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Docket No. 12-56892 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELEN GALOPE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE UNDER POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF MAY 1, 2007 SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2007-BR4; WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC; BARCLAYS BANK PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE INC. d/b/a HOMEQ SERVICING; OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, and DOES 4 through 10, Inclusive, Defendant - Appellee. APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF APPEAL FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT For the Central District of California, Santa Ana Case No. 8:12-cv-00323-CJC (RNBx) The Honorable Cormac J. Carney, Presiding Lenore L. Albert, Esq. SBN 210876 Law Offices of Lenore Albert 7755 Center Avenue, Suite #1100 Huntington Beach, CA 92647 Ph: 714-372-2264 Fx: 419-831-3376 Email: lenorealbert@msn.com Counsel for Plaintiffs Appellants, Helen Galope On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS .........................................................................4 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................13 STATEMENT OF KEY ISSUES ON APPEAL .........................................16 STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................16 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................................................17 STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................19 ARGUMENT..............................................................................................20 A. This Case Cannot Be Mooted Through Involuntary Settlements ................. 17 B. Price Fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act .......................... 23 1. Plaintiff Has Standing to Bring This Claim .............................24 2. Plaintiffs Consumer Expectations Were Not Taken Into Account ..................................................................................25 3. The Consumer Expectation Test is Widely Used ....................26 4. The Rational Expectation Theory is Also Used .......................27 5. Article III Standing Was Met in this Case ...............................30 6. Plaintiff was a Purchaser of the Price Fixed Product So She Met the Direct Injury Test ................................................30 7. Plaintiff Had a LIBOR Loan so Her 30-Year Debt Was Tied to LIBOR ........................................................................31 8. Plaintiff Rationally Expected to Refinance to A Lower Rate at a Later Time So She Purchased the Loan ....................33 9. Plaintiff Had Standing to Obtain an Injunction .......................35
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C. 17200 As to the LIBOR Manipulation ........................................................38 1. The Nature of Plaintiffs Injury; that is, This Was the Type of Harm the Antitrust Laws Were Intended to Forestall .............................40 2. The Injury is Direct ................................................................................41 3. The Nature of the Harm is not Speculative.............................................41 D. FAL Based on LIBOR Manipulation ..........................................................45 E. Wrongful Foreclosure .................................................................................47 1. No Tender Is Required ...........................................................................49 2. The Maker of the Note Did not Transfer the Note to Any Defendant ..............................................................................................50 3. The Documents had Indicia of Robo-Signing ........................................50 F. Transferring Property in Violation of 11 USC 362 is an Unlawful Business Practice ........................................................................................51 G. Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing .........................................................53 1. The Power of Sale Covenant ..................................................................53 2. Implied Covenant to Disclose All Material Terms .................................54 H. Fraud ..........................................................................................................56 1. Misrepresentation ..................................................................................57 2. Knowledge of Falsity .............................................................................57 3. Intent to Defraud or Assertion of Fact of that which is Not True by one who has No Reasonable Ground for Believing it to Be True ...........57 4. Justifiable Reliance ................................................................................58 5. Damage ..................................................................................................59 I. Declaratory Relief .......................................................................................60 J. UCL 17200 As to the Modification .............................................................60 K. Failure to Give Leave to Amend .................................................................61 IX. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................62 X. XI. XII. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES .......................................................64 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT..........................................................65 PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................................66

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Supreme Court Opinions Blue Shield v McCready, 477 US 465, 107 SCt 2540 (1982) .............................. 31 BMW of North America v. Gore, (1996) 517 U.S. 559 , 134 L. Ed. 2d 585, 123 S. Ct. 1513 ......................................................................................... 52 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) .......... 31 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Ent'l Serv., Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) ............................................ 21, 32 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) .................................................................................... 29, 32, 35 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) ................................................................................................ 27 Northern Pacific Ry. v. U.S., 356 US 1, 5 (1958) ...................................... 7, 24, 40 U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150 (1940) .............................. Passim Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1969) ............................................................. 32 Ninth Circuit Opinions Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................. 35 Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) .......................................... 20 Big Bear Lodging Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................................................................................................ Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................ Crayton v. Concord EFS, Inc. (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.), 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................... Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) ...... 24 34 31 47

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) .............. 61 Erickson v PNC Mortg., 2011 WL 1743875 (D. Nev May 6, 2011) .................... 53 Freeman v San Diego Assn of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) ............. 25 Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2009) ........................................... 20

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Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) ............... 19 In re Abrams, 127 BR 239, 240-244 (9th Cir BAP 1991) .................................... 47 In re Davis, 177 BR 907, 911-912 (9th Cir BAP 1995) ....................................... 48 In re Dawson, 390 F3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir 2004) .............................................. 51 In re Ramirez , 183 BR 583, 589 (9th Cir BAP 1995) ......................................... 51 In re Wardrobe, 559 F3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................. 46 Johnson v General Mills, Inc, 275 FRD 282, 286 (CD Cal 2011) ....................... 60 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) ......................................... 21 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................. 19 Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) ............ 20 Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................ 46 Royal Printing Co. v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980) ......... 36 Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................... 20 Simo v. Union of Needletrades, 322 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................. 19 Southwest Marine, Inc. v Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 805 808 (ND Cal 1989) .......................................................................................... 37 Sternberg v Johnston, 595 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................. 47 Studio Unions v Loews, Inc. 193 F2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir 1951), cert denied, 342 US 919, 72 SCt 367 (1952) ................................................................ 30 Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp. 918 (C.D. Cal. 1966) ........................................................................................ 38 Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................... 35, 48 Susilo v Wells Fargo Bank, 706 F Supp 2d 1177 (CD Cal 2011) ......................... 54 Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................ 19 Second Circuit Opinions U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1376-70 (2d Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................... 33 Third Circuit Opinions Sterling Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Mortgage Corner, 97 F.3d 39 (3rd Cir. 1996) ......... 27
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Fifth Circuit Opinions In re Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 908 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Miss) ................. 32 Sixth Circuit Opinions Dry Cleaning & Laundry Institute of Detroit, Inc. v. Flom's Corp., 841 F. Supp. 212, 215 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ............................................................ 33 Seventh Circuit Opinions A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989) ........................................................................................................ 27 Wigod v Wells Fargo, 673 F3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................. 53 Eighth Circuit Opinions Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1989) .............................................. 27 Eleventh Circuit Opinions Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) ......................................... 27 California State Opinions Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ............ 26 Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239 ...................... 57 Allied Grape Growers v Bronco Wine Co, 203 CalApp3d 432 (1988) ................ 43 Boschma v Home Loan Ctr, Inc. 198 CalApp4th 230, 254 (2011) ....................... 60 Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc., (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 371-372 .................................................................. 52 Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) ................................................................................................ 37 Chern v Bank of America, 15 Cal3d 866, 870 (1976) .......................................... 44 Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1255 ...... 56 DeMando v Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................. 55 Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal.App.4th 499 (1997) .................... 38, 51 Intengan v BAC Home Loans Servicing, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 225 (3/22/13) ................................................................................................... 61 Johnson v. Ford Motor Company, 35 Cal. 4th 1191 (2005) ............................... 51
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Jolley v Chase Bank Finance, LLC, (2013, 1st Dist) 2013 Cal.App. LEXIS 107 ................................................................................................. 55, 56, 61 Kwikset Corp. v Sup. Court, (2011) 51 Cal 4th 310 ......................... 38, 39, 59, 60 Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 ........................................... 56 Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93 ........................................ 56 Motors, Inc. v Times-Mirror Co., 102 CalApp3d, 735, 741-742 (1980) .............. 37 Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 .................................................... 46 People v Toomey, 157 CalApp3d 1 (1985) .......................................................... 43 Pfeiffer v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 211 Cal App4th 1250 (12/13/12) 48, 59, 61 Poseidon Development Inc v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1106 ........................................................................................... 59 Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1225 (1999), (Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51-51.4) ..................................................... 38 Shapiro v. Sutherland 64 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1548 (1998) ................................... 57 Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 553 (1998) .............. 38 Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (2002) ........... 38 Wallace v Geico General Ins. Co., 183 CalApp4th 1390 (2010) ................... 21, 51 West v. Johnson & Johnson, 174 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ............ 26 West v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 CalApp4th 780 ........................ 61 Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 952 (2000) ................................ 38 Other State Opinions Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213 (Del. Ct of Chanc. 1999) .......... 27 Federal Statutes 7 USC 9 ............................................................................................................. 41 7 USC 12(a)(2) ................................................................................................. 41 7 USC 13b .................................................................................................. 41, 42 11 USC 362 .............................................................................................. Passim 28 USC 1291 ...................................................................................................... 1 28 USC 1332 ...................................................................................................... 1 Commodity Exchange Act Section 6(c) ......................................................... 16, 41
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Commodity Exchange Act Section 6(d) ........................................................ 16, 41 12 CFR 226 ....................................................................................................... 54 62 Fed. Reg. 23,189 (Apr. 29, 1997) ................................................................... 55 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) ................................................................... 55 California Statutes California Business & Professions Code 17200 .............................. 21, 37, 50, 51 California Business & Professions Code 17204 ................................................ 21 California Commercial Code 3201 ..................................................................... 49 Penal Code 115 ................................................................................................. 49 Penal Code 132 .................................................................................................. 49 Penal Code 186.2 .............................................................................................. 49 Penal Code 470 ................................................................................................ 49 Senate Bill 900..................................................................................................... 23 Other 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 654A(B) at 89 (Supp. 1994). .......... 27 Restatement Second of Torts (section 533) .......................................................... 57 4 Witkin, Sum. Of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Secured Transactions in Real Property, 168. .......................................................................................... 46

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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The district court had jurisdiction over this matter because it concerned a controversy of $5,000,000.00 or greater where at least one plaintiff was diverse from the defendant under CAFA 28 USC 1332. This court has jurisdiction under 28 USC 1291 to review a final order of dismissal. Judgment was entered on October 11, 2012 (Doc. No. 111) (ER 8-17) as to the Barclays LIBOR Rate Defendants, and judgment was entered on September 26, 2012 (Doc. No. 108) as to the Deutsche Bank National Trust Company Foreclosing Defendants (Doc. No. 108) (ER 18-28) as a direct result of a series of interlocutory orders to show cause that issued. (ER 29-32) A timely appeal was noticed on October 16, 2012. (ER1-7) II. STATEMENT OF KEY ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in dismissing a putative class action of borrowers who purchased LIBOR loans against the LIBOR manipulation defendants for violation of the antitrust laws, unfair competition, false advertising law, fraud, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the foreclosing defendants who took Plaintiffs property in violation of the

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automatic stay then refused to rescind the sale thereafter; and created a modification agreement but purportedly used legal size paper that contained all of the payment terms then faxed it to plaintiff to sign on the grounds Plaintiff did not have standing because Plaintiff was not injured as a result. 3. Whether issuing a series of Orders to Show Cause was just in this case. 4. Whether the district court erred in not allowing plaintiff leave to amend. III. PRIMARY AUTHORITY

All applicable statutes, constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules are contained in the brief, except for Californias Home Owners Bill of Rights (HBOR) which is already part of the record in the Excerpts. Circuit Rule 28-2.7 IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Helen Galope received a loan from loan seller, New Century Mortgage, in 2006 with a high interest rate expecting to refinance in 6 months. It was a LIBOR based loan and she was not allowed to refinance to a lower rate. She was offered a modification but did not receive all modified terms because it was a legal size document faxed to her which she printed on letter paper. When she sought bankruptcy protection to work the loan out, defendants transferred title during the automatic stay by foreclosure sale. Barclays was the entity servicing the loan and 2

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created the trust and SWAP agreements. DBNTC was the trustee. Barclays and DBNTC later admitted they were involved in manipulating the LIBOR rate during the relevant time period of this loan. Those financial institutions bet against the borrower, and cashed in. Plaintiff seeks to reinstate this putative class action against DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE UNDER POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF MAY 1, 2007 SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2007-BR4; WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC; BARCLAYS BANK PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE INC. d/b/a HOMEQ SERVICING; OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, and DOES 4 through 10, inclusive, (Defendants) on the grounds that defendants were a substantial factor in plaintiff losing her home. V. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March On March 1, 2012 Helen Galope filed this action alleging wrongful foreclosure, declaratory relief, breach/rescission, violation of Truth In Lending (TIL) and unfair competition liability (UCL) claims. (ER 33 -43). The action was originally filed against the foreclosing Defendants, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (DBNTC); and Western Progress, LLC. (ER 33 57). 3

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On June 27, 2012 the CFTC imposed the largest civil penalty ever against Barclays (d/b/a HomeEq) for unlawfully manipulating the LIBOR market rate during the time Galope was given her loan based on LIBOR and modification thereon. Barclays was fined $454 million dollars for its conduct of market manipulation. (ER 359). At that time, Barclays Bank PLC, Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq Servicing, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen) were added to the Complaint as Defendants along with the supplemental allegations of price-fixing. (ER 653). Helen Galope acquired title to her home located in Los Angeles County, California on September 24, 2004. (ER 37, 242). Her original loan was an Interest Only Adjustable Rate Mortgage that was set to reset in 2006. (ER 242). Her broker reassured her that she could obtain a fixed rate loan at a lower interest rate before the mortgage reset. (ER 242). So she contacted the broker in 2006 to refinance her mortgage. (ER 37, 242). However, when she arrived to sign the new papers, she was once again being placed in another Interest Only Adjustable Rate Mortgage that would reset in two years. (ER 242). The initial interest rate of 8.775% was better than what her current mortgage would be after it reset so she signed the document upon the expectation that she would be receiving a new refinance package with a lowered fixed rate in the next six months. (ER 242). 4

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This refinance was secured by a deed of trust with a promissory note whereby New Century Mortgage Corporation, the loan seller, sold plaintiff a LIBOR interest only adjustable rate mortgage in the sum of $522,000.00 secured by Ms. Galopes Subject Property on or about December 15, 2006. (ER 37, 242, 656). New Century was hired as an agent of Barclays to sell this particular loan product. According to the Defendants, Plaintiffs loan was placed in a mortgage backed securitized trust captioned the SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2007-BR4 (MBS trust). (ER 656). Defendant, DBNTC was the trustee in charge of administering the MBS trust. (ER 656). Defendant, Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq was the designated servicer on this loan which defendant Ocwen took over in 2009-2010. (ER 656). Defendant, Barclays Bank PLC was the administrator of the sponsor, wholly owned the depositor as a subsidiary, and was the Interest Rate Swap and Cap Provider of the MBS trust. (ER 656). The terms of Ms. Galopes loan were abusive and predatory. (ER 242, 656). Ms. Galopes debt was based on the LIBOR rate. (ER 656). 5

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There were 5,072 loans placed in the MBS trust and a substantial portion of them were based on the LIBOR rate like Ms. Galopes loan. (ER 657). The interest rate would adjust every six (6) months based on the published LIBOR rate plus other fixed percentage points added to the LIBOR rate as laid out in the Note. (ER 657). LIBOR is an acronym for London Interbank Offered Rate and is, intended to be a barometer to measure strain in money markets, that it often is a gauge of the markets expectation of future central bank interest rates, and that approximately $350 trillion of notional swaps and $10 trillion of loan are indexed to LIBOR. (ER 657). Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Barclays PLC and Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq Servicing was manipulating the LIBOR rate from 2005 through 2009. (ER 657). The Barclays Defendants and Deutsche Bank defendants are some of the largest international financial institutions in the world. (ER 657). They are two (2) of sixteen (16) financial institutions that daily report their interest rates that are then pooled together where in the middle eight (8) rates are then averaged for Barclays then to create the LIBOR rate. (ER 657). The LIBOR rate is reported daily in the Wall Street Journal and there is also the 1 month, 3 month, 6 month and 12 month LIBOR rate. (ER 657). Ms. Galopes home loan was based on the 6 month LIBOR rate. (ER 657). 6

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The average home loan in the United States is a loan expected to be paid back over a thirty year (30) term. (ER 657). Ms. Galopes home loan was originally supposed to be paid back over a 30 year term. (ER 657). Over the course of a loan, a consumer, like Ms. Galope is expected to pay principal plus interest based on the principal loan amount which is supposed to be based on the current market value of the home. (ER 658). The market interest rates of LIBOR which represents the cost of loaning money and market value of long term investments such as real property are complementary rates that should fluctuate in unison over time based on independent market factors. If it costs more dollars to borrow money (the LIBOR rate) then the price to buy the property should also go up (market value). (ER 658). Barclays, along with the assistance of DBNTC and other nondefendants manipulated the LIBOR rate. (ER 658). Traditionally, certain agreements have been conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue. Northern Pacific Ry. v. U.S., 356 US 1, 5 (1958). (ER 658).

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Such agreements are considered illegal, per se. U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150 (1940). (ER 658). Barclays has entered into several agreements with various government agencies admitting that Barclays and other financial institutions and their agents/employees were manipulating the LIBOR rate, fixing the rate higher or lower at various times from 2005 through 2009. (ER 658). According to Appendix A to the Non-Prosecution Agreement, dated June 26, 2012 between the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Barclays Bank PLC, at the same time plaintiff, Ms. Galopes initial loan rate was being figured, a message was sent to manipulate the LIBOR rate as follows: For Monday we are very long 3m cash here in NY and would like the setting to be set as low as possiblethanks (December 14, 2006, Trader in New York to Submitter). (ER 659). Six Month LIBOR in November of 2006 was 5.3495 percent. (ER 659). Plaintiffs note based on LIBOR required plaintiff to initially pay 8.775 percent interest. (ER 266). There was no margin that would account for the difference in the rate in the note. The note just plainly stated that the interest only period would be 8.775 percent interest. 8

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Consequently, Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation with the information known to her that she could refinance for a lower rate in the future when she entered into this loan product. Over the next several years while Barclays was manipulating the LIBOR rate, the manipulated LIBOR rate actually decreased. (ER 385-387; 382-383; 389409; 455-472) So while plaintiff was stuck paying 8.775% fixed interest on her interest only LIBOR rate loan, Barclays was making a positive cash flow and keeping consumer expectations high that they could enter into these bad loan products on the grounds it looked reasonable that they could obtain a lower interest in the future. This promise made upon signing was a common industry practice during this time period. (ER 2066 et seq) The problem was that the actual LIBOR rate was not a true market rate but it was being artificially suppressed. Through various government investigations, it was discovered that LIBOR submitters regularly considered the swaps traders reques ts when determining and making Barclays US Dollar LIBOR submissions. (ER 385-387; 382-383; 389409; 455-472) The court found that Plaintiff had no standing under any theory on the grounds she had not been harmed. Galope alleged that during this time period, she 9

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paid $34,354.17, $20,229.88 and $9,430.92 in interest on her loan in 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. By mid-2008 she was in default and at risk of her losing her home. (ER 2070-2101) During each of these years, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc d/b/a HomEq were manipulating the LIBOR rate. (ER 385-387; 382383; 389-409; 455-472) Ms. Galope was hospitalized in 2008 wherein she nominally fell behind on her interest mortgage payments. (ER 243) To cure the default, plaintiff attempted to obtain a loan modification on April 7. 2008 from Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc d/b/a HomEq where $7,634.26 was then capitalized to the principal amount owed on her loan which also coincided shortly after the last item was publicly reported to the SEC with regard to the MBS trust. (ER 55-57; 119-121) Taheera Franklin, employee of HomEq, faxed a document dated April 7, 2008 titled Modification Agreement to plaintiff on or about April 10, 2008. Attachment A recited that the $7,634.26 was being added to the principal of the loan; that the existing payment of $3,817.13 was being reduced to $2,465.61 plus impound of $561.41 making her new payment $3,027.02 and that the remaining term on her new loan was 345 months at an interest rate of 5.5%. (ER

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55-57; 119-121; 2070-2101)Taheera Franklin instructed plaintiff to sign it and fax it back. So, plaintiff immediately signed the agreement as presented on the belief that her loan was modified to more favorable terms and continued to make all of her payments in 2008. Plaintiff complied with all conditions contained in the document, signed and started making the modified payments under the belief she received the modification as represented by defendants representative on the telephone. Defendant HomEq accepted and cashed plaintiffs payments of $3,027.02 through on or about April 1, 2009. Ms. Galope noticed that the description of her modified terms stopped at March 1, 2013. Paragraph 1(d) at the bottom of page one of the agreement did not pick up again at page 2. It simply read: 1.NOTE MODIFICATIONS: d. The period in which Borrowers monthly principal and interest payment will consist of interest only is extended until 04/01/2013 (the Interest Only Period). Upon expiration of the Interest Only Period, Borrowers monthly principal and interest payment will be increased to an At that point it just stopped in mid-sentence. When she flipped the modification agreement to begin reading the top of the next page, the modification agreement continued with: 11

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3. RELEASE: Borrower releases HomEq, its subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, officers and employees, from any and all claims, damages or liabilities of any kind existing on the date of this Agreement, which are in any way connected with the origination and/or servicing of the Loan, and/or events which resulted in Borrower entering into this Agreement. Plaintiff was shocked and concerned that her modification payments may change on April 1, 2013 contrary to what she was promised in her phone conversations with Taheera Franklin. The fax was misleading in that it stopped at 1.d and then the next page started at 3 making it appear that a page was missing from the fax transmission that contained the missing terms of 1.d and 2 as originally represented by Taheera Franklin over the telephone. After litigation, defendant represented the entire document was merely faxed by defendant without warning that the fax transmission actually contained 2 legal size papers sandwiched between 2 letter size pages in such a way that the least sophisticated consumer would not immediately realize that material terms were missing from the consumers version of the contract. Letter size paper is the customary size paper used for faxes. Defendant apparently placed the material terms of the loan on the bottom three inches of the legal size document that were cut off through the fax transmission when it was printed out on letter size paper. 12

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Plaintiff telephoned HomEq to find out the missing terms and she was directed to and communicated with Taheera Franklin. Taheera Franklin never disclosed the terms or explained to plaintiff that the 2 pages in the middle of the document were legal size documents that contained additional writing that would be omitted if plaintiff had printed out the document on letter size paper. (ER 55-57; 119-121; 2070-2101) Knowing what Ms. Galope was required to pay back per month after April 1, 2013 on her loan was material to the agreement. Taheera Franklin continued to orally represent to plaintiff that the more favorable terms as discussed previously were part of the document but failed to fax or mail over the entire verbiage of the agreement that was contained on the two legal size pieces of paper. Plaintiff followed up with several more phone calls and the same answer was given, nothing more and nothing less. Then one day she was told by Taheera Franklin that the rates could go up or down, but nothing more. Ms. Galope, still not comprehending the scam, continued making her payments but became concerned and hired an attorney Mr. Laverty for $5,600.00 in an attempt to resolve this issue. However, these scams were not known in 2009 or discoverable. (ER 55-57; 119-121) 13

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Defendant responded by causing a Notice of Default to be recorded on the Premises on July 31, 2009. (ER 67, 124-126, 209-211, 145, 181) Plaintiff then sought bankruptcy protection in the hopes to work out this dispute on or about January 15, 2010. By this time defendant Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq Servicing had employed defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC to service plaintiffs loan. The notice of default was rescinded and another notice of default was thereafter recorded on March 8, 2011 by defendant Western Progressive, LLC on behalf of beneficiary Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee under pooling and servicing agreement dated as of May 1, 2007 securitized assetbacked receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR4 Mortgage Passthrough Certificates, Series 2007-BR4 (aka DBNTC). (ER 145, 181) Defendant Ocwen requested Defendant Western Progressive, LLC on behalf of DBNTC to record the Notice of Default. So, Plaintiff sought bankruptcy protection in July 2011 under Chapter 13. Defendant Ocwen requested Courtesy Notice of all filed documents electronically shortly after Ms. Galope filed for bankruptcy protection. (ER 1998-2030)

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Western Progressive, LLC was working on the explicit instruction of defendant Ocwen during this time period. Although the Premises was protected from foreclosure sale by an automatic stay, and defendant Ocwen knew that the stay was in place, defendant Ocwen instructed defendant WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC to transfer the property out of plaintiffs name on September 1, 2011 and recorded a trustees deed upon sale in favor of defendant DBNTC on September 8, 2011 at the Los Angeles County Recorders Office divesting plaintiff of her property interest to the Premises. (ER 1989-2065, 193-194, 154-155, 236, 341) Plaintiff immediately informed defendants OCWEN, WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC and DBNTC that there was an automatic stay pursuant to 11 USC 362 forbidding the transfer of her property on September 1, 2011. Plaintiff also demanded the defendants rescind the transfer and to restore title to the property back in plaintiffs name. (ER 55-57; 119-121) But defendants OCWEN, WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC and defendant DBNTC failed and refused to rescind the TDUS up to and including the date that this action was commenced. (ER 345-346) During this time, plaintiff had no knowledge that her interest rate payments were being fixed by a manipulated LIBOR rate between Submitters and Swap Traders and Barclays. 15

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On June 27, 2012 a press release from the U.S. Dept. of Justice announced Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty. (ER 382-383, 389-409, 385-387, 411-454, 455-472, 2035, 2039, 2037, 2032-33, 1998-2030) LIBOR is an acronym for the London Interbank Offered Rate. At the same time, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the Matter of Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket No. 12-25 issued an Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Section 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions. Barclays Bank PLC was the administrator of the Sponsor to the trust; Barclays Bank PLC wholly owned the depositor of the MBS trust; and the Swap and Cap Provider of the MBS trust. (ER1716 et seq FWP) A substantial number of the borrowers in the trust had LIBOR loans. (ER1391-1714) As a result, defendants conduct has harmed those with loans based on the LIBOR market rate, those whose loans were placed in a trust that contained a substantial number of LIBOR type loans in the pool, those loans where Barclays

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was the Swap Trader and/or Servicer based on the fact that they had the power and control to manipulate the payments required under the loans terms. Then to confuse matters even more, Plaintiffs Note made to New Century was never endorsed by them. Instead there was one lone Allonge with a purported endorsement from Sutton Funding, LLC as assignee to DBNTC. (ER 20702101) Sutton Funding, LLC had no standing to endorse the Note. It became clear that none of these defendants had standing to foreclose based on nonpayment of the Note. VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This is a homeowners rights case. Homeowners rights have become a primary national and state concern. On July 11, 2012 California passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill 900 into law. Part of the preamble states: The people of the State of California do enact as follows: SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following: (a) California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a wave of residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From 2007 to 2011 alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure sales. In 2011, 38 of the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation were in California, and the current wave of foreclosures continues apace. All of this foreclosure activity has adversely affected property values and resulted in less money for schools, public safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the Urban Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local governments, including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred twenty-nine dollars 17

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($19,229) in local government costs. And the foreclosure crisis is not over; there remain more than two million underwater mortgages in California. (b) It is essential to the economic health of this state to mitigate the negative effects on the state and local economies and the housing market that are the result of continued foreclosures by modifying the foreclosure process to ensure that borrowers who may qualify for a foreclosure alternative are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options. These changes to the states foreclosure process are essential to ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by unnecessarily adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative to foreclosure may be available. [Bold Added]

Plaintiff alleged she lost and continues to be on the precipice of losing her home on the grounds that these Defendants were manipulating the entire markets LIBOR rate while creating and servicing these Interest Only Adjustable Rate Mortgages based on LIBOR that were then controlled by the Defendants in the mortgage backed securities such loans were transferred into. Ms. Galope, like many other similarly situated consumers were placed in predatory loans and were reassured they would be able to refinance the loan before the loan they were in was going to reset and become unaffordable. So Ms. Galope rationally expected to refinance her loan in six months after obtaining the 8.775% interest loan to a more affordable product which was rationally based because the LIBOR rate was lower than what she was currently paying. By 2006 this had become a custom in the industry to do so.[ER 355, 3253, 3256] 18

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Ms. Galopes consumer expectation (under the economic rational expectation theory) was not based on the true market rate as consumers were experiencing in 2006; rather the Plaintiff/appellants consumer expectations of continued lowered market rates were based on Defendants direct or indirect manipulation of the LIBOR rate, which a substantial portion of residential financing in the United States was based upon. As a consequence, Ms. Galope was stuck in a bad loan, and like quicksand, started to struggle as the housing and financial sector suddenly imploded. This consumer expectation was created by the Defendants own mortgage product and manipulation of the LIBOR rate - a fact not discoverable until June 27, 2012. Although, the housing foreclosure crisis was a commonly known fact by the time this case was filed in March 2012, the district court did not believe the Defendants conduct could cause any harm to the Plaintiff or those similarly situated. Plaintiff appeals on her behalf, and on all others similarly situated, requesting that this court reverse the district courts summary judgment and its dismissal. VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW Dismissal for failure to state claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). The 19

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Court must accept Appellants allegations of material facts as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to Appellants. Id. A district courts decision to grant, partially grant, or deny summary judgment or a summary adjudication motion is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. See Simo v. Union of Needletrades, 322 F.3d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 2003). On review, the appellate court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). The court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). The abuse of discretion standard is used for denying a motion for leave to amend. Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the Complaint could not be saved by any amendment. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 736 (9th Cir. 2009). VIII. ARGUMENT 20

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A. This Case Cannot Be Mooted Through Involuntary Settlements The District court dismissed every cause of action by way of a Motion to Dismiss or Summary Judgment on the same grounds: that plaintiff purportedly was not harmed by any of the Defendants conduct so she lacked standing. Prior to filing suit, these same defendants took tit le to plaintiffs home by conducting an unlawful foreclosure sale. Plus, they refused to give title back even when faced with the fact that they took it unlawfully. After plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 1, 2012 which followed the next year, Defendant decided to miraculously rescind the trustees deed on March 23, 2012 and then alleged Galope cannot pursue her claims because Defendants rescinded the trustees deed upon sale so she no longer has standing. The court in Wallace v Geico General Ins, Co, 183 CalApp4th 1390, 1401 (2010) explained We see no indication in the history of Proposition 64...that the voters amended section 17204 with the intent of allowing defendants in class actions brought under section 17200 et seq to defeat class status by forci ng an involuntary settlement. What mattered was that Wallace had standing when the suit was filed. Here, Galope had standing when the suit was filed. Defendants held title from September 2011 through March 2012. They clouded her title, tied up her property, caused emotional distress and forced her to wage an all-out litigation war

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in order to make them do the lawful thing they were supposed to do in the first place. [T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Ent'l Serv., Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011)

Wrongfully taking title to real property from September 1, 2011 through March 27, 2012 caused sufficient harm for wrongful foreclosure, and a violation under the UCL as being an unfair practice. Moreover, without future declaratory relief, there is a threatened harm, the defendants will wrongfully take title to the property again. The Defendants refusal to provide the missing material terms to the modification or even record, was a substantial factor leading to the default. Additionally, but for the LIBOR defendants practice of manipulating the LIBOR rate while simultaneously creating bad loan packages with the promise that the borrower would be able to refinance six months later to a lower rate (and giving them a rational basis for believing that to be true), Ms. Galope would not have been facing foreclosure in the first place.

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There is a concrete injury that can be directly traced to the defendants that could be legally redressed. Thus, plaintiff had standing under Article III. The court erred, when it summarily concluded Ms. Galope was not injured. Losing ones home is a substantial injury that causes substantial injury from humiliation, depression, fear, anxiety, and family strife, to destabilization of their own socioeconomic status, their workplace, health and general welfare in addition to shelter and losing something that is unique and irreplaceable. This brief should end here, and the judgments should be reversed, but in an abundance of caution, appellant will address each of the causes of action in their context. B. Price Fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act Plaintiff alleged that defendants injured her due to their manipulation of the LIBOR rate, of which her residential loan secured by a deed of trust attached to her home was based on. The district court summarized the material facts well. Her cause of action for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act was based on allegations that Defendants conspired to fix, raise, and stabilize the LIBOR rate from 2006 through 2009, as well as the rate at which Defendants would sell mortgages incorporating the LIBOR. As a result of this alleged conduct, Ms. Galope contended that she has been injured in her business or property in that she has been forced to pay 23

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interest on her long term investment of 30 years for the purchase of her home based on the LIBOR rate fixed by defendants and their coconspirators which was substantially higher than what she would have paid in the absence of the violations. Ms. Galope also alleged that she has lost/or is losing her property due to the effect of the LIBOR manipulation on the value of the Subject Property. 1. Plaintiff Had Standing To Bring This Claim Galope is alleging price fixing by Deutsche Bank, Barclays and others. Galopes case is one of price fixing based on LIBOR manipulation which has already been admitted to by Barclays and by Deutsche Bank. Such agreements are considered illegal, per se. U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150 (1940). Agreements to fix prices in interstate commerce are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act, and no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which the agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense. U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150, 210, 218 (1940). The court held Plaintiff did not have standing. [T]o plead [antitrust standing], plaintiffs must allege facts that if taken as true would allow them to recover for "an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Big Bear Lodging Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) 24

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Here, plaintiff lost the opportunity to obtain financing of her home based on an independent market rate. Such agreements have been conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue. Northern Pacific Ry. v. U.S., 356 US 1, 5 (1958). Nevertheless, the district court granted defendants motion to dismiss without leave to amend on the grounds Ms. Galope could not have suffered harm based on manipulation of the LIBOR because her interest rate was never affected by the LIBOR. (ER 13) [emphasis added] This was based on the grounds Ms. Galopes note was an adjustable rate with an initial fixed rate of 8.75% until January 1, 2009 so it was not, in the courts mind, affected by the manipulation of the LIBOR rate. 2. Plaintiffs Consumer Expectations Were not Taken Into Account The court wholly ignored that Ms. Galope was affected because she was the direct purchaser of a LIBOR loan product. Whether or not the Plaintiff was a direct purchaser of the product that was being price fixed is the proper test. Injury to Ms. Galope was foreseeable, clearly within the target area and passes the direct injury test.

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The district courts reasoning on the attack of lack of standing as to Ms. Galope is similar to the reasoning of the district court in Freeman v San Diego Assn of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts ruling in Freeman, and it should exercise the same discretion to reverse the district courts decision in this case, too. In Freeman, this circuit explained the flaw in the logic through an analogy that is apt to this case: [i]f Elle Woods pays someone to walk her dog, she's the buyer and the dog-walker is the seller, even though Bruiser gets the exercise. And if the Cambridge dog-walking cartel starts fixing prices, it's hardly a defense for them to say "We just walk dogs!" Freeman, Id at 1144-45. Ms. Galope, like many other similarly situated consumers, expected to refinance her loan in six months after obtaining the 8.775% interest loan in the first place. By 2006 this had become a custom in the industry to do so. 3. The Consumer Expectation Test is Widely Used Ms. Galopes consumer expectation was not based on the true market rate as consumers were experiencing in 2006; rather the Plaintiff/appellants consumer expectations of continued lowered market rates were based on Defendants direct or indirect manipulation of the LIBOR rate, which a substantial portion of residential financing in the United States was based upon.

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As a consequence, Ms. Galope became stuck in a bad loan, and like quicksand, started to struggle as the housing and financial sector crumbled. The rose colored glasses of consumer expectation was created by the Defendants own manipulation and the district courts summary dismissal of this claim at the motion to dismiss stage on the first opportunity when the Defendants and claims were added to the complaint was an error that should be reversed. The use of a consumers expectations in one form or another has been widely recognized in the law. For example, in products liability law, California courts have historically applied a consumers expectations tes t, liberally in cases involving novel factual circumstances or somewhat esoteric scientific issues. See, e.g., Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); West v. Johnson & Johnson, 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 4. The Rational Expectation Theory Is Also Used In economics, there is a similar theory called rational expectations theory. It is an economic idea that people in the economy will make choices based on their rational outlook, available information and past experience. The theory suggests that current expectations in the economy are equivalent to what the future state of the economy will be. This theory has been used in several scenarios when looking at the defendants behavior in Robinson Patterson types of price discrimination schemes. 27

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(See, Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); See, Delmarva Health Plan v. Aceto, 750 A.2d 1213 (Del. Ct of Chanc. 1999) where the court stated the reasonable expectations of the insured 'so far as its language will permit.; Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1362-63 n.17 (8th Cir. 1989). reasonable expectation of recouping any losses from predatory pricing.; A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. , 881 F.2d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 1989) (the rational expectation of later realizing monopoly profits), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019, 108 L. Ed. 2d 501, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990). Sterling Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Mortgage Corner, 97 F.3d 39 (3rd Cir. 1996) ; and 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 654A(B) at 89 (Supp. 1994). Here, even flipped the other way, the financial institutions like Barclays and DBNTC have gained power, profits, and market share throughout this period of time and they had a reasonable expectation of doing so because the MBS trusts were set up that way. (Here, Barclays bet against the trust and was the SWAP and CAP provider). There was no reason to neglect Ms. Galopes consumers expectations when she purchased her loan in 2006, to determine if she had standing under the price fixing scheme that is now before this court.

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Ms. Galope expected she was receiving a loan based on a rate that was not being manipulated by the market actors such as DBNTC and Barclays. Ms. Galopes expectations were that she could obtain a more favorable loan rate after being in this loan for six months, based on her past experiences with her broker and that the new loan interest rate would be more favorable and there was some evidence of that in the record.1 The failure to meet her consumer expectations in this case led to the ultimate threatened loss of her property her home. As such, when Ms. Galope contended that she has been injured in her business or property in that she has been forced to pay interest on her long term investment of 30 years for the purchase of her home based on the LIBOR rate fixed by defendants and their coconspirators which was substantially higher than what she would have paid in the absence of the violations. (TAC 131 .) There was support for that allegation in the record making the allegation plausible.

Furthermore, as can be seen, financial competitors in line with Defendants

imploded making these large financial institutions even larger during this same period of time. This is not, as suggested by some, a case where the consumers benefited from the manipulation of the LIBOR rate.

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Additionally, both expert Mr. Matz and Helen Galope declared that she would not enter into the loan based on LIBOR if she knew LIBOR was being manipulated. (ER 2066-2101) 5. Article III Standing Was Met In This Case The court never discussed the complexities of the Antitrust law itself or made any ruling in that regard, it summarily dismissed the claim on its first round of pleading, without leave to amend on the basis that standing under Article did not exist based, in part on Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555. Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 explains that [a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan at 561. This consumer expectation of being able to refinance at a lower rate was based on the general behavior of the market where the interests were staying in an artificially depressed state. No one knew at the time that the interest rates were going down due to the artificial suppression of the rate by the defendants. 6. Plaintiff Was A Purchaser of the Price Fixed Product So She Met the Direct Injury Test There are two direct injury groups in antitrust price fixing litigation which virtually always pass the standing test: (1) consumers/customers, and (2) the 30

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violators competitors. Ms. Galope falls squarely in the first category because she was defendants customer who bought a Note based on LIBOR that was placed in a pool manipulated by LIBOR and by those who could manipulate LIBOR. This made Ms. Galope a direct purchaser. The target area test was first discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Studio Unions v Loews, Inc. 193 F2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir 1951), cert denied, 342 US 919, 72 SCt 367 (1952). The target area test only requires the plaintiff to show that he is within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. The test gives a strong preference to customers/consumers who are injured like Ms. Galope. 7. Plaintiff Had a LIBOR Loan So Her 30 Year Debt Was Tied to LIBOR The court argued there was no harm because Plaintiffs loan payments she made was not tied to the LIBOR rate. Her debt she purchased and owed was tied to LIBOR. Ms. Galope fell squarely within the target area of the economy because she was left with being tied to a home that was doomed to lose all of its equity due to the timing of her refinancing and encouraged consumers like Galope to refinance their homes without concern of the terms to the extent, the consumers were led to believe that they could refinance at a more favorable rate later from, in substantial part, the manipulation of LIBOR. 31

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In 1982, the United States Supreme Court broadened the test to one of foreseeability in the case of Blue Shield v McCready, 477 US 465, 107 SCt 2540 (1982). The Ninth Circuit follows this broader approach when looking at direct purchasers. Crayton v. Concord EFS, Inc. (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.), 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012) (Direct purchasers have standing to sue. Here, the court affirmed lack of standing of an indirect consumer on other grounds) The district court focused on its belief that Plaintiff was not harmed on the grounds that her loan was written in a way where she initially paid an initial fixed rate. Whatever amount plaintiff was required to initially pay, did not change the fact that the actual debt plaintiff owed was based on LIBOR. It also ignores the consumer expectation part of the analysis. Furthermore, her investment was long term. She purchased a 30 year Interest Only Adjustable Rate Mortgage LIBOR Note in December 2005 that was not due to expire until January 2036. The Supreme Court has recognized parties who are locked into a transaction may be especially vulnerable to the impacts of anticompetitive behavior as they have no opportunity (or only a costly opportunity) to change the transactions terms. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992) . Plaintiffs submissions present dispositive more than the mere "general averments" and "conclusory allegations" found inadequate in Lujan v. National 32

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Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695, 110 S. Ct. 3177, or the "'someday' intentions" to visit endangered species halfway around the world held insufficient in Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. at 564. Pp. 9-13. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000). 8. Plaintiff Rationally Expected to Refinance to A Lower Rate at a Later Time So She Purchased the Loan In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., the Supreme Court explained, "[Plaintiff's] burden of proving the fact of damage . . . is satisfied by its proof of some damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage." 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1969). See also In re Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 908 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Miss. ("An adequate showing of the amount of damages is not necessarily required for the plaintiffs to survive the defendants' motions for summary judgment [in an antitrust action].") Here, we have evidence that this single mortgage backed securitized trust housed almost 5,072 loans, meaning 5,072 similarly situated borrowers where over half were LIBOR rate loans like Plaintiffs loan in this case. In 2008 the entire housing market and financial industry crashed. As a result, Congress passed sweeping legislation under the Emergency Economic Stability 33

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Act of 2008 granting money to a vast majority of financial institutions because they were too big to fail and a foreclosure crisis that was looming to be prevented. However, as recent history teaches us, these large financial institutions only became larger and California became one of the hardest hit states with over x homes in foreclosure. Over 3,000,000 (three-million) homes have been foreclosed upon in the United States since this crisis started - and it is not over yet. In this case, according to Jay Petersons study no loans were modified before 2010 from this mortgage backed securitized trust in order to try to sustain homeownership and there are less than 2,000 left in it. (ER 2114-2120) Like Plaintiff, refinancing was not available to those similarly situated as anticipated when they accepted refinancing because it was based on the false belief that their home equity was going up as the interest rate was falling and was going to continue to fall. (ER2066-69) Even if Galope may be unable to quantify any damages it incurred, it would not deprive her of standing, because she may seek nominal damages. See Dry Cleaning & Laundry Institute of Detroit, Inc. v. Flom's Corp., 841 F. Supp. 212, 215 (E.D. Mich. 1993), and U.S. Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1376-70 (2d Cir. 1988). 34

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9. Plaintiff Had Standing to Obtain An Injunction Finally, Plaintiff has an additional basis for standing because, in addition to damages, she seeks to enjoin Defendants from engaging in continued price collusion. The alleged conspiracy by the defendants to manipulate LIBOR was pervasive, continuing from about 2005 to 2009. Evidence indicates that Barclays and DBNTC employees at the highest levels operated as ringleaders, orchestrating meetings and communicating globally with fellow conspirators to exchange critical price and business information. A settlement with the government resulted from this conduct, but that does not mean that such collusion cannot continue in the future. "[T]he possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs; threatened injury constitutes 'injury in fact.'" Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) "The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing requirements." Id. The financial market that measures the current index of monetary supply remains concentrated, and has continued to consolidate, while barriers to entry for new competitor in this financial arena remain high. LIBOR has not dissipated, it is firmly entrenched in the marketplace and there is no evidence to suggest that 35

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Defendants will not continue to maintain their relationships. These factors can contribute to collusion. In addition, Plaintiff produced significant evidence of Defendants' collusive conduct as presented by the government in the settlement. "[W]here the defendants have repeatedly engaged in the injurious acts in the past, there is a sufficient possibility that they will engage in them in the near future to satisfy the 'realistic repetition' requirement." Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff is tied to a 30-year LIBOR loan with these defendants who were manipulating LIBOR. If she walks away from the loan, she loses her home. Losing a home is irreparable harm. Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff is at a greater risk of future injury than the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) where the threatened harm to the plaintiffs in Lujan was attenuated, based on past trips to foreign countries to observe endangered species, without present plans to return. 504 U.S. at 558-59. In this case, the perspective of damages arising from the LIBOR rate manipulation scandal is that of homeowners who made a loan with the Defendants agent who then deposited that loan with the Defendants subsidiary into a mortgage backed security that the Defendant controlled and bet against while they 36

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manipulated the LIBOR market rate which artificially suppressed the rate making it appear to consumers that refinancing in the near future at a lower rate was possible and thus entering into the market for a long term loan like a mortgage was a more acceptable risk, even if the loan interest rate term was not as low as the person anticipated paying over the life of the loan. This would fit the Royal Printing Co. v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980) exception to the Illinois Brick rule where standing is granted when a direct purchaser As a complimentary corollary, consumers expect that interest rates that rise constricts the money supply and the price of home stabilizes. As interest rates fall, the price of the home can raise. Consequently, they expected that their equity would continue to climb as the interest rates fell. However, the true market rate was suppressed so the true equity in their home was being artificially inflated and then, in 2008 the housing market crashed which was a true adjustment of the market rate and home equity bringing all homes magically underwater and without equity. Without the anticipated equity, Ms. Galopes home value fell to almost half leaving her underwater. She could not refinance t he home loan because there was no longer any equity in it. Ms. Galope and those similarly situated, were injured as a result as they started going into default and could not cure it.

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Although the market rate manipulation was not the sole factor in this injury, it was a substantial factor in causing Ms. Galope and those similarly situated harm. The district court should have found that Plaintiff has shown a threat of future injury enough to pass a motion to dismiss. The presumption of class-wide impact from price-fixing activities, and the availability of nominal damages, this was sufficient to provide Plaintiff with standing to pursue her case on the merits. Accordingly, this court should reverse dismissal of this claim. C. 17200 As to the LIBOR Manipulation The district dismissed this cause of action finding there was no standing. Motions to dismiss are supposed to rarely defeat a Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 claim on the grounds that the complaint is supposed to be construed to uphold the action whenever possible. Motors, Inc. v Times-Mirror Co., 102 CalApp3d, 735, 741-742 (1980); Southwest Marine, Inc. v Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 805 808 (ND Cal 1989). California's unfair competition law prohibits "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200.) And under this law, a practice can be prohibited as unfair or deceptive even if not unlawful, and vice versa. (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999).) For example, a plaintiff's allegations that a defendant used incomplete and misleading illustrations to sell universal life 38

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insurance policies may be actionable under the unfair competition law absent any claim that such conduct violated any regulation or statute. Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co., 78 Cal. App. 4th 952 (2000). An unlawful business practice can be "anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law." (Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp. 918 (C.D. Cal. 1966) This prong of the unfair competition law allows a plaintiff to enforce a broad array of state and federal statutes, including consumerprotection statutes (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (2002) (Cal. Civ. Code 2954.4); antidiscrimination statutes (Reese v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1225 (1999), (Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51-51.4)); criminal statutes (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 553 (1998), (Cal. Penal Code 308); and environmental statutes (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. , 54 Cal. App. 4th 499 (1997), (Cal. Pub. Res. Code 4511).) Injury in fact to have standing to bring this claim was outlined in Kwikset Corp. v Sup. Court, (2011) 51 Cal 4th 310 where the California Supreme Court reaffirmed economic injury from unfair competition may be shown: A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; (2) have a present or future property interest diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to which he or she has a 39

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cognizable claim; or (4) be required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary. Id. at 323. Contrary to the courts conclusion that Plaintiff was not paying on a LIBOR loan, the Deed of Trust had an Adjustable Rate Rider attached to it that was captioned as follows: ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER (L1BOR Six-Month Index (As Published In The Wall Street Journal)-Rate Caps) 2 YEAR RATE LOCKS YEAR INTEREST ONLY PERIOD (ER 176-179)

1. The Nature of Plaintiffs Injury; that is, This was the type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall Galope is alleging price fixing by Deutsche Bank, Barclays and others. Galopes case is one of price fixing based on LIBOR manipulation which has already been admitted to by Barclays and by Deutsche Bank. Such agreements are considered illegal, per se. U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150 (1940). This is exactly the type of injury the antitrust laws were enacted to forestall. Agreements to fix prices in interstate commerce are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act, and no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which the agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense. U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150, 210, 218 (1940).

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2. The Injury is Direct Defendants contend that Galope was not injured by the price fixing. In fact, they speculate that it would have only helped Galope because it would have lowered how much she owed because the rate was depressed. Agreements to fix prices in interstate commerce are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act, and no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which the agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense. U.S. v SoconyVacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150, 210, 218 (1940). 3. The Nature of the Harm is not Speculative Such agreements have been conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue. Northern Pacific Ry. v. U.S., 356 US 1, 5 (1958). Both Ms. Galope and expert witness William Matz have supplied declarations that Ms. Galope and those similarly situated would not borrow money from an entity that could fix the interest rate at which the borrower was required to pay in the future. (ER 2066-2101) As explained by the US Supreme Court in U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150 (1940), [r]uinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price 41

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cutting, and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event, the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended. U.S. v SoconyVacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 US 150, 222(1940). Galopes loan and monthly obligations were not based on an independent index. The depositors administrator, Barclays, who was also the servicer and Swap trader of her loan was manipulating the price she had to pay on her monthly obligations by fixing the interest rate. No one would knowingly enter into a loan in which they knew the lender could manipulate the rate. (Decl of Matz, Decl of Galope) The fact that the actual rate may have gone down or up is irrelevant; what matters is that the rate was not independently determined. (ER 2066-2101) There were 5,072 loans placed in this trust. LIBOR loans are identified 3,232 times in the Free Writing Prospectus FWP. (RJN). (ER 1716-1988) The CFTC found that Barclays manipulated the LIBOR and as a result violated Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 USC 9, 13b and 12(a)(2). (ER 1326-1368) 42

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7 USC 9 prohibits manipulation of the market. Unlawful manipulation for purposes of this paragraph shall include, but not be limited to, delivering, or causing to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any means of communication whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate. 7 USC 9(a)(1)

7 USC 13b makes such conduct a felony: Barclays repeatedly attempted to manipulate the market and made false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate submissions concerning LIBOR. (ER 19982030) From at least mid-2005 through the fall of 2007, and sporadically thereafter into 2009, Barclays, through the acts of its swaps traders and submitters, attempted to manipulate US Dollar LIBOR.. (RJN Ex 7 pg 7-8) The swap traders made the requests in person, via email, and through electronic chats over an instant messaging system. (RJN Ex 7 pg 8) The swap traders, included internal swap traders and they requested that the LIBOR be placed higher or lower depending on their position. DBNTC has admitted that some of its staff was involved in this market manipulation. (ER 2037, 2039) A defendant need not know that the conduct was unlawful, but the defendant who has knowledge of the conduct and assists by 43

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aiding and abetting can be held liable, such as individual corporate officers or majority stockholders. People v Toomey, 157 CalApp3d 1 (1985). There were messages fixing the LIBOR rate during the time period Galope received her loan as demonstrated by the US DOJs office. (RJN). This is akin to the case of Allied Grape Growers v Bronco Wine Co, 203 CalApp3d 432 (1988) wherein defendants practice of downgrading grapes which occurred over a one-month time period was a practice even though it was done with respect to a single contract, since the contract was with a cooperative having many members. Defendant urged the court to find that there was no damage as a result of the market manipulation. However, as explained above Galope and those similarly situated were entering into these predatory loans with a consumer expectation of being able to refinance to a better loan product in the near future because defendants were artificially manipulating the LIBOR rate where it was artificially depressed. These predatory products were created by the same Defendants who were manipulating the LIBOR index. It was done at a profit and is the very essence of a sophisticated price-fixing scheme. Moreover, no consumer would knowingly enter into a long term contract with the other party who has the ability to change the borrowers interest rate

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because that interest rate was not based on an independent market, as represented, but on their own artificial manipulation of it. Here, the plaintiff was losing her home to foreclosure. A loss or threat of loss of property is an injury of the type envisioned by Kwikset to sustain the element of standing. As such, the court should have found plaintiffs have pled injury and have standing to sue under the UCL and the courts decision dismiss ing this cause of action should be reversed. D. FAL Based on LIBOR Manipulation Again, the court dismissed this cause of action based on the failure to allege any harm to the plaintiff. The rule is that advertising that can be interpreted in a misleading way should be construed against the advertiser. Resort Car Rental System, Inc v FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975). Advertising includes a banks misquote of interest rates over the telephone to a potential borrower. It does not have to be put in the public media. Chern v Bank of America, 15 Cal3d 866, 870 (1976). Here, the LIBOR rate was advertised in the Wall Street Journal on a regular basis. Barclays manipulated the LIBOR rate and published it in the Wall Street Journal. 45

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The LIBOR rate is an index that consumer expectations would be based upon and in this instance consumers expected that the rates were low and they could obtain more favorable refinancing in the near future. The Defendants misquoted the entire market rate and induced certain market behavior by consumers, to the Defendants profit and the consumers injury. Ms. Galope, like many other similarly situated consumers, expected to refinance her loan in six months after obtaining the 8.775% interest loan in the first place. By 2006 this had become a custom in the industry to do so. Ms. Galopes consumer expectation was not based on the true market rate as consumers were experiencing in 2006; rather the Plaintiff/appellants consumer expectations of continued lowered market rates were based on Defendants direct or indirect manipulation of the LIBOR rate, which a substantial portion of residential financing in the United States was based upon. (ER 2066-2101) As a consequence, Ms. Galope became stuck to a bad loan and like quick sand started to struggle as the housing and financial sector crumbled. The rose colored glasses of consumer expectation was created by the Defendants own manipulation and the district courts summary dismissal of this claim at the motion to dismiss stage on the first opportunity when the Defendants and claims were added to the complaint was an error that should be reversed. 46

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E. Wrongful Foreclosure The elements of a common-law cause of action for damages for wrongful foreclosure are: (1) Trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of real property; (2) pursuant to a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust; and (3) the Trustor or mortgagor sustained damages. (Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7; see 4 Witkin, Sum. Of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Secured Transactions in Real Property, 168.) On August 30, 2011 Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC was notified that an automatic stay was initiated, prohibiting the transfer of Ms. Galopes property outside of the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, through its authorized agent, Western Progressive, transferred Ms. Galopes property to DBNTC in violation of 11 USC 362 on September 1, 2011. Any act taken in violation of an automatic stay in bankruptcy (11 USC 362) is void. Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 1995). See also, In re Wardrobe, 559 F3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2009). Consequently, the transfer of Galopes property on September 1, 2011 was an illegal sale. The transfer was made by a nonjudicial foreclosure that was initiated pursuant to a power of sale provision in Ms. Galopes deed of trust. Ms. Galope sustained damages as a result. She was deprived of title to her property for months; and incurred costs and attorney fees in order to regain title to the property. 47

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The District found summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the grounds there was no injury to Plaintiff. After the transfer occurred, Helen Galope immediately notified the defendants of the illegal transfer but they refused to rescind the sale. Defendants wrongfully retained the title to the property for months. In re Abrams, 127 BR 239, 240-244 (9th Cir BAP 1991). The Defendants did not rescind the sale until 23 days after this action was commenced. As such, plaintiff was forced to incur costs and attorney fees in order to remedy the violation, causing her damage. Types of damages include costs and attorney fees, actual damages, and emotional damages due to the violation. Sternberg v Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 943 and 946-948 (9th Cir. 2010) The district court found that holding title to Plaintiffs property from September 1, 2011 through March s, 2012 did not create any harm. This Court has held that "actual damages" that may be recovered by an individual who is injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.S. 362(h), include damages for emotional distress. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit declined to require a financial loss as a predicate to awarding emotional distress damages. Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Emotional distress can be determined by the circumstances making it obvious that a reasonable person would suffer significant emotional harm. Significant harm includes a parent having to cancel her childs birthday p arty because a creditor froze the bank account. Dawson, supra. This was an obvious cloud on Ms. Galopes title wherein she lost title to her residence. She lost her home. This circuit knows this type of situation not only to be a harm reasonably known to all, but an irreparable one, too. Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, Galope declared she incurred expenses and attorney fees in remedying the stay violation which defendants do not refute. Because Galope has not been compensated for her damages yet, her claim is not moot. In re Davis 177 BR 907, 911-912 (9th Cir BAP 1995). 1. No Tender Is Required Finally, Ms. Galopes wrongful foreclosure cause of action did not require tender on two grounds (1) the sale was rescinded after this case was filed and (2) the trustees deed upon sale was void and any void sale never requires tender. Pfeiffer v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 211 Cal App4th 1256 (12/13/12)

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2. The Maker of the Note Did not Transfer the Note to Any Defendant Second, Ocwen sent Plaintiff a letter dated February 28, 2011 stating that the Note it was foreclosing on was enclosed. The Note was made between New Century Mortgage and Helen Galope. The Note was not endorsed in blank. It contained an Allonge purportedly specially endorsing the note from Sutton Funding, LLC to Defendant DBNTC. Since the indorsement was not made from New Century Mortgage, the attempt to transfer to DBNTC was void under California Commercial Code 3201. (Cal Comml Code 3201(b) if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement by the holder.) 3. The Documents Had Indicia of Robo-Signing Finally, on top of the mystery Allonge without an endorsement in blank, the records provided by Ocwen were specious at best. The names were cut off; there were signature lines missing from the documents; and even the recording dates were blurred beyond legibility. Stacy appears in many different capacities. She apparently has a LinkedIn page showing she actually works as a paralegal for Barclays PLC. (ER 1288-90, 1292-93, 1288-1295) 50

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Plaintiffs documents were signed, and had signature blocks cut and pasted to create documents to initiate and conclude a nonjudicial foreclosure. (ER 161-75, 209-11, 228, 93-94, 131-132, 145). This type of robo-signing as described above, violated Penal Code 470, 115, 132, 186.2 as Criminal profiteering activity which means any act committed or attempted or any threat made for financial gain or advantage. As explained above, the evidence or lack thereof existed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the basis of fraud. The court erred in dismissing this cause of action on each of these grounds. F. Transferring Property in Violation of 11 USC 362 is an Unlawful Business Practice Plaintiff alleged it was defendants business practice to ignore automatic stay provisions and as such, this violated Cal Bus & Prof Code 17200. It is unlawful to transfer property while there is a bankruptcy stay prohibiting any transfers. 11 USC 362. Defendants violated 11 USC 362 by transferring plaintiffs property while the automatic stay under 11 USC 362 was in place. Again, the court did not deny the violation but found no standing on the grounds the court believed Plaintiff was not harmed.

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Such recidivism entitled plaintiff to injunctive relief in addition to any damages, attorneys and costs she may recover under the wrongful foreclosure claim. Violations of existing TRO orders are akin to automatic stays and are actionable claims under the UCL. Defendants claim that the cause is now moot. Case law is contrary. In Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal.App.4th 499 (1997), the plaintiffs complaint alleged the defendants violated Cal Business & Professions Code 17200 by cutting down trees in violation of an existing TRO. The court noted that had the defendants waited just a short time, it could have lawfully cut the trees down. However, since it did not wait, a viable claim for violating Cal Business & Professions Code 17200 was made. Actual damage ares mandatory. In re Ramirez 183 BR 583, 589 (9th Cir BAP 1995). Damages include attorney fees, costs and emotional distress. In re Dawson, 390 F3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir 2004). Here, it is uncontroverted that Ms. Galope was placed in distress over the transfer for nine months that duration of distress warrants substantial emotional distress damages. (Decl of Galope) Third, Defendant cannot moot the claim and pick off the plaintiff by what would amount to an involuntary settlement. See, Wallace v Geico General Ins. Co., 183 CalApp4th 1390 (2010). 11 USC 362 specifically provides that a defendant

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who transfers property during a bankruptcy stay, must pay for all damages caused, including attorney fees, costs and even punitive damages if warranted. Punitive damages are warranted here because it took nine months (9 months) to get the sale rescinded. Johnson v. Ford Motor Company, 35 Cal. 4th 1191 (2005). BMW of North America v. Gore, (1996) 517 U.S. 559 , 134 L. Ed. 2d 585, 123 S. Ct. 1513. G. Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing The court found there was no breach of good faith and fair dealing as to the LIBOR manipulation, the violation of the automatic stay when invoking the power of sale clause or in faxing over a modification missing material terms which defendant refused to disclose and refused to record it. The court based its ruling on lack of harm to plaintiff. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342, 371372 (1992). Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." ' [] The covenant of good faith finds particular application in situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another. Such power must be exercised in good faith." (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 371-372. 1. The Power of Sale Covenant

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The deed of trust had a power of sale clause in it which allowed Defendant to use Californias nonjudicial foreclosure process. An implied condition of allowing Defendant to invoke the Power of Sale in the deed of trust, was that Defendant would comply with all state and federal laws in the process. Here, the defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing selling the home during the automatic stay as invoked under federal law. Defendant was on notice of plaintiffs bankruptcy filing and the reinstatement of the stay. Nevertheless the defendant took the property by credit bid on September 1, 2011. Then defendant refused to rescind the sale after plaintiff demanded it, until defendant was under the eyes of the court and this lawsuit was filed as a result. Furthermore, the defendant failed to follow state law which required the defendant to record the rescission of the sale immediately forthwith. (CCP 2924 et seq) In the context of loan servicing, violation of this duty frequently relates to the decision to accelerate and foreclose improperly in one form or another. Erickson v PNC Mortg., 2011 WL 1743875 (D. Nev May 6, 2011). Consequently, the courts decision to dismiss should be reversed. 2. Implied Covenant to Disclosure All Material Terms Second, failing to disclose the material terms of the modification agreement was a breach of good faith and fair dealing. Wigod v Wells Fargo, 673 F3d 547 (7th 54

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Cir. 2012). There was no legitimate reason for Defendant withholding that information for three years and until litigation was under way. In Susilo v Wells Fargo Bank, 706 F Supp 2d 1177 (CD Cal 2011) the court refused to dismiss the claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing when it did not disclose the payoff amount. Here, Defendants hid the terms of the long term contract past 2013 and has made inconsistent representations as to what those terms were (either adjustable or fixed). Indeed, disclosure of these terms are mandated by federal law. Regulation Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board under the Truth in Lending Act (12 CFR 226 et seq) required defendants to give plaintiff these material terms. The Deed of Trust expressly stated that the Defendant would follow all federal laws. It was implied that any modification offered would also comply with federal law, including Regulation Z. Regulation Z has been around in one form or another since 1969. The Federal Reserve Board was given authority to oversee its implementation. When Congress created this authority, it made clear that it wanted the FRB to engage in regulations, particularly as to new products and practices that facilitated reverse redlining and equity-skimming, or evaded restriction of TILA or other consumer protection legislation. The FRB held hearing and obtained public comment on a variety of issues relevant to HOEPA in 1997, 2000, 2006 and 2007. In 2001, the 55

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FRB issued final changes to Regulation Z but it was not until 2008 that the FRB used its rulemaking power to address widespread abuses in the mortgage market as Congress had originally intended. These protections are now supplemented by the various rules in the Dodd Frank Act. See, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,189 (Apr. 29, 1997); and see 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008). Consumers have standing for Article III purposes when they are deprived of their statutory right to TILA disclosures. DeMando v Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff informed Defendant for two years that she was missing the terms of her monthly mortgage payments after 2013 and yet, Defendant refused to resend the document to her. The failure to adequately communicate the terms to the borrower was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, entering into a Note knowing that one is manipulating the market index the note is based upon is a breach of good faith and fair dealing as already explained earlier in this brief. These claims should not have been dismissed. H. Fraud Plaintiff alleged defendants conduct was fraudulent. The elements of fraud are restated in Jolley v Chase Bank Finance, LLC, (2013, 1st Dist) 2013 Cal.App. LEXIS 107, *34. 56

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The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation; (b) knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud, i.e., induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) damage. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93; see also, Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.). The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit [citation], does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true. (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1255.). The court found no standing (no harm) and that plaintiff could not plead because her loan was not actually tied to LIBOR. 1. Misrepresentation Plaintiff alleged Defendants misrepresented the true LIBOR rate from 2006 through 2009. The who, what, where and when were pleaded meeting the heightened pleading standards for a fraud claim. 2. Knowledge of Falsity Plaintiff alleged the bank knew these representation that the published LIBOR were false and misleading and made them knowing they were not true market indicators. Hence, the element of knowledge of falsity was pleaded. 3. Intent to Defraud or Assertion of Fact of that which is Not True by one who has No Reasonable Ground for Believing it to Be True Plaintiff alleged that the bank knew it was going forward with and did go forward with publishing a manipulated LIBOR rate from 2006 through 2009.

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The intent to defraud only needs to allege that defendant knew or had no reason to believe the truth of the statement. Jolley v Chase (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 872, *891 This was pled. (FAC 215-216). Hence, the element of intent or assertion of fact was pleaded. 4. Justifiable Reliance The court does not find any tying of the LIBOR loan to the LIBOR rate on the grounds there was a fixed rate above the actual LIBOR rate being depressed at the time. As asserted previously, Plaintiff entered into the higher loan refinance on the grounds she had the rational expectation that she could refinance at a better rate on the grounds the market industry rate of LIBOR was lower. Except in the rare case where the undisputed facts leave no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, the question of whether the plaintiffs reliance is rea sonable is a question of fact.Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239. Plaintiff provided expert witness declaration that this was the consumer expectation at the time. (ER 2066 et seq) [A] defendant cannot escape liability if he or she makes a representation to one person while intending or having reason to expect that it will be repeated to and acted upon by the plaintiff (or someone in the class of persons of which plaintiff is a member). This is the principle of indirect deception described in section 533 of the Restatement Second of Torts (section 533). Shapiro v. Sutherland 64 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1548 (1998) 58

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Hence, the element of justifiable reliance was pleaded with regard to intent to defraud. 5. Damage Plaintiff alleged her loan stated it was based on LIBOR, the LIBOR rate was lower in the six preceding months than her loan rate, and as a result of these representations, plaintiff was led to believe that her home loan monthly mortgage payments were based on a LIBOR market interest rate based on market factors outside of Barclay's control and not by Barclay's manipulation. Plaintiff alleged she would have never entered into a 30 year adjustable rate note where the lender could manipulate the interest rate being charged; and that she took the loan because her last loan was resetting and she believed she could refinance out of this loan in the next six months. She was led to believe that she could obtain a more favorable loan in the next six months because her interest rate of 8.775% was higher than the market rate. That is rational expectation behavior of a consumer. The court threw the baby out with the bathwater if it could not understand consumer behavior where a simple pleading adjustment could have cured the defect. Consequently, the court should deny defendants motion to dismiss the fraud cause of action. 59

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I. Declaratory Relief Third the district court summarily dismissed the declaratory relief claim. This claim was predicated on the wrongful foreclosure claim. There is Sutton Funding, LLC as the only endorser on a Note with New Century as the Lender purportedly transferring the Note to DBNTC and then DBNTC has stepped into the chain of title to foreclose. Poseidon Development Inc v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1106. If the wrongful foreclosure claim survives, so too, should the declaratory relief. Second, if the modification that is not found anywhere in the MBS trust is deemed to be a contract, then gap filler terms need to be declared because the terms after 2013 were missing. To allow a defendant to miraculously produce the missing terms after three years of refusing to disclose them, should not be without some judicial determination of fairness to the consumer. Pfeiffer v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 211 Cal App4th 1256 (12/13/12) J. UCL 17200 As to the Modification The district court summarily dismissed this violation based on lack of standing. As stated above, injury in fact to have standing to bring this claim was outlined in Kwikset Corp. v Sup. Court, 51 Cal 4th 310 (2011)

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When one does not receive the benefits, one was promised such as a permanent modification or some other long term solution to save their home, then he has suffered economic injury because he did not receive the promised benefits. See Johnson v General Mills, Inc, 275 FRD 282, 286 (CD Cal 2011). See also, Boschma v Home Loan Ctr, Inc. 198 CalApp4th 230, 254 (2011). By refusing to give Plaintiff the material terms of her loan modification that she sought in order to cure her default, she suffered economic injury because she did not receive the promised benefits and was thrown in default for demanding the terms of the modified loan. West v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 CalApp4th 780. K. Failure to Give Leave to Amend Here, the Court put the appellant through a series of Orders to Show Cause. When plaintiff adequately pled a claim, the court issued an Order to Show Cause setting a Motion for Summary Judgment right out of the gate. This was not a garden variety case, but a complex one that deserved the time and discovery in order to develop the theories before being brought to the gauntlet. There was nothing specious about this case as can be seen by the various MDL complaints, time is needed for the economic models to be run. But no time was given to develop theories. The court erred and if there was a pleading defect or defect in theory, at the very least, leave should have been given to amend and time for 61

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discovery to be had. This policy is applied with extraordinary liberality. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). These violations can be adequately pled and do justify a trial on their merits. Squires v BAC Home Loans Servicing, No. CV 11-0413-WS-M (SD Ala 11/29/11). IX. CONCLUSION Whatever policy that allowed financial institutions such strong legal protection by the district court; that policy is now archaic and is no longer consistent with justice or the policy of this state. (See, West v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 CalApp4th 780, Jolley v Chase Home Finance (2013) 213 CalApp4th 872, Pfeiffer v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012) 211 CalApp4th 1250, and Intengan v BAC Home Loans Servicing, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 225 (3/22/13)). We live [] in a world dramatically rocked in the past few years by lending practices perhaps too much colored by shortsighted selfinterest. We have experienced not only an alarming surge in the number of bank failures, but the collapse of the housing market, an avalanche of foreclosures, and related costs borne by all of society. There is, to be sure, blame enough to go around. And banks are hardly to be excluded. Jolley at 902. Appellant requests that this Court reverse the district courts decision in dismissing this complaint; finding summary judgment to the defendant; denying plaintiffs motion for leave to amend; and award costs thereon.

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Dated: April 24, 2013

Respectfully Submitted, LAW OFFICES OF LENORE ALBERT

/s/ Lenore Albert___________________ LENORE L. ALBERT, ESQ. Counsel for Plaintiffs Appellants, Helen Galope on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES Plaintiffs/Appellants are not aware of the following cases pending in this Court that would be deemed related pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6. Dated: April 24, 2013 Respectfully Submitted, LAW OFFICES OF LENORE ALBERT

/s/ Lenore Albert___________________ LENORE L. ALBERT, ESQ. Counsel for Plaintiffs Appellants, Helen Galope on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT I certify that this brief complies with enlargement of brief size permitted by the Ninth Circuit Rule 28-4. The briefs type size and type face comply with Fed Rule of Civ Proc 32(a)(5) and (6). This brief has 13,998 words including this Certificate and excluding the portions exempted by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), if applicable. Dated: April 24, 2013 Respectfully Submitted, LAW OFFICES OF LENORE ALBERT

/s/ Lenore Albert___________________ LENORE L. ALBERT, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiffs Appellants, Helen Galope On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

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PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE: I declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action; that I am employed in Orange County, California; my business address is 7755 Center Avenue Suite #1100, Huntington Beach, CA 92647. On April 24, 2013, I served a copy of the following document(s) described as: APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF on the interested parties in this action as follows: See attached Mail List [ ] BY OVERNIGHT MAIL I caused such document(s) to be placed in preaddressed envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid and sealed, to be deposited as Express/Priority Mail for next day delivery at Westminster, California, to the aforementioned addressee(s). [x] BY CM/ECF I caused such document(s) to be transmitted to the office(s) of the addressee(s) listed above by electronic mail at the e-mail address(es) set forth pursuant to FRCP 5(d)(1). [ ] BY EMAIL I caused such document(s) to be transmitted to the office(s) of the addressee(s) listed above by email at the e-mail address(es) set forth pursuant to agreement between counsel. [ ] BY FAX I caused such document(s) to be transmitted facsimile from the offices located in Westminster, California this business day to the aforementioned recipients. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: April 24, 2013 /s/ Lenore Albert__________________ Lenore Albert

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Mailing List For Defendant Western Progressive, LLC; Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company: Eric D. Houser, Esq. Steven S. Son, Esq. HOUSER & ALLISON 3760 Kilroy Airport Way, Suite 260 Long Beach, CA 90806 Telephone: (949) 679-1111 Fax: (949) 679-1112 Email: sson@houser-law.com Email: ehouser@houser-law.com

For Defendant BARCLAYS BANK, PLC; BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL ESTATE INC. d/b/a HOMEQ SERVICING: Scott H. Jacobs (SBN 81980) shjacobs@reedsmith.com Brandon W. Corbridge (SBN 244934) bcorbridge@reedsmith.com Margaret Anne Grignon (SBN 76621) mgrignon@reedsmith.com REED SMITH LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514 Tel: (213) 457-8000 Fax: (213) 457-8080 James Meadows jmeadows@bsfllp.com Jonathan D. Schiller jschiller@bsfllp.com Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP 575 Lexington Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10022 Tel: (212) 446-2300 67

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Fax: (212) 446-2350 David H. Braff braffd@sullcrom.com Yvonne S. Quinn quinny@sullcrom.com Jeffrey T. Scott scottj@sullcrom.com Matthew S. Fitzwater fitzwaterm@sullcrom.com Adam S. Paris Parisasullcrom.com Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 Tel: (212) 558-4705 Fax: (212) 558-3588 Hon. Cormac J. Carney United States District Court Central District of California 411 W. Fourth Street, #1053 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4518 Attorney Generals Office: Appellate Coordinator Office of the Attorney General Consumer Law Section 300 S. Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90013-1230

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AMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE: I declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action; that I am employed in Orange County, California; my business address is 7755 Center Avenue Suite #1100, Huntington Beach, CA 92647. On April 24, 2013, I served a copy of the following document(s) described as: APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF on the interested parties in this action as follows: See attached Mail List [ x] *BY MAIL I caused such document(s) to be placed in pre-addressed envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid and sealed, to be deposited as Express/Priority Mail for next day delivery at Huntington Beach, California, to the aforementioned addressee(s). [x] **BY CM/ECF I caused such document(s) to be transmitted to the office(s) of the addressee(s) listed above by electronic mail at the e-mail address(es) set forth pursuant to FRCP 5(d)(1). [ ] BY EMAIL I caused such document(s) to be transmitted to the office(s) of the addressee(s) listed above by email at the e-mail address(es) set forth pursuant to agreement between counsel. [ ] BY FAX I caused such document(s) to be transmitted facsimile from the offices located in Huntington Beach, California this business day to the aforementioned recipients. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: April 25, 2013 /s/ Lenore Albert__________________ Lenore Albert

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Mailing List By ECF: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee under Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of May 1, 2007 Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007BR4 Defendant - Appellee, Eric D. Houser, Attorney Email: ehouser@houser-law.com Direct: 949-679-1111 [COR LD NTC Retained] Houser & Allison, APC 9970 Research Drive Irvine, CA 92618 Steven Saeyoung Son, Esquire Email: sson@houser-law.com Direct: 562-256-1675 [COR LD NTC Retained] Houser & Allison, APC Firm: 562-256-1675 3780 Kilroy Airport Way Suite 130 Long Beach, CA 90806 WESTERN PROGRESSIVE, LLC Defendant - Appellee, Eric D. Houser, Attorney Direct: 949-679-1111 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Steven Saeyoung Son, Esquire Direct: 562-256-1675 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) BARCLAYS BANK PLC Defendant - Appellee, David Harold Braff braffd@sullcrom.com Direct: 212-558-4705 [COR LD NTC Retained] Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Firm: 212-558-4000 125 Broad Street 3

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New York, NY 10004-2498 Brandon W. Corbridge, Esquire bcorbridge@reedsmith.com Direct: 213-457-8312 [COR LD NTC Retained] Reed Smith LLP Suite 2900 355 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514 Matthew Scott Fitzwater, Special Counsel fitzwaterm@sullcrom.com Direct: 212-558-1632 [COR LD NTC Retained] Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Firm: 212-558-4000 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2498 Margaret Anne Grignon, Esquire mgrignon@reedsmith.com Direct: 213-457-8056 [COR LD NTC Retained] Reed Smith LLP Suite 2900 355 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514 Scott H. Jacobs, Attorney shjacobs@reedsmith.com Direct: 213-457-8000 [COR LD NTC Retained] Reed Smith LLP Suite 2900 355 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514

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James Meadows, Esquire** jmeadows@bsfllp.com [COR LD NTC Retained] BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 7th Fl. Firm: 212-446-2300 575 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022 Adam S. Paris, Attorney Parisasullcrom.com Direct: 310-712-6600 [COR LD NTC Retained] Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Suite 2100 1888 Century Park East Los Angeles, CA 90067 Yvonne S. Quinn, Esquire** quinny@sullcrom.com [COR LD NTC Retained] Sullivan & Cromwell LLP Firm: 212-558-4000 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2498 Jonathan Schiller, Esquire** jschiller@bsfllp.com [COR LD NTC Retained] BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 7th Floor Firm: 212-446-2300 575 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022 Jeffrey T. Scott, Esquire** scottj@sullcrom.com [COR LD NTC Retained] Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 5

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Firm: 212-558-4000 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004-2498 BARCLAYS CAPITAL REAL David Harold Braff ESTATE, INC., DBA Homeq Servicing Direct: 212-558-4705 Defendant - Appellee, [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Brandon W. Corbridge, Esquire, Attorney Direct: 213-457-8312 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Matthew Scott Fitzwater, Special Counsel Direct: 212-558-1632 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Margaret Anne Grignon, Esquire Direct: 213-457-8056 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Scott H. Jacobs, Attorney Direct: 213-457-8000 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) James Meadows, Esquire [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Adam S. Paris, Attorney Direct: 310-712-6600 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) 6

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Yvonne S. Quinn, Esquire [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Jonathan Schiller, Esquire [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) Jeffrey T. Scott, Esquire [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC Defendant - Appellee, Eric D. Houser, Attorney Direct: 949-679-1111 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above)

Steven Saeyoung Son, Esquire Direct: 562-256-1675 [COR LD NTC Retained] (see above) **Counsel not registered with ECF service by US Mail not mandated *By Mail: Hon. Cormac J. Carney United States District Court Central District of California 411 W. Fourth Street, #1053 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4518 Attorney Generals Office: Appellate Coordinator Office of the Attorney General Consumer Law Section 300 S. Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90013-1230