You are on page 1of 23

The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States Author(s): Douglas S.

Massey Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 631-652 Published by: Population Council Stable URL: . Accessed: 27/01/2011 11:59
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact

Population Council is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Population and Development Review.




The New Immigration and Ethnicityin the United States


As ANYONE WHOWALKS the streetsof America's largest cities knows, there

has been a profound transformation of immigration to the UnitedStates. Notonlyare theremoreimmigrants, butincreasingly theyspeaklanguages and bear cultures thatare quite different from thosebrought by European immigrants in the past. The rapidity of the change and the scale of the movementhave led to much consternation about what the "new immigration" means forAmerican society. Some worryabout the economic effects of immigration, although quantitative analysesgenerally show thatimmigrants do notcompetewith nativeworkers and do not have strong effects on US wage ratesand employment levels (Borjas and Tienda 1987; Borjas 1990; Borjas and Freeman 1992). Othersworry about the social welfare burdencaused by immigrants, butstudies ofsome refugee againsuggest that, withtheexception groups,immigrants do not drainpublicresources(see Blau 1984; Simon 1984; Tiendaand Jensen1986; Borjas 1994; butRothman and Espenshade 1992 show thatlocal fiscaleffects Observers also exmay be significant). press fearsof linguistic fragmentation, but researchindicatesthatimmigrantsgenerallyshift into Englishas timepasses and thattheirchildren move decisively intoEnglishiftheygrowup in the UnitedStates(Grenier 1984; Stevens1985; Veltman1988). Despite thisreassuring evidence,however,considerable disquietremains about the new immigration and its consequences (see Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Indeed,an immigrant backlashappearsto be gatheringforce. English-only amendments have passed in severallocales; federal and poliand punitive; immigration law has grownsteadily morerestrictive thepoPeteWilsonofCalifornia, have discovered led by Governor ticians,





liticaladvantagesthatmay be gained by blamingimmigrants forcurrent social and economicproblems. Giventhe apparentanimus towardimmigrantsand the imperviousness of public perceptions to the influenceof objectiveresearch findings, one suspectsthatdeeperforces are at workin theAmerican psyche. Thisconsternation may have less to do withascertainable facts about immigration thanwithunarticulated fearsthatimmigrants will somehow createa verydifferent society and culturein the UnitedStates.Whatever objectiveresearch saysabout theprospects forindividual assimilation, the ethnicand racialcomposition ofthe UnitedStatesis clearly changing, and withit the sociocultural and worldcreatedby priorEuropeanimmigrants theirdescendants.According Americansof to demographic projections, European descentwill become a minority in the UnitedStatessometime and Passel 1991), and thisprojected duringthe nextcentury (Edmonston shift has alreadyoccurredin some urban areas, notablyLos Angelesand Miami. In othermetropolitan areas,such as New York,Chicago,Houston, and San Diego, thetransformation is well underway. This demographic reality suggests the real natureof the anti-immigrant reaction amongnon-Hispanic whites:a fearofcultural changeand a will be displacedfromtheir thatEuropean Americans deep-seatedworry have been relucdominant life.Most social scientists positionin American howit (nonacademics, tantto addressthisissue,or even to acknowledge ever,are not so reticent-seeLammand Imhoff 1985; Brimelow1995). As a result,analysesby academic researchers have focusedrathernarrowly on facts are there, and empirical issues:how manyundocumented migrants do theydisplacenativeworkers, do theydrivedown wage rates,do they use morein services thantheypay in taxes? howAnswers to thesequestionsdo notgetat theheartofthematter, ever. What the publicreallywantsto know (at least,I suspect,the native will assimilateinto white public) is whetheror not the new immigrants the Euro-American and societyofthe UnitedStates,and how thatsociety itsculturemight changeas a resultofthisincorporation. While social scientists have analyzedthe stateof the trees,the publichas worriedabout the future of the forest, and no amountof empirical researchhas quieted theseanxieties.In thisarticle, of I assess the prospects forthe assimilation the new immigrant on the society, groupsand judge theirlikelyeffects and languageofthe UnitedStates. culture, I beginby placingthe new immigration in historical and perspective pointing out the distinctive features thatset it apartfrom earlierimmigraoftoday's tions.I thenappraisethestructural for context theincorporation theirasimmigrants and argue thatbecause of fundamental differences, similation is unlikely to be as rapidor completeas thatachievedby Euroin the past. I concludeby discussing how the natureof pean immigrants thatis linis likelyto change as a resultof a new immigration ethnicity




continuand temporally clustered, geographically concentrated, guistically unequal. and stratified society thatis increasingly ous intoan American

perspective The new imiigration in historical

can be dicentury duringthe twentieth of US immigration The history era of mass European immigrainto threephases: a classic vided roughly movement oflimited hiatus about 1901 to 1930; a long from tionstretching non-Europeanimmiof large-scale, from1931 to 1970; and a newregime The cutpoints to thepresent. thatbeganaround 1970 and continues gration ofcourse,but theycorrespond arbitrary, 1930 and 1970 are to some extent policy.The 1924 NationalOriin US immigration to major shifts roughly in 1929; and quotas,tookfulleffect country ginsAct,whichimposedstrict repealed Act, which Nationality and totheInmigration the1965amendments in 1968 (see Jassoand Rosenzweig1990: 26-97). thosequotas,tookeffect flowsduring of immigrant on the size and composition Information by in Table 1. Actualcountsof immigrants the threeperiodsis presented are derived) was largely the table which regionand decade (the data from to legal refer in the Data Appendix.In both tables,the figures presented theydo not include undocumented enumeratedupon entry; immigrants nordo annual estimates), (see Masseyand Singer1995 forrecent migrants to be signifihave shown which studies migration, theyadjust forreturn cant in both the classicera (Wyman 1993) and the new regime(Warren The classicyears1901-30 are actuallypartofa sustained50-yearpethatbegan sometimearound 1880. Duringthis riod of mass immigration enteredthe UnitedStatesand, except periodsome 28 millionimmigrants fortwo yearsat the end of WorldWar I, the yearlytotalneverfellbelow flowsoccurred 200,000,and in mostyearsitexceeded400,000. The largest 1930 almost19 1901 to From century. in thefirst decades ofthe twentieth an annual averageof on Americanshores,yielding millionpeople arrived in 1907 when some (see Table 1). The peak occurred 621,000 immigrants these numberswere unarrived.Untilrecently, 1.3 millionimmigrants history. equalled in American of these people came fromEurope. Althoughthe The vast majority and WesternEurope to Southernand from Northern shifted composition spreadacrossthe Americancontinent EasternEurope as industrialization the first throughout (see Massey 1988; Morawska 1990), the composition European,averagremainedoverwhelmingly threedecades ofthecentury the UnitedStatesbecame period.As a result, ing 80 percentforthe entire and outlook. Europeanin culture lessblack,morewhite,and morefirmly nation'senof the to some rise gave Thisperiodofmass immigration about to overcome poverty, ofimmigrants aboutthestruggle during myths: about the individual effort, through ofeconomicmobility theachievement
and Kraly 1985; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990).




TABLE 1 Patterns of immigration to the United States in three periods of the twentieth century Classicera 1901-30 Whole period Region of origin(percent) Europe Americas Asia Other Total Total immigration (thousands) Annual average (thousands) Peak year Peak immigration (thousands) First ten years Region of origin(percent) Europe Americas Asia Other Total Total immigration (thousands) Annual average (thousands) Last ten years Region of origin(percent) Europe Americas Asia Other Total Total immigration (thousands) Annual average (thousands) Long hiatus New regime 1931-70 1971-93

79.6 16.2 3.7 0.5 100.0 18,638 621 1907 1,285

46.2 43.6 8.6 1.6 100.0 7,400 185 1968 454

13.0 49.6 34.5 2.9 100.0 15,536 675 1991 1,827

91.6 4.1 3.7 0.6 100.0 8,795 880

65.9 30.3 3.2 0.6 100.0 528 53

17.8 44.1 35.3 2.8 100.0 4,493 449

60.0 36.9 2.7 0.4 100.0 4,107 411

33.8 51.7 12.9 1.6 100.0 3,322 332

10.2 54.0 32.7 3.1 100.0 9,293 929

SOURCE: US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1994: Table 2.

importance ofgroupsolidarity in thefaceofethnicprejudiceand discrimination,and about the inevitability of assimilation into the melting pot of American life.In the wordsofan influential at midcentury, social scientist the first decades of the century offer "The Epic Storyof the GreatMigrationsthatMade the AmericanPeople" (Handlin 1951). Althougha reactionagainstthe melting laterarose in the second and third pot myth genthiswas largely a symbolic erations, opposition bypeoplewho had watched theirparentsand grandparents suffer under 'Northern European" domi-




nance,but who bythe 1960s had largely penetrated arenasofpower,prestige,and influence and wantedto let the worldknow about it (see Glazer and Moynihan1970; Greely1971; Novak 1971). The classicera ofmass immigration was followed by a 40-yearhiatus duringwhich immigration levels fellto verylow levels and the predominance ofEuropeanimmigrants came to an end. From 1931 to 1970, average annual immigration fellto 185,000 and the share arriving fromthe Americasincreasedsubstantially, eventually equallingthatfromEurope. Over the entirehiatus period,44 percentof immigrants came fromthe Americas, compared with46 percent from Europeand 9 percent from Asia (the last region, according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, includesthe MiddleEast,whichhas contributed a smallnumberofimmigrants over the years,comparedwithsuch countries as China,Korea, the Philippines, and Japan).By the last decade of the hiatus,52 percentofall immigrants were from the Americasand only 34 percentcame from Europe;thepeak yearofimmigration occurred in 1968,when454,000 people were admitted for permanent residence. As I have alreadynoted, the dividing pointsof 1930 and 1970 are somewhatarbitrary and were chosenpartly forconvenience, sincedecennial yearsare easy to remember and correspond to the decennialtabulationsfavored by demographers. Evidenceofthecoming hiatuswas already in thelastdecade oftheclassicera,when immigration apparent levelswere a third below their1901-30 average (411,000 ratherthan 621,000) and about half the average that prevailedin the first decade of the century were (880,000). Moreover, bytheend oftheclassicera,immigrants' origins toward already shifting theAmericas. ofall immigrants Whereas92 percent in the first decade of the century were European,by the 1920s the percentagehad droppedto 60 percent.Althoughit was not recognizedfor manyyears,the era ofmassiveEuropeanimmigration was alreadybeginningto wind down. The termination of mass immigration to around 1930 is attributable The one thatscholarsmostoftencredit manyfactors. is thepassage of restrictive In responseto a publicbacklashagainst immigration legislation. immigrants, Congresspassed two new "quota laws," in 1921 and 1924, thatwere designedto limitthe numberof immigrants theiroriand shift gins fromSouthernand EasternEurope back to Northern and Western votersof Europe (where theybelonged,at leastin theview ofthenativist thetime-see Higham1963 and Hutchinson 1981). Although the nationalorigins bans on quotas,combinedwithearlier Asian immigration enactedin 1882 and 1917, did play a role in reducing I believe theirinfluence the numberof immigrants, has been overstated. For one thing, from the the new quotas did not applyat all to immigrants from Latin Western massentry Hemisphere, leavingthedoorwide open for




America, particularly Mexico.Indeed,beginning in thedecade ofthe 191Os, employers in Northern industrial citiesof the UnitedStatesbegan to recruitextensively in Mexico, and immigration fromthat country mushroomedfrom50,000 in the first decade of the century, to 220,000 in the second,to 460,000 in the third(see Cardoso 1980). Were it not forother factors, the change in immigration law would, at most,have shifted the nationalorigins ofimmigrants moredecisively towardthe Americas in the 1930s,but itwould nothave haltedimmigration per se. More thananychangein legislation, however, theoutbreak ofWorld War I in 1914 broughta sudden and decisivehalt to the flow of immigrants fromEurope. Duringthe first halfof the decade, the outflow proceeded apace: 926,000 Europeanimmigrants arrived in the UnitedStates in 1910, 765,000 in 1911, and just over 1 million came in both 1913 and 1914. Duringthe first fullyearofthewar,however,immigration dropped to 198,000 and it felleveryyearthereafter to reacha low pointof 31,000 in 1918. As a result, during the 1910s totalimmigration was halved comparedwiththepriordecade (Ferenczi1929). Duringthe 1920s, Europeanimmigration began to revive, despitethe restrictive immigration quotas.Some 412,000 immigrants arrived from Germany during 1921-30, 455,000 came fromItaly,227,000 fromPoland, and

102,000 from Czechoslovakia. These entries supplemented largenumbers from arriving European countries thatwere not limited by the new quotas: 211,000 fromIreland, 340,000 from Britain, and 166,000 from Nor-

way and Sweden combined. One country, however, is notably absentfrom European immigrant flowsofthe 1920s: Russia,or as it was now known, the SovietUnion (US Immigration and Naturalization Service1994: 27). Priorto WorldWarI, immigration from Russiahad been massive:1.6 millionRussianimmigrants deenteredthe UnitedStatesduringthe first cade ofthe century, the subsequent and 921,000 managedto getin during of these decade despitethe outbreakof war in 1914. The greatmajority and pogroms ofCzaranti-Semitism peoplewereJewsescaping therampant of istRussia (see Nugent1992: 83-94); but withthe BolshevikRevolution 1917 and the consolidation communist of the world'sfirst state,the RusWest and emigrafrom the capitalist sian Pale was abruptly disconnected immitionwas suppressed by a new statesecurity apparatus.As a result, grationfrom Russia fellto a totalof only 62,000 in the 1920s and to just did not exceed 1,400 duringthe 1930s. The flowof Russian immigrants Service and Naturalization until the 1970s 2,500 again (US Immigration fromnon-RussianEurope was gainingground Justas immigration halted all internaeventvirtually duringthe 1920s, anothercataclysmic theGreatDepression. tionalmigration: Froma totalof241,000 immigrants in 1930, the flowdroppedto 23,000 threeyearslater.Withmass unem1994: 27-28).




workers evapoin the UnitedStates,the demandforimmigrant ployment fellbelow 1 millionforthe ratedand duringthe 1930s totalimmigration enteredthe United first time since the 1830s. Only 528,000 immigrants an annual averageofonly53,000. Statesfrom1931 to 1940, yielding Beforethe GreatDepressionhad ended, WorldWar II broke out to Duringthe war yearsthe movement. to international add anotherbarrier to theUnitedStatesfellonce again.Froma depressionflowofimmigrants fellto only24,000 era peak of 83,000 in 1939, the numberofimmigrants averthe numberofimmigrants in 1943; and duringsix yearsofwarfare, yearsof thedepression aged only40,000 peryear,lowereven thanduring from Europe in 1945,immigration ofhostilities Withthe termination resumed;butby 1945 thefaceofEuropehad changeddramatically. finally the area ofcomline marking The Cold War had begun and theboundary In additionto the SovietUnion, westward. dominancehad shifted munist economyof the West. from the capitalist EasternEurope was now cut off Countriessuch as Czechoslovakia,Hungary,Romania, and Yugoslavia, conbeforethe depression, whichhad sent largenumbersof immigrants came to the 228,000 Polishimmigrants tributed fewafter1945. Although the 1950s. during the 1920s,only 10,000 entered UnitedStatesduring Europewereblocked, Eastern from emigration Just as theavenues for the countriesof WesternEurope began to seek workersto rebuildtheir and economicgrowth economies.The wave of investment war-shattered demand forlabor that,by by the MarshallPlan createda strong triggered the 1950s, began to exceed domesticsuppliesof most countries(Kindleberger1967). As the postwareconomyexpanded and the pace of growth not Belgium,and the Netherlands France,Britain, quickened,Germany, ofimmimigrants abroad,theyall became countries onlystoppedsending from Southern ofimmigrants largenumbers attracting themselves, gration from the Balkans, Turkey, Europe and then,as these sources dried up, and Asia (see Stalker1994). The era of mass European miNorthAfrica, over. and decisively to the UnitedStateswas finally gration from wereno longeravailablein largenumbers immigrants Although a strong created boomin theUnitedStatesnonetheless Europe,thepostwar and Western Europe demandforlaborthere.WithEasternEurope cut off thisnew demandwas metby LatinAmeriimmigration, a magnetfor itself under the quotas of the 1920s. The cans, whose entrywas unregulated 61,000 in the 1940s to 300,000 rose from numberofMexican immigrants
in the 1950s and 454,000 during the 1960s. This expansion of immigration 1930-39 (US Immigrationand Naturalization Service 1994: 27-28).

was not limitedto Mexico. Duringthe last decade of the hiatus period, theUnited alongwith100,000DominiStates, some200,000Cubansentered was immigration A new era ofnon-European cans and 70,000 Colombians. 1994: 27-28). Service on therise(US Immigration and Naturalization clearly




It has become conventional to date the emergence ofthe new regime in US immigration from thepassageofthe 1965 amendments to theImmigration and Nationality Act,whichwere phased in and implemented fully in 1968. In keepingwiththe spirit of the times,thislegislation abolished thediscriminatory national-origins quotas and ended theban on Asianentry.It put each nationin the EasternHemisphere on an equal footing by establishing a uniform limitof20,000 entrants it set an overper country; all hemispheric cap of 170,000 immigrants; and it establisheda "preference system" of family and occupationalcategories to allocatevisas under theselimits. The amendments exempted immediate relatives ofUS citizens from thenumerical caps,however, and nationsin theWestern Hemisphere weresubject onlyto a hemispheric cap of120,000immigrants, nota 20,000per-country limit. Althoughthislegislation contributed to the creationof the new immigration regime, it was neither the sole nor the mostimportant cause of theincreasein numbers or theshift in origins. As withthenational-origins quotas, I believe scholarshave generally overstated the role of the 1965 in bringing amendments aboutthenew immigration. The Immigration and Actwas in no way responsible Nationality forthe dropin Europeanimmigration, forexample,since thistrendwas clearlyvisiblebefore1965 and followed from otherconditions described above. Nor did the 1965 Act increasethe level of immigration fromLatin America.On the contrary, by placingthe first-ever cap on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, the legislation actuallymade it moredifficultforLatinAmericans to enterthe UnitedStates.Since 1965, additional in theWestern amendments from have further restricted entry nations Hemisphere,placingthem under the 20,000-per-country limit,abolishingthe ofminor separate theright hemispheric caps,eliminating children to sponsor theimmigration ofparents, the"TexasProviso" and repealing thatexempted from employers prosecution for hiring undocumented Rather than migrants. promoting theshift towardLatinAmerican origins, then,the 1965 Actand its successoramendments actuallyinhibited the transformation. The shift in origins occurred in spiteofthelegislation, notbecause ofit. The one effect thatthe 1965 Actdid have was to removethe ban on Asianentry and thereby unleashan unprecedented and entirely unexpected flowofimmigrants from Korea,Taiwan,China,the Philippines, and other Asian countries (see Glazer 1985). At the time,the legislation was seen as a way of redressing past wrongsthathad been visitedupon Easternand Southern theresentment oftheir and Europeansand ofmollifying children in the grandchildren, who had risento wield powerful politicalinfluence DemocraticParty, which dominatedthe US Congress.Ratherthan openingthe UnitedStatesto immigration from, say,Italyand Poland,however, as legislators such as PeterRodino and Dan Rostenkowski had intended, itsprincipal from Asia. effect was to initiate large-scale immigration




of Asiansrose from under 10 perAs Table 1 shows,the percentage centofimmigrants during theclassicand hiatuseras,to around35 percent under the new regimethatbegan after1970. Whereasonly 35,000 Chias immigrants nese, 35,000 Indians,and 34,000 Koreans were admitted
during the 1960s, by the 1980s these numbers had become 347,000,

(US Immigration and Naturalization 251,000, and 334,000, respectively ofthissharpand suddenincreasein Asian Service1994: 27-28). As a result of Asians in the US populationbegan rising immigration, the percentage forthefirst timein morethana century. cannotexplainthe remarkYetby themselves the 1965 amendments able surgein Asian immigration. Anotherkey factor was the loss of the VietnamWar and the subsequentcollapseofthe US-backedgovernments in Indochina.Withthe fallof Saigonin 1975, the UnitedStatesfacednew demandsforentry officials, officers, government by thousandsofmilitary authoriand US employeesfearful from the new communist of reprisals during in Vietnamdeteriorated ties.As economicand politicalconditions the late 1970s and early1980s,larger minorofficials, numbers ofsoldiers, and merchants attempts to escape. tookto the seas in desperate reasons,the UnitedStateshad For both politicaland humanitarian establimits little choicebut to acceptthesepeople outsidethe numerical lished under the 1965 Act. Althoughonly 335 Vietnameseenteredthe
United States duringthe 1950s and 4,300 arrivedduringthe 1960s, 172,000 were admitted during the 1970s and 281,000 arrived during the 1980s. In

in Indochinaled to the additionto the Vietnamese, the US misadventure ofmanythousandsofCambodian, an Laotian,and Hmongrefugees, entry influxthat collectively totaled300,000 by 1990. In all, about a thirdof ofthe to thefailedintervention Asianimmigrants since 1970 can be traced Service and Naturalization United States in Indochina (US Immigration immigration fromAsia and Latin For different reasons, therefore, to official statisAmericahas surgedoverthepast two decades.According averaged675,000 duringthe petics,the totalannual flowofimmigrants riod 1971-93, an influxthatin absolute termsexceeds the 621,000 observedduring during theclassicera from 1901 to 1930. Unliketheentrants were overwhelmthe earlierperiod,these 15.5 millionnew immigrants LatinAmericaand overa third ingly non-European:about halfcame from in Asia; 13 percent were from Europe.The peak yearwas 1991, originated forpermanent residencein the when 1.8 millionpersonswere admitted UnitedStates. is,bothabsolutely As largeas theannual flowof675,000 immigrants an it nonetheless constitutes and relativeto earlierperiodsin US history, forit does not capturethe underestimate ofthe truelevel ofimmigration, fullextentof undocumented to the United States,a category migration thatbecame increasingly the 1970sand 1980s. Although during important
1994: 28).




thefigures in Table 1 include3.3 million summarized former undocumented migrants who legalizedtheirstatusunder the 1986 Immigration Reform and ControlAct (IRCA), theydo not include otherillegalmigrants who failedto qualify fortheamnesty program or who enteredafter1986. Woodrow-Lafield (1993) estimates thatabout 3.3 millionadditional undocumented in immigrants lived the UnitedStatesas of 1990, bringing the totalnumberofimmigrants fortheperiod1971-93 to around 854,000 per year.Thisfigure stillunderstates the truesize of the inflow, however, because her estimatedoes not include immigrants who enteredillegally and subsequently died, or those who subsequently Full incoremigrated. porationof all undocumented migrants into the figures of Table 1 would boostthe relative shareofLatinAmericans even more,giventhepredominance of Mexicans in this population.Among undocumentedmigrants countedin the 1980 census,estimates suggest that55 percentwere Mexican (Warrenand Passel 1987), and ofthoselegalizedunderIRCA, 75 percentwere from Mexico (US Immigration and Naturalization Service1991). Whatever itis clear allowanceone makesfor undocumented migration, thataround 1970 the UnitedStatesembarkedon a new regimeof immigrationthat marksa clear break with the past. The new immigration is composed of immigrants fromAsia and Latin America,a large share of whomare undocumented in substantially numand who are arriving larger berscomparedwithearlier periodsofhighimmigration. the 1965 Although amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Actplayed some role in creating thisnew regime,ultimately the effect of US immigration policy has been secondary.The dramatic change reflects more powerfulforces in theUnitedStatesand elsewherein the world. operating

The new immigration ofethnicity and thefuture

No matter what one's opinionofthe melting pot ideology, the remarkable amalgamation ofEuropean immigrants intothe societyand cultureofthe UnitedStatesis a historical fact. The disparate thecoungroups thatentered in greatnumbers try between1880 and 1930-Italians, Poles,Czechs,Hungarians, and RussianJews-were notonlyquitedifferent from Lithuanians, priorwaves ofimmigrants from Northern and Western Europe,theywere also quite different fromone anotherin termsof language,literacy, culture,and economicbackground. After severalgenerations ofUS residence, however,the differences are largely gone and thevariousgroupshave to a greatextentmerged one large,amorphousclass ofmixed together to form European ancestry. in Southernor EasternEuBy 1980, mostpeople reporting ancestry rope were in theirthirdor fourth generationof US residence,and as a resultofextensive in earlier intermarriage generations, theywere increasofmixedorigins. Overhalfofthosereporting ingly Polish,Russian,Czech,




or Hungarianancestry in the 1980 census were of mixedparentage;and forwomen ofItalianand Russian the rateofintermarriage was 60 percent forCzech women,and 88 origin, 70 percent forPolishwomen,83 percent percentforHungarianwomen. For all women,the odds of intermarriage olderto younger cohorts, and intergroup rose sharply as one movedfrom differences withrespect to income,education,and occupationhad all but disappeared(Lieberson and Waters1988). in the populationofmixedEuropean anAs a resultofrapidgrowth losingcontact withtheirimmigrant cestry, whiteAmericans are gradually origins. Researchby Alba (1990) shows thatsuch people do not regularly cook or consumeethnicfoods;theyreport experiencing little or no ethnic uninvolved and uninterested prejudiceor discrimination; theyare largely in ethnicpolitics; to be members of any ethnicsocial or theyare unlikely political organization; and theytendnotto live in ethnicneighborhoods. the identify themselves ethnically, AlthoughmostwhiteAmericans complexand thepercentage who call themlabelsare growing increasingly at all" is rising (Lieberson and Waters1988; selves"American" or "nothing socialworldofEuropeanAmeriAlba 1990). In thelate twentieth-century are common,ecomixedancestries cans,whereintermarriage is pervasive, mixing is the norm,ethnicity nomicdifferences are trivial, and residential a rangeof "ethnic has become symbolic (Gans 1979), a choicemade from (Waters1990). options"thatare looselytiedto ancestry of the past,the descendants ethnicity Comparedwiththe ascriptive of ethnicity" ofEuropean immigrants (Alba are movingintothe "twilight the use of ethnic a lack of assimilation, 1981), and ratherthan signaling of Eurohas come. The amalgamation labels proveshow farassimilation of pean ethnicgroupshas proceededto such an extentthatexpressions to nationalunity.On the ethnicidentity are no longer as threats perceived oneself the use ofethniclabels has become a way of identifying contrary, as American(Alba 1990). as a model It is naturalto view the processof European assimilation Present for theincorporation intoUS society. ofAsiansand LatinAmericans ofethnicfragmentation fears were fears thatsimilar are assuagedbynoting worofItalians, Poles,and Jews.Nativist expressed about theimmigration appearto be assimilatriesare allayedby showingthattoday'simmigrants to available evidence,income and ocing much as in the past. According cupational statusrise with time spent in the United States; patternsof thoseof nativesas sofertility, language,and residencecome to resemble becomes cioeconomicstatusand generations increase;and intermarriage in and increment commonwitheach succeedinggeneration increasingly incomeand education(Massey 1981; Jassoand Rosenzweig1990). ofassimilation, however,ignoresthe Focusingon individual patterns on occurs.By focusing structural contextwithinwhich the assimilation thatthe remarkwe forget microlevel attainment, analysesof immigrant




able absorption ofEuropeanimmigrants in the past was facilitated, and to a largeextent enabled,byhistorical conditions thatno longer prevail.Compared withthe greatEuropeanimmigrations, the new immigration differs in severalcrucialrespects thatsignificantly altertheprospects forassimilationand, hence,themeaningofethnicity forthenextcentury. The first unique historical feature of European immigration is thatit was followed by a longhiatuswhen fewadditional AlEuropeansarrived. thoughnearly15 millionEuropeanimmigrants enteredthe UnitedStates in the threedecades between 1901 and 1930, forthe next 60 yearsthe flowfellto the functional equivalentof zero. Comparedwith an annual averageof495,000 Europeanimmigrants from1901 to 1930, only85,000 arrivedeach year from1931 through1970, and most of these were not Poles,Italians, orRussianJews, thebiggroups before 1930.Although overall immigration revivedafter1970, the flowfrom Europe remainedsmallat around88,000 peryear. Thus,after theentry oflargenumbers ofEuropeansfor some 50 years, theinflux suddenly stoppedand for thenext60 years-roughlythreegenerations-it was reducedto a trickle. from The cutting off of immigration Europeeliminated thesupplyofrawmaterials forthegrist millofethnicity in theUnitedStates, ensuring thatwhatever ethnic identities existed would be predominantly within a consequenceofeventsand processesoperating theUnitedStates. Without a fresh thegenerational ofimmigrants each year, comsupply position of people labeled "Italians,""Poles," and "Czechs" inexorably shifted: first, foreigners gave way to the native-born, thenfirst-generation nativesyieldedto the children of natives,and more recently the children ofnativeshave givenway to the grandchildren ofnatives.Over time,successivegenerations dominated the populations ofEuropean ethnicgroups and came to determine each theircharacter. With generational transition, ethnic untilfinally most identities and themeaning itself shifted ofethnicity groupsmovedintothe "twilight ofethnicity." Thispattern facilitated ofassimilation was undoubtedly greatly bythe In essence,it gave the UnitedStates longhiatusin Europeanimmigration. a "breathing social and economicprospace" withinwhich slow-moving cesses leading to assimilation could operate.The hiatus shaped and constrained the meaningof ethnicity the generational by limiting complexity ethnic the of underlying each group's identity: ending Europeanimmigration in 1930 meant that forall practicalpurposes,ethnicgroupswould neverincludemorethanthreegenerations at anypointin time. In additionto generational change,the otherengine of immigrant of European assimilation is social mobility, and a second historical feature immigration is thatitwas followed bya sustained economicexpansionthat for offered unusual opportunities From1940 socioeconomic advancement. through1973, incomesrose,productivity increased,unemployment fell,




ratesdeclined,ratesof college atpoverty income inequalitydiminished, oflivingseemed as the US standard tendancegrew,and housingimproved and 1963; Levy 1987, 1995). Firsteach year (Galbraith to riseeffortlessly Europerodethis and Eastern Southern from immigrants second-generation and WestwithNorthern wave ofprosperity to achievefulleconomicparity ernEuropeansby 1980. and conditions-thelong hiatusin immigration Thus,two structural responsible forthe theeconomicboom thataccompaniedit-are primarily into the United States. of European immigrants assimilation remarkable ofimmigrant ofthesefactors lacking, thestory arrival, adaptaWereeither conclusion would have had a verydifferent absorption tion,and ultimate or the emergenceof symof ethnicity than movementinto the twilight condiof thesetwo structural bolic ethnicity. On the otherhand, neither from Asia and LatinAmerica, thenew immigrants tionsis likely to holdfor are likelyto be quite differand outcomesofassimilation and thepatterns entas a result. space" of a 60-year"breathing Ratherthan havingthe opportunity the cohorts of immigrants, large within whichto absorband accommodate immigration. ofperpetual become a country UnitedStateswillmorelikely Unlikethe European ethnicgroupsof the past, today'sLatin Americans augmentedby continuously and Asians can expectto have theirnumbers than being a onea steadysupplyof fresharrivalsfromabroad. Rather struchas become a permanent immigration timehistorical phenomenon, ofthe UnitedStates. society ofthepostindustrial turalfeature of causes is a matter of the different influence Althoughthe relative a from stems clearly migration debate (Massey et al. 1993), international at severallevels (Masseyet al. 1994). operating offorces complexinterplay countries provideincentives betweenpoor and affluent Wage differentials at the destinaearnings forindividuals to reap higherlifetime to migrate send migrants Households 1987). Maruszko Todaro and 1976; tion(Todaro againstrisk as a means of self-insuring to work in foreign labor markets at home (Stark failures created bymarket and overcoming constraints capital societiesbecause arisesin postindustrial 1991). A demand forimmigrants and status, pay, little with low of jobs a class creates segmentation market few mobility thatnativeworkerswill not accept (Piore 1979); prospects creates itself societies intodeveloping and thepenetration ofmarket forces movement(Sassen 1988). a mobile populationdisposedto international world. in thedeveloping byrapidpopulationgrowth is amplified The effect to thatis resistant Once begun,migratory flowsacquirea momentum ofsocialtiesdevelop or regulation (Massey1990a). Networks management in sendingreand relatives in destination to linkmigrants areas to friends formin the eventually gions (Massey et al. 1994). Branch communities riseto enclave economiesthatact as magnetsfor giving society, receiving additional (Portesand Bach 1985; Portesand Manning 1986; immigration




Logan,Alba, and McNulty1994). Large-scale emigration causes othersocial and economicchangeswithin bothsending and receiving societies that lead to itscumulative causationovertime(Massey 1990b). Thus, current knowledgeabout the forces behind international migrationsuggeststhatmovementto the UnitedStateswill grow,not decline. None of the conditions known to play a role in initiating international migratory flows-wage differentials, marketfailures, labor market segmentation, globalization oftheeconomy-is likely to end anytimesoon. Moreover,the forcesthatperpetuateinternational movement-network formation, cumulative causation-help to ensurethattheseflowswillcontinueintothe foreseeable future. To a greatextent, theseforces are beyondthe immediate reachofUS policy, particularly immigration policy. Despitethepassageofmore-restrictiveimmigration laws and the enactment ofincreasingly punitive policies, illegalmigration from Mexico (and elsewhere)has continuedto growand showsno signsofdiminishing (Donato,Durand,and Massey 1992; Massey and Singer 1995). Althoughpoliticianscall foreven stronger measures (Lamm and Imhoff 1985), the forces producing and perpetuating immigration appearto be ofsuch a magnitude thatthenew regime ofUS immigration maycontinueindefinitely. The beliefthatimmigration flowscan be controlled through legislationstemsfrom a misreading ofUS history. Although the cessationofEuropean immigration in 1930 is widelyattributed to the implementation ofrestrictive quotas in the early1920s,I arguethatthe cutoff actuallyoccurredbecause of a unique sequence of cataclysmic events:WorldWar I, theBolshevik Revolution, theGreat Depression, and WorldWarII. A similar of destructive the powstring and bloodyeventsmight ariseto extinguish erful Latin migratory flowsthathave become well established throughout America and Asia,butfor thesakeoftheworld we shouldhope theydo not. In all likelihood, therefore, the UnitedStateshas alreadybecome a ofperpetual country immigration, one characterized bythecontinuousarrivalof largecohortsof immigrants from particular regions.This factwill inevitably createa verydifferent structure ofethnicity comparedwiththat prevailing amongEuropeanimmigrant groupsin thepast. Changesin the about not size ofpopulations from LatinAmericaand Asia willbe brought successionand only throughassimilative processessuch as generational intermarriage, but also through the countervailing processofnet inmigraAmerican and Asian tion.In contrast of Latin theranks to Europeanethnics, from abroad. ethnics willbe augmented continuously withnew arrivals Ratherthancreating relatively homogenouspopulationsspanningat mostthreegenerations, the new regimewill therefore produceheterogecomneous ethnicpopulations characterized by considerable generational plexity. Processesof social and economicassimilation actingupon earlier




arrivals and theirchildren, when combinedwiththe perpetualarrivalof ofethnicity along thelines new immigrants, willlead to thefragmentation of class, generation, and ancestry. Ratherthan a slow, steady,and relatowardtwilight, itwillincreasingly tively coherent progression ofethnicity stretch from dawn to dusk. Moreover,because the social and economicforcesthatproduce asimmigration workquickly, similation operateslowly, whilethosepromoting the rateat whichethnicculture by new arrivals from abroad is augmented willtendto exceed therateat whichnew ethnicculture is createdthrough in the United and intermarriage generational succession,social mobility, States.As a result, willbe determined relatively the character ofethnicity more by immigrants shifting the and relatively less by latergenerations, balance ofethnicidentity and ways oflifeof towardthelanguage,culture, the sendingsociety. The future state of ethnicity in the UnitedStatesis now seen most in theMexicanAmerican ofnorthUpontheannexation clearly population. ern Mexico into the UnitedStatesin 1848, fewerthan 50,000 Mexicans all Mexibecame US citizens(Jaffe, Cullen,and Boswell 1980). Virtually can Americanstoday are descendantsof immigrants who arrivedin the During thistime, theUnitedStates 100 years between1890 and thepresent. tenfrom Mexico exceptfora brief, experienced continuousimmigration thatwill proba pattern yearspan duringthe 1930s,thereby establishing in thefuture ofimmigration (Hoffman 1974; ablycharacterize other streams Cardoso 1980; Masseyet al. 1987). fromMexico, Mexican Owing to the long historyof immigration of generations, socioeconomic Americans are distributed across a variety identities and,ultimately, (Bean classes, legalstatuses, ancestries, languages, thatcharand Tienda 1987). Ratherthan the relatively coherent identity is rifewith internal acterizedEuropean ethnicgroups,Mexican identity and de la Garza and tensions(Browning divisions, conflicts, contradictions, is restateof ethnicity 1986; Nelson and Tienda 1985). The fragmented in the factthatthe US Bureau of the Census mustuse threesepaflected rateidentifiers in its SpanishOriginquestion-Mexican, Mexican Amerito a particular conception can, and Chicano-each of which corresponds ofMexican identity (Garcia1981). and fragcreatea new,complex, Notonlywillcontinuous immigration and theirdescendants mentedkind of ethnicity, but the new immigrants theone experienced are likely to encounter a verydifferent economyfrom Ratherthan rising and theirchildren. prosby the European immigrants and occupational economictrends pointin the opperity mobility, current and In theUnitedStatessince 1973,wages have stagnated positedirection. incomeinequality has grown(Phillips1990; Levy 1995); the long decline in poverty strucin theoccupational ratesended (Smith1988); and mobility




turehas decreased(Hout 1988). Moreover, just at the pointwhen public schoolsused byimmigrants have fallen intoneglect, theimportance ofeducation in the US stratification systemhas increased(Hout 1988; DiPrete and Grusky 1990; Levy1995),particularly for Hispanics (Stolzenberg 1990). Thus, not onlywill the UnitedStateslack the opportunity of an extended periodwithin whichto absorb and integrate numan unprecedented ber of new immigrants, but one of the basic enginesof past assimilation maybe missing: a robusteconomythatproducesavenues of upwardmobilityforpeople with limitededucation. Continuous immigration will strengthen therelative influence offirst-generation arrivals in creating ethnic culture, whiletherigidification oftheUS stratification system willslow the rateof socioeconomic advancement amongthe second and third generations,makingthemlook more like the first. Both of these structural conditions will increasethe relative lanweightof the sendingcountry's in defining guage and culture ethnicidentity. The new immigration also differs from in other Europeanimmigration respects likelyto influence in the creationand maintenanceof ethnicity the UnitedStates.Although the flowof immigrants from1971 to 1993 is smaller relative to thesizeoftheUS population thantheflowduring actually theclassicera,itis moreconcentrated in terms ofnationalorigins and language. As Table 2 shows,the rateof legal immigration (3.0 per thousand population)is presently less thanhalfthatobservedduringthe classicera (6.3 per thousand);and even making an allowanceforundocumented migration (raising thetotalannual flowto 830,000) does noterase the differential (it increasesthe rate only to 3.8 per thousand population). But whereasthelargest oftheclassicera (Italians)represented nationality only 19 percentof the total flowof immigrants, the largestgroup under the new regime (Mexicans) constitutes 24 percentof the flow. Moreover, whereasthe languagemostoftenspokenby immigrants in the classicera from (Italian) was confined to immigrants one country, the mostimportantlanguageamongthe new immigrants (Spanish)is spokenby migrants from a dozen countries who together constitute 38 percent ofall arrivals. Thus,althoughEuropean immigrants were relatively largerin number,theywerescattered acrossmorenational-origin groupsand languages, thereby reducingtheirsalience fornativewhite Americansand limiting thepossibilities forlinguistic in the UnitedStates.For Eurosegmentation pean immigrants during theclassicera,theonlypractical was linguafranca English; but sincenearly 40 percent ofthenew immigrants speak thesame language,Spanishbecomesviableas a secondlanguageofdailylife,creatingthepossibility ofa bilingual society. The new immigrants are not only more concentrated linguistically, In 1910 the fivemostimportheyare also moreclustered geographically. tantimmigrant-receiving statesof the UnitedStates-New York,Pennsyl-




TABLE 2 Indicators of the relative size and concentration of immigration to the United States in two periods of the twentieth century Classicera

New regime

Rate ofimmigration(per 1,000 population) (including Rate of immigration undocumentedmigrants) Share oflargestnationalgroup (percent) group (percent) Share oflargestlinguistic destination Share ofthe fivemostimportant states,1910 and 1990 (percent)a urban Share of the fivemostimportant 1910 and 1990 (percent)b destinations,

6.3 6.3 19.4 19.4 54.0 35.6

3.0 3.8 23.6 38.4 78.2 47.9

Illinois,Massachusetts,and stateswere New York,Pennsylvania, destination aIln 1910 the fivemostimportant in 1990 theywere California, New York,Texas, Illinois,and Florida. New Jersey; were New York,Chicago,Philadelphia,Cleveland, and urban destinations 1910 the fivemostimportant biln Boston; in 1990 theywere Los Angeles,New York,Chicago,Anaheim-SantaAna, and Houston. Service 1991, 1993: Tables 2, 17, and 18; US Bureau ofthe and Naturalization SOURCES: US Immigration Census 1913: Tables 15 and 16.

and New Jersey-tookin 54 percentof the vania, Illinois,Massachusetts, (New York, urbandestinations important five most the whereas totalflow, Cleveland,and Boston) received36 percentof the Chicago,Philadelphia, immigrant-receiving the fivemostimportant flow.By 1990, in contrast, and Florida-absorbed78 perTexas,Illinois, states-California, New York, urban areas (Los Angeles, cent of the flow,and the fivemostimportant Ana, and Houston) receivednearly New York,Chicago,Anaheim-Santa areas receiving theseimThe metropolitan immigrants. halfofall entering New York,Chicago,and Los Angeles-were the most migrants-notably guarand massmediain thecountry, centers ofcommunication important would be a visiblepresencenot onlyin anteeingthatthenew immigration at centers oftheEast and Westcoasts,butin the country thecosmopolitan large. in a few immigrants ofSpanish-speaking The increasing concentration itself. changetheprocessofassimilation areas willinevitably metropolitan will ofSpanishspeakers largecommunities thenew immigration, Through theeconomicand social costsof emergein manyUS urbanareas,lowering of speakingSpanish. As a the benefits not speakingEnglishwhile raising from LatinAmericaare less likelyto learnEnthe new immigrants result, at the turnof the century glishthan were theirEuropean counterparts enclaves-a (Jassoand Rosenzweig 1990). The emergenceof immigrant processalreadywell advancedin manyareas-also reducesthe incentives to learn otherculturalhabitsand behavioralattributes and opportunities ofEuro-American society.




The new immigration to the UnitedStatesfromAsia and Latin America that has become increasingly prominent since 1970 has several features thatdistinguish itfrom theolderEuropeanimmigration ofthe earlytwentiethcentury. First, the new immigration is partof an ongoingflowthat can be expectedto be sustainedindefinitely, makingthe UnitedStatesa country ofcontinuousimmigration rather thana nationofperiodicentry. Second,thenew immigrants willlikely enter chara highly stratified society acterizedby highincomeinequalityand growing labor marketsegmentationthatwill providefeweropportunities forupwardmobility. naThird, tionalorigins and geographic destinations ofthenew immigrants are highly in concentrated, creating largeforeign-language and cultural communities manyareas ofthe UnitedStates. That these distinctive conditions will prevailin the comingdecades and beyondis, of course,conjectural-otherscenariosare also possible.I I described would argue,however,thatthe conditions are the mostlikely outcome of existing and well-established trends.If so, the experienceof and inEuropean immigrants providesa poor model forthe assimilation ofnew immigrants from corporation Asia and LatinAmerica.Ratherthan relatively homogenousethnicgroupsmovingsteadily towardassimilation withtheAmerican willcreatecomplexethmajority, thenew immigration nic groupsfragmented along the lines of generation, class,ancestry, and, ultimately, identity. Ratherthan ethnicpopulationsmovingtowardthe of ethnicidentity, will be stretched twilight ethnicity itself out acrossthe generations to reachfrom dawn to dusk. The uninterrupted fromLatin Americawill also flowof immigrants increasethe prevalenceand influence of the Spanish language and Latin culturein the UnitedStates.LargeSpanish-speaking have alcommunities readyemergedin the gatewaycitiesof New York,Los Angeles,Houston, and Chicago,and Latinoshave become the majority in Miami, San Antonio, and in most citiesalong the Mexico-US border.The combination of continuous immigration and highregional and linguistic concentration will produce more such communities and will move the UnitedStatestoward and biculturalism. bilingualism will become more of a twoAssimilation way street, with Euro-Americans learningSpanish and consumingLatin cultural products as well as Latinslearning Englishand consuming AngloAmericanproducts.Increasingly for the economicbenefits and prospects mobility will accrue to those able to speak both languagesand move in two cultural worlds. Since these trendswill occur in an increasingly rigidand stratified society, growing antagonisms along class and ethniclinescan be expected, both withinand betweengroups.Given the salience of race in American




and the Caribbean, from Africa ofblackimmigration life,the acceleration the relain theUnitedStates, ofracialconflict and hostility and thehistory is likely to be partionship betweennativeblacksand thenew immigrants (see Portesand Stepick 1993; Portesand Zhou ticularly conflict-ridden 1993). Althoughthese trendsare now mostapparentwithrespectto Latin and ethnic forimmigration Mexicans,the potential Americans, especially in Asia,wheremigration to the United transformation is probably greater alone is enorforChineseimmigration Stateshasjust begun.The potential not ofall legal immigrants, mous. Alreadythe Chinesemake up 7 percent and variousSoutheastAsian countries, the ethnicChinesefrom counting and Chinatowns have arisenand expandedin manyUS cities.Sincetheory is createdby ecoevidence suggestthatlarge-scaleemigration empirical nomic developmentand marketpenetration(Massey 1988; Hatton and towardmarkets and rapideconomic Williamson1992), China'smovement growth maycontainthe seeds ofan enormousmigration. withmore when appliedto a country Even a smallrateofemigration, thatwould dwarf thana billion people,wouldproducea flowofimmigrants linking now observedfromMexico. Social networks levels of migration and in the future will China and the UnitedStatesare now beingformed from Chinaand otherpopuserveas thebasis formass entry. Immigration potentialto lous, rapidly developingnationsin Asia has an unrecognized alterthe meaning and to further transform America'sethniccomposition ofethnicity in theUnitedStates. and conception

DATA APPENDIX: Immigrants to the United States from major world regions: Numbers by decade 1901-90 and for 1991-93 (thousands)

Region of origin Years 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-93 1901-93 Europe 8,056 4,322 2,463 348 621 1,326 1,123 800 762 466 20,287 Americas 362 1,144 1,517 160 356 997 1,716 1,983 3,615 2,104 13,954 Asia 324 247 112 17 37 153 428 1,588 2,738 1,032 6,676 Other 53 23 15 3 21 39 55 122 223 103 657 Total 8,795 5,736 4,107 528 1,035 2,515 3,322 4,493 7,338 3,705 41,574

andNaturalization SOURCE: US Immigration Service 1994:Table2.







Alba, RichardD. 1981. 'The twilight of ethnicity among AmericanCatholicsof European sityPress.
ancestry," Annals oftheAmerican Academy ofPoliticaland Social Science454: 86-97. . 1990. EthnicIdentity: The Transformation of WhiteIdentity. New Haven: Yale Univer-

Bean, Frank D. and Marta Tienda. 1987. The Hispanic Population of the UnitedStates.New

York:RussellSage. Blau, FrancineD. 1984. 'The use oftransfer payments by immigrants,' Industrial andLabor
RelationsReview37: 222-239. Borjas, George J. 1990. Friendsor Strangers: TheImpactofImmigrants on the U.S. Economy. New

York:Basic Books. . 1994. "Immigrants and the U.S. welfaresystem," paper presented at the Symposium on Immigration, PopulationStudiesand Training Center, BrownUniversity, 11 March. and MartaTienda. 1987. "Theeconomicconsequencesofimmigration," Science 235: 645-651.

and Richard B. Freeman (eds.). 1992. Immigration and the Workforce: EconomicConsequencesforthe UnitedStatesand SourceAreas. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Brimelow, Peter. 1995. Alien Nation: Common SenseAboutAmerica'sImmigration Disaster.New

York:RandomHouse. Browning, HarleyL. and Rodolfode la Garza (eds.). 1986. Mexican Immigrants and Mexican Americans: AnEvolving Relation. Austin:CenterforMexicanAmerican Studies,UniversityofTexas. ofArizonaPress. versity DiPrete, ThomasA. and David B. Grusky. 1990. 'Structure in theprocessofstratiand trend fication forAmerican men and women,"American 96: 107-121. Journal ofSociology Donato, KatharineM., Jorge Durand,and Douglas S. Massey. 1992. "Stemming the tide? Assessing thedeterrent effects oftheImmigration Reform and Control Act," Demography 29: 139-157. Edmonston, Barry and Jeffrey Passel. 1991. "Thefuture immigrant populationoftheUnited States,"paperpresented at the Conference on Immigration the Urban and Ethnicity, Institute, Washington, D.C., 17-18 June. Espenshade,ThomasJ. and CharlesA. Calhoun. 1993. "An analysisof public opiniontoFerenczi, Imre.1929. International Migration, Vol. 1, Statistics. New York:NationalBureau of EconomicResearch. JohnK. 1963. TheAffluent New York:Dutton. Galbraith, Society. J. 1979. 'Symbolic ethnicity: Gans, Herbert The futureof ethnicgroupsand culturesin
Social ScienceQuarterly 62: 88-98. San Francisco: InGlazer, Nathan. 1985. Clamorat theGates: The New AmericanImmigration. ward undocumented immigration,"PopulationResearchand PolicyReview 12: 189-224. Cardoso, Lawrence. 1980. Mexican Emigrationto the UnitedStates: 1897-1931. Tucson: Uni-

and sociodemographic Garcia,JohnA. 1981. "Yo soy Mexicano: Self-identity correlates,' forContemporary stitute StudiesPress.

America," Ethnicand Racial Studies2: 1-20.

tongue," Social ScienceQuarterly 65: 537-550. Handlin, Oscar. 1951. The Uprooted: thatMade theAmeriThe Epic Story oftheGreatMigrations

of Spanishmother Gilles.1984. "Shifts to English Grenier, as usual languageby Americans canPeople. Boston:Little, Brown. G. Williamson.1992. "International Hatton,Timothy J. and Jeffrey and world migration

and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1970. BeyondtheMelting Pot: The Negroes, PuertoRicans,Jews, Italians, and IrishofNew YorkCity.Cambridge: MIT Press. Greeley, Andrew. 1971. WhyCan 't TheyBe Like Us? New York: Dutton.




Higham, John. 1963. Strangers in the Land: Patternsof AmericanNativism,1896-1925. New

development: A historical perspective," Historical Paper No. 41. NationalBureau of EconomicResearch, Cambridge, Mass.


Hoffman, Abraham. 1974. UnwantedMexican Americansin the GreatDepression:Repatriation

Pressures 1929-1939. Tucson:University ofArizonaPress. Hout,Michael. 1988. "More universalism, less structural mobility: The Americanoccupationalstructure in the 1980s,"American Journal ofSociology 93: 1358-1401.
Hutchinson, Edward P. 1981. LegislativeHistory of AmericanImmigration Policy,1798-1965.

Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press. A. J., Ruth M. Cullen, and Thomas D. Boswell. 1980. TheChanging of Jaffe, Demography
New York: Academic Press. Spanish Americans. in the Jasso, Guillermina and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1990. The New ChosenPeople: Immigrants Kindleberger, Charles P. 1967. Europe's PostwarGrowth:The Role ofLabor Supply.New York: of Lamm, Richard D. and Gary Imhoff. 1985. The Immigration TimeBomb: The Fragmenting Levy, Frank. 1987. Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American IncomeDistribution. New York:

United States. New York:RussellSage.

Oxford University Press.

America. New York:Dutton.

RussellSage. .1995. "Incomes and incomeinequality," in Reynolds Farley(ed.), State oftheUnion-

Americain the 1990s,Vol. 1: EconomicTrends.New York: Russell Sage, pp. 1-58. Lieberson, Stanley and Mary C. Waters. 1988. FromMany Strands:Ethnicand Racial Groupsin America.New York: Russell Sage. Contemporary

economiesin metLogan,JohnR., Richard D. Alba,and ThomasL. McNulty. 1994. "Ethnic ropolitan regions: Miamiand beyond,"Social Forces 72: 691-724. to the UnitedStatesand Massey,Douglas S. 1981. "Dimensionsof the new immigration theprospects forassimilation," Annual Review ofSociology 7: 57-85. perspec.1988. "Economicdevelopment and international migration in comparative
tive," Populationand Development Review 14: 383-413. gration," PopulationIndex 56: 3-26.

causationofmi.1990a. "Social structure, householdstrategies, and thecumulative AnnalsoftheAmerican . 1990b. "The social and economic originsof immigration," The toAztlan: RafaelAlarcon, Gonzalez. 1987. Return Jorge Durand,and Humberto

Academy ofPoliticaland Social Science510: 60-72.

ofCalifornia University Press. et al. 1993. "Theoriesof international A reviewand appraisal, Populamigration:
tionand Development Review 19: 431-466. case, Populationand Development Review20: 699-751.

Social ProcessofInternational Migration fromWestern Mexico. Berkeley and Los Angeles:

et al. 1994. "An evaluationof international The NorthAmerican migration theory:

and and AudreySinger.1995. "Newestimates ofundocumented Mexicanmigration theprobability ofapprehension," Demography 32: 203-213. Yansin Virginia Morawska, Ewa. 1990. "Thesociology and historiography ofimmigration," Oxford University Press, pp. 187-240. Historical ofHispanicethnicity: Nelson,Candace and MartaTienda. 1985. "The structuring and contemporary 8: 49-74. Ethnic andRacialStudies perspectives,"
Ethnics.New York: Macmillan. Novak, Michael. 1971. The Riseofthe Unmeltable 1870-1914. Bloomington: The GreatTransatlantic Nugent, Walter. 1992. Crossings: Migrations, McLaughlin (ed.), Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics.New York:

in the Phillips, Kevin. 1990. The Politicsof Rich and Poor: Wealthand the AmericanElectorate New York: Random House. Reagan Aftermath.

Indiana University Press.




Piore, Michael J. 1979. BirdsofPassage: MigrantLabor in IndustrialSocieties. New York: Cam-

bridge University Press.

Portes, Alejandro and Robert L. Bach. 1985. Latin Journey: Cuban and MexicanImmigrants in

theUnited States. Berkeley and Los Angeles:University ofCalifornia Press. and RobertD. Manning. 1986. "The immigrant enclave: Theoryand empirical examples,"in Susan Olzak and JoaneNagel (eds.), Competitive Ethnic Relations. Orlando: AcademicPress, pp. 47-68. Los Angeles:University ofCalifornia Press. and Min Zhou. 1993. "Thenew second generation: Segmented assimilation and its
and Alex Stepick. 1993. Cityon theEdge: The Transformation ofMiami. Berkeley and

Rothman, Eric S. and ThomasJ.Espenshade. 1992. 'Fiscal impacts of immigration to the LaborFlow.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simon,JulianL. 1984. "Immigrants, taxes,and welfarein the UnitedStates,"Population Smith, JamesP. 1988. "Poverty and the family in the UnitedStates,"in GaryD. Sandefur
Stalker, Peter. 1994. The WorkofStrangers: A Survey ofInternational Labour Migration.Geneva: and Development Review10: 55-69. and Marta Tienda (eds.), Divided Opportunities: Minorities, Poverty, and Social Policy.New United States,' PopulationIndex 58: 381-415. Sassen, Saskia. 1988. The Mobility ofLabor and Capital:A Studyin International Investment and

variants," Annals oftheAmerican Academy ofPoliticaland Social Science530: 74-96.

York:Plenum,pp. 141-172.

International LabourOffice. Stark, Oded. 1991. TheMigration ofLabor.Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Stevens,Gillian.1985. "Nativity, intermarriage, and mother-tongue Socioshift," American Stolzenberg, Ross M. 1990. "Ethnicity, of Hisgeography, and occupationalachievement panic men in the UnitedStates," American Sociological Review 55: 143-154. tionalLaborOffice. and LydiaMaruszko. 1987. "Illegalmigration A conreform: and US immigration
logicalReview50: 74-83.

Todaro, Michael P. 1976. International Migrationin DevelopingCountries.Geneva: Interna-

ceptual framework,"Populationand Development Review 13: 101-114. Censusofthe UnitedStatesTaken in the Year 1910, US Bureau of the Census. 1913. Thirteenth YearbookoftheImmigration US Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1991. Statistical and

Census. Abstract ofthe D.C.: US Government Washington, Office. Printing

D.C.: US Government Naturalization Service, 1990.Washington, Office. Printing

ternational Migration Review22: 545-562. States. Warren, Robert and Ellen P. Kraly. 1985. TheElusiveExodus:Emigration fromthe United

ton,D.C.: US Government Office. Printing Calvin. 1988. "Modelling Veltman, Inthe languageshift processofHispanicimmigrants,"

1994. Statistical YearbookoftheImmigration and NaturalizationService, 1993. Washing-

aliens counted in the 1980 United States Census," Demography 24: 375-393. in America.Berkeley and Los AngeIdentities Waters, Mary C. 1990. EthnicOptions:Choosing

PopulationReference Bureau, OccasionalPaperNo. 8. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau. and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1987. "A countoftheuncountable: Estimates ofundocumented

les: University ofCalifornia Press. in the UnitedStatesin 1989KarenA. 1993. "Undocumented residents Woodrow-Lafield, 1990: Issues ofuncertainty in quantification," at theAnnualMeeting paperpresented ofthe Population Miami. ofAmerica, Association
Return toEurope 1880-1930. Ithaca: Wyman, Mark. 1993. RoundTriptoAmerica:TheImmigrants

CornellUniversity Press.