Korean Military Security After Unification And there went out another horse that was red; and

power was given to him that sat thereon to take peace from the earth, and that they should kill one another: and there was given unto him a great sword. -Revelations 6:4If you want peace, prepare for war -Latin proverbI. Introduction A. Peace Money When the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc were in their final death throes in 1990 and 1991, most western observers, like the noted historian Arthur Schlesinger, were quick to declare the event a victory for the west: `the proponents of liberal society were proven right. After seventy years of trial, communism turned out - by the confession of its own leaders - to be an economic, political, and moral disaster. Democracy won the political argument between the East and the West. The market won the economic argument'. There were, however, people who begged to differ, emphasizing the enormous cost the Cold War had exacted upon the adversaries, and none spoke out for this position more succinctly than George F. Kennan:
Nobody-no country, no party, no person-`won' the Cold War. It was a long and costly political rivalry, fueled on both sides by unreal and exaggerated estimates of the intentions and strengths of the other party. It greatly overstrained the economic resources of both countries (i.e. the US and USSR), leaving both, by the end of the 1980's, confronted with heavy financial, social, and, in the case of the Russians, political problems that neither had anticipated and for which neither was fully prepared.

But whatever their respective positions on the final outcome of the Cold War may be, analysts on both sides would agree that military spending by the superpowers and their clients, in order to outmatch the capabilities of the other side, was the single factor contributing to the `constraints' placed upon their national economies, as Kennan points out in the above statement. So it was only natural, and correct, for most people to assume that the level of spending that had once been necessary to maintain Cold War militaries were made unnecessary, which fueled expectations of massive arms reductions, and subsequent debates as to how to invest the resulting `peace dividend', estimated at US$58 billion in 1991, back into society. It is the same type of debate that will likely take place in Korea following unification and the dismantling of the military demarcation line. Considering that the main rationale behind the arms race for either of the Korean states is the very presence of the other, proponents of arms reduction will contend that a unified Korea will not need kind of military budgets like the combined US$13.85 billion (North: $1.35 billion/ South: $12.5 billion) spent in 1999 alone, as there no longer will be a threat of war in the peninsula. Although unification will necessitate some type of a reduction in the current 1.74million-strong (South and North combined) armed forces, with some of that manpower placed back into economic production, expectations of a massive arms reduction after unification and subsequent diversion of the resulting `peace dividend' to the civilian sector is erroneous, and perhaps even dangerous, given the current and future political climate in Northeast Asia. It should be noted that Northeast Asia was made dangerous by virtue of its violent modern history, marked by colonization, military confrontation, and political ill-will arising thereof. Another, and a very crucial factor, that adds tension to the region is what I will henceforth refer to as `politics of compensation', namely attempts by Korea's powerful neighbors (i.e. Japan, China, Russia) to relive the glory they had enjoyed

in the past. B. Past glories lost As the particulars of the `glory' that the three regional powers had once enjoyed will be explained in the section to follow, a brief summary should suffice at this juncture. The Chinese had been unchallenged in its pre-eminence in the region throughout the Ming and Qing dynasties, a status that began to slip from them following their defeat to the western powers, and completely lost after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. China was superseded by Japan as the premier regional power, and the Japanese sought to mark the region off as its `sphere of influence', exemplified by Fukuzawa Yukichi's claims of `Asia for the Asians', and the country's attempt to establish the `Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere'. However, the grandiose designs the Japanese elite tried to realize through colonization and war were brought to a crashing halt by their defeat in WWII. Japan was subsequently forced to relinquish its claims on regional hegemony, and it naturally led to the American and Soviet ascendancy, and American and Soviet domination of regional politics for the next four and a half decades. Northeast Asia, like the rest of the world, became an ideological (and sometimes actual) battleground for the two superpowers, which emerged as key regional actors by default. The communist victory in China and the North Korean invasion of the South became, for the US, a clear attempt by the USSR and its regional clients to expand their influence in the region. The US responded by establishing a huge military presence in the area, which drew a response in kind from the Soviet Union, in the form of Soviet Far Eastern Forces, positioned mostly in the Maritime provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula. The actual purpose for stationing of the forces in Northeast Asia notwithstanding, positioning of these forces was alone an undeniable reminder of Soviet power for the states in the region, and its formidable presence in the region, presence which was lost following the collapse and disintegration of the political entity known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Russian Republic, for its part, has not been able to match the level of regional influence the Soviets once possessed. C. Getting it back and getting even All three powers in close geographical proximity with Korea have attained regional hegemony (shared with the US, in case of the USSR) at one time or another during the course of the last century and a half, and loss of such dominance is considered a disgrace and a festering political sore by the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians alike. It is almost a foregone conclusion that a state that had once been great and prides itself on glories past will make attempts at their recovery, with expansion of national power being the obvious method of choice, and military power in particular. Military power, according to Joseph Nye, is one of the twin factors that constitute `hard power', and the most explicit manifestation of a nation's capacities. And if recent pattern of rising military expenditures and capacity of states in the region are any indication, it can be said they are well-aware of the connection between military capacity and political influence in the international stage. There are two factors that make the above-mentioned pattern a troubling trend, and bode ill for the unified Korean nation-state. The first and obvious one is that military power has become the chief instrument in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian efforts to recover or maintain the regional influence they had formerly attained. One does not need to scrutinize display of Chinese military capabilities in the Spratleys, the level of hightech possessed by the JSDF, and Russian maintenance of its massive military-industrial complex, along with positioning of its latest version ICBM's in the Far East, too carefully to realize what those three countries are aiming at. The second factor, an extension of the first and much more dangerous, is the fact that the pace of military build-up in Northeast Asia is increasing after the formal end of the Cold War, directly contradicting the trend for the rest of the world. D. The anarchic region

Moreover, rivalry and enmity accumulated between states in the region as a result of the its violent history adds to the risk this trend poses for the region, not to mention the fact that there exists no regional organizations or regimes to temper conflicts arising from such animosity. In short, the current and future developments in the region provide a perfect model of the `anarchic international order' expounded by the realist school of international relations. With the sort of hegemonic peace afforded by the bipolar Cold War order gone, and waning American influence, there are no checks upon the ambitions or actions of states in the region save for countervailing action by other states. The two main actors (US and USSR) now in decline, the primary actors of the region became individual states, in which it is every state for itself. Without a 'system' to safeguard their borders, or maritime routes vital to their economic interests, these states now have to fend for themselves, and safeguard their own interests. Never mind attempts at regional schemes, for they will be ineffective in an area that has, again, no such tradition. And these individual states, whose interests were made secondary under the bipolar scheme, are now striving to adjust to this new political environment. Realizing the regional free-for-all for what it is, these states are now engaged in unprecedented military build-up to defend their interests and spheres of influence. Past issues and contending regional interests that were relegated to the backburner during the Cold war that are now coming to the forefront. This has forced the regional states to rely on their own strengths to best the other contenders. In this light, the notion that an area of detente and peace has arrived in East Asia is gravely mistaken indeed, for what brief peace there was right after the collapse of the Soviet Union is now replaced by a new era of tension brought about by regional militarism. And I would like to counter those detractors who claim Northeast Asia will seek a path of cooperation, as the rest of the world, with words of Reinhold Niebuhr: "Frantic efforts at some of our idealists to escape this hard reality by drawing up schemes of an ideal world order which have no relevance to either our present dangers or our urgent duties". E. Caught in the middle: Korea If it is true that a state's military capacities enhance perceptions of its power in the eyes of other states; if it is true that, as Karl Deutsche pointed out, power is the currency for `getting one's way' in politics; and if it is true that power of a state is relative of capabilities of other states, Korea faces an acute danger of falling victim should the three surrounding powers decide to use their (future) enhanced military capacity for political gain should they be unable to mobilize its military resources to counter possible uses of `compellent' military power. Power fails to have any meaning if it does not create `a type of causal relationship in which the power wielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of another actor', to paraphrase David Baldwin's argument. It is quite unnecessary to mention that the powers that surround the Korean peninsula hold both a quantitative (PRC, Russia) and qualitative (Russia, Japan) advantage over both Koreas in terms of military power, and arguably, economic as well. Therefore, there is little argument that a unified Korean state should not spare any effort to provide for itself military capacity to meet future challenges imposed by the changing political environment. However, the argument for improvement of Korean military capabilities should not be taken as a proposal for quantitative augmentation, for conflicts in the future will no longer proceed in a manner consistent with wars of the industrial age, characterized by mass production and mass destruction, as their conduct will depend less on industrial production and more on technology, and their outcome will be decided not by mass mobilization of weaponry, but their speed and precision. In addition, conflicts will most frequently turn out to be skirmishes, fought not by masses of ground units in large battlefields, but by air and naval units at considerable distance from their home territories. Expeditious communication and provision of information to the combatants will be crucial, given the likely frenetic pace of combat by high-speed units and weaponry.

II. Glories gone by A. China The reader will have come up with several questions about this compensation hypothesis by this point, and the first will no doubt concern the nature of the `glory' that the three (Japan, China, Russia) are seeking to recover. The answer to this question will require an elaboration of the region's modern (beginning with the Opium War) history, starting with the Chinese. Prior to the Opium War, there was little doubt that China (Ming and Qing) was the pre-eminent power in the region, with a population of 100-130 million by the fifteenth century (compared to 55 million in all of Western Europe); technological precocity in the form of gunpowder, the movable type, paper money, the compass, enormous ironworks created centuries ahead of Europe; a million-man army; a huge navy with 400-feet ships seaworthy enough to sail to Zanzibar; and a unified administration run by well-educated bureaucrats, China was a superpower well before the European explorers set sail. All of the above attributes were certainly sufficient to ensure hegemonic status for the Chinese, for no states or peoples in the vicinity were willing to issue challenge to Chinese power, and all seemed willing to accept the suzerain authority of the Chinese emperor. A sole hegemon without viable challengers in the region often results in what is known today as a state of hegemonic stability, where conflicts are tempered by the sheer disparity of power between the hegemon and the surrounding states. Serious military threats were nonexistent throughout the Ming, although a revival of Mongol power under Altan Khan in the early sixteenth century did cause a measure of worry, until the arrival of the Manchus. China was not only a military but a cultural power as well, with Chinese classics becoming the standard curriculum for Korean scholars, and Japan's Tokugawa shoguns adopting Zhuxi Confucianism as ruling ideology shortly after establishing the bakufu in Edo. Choson's kings and crown princes were not officially recognized as such until their positions were approved by the emperor in Beijing. And Chinese power did not decline, but increased under Qing rule, with territories at one point stretching from the present Maritime provinces to Lake Balkhash, from Baykal to Yunnan. China's population increased exponentially, reaching 340 million by the reign of Qing emperor Daogwang. Chinese confidence, combined with traditional feelings of superiority, had reached its zenith, if Emperor Qianlong's response to Lord McCartney's British mission in 1793 is any indication. The rest is, of course, history. China would suffer a series of defeats to the western powers in the Opium War (to the British), the Second Opium War (British and French), and the Sino-French War. China was forced to pay huge indemnities and sign one humiliating treaty after another, and its traditional status as the center of world was lost. China's half-baked attempts at reform never materialized, and its confidence would be dealt a death blow when its lost even its status as regional hegemon as a result of its defeat to the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War, precipitating China's fall to semi-colonial status. China has never been able to regain the level of regional hegemony ever since, a status they are struggling to regain even to this day. B. Japan Japanese hegemony in Northeast Asia began in the late nineteenth century, eclipsing China by virtue of their victory in the Sino-Japanese War. But the confidence the Japanese felt were not necessarily newfound, but were an extension of pre-existing attitudes, hailing from the time of Arai Hakuseki. An advisor to Ienobu, the sixth Tokugawa shogun, Hakuseki exclaimed, by citing the Nihon Shoki, that the Japanese emperor had equal status with the emperor in China and the same went for the shogun with the Korean king. He went so far as to say that the shogun must use the title <King of Japan> when referring to himself in diplomatic documents, and added that it was the height of humiliation for the Korean missions to march into Edo when the Japanese counterparts had to stop at Tongnae. Old confidence would later merge with the new, giving rise to a form of expansionism that would come to be known as seikanron, or Doctrine for the Conquest of Korea, which would become the first step in their eventual

military expansion into Asia. In turn, the newfound confidence was given life by a national drive to improve Japanese power, under the slogan of fukoku kyohei, or `rich country, strong army'. Successful efforts at modernization and expansion of national power would transform Japan, from `a country destined to remain politically immature, economically backward, and militarily impotent' into a formidable power that would defeat its former Chinese suzerain, and even Czarist Russia. Japan had waited, according to a certain Baron named Hayashi, `for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives, Japan will decide her own fate...', and she did, annexing Korea in 1910 and launching itself into Manchuria, and the Asian mainland, in 1931. As Japan was driving the Nationalist and Communist Chinese troops deeper into China, no one in East Asia was in position to challenge her regional supremacy. Japan became a symbol of Asian audacity (in the eyes of the west), defiance, and strength vis-a-vis the West, and commanded admiration throughout Asia. The Japanese would designate East Asia as their `lebensraum', called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and designated themselves its leaders by dominating the political scene, taking over local economies of conquered lands, and imposing broad programs of Japanization. A secret study by the bureaucracy in 1942-3 extolled the destiny of the Japanese as the `leading race' in Asia. With such attitudes of supremacy came overexpansion, striking at Southeast Asia and Hawaii. The Japanese Empire at its height would stretch from Burma to Wake Island, from the Aleutians to New Guinea, but their glory waned and confidence lost in an utter defeat to the US and allied forces in the WWII. However, with less than two generations from the end of the war, Japan's former glory is still fresh in the minds of higher echelons of Japanese society. C. The end of the Cold War and the decline of Russia Both Great Britain and the USSR emerged victorious at the end of WWII, but the similarity ends there. Britain, being the only major state to fight in WWII from beginning to end, was severely overstrained, not to mention the damage to its industrial base inflicted by the Luftwaffe. However, with industrial/production bases tucked away behind the Urals, beyond the reach of German bombers, the Soviets emerged as one of the premier post-war industrial powers, its economic output outpacing the UK and France combined by 1950, and closing the gap with the US, and power being relative, the Soviets decided to use their newfound power to their advantage. Two main rationales guided the Soviets into East Asia after WWII, the first being the traditional policy of eastward and southward expansion, a consistent pattern dating back to Ivan the Terrible's defeat of the Golden Horde. Second, Stalin and other Soviet leaders saw the necessity of filling power vacuums and replacing them with socialist rule wherever possible, attested by their refusal of entry by the UNTCOK to the northern part of the Korean peninsula in 1948. The USSR established itself as the leader of the socialist bloc, creating socialist governments in its sphere of influence (i.e. Eastern Europe) and offered support for communist insurgencies (Greece in 1947). The communist victory in China further bolstered the Soviet position in East Asia, and aroused the fears of a `monolithic communism' in the west. The USSR offered to the Chinese and North Koreans advice and military equipment (i.e. MiG-15's during the Korean conflict), created a Mongolian satellite (albeit before WWII), in addition to designation of Vladivostok as home port for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which would represent a full third of all Soviet naval power by 1988. The USSR also provided the PRC with knowledge to build the atomic bomb (though all assistance was discontinued in June, 1959), and the Soviet Union clearly emerged as patron, mentor, and leader for the East Asian communist states. For the US, the Soviet leadership among East Asia's communist states represented a grave threat, and responded by establishing military presence in three countries (ROK, Japan, Philippines), in addition to its territory in Guam. The Seventh Fleet established Yokusuka, Japan, as its home port in Asia. Though the stationing of American

forces in Asia also had the Chinese threat as one of its reasons, there was a crack in the facade of `monolithic communism' following Sino-Soviet border clash and political split in 1969, precipitating the Nixon's 1972 visit to China and Sino-American rapprochement. But although the US nominally succeeded in enlisting the Chinese against the Soviet Union, it did not materialize in the form of decline of Soviet influence in Asia, maintaining a Far Eastern Force of up to 58 divisions (in 1988), and establishing a ballistic submarine base in Petropavlovsk, in the Kamchatka peninsula, a kind of military presence that no state in the region could take lightly. It would suffice to say that although the USSR did not become the sole hegemon in East Asia, it shared such status with the US, and its semi-hegemony in East Asia collapsed along with the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. III. The Realist Logic in East Asia: from system to Anarchy A. The Maneuvering The Cold War regime in Asia was that of a bipolar system, in which two unquestioned superpowers held sway over the region, namely the US and the USSR. It was a system which Kenneth Waltz described as "the reciprocal control of the two strongest states by each other out of their mutual antagonism.....each is very sensitive to the gains of the other". The disparity of power between those superpowers and other regional states were so great, the US and USSR was able to force its policy schemes upon Asia. They vied for hegemony in the region and projected their influence upon the region, and indeed, many of the great political events in Asia during the Cold War were direct or indirectly related to their mutual attempts to prevent the other from achieving hegemony. The security and military policies of individual states depended less upon their own needs than on the military maneuvering of these two superpowers. In this system, the primary actors were the two hegemons, and all other interests held by the regional states were made secondary concerns in this grand, bipolar scheme. The system seemed to be mollifying into a "tripolar" system described by Ronald Yalem as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Again, the US attempted to take advantage of this situation by allying itself with China to keep Soviet power in check in Asia, a clear indication of two powers coalescing against the remaining other. The PRC however, did not have military or industrial might to be considered a world power to really effect the bipolar scheme, and the bipolar system essentially continued during the eighties in the form of a "new Cold War" brought about by Ronald Reagan's "peace with strength" policy. Indeed what the US and the USSR feared the most was "being at each other's mercy", continued to seek a balance of power in the region, utilizing every technological and military power at their disposal. China, for its part, sought to play the role of `balancer' between the two superpowers, aligning itself with the United States when it seemed weak (1970's), and shifting to an equidistant policy in the 1980's as US power resurged and Soviet economic power declined. However, a new environment was introduced into East Asia as a result of Deng's reform in China and Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. PRC set upon the road towards market reform, but Gorbachev's policies eventually turned out to be a pandora's box that eventually brought about the end of the Soviet empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that there was no longer a bipolar system in the region. But the US, burdened by military expenditures and federal deficits, was forced to reduce its military budget by $30 billion over the nine-year period from 1990 to 1999, and was unable to step forward as the foremost hegemon in the region. The two main actors now in decline, the primary actors of the region became individual states, which means an era of anarchy arrived, in which it's every state for itself. Although economic power might serve as the basis of national power, the surest demonstration of state power is its military machine. No amount of economic power can achieve the kind of gains that can be made in one swift military maneuver, and economic power is useless unless backed by military might. According to Samuel Huntington, rapid economic growth and rising confidence of Asian societies are disruptive to international

politics in at least two ways. The economic development enables the regional powers to expand on their military capabilities, promotes uncertainty in future relations between them, and brings to the fore issues and rivalries that had been suppressed by Cold War politics. With the bipolar system gone, no one has more interests to defend then Japan, engaging in greater military build-up AFTER the Cold War. But because of the historical past and regional fears of a resurgent Japan, this is inducing military build-up of other countries, especially China. That in turn has elicited military build-up of Taiwan, since China never relinquished their policy of "taking the island by force". South Korea, always vigilant of the communist threat from the north, is now realizing that it is not only North Korea, but other countries that she might have to defend her interests against, and the reasons for this military build-up is clear: they are trying to secure their interests, for according to Hans Morgenthau, "interest, indeed, is the last word in politics". They no longer feel safe in this new environment, and the only thing a state can rely on in a balance of power structure is its own power. Now that each individual states are the main actors in East Asia, they are "necessarily seeking safety by relying on its own power and viewing with alarm the power of its neighbors", as stated by Frederick L. Schumann. Among East Asian states, there are three dimensions involved in their disputes with each other: Nationalism, territorial disputes, and historical enmity. The division of Korea and China into two states are also factors that make the East Asian situation precarious. Economic prosperity is bound to lead to national confidence, which in turn converts to nationalism. In an economically prosperous region such as East Asia, there is nationalism aplenty. But nationalism does not manifest itself alone, but often becomes intertwined with other points of dispute. One such dispute is with various territories that lie precariously on disputed maritime borders, such as Tokdo, Diaoyutai (Sengaku), and the Paracels (The dispute over the Spratleys is more of a military power play by the Chinese than an earnest dispute). The dispute over these islands has generated much public furor and fanned flames of anti-Japanese nationalism in Korea and China, with protests to remember Japanese atrocities during WWII. The level of nationalism generated was unprecedented, as demonstrated by death of David Chan, leader of a Chinese protest contingent from Hong Kong in protest against Japan at Diaoyutai, which created a martyr for Chinese nationalism. What exacerbates such build-up and conflict is the fact that there is no organized body to mediate them. In comparison, the European continent is bound by an incredibly dense array of international institutions, which includes: the EU, NATO, Western European Union, Council of Europe, the OSCE, and others. An `international society' (In the British sense of the word), has not existed in East Asia. East Asia has no regional body except the ASEAN, which does not include any major power, and has generally eschewed security and military issues. APEC, a new and seemingly comprehensive organization, has not been able to wield much influence, and is much weaker compared with ASEAN. There is no international institution that can bring the principle powers of East Asia together. The UN might be there, but its influence is questionable, since it is not a region-specific body. This absence of a mediating body redoubles the sense of insecurity felt by East Asian countries, and the arms race continues. Of course, when a hegemonic power declines and leaves a power vacuum, there are always attempts at power transition, where another power decides to fill the gap. This is what's being attempted by both Japan and China. Realizing that economic power does not ensure political influence, Japan has been engaged in extensive military buildup since the 1970's and now possesses the most technologically advanced military power in the region, with politicians like Ozawa and Hashimoto openly calling for a greater political role for Japan, and there are fears of Japan seeking to revive the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere". But in a balance of power structure such attempts do not go unchallenged, for others try to match power with power. China has been turning over the fruits of its economic success to modernize its armed forces, and its is also seeking regional dominance, as can be seen in its claims toward the Paracels

and the Spratleys. But there is not yet a hegemonic power in the region, in other words, no one "reigns supreme" over the region. Any attempt by any state in the region to emerge as a regional hegemon will be held in check by other countries who fear such dominance, on which I would like to quote Schumann one more time, "viewing with alarm the power of its neighbor". This is the background of the general trend towards military build-up in East Asia. The hegemons that presided over a bipolar system have weakened, and the states in the region are now facing the reality of safeguarding their own interests. According to Nicholas Spykman, states exist because they are strong or have other states protecting them. In the bipolar scheme, it was definitely the latter. But there were contending regional interests that were put on the backburner during the Cold war that are now coming to the forefront. This has forced the regional states to rely on their own strengths, regarding it their policy of choice in besting the other contenders. In this light, the notion that an era of detente and peace has arrived in East Asia is gravely mistaken indeed, for what brief peace there was right after the collapse of the Soviet Union is now replaced by a new era of tension brought about by regional militarism. To say that economic interdependence alone is enough to assuage fears that these states have of each other is simply mistaken, for it is always politically lucrative to establish hegemony over a region. Such attempts at hegemony among the regional states is the very factor that drives the balance of power structure in East Asia, trying to keep each other from being hegemons in the first place. I would like to counter such naivete of interdependence proponents by quoting Reinhold Niebuhr one more time: "frantic efforts at some of our idealists to escape this hard reality by drawing up schemes of an ideal world order which have no relevance to either our present dangers or our urgent duties". Although Niebuhr was referring to the idealists in the US, he speaks for East Asia as well. It is safe to say an era of earnest power balance has arrived in Asia. B. The Ex-hegemons Following the decline of the Soviet Union, the Russian Far East forces were initially reduces reduced. But when Yeltsin survived two coup attempts because of military support, he promptly halted any cuts in the military budget, since they were essential for maintaining his power. Also, Russia was forced to seek its fortune in the Pacific region when it was clear it would be excluded from EU or any sort of Western European regime. It seems to be prudent economic move, since East Asia possesses large foreign exchange reserves that could be utilized for its development of Siberia. In recent years Russia has been attempting to regain its lost status in the region, and revamped its Far East Forces with modern weaponry so that it continues to be a 'presence" in the region. Decades of security burden and strains it caused the US economy is the primary justification for US retreat from the region. But a more isolationist EU bloc will prohibit any American attempts to make new inroads there economically, so East Asia will remain its principal economic partner. The US now has reconfigured its role as a 'mediator' and not a dominator of the region, for it fears a sudden US pull out will trigger a dangerous military competition in the region due to pre-existing conflicts and interests. The US is likely to maintain its security agreements with various countries, in order to "keep a foot" in the region, calculating that Asian states with US troops on its soil will not engage in direct military conflicts because it might involve the US-as a mediating factor. For those reasons, the US is likely to maintain a military presence until a successful power transition occurs where an Asian power capable of matching US military might emerges to maintain a new order, or a true multipolar structure on a European model is created. But the US and Russia alike are now regional contenders just like the any other country in the region, because they are no longer as strong as they used to be, coupled with the fact that the power of East Asian states has risen considerably. To reiterate a point made by Kenneth Waltz, there is not enough power disparity between the regional powers and the US/Russia to maintain the bipolar scheme of the past.

IV. The Plea for Korea A. Soldiers and more soldiers The balance of power seem to be the future trend for the East Asia, so what should Korea do in such an environment? The US is no longer willing to maintain the level of forces it did during the Cold War, and past Korean reliance on an American security framework means that South Korea must consider serious revision of its security policy. Now, do we keep our security policies focused on North Korea and hope that US will take care of our regional defense needs? Do we wish for China or Japan to become 'good neighbors' even after they establish hegemony over the region? The answer is a resounding NO! In a balance of power scheme, Korea cannot assume that our `neighbors' today will remain so in the future. There are no such thing as a genuine ally or neighbor in a balance of power scheme, only competing states whom we should try to best in political competition, and the only thing we can rely on is our own power. The ideological confrontation that dominated politics in the Korean peninsula have left its mark militarily as well, and the percentage of the population in uniform expended for military purposes is telling evidence of the fact. It is only natural that states located in a politically tense region or facing hostile states will maintain militaries commensurate to the level of threat they perceive, and both Koreas exhibit a pattern consistence with other states in similar situations. Case in point, Iraq is located in a region that has known little peace throughout modern history (Middle East) and facing a hostile neighbor (Iran) at the same time. The same goes for Taiwan, facing a giant communist power (PRC) which has made it clear that any declaration of formal independence by the island state will not be tolerated, and Israel, facing enemies that have vowed to drive the Jewish state `into the sea'. The figure for Iraq stands at 4.9%, while 1.78% percent of the Taiwanese and 3.06% of the Israeli population are in arms. Although 1.78% may not strike anyone as a large figure, considering that the percentage for states with comparable populations, like Canada, is at a mere quarter of a percent, the ratio basically demonstrates the kind of threat Taiwan feels it needs to prepare itself for. Coming back to Korea, 4.71% of the entire North Korean population currently serve in the KPA, and 1.41% of all South Koreans in the country's national army. The figure for North Korea is one of the highest in the world, and the numbers for South Korea is also unusually high relative to countries with comparable populations. Hostility and distrust still remain the two Koreas as a result of the Korean ROK constitution has designated the DPRK government an `illegal organization', while North Koreans frequently makes use of the term `puppet regime' to deride the Seoul government, a clear demonstration of the unwillingness to accept each other as legitimate state entities, also a factor that contributes to the high percentage. Excluding such hostility and ideological confrontation, the factor that stands out most explicitly is the heavy emphasis placed on the ground forces (82% of total for ROK; 87% for DPRK), an understandable phenomenon, taking into account the likely mode of warfare in case of conflict in the Korean peninsula. Both Koreas clearly feel that decisive battles will be fought on the ground and prepared likewise, with absence of any strategic weaponry (North Korea's ballistic missiles being an important exception). B. The case against general reduction 1. To be great once more: politics of compensation The states engaged in the arms race described above have one unequivocal goal: regional hegemony. Starting with China, it is precipitated by China's need to redefine its role in world affairs after the value of the `China card' in East Asia was lost, and its policymakers have set two goals in that regard. First, to become the core state and civilizational magnet towards which all other Chinese communities (i.e. Greater China) would orient themselves, and second, to resume its historical position, which was lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia. China's huge

population, awesome military power, economic bulk, and international influence (i.e. permanent seat in the UNSC) adds up to leave the rest of the region perpetually perturbed. Another factor facilitating such a move by China is the emergence of an entity known as `greater China' from a cultural and economic community into a political one. What's more, many are predicting that China will supersede the US as the next superpower (although it may be too early to tell), and its rise as the premier power in East Asia is taken virtually as a given, if Murray Weidenbaum's following assessment is correct:
Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter of industry. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing, and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources, and labor (mainland China).

However, it seems that a little too much attention has been given to China's recent growth, for China was already a formidable manufacturing power even before the arrival of Mao Zedong's communist regime. In addition, the PRC has achieved a consistent, five to six percent annual growth in its GNP since 1952, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward Period, noticed one observer in 1984. If this assessment is indeed true, it means that Deng's reform merely accelerated an ongoing process, and by 1999, the Chinese economy was nearly 11 times larger than it had been in 1949. A power as proud and ambitious as China will naturally seek to translate such growth into military power, which, of course, is the ultimate instrument of political influence. The particulars of China's military build-up will be mentioned in the following section, but her increasing assertiveness has not gone unnoticed, as US Marine general Anthony Zinni has commented at an Army Science Board meeting off-handedly, that America's "longstanding Europe-centric focus" probably would shift in coming decades as policymakers "pay more attention to the Pacific Rim, and especially to China." China has not been subtle, and has been, in fact, very vocal in its attempt to assert itself in the region. The most visible signs of its muscle-flexing were made manifest in the row over the Paracels and the Spratleys, as China's naval strategists are moving away from their traditional focus on coastal defense to securing maritime interests. The Chinese navy inflicted considerable losses to the Vietnamese forces in a skirmish around the islands in January 1988, and unilaterally incorporated the islands as its `29th province' in March of same year. Furthermore, it claimed that there would be no negotiations concerning the islands, and completely ignored the claims of other states in the vicinity. President Jiang Zemin's symbolic donning of a Mao suit during his state visit to Japan to protest Japanese attitudes concerning past atrocities, and firing its missiles to intimidate the Taiwanese for Pres. Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US were also evidence that the PRC will not let its voice go unheard in the international scene. In the longer run, many American policymakers expect China to emerge sooner or later as a great power with significant influence over the rest of Asia. That, along with a spate of belligerent statements about Taiwan from Chinese officials has helped focus the attention of top policymakers on China's possible military ambitions. Analysts like Abraham Schulsky of the Rand Corp. states succinctly that, "The Chinese saber-rattling has gotten people's attention, there's no question of that." But if the situation in East Asia is as tense as I have mentioned in Section III, than Japan is not going to stand by with folded arms while China asserts itself. There are those who doubt resurgent Japanese militarism on the basis of changing of the guard among the politicians, the effete new generation who is not willing to fight in a war, and aging society, which will increase future social security burdens. I have already mentioned that the unrepentant attitude of the old politicians have been taken up by these new generation of politicians in power now. One such politician is former PM Hashimoto Ryutaro, who heads the parliamentary group that pays homage to Yasukuni temple. What Hashimoto advocates is a Japan that can play a leadership role in Asia,

since Japan contributes to its development by supplying a great percentage of the ODA for the region.The ex-Japanese PM wants Japan to play a political role commensurate with its economic bulk, pointing out Japan's $13 billion contribution to the Gulf War allies and her subsequent exclusion from Kuwait's reconstruction. Ozawa Ichiro is another example who project a similar views Japan as an overdeveloped economy but a disproportional lack of political, social, and military aspects, a `state out of balance'. Ishihara Shintaro, Tokyo governor and the author of <Japan that can say NO>, claimed that Japan's colonial rule was actually beneficial for those colonized and that US military's reliance on Japanese technology is a testament to Japanese power. The attitudes displayed by these new generation are not a simple continuation of old attitudes, but such an attitude merged with new confidence generated by Japan's status as an economic superpower. East Asia has good reason to be weary of the fact that these people are not the only three with such positions, for it is the newest 'trend' in Japanese politics (Politicians like Hosokawa were notable exceptions). Statements from Japan's postwar leaders also warrant our attention. Since there are so many of these statements, I will list a few significant ones that exhibit expansionistic attitudes: Yoshida Shigeru: 1. We must follow Ito Hirobumi and plant down our roots in Korea 2. (Speech at inauguration of JSDF) : You must serve as a firm basis for a new national army. Ono Bamboku: It would be nice to form a "United States of Japan" along with Taiwan and South Korea Ikeda Hayato: We have to make new efforts to penetrate into Korea If one insists on calling our dream of uniting the five races (오족협화) then I would like to say it was glorious imperialism.

Shiina Etsusaburo:

Nakasone Yasuhiro: The valiant souls who died for Asia will be displeased if Japan is ostracized from the rest of Asia These statements exhibit nonrepentence and justification of their past imperialism, and Japanese intentions to dominate Asia as a regional power. Also, the LDP formed an intraparty fraternity called the "The Org. for National Essence', and continue to support right-wing organizations such as the kokuryu-kai (Black Dragon Society) and the Yakuza.These groups continue to maintain the nationalist voice in society, and sometimes engage in terrorism against political opponents, as can be witnessed in the 1960 assassination of Right JSP Chairman Asanuma Inejiro by a right wing student. Feeling confident in its abilities of the JSDF, Prime Minister Suzuki Senko openly stated that Japan was ready to defend the 1000-nautical mile sea lane, way beyond Japan's territorial waters. If these were simply ravings by older generation of politicians, then we have nothing to fear. But the new politicians who have taken over the political mantle continue to display similar attitudes. Ozawa Ichiro, former head of the Sakigake, is the most visible of the younger politicians. Although he talks about coming to terms with the past, it is motivated his visions of Japan's future grandeur, that Japan cannot be a world power tied down by these past issues. What he aims for is a so-called "normal state", a state replete with political and military power to go along with its economic bulk, and not just an economic power represented in the term "Japan Inc." Ishihara Shintaro and Morita Akio openly defied US influence over Asia in "A Japan that can say NO". Hashimoto Ryutaro advocates in his <Vision of Japan> that Japan needs to desist from the role of a financial contributor, like it did with the $13 billion aid to the allies in the Gulf as well as their ODA for other Asian countries, but needs to secure political power proportional with its

economic strength, along with his advocation of visits to the Yasukuni temple. The more things change, the more things stay the same, and judging from the attitude of these socalled "new" upper echelons of Japanese society, they are definitely changing for the worse. Money is not the only thing Japan can utilize in achieving its political ends. Realizing that economic power is negligible unless supported by military strength, Japan decided to secure an international role for the JSDF by participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations, and established a pretext for overseas dispatching of the JSDF in the future, which is forbidden under the constitution. Looking at the PKO from Japan's security perspective, her first earnest action overseas occurred in Southeast Asia, which is not a coincidence. Japan needed to safeguard the sea lanes for its supply of natural resources ever since the 1930's, or I should say the 1890's. Petroleum is a lifeblood for modern industry, and the Persian Gulf supplies most of the Japan's petroleum needs. Those tankers have to pass through either Straits of Malacca and Sunda, so securing of these two maritime passageways is of paramount concern for Japan. Should these strategic passageways be closed off to Japan, the only option left for Japan would be to remilitarize and secure them for itself. Moreover, the Japanese government has been steadily resurrecting nationalistic symbols that were once discarded. The flying of the hinomaru (the rising sun flag) and singing the kimigayo-wa (national anthem) was reinstated to public schools in the recent years. A 1988 survey showed that 65% of people would support the JSDF or take up arms themselves to defend Japan, and only 7.2% thought the disbanding of the JSDF was necessary. Even during the debate over PKO participation, there was an initial 58% opposition by the public that turned into 74% support after six months. Even the JSP is aware of these trends, and is tilting towards agreement with the conservatives to the constitutionality of the JSDF, which it always claimed was unconstitutional. Russia's fall from grace from East Asia's pecking order was as sudden as the collapse of the Soviet empire, and has been unable to regain its former prominence, due to political instability and economic hardships. However, it has more than demonstrated its refusal to fade away from the East Asian scene. Though it was nonetheless forced to reduce the size of its Far Eastern forces, the forces received a qualitative boost, with the latest weaponry in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, a trend that continues to this day. Russia has already announced in its discomfort with American attempts to dominate the region's security issues, in the form of unequivocal opposition to the Theater Missile Defense scheme And just as the PRC played the `China card' against the USSR during the Cold War, Russia has the `Russia card' to play against its rivals, for a Russian-Chinese alliance would decisively tilt the Eurasian balance against the West. From the Russian viewpoint, this warming of relations represents both a conscious decision to work with China as its Asian partner, given the stagnant coolness of its relations with Japan, and reaction to conflicts with the West over the expansion of NATO, economic reform, arms control, economic assistance, and membership in western international institutions. 2. The East Asian military build-up: in a dangerous neighborhood There is no argument that the military tension that has dominated politics in the Korean peninsula will be alleviated in case of unification, and will no doubt be a cause for celebration among the `doves', seeing it as an opportunity to divert funds used for military build-up into economic development, social services, education, etc. Such argument will find justice in the fact that a confrontation between two hostile states was the primary rationale for the arms race in the peninsula, and that a large military establishment will be rendered unnecessary in a single Korean nation-state. But as I have stated repeatedly in this paper, any attempts at unilateral reduction on Korea's part will likely place the unified peninsula in harm's way, not only because of the unstable situation in Northeast Asia, but such instability combined with political ambitions of the regional powers, not to mention the military build-up in the region motivated by the needs of the regional powers to `compensate' for their past glories lost.

The world saved approximately US$140 billion in military expenses from the period extending from the end of the Cold War in 1990 to 1994, with expenditures on all the major regions of the globe, including strife-ridden Africa, undergoing reduction during the same period. However, as can be seen from the following chart, East Asia remained a glaring exception from this global trend. (in US$billion) REGION Asia-Pacific USA Europe Russia and CIS Middle East The Americas(w/out USA) Africa The world

1985 Expenditure 99.0 339.2 231.9 157.7 100.9 28.8 9.8 967.4

1993 Expenditure 144.7 297.3 201.7 86.3 57.9 26.1 8.8 823.0

The military build-up in East Asia did not let up after 1993. In a balance of power system there is no there is no legally and politically superior authority, the power of the state becomes the ultimate arbiter. The protection of the nation-state's security and interests become paramount. The power of the state, I say again, is best represented by its military machine, its capability to inflict violence on others. For example, the North Korean economy is in utter ruin, but everyone treads lightly around North Korea because it has enough military capability to inflict serious damage on South Korea. Although the probability of East Asian countries going to full-scare war is low, the is fair possibility of a limited conflict or skirmishes from territorial disputes, and the countries in East Asia are acquiring battle-tested and effective, high-tech weapons systems for such eventuality. These include improvement of Air and Naval forces, combat data systems, communications, and electronics warfare. Most of the revamping is concentrated around the air and naval forces, along with transport/logistics for rapid troop deployment, in order to project power beyond their border. Japan has been engaged in military buildup beyond defensive capabilities ever since the Third Defense Reorganization period (1967-71). After establishing their "Grand Plan for Defense", the JSDF saw massive increase during the tenure of prime ministers Suzuki and Nakasone, whose policies dovetailed with Reagan's slogan of "strong America". Their buildup continues after the Soviet collapse and the end of Cold War, for greater political role in the region (and the world). But noting that other East Asian countries might be weary of its buildup, the size of the SDF was left alone at 240000 to make it look diminutive in comparison to other military establishments in the region. Most of the buildup centered around its Air and Maritime SDF, especially on developing or procuring high-tech weaponry. Considering that a powerful navy is an important tool of power projection, refitting it with advanced weaponry such as an Aegis cruisers, with completely automated combat data system that was built to be command center for a larger fleet including an aircraft carrier (Japan does not possess it as of yet, but probably will in the future) is testimony enough of its future intentions. Other weapons of power projection include other naval vessels possessing equal capability with US ships; KC-135 Stratotanker and an E-3C Sentry AWACS, to give its squadrons of F-15 fighters greater combat capability and operational range; and Patriot anti-aircraft missile, the best in antiballistics technology. It is coupled by Japanese technical capability that already started producing home-made weapons system in the sixties, now engaged in the development of the FSX fighter, designed to defeat all other known fighters in a dogfight with its short turn radius. Also, the JSDF is structured around officers and NCO's, with 75% (180695 out of 273810 in 1996) of service members in the JSDF above that rank of sergeant, and

considering that NCO's will naturally form the core of the JSDF should conscription be necessary, which would increase the size of the forces three-to-four-fold, and a 1.2 million JSDF is definitely a possibility. All in all, Japan already possesses a formidable military establishment, and its potential capabilities are limitless, considering the level of technology it possesses. Japan has accumulated enough technology to provide the US with the high-tech equipment for US armaments and ordnance used in Operation Desert Storm. Japan is also producing the F-15 under license at a Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya, and begun joint production of the F-2 fighter, considered better than the Strike Eagle. Japan is able to construct the Aegis cruiser with domestic manpower only at Nagasaki. And while it does not possess strategic forces at the moment, Japanese rocket/ballistics know-how, like the H-2 rocket, and its fairly recent importation of plutonium from France is clear indication that they possess sufficient technology to create such capabilities. Defense analysts such as Sato Seisaburo has stated that Japan would be able to produce nuclear weapons in a mere six months, should she find it necessary. China always had the largest military establishment in the world due to its large ground forces, but was never acknowledged as an earnest military power. Besides, large ground forces are usually intended more for domestic security than for battling in foreign territory. Without modern armaments and reduction of ground forces, there was no way for China to become a military superpower. However, with foreign exchange acquired from its economic growth, it had military budget enough to modernize its outdated armaments, and the modernization effort is concentrating on its air and naval forces, as well as ballistics technology. The old submarines were replaced by six Han-class and two Xia-class boats, and each are nuclear-powered and capable of delivering 12 SLBM's each. Its missile attack boats are being replaced by Jianghu-class frigates, with operational range of 4000 miles, Luda-class destroyers fitted with modern anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, in addition of planned purchase of Sovremenyy-class destroyers from Russia. The PRC Navy has already purchased the Russian Kilo-636 submarines, and signed another contract for procurement of 7000-ton destroyers. However, its construction of 6000-ton Luhai-class destroyers demonstrate a measure of technical aptitude. Its air force was revamped with Russian-built SU-27 fighters and Hong-7 supersonic bombers, built with domestic technology, to eventually replace its squadrons of ancient MiG's. In addition, the PRC constructed a state-of the-art air force training facility in Inner Mongolia to test its newest crop of fighters (J-10, J-12, JH-7), all developed with local technology. Knowing that it has lacked power projection capacity, as well as ability to respond quickly to contingencies, as a superpower should, it has created an earnest attack helicopter squadrons, and organized eight army divisions into its rapid deployment force. China has also constructed the Dongfeng-31 missile, which is accurate, mobile, and has nuclear capability. The Dongfeng warhead detaches from the booster in its last flight stage, putting the effectiveness of the latest Patriot SAM systems in doubt (which might have alarmed the US into considering creation of a National Missile Defense system). As for the US and Russia, there are no prospects for the reduction of their forces in the forseeable future. After halting the general reduction, the Russian Far East forces were re-equipped with modern armaments including the T-80 tanks, along with MiG-29 SMT's for the air force, and VTOL SU-33's for its naval aviation. Although the ballistic missile submarine base at Petropavlovsk has been closed, the main naval base at Vladivostok in still in full operation, as well as the formidable Pacific Fleet, recently bolstered by such vessels as the 25000-ton nuclear missile cruiser Peter The Great, armed with the latest Yakhunt ship-to-ship missiles. Quantitative reduction coupled with qualitative improvement is also a pattern applicable to Russia's handling of its strategic forces, as can be seen in its elimination of old missiles, to be replaced by new ones such as the TOPOL-M. Although the US was forced to leave Subic Bay and Clark AFB in the Philippines when the Philippines senate refused to renew the lease for these bases, the US still

maintains sizable military forces in the area, and the US Seventh Fleet remains the most powerful naval force in the region. In light of that fact, we can surmise that US still dominates the vital sea routes which serve as lifelines of east Asian economies. These Russian and American troops in Asia are now political levers that can be utilized to maintain the balance of power, since no state in the region seem capable of militarily outstripping US and Russia any time soon. The continued stationing of the USFK in Korea as a political card against DPRK or the intervention by the Seventh Fleet against PRC during the Chinese intimidation of Taiwan are examples of what purposes these troops might serve in the future. 3. Be there woe for the unprepared Those who are not convinced of the vital necessity of military preparations after unification by this point will emphasize the 1.74 million service members in arms a unified Korean state would possess. Besides, so many people in arms will not strike anyone as weak, which would mean a second-largest military force in the world, at least in quantity. So what it is about future conflicts that leads one to hypothesize that the forces will be `unprepared'? For one thing, terrestrial `frontiers' that previously separated East Asia's ideological camps are gone, replaced by the seas surrounding the states as major areas of contention, meaning that armed forces of the respective states will need to operate over larger area, and longer distances. Huge ground forces meant to be of advantage in land battles will be of little use, and the outcome will be decided by superior air and naval forces. The Korean peninsula remains one of the last vestiges of the Cold War, a fact reflected in military composition and strategy of both Korean states, that make both North and South Korean forces ill-equipped and ill-composed for future contingencies. An observation of the current state and composition of both South and North Korean armed forces will show that both Korean states are woefully unprepared for future warfare. UNIFIED KOREAN ARMED FORCES (Projected) Ground Force (Total: 1.48 million)
Divisions Regiments Tanks APC's Artillery Helicopters Combat vessels Support vessels (inc. landing craft) Submarines Aircraft 104 120 6050 (M-48, M-60, K-1, T-34, T-55, T-60, T-80) 4600 16850 900 610 280 100 60

Navy (Total: 114000) Air Force (Total: 151000)
Fighters/Bombers Special (Reconnaissance, ECW, etc.) Support (Transport, trainer, etc) Helicopters 1350 40 710 350

One facts that stands out upon review of the above charts is that there is a clear emphasis on the ground forces. Both North and South Korea clearly felt and expected decisive land battles and prepared likewise, resulting in a land force almost the size of the entire US armed forces. Likewise, the clear lack of strategic weaponry (except

ballistic missiles) or bombers indicate that the Air Force will be relegated to a secondary role of supporting ground forces in the battlefield, limiting itself to tactical maneuvers. Fortunately, thanks to Soviet doctrine that dictates concentration of artillery at the front, the number of field artillery is quite formidable, many of them with ranges up to 40 miles. On the other hand, with landward invasion from the surrounding powers into Korea highly unlikely, unified Korea's ground forces probably will not see combat in any future conflict, and virtually useless in converting the present passive defense strategy to a one of positive defense to safeguard the nation's interest at great distance from the home territory. Aircrafts that will comprise the unified Korean Air Force will be equally unsuitable as the ground forces, simply because most of them do not have long-range combat capability, and there are no KC-135's or other tanker aircraft that can extend a fighter's operational range in the inventory. Also, a great majority of the aircraft will be obsolete, due to their antiquated design and inability to carry long-range, air-to-air missiles. The MiG-15's and 17's were constructed in the 1950's, and lack the radars necessary to guide air-to-air missiles, and while F-4 Phantoms are able to carry a fair amount of payload, its original design as a fighter/bomber for ground support will not allow them to operate against maritime targets. It is also doubtful whether these vintage aircrafts will be able to penetrate advanced radar and early-warning systems found in the high-tech opponents such as the fleet of Japanese Kongo-class cruisers, or aircraft like the E-3 Sentry's and Russian Mainstay's. Although the highly maneuverable MiG-21's and F-16's are considered excellent `dogfighters', they are unable to pose significant danger to enemy aircraft armed with long-range AAM's. The MiG-23's and MiG-29's, the only fighters with either long-range or all-aspect missiles, are not numerous enough (30 in case of MiG29's), and will not be a match for opponents such as 180 F-15's of the Japanese ASDF. The situation is scarcely better upon an observation of Korea's naval forces. The North Koreans have been shying away from developing actual combat vessels for naval engagement, and has concentrated on construction of hovercrafts and modifying fishing vessels for infiltration, and the largest ship it can contribute to the unified Korean navy is the 1600-ton frigate Soho. Otherwise, the North Korean fleets were basically designed for guerilla warfare in the seas, relying on Osa-class missile boats armed with SS-N-2C Styx missiles (with huge 512-kg warheads), clearly intended for hit-and-run mission in Korea's jagged coastline. South Korea will contribute less numbers of ships, but will add more tonnage, although certainly not its aging fleet of Gearing-class frigates and Allen Sumner-class destroyers. Although construction of modern destroyers (KDX) have been under way, the largest of them will not exceed a displacement of 4000 tons. In short, the combined Korean fleet is not a blue-water navy by any means, unable to sail beyond its coastline for the most part, unable to defend anything like the 1000-nautical mile `lanes of interest' as stated by the Japanese. Its fleet of Romeo-class submarines have been judged `ineffective for modern combat' by Jane's Publishers, due to their age and thus propensity to create excess noise, as they do not possess the anechoic coating of later models. The quiet 209-type diesel submarines will fare much better, except that their numbers are lacking (10) at the moment. Moreover, the lack of C4I will further hamper any attempts to engage enemy units intruding by air or maritime routes. And furthermore, long-distance operations will be out of the question for a unified Korean state given the present shortage of viable rapid-deployment forces, amphibious units, and power projection capability. Last but not least, without strategic industries (such as aerospace) to speak of, and weapons acquisition heavily dependent either upon domestic production or single-source procurement (in case of South Korea) remain a crippling obstacle to any preparations for future warfare. Also, restrictions such as the 300-km limit on ballistic missiles also stand in the way of earnest qualitative improvement. Though the range of topics included this treatise may be broad, but it explained why a general reduction of Korea's armed forces is NOT a good option for the future, and what should be done to safeguard the interest and security of this nation in an increasingly dangerous political climate.

C. The Transformation If a unified Korean force is to engage in modern combat, prepare itself for future contingencies, defend the maritime lanes, and keep the fires of war from reaching Korea itself, they will need to follow the following formula. First, Korea should designate a `strategic zone of military operation', another word for strategic locations crucial to the defense of home territories. For example, the old Soviet Union had an interest in keeping the Dardanelles open, as it was the only maritime route that led from its warm water ports out to major bodies of water. The same goes for the Panama Canal and the US, and the Straights of Malacca and the East Asian countries. In an age of high-tech, high-speed combat units, locations such as the ones mentioned above will almost always be at great distances. Korea being an export economy, meaning much of its commerce are transported by maritime traffic, it will be vital that she ascertain such key `choke points' and prepare ahead of time, just as the turn-of-the-century Japanese prime minister Yamagata Aritomo designated `lanes of interest', meaning maritime routes for Japanese shipping that the country should defend. The defense of strategic locations mentioned above, of course, will require a creation of a blue-water navy, with the ability to interdict enemy forces at sea, or protect merchantmen faraway from home port. The main security threat for both Koreas were each other, likely to come across the Cold War frontier known as the DMZ, but Asia's military `frontier' at Korea's demilitarized zone has moved to the seas: to the East Sea (Sea of Japan), the Yellow Sea, and East and South China Seas. Korea's mainstay Gearing and Sumner class vessels were constructed in the mid-1940's, and although they have been revamped with Westinghouse radars, chaff launchers, and `Goalkeeper' cannons, they are simply inadequate should operations against Kongo-class cruisers, Luda and Sovremenyy destroyers, not to mention larger vessels like Peter the Great, come to pass. Their old hulls will produce much excess noise, and will be sitting ducks against enemy submarines. Although an aircraft carrier will greatly enhance Korea's naval power, Korea simply does not have enough vessels to create a carrier battle group, such as missile cruisers, to protect the floating fortresses. The improvement of the navy, therefore, should begin with acquisition of missile cruisers able to engage in land, air, and maritime targets simultaneously. Needless to say, a unified Korea will be in serious need for long-range strike capability, either through acquisition of long-range fighters, or ballistic missiles. A country without long-range forces will be at the mercy of enemy strategic forces in case of conflict. Should Korea be embroiled in conflict with, for instance, China, Korea's F-16's and MiG-29's will not have the range to strike China's heartland, while all of Korean territory will be vulnerable to China's supersonic bombers, or its ballistic missile forces. Continuation of North Korea's present missile program AFTER unification should be one of the policies a unified Korea must consider. Strategic forces are formidable because they give a state the ability to exercise its military power from great distances, and AWAY from its home territory. Since strategic forces are very expensive to maintain, funds should be secured with cuts in Korea's enormous ground forces, by remedying the 72 to 28 maintenance-to-investment ratio of the current defense budget (ROK). An army with 560000 soldiers but only 310000 actual combatants is a serious drain on military resources, because to manage 310000 combat soldiers with an equally numerous 260000 support personnel simply makes no sense. More ships in the navy, more aircraft in the air force plus maintenance personnel, in addition to people to man Korea's new strategic forces will necessarily be predicated upon reduction of ground forces and diversion of manpower to the naval and air forces. A larger navy and air force will be inevitable given the maritime nature of future conflicts, and will require an adjustment in the composition of Korea's future forces. Despite facing the sea on three sides of its territory, much of it continental shelves with considerable marine resources, the percentage of Korea's naval forces have been low. This is the natural result of being under the political aegis of a maritime power (US), against

continental forces (USSR, PRC), thus providing the ground forces necessary to hold the later in check while the former uses its navy to protect Korea's maritime lanes, thus obviating the need for a large navy. On the other hand, Cold War rules will not apply in a situation where Korea will have to fend for itself, and the US no longer willing to provide the same level of protection. A look around the world reveals a pattern consistent with a particular country's geography and security interests. For example, the army constitutes less than half of Britain's armed forces (49%), with the Royal Navy (21.3%) and Air Force (29.7%) taking up the rest. The naval and air forces constitute 36.8% of the JSDF, and Taiwan's figure stands at 36%. In contrast, the composition of ROK's armed forces is overwhelmingly biased towards the army (82.1%), and even more so for the DPRK (88.7%). Considering Korea's geography and maritime interests, in terms of sea lanes for its merchantmen and tankers for import of vital petroleum, the 9.5% (ROK) or 4.1% (DPRK) figure for Koreas' navies is critically inadequate. A more balanced figure, according to Sejong Institute researchers, is 50%-26%-24% for the army, navy, and air force, respectively. Given that the Korean peninsula is surrounded by less-than-friendly neighbors, it must continue to be classified as a `tense' region adjacent to hostile states (i.e. CIS, Taiwan) after unification, usually keeping 1.39 to 1.78% of its population in arms. Tabulating from the expected post-unification population of approximately 70 million, it would represent anywhere from 0.98 to 1.26 million, though I would prefer the latter given all the tension in the region. Therefore, a unified Korean armed forces will be made up of 630000 in the army, 320000 naval personnel, and 305000 soldiers serving in the air force. V. CONCLUSION Peace has never been easy to achieve, and it seems that humanity in various regions of the world have been at each other's throats for eons. When such visceral violence mixes up with ideology, tension is sure to reach extreme levels, if Korea, the French Colonial Wars, Vietnam, Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Gulf War is any indication. However, many in the world saw a chance for peace upon witnessing the end of the Cold War. And still more rejoiced at all the financial resources that would no longer be spent in preparation to kill each other, that they would serve more useful purposes. The above was true in Europe, and in North America, and even the previously war-torn regions saw a decline in monies spent for arms. However, one region remained an exception. The region was East Asia, so culturally diverse there were more differences than commonalities, and worse, there was enough enmity and hatred to last a millenium, due to tragedies that occurred throughout its modern history, pitting states of the region against each other. Of course, such rivalries could not surface with Cold War bipolarity in full force, but which opened up like a virtual pandora's box when the power of the hegemons waned. The history being what it was, the states of the region did not trust each other, although most of that distrust was aimed at a single point (Japan). When countries do not trust each other, they will not tolerate `being at each other's mercy', and will attempt to best each other by any means. Moreover, all of the states concerned were in dominant position in the region at one time or another, and sought to regain the glories they had lost, mostly by building up their force of arms. Korea. a country that had once been great but relegated to secondary status in recent times, was caught in the middle. Korea had the bad luck of occupying a geographical position between a three of the world's most powerful states: China, Japan, and Russia. Power in the international stage being what it is, relative, a country that would have been formidable if it was located elsewhere (i.e. Southeast Asia), suddenly had a high possibility of ending up a political `punching bag' for the surrounding powers. Unfortunately, there were those among its population, possessed of incredible naivete, that unification would ensure

peace ad infinitum, and again, money for other social sectors, without taking into account the dangers rife in the region, the sheer power of its neighbors, and all three harboring ambitions to maintain or recover the preeminent regional position they had enjoyed in the past. What's more, these `neighbors' were trying to achieve their goals not by war of words, but by honing their guns and missiles, and fight a war if necessary. Korea has been placed in harm's way, and it should realize the region's dangers for what they are, arm itself to prepare, and keep its guard up. The way to Korean power is here as follows. First condition for any such effort is unification; it is impossible for a for Korea to be an earnest regional power when its population and resources are divided, and so much expenses are wasted in military competition with EACH OTHER, instead of against other countries in the region. Second, Korean industry has to desist from an investment to innovation mode, which expedites technological advancement that can be utilized militarily. Third, Korea should concentrate its military buildup towards a genuine blue-water navy, which will facilitate its effort at power projection, and this should include acquisition of an AEGIS-type cruiser and building a carrier battle group. Fourth its air force should be strengthened for skirmishes that are not significant enough to warrant the use of ground forces. Fifth, a rapid deployment force should be built so that Korea can have a regional military role. Last but not least, we should "watch with alarm the power of our neighbors", especially Japan. What I have outlined so far is basically a policy of "a rich country, strong army (부국강병)", which is exactly what Korea should pursue if it seeks to survive in this new environment.