS, overload control regulations) in relevant websites. Where such information is available only through private customs brokers like CFAs, it increases transaction fees, leads to transaction delays, while the information may not always be up to date or sufficiently detailed to enable compliance, thus opening opportunities for corruption.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRADE FACILITATION SERVICES ALONG THE MAJOR EAC TRANSPORT CORRIDORS

The EAC Secretariat should facilitate speedy harmonization of weighbridge regulations/ specifications amongst EAC countries; reduction in the number of weighbridges to two along major transport corridors particularly for transit goods , standardizing the weighbridges measuring equipment to avoid variances in weights recorded by various stations, ensuring regular calibration and maintenance of the weighing scales, and introduce modern weighing technology including the weigh-in-motion system, all aimed at achieving faster transport and transit of goods in the region. The regulatory authorities should also design rules that encourage businesses to comply and to pay relevant fees and taxes without evasion and fraud. Failure to achieve 100% effectiveness of such trade transaction rules can easily create room for manipulation and avenues for corruption. The Partner states regulatory authorities should encourage drivers and transporters to report cases of bribery practices experienced during the course of transporting goods within the region by ensuring actions are taken on such reports without chances of exposing those who report. Partner states through their EAC Ministries and business membership organizations should introduce corruption-related education programmes to enable drivers, transporters and CFAs to have a clear understanding of the dynamics and adverse impact of corruption to business operations. Partner states need to cultivate a culture of tax payment and obligations among their citizens. The EAC Secretariat should design an EAC Partner states tax obligations and payment procedure guide to be disseminated through appropriate forums and the media. Partner states with facilitation by the EAC Secretariat need to harmonise their laws on overload control including: 1. 2. Decriminalizing overloading. Harmonising the overall framework for overload control along the main transport corridors in the region, aimed at ensuring efficient management of weighbridge regulations, and building faith in the systems amongst the transporters.

3. Harmonising the institutional controls enforced by road authorities to ensure economic penalties are paid for overloading as part of measures to guard against road damages. 4. Harmonizing roles of authorities in charge of transport matters and defining their direct responsibilities in controlling overloading practices, including the roles of the police in the whole process. Harmonizing the training curriculum of officers responsible for enforcing overload control regulations, aimed at building an appropriate caliber of staff that can

5.

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effectively enforce the harmonized regulations. 6. Harmonising the roles of actors involved in an overloading incident, namely truck owners/transporters and drivers, and the consequent responsibilities for payment of overloading fines.

Partner states need to strengthen the advocacy capacity of their business associations that deal with transport and CFA issues, to enable such institutions to engage regulatory authorities in effective policy dialogue that would facilitate evolvement of efficient and corrupt-free transportation within the region. Partner states anti-corruption authorities should enforce existing laws against bribery for both private and public sector officials involved in the vice without any form of discrimination. This entails periodic checks of malpractices along the major transport corridors in the region Partner states should urgently implement the Single Window System, aimed at facilitating electronic submission of import/export transaction documents. This will enhance transparency of the tax systems, substantial reduction in manual documentation, and increased efficiency in the import-clearance process. Regulatory authorities involved in trade transactions should increase their personnel numbers and skill levels to increase efficiency in transportation and transit of goods across the region. Partner states need to move faster in implementing previous political directives to reduce the number of police checkpoints along major transport corridors in the region. Lastly but not least, Partner states need to harmonise legal documentation requirements for transporting goods across the EAC borders, and to speedily implement the proposed legally binding mechanism on the elimination of NTBs.

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Annex 1: Most Preferred Transport Routes by Transporters Kenya Nairobi-Malaba Nairobi-Athi RiverMariakaniMombasa Nairobi-KampalaJuba Nairobi-Busia Nairobi-Mombasa Nairobi-NakuruKisumu Nairobi-NakuruKisumu-Kampala 5 6 6 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 6% MombasaNairobiMalaba/Busia KampalaKinshasa Kabale-Kaluma Kigali-Sudan Total 6% Nairobi-Malaba 1 14 2 1 1 18 5% 1 6% 6% 78% 11% 6% 6% 100% Mombasa-NairobiMalaba-Juba Mombasa-NairobiBusia-Kampala Mombasa-Kigali Nairobi-AthiriverYala Nairobi-KisumuKakamega Mombasa-NairobiMalaba-Kampala Eldoret-Kigali Busia-NairobiMombasa Malaba-Mombasa
8 No. indicates number of respondents

No8 1 Percent 1% MombasaMalaba-Kenya MombasaMalabaKampala MombasaBusia-Kampala Kampala-Juba BusiaMombasaNairobi NairobiKampala NairobiMombasa 1 6% 1 6% 1 6% 1 6% Arusha Arusha-MoshiKenya Dar-es-salaamArusha Arusha-MoshiDar-es-salaam Moshi-Kenya-Dares-salaam-ZambiaCongo Moshi-Dar-essalaam Moshi-Kenya (Nairobi) Moshi-Dar-essalaam-Kenya Moshi-ArushaDar-es-salaam Dar-es-salaamMoshi-Arusha Dar-es-salaamArusha-Kenya Arusha-Namanga Arusha-Moshi Arusha-Longido1 1 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 21 1 4 7 39% Namanga 1 Kenya 6% 0.8% No 1 Percent 6% No 1 6

Uganda Percent 0.8%

Tanzania

Rwanda MombasaKigali DaressalaaKigali

No 1 1

Percent 20%

Burundi

20%

1 1 7 4 4% 7% 1%

1%

0.8% 0.8% 3% 0.8% 0.8% 2% 1.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.6% 17% 0.8% 3%

17%

100.0

90

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

DarsalamRusumoKigali Total

3 5

60%

Dar-Es-SalamMuyingaBujumbura Dar-Es-SalamMuyingaNNgoziKayanzaBujumbura Dar-Es-SalamBujumbura

No 1

Percent 0.2%

17%

50%

100%

DarBujumbura KampalaKigaliBujumbura Total

0.8%

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Kenya Malaba-Mombasa Nairobi-Nakuru 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1 1 55 2 2 Dar-es-salaamBukoba Bukoba-Mutukula Mbeya-Zambia Dar-es-salaamZambiaCongo,Burundi,R wanda Arusha-Zambia Dar-es-salaamCongo 1 2 3 2 1% 1 2% 4 3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 43.7% 1.6% 1.6% 0.8% 2% 2% 1.6% 1% 1% 4 3 3% 2% Mombasa-NairobiEldoret Mombasa-NairobiBusia-Juba Nairobi-NamangaDar es Salaam Mombasa-NairobiKisii Mombasa-NairobiKisumu Nairobi-KampalaBujumbura Nairobi-Industrial Area-Ruiru-Nakuru Nairobi-Kericho Nairobi-EldoretKisumu Busia-Malaba Mombasa-NairobiBusia Mombasa-NairobiMalaba Mombasa-NairobiNakuru/ Eldoret/ Kisumu/ Malaba/ Busia/ Kisii/ Kampala/ Juba/ Kigali/ etc Nairobi-Thika 62 59% 2 1 1 2% 1% 1% Nairobi-NamangaMombasa Nairobi-Thika-Meru 1 1%

Uganda

1 2

0.8% 2%

Dar-es-salaamZambia Dar-es-salaamMwanza-Kigali (Rwanda) Dar-es-salaamMbeya-Zambia

3 1 1

2% .8% 0.8%

91

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Tanzania Namanga-Nairobi Moshi-ArushaNamanga Arusha-NamangaNairobi Nairobi-NamangaArusha Dar-es-salaamKenya Dar-es-salaamMoshi-ArushaKenya Total Dar-MoshiArusha-Nairobi, etc route Morogoro-Dar-essalaam Morogoro-Tabora

Rwanda

Burundi

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

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Kenya Mombasa Nairobi-Thika-Meru Nairobi-EmbakasiWestlands-NgongIndustrial Area Nairobi-Wajir 1 1 4 10 6 5 3 6 105 100% 6% 3% 5% 6% 10% 1% 4% 1% Nairobi-Tanzania Isibania-NamagaBusia Busia-MalabaNamanga Busia-NamagaLunga Lunga Isibania-NamagaMalaba Malaba-Lunga Lunga-Busia Lunga LungaIsibania-Namanga Total MorogoroDodoma-KahamaBukoba-Kampala Morogoro MorogoroDodomaShinyanga Mbeya-MalawiZambia Dar-es-salaamKyela Mbeya-Dar-essalaam Mbeya-Kyela Mbeya-Tunduma Dar-es-salaamTunduma Dar-es-salaamKyela No Response Dar-es-salaamMbeya Total 3 3% 1 5 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 28 5 126 1 1% 1

Uganda

Tanzania Mwanza-Kigali (Rwanda) Dar-es-salaamMbeya-Zambia MorogoroMwanza 4%

Rwanda 0.8% 0.8%

Burundi

0.8% 0.8% 2% 2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 22% 4% 100%

Source: Survey Data

93

84 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Annex 2: Most Preferred Transport Routes by Drivers Kenya Transport Routes No 128 53 38 25 23 18 17 3.1% Tororo - Seroti - Gulu - Nimule Busia - Kampala Mbale - Kampala Chulu Mombasa - Busia Tororo - Mbale - Jinja Kampala - Mbarara Rwanda Mbale - Tirirnyi Tororo Kampala - Gulu Road 11 10 10 2.0% 1.8% 1.8% Busia Kampala Jinja Kampala - Juba 10 3.3% Malaba Tororo Mbale 10 3.7% 3.7% 4.2% 11 4.0% 4.6% 13 4.8% 6.9% 13 4.8% 9.7% Mombasa - Malaba Juba Kampala - Malaba Nairobi Juba - Malaba Tororo - Kamudin Tororo - Lira 19 7.0% Dar es Salaam Burundi Dar es Salaam Tunduma Dar es Salaam Kyela Dar es Salaam Lusaka Iringa - Mbeya 23.4% Mombasa - Malaba Kampala 51 18.8% Dar es Salaam Kigali 94 35 34 32 31 31 Dar es Salaam Mbeya 10 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 3.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% Kyaka - Mtukula Central Road Morogoro Dodoma - Singinda Dar es Salaam Sumbwanga Dar es Salaam Zambia - Congo Simbwnaga Songea Dar es Salaam Tukuyu Dar es Salaam Arusha - Nairobi 30 Percent No Percent No Mombasa-NairobiMalaba Kampala Mombasa-Nairobi Malaba Mombasa - Nairobi Busia Kampala Mombasa-Nairobi Mombasa-Nairobi Busia Kampala Mombasa-Nairobi Kigali MalawiTanzaniaNamanga- Nairobi Mombasa - Nairobi Isebania Mwanza Mombasa - Namanga Arusha Nairobi - Nakuru - Kisii - Isebania Mwanza Eldoret-Nairobi 16 13 13 12 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 2.9% Nairobi - Kisumu Kampala Nairobi - Namanga Zambia Mombasa - Nairobi Kisumu Kampala Nairobi-NamangaArusha-Dar-es-Saalam 17 3.1% Uganda Transport Routes Tanzania Transport Routes Rwanda Percent Transport Routes 14.3% 5.3% 5.2% 4.9% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% Rusomo - Gisenyi Tanzania - Rusumo Kaba - Kobe Rusizi 2 Katuna Rusuma Kanyaru No 9 15 1 6 13 3 4

Percent

Burundi Transport Routes

No

Percent

3.5%

5.8%

.4%

2.3%

5.0%

1.2%

1.5%

20 19 17 17 17 16 14 14

3.0% 2.9% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.1% 2.1%

Rusizi Dar ES Salaam Rusumo Gisenyi - Gomo Rusuno - Kigali Kigali - Gisenyi Rusumo - Kigali Rusizi Rusumo - Kigali Akanyaru Mombasa - Busia Gatuna - Akanyaru

9 2 4 88 15 3 3 3

3.5%

.8%

1.5%

33.8%

5.8%

Muyinga-NNgoziKayanzaBujumbura Uvira-GatumbaBujumbura Kanyaru-KayanzaBujumbura BujumburaGatumba_Congo Kabanga-KoberoBujumbura Dar-SalamNuyunga-NNgoziBujumbura Dar-SalamNuyunga-NNgozi KayanzaBujumbura Dar-Salam-NNgoziBujumbura Kampala-KigaliBujumbura Bujumbura-KigaliGatuna-Kampala Bujumbura-KigaliKampala-NairobiRDC Bujumbura Kigali

40

26.5

31

20.5

3.3

.7

1.3

4.6

14

9.3

4.6

1.3

.7

2.0

.7

1.2%

1.2%

1.2%

BujumburaKayanza-N-NgoziMuyinga BujumburaRwanda-KampalaNairobi Kampala-BurundiRwanda

19

12.6

1.3

.7

94

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

| 85

Kenya Transport Routes No 9 9 8 8 8 6 1.1% jinja - Kampala Mbarara - Kasese DRC Nairobi - Kisumu Busia - Kampala Gulu Eldoret - Malaba Kampala Busia - Kampala Mabarara - Katuma Rwanda Sudan - Congo Kampala Tororo - Mbale Soroti .9% .7% .7% 4 4 4 .7% .7% .7% Uganda - Sudan Uganda - Rwanda Uganda - Burundi Nairobi - Kampala Kigali - Congo 4 4 4 1.5% 1.5% Bondume - Isasha Bungoma 4 1.5% 1.5% Mbarara - Mubende 5 1.8% 1.5% 5 1.8% Maynard - Arusha Namanga - Arusha - Dar es Salaam Loliondo - Arusha Dar es Salaam Arusha - Manyara 1.5% 1.5% Mwanza - Singinda - Arusha Dar es Salaam Malawi 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% .7% .7% .7% .7% Dar es Salaam Rusuomo Dar es Salaam Msasi Dar es Salaam Newala Dar es Salaam Mwanza Dar es Salaam Lindi Dar es Salaam Nangurukuru Tanga - Dar es Salaam 1.6% Mombasa - Busia Arusha Mombasa - Eldoret Busia - Kampala 5 1.8% Bahai - Namanga 11 11 11 9 8 1.6% Malaba - Tororo Mable - Jinja 5 1.8% Moshi - Namanga 13 Percent No Percent No Mombasa-Nairobi Nakuru - Kampala Kigali Mombasa-NairobiIsebania-North Mara Mombasa-NairobiBusia - Kampala Kigali - Gama Congo Mombasa - Nairobi Gilgil-Kericho-Mwanza Eldoret Uganda Mombasa-Nairobi Busia - Mbale Juba Mombasa - Nairobi Kisumu Nairobi - Narok - Kisii Isebania - Mwanza Mororgoro - Mbeya Malawi Mombasa - Nairobi Eldoret - Malaba Kampala Tanga - Namanga Nairobi Kampala Kisumu - Busia Kampala 5 5 4 4 .9% Nairobi Kisumu Nairobi - Busia Kampala Mwanza - Isebania Nakuru-Nairobi Mombasa Lunga Lunga - Horo Horo5 .9% 5 .9% 2.0% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.4% 1.2%

Uganda Transport Routes

Tanzania Transport Routes

Rwanda Percent Transport Routes Kigali - Koaitmba Uganda - Gatuna Kigali - Ginkgo Gatuna - Kigali Dar es Salaam Nyakaura - Kigali Kigali - Akanyaura Ushirombo Nzewe - Nyahaula Benarko Rusumo Nairobi - Malaba Kampala - Gatuna - Akanyaura KahamaNyakaola- Benarko

No 2 6 11 3 2 2

Percent

Burundi Transport Routes

No

Percent

.8%

Burundi-Rwanda

.7

2.3%

4.2%

1.2%

.8%

2.6

.8%

.7

8 8

1.2% 1.2%

2 1

.8%

Kobero-NNgoziKayanza

.7

.4%

8 7 7 7 6 5 5

1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% .9% .8% .8%

Rusuma - Runda Tabola - Nzenga Talinyanga Nzewe - Nyahaula Benarko Rusumo Chalinze Mologola Sing'iola Tanzania - Bukaru Tanzania - Gisenyi Tanzania Bujumbura -

1 2 1 1 1 3 2

.4%

.8%

Kobero-MuyingaNNgoziBujumburaGatumba-Congo Rutana-BaruriBujumburaKayanza-Kanyaru

.7

.7

.4%

.4%

.4%

1.2%

.8%

95

86 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

BujumburaMoravia-Guthega BujumburaGuthega-MoraviaRougeBujumburaKayanza-Kanyaru BujumburaKayanza-KanyaruNairobi NNgozi-Kayanzabujumbura

1.3

1.3

1.3

Kenya Transport Routes No 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 es 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 .2% .2% .2% .2% .4% .4% .4% es Uganda - Kenya Kampala - Kasese Kampala - Arua Kampala - Tororo Mubende - Congo Fortportal - Kampala Kampala - Mpondwe .4% Uganda - Congo .4% Mombasa - Malaba 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .4% Kisumu - Malaba 1 .4% 1 .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% Kabale - Kaluna Kizari Kalumna - Kampala 1 .4% .4% 1 .4% Makueni Tanga - Korogwe Tanga - Pangani Tanga - Lagoba Tanga - Moshi Tanga - Saruji Mkambaku Mtwara Handeni - Dar es Salaam Mwanza - Mara Shinyanja Mwanza Mwanza - Kahama Mwanza - Geira Mwanza - Uganda .4% Dar es Salaam Nairobi Nairobi - Mombasa 1 .4% Kangera .5% 1 .4% 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 .5% Nairobi - Busia Kampala Mombasa - Busia Kampala 2 .7% Dar es Salaam Mombasa Tanga - Arusha Dar es Salaam 5 .5% Busia - Kampala Congo - Sudan 2 .7% Mtwara - Songea 5 .8% .8% .8% .6% .6% .6% .6% .6% .5% .5% .5% .5% .5% .5% .5% .3% .3% Percent No Percent No Tanga Mombasa-Nairobi Gilgil - Kericho - Busia Jinja Nairobi - Busia - Mbale Uganda - Ngoma Congo Mombasa-NairobiMlolongo-NakuruIsebenia-Nyamongo Goma Congo - Uganda Kampala Nairobi Nairobi - Busia Kenya Busia Uganda Nairobi Nakuru Kitale -NairobiMombasa Mumias - Nairobi Mombasa Nairobi - Uganda Rwanda Geita-MwanzaIsebenia-NakuruNairobi NamangaDar Salaam- Kigali Namanga - Dar Salaam Congo Mombasa - Taveta Holili Arusha Kisumu - Naivasha Nairobi Kisumu - Maseno Kampala Nairobi Eldoret Kampala Congo- Busia Goma

Uganda Transport Routes

Tanzania Transport Routes

Rwanda Percent Transport Routes Kigali Chayangura Chayangura Bujumbura Dar es Salaam Murogola Dodoma Kampala - Kenya Tanzania - Uganda Uganda - Burundi Bukavu - Goma Kampala - Goma Burundi - Kanyaru - Kigali - Gisenyi Goma Bujumbura Cyanguru-Bukavu Nzenga - Kohama Rusumo Morogolo Dodoma - Singinda - Rusumo Ngalu - Kobelo Nemba - Kigali Kagitumba - Kigali Tanzania - Rusumo - Kigali - Gikondo TchinyangaNyakaula-RusumoKigali Kugumo

No 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 4 2 5 1 2

Percent

Burundi Transport Routes

No

Percent

.4%

1.2%

.4%

.8%

.8%

.4%

.8%

1.2%

.4%

.4%

.4%

1.5%

.8%

1.9%

.4%

.8%

96

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

.4%

| 87

Kenya Transport Routes No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% Busia - Kigali Gulu - Sudan Kasese - Kila Kila - Arua Kampala - Kahuna Kahuna - Kigali Kenya - Congo Malaba - Nairobi .2% .2% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2% Mombasa - Malaba Masaka - Katuna Rwanda Kigali - Kisumu Jinja - Kampala 1 .2% Mombasa - Kigali 1 .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .4% .2% Malaba - Katuna Razizi 1 .4% .2% Rwanda - Burundi Juba - Congo 1 .4% .2% Kampala - Paider 1 .4% .2% Kenya - Rwanda 1 .4% Moshi - Dar es Salaam Dar es Salaam Luhumbashi Shinyanga - Mbeya - Dar es Salaam Moshi - Arusha Shirinyanga Morogoro Dodoma Mbeya - Zambia Malawi - Congo Moshi - Arusha Moshi - Kiteto Iringa - Arusha Iringa - Dar es Salaam Iringa - Mwanza Holili - Moshi Morogoro Dodoma - Mwanza Dar es Salaam Bukoba Dar es Salaam Dodoma Dar es Salaam Morogoro Morogoro Mahege Dodoma - Tabora Mororgoro - Moshi 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2% Kenya - Sudan 1 .4% Bukoba - Mwanza 2 Percent No Percent No Kampala - Busia Nairobi Mwanza - Isebania Nairobi Mombasa Mombasa Tororo Nairobi - Nakuru Isiolo Meru Nairobi Kitale Mombasa-NairobiBusia - Bibya Uganda Nimlwe Sudan Mbeya - Namanga Nairobi - Busia - Ntebe Uganda Mombasa-Taveta Mombasa-NairobiMlolongo-GilgilIsebenia-Mwanza Nakuru-Kisii-IsebeniaMwanza Mombasa-Nairobi Isiolo Mandera Kampala-Nairobi- Kisii Mwanza Eldoret - Kisii Mwanza Kampala Arusha Ruiru Arusha Morogoro Nairobi Dar es Salaam - Zambia Mombasa Nairobi Mombasa - Mariakani Nairobi -

Uganda Transport Routes

Tanzania Transport Routes

Rwanda Percent Transport Routes .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .3% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% Bukavu - Rusizi Kigali - Katuna Tinde - Isaka Kahama - Rusumo No response

No 1 1 1 6

Percent

Burundi Transport Routes

No

Percent

.4%

.4%

.4%

2.3%

97

88 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Kenya Transport Routes No 1 1 1 .2% Mororgoro Shinyanga Nyakanari Iringa - Mbamba Bay Iringa - Morogoro Dodoma - Tabora Kigoma Kigoma - Mayovu Dar es Salaam Korogwe - Moshi Himo Nairobi - Kampala Mwanza - Isebania - Narok - Nairobi Mombasa - Nairobi - Nakuru - Isebania Mwanza - Nakuru Nairobi Songea - Mtwara Msasi Dar es Salaam Mutuma Songea - Njombe Songea - Matumbo Songea - Iringa Songea - Dar es Salaam Songea - Newala Total 547 100.0% Total 272 100.0% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 656 .2% 1 .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% .2% 100.0% .2% Morogoro Mafinga Tanduma Kahama - Musoma 1 .2% Percent No Percent No Garissa Rwanda Tanga - Njia Panda Taveta Nairobi Nairobi-Malaba

Uganda Transport Routes

Tanzania Transport Routes

Rwanda Percent Transport Routes

No

Percent

Burundi Transport Routes

No

Percent

Total

Source:

Survey

Total

260

100.0%

Total

151

data

100.0

98

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

| 89

Annex 3: Detailed Suggested Improvements by Transporters to Enhance Efficiency in the Transportation of Goods Within EAC Kenya Suggested improvements Computerize work Quicken cancellation of Custom security bonds 14% Improve on ICT 13% Improve and or Invest in ICT 13% 13% 13% 13% Service Weigh Bridges Well inorder to give standard measures Improve Infrastructure 12% 8% 7% Reduce the clearing procedures Establish a discussion forum between transporters and authorities Uniform currency for East African countries Harmonise legal framework between EAC countries Put clearing agents on every border 6% 6% 6% Revenue authority reduce taxes Police Reforms to 13% Improve infrastructure, for example, roads all paper Percent response 17% Work faster to reduce backlogs and delays Punish Police, drivers and officials who break the law by asking for bribes Integrity to be instilled in custom officials so as to offer better services Increase processing to reduce backlogs and delays Presence of anti-graft authorities at border points Improve technology such as power generators and internet Reduce checkpoints Percent response 19% Uganda Suggested improvements Tanzania Suggested improvements Percent response 16% 10% Suggested improvements No idea Build modern infrastructure at Rusumo border (parking & electricity) Avoid unnecessary documentation and delays No Response 10% 9% 8% 6%

Rwanda Percent response 40%

20%

Burundi Suggested Percent improvements response Computerization of 30% transport service systems Reduction of 30% administrative procedures

20%

Punish Corruption

20%

20%

Abolition of slow pace of delivery of goods and services Avoid unnecessary delays

10%

10%

Employ Qualified Custom Officials Custom to process data before trucks arrive at border stations Introduce 24 Hour Economy Introduce Effective and Efficient Clearing Processes at the Border Points Flexibility of Rules and Regulations Introduce an Orderly System of Handling Containers Establish help desks at border points Carry Out Education to Stake Holders Drivers to be 6% 6% 4% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1%

6%

Increase number of staff at customs Drivers to know their rights and stand by them and not break laws Standardize weighbridges Better understanding and co-ordination between officials and drivers Change the laws and regulations to enhance better service delivery Government to reduce taxes

6% 5% 5% 4%

3%

3% Increase number of checkpoints in weighbridges to avoid delays Improve infrastructure, for example, tarmac roads Increase salaries for custom officials to 3% 3%

99

2%

90 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Kenya Suggested improvements accompanied by Co Drivers Percent response 1%

Uganda Suggested improvements


Increase security to provide better services, for example, parking Police reforms No response Educate drivers on the law and taxes Create a similar tax bracket across East Africa Motivate drivers and increase their salaries Reshuffle officials to reduce bribes and corruption incidences

Percent response reduce bribes 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%

Tanzania Suggested improvements

Percent response 2%

Suggested improvements

Rwanda Percent response

Burundi Suggested improvements

Percent response

Source: Survey data

100

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

| 91

Annex 4: Detailed Suggested Improvements by Drivers To Enhance Efficiency in the Transportation of Goods Within EAC Kenya Suggested improvements Police Reforms, for should be more friendly Infrastructure should be improved e.g. roads, security, Parking, number of weigh bridges 11% 10% Increase the speed of handling cargo at customs to reduce back log 10% 8% To reduce the number of Weigh Bridges and Checkpoints 9% Infrastructure should be improved, for example, roads, security, Parking, number of weigh bridges Increase the speed of handling cargo at customs to reduce back log To reduce the number of Weigh Bridges and Checkpoints Invest in ICT Truck Owners should Ensure they comply with the rules and regulations 4% Increase the Number of Employees in the Customs Office, Weigh Bridges, Checkpoints Truck Owners to form an Association 4% 7% Weigh Standardize the Bridges Measuring equipment to avoid disparity in weight for similar goods Police Reforms, for example, should be more friendly example, Corrupt officials should be arrested and prosecuted Percent response 11% Increase the pace of service delivery by reducing the number of checkpoints The government to formulate strict laws to ensure both drivers and officials act accordingly Empower the AntiCorruption Authority to follow up on allegations of corruption The weighbridge regulations should be reviewed and all weighbridges standardized to give similar weights Improve the infrastructure especially roads and parking services 7% 6% Educate the police and custom officials on how to perform their duties diligently and ethically Drivers to be educated on their rights and how to conduct themselves Reduce the number of road barriers 6% 6% 4% 5% 5% 5% No comment Percent Percent response 13% Uganda Suggested improvements Tanzania Suggested improvements Percent response 21% Rwanda Suggested improvements Increase Services such as parking, hygiene 15% Satisfied with services

Percent response 24%

Burundi Suggested improvements Corrupt policemen should be arrested

Percent response 27%

16%

Provision electricity 13% Reduce procedures at checkpoints 9% Reduce the traffic while tanks discharge fuel

of

2%

6%

Reduction of taxes

5%

Standardize the Weigh Bridges Measuring equipment to avoid disparity in weight for similar goods 7% Increase the Number of Employees in the Customs Office, Weigh Bridges, Checkpoints and the KRA Truck Owners should Ensure they comply with the rules and regulations Kenya Anti Corruption Officials to be Stationed at the checkpoints Carry out Education on Corruption

8%

Switch to 24 hours economy 7% No answer

6%

5%

The government should change the working policy to avoid del Do away with police agents at Kayanza border 5% 3% Police Reforms Increase number of employees at Checkpoints and Border Points Reduce harassment and increase customer service 3% 5% Increase the salaries of custom officials and police to discourage them 3% Reduce tax on items

6%

3%

5%

4%

Establishment of a fixed time for the checking Unskilled staff needs to be replaced

1%

3%

3%

More tools for the improvement of the clearing process

10%

Corrupt officials should be arrested and prosecuted

3%

Computerized System

7%

101

92 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

14%

Introduce 24 working border

hour

11%

Kenya Suggested improvements Percent response on 5% 4% 4% 4% from taking bribes Increase the staff improve services to They should work 24 hours a day Increase the number of checkpoints for faster service The weights should be indicated during weighing process so the drivers are aware They offer good services 3% Police to increase security along roads and checkpoints 4% 3% 3% 3% Avoid Segregation and Discrimination They should open more border points and weigh Bridges Police to increase security along roads and checkpoints Ugandan Anti Corruption Officials to be Stationed at the checkpoints, weigh bridges and Revenue Authority Salaries for police and weigh bridge officials should be Increased to avoid bribery incidences the people Reshuffle employed at the Customs and KRA Reduce Traffic Jams on roads Rules and Regulations governing the Transport Sector should be more flexible Increase working hours operate 24 hours Payments of everything Should be done at one point instead of may points 1% 1% 1% 1% Improve services especially in No suggestions since nothing seems to change Employers should give up more mileage allowances Reshuffle the people employed at the Customs and KRA Salaries should be Increased to avoid bribery incidences 2% Invest in ICT 2% Carry out Corruption Education 3% 2% 1% 1%

Percent Percent response

Uganda Suggested improvements

Tanzania Suggested improvements

Percent response

Rwanda Suggested improvements

Percent response

Burundi Suggested improvements

Percent response

1%

Reduce number of checkpoints and border points 3% There should be frequent reshuffle of officials especially police reshuffles Truck owners to ensure the trucks are in good condition so drivers do not get into problems with the police Reduce taxes, review tax law and standardize tax rates across East Africa A proper customer service to listen to the views and complaints of drivers 1%

2%

Enforcement Transport laws

ot

1%

Payment of tax should be done at one point 2% 1% Improve System the

1%

Education responsible citizenship

for

1%

Truck Owners Association 2%

to

form

an

ICT

1%

Wear Uniforms to differentiate Customs and civilians 2% 1% 1% 1%

2%

Rules and Regulations governing the Transport Sector should be more flexible Improve services especially in No Mainland such as parking and hygiene to avoid spread of diseases 1% They should open more border points and weigh Bridges They are doing a good job no complains

Improve infrastructure

1%

Improve Service

customer

2%

1% 1%

Increase working hours

1%

The police to stop harassing Kenyan drivers Checks and measure system to determine the successes and failures of the current and future regulations Improve security

1% 1%

1%

102

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Owners of truck to follow rules and regulations Drivers should obey law and traffic rules Educate police and public about corruption Arrest and prosecute corrupt officials and police

3%

Employ more staff at the border

12%

3%

3%

2%

Capacity building for the customs officer Provide accommodation at the border Provide ample parking space

3%

4%

2%

| 93

Kenya Suggested improvements Increase working hours Truck owners should provide their drivers with co-drivers/ turn boys to ensure efficiency Charges/Fines to be placed on the number of days one delays on paying taxes Payments of everything should be done at one point instead of may points Introduce mobile weighbridges to reduce traffic 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% Fully Implement constitution the No suggestions since nothing seems to change 0% 0% Employers should give up more mileage allowances 0% Truck drivers should stop complaining Fully Implement the constitution 1% 1% Land such as parking and hygiene to avoid spread of diseases Those causing delays to be fined Percent response 1% Improve security

Percent Percent response 1%

Uganda Suggested improvements

Tanzania Suggested improvements

Percent response 1% 1% 0% 0%

Rwanda Suggested improvements

Percent response

Burundi Suggested improvements

Percent response

They should merge customs with revenue authority Every country to have its own officials at the border They staff is lazy and incompetent Improve the services at Tunduma border point

0% 0% 0% 0%

Source: Survey data


Annex 5: Detailed Suggested Improvements By Cfas To Enhance Efficiency In The Transportation Of Goods Within EAC Kenya Suggested improvements Improve on ICT 18 16 15 12 15.5% 14.6% 11.7% 17.5% Employ Staff Improve on Infrastructure Reduce Burecracy in the Documentation Process Efficient No Percent Tanzania Suggested improvements Improve Infrastructure Regulate meetings and engagement with stakeholders Increase number of staff Improve on ICT system No 7 6 3 3 Percent 26.9% 23.1% 11.5% 11.5% Uganda Suggested improvements Integrity in customs, border points and checkpoints Government to fight corruption in borders and customs Reduce checkpoints Increase clearing and forwading in customs to reduce backlogs and traffic No 17 15 14 13 Percent 14.0% 12.4% 11.6% 10.7% Rwanda Suggested improvements Recruit more staff Educate people on services Improve on customer service Improve infrastructure

Burundi

No

Percent

12

38.7%

Suggested improvements Staff Training

No

Percent

18.2%

16.1%

Computerization

15.2%

9.7%

9.7%

Reduce tariff Barriers Employ more staff

15.2%

12.1%

103

94 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Decentralize clearing to provincial capitals and not at border points Allow transportation of farm produce outside the country No response

Kenya Suggested improvements Anti - Corruption Officials to be Stationed at Freight Stations Introduce Strict Rules on Bribing , for example, sacking Reshuffle Employees 10 9.7% Reduce on procudures 2 7.7% Increase officials at customs and border points People should be faithful to their country and government especially to custom officials No comment Police reforms Improve machines and tools of trade Increase the number of weighbridges and standardize them to be the same across East Africa Custom officials should work 24 hours a day Drivers and owners should be diligent and follow rules and regulations Embrace ICT Improve infrastructure for example, roads,rail Weights to be checked at one point and not many different points Reduce amount of fines and tax charged Form Drivers' Association to protect drivers Prosecute truck owners and the 1 1.0% 7 10 6 5.8% Improve security 2 7.7% 5 1 1 1 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 5 4 3 2.9% 3.9% Train staff 4.9% 4.9% Nothing can done Introduce Corruption Education Work Faster be Harmonise legal framework between Kenya and Uganda Fight corruption 7 6 6 6 No Percent Suggested improvements No Percent Suggested improvements No Percent 8.3%

Tanzania

Uganda

Rwanda Suggested improvements I dont know

Burundi

No

Percent

6.5%

Suggested improvements Reduce the amount required for documents 5.8% Quicken services

No

Percent

9.1%

6.5%

Lower taxes

9.1%

5.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%

Increase services

financial Reduce documentation Train staff Abide by rules and regulations 4 3.3%

3.2%

3.2%

3.0%

3.2%

3.0%

3.2%

Competent agents

3.0%

Customs officials to be paid well to avoid greed hence corruption No response 3 1 1 1.0% 1.0% 2.9% Introducde a Customer Care Center Train the Staff Change government

2.9%

Good staff salary

3.0%

3 3 3 2 1 1 1

2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.7% .8% .8% .8%

104

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Reduce Administrative Procedures Increase working tools Avoid Corruption

9.1%

| 95

Kenya Suggested improvements not drivers Pay police and custom officials more so as to reduce bribery cases Satisfied with the serviceskeep up 1 1 1 No Percent Suggested improvements No Percent Suggested improvements No

Tanzania

Uganda Percent .8% .8% .8%

Rwanda Suggested improvements

Burundi

No

Percent

Suggested improvements

No

Percent

Source: Survey Data

105

96 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Annex 6: Customs Station/ Transit Stations Covered by Survey Kenya Customs Transit point Station/ 1 4 5 1 1 4 2 18 5.6 22.2 27.8 5.6 5.6 22.2 11.1 100.0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 23.1 30.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 Sirari Namanga Dar es salam Moshi Mwanza Mtukula Mtwara Total 2 2 5 3 3 3 2 20 10.0 10.0 25.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 10.0 100.0 No. Percent Malaba Busia Isebania Namanga Nairobi Mariakani Taveta Total Annex 7: Weighbridge Station/ Police Checkpoints Covered by Survey Kenya Weighbridge Station/ Police check point No. Percent Uganda Weighbridge Station/ Police check point No. Percent Malaba Mbale Mubende Luwero Kampala Katuna Mbarara 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 30.8 30.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 Tanzania Weighbridge Station/ Police check point Makambako Lindi Tanga Nyakahupa Singed Meyer Arish Kwanza Him Kabana/Mail Muja Dar es salaam Mikese/Morogoro Kabanga Dodoma Songea No. Percent Rwanda Weighbridge Station/ Police check point 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 5.6 5.6 11.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 11.1 11.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 Kigali Kisenyi Rusumo No response No. Uganda Customs Station/ Transit point Malaba Busia Holili Entebbe Katuna Kabale Tororo Kampala No. Percent No. Percent Tanzania Customs Station/ Transit point Rwanda Customs Station/ Transit point Kigali Gikondo No. 20 7

Percent

Burundi Customs Station/ Transit point

No.

Percent

74.1 25.9

Bujumbura

20

100.0

Percent

Burundi Weighbridge Station/ Police check point 3 2 1 1

No.

Percent

Malaba Kisumu Busia Gilgil Isebania Namanga Nairobi Mariakani Taveta

1 2 4 2 3 2 2 2 2

5.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

42.9 28.6 14.3 14.3

Bujumbura

10

100.0

Source: Survey Data

106

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Annex 8: Detailed Suggested Improvements by Police Officers to Enhance Efficiency in the Transportation of Goods within EAC Kenya Suggested improvements Motorists 23% be made fixed and regulations on 5 Improve 9% infrastructure offices parking areas automated, e.g. on 2 for offices parking 17% Provision housing of Police 4 14.3% Improve on the 2 facilities infrastructure and Weigh bridge should 4 18% trained on their rights and also on road safety and regulations Improve infrastructure example, automated, areas Increase the salary of 4 the police system 13% Improve on lighting 2 9% Improve on 4 infrastructure e.g. offices automated, parking areas 14.3% Capacity building 1 should be 7 Motorists should be 4 improvements improvements 14.3% No. Percent Suggested No. Percent Suggested No. Tanzania Uganda Percent Rwanda Suggested improvements Hire more staff 3 No.

Burundi

Percent

Suggested

No.

Percent

improvements

42.9

Salary Increment

21.4%

trained on their rights and also on road safety

28.6

The

new

office 2

14.3%

building will make

service better

14.3

The

government 2

14.3%

should

introduce

computerized

system Training 10% to be Officers bribery practices Provision housing to the police of good 3 10% to avoid of Police 3 Weigh machines need 2 serviced to avoid any delays Training Officers of to bribery practices Weigh machines need 2 to be serviced to avoid any delays 7% All weighbridges 2 should be privatized 9% The law should providing services be 2 obeyed to the letter while 7.1% Police 2 avoid 9% Provision services of efficient 2 7.1% 9% Increase police salary 4 14.3% Good relations customer 1

14.3

We

must

have 2

14.3%

weighbridges

Training of Police 2

14.3%

Officers to avoid

bribery practices

Provision

of 1

7.1%

training

to

high

technology

107

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Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Kenya Suggested improvements Weigh bridge should 1 Tenders 9% machines need to be installed capable of reading both the inside and the outside of the vehicle All should be privatized fighting machines weighbridges 1 Provision of 3% fire 1 5% Increase the number of 2 weigh machines reduce delays Tenders 3% trained on their rights and safety and regulations also on road renewed performance competitors who get the tender The services at the 1 3% the police weighbridge should be given government since the privatized services are poor(i) Standardize weighbridges(g) the 1 3% The services at the 1 weighbridge should be given back to the government since the 5% back to the Increase the salary of 1 5% Increase the number of 2 policemen checkpoints at various 7.1% by subject to should be 1 Motorists should be 1 5% Training bribes of Police 2 Officers to avoid taking 7.1% to 7.1% Better renewed performance competitors who get the tender by subject to should be 2 be made fixed 3% weighbridge 2 improvements improvements 7.1% No. Percent Suggested No. Percent Suggested No. Percent

Tanzania

Uganda

Rwanda Suggested improvements No.

Burundi

Percent

Suggested

No.

Percent

improvements

Provision of meals

7.1%

Recruitment

of 1

7.1%

more

honest

and

professional people

14

100.0%

108

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

| 99

Kenya Suggested improvements privatized services are poor Motorbikes should be 1 3% weighbridges provided easy escaping defaulters/drivers Provision housing to the police of good 1 5% chasing of to provide Standardize the 1 5% improvements improvements No. Percent Suggested No. Percent Suggested No.

Tanzania

Uganda Percent

Rwanda Suggested improvements No.

Burundi

Percent

Suggested

No.

Percent

improvements

Source: Survey Data

Annex 9: Detailed Suggested Improvements by Customs Officers To Enhance Efficiency In The Transportation Of Goods Within EAC Kenya Suggested improvements Employ more staff No. Percent 8 28% Tanzania Suggested improvements Improve and invest in its infrastructures starting with IT Create public awareness regarding custom operations 3 10% Customs should be communicating with clients more often of staff 3 10% Salary increment for workers No. 9 Percent 33% Uganda Suggested improvements Transporters, drivers and their agents need to be trained about customs services Customs Officers need to be trained more on customs 4 14% 4 15% 3 11% Improvement of infrastructure, for example, verification shed Employ more staff 3 11% No. 9 Percent 38% Rwanda Suggested improvements Hire more staff

No. 3

Percent

27%

Burundi Suggested improvements Employ more staff 5 21% Improve on the facilities and infrastructure 4 17% Capacity building 2 8% Nothing/None 2

No.

Percent

31%

Improvement of infrastructure for example, verification shed Full computerization of the system Provision housing

18%

Provision of staff housing 2

25%

18%

Computerized services 2

19%

18%

109

Collaboration in harmonisation of transport

6%

100 |

Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

Kenya Suggested improvements No. Percent No. Percent No. Administration Police and custom officials need to work as a unit Good lighting to adequately work during the night 2 2 7% 2 7% 7% 2 7% Improve staff allowances and skills Clearing and forwarding agents should be trained Avoid duplication of tasks, for example, the police Banks should work 24 hours Citizens must be properly sensitized about customs services Increase staff salary Reduce high tax levels 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3% 3% 3% 3% Stakeholders work for 24hrs to 3% 1 4% 4% 3% 1 4% 3% Improve on service delivery Payment of taxes upon assessment of goods Hire more skilled staff 1 4% Importers should pay in advance for ease of operations Transparency guidelines to be set and adhered to Full computerization of the system that is use of internet Custom officers, transporters and agents needs to work collectively to avoid delays Provide staff housing Reduce high tax levels 1 1 4% 4%

Tanzania Suggested improvements

Uganda Suggested improvements

Percent

Rwanda Suggested improvements Salary increment Good customer relations

No.

Percent

1 1

9%

9%

Burundi Suggested improvements systems between EAC countries Respect for rules and training of CFAs Avoid duplication of tasks e.g. the police 1 1 4% 4%

No.

Percent

13%

6%

Source: Survey Data

110

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REFERENCES
ASARECA ,Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers on Cross-Border Trade in Eastern Africa, Nairobi (2012), CPCS Transcom Limited, Analytical Comparative Transport Cost Study Along the Northern Corridor Region, Volume 1,(2010) East Africa, Nairobi, (2009) East African Business Council, Business Climate Index, Nairobi (2011) Karugia et al, working paper No 29 The impact of Non-Tariff Barriers on Maize and Beef Trade in Kimberly Ann (ed), Corruption and the global Economy; Institute of International Economics, Washington (1997) Mbaru Jimna, Transforming Africa; New Pathways to Development, East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi (2003) Mukhisa Kituyi, a Free Trade Road Map for Africa, But wholl keep their Promise? Sunday Nation, (January 28th 2012) Omondi Paul, Assessment Study on Corruption at the East Africa transport corridors Transit Points, Nairobi (2007) Robert Kirk, Addressing Trade Restrictive Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the East African Community, African Trade Policy Notes, World Bank Publication (2010) Transparency International Kenya, East African Bribery Index, Nairobi (2012) World Bank, Anti Corruption in Transition; A contribution to Policy Debate, Washington DC (2000)

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WEB SOURCES
http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/PDF/newspaper3.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/Kritzinger.pdf http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR002/SR002_pitsuwan.pdf http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2004/11/09/774.transport.infrastructure.development/ http://www.iss.co.za/af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/eac/EACTreaty.pdf http://www.tradebarriers.org/ntb/non_tariff_barriers http://www2.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Consultant/TAR-IND-4066/Trade/mehta.pdf http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=47 Research Paper on The Non Tariff Barriers in trading within the East Africa Community by CUTS GRC/GIZ (2010) http://www.resakss.org/index.php?pdf=42386 http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/the_anti_corruption_plain_language_guide http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/crossheading/general-bribery-offences http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf http://www.aae.wisc.edu/dbromley/pdfs/transport.pdf http://www.feweb.vu.nl/nl/Images/De%20groot%20%282004%29%20-%20The%20institutional%20determinants%20of%20bilateral%20trade%20patterns_tcm96-271556.pdf http://www.tikenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=67 http://www.asareca.org/old2011/resources/reports/NTBtechES.pdf http://www.afrol.com/articles/29888 http://www.kra.go.ke/speeches/cgspeechncorridor061005.html http://www.asareca.org/resources/reports/NTBtechES.pdf http://www.africareview.com/Business+++Finance/Call+to+fasttrack+removal+of+non+tariff +barriers+in+EAC/-/979184/1367762/-/9l17jr/-/index.html http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/113621/2/series75.pdf http://allafrica.com/stories/201203270156.html http://www.tikenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=67 http://www.asareca.org/old2011/resources/reports/NTBtechES.pdf

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