Goebbels to German journalist (Use this to show that Britain should not have appeased Hitler) "They left

us alone and let up slip through" “If I was the French premier in 1933, I would not have tolerated the men who wrote Mein Kampf” “They could have arrested us in 1925 (The Beer Hall Putsch) and that would have been the end of it”

Mein Kampf (World domination) "Germany must either be a world power or there will be no Germany" World here did not just mean Europe. Hitler was bent on taking over the world. He had learnt from WW1 that it was essential for Germany to break out of its central European base because enemies could easily encircle it. Ludendorff had begun to achieve this at Brest-Litvosk before he was "stabbed in the back" Hitler's plan began where Brest-Litvosk ended. The clock put back to spring 1918 but with Germany united and more importantly cleansed.

Race poisoning - If 5000 Jews were to be deported to Sweden, they would all immediately occupy key positions Excuse for his mistakes as well "All of us suffer from the sickness of mixed, corrupt blood" Race poisoning common issue - similar to environmental pollution in the 70s and 80s Hitler believed that if he could eliminate racial poisoning in Germany, Germany would inevitably become 'lord of the earth' Hitler had a grand plan laid out 1) Gain control of Germany and begin cleansing process 2) Destroying Versailles 3) Destroy the Soviet Union to rid the "breeding ground" of the "bacillus" (Jewish-style Bolshevism) 4) Colonize most of Africa Churchill called Mein Kampf “granite pillars” that German policy rested on.

At least four of his phases must be accomplished while he was not only alive but at the height of his power. Hitler responded with unconcealed contempt and derision in a speech at the Reichstag. even after Hitler took over. Hitler was pragmatic. there wasn‟t any chance of France carrying out a preemptive strike Roosevelt was bitterly anti-French and after Roosevelt took America off the gold standard. Similar to Lenin. He stood for 'Capitalism in One Country" 1935 . With such a monster at large and with unrestrained control of the world's second strongest economy . Britain and France (without America) might have contained Hitler France actually possessed the physical means to do so BUT after the departure of Poincaré in 1929.what possibility was there of maintaining the old European system. The USA was the cause of WW2 because of its refusal to back Britain and France against Germany USA was isolationist Roosevelt announced that his New Deal (1933) was incompatible with a negotiated world trading system.Congress passed the neutrality act Many Americans were determined to stay away from the European mess after WW1 Roosevelt sent Joseph Kennedy – the violently anti-British ambassador to London Roosevelt‟s actions were worse than useless – his absurd demand (1939) that Germany gave 10-year non-aggression guarantees to 31 countries only convinced Hitler that USA would not intervene military in the event of war.Until he was engulfed by war. Therefore. This had led some historians to conclude that he did not have a master plan when in fact. always ready to seize openings and modify his theory accordingly. as this was likely to provoke a future war. France occupied most of 1933 with pathetic attempts to create a gold block Britain was fearful of a “well armed” France facing a disarmed Germany. while adjusting the tactics to suit the moment. he was a superb opportunist. it remained British policy to cut France‟s army as well as it‟s own army .the first and indeed the only one to emerge fully from the Great Depression . he pursued his long term strategy with a brutal determination.

He could not differentiate between Mussolini. which was „intended for home consumption‟ (Time . the German had done no more than walk into their own backyard. Clifford Allen (British politician) “I am convinced he genuinely desires peace” Leonard Woolf “That wicked Treaty” Lord Lothian “”In remilitarizing the Rhineland. which was largely revolved around India. Britain began decreasing it‟s armed force when Hitler began his program of illegal armament  Britain‟s armed forces during the interwar period was only 100 000 and it‟s navy severely limited by the Treaty of Washington and London Britain‟s weight in world affair was dependent on its empire. who was corruptible but . This was a gift Anthony Eden. It was as if the British had reoccupied Portsmouth” It is of the essence of geopolitics to be able to distinguish between different degrees of evil. good British candidates did not present themselves for the Indian civil service and Indians took the top places in the entrance examinations. With no certain future. By 1931.” There was also the tendency by the British government to ignore the actual evidence of Hitler‟s atrocities and dismiss Hitler‟s ferocious statements as „mere rhetoric‟. Hitler had specifically stated that he would destroy France by seeking British neutrality but he had not counted on the British seeking to prevent the French from defending themselves. The British Raj was palpably breaking up.July 1934) Against all evidence. Keynes „Carthaginian argument had captured the mind of both Left and Right that it was felt that Hitler move to smash the Treaty of Versailles by force was itself a step towards peace. the foreign secretary did not possess.Even when Hitler passed the Enabling Act in the Reichstag. Churchill loved India and felt that “Britain would soon be fighting for it‟s life and it would be essential to retain India. Britain‟s excuse for appeasement  Britain also felt that it was unfair that German was surrounded by countries such as France (and it‟s allies Poland and Czechoslovakia who were heavily armed) and thus. the process set in motion by the Montagu reforms and the Amritsar debacle had gathered pace. Britain felt that Hitler not only wanted peace but also was a factor for it. Britain announced that it was going to cut France‟s army from 700 000 to 400 000.

. therefore Britain would not back France over the Rhineland. “the feeling in the House is terribly pro-German which means afraid of war”. It was the Abyssinia crisis. Churchill warned parliament in 1934 that up to 40 000 Londoners would be injured or killed in fighting in the first week of war. Eden did not realize that any threat from Italy with her weak and already flagging economy. The uproar it raised over Italy‟s invasion of Abyssinia was far noisier than the hostile moves made by Hitler.” Behind all the (British) facile rationalization was simple. which enabled Hitler to bring forward his plan to remilitarize the Rhineland. it was estimated that Italian and German forces could drop 600 tons of bombs per day. Hitler also benefitted greatly from the turmoils in the world. was not to be compared with the potential destructive power of Germany.opened to civilized influences too.” H. By May that year. Germany had 800 bombers to Britain‟s 48. The Abyssinia crisis created bitter Anglo-French antagonism and ruled out any possibility of securing joint agreement to a firm counter-move against Hitler. As Harold Nicolson (a British politician) noted during the Rhineland crisis. old-fashioned fear. Wells film “Things to Come” presented a terrifying scenario of total destruction and devastation.G. It was a risk and Hitler later admitted “If the French had marched into the Rhineland we would have to withdraw with out tails between our legs. The Spanish Civil War then the Sino-Japanese conflict burdened the League of Nation with a multitude of fast changing problems they could not solve. France would not back Britain over Abyssinia. Hitler timed his invasion of the Rhine at the height of Anglo-French confusion. Baldwin thought the “man on the street” ought to “realize that there is no power on earth that could protect him from being bombed. with the world‟s second largest industrial economy and a military tradition of unparalleled ferocity. Bertrand Russell (a pacifist) predicted that 50 gas bombers could poison all of London. a man who had already murdered hundreds and placed his intention to transform Europe. altered the naval air equations radically. This extraordinary lack of perspective was shared by British public opinion. Meanwhile Hitler rearmed steadily and strengthened his alliances. “ Between 1936-7. By 1937. The Rome Berlin Axis of November 1936 followed later that month by the AntiComintern pact with Japan. and Hitler.

Britain and Italy because Hitler introduced conscription and was starting to build up his air force. He had to strike sooner rather than later because he knew that the military advantage that Germany had was fleeting. This ultimately failed because Italy invaded Abyssinia Historian views Richard Overy and Ian Kershaw Hitler miscalculated by invading Poland. He was haunted by the idea that he might miss a crucial strategic opportunity. He was expecting Britain and France to continue their policy of appeasement (similar to the Munich Conference) Tim Mason (an American historian) disagree with Overy and Kershaw Hitler went to war because of the economic crisis in Germany. he knew that he would have to eventually face the western powers and he decided that he would rather do this sooner rather than later *Sudetenland crisis – Germany occupation of Czechoslovakia Hitler‟s biographer explain why he would risk invading Poland (since the Western powers would intervene) Hitler was burdened by a sense of mortality. He did not intend to start a war. Even since the Sudetenland crisis.Anti-Comintern Event chronology Remilitarization of the Rhineland  Austria  Czechoslovakia (Munich agreement) Baltic states Latvia Lithuania Estonia Finland The Stresa Front is the coalition formed in 1935 between France. .

Hitler‟s anti-Semitism was rationalized into the overall “Versailles is to blame” explanation “The murder of Jews was largely the reflex of the external persecution to which Germans have been subjected since the war” – Lord Lothian . The introduction of peacetime conscription by Chamberlain + the increase in the RAF expenditure had a direct impact on Hitler‟s strategy. 11 days after the Saar is reverted to Germany Hitler challenges the disarmament clause of the Versailles Treaty June 1935 – despite the Stresa Front – British signs the Anglo-German Naval Treaty – accepting a fait accompli with Germany . Germany‟s rearmament was slowing down British policy of appeasement The arguments used by the British to justify a policy of quasi-pacifist inactivity were intellectually flimsy at the time and seem in retrospect pitiful Hitler‟s savage persecution of the Jews was largely ignored not because Britain was anti-Semitic Unlike France. Starting from the spring of 1939.a key antirearmament politician of the „soft‟ Right The real issue of how to organize collective security in Europe was never properly debated – couldn‟t decide when and how force should be used Hitler‟s conduct of foreign and military policy from 1933 to 1938 was flawless – not a single error in judgment 1933 and 1943 – Rearmament and internal consolidation The action began on January 1935 when Hitler won the Saar plebiscite March 1935.This can be seen in a letter he wrote to Mussolini about Britain. Jew-baiters like William Joyce and Henry Hamilton who advocated mass extermination and used the term „final solution‟ were a tiny minority It was rather that. Britain‟s government was on the path of eradicating totalitarian state. Prove: Newly opened archive from the Third Reich showed that during the first half of 1939.

Communism > Nazism.The inexplicable surrender gave Germany the right to 35% of Britain‟s surface fleet and parity in submarines It was the beginning of positive appeasement rather than supine inactivity Anthony Eden could not distinguish between different degrees of evil – Germany vs. the frightened man signed a series of concessions including the appointment of a Nazi as his interior minister 30 days later. there would no allied declaration of war Chamberlain believed that without Nazism. there would be communism (and not liberal democracy) in Germany For Daladier and Chamberlain. despite General Gamelin presenting to Chamberlin an optimistic picture of allied strength . Hitler tells his top military and foreign policy adviser that a period of active expansion could now begin with Austria and Czechoslovakia as the first targets Summoning the Austrian Chancellor. Some German generals believed that war over Czechoslovakia would be disastrous for Germany The Chief of Staff Ludwig Beck told the politician Ewald who was going to Britain “Bring me back proof that England will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked and I will put an end to this regime” Hitler assured his generals in August 1938 that as long as Chamberlain and Daladier were in power. Hitler‟s troops entered Austria University professors made to scrub the streets with their bare hands The invading Nazis stole anything that they could lay their hands on Despite the brutality in Austria. the allies appeased Hitler at the Munich Conference when he intended to invade Czechoslovakia Five weeks after he swallowed Austria. Kurt von Schuschnigg to his mountain villa. Italy Treatment of Austria was brutal and bestial November 1937. both of them did not understand Hitler‟s 4 goals and his ideology. Hitler instructed Keitel to prepare an invasion plan for Czechoslovakia. which was demonstrated in Mein Kampf (See Page 1) The week before the Munich Conference.

Chamberlain wanted to know “Who will guarantee that Germany will not become Bolshevik afterwards” Daladier took a similar stance “The Cossacks will rule Europe” Not fighting over Czechoslovakia was a fatal mistake for the allies The pace of allied rearmament. especially of British air power was overtaking Germany‟s The Munich Conference in 1938 was not only a diplomatic surrender by France and Great Britain but also a military disaster too The actual redrawing of the Czech frontiers at Munich was determined based on military (NOT RACIAL) grounds No plebiscite was held Some 800. he got the means to furnish his own divisions using the huge Czech armaments industry Germany‟s turnaround of 80 divisions (as a result of receiving Czechoslovakia) was equivalent to the entire French Army The surrender at Munich as Churchill noted was also the end of France‟s system of alliances in the east and brought about a moral collapse in the Danube basin Seeing the Czechs abandoned by the democracies. which she had coveted since 1919 2. built with French assistance. in the closing weeks of 1939. Hitler without firing a shot had appeared to restore all the splendor of Wilhelmine Germany . Poland was allowed to tear off Teschen.000 Czechs were absorbed into Germany and 250. were taken over by the German  There was now no possibility of the Czechs offering armed resistance to an outright invasion  Massive shift in the strategic balance of allied power  the Czech‟s 40 divisions were among the best-equipped in Europe  When Hitler Marched into Czechoslovakia. Hungary too got a slice of the Czech carcass Throughout Europe. the smaller states scuttled for cover or joined 1.000 Germans left behind The Czech‟s elaborate frontier defenses. fascist parties welled in influence and pride The German economy boomed.

a wave of anti-Semitism that public opinion changed The German occupation of Prague on March 1939 followed by the seizure of Memel from Lithuania six days later convinced most British people that war was imminent . Daily Telegraph and Daily Herald were all in favor of appeasement The editor of the Times. Hitler believed that they would not intervene in Poland after all.Because the allies had not intervened in Czechoslovakia. He believed that they would welcome his move Eastwards. the Guardian. Chamberlain‟s closest press confidant supported Munich so did New Statesman whose editor was Keynes It was only after Goebbels unleashed in Germany during November 1938. against the heartland of Bolshevism. Why Poland? 1) It barred his invasion route into Russia and therefore inhibited Hitler‟s plan to deal with the home of „bacillus‟ 2) Poland also contained a large German population and territories that Hitler felt belonged to him British opinion had only turned against Germany after the Munich Conference Even during Munich. Dawson.