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-1CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Table of Contents

1. Niccolo Machiavelli – The Prince Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source Secondary Reading Primary Source 2 5 12 14 20 24 29 31 35 37 41 43 47 49 53 56 62 64 70 73 80 82 86 89 92 95 106 109 117 120

2. Francis Bacon: Novum Organum

3. Rene Descartes: Discourse on Method

4. Thomas Hobbes: Levithan

5. John Locke: Two Treatises of Government

6. Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations

7. Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract

9. Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France

10. Thomas Paine: Rights of Man

11. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women

12. Thomas Malthus: Essay on Population

13. Karl Marx: Communist Manifesto

14. Charles Darwin: Origin of the Species

15. Fredrich Nietzche: Beyond Good and Evil

-2CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Nicollo Machiavelli’s The Prince Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Niccolo Machiavelli Among the most original thinkers of the Renaissance is a brilliant and slightly tragic figure, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, his name would be synonymous with deviousness, cruelty, and willfully destructive rationality; no thinker was every so demonized or misunderstood than Machiavelli. The source of this misunderstanding is his most influential and widely read treatise on government, The Prince, a remarkably short book that attempts to lay out methods to secure and maintain political power. His life spanned the greatest period of cultural achievement in Florence to its ultimate downfall. This period was marked by political instability, fear, invasion, intrigue, and high cultural achievement as the tiny states of Italy, including the Papal States, were pulled into the politics and wars of Europe by the immense gravity of two large states, Spain and France. His life began at the very start of this process: in 1469, when Ferdinand and Isabella married and through this marriage created a new, large kingdom of Spain composed of Castile and Aragon, Machiavelli was born to a wealthy Florentine lawyer. In his lifetime, he would see the efflorescence of Florentine culture and political power under the brilliant political genius of Lorenzo de'Medici. He would also see the twilight of the Medici power as Lorenzo's son and successor, Piero de'Medici, was thrown from power by the Dominican monk, Savonarola, who set up a true Florentine Republic. When Savonarola, fanatic about reform, was himself thrown from power and burned, a second Republic was set up under Soderini in 1498. Machiavelli was the secretary of this new Republic, an important and distinguished position. The Republic, however, was crushed in 1512 by the Spanish who installed the Medici's as rulers of Florence once again. It seems that Machiavelli really had no political commitments or political stripe: he seems to have been on nobody's side politically. For when the Medici came to power, he began to work overtime to get in good with them. It seems that either he was ruthlessly ambitious or believed in serving in government no matter what political group or party was in charge. The Medici, however, never fully trusted him since he had been an important official in the Republic. They imprisoned and tortured him in 1513 and eventually banished him to his country estate at San Casciano (all this torture and imprisonment, however, didn't stop him from trying to get in good with the Medicis). It was during his exile in San Casciano,

-3when he was desparate to get back into government, that he wrote his principle works: the Discourse on Livy , The Prince , The History of Florence , and two plays. Many of these works, such as The Prince , were written for the express purpose of getting a job in the Medici government. The tremendous innovation of both the Discourses on Livy and The Prince was Machiavelli's uncoupling of political theory from ethics. Throughout the Western tradition, as in the Chinese tradition, political theory and policy was closely linked to ethics. Aristotle summed up this connection when he defined politics as merely an extension of ethics. Throughout the Western tradition, then, politics had been understood in terms of right and wrong, just and unjust, temperate and intemperate, and so on. The moral terms used to evaluate human actions were employed to evaluate political actions Machiavelli was the first to discuss politics and social phenomena in their own terms without recourse to ethics or jurisprudence. In many ways you could consider Machiavelli to be the first major Western thinker to apply the strictly scientific method of Aristotle and Averroes to politics. He did so by observing the phenomena of politics, reading all that's been written on the subject, and describing political systems in their own terms. For Machiavelli, politics was about one and only one thing: getting and keeping power or authority. Everything else—religion, morality, etc—that people associate with politics has nothing to do with this fundamental aspect of politics—unles being moral helps one get and keep power. The only skill that counts in getting and maintaining power is calculation; the successful politician knows what to do or what to say for every situation. With this insight, Machiavelli in The Prince simply describes the means by which individuals have tried to seize and to maintain power. Most of the examples he gives are failures; the entire book is suffused with tragedy for at any moment, if the ruler makes one miscalculation, all the authority he has so assiduously cultivated will dry up like the morning dew. The social and political world of the The Prince is monstrously unpredictable and volatile; only the most superhuman calculative mind can overcome this social and political volatility. Throughout The Prince and the Discourses , it's clear that Machiavelli has praise only for the winners. For this reason, he admires figures such as Alexander VI and Julius II, universally hated throughout Europe as ungodly popes, for thei astonishing military and political success. His refusal to allow ethical judgements enter into political theory branded him throughout the Renaissance as a kind of anti-Christ. In chapters such as "Whether a Prince Should Be True to his Word," Machiavelli argues that any moral judgment should be secondary to getting, increasing and maintaining power. The answer to the above question, for instance, is "it's good to be true to your word, but you should lie whenever it advances your power or security—not only that, it's necessary."

-4It might help to understand Machiavelli to imagine that he's not talking about the state so much in ethical terms but in medical terms. For Machiavelli believed that the Italian situation was desparate and that the Florentine state was in grave danger. Rather than approach the question from an ethical point of view, Machiavelli was genuinely concerned with healing the state to make it stronger. For instance, in talking about seditious points of view, Machiavelli doesn't make an ethical argument, but rather a medical one—"seditious people should be amputated before they infect the whole state." The single most articulated value in the work of Machiavelli is virtú (Latin virtus), which is related to our word, "virtue." Machiavelli means it more in its Latin sense of "manly," but individuals with virtú are primarily marked by their ability to enforce their will on volatile social situations. They do this through a combination of strong will, strength, and brilliant and strategic calculation. In one of the most famous passages from The Prince , Machiavelli describes the proper orientation towards the volatility of the world, or Fortune, by comparing Fortune to a lady: "la fortuna é donna," or "Fortune is a Lady." Machiavelli is referring to the courtly love tradition, where the lady that constitutes the object of desire is approached and entreated and begged. The ideal Prince, however, for Machiavelli does not entreat or beg Lady Fortune, but rather physically grabs her and takes whatever he wants. This was a scandalous passage and still is today, but it represents a powerful translation of the Renaissance idea of human potential to the area of politics. For if, according to Pico della Mirandola, a human being can self-transform into anything it wants, then it must be possible for a single, strong-willed individual to order the chaos of political life. Despite his hopes that the Medicis might prove to be those ideal rulers that could unite Italy, they did not remain in power for long. When Guilio de'Medici left Firenze to become Pope Clement VII, the subalterns that he left in charge of the city managed it very poorly. The people soon overthrew the Medici rule and established the Third Republic of Firenze in 1527. Machiavelli saw his chance and tried to get a position in the new republic, but the new rulers distrusted him because of his long association with the Medici. So on June 22, 1527, only a few months after the establishment of the Third Republic, Machiavelli died. That same year, Rome was sacked by Emperor Charles VII and the pope was forced to ally with Charles. In 1530, the pope and Charles led a punitive expedition against Firenze and crushed it as an independent state. Three years after the death of Machiavelli and two years before the publication of The Prince , , the state that Machiavelli worked so hard to help and believed so much in blinked out of existence. Text Citation: Hooker, Richard. “Niccolo Machiavelli” World Civilizations, Washington State University, originally published at:, 1996.

-5CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Nicollo Machiavelli’s The Prince Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Those who want to gain a prince's favour usually offer him those things they value most or that they think he likes best. So we often see people giving him horses, armour, cloth of gold, gems, and similar ornaments suitable to their position. Wishing to offer Your Magnificence something on my behalf as evidence of my devotion, I find nothing in my possessions I value higher than the knowledge of the actions of great men, which have gained from long experience of the affairs today and from constant study of the past. I have carefully examined and thought about these matters for a long time, and now I have written it all down in a small volume, which I send to Your Magnificence. Although I judge this book unworthy for you to receive, I am confident that you will generously accept it, especially when you recall that I can give no greater gift than to help you understand in a very short time what it has taken me many years and many dangers and much discomfort to learn. A prince, first of all, should have no other object or thought in mind than war and how to wage it. He must not take up anything else to be skilful in, for war is the only art essential to those who govern. It is, moreover, of such great value that it not only keeps in power those who have been born rulers, but often helps men of humble origin to rise to high rank. On the other hand, when princes turn their attention more to luxuries than to war, they lose their power. The chief cause of losing power is neglect of the art of war; the chief means of acquiring power is skill in the art of war. We must now see what methods and rules a prince should use in dealing with his subjects and his friends. Because I know that many have written about this, I fear that my writing about it will be judged presumptuous, since I disagree in this matter completely with the opinions of others. But since I intend to write something useful to those who understand, it seems to me more practical to go directly to the actual truth of the matter than to speculate about it. Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known really to exist. But there is such a difference between how we live and how we ought to live that he who turns away from what actually does occur for the sake of what ought to occur, does something that will ruin him rather than save him. For he who wants to be a good man all the time will be ruined among so many who are not good. It is therefore necessary for a prince who wants to survive to learn how not to be good and to use

-6goodness, or not use it, according to what needs to be done. Leaving aside, then, those matters which concern only an imaginary prince and talking about those things that are real, I say that all men, and especially princes because they are situated higher, exhibit certain qualities which bring them either blame or praise. Thus, one is termed liberal or generous, another miserly or is thought unselfish, another greedy; one cruel, another compassionate; one unreliable, another trustworthy; one effeminate and cowardly, another fierce and courageous; one humane, another proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, the other crafty; one harsh, the other easygoing, one serious, the other light-minded; one religious, the other an unbeliever; and so on. I know that everyone will admit that it would be very fine for a prince to have all of the qualities mentioned above that are judged good. But because human nature will not allow it, they cannot all be possessed or maintained. It is necessary, therefore, that the prince be clever enough to know how to avoid a bad reputation for having those vices which might endanger his position, and if he can do so, he should also avoid those vices that are not dangerous to his position. But if he cannot do so, he can let them persist with less worry. He must not care if he gets a bad reputation on account of those vices without which he could not protect the state; because, all things considered, we find that some things which seem to be virtues would, if followed, lead to ruin, whereas something else which seems vicious will bring about security and well-being. Beginning now with the first of the qualities mentioned above, I say that it would be well to be thought liberal or generous. Nevertheless, liberality used to such a degree that you are known for it, is harmful to you. If you practise it moderately, as one ought to, no one will know about it, and you will be blamed for the opposite vice. If, on the other hand, you want to gain a reputation for being liberal or generous, you must not omit any extravagance, to such an extent that a prince who does so will use up his resources. It will then become necessary at last, if he wants to keep on being known for his liberality, for him to tax his people heavily, to extort money from them, and do everything possible just to get money. This will begin to make his subjects hate him, and when he becomes poor no one will think much of him. Thus, having harmed many and benefited few by his generosity, he will be subject to all kinds of hardships and all kinds of dangers. If he realizes this and wants to change his ways, he is immediately blamed for becoming stingy. A prince, therefore, being unable to use this virtue of liberality or generosity to the point where it is recognized without harming himself, ought not, if he is wise, object to being termed stingy. For as time passes he will be termed more liberal when people see that because of his thriftiness his income is enough both to defend himself against those who make war against him and to begin his own enterprises without burdening the people. Such a prince is actually liberal to those from whom he takes nothing, who are numerous, and stingy to those to whom he does not

-7give, who are few. In our times we have not seen any great achievements except the ones performed by those considered stingy. The others have failed. Pope Julius II, though he used his reputation for generosity to win the papacy, did not try to maintain it afterwards because he wanted to be able to wage war.The present king of France has made many wars without imposing heavy taxes on his people because the extra expenditures were paid for by his long-term economies.The present king of Spain, if he had continued being liberal, would not have begun or completed so many undertakings. For these reasons a prince ought to care little about being thought stingy if he thereby avoids robbing his subjects and can still defend himself, and if he does not become poor and contemptible or is not forced to become greedy. For this vice of stinginess is one of those that will enable him to rule. If someone says that Caesar came to power by using liberality and many others attained high rank by being generous or being thought so, I reply that you are already a prince or you are on the way to becoming one. In the first case, this liberality is dangerous; in the second it is quite necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who wished to come to power in Rome. But if, after attaining power, he had lived and had not decreased his expenditures, he would have destroyed his authority. And if someone should reply that there have been many princes considered to be very generous and who have done great deeds with their armies, I say that either the prince spends his own money and his subjects' or someone else's. In the first case, he ought be careful; in the other case, he should not neglect in any way being very generous. Generosity is necessary for the prince who marches with his army and lives on plunder, loot, and ransoms, and uses other people's wealth. Otherwise his soldiers would not follow him. You can be very generous with what does not belong to you or to your subjects, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander. To spend others' money does not harm your reputation but helps it. It is only spending your own money that hurts you. There is nothing that uses itself up like generosity. For while you use it, you lose the power to use it, and you become either poor and despised or, in order to escape poverty, you become greedy and hated. Above all, a prince must guard against being despised and hated, and generosity or liberality brings you to one or the other condition. However, it is wiser to be known as stingy, which brings you disgrace without hatred, than trying to be known as liberal, which necessarily makes you known as rapacious; having a reputation for that brings disgrace and hatred.... Proceeding to the other qualities mentioned before, I say that every prince ought to wish to be thought merciful and not cruel, but he ought to be careful not to misuse that mercy. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; nevertheless, his cruelty pacified the Romagna, united it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. If this is well thought through, it will be seen to have been more merciful than the people of Florence who, in order to avoid being called cruel, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. Hence, a prince ought not to worry about a reputation for being cruel in order to keep his subjects unified and loyal, for with a very few examples

-8of cruelty he will prove more merciful than those who, because of too much leniency, allow disorder to erupt, whence arise murders and lootings. For these harm a whole community, whereas the executions ordered by the prince harm only individuals. And of all princes, it is impossible for a new one to avoid the reputation of being cruel because new states are full of dangers. Virgil says in Dido's words: "Harsh times and the newness of the state force me to do such things and to guard all my lands." Nevertheless, the prince should be cautious in judging and acting, but not timid. He should proceed in a temperate manner, with prudence and humanity, so that overconfidence does not make him careless, or excessive suspicions make him intolerable. From this rises a question: Is it better to be loved than feared, or the reverse? The answer is that the prince should be both feared and loved, if possible. But since it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be given up. For it can be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, talkative, tricky and deceitful, eager to avoid dangers, anxious for gain. While you are doing them favours, they are all yours, offering you blood, possessions, life, and children, as I said before, when need for these is remote; but when you need them, they turn on you. And the prince who has trusted their words without making other preparations is ruined, for friendships gained by favours, and not by greatness and nobility, cannot be counted upon when needed. Men care less about offending someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared, because love is supported by a chain of obligation, which because of man's debased nature, is broken at every occasion for selfish profit; but fear, maintained by dread of punishment, never fails. Nevertheless, the prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at least avoids hatred. For to be feared and not to be hated go very well together. This can always be done if the prince refrains from taking the property and women of his subjects. And when indeed it is necessary to take someone's life, it should be when there is sufficient justification and obvious cause. But above all he should refrain from taking the property of others, for men forget the death of their father sooner than the loss of their property. Moreover, reasons for taking property are never lacking, and he who begins to live by extortion always finds reasons to take the goods of others, whereas reasons for taking life are fewer and less lasting. I conclude, therefore, that as far as being feared or loved are concerned, men love as they please but fear as the prince wills. A wise prince ought to rely on what is in his power and not in the power of others, only being careful to avoid being hated, as I have pointed out.... Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live honestly and not be deceitful. Nevertheless, experience shows that princes in our times who have done great things have cared little for honesty; they have known how to confuse men's minds with their cleverness and have finally defeated those who put their faith in honesty.

-9You ought to realize, therefore, that there are two ways of fighting: one according to laws, the other with force. The first is appropriate to men, the second to animals. But often the first is not enough, and it is necessary to turn to the second. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince to know very well the methods of both animal and man. This lesson was secretly taught by writers of antiquity, who tell how Achilles and many other princes of ancient times were given to the centaur Chiron, so that he could raise and teach them. Their having as tutor a creature half-animal and half-man indicates the need of a prince's knowing how to use the nature of both and that one cannot bring success without the other. Therefore, since it is necessary for a prince to know well how to act like an animal, he should choose the natures of the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot defend himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. A prince needs to be a fox to know about traps, and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who behave only like the lion do not understand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when to do so would be disadvantageous and when the reasons for making promises no longer exist. If all men were good, this precept would not be good. But since they are bad and would not keep their promises to you, it is not necessary for you to keep yours to them. A prince never lacks good reason to excuse his breaking his word. One could give innumerable modern examples of this and show how many peace treaties and promises have been broken ' and made ineffective by the untrustworthiness of princes. He who has best known how to act like a fox has succeeded best. But he who has this talent has to know how to keep it hidden and to pretend and deceive. Men are so simple and yield to the needs of the present so readily that he who deceives will always find those who let themselves be deceived. I do not wish to remain silent about one recent example. Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men and thought of nothing else, yet he always found the opportunity to do so. There never was a man who had greater success in affirming something; and the more oaths he used in affirming it, the sooner he broke his promise. Nevertheless, his deceptions always succeeded in the way he wanted, for he knew the way of the world. It is not necessary, then, for a prince to have the good qualities mentioned above, but it is necessary to seem to have them. I would even say this: to have them and use them all the time is dangerous, but seeming to have them is useful. He should seem to be pious, faithful, humane, honest, religious, and to be so. But he should have his mind so prepared that when occasion requires, he is able to change to the opposite. And it must be understood that a prince, especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good; it is often necessary to act contrary to faith, charity, humanity, and religion in order to maintain the state. It is therefore necessary for him to have the ability to change his mind according to the way the winds of fortune and conditions require. If possible, he ought not, as I have said before, turn away from what is good, but he should be able to do evil if necessary.

- 10 A prince should be very careful that nothing ever comes from his mouth that is not full of the aforementioned [good] qualities. Those who see and hear him should think him all compassion, all faith, all integrity, all humaneness, all religion. And nothing is more necessary to seem to have than the last quality. For people in general judge more with their eyes than with their minds. Everyone can see; few have understanding. Everyone sees what you seem to be; few know what you really are. And those few do not dare oppose the opinion of the many, who have the power of the state to support them. In the actions of individuals, especially princes, when there is no judge to appeal to, people look at the results. A prince only has to conquer and maintain the state. His means will always be considered honourable, and everyone will praise them because the common crowd is always deceived by appearances and by the way things turn out. In the world the crowd is everything. The few are isolated when the crowd is in control. A certain prince of the present time, whom it would be well not to mention by name, always preaches peace and fidelity but is actually a great enemy of both. Either of these qualities, had he followed them, would often have taken from him his reputation or his state.... Since I have spoken of the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I want to discuss the others briefly, with this generalization: the prince should pay attention, as has been said before, to avoiding those things which make him hated and despised. As long as he succeeds in this, he will have done his part and will not find danger in other vices. Hatred, as I have said, comes from being greedy and seizing his subjects' property and women. He must refrain from doing these things. For most men live contentedly as long as they are not deprived of their property or honour. Then he has to contend only with the ambition of a few, which he can easily control in many ways. He is judged contemptible if he is thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. A prince ought to guard against these as from a dangerous reef. He must try to show by his actions his greatness, spirit, seriousness, and bravery. In governing the affairs of his subjects, he must make his decisions irrevocable. He ought to maintain such a reputation that no one would think of deceiving or cheating him. The prince who earns such an opinion for himself has a great reputation. If a prince has a great reputation, it is difficult to plot against him or to attack him so long as he is thought to have great ability and the respect of his subjects. Therefore, a prince must fear two things: one from inside his state because of his subjects, the other from outside because of foreign enemies. He can defend himself from the latter with good weapons and good friends, and he will always have good friends if he has good arms. Conditions inside the state will remain quiet when conditions outside are quiet, unless they are already stirred up by a conspiracy. When attacked from outside, if he has ruled and lived as I have said, and if he stands firm, he will repel all attacks as the Spartan Nabis did. But concerning his subjects when external matters are stable, he still has to be wary of their plots. The prince can be quite safe from these if he avoids being hated and if he keeps the people satisfied, which will of course happen as I have already explained.

- 11 One of the most effective safeguards a prince can have against conspiracies is not being hated by the people, for every conspirator believes that he will please the people by killing the prince. But if he thinks he will offend them by doing so, he does not dare to carry out the action because the difficulties encountered by conspirators are very many. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies, and few have turned out well because a conspirator cannot act alone. He can get companions only from among those who, he thinks, are discontented. And just as soon as you have revealed your plot to a malcontent, you give him the means to be contented.... He sees on the one hand certain gain and on the other an uncertain prospect full of danger. He would have to be a rare friend to you or a fierce enemy of the prince to keep his word to you. To put the matter briefly, I say that a conspirator can know nothing but anxiety, jealousy, and fear of punishment, which terrifies him. But on the prince's side there are the prestige of his office, the laws, and the power of his friends and the state that defend him. When the good will of the people is added to all of these, it is impossible that anyone would be so foolhardy as to conspire. Whereas a conspirator usually has to be afraid before committing the act, in this case he also has to be afraid afterwards, for he will have the people for his enemy too, and he will have no hope of any escape.

- 12 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Francis Bacon as an influence on the Enlightenment From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Francis Bacon, son of the lord keeper of the great seal of England, Sir Nicholas Bacon, attended Trinity College at Cambridge University and entered the legal profession in 1582. His contacts with the English court brought him knighthood in 1603 (with the accession of James I) and the post of lord chancellor of England in 1618. In 1621, however, Bacon lost the chancellorship after being convicted of bribery. He retired to his estate near Saint Albans and devoted himself to studying the philosophy of science. Although Bacon's life preceded the onset of the Enlightenment by nearly a century, his writings nevertheless served as one of its primary intellectual sources. In the spirit of many figures of the late Renaissance, Bacon envisioned a thoroughgoing reform of all human knowledge, based on a new scientific method. Bacon's method was that of philosophical induction. It involved the careful collection of observations (facts) from experience and experiment and their subsequent organization into a new system of knowledge. He equated the collection and description of observations from nature with natural history and called that discipline the "great root and mother" of all scientific endeavor. The new system of knowledge would include not only the abstract disciplines such as philosophy and mathematics but also the trades and crafts. A group of intellectuals working together (collaborating) at their task would create the new system. Once elaborated, the new system of knowledge would be used to solve practical problems in human life. Knowledge, then, would acquire a certain utility (usefulness) for human society, would serve the cause of progress, and would play a central role in creating a human utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis. Bacon's method stood in stark opposition to the deductive method in philosophy. Deduction began not with observations (facts) but with a single philosophical principle or axiom. From that principle it created a whole system of knowledge by applying the rules of logic. Deduction had produced the great medieval systems of Scholastic philosophy, and in a revised form, it would create the geometric method and mechanical philosophy of René Descartes.

- 13 Bacon outlined his method and program in several works, the most significant of which were: Novum organum (New instrument; 1620), part one of the projected Great Instauration; De augmentis scientiarum (On the advancement of learning; 1623), part two of the projected Great Instauration; The Advancement of Learning (1605), an early English version of De augmentis scientiarum; and New Atlantis (1627), the presentation of Bacon's utopian vision, published in English for the general reading public. Bacon's inductive method, and his conceptualization of science as a collaborative project based on inductive reasoning and aimed at achieving complete human knowledge inspired the work of 17th-century experimental scientists in England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and France. His vision of science received institutional form in the creation of the Royal Society of London. The society's founders consciously modeled their organization on Bacon's vision of collaborative, experimental science. Through the activities of the Royal Society and of scientists throughout Europe who were committed to experimental methods, the Baconian vision eventually entered into the discourse and vision of the Enlightenment. Voltaire, whose Lettres philosophiques (Philosophical letters) introduced the general French public to the experimental science of Newton and the sensation psychology of John Locke, included Bacon as one of the philosophers who had proved the necessity of experiment in attaining knowledge. Denis Diderot planned the Encyclopédie as a comprehensive presentation of human knowledge in the sciences, trades, crafts, and arts. He followed not only Bacon's general vision but also the specifics of his classification of human knowledge. In addition, Bacon's elevation of natural history to a primary role in creating comprehensive knowledge helped to stimulate the dramatic growth and intellectual development of that discipline. In short, the Enlightenment in some instances represented an attempt to bring Bacon's New Atlantis, that utopian human society built on knowledge, into actual existence. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Francis Bacon as an influence on the Enlightenment." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 14 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was among the most important contributors to the development of the scientific method and rational thought. A politician and lawyer as well as a philosopher, Bacon took all knowledge as his province. In Novum Organum (1620), he attempted to develop a new method of philosophical and scientific inquiry that was certain and secure. Bacon's empiricism, an insistence on basing all thought on data derived from experience, became one of the marks of modern intellectual life. Bacon's Novum Organum, never completed, consisted of a series of aphorisms, brief statements about science and knowledge. Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature. Beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything. Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect much. It is by instruments and helps that the work is done, which are as much wanted for the understanding as for the hand. And as the instruments of the hand either give motion or guide it, so the instruments of the mind supply either suggestions for the understanding or cautions. Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule... The cause and root of nearly all evils in the sciences is this—that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind we neglect to seek for its true helps. The subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of the senses and understanding; so that all those specious meditations, speculations and glosses in which men indulge are quite from the purpose, only there is no one by to observe it. As the sciences which we now have do not help us in finding out new works, so neither does the logic which we now have help us in finding out new sciences.

- 15 The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after truth. So it does more harm than good. The syllogism is not applied to the first principles of sciences, and is applied in vain to intermediate axioms, being no match for the subtlety of nature. It commands assent therefore to the proposition, but does not take hold of the thing. The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and overhastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction..... The discoveries which have hitherto been made in the sciences are such as lie close to vulgar notions, scarcely beneath the surface. In order to penetrate into the inner and further recesses of nature, it is necessary that both notions and axioms be derived from things by a more sure and guarded way, and that a method of intellectual operation be introduced altogether better and more certain. There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. The understanding left to itself takes the same course (namely, the former) which it takes in accordance with logical order. For the mindlongs to spring up to positions of higher generality, that it may find rest there, and so after a little while wearies of experiment. But this evil is increased by logic, because of the order and solemnity of its disputations. The understanding left to itself, in a sober, patient, and grave mind, especially if it be not hindered by received doctrines, tries a little that other way, which is the right one, but with little progress, since the understanding, unless directed and assisted, is a thing unequal, and quite unfit to contend with the obscurity of things. Both ways set out from the senses and particulars, and rest in the highest generalities; but the difference between them is infinite. For the one just glances at experiment and particulars in passing, the other dwells duly and orderly among them... Bacon challenged old "Idols," which he believed inhibited the development of knowledge. The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only so beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance is

- 16 obtained, they will again in thevery instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults. There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names, calling the first class Idols of the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Cave; the third, Idols of the Market Place; the fourth, Idols of the Theater. The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols. To point them out, however, is of great use; for the doctrine of Idols is to the interpretation of nature what the doctrine of the refutation of sophisms is to common logic. The Idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it. The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world. There are also Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market Place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate, and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. Arid therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies. Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed

- 17 and in like artificial manner set forth; seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part alike. Neither again do I mean this only of entire systems, but also of many principles and axioms in science, which by tradition, credulity, and negligence have come to be received... Included among the obstacles to scientific inquiry were superstition, religion, and despair. Neither is it to be forgotten that in every age natural philosophy has had a troublesome and hard to deal with adversary—namely, superstition, and the blind and immoderate zeal of religion. For we see among the Greeks that those who first proposed to men's then uninitiated ears the natural causes for thunder and for stores were thereupon found guilty of impiety. Nor was much more forbearance shown by some of the ancient fathers of the Christian church to those who on most convincing grounds (such as no one in his senses would now think of contradicting) maintained that the earth was round, and of consequence asserted the existence of the antipodes. Moreover, as things now are, to discourse of nature is made harder and more perilous by the summaries and systems of the schoolmen who, having reduced theology into regular order as well as they were able, and fashioned it into the shape of an art, ended in incorporating the contentious and thorny philosophy of Aristotle, more than was fit, with the body of religion. To the same result, though in a different way, tend the speculations of those who have taken upon them to deduce the truth of the Christian religion from the principles of philosophers, and to confirm it by their authority, pompously solemnizing this union of the sense and faith as a lawful marriage, and entertaining men's minds with a pleasing variety of matter, but all-the while disparaging things divine by mingling them with things human. Now in such mixtures of theology with philosophy only the received doctrines of philosophy are included; while new ones, albeit changes for the better, are all but expelled and exterminated. Lastly, you will find that by the simpleness of certain divines, access to any philosophy, however pure, is well-nigh closed. Some are weakly afraid lest a deeper search into nature should transgress the permitted limits of sober-mindedness, wrongfully wresting and transferring what is said in Holy Writ against those who pry into sacred mysteries, to the hidden things of nature, which are barred by no prohibition. Others with more subtlety surmise and reflect that if second causes are unknown everything can more readily be referred to the divine hand and rod, a point in which they think religion greatly concerned— which is in fact nothing else but to seek to gratify God with a lie. Others fear from past example that movements and changes in philosophy will end in assaults on religion. And others again appear apprehensive that in the investigation of nature something may be found to subvert or at least shake the authority of religion, especially with the unlearned. But these two last fears seem to me to savor utterly of carnal wisdom; as if men in

- 18 the recesses and secret thought of their hearts doubted and distrusted the strength of religion and the empire of faith over the sense, and therefore feared that the investigation of truth in nature might be dangerous to them. But if the matter be truly considered, natural philosophy is, after the word of God, at once the surest medicine against superstition and the most approved nourishment for faith, and therefore she is rightly given to religion as her most faithful handmaid, since the one displays the will of God, the other his power. For he did not err who said, "Ye err in that ye know not the Scriptures and the power of God," thus coupling and blending in an indissoluble bond information concerning his will and meditation concerning his power. Meanwhile it is not surprising if the growth of natural philosophy is checked when religion, the thing which has most power over men's minds, has by the simpleness and incautious zeal of certain persons been drawn to take part against her. Again, in the customs and institutions of schools, academies, colleges, and similar bodies destined for the abode of learned men and the cultivation of learning, everything is found adverse to the progress of science. For the lectures and exercises there are so ordered that to think or speculate on anything out of the common way can hardly occur to any man. And if one or two have the boldness to use any liberty of judgment, they must undertake the task all by themselves; they can have no advantage from the company of others. And if they can endure this also, they will find their industry and largeness of mind no slight hindrance to their fortune. For the studies of men in these places are confined and as it were imprisoned in the writings of certain authors, from whom if any man dissent he is straightway arraigned as a turbulent person and an innovator. But surely there is a great distinction between matters of state and the arts; for the danger from new motion and from new light is not the same. In matters of state a change even for the_ better is distrusted, because it unsettles what is established; these things rest on authority, consent, fame and opinion, not on demonstration. But arts and sciences should be like mines, where the noise of new works and further advances is heard on every side. But though the matter be so according to right reason, it is not so acted on in practice; and the points above mentioned in the administration and government of learning put a severe restraint upon the advancement of the sciences. Nay, even if that jealousy were to cease, still it is enough to check the growth of science that efforts and labors in this field go unrewarded. For it does not rest with the same persons to cultivate sciences and to reward them. The growth of them comes from great wits; the prizes and rewards of them are in the hands of the people, or of great persons, who are but in very few cases even moderately learned. Moreover, this kind of progress is not only unrewarded with prizes and substantial benefits; it has not even the advantage of popular applause.. For it is a greater matter than the generality of men can take in, and is apt to be overwhelmed and extinguished by the gales of popular opinions. And it is nothing strange if a thing not held in honor does not prosper. But by far the greatest obstacle to the progress of science and to the undertaking of new tasks and provinces therein is found in this—that men despair and think things impossible. For wise and serious men are

- 19 wont in these matters to be altogether distrustful, considering with themselves the obscurity of nature, the shortness of life, the deceitfulness of the senses, the weakness of the judgment, the difficulty of experiment, and the like; and so supposing that in the revolution of time and of the ages of the world the sciences have their ebbs and flows; that at one season they grow and flourish, at another wither and decay, yet in such sort that when they have reached a certain point and condition they can advance no further. If therefore anyone believes or promises more, they think this comes of an ungoverned and unripened mind, and that such attempts have prosperous beginnings, become difficult as they go on, and end in confusion. Now since there are thoughts which naturally present themselves to men grave and of great judgment, we must take good heed that we be not led away by our love for a most fair and excellent object to relax or diminish the severity of our judgment. We must observe diligently what encouragement dawns upon us and from what quarter, and, putting aside the lighter breezes of hope, we must thoroughly sift and examine those which promise greater steadiness and constancy. Nay, and we must take state prudence too into our counsels, whose rule is to distrust, and to take the less favorable view of human affairs. I am now therefore to speak touching hope, especially as I am not a dealer in promises, and wish neither to force nor to ensnare men's judgments, but to lead them by the hand with their good will. And though the strongest means of inspiring hope will be to bring men to particulars, especially to particulars digested and arranged in my Tables of Discovery (the subject partly of the second, but much more of the fourth part of my Instauration), since this is not merely the promise of the thing but the thing itself; nevertheless, that everything may be done with gentleness, I will proceed with my plan of preparing men's minds, of which preparation to give hope is no unimportant part. For without it the rest tends rather to make men sad (by giving them a worse and meaner opinion of things as they are than they now have, and making them more fully to feel and know the unhappiness of their own condition) than to induce any alacrity or to whet their industry in making trial. And therefore it is fit that I publish and set forth those conjectures of mine which make hope in this matter reasonable, just as Columbus did, before that wonderful voyage of his across the Atlantic, when he gave the reasons for his conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides those which were known before; which reasons, though rejected at first, were afterwards made good by experience, and were the causes and beginnings of great events... Source: Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, edited by Fulton Anderson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 39, 40-41, 42-43, 47-49, 87-91.

- 20 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Rene Descartes’ Discourse on Method Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

René Descartes as an influence on the Enlightenment From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Born into the robe nobility (lawyers and officeholders), Descartes was the son of Olympe-Joachim Descartes and Jeanne Brochard. Descartes's middle name, Du Perron, comes from the estate of Du Perron ceded to him by his father. In 1606, Descartes entered the prestigious Collège La Flèche, founded by the Jesuits at the request of King Henri IV. The college provided Descartes with an education steeped in mathematics, philosophy, physics, and Latin classics. After his graduation in 1612, Descartes spent a few months in Paris acquiring the social skills required of his status, then pursued a law degree at the University of Poitiers. In 1616, with law degree in hand, Descartes volunteered for military duty in the army of Prince Maurice of Nassau. He spent the winter of 1618–19 at the garrison in Breda, where he met the mathematician Isaac Beeckman. Under Beeckman's influence, Descartes began exploring mathematical problems, making his first discoveries in what would become analytical geometry. He also wrote a brief treatise on music theory, the Compendium Musicae (Compendium of music), published posthumously in 1650. The winter of 1619–20 found Descartes quartered near Ulm in southern Germany, having passed into the service of the elector of Bavaria. For four years, he would participate in the bloody battles of the Thirty Years' War. But the first winter in Ulm had significance far beyond his military career, for it was during that time that Descartes claimed to have gained his most important philosophical insights. He published nothing of his ideas, however, until 1637. [Between 1628 and 1449] Descartes developed the systematic philosophy that made him renowned throughout Europe. Publication of parts of this work was delayed until 1637, for Descartes definitely feared prosecution after hearing of Galileo Galilei's fate at the hands of the Roman Inquisition. His works, however, were circulating before 1637 in manuscript form. When Descartes began his work in 1619, European philosophers and theologians were wrestling with problems about epistemology that were being forcefully stated or restated by skeptics. Skeptics were thinkers who followed several forms of philosophical skepticism that were part of

- 21 the intellectual inheritance from antiquity. Skepticism claimed that all knowledge obtained through our senses and intellect is unreliable and necessarily subject to doubt. People of Descartes's generation were deeply disturbed by these claims, as they seemed to call into question all tradition and knowledge, even knowledge of God. Descartes was one of many who tried to answer the skeptics in order to restore a sense of intellectual and psychological security. His approach was novel in that he used the very strategy of the skeptics—radical doubt and criticism—to overturn their claims. He resolved to subject all his own ideas to critical doubt, retaining only those that were "clear and distinct," that is, "selfevident" and impossible to deny. This exercise yielded one self-evident truth, the bit of intuitive knowledge encapsulated in the famed phrase, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). Starting with this simple idea, Descartes proceeded to formulate additional reliable ideas about humankind, the world, and, ultimately, God. He determined that body and mind are distinctly different, the former made of matter, the latter of spirit (not-matter); that all the phenomena of the universe can be explained in terms of matter and its motion; and that God does indeed exist. The process by which he arrived at these ideas is his famous geometrical method of reasoning, which he sketched out in the Discours de la méthode (Discourse on Method; 1637). Geometrical Method The geometrical method relies wholly on a disciplined form of reasoning to arrive at reliable knowledge. It consists of four simple rules: start only with clear and distinct ideas; divide any complex idea into small, simple ones (analysis); think in an orderly process, moving from the simplest to the most complex ideas; and, finally, subject the process at every point to thorough criticism and evaluation so that nothing escapes your attention. The term geometrical in this method reveals its roots in Descartes's formal Jesuit education at La Flèche, specifically his acquaintance with the deductive reasoning used in Euclidean geometry. This geometry constructs a complex system of reliable knowledge about two- and threedimensional figures from simple axioms such as "two points define a line." That Descartes turned to mathematics as an intellectual model is no surprise, for he believed that only mathematics and theology, both rooted in philosophical logic, provide reliable knowledge, the former about the world, the latter about God. Descartes was not alone in seeking refuge within these two disciplines. The project of mathematizing all human knowledge about the world became a sort of collaborative effort in the 17th century as thinkers all over Europe exchanged their ideas and actual mathematical discoveries through the unofficial network called the Republic of Letters. Descartes has often been hailed as a radical who broke with tradition, but modern scholarship provides a more balanced perspective and reveals the many ways he drew on the past for his ideas, even as he restated them in novel form for his contemporaries. Whatever his indebtedness to the past, it must be emphasized that Descartes took a radical step when he made the thinking, reasoning human being (the subjective self, in philosophical language) the final judge of truth. Many scholars believe this step

- 22 prepared the way for the later emergence of individualism in western European thought and society. The geometrical method was just one tool used in a comprehensive work, De mundo (On the world), written between 1627 and 1633, in which Descartes used the method, mathematics, and Copernican theory to demonstrate the unity of all knowledge—that is, the applicability of a few simple principles about matter, motion, and geometrical reasoning to all disciplines. The desire to prove precisely this unity is one of the threads that links 17th-century thinkers to the early Enlightenment. Although Descartes finished De mundo by 1633, he did not publish it as a whole; Galileo had just been condemned for writing from a Copernican perspective, and Descartes did not want to suffer the same fate. Thus, he began testing the mood of the censors by issuing the four sections separately. The sections on optics and meteors came first, followed by the seminal Traité de géométrie (Treatise on geometry). It spelled out the basic tenets of Descartes's new coordinate geometry, which demonstrated that geometry (lines, planes, and solids) and algebra (numbers and their relationships) could be combined and even made interchangeable. This treatise provides an excellent, still valid example of the results that could be obtained in the search for unified knowledge. Finally, Descartes decided to publish De mundo as a whole in 1637, with its preface, the famed Discours de la méthode. Mechanical Philosophy The unified natural philosophy developed by Descartes is called mechanical philosophy. It begins with the two simple ideas of matter (defined as extension, the ability to occupy space) and motion, then goes on to explain all natural events in the universe in terms of matter moving according to mathematical laws. It addresses the movement of bodies in space as well as the physiology of human bodies, and much more. From our contemporary perspective, much of Descartes's work is imaginary, an exercise in "armchair science," but this view overlooks the fact that Descartes actually developed his ideas by applying his method to the basic mechanical principles he had outlined in the Discours de la méthode. He did not resort to observation because he believed it would produce inferior and unreliable knowledge. One of the foundations of mechanical philosophy was the Cartesian principle of inertia, the notion that an object (matter) in motion continues to move so long as something does not interfere. Changes in the direction of motion occur only as a result of impact between two objects, and the quantity of motion is always conserved in these collisions. Any theory of motion must account for circular motion. In the scientific philosophy of Aristotle, circular motion was considered "natural," "perfect" motion. Galileo changed that conception, making linear motion the natural motion. Descartes accepted Galileo's idea, but then had to explain how circular motion arises. He attempted to explain it by resorting to the impact between particles, and offered a picture of the creation of the universe that was dominated by swirling vortices.

- 23 Descartes's theory was never very satisfactory but it nevertheless had many adherents throughout the 17th century and into the 18th century. Isaac Newton was addressing the problem of circular motion when he developed his substitute theory of universal gravitation with its associated concepts of centripetal and centrifugal motion. Like the geometric method, mechanical philosophy contained troubling implications for Christian theology. If the universe operated according to a set of mathematical laws as Descartes claimed, then it seemed to have no need of God. The later representations of God as a watchmaker and the universe as a clock point to this reduced role. Lacking a deity, humankind would need something other than divine law to provide a basis for morality. This problem would not only bedevil natural philosophers but would also stimulate the development of deism and other contributions of the Enlightenment to the disciplines of natural theology and moral philosophy. Yet another perplexing problem was raised by the implications of Descartes's philosophy for human psychology. At the very outset of his work, in the Discours de la méthode, Descartes claimed that the distinction between soul and body, one of Christianity's central tenets of orthodoxy, follows immediately from the idea of cogito, of knowing oneself directly only as a thinking being. The mind, which is equivalent to the soul, recognizes the body, a type of matter, as something separate. Moreover, it does this without knowing anything about the rest of the external world. Therefore, the mind is distinct from all matter, just as it is from its own body. Descartes wished to refute the claims of the various animist and occult philosophies that were legacies of the Renaissance. The material world he envisioned was dead, stripped of the unruly, capricious forces and the magic present in these Renaissance views. Without a soul, Descartes's mechanical, rational world functioned only according to the orderly, mathematical laws created by God. While this system worked passably for matter, it failed to explain how, in human beings, a nonmaterial soul could act through a material body. Descartes thought that the site of intersection and interaction lay in the brain, in the tiny pineal gland, but he could not develop an adequate explanation of the way in which mind-body interactions occurred. The body-mind (body-soul) problem would challenge philosophers throughout the 17th century and the Enlightenment. If in the end many Cartesian ideas were surpassed, they nevertheless served as important stimuli for the science of the Enlightenment. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "René Descartes as an influence on the Enlightenment." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 24 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Rene Descartes’ Discourse on Method Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The Discourse on Method (1637) of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) has had enormous influence on the development of rationalism, deduction, and modern science. Descartes was a mathematician, and he stressed the importance of using the mathematical method as the means of obtaining knowledge that was precise and verifiable. Emphasizing the centrality of the mind in defining human nature, Descartes' work lent authority to those who were investigating nature as an orderly system which could be understood by human beings. The Discourse on Method was a kind of intellectual autobiography, in which Descartes told the reader how he arrived at his methodology. He discussed his early education and why he determined to seek a new method of obtaining knowledge. ... When I was younger, I had studied a little logic in philosophy, and geometrical analysis and algebra in mathematics, three arts or sciences which would appear apt to contribute something towards my plan. But on examining them, I saw that, regarding logic, its syllogisms and most of its other precepts serve more to explain to others what one already knows, or even, like the art of Lully, to speak without judgement of those things one does not know, than to learn anything new. And although logic indeed contains many very true and sound precepts, there are, at the same time, so many others mixed up with them, which are either harmful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficult to separate them as to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a block of unprepared marble. Then, as for the geometrical analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides the fact that they extend only to very abstract matters which seem to be of no practical use, the former is always so tied to the inspection of figures that it cannot exercise the understanding without greatly tiring the imagination, while, in the latter, one is so subjected to certain rules and numbers that it has become a confused and obscure art which oppresses the mind instead of being a science which cultivates it. This was why I thought I must seek some other method which, while continuing the advantages of these three, was free from their defects. And as a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for vice, so that a State is much better ordered when, having only very few laws, they are very strictly observed, so, instead of this great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed I would have sufficient in the four following rules, so long as I took a firm and constant resolve never once to fail to observe them.

- 25 The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be evidently so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to include in my judgements nothing more than what presented itself so clearly and so distinctly to my mind that I might have no occasion to place it in doubt. The second, to divide each of the difficulties that I was examining into as many parts as might be possible and necessary in order best to solve it. The third, to conduct my thoughts in an orderly way, beginning with the simplest objects and the easiest to know, in order to climb gradually, as by degrees, as far as the knowledge of the most complex, and even supposing some order among those objects which do not precede each other naturally. And the last, everywhere to make such complete enumerations and such general reviews that I would be sure to have omitted nothing. These long chains of reasoning, quite simple and easy, which geometers are accustomed to using to teach their most difficult demonstrations, had given me cause to imagine that everything which can be encompassed by man's knowledge is linked in the same way, and that, provided only that one abstains from accepting any for true which is not true, and that one always keeps the right order for one thing to be deduced from that which precedes it, there can be nothing so distant that one does not reach it eventually, or so hidden that one cannot discover it. And I was in no great difficulty in seeking which to begin with because I knew already that it was with the simplest and easiest to know; and considering that, among all those who have already sought truth in the sciences, only the mathematicians have been able to arrive at any proofs, that is to say, certain and evident reasons, I had no doubt that it was by the same things which they had examined that I should begin, although I did not expect any other usefulness from this than to accustom my mind to nourish itself on truths and not to be content with false reasons... And, indeed, I dare say that the exact observation of these few precepts that I had chosen gave me such ease in unravelling all the questions covered by these two sciences in the two or three months which I spent on examining them, having begun by the simplest and most general, and each truth that I found being a rule which served afterwards to find others, not only did I resolve several questions which I had earlier judged to be very difficult, but it also seemed to me, towards the end, that I could determine, even in those of the solution of which I was ignorant, by what means acid how far it would be possible to resolve them. In this I shall not perhaps appear to you to be too vain, if you consider that, as there is only one truth of each thing, whoever finds it knows as much about the thing as there is to be known, and that, for example, a child who has been taught arithmetic, having added up according to the rules, can be sure that he has found out, as far as the sum he was examining is concerned, all that the human mind is capable of finding out. For, after all, the method which teaches one to follow the true order and to enumerate exactly all the factors required for the solution of a problem, contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of arithmetic.

- 26 But what satisfied me the most about this method was that, through it, I was assured of using my reason in everything, if not perfectly, at least to the best of my ability. Moreover, I felt that, in practising it, my mind was accustoming itself little by little to conceive its objects more clearly and distinctly, and not having subjected it to any particular matter, I promised myself that I would apply it just as usefully to the difficulties of the other sciences as I had to those of algebra... The mind-body distinction was an important one for Descartes. In the work he arrived at his famous definition of his own being: "I think, therefore I am. I do not know if I ought to tell you about the first meditations I pursued there, for they are so abstract and unusual that they will probably not be to the taste of everyone; and yet, so that one may judge if the foundations I have laid are firm enough, I find myself to some extent forced to speak of them. I had long ago noticed that, in matters relating to conduct, one needs sometimes to follow, just as if they are absolutely indubitable, opinions one knows to be very unsure, as has been said above; but as I wanted to concentrate solely on the search for truth, I thought I ought to do just the opposite, and reject as being absolutely false everything in which I could suppose the slightest reason for doubt, in order to see if there did not remain after that anything in my belief which was entirely indubitable. So, because our senses sometimes play us false, I decided to suppose that there was nothing at all which was such as they cause us to imagine it; and because there are men who make mistakes in reasoning, even with the simplest geometrical matters, and make paralogisms, judging that I was as liable to error as anyone else, -I rejected as being false all the reasonings I had hitherto. accepted. as' proofs. And finally, considering that all the same thoughts that-We had when we are awake can also come to us when we are asleep, without any one of them then being true, I resolved to pretend that nothing which had ever entered_ my mind was any more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I became aware that, while I decided thus to think that everything was false, it followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; and observing that this truth: I think, therefore I am, was so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking. Then, examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world or place that I was in, but that I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist, end that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the -truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thereby concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the

- 27 body, and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is. After this, I considered in general what is needed for a proposition to be true and certain; for, since I had just found one which I knew to be so, I thought that I ought also to know what this certainty consisted of. And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this, I think, therefore I am, which assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order to think one must exist, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is nevertheless some difficulty in being able to recognize for certain which are the things we see distinctly. God was conceived by Descartes as a "perfect Being," though he used concepts of nature and mathematics to discuss his idea of a deity. Following this, reflecting on the fact that I had doubts, and that consequently my being was not completely perfect, for I saw clearly that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt, I decided to inquire whence I had learned to think of some thing more perfect than myself; and I clearly recognized that this must have been from some nature which was in fact more perfect. As for the notions I had of several other things outside myself, such as the sky, the earth, light, heat and a thousand others, I had not the same concern to know their source, because, seeing nothing in them which seemed to make them superior to myself, I could believe that, if they were true, they were dependencies of my nature, in as much as it had some perfection; and, if they were not, that I held them from nothing, that is to say that they were in me because of an imperfection of my nature. But I could not make the same judgement concerning the idea of a being more perfect than myself; for to hold it from nothing was something manifestly impossible; and because it is no less contradictory that the more perfect should proceed from and depend on the less perfect, than it is that something should emerge out of nothing, I could not hold it from myself; with the result that it remained that it must have been put into me by a being whose nature was truly more perfect than mine and which even had in itself all the perfections of which I could have any idea, that is to say, in a single word, which was God. To which -I added that, since I knew some perfections that I did not have, I was not the only being which existed (I shall freely use here, with your permission, the terms of the School) but that there must of necessity be another more perfect, upon whom I depended, and from whom I had acquired all I had; for, if I had been alone and independent of all other, so as to hafe had from myself this small portion of perfection that I had by participation in the perfection of God, I could have given myself, by the same reason, all the remainder of perfection that I knew myself to lack, and thus to be myself infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, allpowerful, and finally to have all the perfections that I could observe to be in God. For, consequentially upon the reasonings by which I had proved the existence of God, in order to understand the nature of God as far as my own nature was capable of doing, I had only to consider, concerning all the things of which I found in myself some idea, whether it was a

- 28 perfection or not to have them; and I was assured that none of those which indicated some imperfection was in him, but that all the others were. So I saw that doubt, inconstancy, sadness and similar things could not be in him, seeing that I myself would have been very pleased to be free from them. Then, further, I had ideas of many sensible and bodily things; for even supposing that I was dreaming, and that everything I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were really in my thoughts. But, because I had already recognized in myself very clearly that intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, considering that all composition is evidence of dependency, and that dependency is manifestly a defect, I thence judged that it could not be a perfection in God to be composed of these two natures, and that, consequently, he was not so composed; but that, if there were any bodies in the world or any intelligences or other natures which were not wholly perfect, their existence must depend on his power, in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single instant. I set out after that to seek other truths; and turning to the object of the geometers, which I conceived as a continuous body or a space extended indefinitely in length, width and height or depth, divisible into various parts, which could have various figures and sizes and be moved or transposed in all sorts of ways—for the geometers take all that to be in the object of their study—I went through some of their simplest proofs. And having observed that the great certainty that everyone attributes to them is based only on the fact that they are clearly conceived according to the rule I spoke of earlier, I noticed also that they had nothing at all in them which might assure me of the existence of their object. Thus, for example, I very well perceived that, supposing a triangle to be given, its three angles must be equal to two right angles, but I saw nothing, for all that, which assured me that any such triangle existed in the world; whereas, reverting to the examination of the idea I had of a perfect Being, I found that existence was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles:--is comprised in the idea of a triangle or, as in the idea of a sphere,-the--fact that all its parts are equidistant from its centre, or even more obviously so; and that consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is this perfect Being, is, or exists, as any geometric demonstration can be... Source: Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, Translated by F.E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 40-43, 53-57.

- 29 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Thomas Hobbes’s Levithan Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. The modern liberal concepts of rights, individualism, liberty, government by consent, and social contract begin with Hobbes's philosophy. A materialist, he looked at human nature and society from a scientific, biological perspective. For Hobbes, people are just like everything else in the universe: matter in motion. He applies this scientific method to humans through their physical senses (sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch), being their only source of knowledge. Thus, human action or behavior can be explained by either pain or pleasure: People have "appetite" to more toward something that pleases their senses (beauty, food, warmth, etc.) and "aversion" to move away from things that hurt their senses (excessive heat or cold, poverty, or boring lecturers). All human thoughts, therefore, are derived from sensory data. This empiricism forms the philosophical basis of behaviorism in social science. It contrasts with earlier Western social thought that explains human conduct in terms of virtue or ethics (Plato and Aristotle) or moral reason. It reduces the human being to the status of any other animal except for one thing: rationality. Rationality for Hobbes is a calculating faculty that humans use to add and subtract pleasures and pain. So, unlike other creatures who are wholly governed by their sensory feelings, human reason allows us to calculate the total pleasure or pain of an experience and sometimes endure some pain for a greater pleasure (like sacrificial saving, investing) or forgo a pleasure that causes greater pain later (such as drunkenness, illicit sex, "flying" off a rooftop). This materialistic view of Hobbes leads him to define human relationships in terms of power. He divides power into natural (one's physical strength, intelligence, eloquence, beauty) and instrumental (money, fame, prestige, honor), but more power allows an individual to acquire more pleasure and avoid more pain. All humans, then, want more power. This is because the worth of a person in Hobbes's view is the amount of power the person has (or what another would pay to use it— leading to the labor market). So, the worth of a person in this materialistic philosophy is the person's price. This reduces people to being products to be bought or sold. It violates the classical and Christian view of human dignity as a moral being created in God's image, capable of noble deeds. Hobbes reduces human dignity to social prestige, especially honors (such as titles) conferred by the state (awards, knighthood, earldoms, etc.).

- 30 Such a view of humanity logically leads to an original society (or "state of nature") that is highly competitive and combative. All individuals seek their own pleasure, power, and prestige, and soon they are in conflict with each other. In this "natural" state, Hobbes says, everyone has a right to anything he or she can get, steal, or kill. Thus, our equality comes from each being able to murder another. Original human society is a jungle existence—full of violence and insecurity. This prevents higher development of economics, culture, art, luxury, or learning. So, in this dangerous setting, human reason comes to the rescue: it tells the person that it is better to give up some liberty in exchange for security. The government is formed by a social contract of all those individuals (by consent) surrendering their rights to the sovereign state (preferably a monarch) who, in exchange, promises to protect them from theft, murder, kidnapping, and so on. The state, for Hobbes, must have absolutist power to accomplish this because people are prone to break their promises. He advocates a strong, terrifying state to keep people in line. Rational citizens will recognize the advantage of social peace and give obedience to the government. Hobbes allows the state to regulate property, censor speech and press, dictate jobs and residence—every aspect of society but killing the subjects, whom it was created to protect. So, this early philosophical liberalism does not allow individuals to retain many natural rights (as later, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, or Thomas Jefferson do), but Hobbes insists that this absolute authority is necessary to preserve social order. He ridicules "those democratical writers" who want to limit the power of the state, comparing their minds to the diseased madness of rabies. Any brutal authority is preferable to the "war of all against all" in the state of nature, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is thought that Hobbes's experience of the disorder of the English civil wars led to a paranoid fear of freedom and anarchy. Because of its authoritarian conclusions, Hobbes's political theory was soon out of favor, but his materialist premises continued to inform democratic liberalism and behaviorist social science. Most significant was Hobbes's materialistic influence on Modern ethical relativism. If all ethical value judgments are derived from knowledge, and all knowledge is from private sensory experience, definitions of good and evil are all personal and vary by individual. If one person takes pleasure in eating dirt, no universal moral standard can obviate that preference. Hobbes's scientific morality bases all ethical decisions in individual senses and choice, without any overriding definition of right and wrong (from the community in Aristotle, the church in St. Thomas Aquinas, God in John Calvin, the Bible in Martin Luther). This leads in Modern egalitarian democratic society to ethical relativism, where no shared common moral vision exists over the whole society. It develops into what James Hunter calls the progressive mindset in contemporary United States.

Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File,

- 31 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Thomas Hobbes’s Levithan Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote his Leviathan (1651) while England was in the midst of its civil wars. He was a rationalist and attempted to use the new methods of scientific inquiry in his work on politics, power, and human nature. Hobbes believed human beings were organisms in motion and that they needed to be restrained by authgrity from pursuing selfish ends. He rejected arguments which placed secular power under theological authority. His rationalism had great influence on subsequent writing about the state and political authority. Early in the work Hobbes speculated on human nature. By manners I mean not here decency of behavior—as how by manners, one should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals—but those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life consists not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way, which arises partly from the diversity of passions in divers men, and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the effect desired. So that, in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual A restless desire of and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he has present without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavors to the assuring it at home by laws or abroad by wars; and when that is done, there succeeds a new desire—in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration

- 32 or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind... The need for an authority to keep the peace was one of Hobbes' key ideas Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which among them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage and from others by the example. So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first makes men invade for gain, the second for safety, and the third for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of war where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short... To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties

- 33 neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in, though with a possibility to come out of it consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters. Authority was given power in order for a commonwealth to exist and prosper. Rights were derived by the people from the sovereign. The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby—that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as has been shown to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. For the laws of nature—as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to—of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be .observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone has then kept when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will—and may lawfully—rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men... The only way to erect such a common power as may be able defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so bears their person shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made

- 34 by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN (or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god) to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth, which to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defense. And he that carries this person is called SOVEREIGN and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his SUBJECT. The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways. One, by natural force, as when a man makes his children to submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by war subdues his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree among themselves to submit to some man or assembly of men voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution, and the former a commonwealth by acquisition... Source: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Herbert Schneider (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958), pp. 86-87,106-107, 108-109, 139, 142-43.

- 35 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

John Locke, Political Philosophy and Influence of From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. The most prominent theorist of British liberalism, John Locke's ideas of natural rights, government by the consent of the governed, social contract, the limited state, private property, and revolution greatly influenced all Modern democratic thought, especially in the United States of America. Thomas Jefferson cites Locke's ideas in the Declaration of Independence, and the U.S. Constitution contains many Lockean principles. Like Thomas Hobbes, Locke's political theory is based on materialist, scientific premises (he was a medical student at Oxford). Humans in their original condition, or state of nature, are "free, equal and independent." From this state of physical freedom, equality, and autonomy, Locke asserts that humans possess the natural rights to "Life, liberty and Estate (property)," or continued existence (self-preservation). This means that murder, theft, slavery, and kidnapping violate a person's rights, but by human reason, Locke believes, each individual knows the law of nature that, like the Golden Rule, tells people that they cannot exercise their freedom to harm anyone else's rights to life, liberty, or property. Most people are reasonable, respecting others natural rights, but some violate others' person or property in criminal ways. Such criminals can be killed by their victims as "beasts of prey" in the state of nature. However, Locke, the Calvinist Puritan, perceives a problem with individuals enforcing the law of nature themselves: human sin. This selfish sin will tend to punish transgressors of rights too harshly, unleashing retaliation and escalating violence. Our "self love" makes us incapable of being judges in our own cases. This dilemma gives rise to government, in Locke's theory. Government is created by the consent of the governed when they realize the "inconveniences" of keeping private justice in the natural state. A social contract is formed whereby the citizens delegate to the state the judicial function, protecting their natural rights by establishing police, courts, prisons, and so on. This Lockean liberal government is "limited" to protecting an individual's natural rights to life, liberty, and property by adjudicating disputes over rights, punishing criminal violators of others' rights, and maintaining social peace.

- 36 If the state itself invades the rights of citizens by killing them, taking their property, or imprisoning them unjustly, it is the right of the people to abolish it and establish a new government that will perform its duties properly. This is Locke's famous "right of revolution," which British Parliamentarians used in the revolution of 1688, and Jefferson used to justify American colonial independence from Great Britain. The idea of a peoples' right to overthrow an oppressive, tyrannical government has justified numerous revolutions since Locke's time. One of the main purposes of the state for Locke is the preservation of private property, which has caused critics to accuse him of being an apologist for early capitalism. Locke's labor theory of value maintains that a person's mixing labor or work with nature gives the person legitimate title to its produce. This is bound by the medieval "spoilage limitation"—that no one can possess more property than he or she can use before it spoils, but the invention of money in imperishable metals (gold and silver) allows unlimited accumulation of wealth. Hiring the labor of another allows wage-capital relations indicative of Modern market, industrial economics. Because the state is supposed to protect property, and because the employer-employee contract is a kind of property, this obliges all with work (or any use of the country's facilities) to obey the law. Hence, all people living in a nation give tacit consent to the laws. Critics of Lockean liberalism claim that most workers have little choice in the matter, and therefore the capitalist state is not legitimate. But this view of free humans, rights, equality, and private property protected by a limited state continue to have appeal with conservative, laissez-faire republicans (like Ronald Reagan), libertarians (Robert Nozick), and liberal individualists generally. John Locke also advocated religious freedom and separation of church and state. For him, in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), a government compelling religious faith and persecuting unbelievers is a violation of the spirit of Christ and infringes on personal liberty of conscience. The proper Christian means of salvation are persuasion and prayer, not legal requirements and punishments. The son of an English Puritan soldier in Oliver Cromwell's parliamentary army, John Locke attended Christ Church (College), Oxford University. His primary work on political philosophy is the book, The Second Treatise of Government (1689). Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "John Locke, political philosophy and influence of." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 37 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The political philosopher who placed rights at the center was John Locke (16321704), whose Two Treatises of Government (1690) challenged authority as it had been formulated by Hobbes. Locke was writing at the time of the debate and events which led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and he wished to find the proper limits of authority. He believed in a contract between the people and the government which was bilateral, and in a human nature which was characterized by tolerance and reason. Locke's ideas about natural rights and social contract had wide influence in constitutional thought and helped to form the basis of modern liberalism Locke, like Hobbes, discussed the human condition in a "state of nature," a time when there was no government. To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection, unless the Lord and Master of them all, should by any manifest Declaration of his Will set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment on undoubted Right to Dominion and Sovereignty... . But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of Licence, though Man in that State have an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it. The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one; And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. For Men being all the

- 38 Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, nor one anothers Pleasure. And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination_ among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another. And that all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation. For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders, and if any one in the State of Nature may punish another, for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that State of perfect Equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one, over another, what any may do in Prosecution of that Law, every one must needs have a Right to do... Individuals form a community, according to Locke, for their mutual benefit. Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it. This any number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature. When any number of Men have so consented to make one Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest. For when any number of Men have, by the consent of every individual, made a Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For that which acts any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necesssary the Body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one Body,

- 39 one Community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in Assemblies impowered to act by positive Laws where no number is set by that positive Law which impowers them, the act of the Majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having by the Law of Nature and Reason, the power of the whole. And thus every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original Compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one Society, would signifie nothing, and be no Compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties, than he was in before in the State of Nature. For what appearance would there be of any Compact? What new Engagement if he were no farther tied by any Decrees of the Society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his Compact, or any one else in the State of Nature hath, who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit. For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason, be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: But such a consent is next impossible ever to be had, if w. consider the Infirmities of Health, and Avocations of Business, which in a number, though much less than that of a Common-wealth, will necessarily keep many away from the publick Assembly. To which if we add the variety of Opinions, and contrariety of Interests, which unavoidably happen in all Collections of Men, the coming into Society upon such terms, would be only like Cato's coming into the Theatre, only to go out again. Such a Constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest Creatures; and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be suppos'd till we can think, that Rational Creatures should desire and constitute Societies only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one Body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again. Whosoever therefore out of a state of Nature unite into a Community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into Society, to the majority of the Community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one Political Society, which is all the Compact that is, or needs be, between the Individuals, that enter into, or make up a Commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a Society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful Government in the World...

- 40 The people have a contract with a sovereign. If the sovereign breaks the arrangement, the right of resistance may be used. As Usurpation is the exercise of Power, which another hath a Right to; so Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a Right to. And this is making use of the Power any one has in his hands; not for the good of those, who are under it, but for his own private separate Advantage. When the Governour, however intituled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; and his Commands and Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion... Where-ever Law ends Tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to another's harm. And whosoever in Authority exceeds the Power given him by the Law, and makes use of the Force he has under his Command, to compass that upon the Subject, which the Law allows not, ceases in that to be a Magistrate, and acting without Authority, may be opposed, as any other Man, who by force invades the Right of another... The Reason why Men enter into Society, is the preservation of their Property; and the end why they chose and authorize a Legislative, is, that there may be Laws made, and Rules set as Guards and Fences to the Properties of all the Members of the Society, to limit the Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the Society. For since it can never be supposed to be the Will of the Society, that the Legislative should have a Power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by entering into Society, and for which the People submitted themselves to the Legislators of their own making; whenever the Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all Men, against Force and Violence. Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this fundamental Rule of Society; and either by Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in Society... Source: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: New American Library, 1960), pp. 309, 311-12, 374-77, 446, 448, 460-61.

- 41 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Smith, Adam From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. A native of Kirkcaldy, Scotland, Adam Smith was raised without a father by his widowed mother. After studies at the University of Glasgow and at Oxford University, Smith returned home for a year before settling in 1748 in Edinburgh. In 1751, he was elected professor of logic at the University of Glasgow, a post he exchanged in 1752 for the chair in moral philosophy. The publication in 1759 of the Theory of Moral Sentiments brought Smith widespread acclaim and resulted in an invitation to serve as a tutor, with a lifetime pension, to the young duke of Buccleuch. Smith resigned from his Glasgow professorship and embarked with his young charge on a grand tour of Europe that extended from 1764 to 1766. During these travels, Smith met Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot and other Physiocrats in Paris and at Versailles. He also visited Voltaire outside Geneva. Upon returning to Scotland, Smith retired to Kirkcaldy, where he wrote the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, better known by its short title, Wealth of Nations. Published in 1776, Wealth of Nations offered a theory of economic structure and functions that is considered one of the foundations of modern liberal political economy. Smith was a friend of David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and other members of the Royal Philosophical Society of Edinburgh. He was also a member of the Literary Club, a group of writers and artists organized in London around Samuel Johnson. His friends in the latter organization included not only Johnson and James Boswell but also the actor David Garrick and the political theorist Edmund Burke. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments grounded social behavior and ethics in the human capacity for sympathy with others. According to Smith, we observe things happening to other people and are capable of feeling compassion, grief, or joy on their behalf. These feelings, rather than some natural law perceived by our reason, provide the basis of our general notions of pleasure and pain, or of good and evil. Thus sensory experiences in the form of sympathy underlie our ideas of propriety and merit.

- 42 The emotional perception of the moral worth of actions grows from three underlying principles of virtue: the sense that an action represents a proper path for our feelings (propriety); the sense that an action involves a balanced exercise of self-interest (prudence); and the sense that the behavior will ensure the happiness of others (benevolence). Although this description of virtue and sympathy might seem to resemble the moral sense theory proposed by Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, Smith actually rejects their approaches, saying that it is not necessary to postulate the existence of such a moral sense in order to explain moral behavior. Smith also left a legacy in political economy of major significance to the subsequent development of capitalist economic theory and practice. Wealth of Nations provided an alternative to the economic theory of mercantilism. He defined wealth as economic productiveness rather than as the physical possession of large quantities of gold or silver. Smith's book offered a clear description of the actual working conditions in England that were being produced by the Industrial revolution. It sketched out theoretical framework that justified these historical developments in terms of the overall economic progress of society. Wealth of Nations also contained a critique of the theories of the Physiocrats, theorists who had made agriculture the primary source of wealth in society. Smith praised the role played by commercial and industrial activities in creating British economic prosperity, and he argued for the importance of these activities in creating national wealth. With his thorough grounding in the basic principles of enlightened moral philosophy, Smith recognized the potency of self-interest in determining human behavior. He attempted to create theories of morality and economics that would demonstrate how the pursuit of individual selfinterest, tempered by enlightenment, could benefit the good of the community. For Smith, in the realm of morality, natural human benevolence and the faculty of sympathy provided needed protection against the potential harm that could result from the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest. In economic behavior, restraint was provided by the operations of the Hidden Hand, a metaphor for the laws and forces that would preserve equilibrium and the common good in unregulated capitalist market systems. Smith's ideas thus provided a theoretical framework to support the emergence of a morally tempered individualism and contributed to the new science of man that was one of the significant creations of the Enlightenment. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Smith, Adam." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 43 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations was the most influential work on economics of the Enlightenment. Still viewed as an apostle of economic liberalism, Smith (1723-90) challenged many of the assumptions of the prevailing mercantilist theories. He recognized that a new economic structure was coming into being in the late eighteenth century, and he believed there was a science of wealth, similar to that of the physical world. The economic sphere, Smith believed, had a natural order, and great progress could be achieved by permitting individuals to pursue their own vision of their economic well-being. He claimed the public good would be enhanced through the workings of individual self-interest. Smith placed his emphasis on production and believed that the mercantile system had too many restrictive regulations at the center. ... The general industry of the society never can exceed what the capital of the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the members of a great society, must bear a certain proportion to the whole capital of that society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord. Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic industry; provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock...

- 44 Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestic industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of the greatest possible value. The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or small, so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods. But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it. What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it. To give the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maximum of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to

- 45 make than to buy. The taylor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a taylor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for. What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.... Smith wished to increase the consumption of goods. Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce. In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which can come into competition with those of our own growth, or manufacture, the interest of the home-consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former is obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost always occasions. It is altogether for the benefit of the producer that bounties are granted upon the exportation of some of his productions. The homeconsumer is obliged to pay, first, the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty, and secondly, the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the .enhancement of the price of the commodity in the home market... It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile regulations, which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest, not so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has been sacrificed to it. A political economist, Smith believed that his new system would increase liberty and freedom. ... It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would

- 46 naturally go to it; or, by extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it; is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour. All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society... Source: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), pp. 421, 42224, 625, 626, 650-51.

- 47 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The Spirit of Laws From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Book on political theory by Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu; first published in Geneva in 1748. Unlike the Persian Letters, The Spirit of Laws (original French title: L'Esprit des Lois) was freely distributed in France, even though the censors never gave it official approval. An immediate success, it sold out 22 editions in two years but also earned a spot on the Catholic Index of Forbidden Books. A large and seemingly disorganized volume consisting of 31 sections, The Spirit of Laws represents Montesquieu's attempt to write a natural history of political society. Montesquieu modeled his investigation on the idea of natural history spelled out by Francis Bacon. He collected facts about human existence and described elements of political, social, and economic organization in various states across the whole of time. From this collection of facts, Montesquieu derived certain principles whose action, he believed, had shaped the course of events in history. This endeavor served as an example of the scientific, experimental, inductive method at its best, but applied to the study of people rather than to natural phenomena. From his vast collection of observations, Montesquieu derived a scheme of distinct forms of government: republics, monarchies, and despotisms. Republics could be either democratic (rule by many) or aristocratic (rule by the few); monarchies had one ruler whose powers were limited by laws; despotisms consisted of rule by one individual who was unrestrained by law or any other human institution. To each form of government, Montesquieu also assigned an underlying animating principle that rules its actions much as the soul or will operates in the human body. Virtue animates republics; honor rules monarchies; and fear rules in despotisms. With this typology, Montesquieu was trying to illustrate the relationships between the character of a people (formed partly by environment and climate) and its form of government. He believed that this character not only demands certain forms of government but also shapes the specific nature of the positive laws of societies.

- 48 The question of freedom—how it is expressed and how it is maintained— informed much of Montesquieu's work. He believed that certain environmental conditions—rugged mountains for instance—make it easier for human beings to protect their liberties. But he also believed that the form of laws and political structure can either help or hinder the expression of individual liberty. One of his aims was to illustrate that in France and other large states the republic was not a viable form of government. Republics had flourished best in simple societies lacking multiple social and economic divisions. France, in contrast, was a complex society marked by the coexistence of agrarian, commercial, and other interests. The motives behind action in France were dominated by perceptions of self-interest, a situation that would not support traditional republican virtues. The problem for Montesquieu was to identify a government form that could create an artificial form of civic virtue based on the operation of self-interest. The same problem preoccupied political theorists such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Bernard Mandeville. In fact, Montesquieu believed that the best form of government for a large nation was a limited monarchy of the type he had observed in England. Such a government consisted of a ruler (king) whose power was limited (mediated) by an intermediary body. Montesquieu believed that in France, the aristocracy of the robe (the ennobled lawyers, judges, and officials) could serve as this intermediary body. They would stand between the king and the rest of his subjects, making laws that would balance the interests of all in the society. Their sense of honour would ensure that they would tailor their concepts of self-interest to fit those of the nation. In describing the system of England, Montesquieu spelled out the concept of the separation of powers, a system in which executive and legislative duties are assigned to different individuals or groups. He believed that such a separation of powers preserves freedom by setting up a system of checks and balances, which in turn creates a dynamic equilibrium capable of minimizing abuses of authority. Certain of Montesquieu's contemporaries believed that he was simply offering an apology for the claims of his own class (he was a member of the robe aristocracy). But this criticism did not prevent his ideas from exercising a strong influence on the political theory of the Enlightenment. Liberal reformers throughout Europe turned to The Spirit of Laws for inspiration. Both the American rebels and the French Revolutionaries derived ideas from Montesquieu, and the United States Constitution made the principle of the separation of powers the foundation of the new nation's political structure. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "The Spirit of Laws." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 49 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws, 1748 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), was a nobleman, a judge in a French court, and one of the most influential political thinkers. Based on his research he developed a number of political theories presented in The Spirit of the Laws (1748). This treatise presented numerous theories - among the most important was respect for the role of history and climate in shaping a nation's political structure. It was for his views on the English Constitution, which he saw in an overly idealized way, that he is perhaps most renowned.

In every government there are three sorts of power; the legislative; the executive, in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard to things that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies; establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state. The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind, arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of` another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may anse, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.

- 50 There would be an end of every thing were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people to exercise those three powers that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals. Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government, because the prince, who is invested with the two first powers, leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the sultan's person the subjects groan under the weight of a most frightful oppression. In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, there is less liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as violent methods for its support, as even that of the Turks witness the state inquisitors, and the lion's mouth into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accusations. What a situation must the poor subject be in, under those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions. The whole power is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment. Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe, whose aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons, all the branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state. The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch; because this branch of government, which has always need of expedition, is better administered by one than by many: Whereas, whatever depends on the legislative power, is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person. But if there was no monarch, and the executive power was committed to a certain number of persons selected from the legislative body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reason the two powers would be united, as the same persons would actually sometimes have, and would moreover be always able to have, a share in both. Were the legislative body to be a considerable time without meeting, this would likewise put an end to liberty. For one of these two things would naturally follow; either that there would be no longer any legislative resolutions, and then the state would fall into anarchy; or that these resolutions would be taken by the executive power, which would render it absolute. It would be needless for the legislative body to continue always assembled. This would be troublesome to the representatives, and moreover would cut out too much work for the executive power, so as to take off its attention from executing, and oblige it to think only of

- 51 defending its own prerogatives, and the right it has to execute. Again, were the legislative body to be always assembled, it might happen to be kept up only by filling the places of the deceased members with new representatives; and in that case, if the legislative body was once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy. When different legislative bodies succeed one another, the people who have a bad opinion of that which is actually sitting, may reasonably entertain some hopes of the next: But were it to be always the same body, the people, upon seeing it once corrupted, would no longer expect any good from its laws; and of course they would either become desperate, or fall into a state of indolence. The legislative body should not assemble of itself. For a body is supposed to have no will but when it is assembled; and besides, were it not to assemble unanimously, it would be impossible to determine which was really the legislative body, the part assembled, or the other. And if it had a right to prorogue itself, it might happen never to be prorogued; which would be extremely dangerous, in case it should ever attempt to encroach on the executive power. Besides, there are seasons, some of which are more proper than others, for assembling the legislative body: It is fit therefore that the executive power should regulate the time of convening, as well as the duration of those assemblies, according to the circumstances and exigencies of state known to itself. Were the executive power not to have a right of putting a stop to the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the other powers. But it is not proper, on the other hand, that the legislative power should have a right to stop the executive. For as the execution has its natural limits, it is useless to confine it; besides, the executive power is generally employed in momentary operations. The power therefore of the Roman tribunes was faulty, as it put a stop not only to the legislation, but likewise to the execution itself; which was attended with infinite mischiefs. But if the legislative power in a free government ought to have no right to stop the executive, it has a right, and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed; an advantage which this government has over that of Crete and Sparta, where the Cosmi and the Ephori gave no account of their administration. But whatever may be the issue of that examination, the legislative body ought not to have a power of judging the person, nor of course the conduct of him who is intrusted with the executive power. His person should be sacred, because as it is necessary for the good of the state to prevent the legislative body from rendering themselves arbitrary, the moment he is accused or tried, there is an end of liberty.

- 52 To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress, it is requisite, that the armies, with which it is intrusted, should consist of` the people, and have the same spirit as the people, as was the case at Rome, till the time of Marius. To obtain this end, there are only two ways, either that the persons employed in the army, should have sufficient property to answer for their conduct to their fellow subjects, and be enlisted only for a year, as customary at Rome: Or if there should be a standing army, composed chiefly of the most despicable part of the nation, the legislative power should have a right to disband them as soon as it pleased; the soldiers should live in common with the rest of the people; and no separate camp, barracks, or fortress, should be suffered . When once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power, and this from the very nature of` the thing; its business consisting more in action than in deliberation. From a manner of thinking that prevails amongst mankind, they set a higher value upon courage than timorousness, on activity than prudence, on strength than counsel. Hence, the army will ever despise a senate, and respect their own officers. I hey will naturally slight the orders sent them by a body of` men, whom they look upon as cowards, and therefore unworthy to command them. So that as soon as the army depends on the legislative body, the government becomes a military one; and if the contrary has ever happened, it has been owing to some extraordinary circumstances. It is because the army was always kept divided; it is because it was composed of several bodies, that depended each on their particular province; it is because the capital towns were strong places, defended by their natural situation, and not garrisoned with regular troops. Holland, for instance, is still safer than Venice; she might drown, or starve the revolted troops; for as they are not quartered in towns capable of furnishing them with necessary subsistence, this subsistence is of course precarious. As all human things have an end, the state we are speaking of will lose its liberty, it will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupted than the executive. It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty, or not. It is sufficient for my purpose to observe, that it is established by their laws; and I inquire no further. Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments, not to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneasiness to those who have only a moderate share of it. How should I have any such design, I who think that even the excess of reason is not always desirable, and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes? From Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, vol. 1, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: J. Nourse, 1777), pp. 221-237, passim.

- 53 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Jean Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Rousseau's Social Contract From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Treatise on political theory by the Genevan philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both the Social Contract (Le contrat social) and Rousseau's educational novel Émile appeared in 1762. They were condemned to be burned in Geneva as threats to the religious and political order. The French censors forbade the distribution of the Social Contract in France, but they did not follow up with more severe measures. Both the Social Contract and Émile address the problems of people in civilization. Each book contains an ideal prescription for correcting the ills of 18th-century society; the Social Contract focuses on curing political ills, while Émile tackles the problem of educating people for societal life. Rousseau disliked the general process of civilization and the associated emphasis on individual rights, viewing both as corruptions of natural man, rather than as examples of human progress. In his vision, the course of History was not one of relentless upward progress, but rather of downward degradation—to the sad state of affairs represented by 18thcentury Europe. Rousseau had already sketched the outlines of this bleak assessment of contemporary civilization in two earlier works, the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1750) and Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755). The Social Contract offered a model for a political society that could be consciously constructed to replace the existing corrupt order. This new order would substitute an artificial political virtue for the degraded natural virtue of the old order. The new society would have analogous relations to the lost primitive state, but it would rest on man-made rather than natural foundations. Rousseau rejected both the liberal political vision associated with the theory of John Locke and the natural law theories stimulated by the work of Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf. He did not believe that a unified society could appear from the simple pursuit of self-interest, nor did he believe that laws, allegedly inscribed in nature could answer the problem of relations between individuals and the social order. The heart of the difficulty in creating a genuine, virtuous political society lay, for Rousseau, in the challenge of creating a true unity (something without individual parts) from a collection of individuals. This statement of the problem was not unique to Rousseau: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,

- 54 for example, had written his monadology 50 years earlier, seeking in its arguments to offer a philosophical solution to the problem. Rousseau, however, provided a restatement of the problem cast in the specific terms of political structure. Rousseau suggested that the solution to the problem of creating a virtuous society lay in the formulation of a genuine social contract, which would be created when all people simultaneously agreed to join together as a political unit. Each individual would freely surrender all property rights and other individual rights to the new unit. In the process, a General Will would emerge, which would represent the collective desires of the society and would provide legitimacy for the positive (humanmade) laws of the society. Rousseau did not see this process as a surrender of individual liberty, because he defined liberty as the freedom to live under self-imposed law. The process by which law would be created in his envisioned society would guarantee this kind of freedom. According to Rousseau, once the social contract had established a society possessed of a collective General Will, this Will would need to be embodied in a set of positive laws. These positve laws would be created by a virtuous Legislator, an extremely perceptive man possessed of abilities both to understand the emotions of people and to rise above them. This Legislator would transform human passions into just laws. The General Will was an abstract concept for Rousseau, one that he struggled to define clearly but that has served as a source of conflicting interpretations ever since the first publication of the Social Contract. Rousseau believed that his ideal political society could be formed only when certain external conditions existed: People had to be already united by some common bond; they had to be free of superstition, secure from invasion, and capable of subsisting without external assistance. Furthermore, a degree of economic equality had to exist, thereby eliminating the divisive conditions caused by extremes of wealth and poverty. In 1762, when the Social Contract was published, Rousseau believed that the only nation where his ideal political society might be established was the island of Corsica. The Corsicans had recently revolted from their colonial overlords, the Genoans. For many enlightened intellectuals they served as a symbol of the potential for political reform and human progress. By 1770, Rousseau had come to believe that the kingdom of Poland could also create his ideal new system. Instead, he lived to see the infamous partitions of Poland in which the kingdom was eventually totally swallowed up by Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The Social Contract generated extensive interest and commentary in the later Enlightenment. Still a subject of controversy, it has been called both a blueprint for pure democracy and a plan for totalitarian government. Much of the controversy over its message has roots in the events of the French Revolution. The book served as a major source of inspiration for Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins. Because their period of leadership during the revolution was marked by the emergence of the

- 55 Reign of Terror, events seemed to underscore the tendency of the General Will and its representative Legislator to become totalitarian in spirit and practice. Whatever the way in which its message was interpreted and translated into political practice, the Social Contract stands as one of the outstanding pieces of political theory created during the Enlightenment. Rousseau challenged the positive contributions of individualism, criticized the idea that private property serves as a guarantor of freedom, and rejected the idea that desirable societies could be founded on traditional concepts of natural law. Thus, in the name of the enlightened ideals of liberty and progress, Rousseau offered a political vision that reversed the very models that had been created during the earlier years of that enlightened era. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Rousseau's Social Contract." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 56 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Jean Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), one of the most controversial figures of the Enlightenment, challenged many of the assumptions of the mainstream of eighteenth century thought. He believed human beings were good in a state of nature, and that in civilization there is the basis of corruption. Yet, we cannot return to an ideal primitive moment and therefore must build a just community in which the individual will and the needs of the community are reconciled. Rousseau put emphasis on the importance of sentiment as well as on reason, and stressed emotional and intuitive elements in assessing human nature. Rousseau's Social Contract (1762) recognized many of the difficulties in thinking about freedom and authority, as he tried to reconcile the need for individual expression with the well-being of community life. Rousseau opened his work with a critique of society and a discussion of its foundations. Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a one believes liirriself the master of others,- and yet he is a greater slave than they. How has this change come about? I do not know. What can render it legitimate? I believe that I can settle this question. If I considered only force and the results that proceed from it, I should say that so long as a people is compelled to obey and does obey, it does well; but that, so soon as it can shake off the yoke and does shake it off it does better; for, if men recover their freedom by virtue of the same right by which it was taken away, either they are justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for depriving them. of it. But the social order is a sacred right which serves as -a foundation for all others. This right, however, does not come from nature. It is therefore based on conventions. The question is to know what these conventions are. Before coming to that, I must establish what I have just laid down. Freedom for Rousseau was one of the conditions of our being human. The earliest of all societies, and the only natural one, is the family; yet children remain attached to their father only so. long as they have ,need of him for their own preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. The children being freed from the obedience which they owed to their father, and the father from the cares which he owed to his children, become equally independent. If they remain united, it is no longer naturally but voluntarily; and the family

- 57 itself is kept toget er.only by convention. This common liberty is a consequence of man's nature. His first law is to attend to his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself, and as soon as he comes to years of discretion, being sole judge of the means adapted for his own preservation, he becomes his own master... The strongest man is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his power into right and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest—a right apparently assumed in irony, and really established in principle: But will this phrase never be explained to us? Force is a physical power; I do not see what morality can result from its effects. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at most an act of prudence... Let us agree, then, that might does not make right, and that we are bound obey none but lawful authorities… Since no man has any natural authority over his fellow men, and since force is not the source of right, conventions remain as the basis of all lawful authority among men. "If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and become the slave of a master, why should not a whole people be able to alienate theirs, and become subject to a king? In this there are many equivocal terms requiring explanation; but let us confine ourselves to the word alienate. To alienate is to give or sell. Now, a man who becomes another's slave does not give himself; he sells himself at the very least for his subsistence. But why does a nation sell itself? So far from a king supplying his subjects with their subsistence, he draws his from them; and, according to Rabelais, a king does not live on a little. Do subjects, then, give up their persons on condition that their property also shall be taken? I do not see what is left for them to keep. It will be said that the despot secures to his subjects civil peace. Be it so; but what do they gain by that, if the wars which his ambition brings upon them, together with his insatiable greed and the vexations of his administration, harass them more than their own dissensions would? What do they gain by it if this tranquillity is itself one of their miseries? Men live tranquilly also in dungeons; is that enough to make them contented there? The Greeks confined in the cave of the Cyclops lived peacefully until their turn came to be devoured. To say that a man gives himself for nothing is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; such an act is illegitimate and invalid, for the simple reason that he who performs it is not in his right mind. To say the same thing of a whole nation is to suppose a nation of fools; and madness does not confer rights.

- 58 Even if each person could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children; they are born free men; their liberty belongs to them, and no one has a right to dispose of it except themselves. Before they have come to years of discretion, the father can, in their name, stipulate conditions for their preservation and welfare, but not surrender them irrevocably and unconditionally; for such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and exceeds the rights of paternity. In order, then, that an arbitrary government might be legitimate, it would be necessary that the people in each generation should have the option of accepting or rejecting it; but in that case such a government would no longer be arbitrary. To renounce one's liberty is to renounce one's quality as a man, the rights and also the duties of humanity. For him who renounces everything there is no possible compensation. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature, for to take away all freedom from his will is to take away all morality from his actions. In short, a convention which stipulates absolute authority on the one side and unlimited obedience on the other is vain and contradictory. Is it not clear that we are under no obligations whatsoever towards a man from whom we have a right to demand everything? And does not this single condition, without equivalent, without exchange, involve the nullity of the act? For what right would my slave have against me, since all that he has belongs to me? His rights being mine, this right of me against myself is a meaningless phrase... The state has its origins in the social contract. I assume that men have reached a point at which the obstacles that endanger their preservation in the state of nature overcome by their resistance the forces which each individual can exert with a view to maintaining himself in that state. Then this primitive condition can no longer subsist, and the human race would perish unless it changed its mode of existence. Now, as men cannot create any new forces, but only combine and direct those that exist, they have no other means of self-preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may overcome the resistance, to put them in action by a single motive power, and to make them work in concert. This sum of forces can be produced only by the combination of many; but the strength and freedom of each man being the chief instruments of his preservation, how can he pledge them without injuring himself, and without neglecting the cares which he owes to himself? This difficulty, applied to my subject, may be expressed in these terms: "To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before." Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract furnishes the solution.

- 59 The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would render them vain and ineffectual; so that, although they have never perhaps been formally enunciated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized, until, the social pact being violated, each man regains his original rights and recovers his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty for which he renounced it. These clauses, rightly understood, are reducible to one only, viz., the total alienation to the whole community of each associate with all his rights; for, in the first place, since each gives himself up entirely, the conditions are equal for all; and, the conditions being equal for all, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others. Further, the alienation being made without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and an individual associate can no longer claim anything; for, if any rights were left to individuals, since there would be no common superior who could judge between them and the public, each, being on some point his own judge, would soon claim to be so on all; the state of nature would still subsist, and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or useless. In short, each giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to preserve what we have. If, then, we set aside what is not of the essence of the social contract, we shall find that it is reducible to the following terms: "Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole." Forthwith, instead of the individual personalities of all the contracting parties, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, which is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives from this same act its unity, its common self (moi), its life, and its will. This public person, which is thus formed by the union of all the individual members, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of republic or body politic, which is called by its members State when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when it is compared to similar bodies. With regard to the associates, they take collectively the name of people, and are called individually citizens, as participating in the sovereign power, and subjects, as subjected to the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and are mistaken one for another; it is sufficient to know how to distinguish them when they are used with complete precision.

- 60 The nature of sovereign authority was one of Rousseau's most controversial sections, one debated ever since by all social and political philosophers in an attempt to grasp and solve the problems raised when considering differences between individual desires and community needs. We see from this formula that the act of association contains a reciprocal engagement between the public and individuals, and that every individual, contracting so to speak with himself, is engaged in a double relation, viz., as a member of the sovereign towards individuals, and as a member of the State towards the sovereign. But we cannot apply here the maxim of civil law that no one is bound by engagements made with himself; for there is a great difference between being bound to oneself and to a whole of which one forms part. We must further observe that the public resolution which can bind all subjects to the sovereign in consequence of the two different relations under which each of them is regarded cannot, for a contrary reason, bind the sovereign to itself; and that accordingly it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot transgress. As it can only be considered under one and the same relation, it is in the position of an individual contracting with himself; whence we see that there is not, nor can be, any kind of fundamental law binding upon the body of the people, not even the social contract. This does not imply that such a body cannot perfectly well enter into engagements with others in what does not derogate from this contract; for, with regard to foreigners, it becomes a simple being, an individual. But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in anything that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing produces nothing. So soon as the multitude is thus united in one body, it is impossible to injure one of the members without attacking the body, still less to injure the body without the members feeling the effects. Thus duty and interest alike oblige the two contracting parties to give mutual assistance; and the men themselves should seek to combine in this twofold relationship all the advantages which are attendant on it. Now, the sovereign, being formed only of the individuals that compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; consequently the sovereign power needs no guarantee towards its subjects, because it is impossible that the body should wish to injure all its members; and we shall see hereafter that it can injure no one as an individual. The sovereign, for the simple reason that it is so, is always everything that it ought to be. But this is not the case as regards the relation of subjects to the sovereign, which, notwithstanding the common interest, would have no security for the performance of their engagements unless it found means to ensure their fidelity.

- 61 Indeed, every individual may, as a man, have a particular will contrary to, or divergent from the general will which he has as a citizen; his private interest may prompt him quite differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will be less harmful to others than the payment of it will be burdensome to him; and, regarding the moral person that constitutes the State as an imaginary being because it is not a man, he would be willing to enjoy the rights of a citizen without being willing to fulfil the duties of a subject. The progress of such injustice would bring about the ruin of the body politic. In order, then, that the social pact may not be a vain formulary, it tacitly includes this engagement, which can alone give force to the others—that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free, for such is the condition which, uniting every citizen to his native land, guarantees him from all personal dependence, a condition that ensures the control and working of the political machine, and alone renders legitimate civil engagements, which, without it, would be absurd and tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses. Source: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract [and] Discourse on the Origin of Inequality edited by Lester G. Crocker (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), pp. 7-8, 10, 11-13, 17-22..

- 62 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

political philosophy of Edmund Burke From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Born in Ireland, educated at Trinity College, Dublin, Burke migrated to London to study law. Through a long political career including terms in Parliament, Burke came to represent the traditional British conservative thought. Burkean conservatism values the past traditions, manners, education, and culture. It rejects sudden change, radical innovation, and newness in fashion. For Burke, the ideas, practices, and traditions (including in art, music, religion, and economics) that have endured for many years embody the best in Western civilization and have a civilizing effect on later generations. New ideas and techniques are unproven until they have stood "the test of time," so a healthy society will pass down (through education and culture) the best of the historical past through training of the young in classical philosophy, art, music, and literature. Humans are not born good but require careful nurturing and training to develop into good, moral, civilized beings. If proper training of the young is neglected or radical innovations in education and the family interjected, chaos and misery will follow. For Burke, humanity is distinguished from other species by its "taste" or aesthetic, artistic appreciation of beauty. If that human capacity to produce and love beauty is cultivated, it will create an ethical, civilized populace. This requires exposure to the most beautiful art, music, landscapes, architecture, and manners at a young age. Much of Burke's objection to radical reform movements comes from their rejection of the past, which he sees as the source of civility. Burke's mature conservatism is developed in response to the French Revolution of 1789 in his book, Reflections on the French Revolution. The French revolutionaries' claim that they could remake and improve society according to democratic theories was repulsive to Burke. Such "speculative" philosophy for him ignored the slow, organic progress of political change. A social contract for Burke was not (as it is in Rousseau) something you could quickly define in your mind and apply to society; the true social contract is a long-term, cultural phenomenon between the past, the present, and the future. Sudden political change, without respect for past traditions and other cultural aspects (family, property, religion, education) will produce a nightmare of violence and disorder rather than improvement and progress. Burke claims that the British revolutions (1640, 1688) did not discard the past wholesale but preserved the valuable traditions of English law and civilization, only

- 63 improving upon major problems (and those gradually). The American Revolution of 1776 was in this British tradition of preserving English liberties and rights, so Burke approved of it. What troubled him about the French Revolution (as would the later Russian and Chinese revolutions) was the sudden and radical changes made in government and society. The violence and oppression that follows such "idealistic," utopian revolutions would not have surprised Burke. Radical revolutionaries tend to come from the ranks of the poor, rejected, and dissatisfied in society. When they gain power, they use it ruthlessly to destroy the traditional institutions and people who rejected them. Consequently, for Burke, most postrevolutionary governments are cruel and vindictive, and their leaders mean and angry. Burke contrasts these mad revolutionaries with the mild, civilized authority of established rulers. A Burkean conservative values those institutions and people who preserve the best of the past. These consist of the wealthy, the church, the military, the family, and the well educated. Private property, religion, and traditional education form the cultural foundations for law, stability, and good order. Change should occur gradually and thoughtfully, careful not to disturb any valuable aspect of the past. Respect for authority, ancestors, and tradition preserves the good society. This explains why Burke regards old ideas or "prejudices" as good—they knit together society. Edmund Burke also argued for the independence of the British Parliament and the "representative" role of the parliamentary member (as opposed to the "delegate" role). A representative uses independent wisdom and judgment, while a delegate simply expresses the direct will of constituents. Burke's philosophy influences later conservative political thought in the West. His love of the past and respect for tradition arises during every conservative period, including during the Reagan era in the United States and Thatcher era in Great Britain. Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "political philosophy of Edmund Burke." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 64 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The most important critic of the French Revolution was Edmund Burke (172997). His Reflections on the Revolution in France was written in 1790, in reply to those in Britain who supported the activities of the Revolution. Burke had supported the American colonists in their revolution because he believed them to have been agitating for their legitimate rights as British subjects. Now, arguing for the importance of tradition, religion, and established institutions, he claimed that the French had changed so much so fast that chaos and destruction would result. Although he was a strong supporter of government under law and in favour of a monarchy restrained by custom and traditional institutions, Burke became the spokesman for the conservative position in the West Burke understood a constitution to be an inherited system, and believed in the value of using tradition as a guide in social and political affairs. ... You will observe that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity—as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors. This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection, or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it. A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free, but it secures what it acquires.... By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence

- 65 and symmetry with the order of the world and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old or middle-aged or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete... We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual men: on account of their age and on account of those from whom they are descended. All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges. Rights for Burke were inherited, as he attacked the concept of natural rights. ... If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by that rule; they have a right to do justice, as between their fellows, whether their fellows are in public function or in ordinary occupation. They have a right to the fruits of their industry and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents, to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favor. In this partnership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock; and as to the share of power, authority, and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the state, that I must deny to be amongst the direct original rights of man in civil society, for I have in my contemplation the civil social man, and no other. It is a thing to be settled by convention. If civil society be the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law. That convention must limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution which are formed under it. Every sort of legislative, judicial, or executory power are its creatures. They can have no being in any other state of things; and how can any man claim under the conventions of civil society rights which do not so much as suppose its existence—rights which are absolutely repugnant to it? One of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is that no man should be judge in his own cause. By this each person has

- 66 at once divested himself of the first fundamental right of uncovenanted man, that is, to judge for himself and to assert his own cause. He abdicates all right to be his own governor. He inclusively, in a great measure, abandons the right of self-defense, the first law of nature. Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together. That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may secure some liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it. Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it, and exist in much greater clearness and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection; but their abstract perfection is their practical defect. By having a right to everything they want everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of themselves, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and admit to infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle. The moment you abate anything from the full rights of men, each to govern himself, and suffer any artificial, positive limitation upon those rights, from that moment the whole organization of government becomes a consideration of convenience. This it is which makes the constitution of a state and the due distribution of its powers a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill. It requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities, and of the things which facilitate or obstruct the various ends which are to be pursued by the mechanism of civil institutions. The state is to have recruits to its strength, and remedies to its distempers. What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics. The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori.... The science of government being therefore so practical in itself and intended for such practical purposes—a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be—it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and

- 67 patterns of approved utility before his eyes... ... Thanks to our sullen resistance to innovation, thanks to the cold sluggishness of our national character, we still bear the stamp of our forefathers. We have not (as I conceive) lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the fourteenth century, nor as yet have we subtilized ourselves into savages. We. are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress amongst us. Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers. We know that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made, in morality, nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mold upon our presumption and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity. In England we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the 'true supporters of all liberal and manly morals. We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags and paltry blurred shreds of paper about the rights of men. We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity. We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and spurious and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty, and, by teaching us a servile, licentious, and abandoned insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of, slavery through the whole course of our 'lives.... You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings, that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and, virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit, and

- 68 not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature... Your literary men and your politicians, and so do the whole clan of the enlightened among us, essentially differ in these points. They have no respect for the wisdom of others, but they pay it off by a very full measure of confidence in their own. With them it is a sufficient motive to destroy an old scheme of things because it is an old one. As to the new, they are in no sort of fear with regard to the duration of a building run up in haste, because duration is no object to those who think little or nothing has been done before their time, and who place all their hopes in discovery. They conceive, very systematically, that all things which give perpetuity are mischievous, and therefore they are at inexpiable war with all establishments. They think that government may vary like modes of dress, and with as little ill effect; that there needs no principle of attachment, except a sense of present convenience, to any constitution of the state. They always speak as if they were of opinion that there is a singular species of compact between them and their magistrates which binds the magistrate, but which has nothing reciprocal in it, but that the majesty of the people has a right to dissolve it without any reason but its will. Their attachment to their country itself is only so far as it agrees with some of their fleeting projects; it begins and ends with that scheme of polity which falls in with their momentary opinion... The validity of the National Assembly of France was challenged. ... I have taken a view of what has been done by the governing power in France. I have certainly spoken of it with freedom. Those whose principle it is to despise the ancient, permanent sense of mankind and to set up a scheme of society on new principles must naturally expect that such of us who think better of the judgment of the human race than of theirs should consider both them and their devices as men and schemes upon their trial. They must take it for granted that we attend much to their reason, but not at all to their authority. They have not one of the great influencing prejudices of mankind in their favor. They avow their hostility to opinion. Of course, they must expect no support from that influence which, with every other authority, they have deposed from the seat of its jurisdiction. I can never consider this Assembly as anything else than a voluntary association of men who have availed themselves of circumstances to seize upon the power of the state. They have not the sanction and authority of the character under which they first met. They have assumed another of a very different nature and have completely altered and inverted all the relations in which they originally stood. They do not hold the authority they exercise under any constitutional law of the state. They have departed from the instructions of the people by whom they were sent, which instructions, as the Assembly did not act in virtue of any ancient usage or settled law, were the sole source of their authority...

- 69 ... This Assembly has hardly a year's prescription. We have their own word for it that they have made a revolution. To make a revolution is a measure which, prima fronte [on the face of it], requires an apology. To make a revolution is to subvert the ancient state of our country; and no common reasons are called for to justify so violent a proceeding. The sense of mankind authorizes us to examine into the mode of acquiring new power, and to criticize on the use that is made of it, with less awe and reverence than that which is usually conceded to a settled and recognized authority... At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing. When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is superadded is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients are to be exercised; they are to be exercised in a continued conflict with the combined force of opposite vices, with the obstinacy that rejects all improvement and the levity that is fatigued and disgusted with everything of which it is in possession. But you may object—"A process of this kind is slow. It is not fit for an assembly which glories in performing in a few months the work of ages. Such a mode of reforming, possibly, might take up many years." Without question it might; and it ought. It is one of the excellences of a method in which time is amongst the assistants, that its operation is slow and in some cases almost imperceptible. If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom when we work only upon inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty, too, when the subject of our demolition and construction is not brick and timber but sentinent beings, by the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits multitudes may be rendered miserable... Source: Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by Thomas H.D. Mahoney (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. Inc., 1955), pp. 37-38, 39, 67-70, 97-100, 191-92, 193, 196-97.

- 70 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Paine, Thomas From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Paine's radical pamphlets and books, including Common Sense (1776), The American Crisis (1776), The Rights of Man (1791–92), and The Age of Reason (1794–95), sold more copies than the writings of any other author in the 18th century. His clear presentation of ideas drawn from the political theory of the Enlightenment proved to be very effective in rallying American colonists against Great Britain during the American Revolution. They were also welcomed in revolutionary France. In England, however, his writings were greeted with hostility from censoring authorities and members of the elite classes, and his later works, which examined the grounds for religious faith, were reviled in both Great Britain and the United States of America. Thomas Paine was born in 1737 as Thomas Pain to Quaker parents in Thetford, England. He did not change his name to Paine until he was 39 years old. His father worked as a staymaker—a craftsman who made women's corsets—and owned enough land to make him one of the few people in Thetford (31 out of 21,000) privileged enough to vote. Paine's mother came from one of the leading families of the town. Nevertheless, the family could not afford to send their young son to secondary school, and he was therefore apprenticed to his father. By the late 1750s, Paine was living in London and attending lectures on mathematics. He married in 1759 only to be widowed in less than a year. Afterward, he took a position collecting excise taxes in towns along the English coast. By 1771, he had remarried and opened a tobacco shop while continuing his tax-collecting duties. His first important political pamphlet, The Case of the Officers of the Excise (1772), argued that excise tax collectors should have an increase in pay to lessen corruption and to increase their efficiency. In 1774, Paine was fired from his job, his shop went bankrupt, and he separated legally from his second wife. Following the advice of Benjamin Franklin, whom he had met in London, and armed with important letters of introduction from the influential Philadelphian, Paine set off for the American colonies. Paine arrived in the colonies just as the tensions that led to the American Revolution were escalating. He obtained work briefly with the Pennsylvania Journal and attracted some attention for an article against slavery. He was fired, however, after a dispute with the magazine's

- 71 owner. Thereafter, he devoted himself to political pamphleteering. Paine's first outstanding pamphlet was really a series of essays, which his friend, Dr. Benjamin Rush, encouraged him to publish in pamphlet form. Entitled Common Sense, these essays appeared in early 1776 and provided a justification for colonial revolt against Great Britain. He followed this success with The American Crisis, a series of propagandistic essays written between 1776 and 1783 while he was fighting in the American army against the British. Several of the essays from 1782 and 1783 were written under a contract signed by General George Washington, and others were financed from a secret congressional fund. In 1777, Paine entered public service as secretary to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Congress, but he was forced to resign after he exposed the corrupt activities of a high government official, Paine, however, found another position, this time as secretary to the Pennsylvania State Assembly. In 1781, he was sent to France on what was a successful mission to obtain money and supplies for the Continental army. After the war, Paine settled on a small farm and lived in poverty. He devoted a considerable amount of time to intellectual pursuits, especially those related to science and technology. He developed plans and a model for a single-span arched iron bridge that could be built and assembled in sections. When he failed to get financial support in the United States for his project, Paine traveled to Europe, again armed with letters of introduction from Franklin. Paine arrived in France in 1787 and soon was embroiled in political action. He became renowned as a champion of the French Revolution in 1791 after he published The Rights of Man. Written as a response to the conservative Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) by Edmund Burke, Paine's book explored the concept of natural rights, using it as a foundation from which to criticize English social, economic, and political structures. For him, the French Revolution represented an attempt to establish a new, republican political and social order grounded on the natural rights of humankind. The Rights of Man met with sensational success in Great Britain, the United States, and France, and it made Paine one of the most controversial writers of the period. Cartoonists lampooned his radical, republican ideas in caricatures that depicted "Mad Tom." Paine responded by writing part two of The Rights of Man (1792), which offered practical ways to implement political, social, and economic reforms. An astounding 1.5 million copies were sold in Great Britain alone. The pamphlet was especially popular among artisans, unskilled workers, poor people, and small-business owners who did not have the right to vote in British elections. The British government tried and convicted Paine for seditious libel, but he had already fled to the safety of revolutionary France. The trial was held without him.

- 72 From the moment he arrived on French soil, Paine was welcomed by enthusiastic crowds. He had been made an honorary citizen of France and was chosen to serve as a delegate to the French National Convention. Although Paine wanted to see the monarchy in France brought to an end, he spoke out in the Convention against the idea of executing King Louis XVI. As a result, he gained enemies among the most radical factions in the National Convention. When those factions came to power during the Terror (1793–94), he was imprisoned. Paine was released at the end of the Reign of Terror (1794) through the intervention of James Madison, the new American ambassador to Paris. Shortly afterward he published part one of The Age of Reason. This tract explored the various grounds for religious faith and ended by arguing in support of deism. Part two of this work appeared in 1795 and applied Paine's critical methods directly to the Bible. It was greeted with cries of atheism in the United States but did not cause much stir in Europe. Paine resented the time he had spent in French prisons, seemingly abandoned by his former friends in the United States whose intervention could have helped him. In 1796, he vented some of his anger in a pamphlet that attacked both the leadership and character of George Washington. In 1802, he finally returned to the United States, an embittered man. Although he was welcomed at the White House by his longtime friend, Thomas Jefferson, he died in obscurity in New York City after suffering a stroke. Paine's literary career illustrates with great clarity that, when the implications of ideas associated with the Enlightenment were carried to their extremes, the writer was often greeted with ambivalence and outright hostility. His works serve as a kind of litmus test that reveals the subtle differences in political and religious opinion that divided the United States from France and both nations from Great Britain at the close of the 18th century. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Paine, Thomas." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 73 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The first part of Thomas Paine's Rights of Man appeared in early 1791, several months after Edmund Burke's Reflections was printed. Thus began the modern argument between radical and conservative, which has continued to the present. Paine (1737-1809) was an Anglo-American whose earlier work Common Sense (1776) strongly supported the American rebellion against the British. Now, he wrote to discredit Burke's position on the French Revolution. Paine believed in a political authority that was contractual, as did Burke, but he also supported natural rights and the idea that democratic institutions must be implemented in order to guarantee those rights. The dialogue between Burke and Paine set the tone for the main political debate of the time. Paine immediately attacked Burke's premises: ... There never did, there never will, and there never can exist a parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling posterity to the "end of time, " or of commanding for ever how the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it; and therefore, all such clauses, acts or declarations, by which the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null and void.—Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave, is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow. The parliament or the people of 1688, or of any other period, has no more right to dispose of the people of the present day, or to bind or to control them in any shape whatever, than the parliament or the people of the present day have to dispose of, bind or control those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. Every generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its government shall be organized, or how administered.

- 74 I am not contending for nor against any form of government, nor for nor against any party here or elsewhere. That which a whole nation chooses to do, it has a right to do. Mr. Burke says, No. Where then does the right exist? I am contending for the rights of the living, and against their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for, by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living. There was a time when kings disposed of their crowns by will upon their deathbeds, and consigned the people, like beasts of the field, to whatever successor they appointed. This is now so exploded as scarcely to be remembered, and so monstrous as hardly to be believed: But the parliamentary clauses upon which Mr. Burke builds his political church, are of the same nature.... A greater absurdity cannot present itself to the understanding of man, than what Mr. Burke offers to his readers. He tells them, and he tells the world to come, that a certain body of men, who existed a hundred years ago, made a law; and that there does not now exist in the nation, nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it. Under how many subtleties, or absurdities, has the divine right to govern been imposed on the credulity of mankind! Mr. Burke has discovered a new one, and he has shortened his journey to Rome, by appealing to the power of this infallible parliament of former days; and he produces what it has done, as of divine authority: for that power must certainly be more than human, which no human power to the end of time can alter... From what, or from whence, does Mr. Burke prove the right of any human power to bind posterity for ever? He has produced his clauses; but he must produce also his proofs, that such a right existed, and show how it existed. If it ever existed, it must now exist; for whatever appertains to the nature of man, cannot be annihilated by man. It is the nature of man to die, and he will continue to die as long as he continues to be born. But Mr. Burke has set up a sort of political Adam, in whom all posterity are bound for ever, he must therefore prove that his Adam possessed such a power, or such a right.... The circumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men change also; and as government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it. That which may be thought right and found convenient in one age, may be thought wrong and found inconvenient in another. In such cases, Who is to decide, the living, or the dead? As almost one hundred pages of Mr. Burke's book are employed upon these clauses, it will consequently follow, that if the clauses themselves, so far as they set up an assumed, usurped dominion over posterity for ever, are unauthoritative, and in their nature null and void; that all his voluminous inferences and declamation drawn therefrom, or founded thereon, are null and void also: and on this ground I rest the matter...

- 75 Paine claimed that Burke opposed the rights of man and supported privilege and aristocracy. When a man reflects on the condition which France was in from the nature of her government, he will see other causes for revolt than those which immediately connect themselves with the person or character of Louis XVI. There were, if I may so express it, a thousand despotisms to be reformed in France, which had grown up under the hereditary despotism of the monarchy, and became so rooted as to be in a great measure independent of it. Between the monarchy, the parliament, and the church, there was a rivalship of despotism, besides the feudal despotism operating locally, and the ministerial despotism operating everywhere. But Mr. Burke, by considering the King as the only possible object of a revolt, speaks as if France was a village, in which everything that passed must be known to its commanding officer, and no oppression could be acted but what he could immediately control. Mr. Burke might have been in the Bastille his whole life, as well under Louis XVI as Louis XIV and neither the one nor the other have known that such a man as Mr. Burke existed. The despotic principles of the government were the same in both reigns, though the dispositions of the men were as remote as tyranny and benevolence. What Mr. Burke considers as a reproach to the French Revolution, (that of bringing it forward under a reign more mild than the preceding ones), is one of its highest honours. The revolutions that have taken place in other European countries, have been excited by personal hatred. The rage was against the man, and he became the victim. But, in the same instance of France, we see a revolution generated in the rational contemplation of the rights of man, and distinguishing from the beginning between persons and principles. But Mr. Burke appears to have no idea of principles, when he is contemplating governments. "Then years ago" (says he) "I could have felicitated France on her having a government, without inquiring what the nature of that government was, or how it was administered." Is this the language of a rational man? Is it the language of a heart feeling as it ought to feel for the rights and happiness of the human race? On this ground, Mr. Burke must compliment all the governments in the world, while the victims who suffer under them, whether sold into slavery, or tortured out of existence, are wholly forgotten. It is power, and not principles, that Mr. Burke venerates; and under this abominable depravity, he is disqualified to judge between them.—Thus much for his opinion as to the occasions of the French Revolution... Through the whole of Mr. Burke's book I do not observe that the Bastille is mentioned more than once, and that with a kind of implication as if he were sorry it was pulled down, and wished it were built up again... From his violence and his grief, his silence on some points, and his excess on others, it is difficult not to believe that Mr. Burke is sorry, extremely sorry, that arbitrary power, the power of the Pope, and the Bastille, are pulled down.

- 76 Not one glance of compassion, not one commiserating reflection, that I can find throughout this book, has he bestowed on those who lingered out the most wretched of lives, a life without hope, in the most miserable of prisons. It is painful to behold a man employing his talents to corrupt himself. Nature has been kinder to Mr. Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of distress touching his heart, but by the showy resemblance of it striking his imagination. He pities the plumage but forgets the dying bird. Accustomed to kiss the aristocratical hand that hath purloined him from himself, he degenerates into a composition of art, and the genuine soul of nature forsakes him. His hero or his heroine must be a tragedy-victim expiring in show, and not the real prisoner of misery, sliding into death in the silence of a dungeon. Rights, contract, and constitutional authority were central to Paine's concerns. ... Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to show how the one originates from the other. Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights. few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.—Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection. From this short review, it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society. The natural rights which he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned, are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind: consequently, religion is one of those rights. The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and so far as the right of mind is concerned, he never surrenders it: But what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redress? He therefore deposits this right in the common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.

- 77 From these premises, two or three certain conclusions will follow. First, That every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in other words, is a natural right exchanged. Secondly, That civil power, properly considered as such, is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers not his purpose; but when collected to a focus, becomes competent to the purpose of every one. Thirdly, That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself. We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of society, and shown, or endeavoured to show, the quality of the natural rights retained, and of those which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply these principles to governments. In casting our eyes over the world, it is extremely easy to distinguish the governments which have arisen out of society, or out of the social compact, from those which have not: but to place this in a clearer light than what a single glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the several sources from which governments have arisen, and on which they have been founded. They may be all comprehended under three heads. First Superstition. Secondly, Power. Thirdly, The common interest of society, and the common rights of man. The first was a government of priestcraft, the second of conquerors, and the third of reason... When I contemplate the natural dignity of man; when I feel (for Nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and happiness of its character, I become irritated at the attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were all knaves and fools, and can scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus imposed upon. We have now to review the governments which arise out of society, in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest. It has been thought a considerable advance towards establishing the principles of Freedom, to say, that government is a compact between those who govern and those who are governed: but this cannot be true, because it is putting the effect before the cause; for as man must have existed before governments existed, there necessarily was a time when

- 78 governments did not exist, and consequently there could originally exist no governors to form such a compact with. The fact therefore must be, that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a_ government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist. To possess ourselves of a clear idea of what government is, or ought to be, we must trace it to its origin. In doing this, we shall easily discover that governments must have arisen, either out of the people, or over the people. Mr. Burke has made no distinction. He investigates nothing to its source, and therefore he confounds everything: but he has signified his intention of undertaking at some future opportunity, a comparison between the constitutions of England and France. As he thus renders it a subject of controversy by throwing the gauntlet, I take him up on his own ground. It is in high challenges that high truths have the right of appearing; and I accept it with the more readiness, because it affords me, at the same time, an opportunity of pursuing the subject with respect to governments arising out of society. But it will be first necessary to define what is meant by a constitution. It is not sufficient that we adopt the word; we must fix also a standard signification to it. A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government. It is the body of elements, to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode of elections, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such bodies may be called; the powers which the executive part of the government shall have; and, in fine, everything that relates to the complete organization of a civil government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall be bound. A constitution, therefore, is to a government, what the laws made afterwards by that government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made: and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution. Can then Mr. Burke produce the English Constitution? If he cannot, we may fairly conclude, that though it has been so much talked about, no such thing as a constitution exists, or ever did exist, and consequently that the people have yet a constitution to form...

- 79 The present National Assembly of France is, strictly speaking, the personal social compact.—The members of it are the delegates of the nation in its original character; future assemblies will be the delegates of the nation in its organized character. The authority of the present Assembly is different to what the authority of future Assemblies will be. The authority of the present one is to form a constitution: the authority of future Assemblies will be to legislate according to the principles and forms prescribed in that constitution; and if experience should hereafter show that alterations, amendments, or additions, are necessary, the constitution will point out the mode by which such things shall be done, and not leave it to the discretionary power of the future government... Source: Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 63-64, 65, 66, 67, 70-71, 72, 73, 90-91, 92-94.

- 80 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Mary Woolstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Wollstonecraft, Mary From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Wollstonecraft's father was the son of a successful weaver, who left him enough money to live as a gentleman farmer. He was unsuccessful and lost most of his family's money. Mary educated herself at home and expressed bitterness over the resources spent on the education of her eldest brother. At age 19, Wollstonecraft escaped from her family by becoming a companion to a wealthy widow in Bath. After returning to her family to nurse her mother through a final illness, she founded a school with her sister and her friend Fanny Blood in 1784. After the school failed in 1786, Wollstonecraft became a governess for one year in the family of Lord Kingsborough in Ireland. While in Ireland, Wollstonecraft completed her first novel, Mary, A Fiction (1787). This largely autobiographical account of her own life was followed by two educational books for children, Original Stories from Real Life (1791) and The Female Reader (1790). Having moved to London, Wollstonecraft worked as a journalist and assistant on the Analytical Review. Her political and social views gradually became more radical during this period. In 1792, she published A Vindication of the Rights of Man, in which she attacked the Reflections on the Revolution in France by Edmund Burke. Later that year, she published her most famous work, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Wollstonecraft's enthusiasm for the French Revolution led her to France in 1792, where she arrived in time to see King Louis XVI pass by on his way to his trial. While in France, she wrote a history of the revolution, An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution (1794), which criticized the violent direction the revolution had taken while still praising its underlying ideals of equality and freedom. In France, Wollstonecraft met an American businessman, Gilbert Imlay, with whom she had a child. After her return to London, Wollstonecraft entered into a relationship with the radical liberal philosopher William Godwin, whom she later married. She died 11 days after giving birth to her second daughter, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, who later married the British romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley.

- 81 The ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft extended the basic principles of the Enlightenment—equality, freedom, justice—to their logical conclusions by applying them to all human beings whatever their gender. Her unconventional behavior underlined the socially revolutionary implications of this logical extension. Mary Wollstonecraft, like other radical thinkers at the end of the Enlightenment, presented a vision of society that many people wished to avoid. Their reactions against her positions provided one of the strands that fed into the web of 19thcentury romanticism and middle-class culture. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Wollstonecraft, Mary." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 82 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Mary Woolstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97) wrote the first major feminist work in the modern period, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Wollstonecraft was a supporter of educational equality and an advocate of women's rights. She lived in Paris during much of the French Revolution and was close to many of its leading figures. A believer in human rights and social progress, Wollstonecraft extended her support of the principles of the Revolution to her own sex, and she argued for a new attitude towards women as part of the belief during the Enlightenment in progress, equality, and reason. Wollstonecraft stated that women did not cultivate much of their intellectual potential because of prevailing social attitudes. ... It is vain to expect virtue from women till they are, in some degree, independent of men; nay, it is vain to expect that strength of natural affection, hich would make them good wives and mothers. Whilst they are absolutely dependent on their husbands they will be cunning, mean, and selfish, and the men who can be gratified by the fawning fondness of spaniel-like affection, have not much delicacy, for love is not to be bought, in any sense of the words, its silken wings are instantly shrivelled up when any thing beside a return in kind is sought. Yet whilst wealth enervates men; and women live, as it were, by their personal charms, how can we expect them to discharge those ennobling duties which equally require exertion and self-denial... To illustrate my opinion, I need only observe, that when a woman is admired for her beauty_ and suffers herself to be so far intoxicated by the admiration she receives, as-to neglect to discharge the indispensable duty of a mother, she sins against herself by neglecting to cultivate an affection that would equally tend to make her useful and happy. True happiness, I mean all the contentment, and virtuous satisfaction, that can be snatched in this imperfect state, must arise from well regulated affections; and an affection includes a duty. Men are not aware of the misery they cause, and the vicious weakness they cherish, by only inciting women to render themselves pleasing; they do not consider that they thus make natural and artificial duties clash, by sacrificing the comfort and respectability of a woman's life to voluptuous notions of beauty, when in nature they all harmonize...

- 83 It is a melancholy truth; yet such is the blessed effect of civilization! the most respectable women are the most oppressed; and, unless they have understandings far superiour to the common run of understandings, taking in both sexes, they must, from being treated like contemptible beings, become contemptible. How many women thus waste life away the prey of discontent, who might have practised as physicians, regulated a farm, managed a shop, and stood erect, supported by their own industry, instead of hanging their heads surcharged with the dew of sensibility, that consumes the beauty to which it at first gave lustre; nay, I doubt whether pity and love are so near akin as poets feign, for I have seldom seen much compassion excited by the helplessness of females, unless they were fair; then, perhaps, pity was the soft handmaid of love, or the harbinger of lust. How much more respectable is the woman who earns her own bread by fulfilling any duty, than the most accomplished beauty!—beauty did I say?—so sensible am I of the beauty of moral loveliness, or the harmonious propriety that attunes the passions of a well-regulated mind, that I blush at making the comparison; yet I sigh to think how few women aim at attaining this respectability by withdrawing from the giddy whirl of pleasure, or the indolent calm that stupifies the good sort of women it sucks in. Proud of their weakness, however, they must always be protected, guarded from care, and all the rough toils that dignify the mind.—If this be the fiat of fate, if they will make themselves insignificant and contemptible, sweetly to waste 'life away,' let them not expect to be valued when their beauty fades, for it is the fate of the fairest flowers to be admired and pulled to pieces by the careless hand that plucked them. In how many ways do I wish, from the purest benevolence, to impress this truth on my sex; yet I fear that they will not listen to a truth that dear bought experience has brought home to many an agitated bosom, nor willingly resign the privileges of rank and sex for the privileges of humanity, to which those have no claim who do not discharge its duties... Would men but generously snap our chains, and be content with rational fellowship instead of slavish obedience, they would find us more observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faithful wives, more reasonable mothers—in a word, better citizens. We should then love them with true affection, because we should learn to respect ourselves.... Equality in education was a major part of Wollstonecraft's reform program. ... Let an enlightened nation then try what effect reason would have to bring them back to nature, and their duty; and allowing them to share the advantages of education and government with man, see whether they will become better, as they grow wiser and become free. They cannot be injured by the experiment; for it is not in the power of man to render them more insignificant than they are at present.

- 84 To render this practicable, day schools, for particular ages, should be established by government, in which boys and girls might be educated together.... Girls and boys still together? I hear some readers ask: yes. And I should not fear any other consequences than that some early attachment might take place; which, whilst it had the best effect on the moral character of the young people, might not perfectly agree with the views of the parents, for it will be a long time, I fear, before the world will be so far enlightened that parents, only anxious to render their children virtuous, shall allow them to choose companions for life themselves. Besides, this would be a sure way to promote early marriages, and from early marriages the most salutary physical and moral effects naturally flow. What a different character does a married citizen assume from the selfish coxcomb, who lives, but for himself, and who is often afraid to marry lest he should not be able to live in a certain style. Great emergencies excepted, which would rarely occur in a society of which equality was the basis, a man can only be prepared to discharge the duties of public life, by the habitual practice of those inferiour ones which form the man. In this plan of education the constitution of boys would not be ruined by the early debaucheries, which now make men so selfish, or girls rendered weak and vain, by indolence, and frivolous pursuits. But, I presuppose, that such a degree of equality should be established between the sexes as would shut out gallantry and coquetry, yet allow friendship and love to temper the heart for the discharge of higher duties. These would be schools of morality—and the happiness of man, allowed to flow from the pure springs of duty and affection, what advances might not the human mind make? Society can only be happy and free in proportion as it is virtuous; but the present distinctions, established in society, corrode all private, and blast all public virtue... In her conclusion, Wollstonecraft asked for a "revolution" in the social system and in attitudes towards both sexes. ... That women at present are by ignorance rendered foolish or vicious, is, I think, not to be disputed; and, that the most salutary effects tending to improve mankind might be expected from a REVOLUTION in female manners, appears, at least, with a face of probability, to rise out of the observation. For as marriage has been termed the parent of those endearing charities which draw man from the brutal herd, the corrupting intercourse that wealth, idleness, and folly, produce between the sexes, is more universally injurious to morality than all the other vices of mankind collectively considered. To adulterous lust the most sacred duties are sacrificed, because before marriage, men, by a promiscuous intimacy with women, learned to consider love as a selfish gratification—learned to separate it not only from esteem, but from the affection merely built on habit, which mixes a little humanity with it. Justice and friendship are also set at defiance, and that purity of taste is vitiated which would naturally lead a man to relish an artless display of affection rather than

- 85 affected airs. But that noble simplicity of affection, which dares to appear unadorned, has few attractions for the libertine, though it be the charm, which by cementing the matrimonial tie, secures to the pledges of a warmer passion the necessary parental attention; for children will never be properly educated till friendship subsists between parents. Virtue flies from a house divided against itself—and a whole legion of devils take up their residence there. The affection of husbands and wives cannot be pure when they have so few sentiments in common, and when so little confidence is established at home, as must be the case when their pursuits are so different. That intimacy from which tenderness should flow, will not, cannot subsist between the vicious. Contending, therefore, that the sexual distinction which men have so warmly insisted upon, is arbitrary, I have dwelt on an observation, that several sensible men, with whom I have conversed on the subject, allowed to be well founded; and it is simply this, that the little chastity to be found amongst men, and consequent disregard of modesty, tend to degrade both sexes; and further, that the modesty of women, characterized as such, will often be only the artful veil of wantonness instead of being the natural reflection of purity, till modesty be universally respected. From the tyranny of man, I firmly believe, the greater number of female follies proceed; and the cunning, which I allow makes at present a part of their character, I likewise have repeatedly endeavoured to prove, is produced by oppression... Let woman share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man; for she must grow more perfect when emancipated, or justify the authority that chains such a weak being to her duty... Source: Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, edited by Carol H. Poston (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 141, 142, 149, 150, 167, 168-69, 192-94.

- 86 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Thomas Malthus’ Essay on Population Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Malthus, Thomas Robert From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. The sixth of seven children born to Daniel Malthus and Henrietta Catherine Graham Malthus, he received a primary and secondary education at the Warrington Academy operated by English Dissenters. Malthus attended Cambridge University, graduating in mathematics in 1788. Following the customs of the English gentry, Malthus as a younger son entered the Anglican clergy, serving actively as a pastor from 1792 until 1794. He was soon elected a fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and spent most of the years between 1793 and 1804 in residence at that school. He traveled through the northern German states and the Scandinavian countries in 1799, gathering materials for his theory of population growth. After 1805, Malthus occupied the first professorship of History and political economy in England, at a college established by the East India Company at Haileybury. His treatise, Principles of Political Economy (1820), was written for his course at Haileybury. Malthus was received into the membership of the Royal Society of London in 1819 and was also a member of the Institut de France and the Berlin Academy. He was a founder of the Statistical Society, which was established in 1834. Malthus rejected the mercantilistic assumption that increases in population were always desirable. He was, in fact, one of the first students of population to assert that Europe was not an underpopulated region. He believed that population tends to increase faster than the food supply. Thus, he rejected the notion put forth by Johann Peter Süssmilch and other mercantilists that the two factors—population and food supply—balance each other continually. In Malthus's pessimistic vision, the human passion for sexual activity will always cause population to increase more rapidly than the food supply. As a result, inevitable periods of critical food shortages will cause high death rates as famine and disease take their toll. Eventually, an unstable and short-lived equilibrium will be restored, until the next cycle of population increase sets the whole cycle once again into motion. The whole process of population change tended to be cyclic, exhibiting repeated episodes of growth and decline.

- 87 As a corrective for this situation, Malthus could offer only sexual chastity before marriage and abstinence within marriage. He rejected both birth control and abortion as alternative forms of population control. He thus tied his vision of the population theory to restrictive morality that called for a full reversal of practices during the Enlightenment. Malthus's vision was decidedly pessimistic, built on his sense that the human passions and natural limitations on the food supply could never be fully controlled by well-meaning, reasonable policies or rulers. He supplemented this position with an equally pessimistic assessment of the practicality of poor relief. He believed that such programs aimed at alleviating suffering only cause a deterioration of general economic conditions by stimulating price rises. However, he never called for repeal of the English Poor Laws but preferred to encourage individuals to control their own actions in order to minimize their negative effects on society. He was one of several English writers at the turn of the century to reject the most pronounced forms of optimism that existed in the Enlightenment, substituting for its belief in human perfectibility a gloomy picture of the limits on human action and potential. For Malthus, the visions of earlier theorists such as Süssmilch, Adam Smith, Bernard Mandeville, William Godwin, and Marie-Jean de Condorcet represented a naive misunderstanding of the real forces that determine the conditions of human existence. Malthus first sketched these ideas in an anonymous publication of 1798, the Essay on the Principle of Population. An expanded edition with the same title appeared over his name in 1803. He also published The Present High Price of Provisions (1800) and his fully developed political, economic, and population theory, The Principles of Political Economy (1820). Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Malthus, Thomas Robert." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc. Thomas Robert Malthus, population theory of From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Malthus argued that human populations outstrip their food supplies if reproduction is left unchecked. This antiutopian, politically conservative view encouraged fierce argument that continues to the present. The argument was first presented by Malthus in a pamphlet published anonymously in 1798, titled An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers. In it, Malthus claimed that human populations increase at a geometrical rate (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, etc.) while agricultural output increases at an

- 88 arithmetical rate (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, etc.). It follows from this that without some check on population growth, the number people to be fed will be greater than the food supply available to feed to them. Malthus proposed two kinds of checks on birthrates—misery and vice. The motivation for Malthus's stark "scientific" presentation of this idea can be seen in the title of the pamphlet: He wanted to counter what he saw as the unwarranted optimism of his intellectual contemporaries, most particularly William Godwin's as expressed in his Enquirer. In 1803, Malthus published a very much expanded second edition titled An Essay on the Principle of Population, or a View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry Into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils Which It Occasions. The second edition is usually described as the "Second Essay," and the first edition as the "First Essay." Although the Second Essay is much longer, the most significant theoretical addition is the claim that in addition to vice and misery as checks on population growth should be added "moral restraint." This third check Malthus understood as delayed marriage—couples would not marry and therefore not reproduce until a later age. What is important here is the idea that what appears in the First Essay as an inevitable, scientifically determined human tragedy can now, in the Second Essay, be controlled in some measure by human intervention. Malthus translated his ideas into particular policy proposals, including the suggestion that poor children should not receive assistance. Of course, these proposals looked to the long-term benefit of societies, but they appeared harsh and, as things turned out, unnecessary. The reception of Malthus's argument was overwhelmingly hostile. Many, including Godwin and later Marx, were committed to the idea that political and social progress would overcome nature and were unwilling to contemplate the thought of naturally imposed limits on their optimism. In literature, Malthus is mocked and portrayed as cruel and heartless. Others though recognized the importance of his thought, including Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Keynes. Darwin acknowledges the importance of Malthus's work in the development of his ideas. One objection to Malthus's argument has been to the claim that food production can grow only arithmetically. He was unable to foresee the role of technology in increasing agricultural output, and so his argument seemed to rest on an untrue premise. However, whether or not the technology of food production can continue to keep us free of Malthus's conclusions remains unclear. A second objection concerns Malthus's moral refusal to consider the role of contraception as way of controlling population growth. Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "Thomas Robert Malthus, population theory of." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 89 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Thomas Malthus’ Essay on Population Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

While Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) wrote his most influential work An Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798, its influence was felt most in the middle of the nineteenth century. Charles Darwin wrote in his Autobiography that upon reading "Malthus on Population [in 1838] ... , it at once struck me that under [certain] circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which to work... " Malthus' theory was a formula that was important in considering social progress as well as evolution. ... I think I may fairly make two postulata. First, That food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state. These two laws, ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been fixed laws of our nature, and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to be what they now are, without an immediate act of power in that Being who first arranged the system of the universe, and for the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all_its various operations. I do not know that any writer has supposed that on this earth man will ultimately be able to live without food. But Mr. Godwin has conjectured that the passion between the sexes may in time be extinguished. As, however, he calls this part of his work a deviation into the land of conjecture, I will not dwell longer upon it at present than to say that the best arguments for the perfectibility of man are drawn from a contemplation of the great progress that he has already made from the savage state and the difficulty of saying where he is to stop. But towards the extinction of the passion between the sexes, no progress whatever has hitherto been made. It appears to exist in as much force at present as it did two thousand or four thousand years ago. There are individual exceptions now as there always have been. But, as these exceptions do not appear to increase in number, it would surely be a very unphilosophical mode of arguing, to infer merely from the existence of an

- 90 exception, that the exception would, in time, become the rule, and the rule the exception. Assuming then, my postulata as granted, I say that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will skew the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second. By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall some where and must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind. Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand. She has been comparatively sparing in the room and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this spot of earth, with ample food and ample room to expand in, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious all pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law. And the race of man cannot, by any efforts of reason, escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death. Among mankind, misery and vice. The former, misery, is an absolutely necessary consequence of it. Vice is a highly probable consequence, and we therefore see it abundantly prevail, but it ought not, perhaps, to be called an absolutely necessary consequence. The ordeal of virtue is to resist all temptation to evil. This natural inequality of the two powers of population and of production in the earth and that great law of our nature which must constantly keep their effects equal form the great difficulty that to me appears insurmountable in the way to the perfectibility of society. All other arguments are of slight and subordinate consideration in comparison of this. I see no way by which man can escape from the weight of this law which pervades all animated nature. No fancied equality, no agrarian regulations in their utmost extent, could remove the pressure of it even for a single century. And it appears, therefore, to be decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure, and feel no anxiety about providing the means of subsistence for themselves and families. Consequently, if the premises are just, the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind...

- 91 Malthus was himself influenced by Condorcet's Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind. The last question which Mr. Condorcet proposes for examination is the,_urganic perfectibility of man. He observes that if the proofs which have been already given and which, in their development, will receive greater force in the work itself, are sufficient to establish the indefinite perfectibility of man upon the supposition of the same natural faculties and the same organization which he has at present, what will be the certainty, what the extent of our hope, if this organization, these natural faculties themselves, are susceptible of amelioration? From the improvement of medicine, from the use of more wholesome food and habitations, from a manner of living which will improve the strength of the body by exercise without impairing it by excess, from the destruction of the two great causes of the degradation of man, misery and too great riches, from the gradual removal of transmissible and contagious disorders by the improvement of physical knowledge, rendered more efficacious by the progress of reason and of social order, he infers that though man will not absolutely become immortal, yet that the duration between his birth and natural death will increase without ceasing, will have no assignable term, and may properly be expressed by the word indefinite. He then defines this word to mean either a constant approach to an unlimited extent, without ever reaching it, or an increase in the immensity of ages to an extent greater than any assignable quantity. But surely the application of this term in either of these senses to the duration of human life is in the highest degree unphilosophical and totally unwarranted by any appearances in the laws of nature. Variations from different causes are essentially distinct from a regular and unretrograde increase. The average duration of human life will to a certain degree vary from healthy or unhealthy climates, from wholesome or unwholesome food, from virtuous or vicious manners, and other causes, but it may be fairly doubted whether there is really the smallest perceptible advance in the natural duration of human life since first we have had any authentic history of man. The prejudices of all ages have indeed been directly contrary to this supposition, and though I would not lay much stress upon these prejudices, they will in some measure tend to prove that there has been no marked advance in an opposite direction... Source: Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, edited by Philip Appleman (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), pp. 19-21, 60-61.

- 92 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Karl Marx, political philosophy of From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Karl Heinrich Marx is the father of modern communism. The communist systems of the 20th century owe their origins to the ideas of Karl Marx. Millions of people in the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Western Europe have lived with the consequences of Marx's theories. The combination of fatal attraction and disastrous results make Marxism one of the most interesting but tragic of political philosophies, and Marx's influence extends beyond the formal communist and socialist nations. His concepts of class conflict, historicism, materialism, and ethical relativism have had enormous influence. No other ideology, except liberalism and Christianity, has exercised such a history-changing effect as Marxism. Karl Marx grew up in a traditional Jewish family (from a long ancestry of teachers or rabbis), though his German father converted to Protestant Christianity to be able to enter the legal profession. Marx studied philosophy (especially Hegel) at the University of Berlin, eventually receiving a Ph.D. degree. Refused academic employment in conservative Germany, he became involved in radical politics, finally emigrating to France and then Great Britain. Much of his adult life was spent in London, unemployed and supported financially by his fellow communist thinker, Friedrich Engels. In his notable writings (The Communist Manifesto, Capital, The German Ideology, etc.), Marx developed an original and highly coherent theory of history, politics, economics, and revolution. His antireligious, antitradition perspective kept him a social outcast in conventional European society all his life, but he was the hero of radicals everywhere. Marx begins his political thought with a view of human nature that conceives of human beings (or "species-being") as production. Humans differ from other creatures in producing their material subsistence and, in the economic process, their own identity. Historical technology becomes the key to understanding humanity, in Marx's mind. People may think that their social, psychological, artistic, or spiritual lives define humanity, but Marx reduces all life to work. The way people work determines their nature. Like the Old Testament God, people create.

- 93 But throughout history, this human creativity has been stifled, frustrated, and alienated. Humanity is meant to produce freely, happily but is bound to social institutions and activities that oppress people. Humans are supposed to be in control of their destiny, like gods, but they are controlled, like slaves. In capitalist society, they experience alienation: fearful separation from the object of their production (which they do not know), from their subjective nature (as producer), from nature and society (which they should dominate, but dominates them), and from other humans (with whom they should cooperate, but who compete and conflict with them). Communism will overcome all these agonies and make a free, productive, just, and happy society. All problems will fade with communist society. The state ownership of property and economic planning will liberate people to enjoy their true creative natures and social harmony. Furthermore, for Marx, this progress to communism is inevitable: Human history and technology is moving inexorably, by scientific laws, to communism. This view of historical inevitability of communism comes from Marx's materialism, which sees reality as the tangible, economic activity of life (production and consumption). Applying Hegel's dialectic, Marx sees history as the clashing of opposites: modes of production, social classes, and ideas. All thought (philosophy, law, art, religion) come from certain ways of working and economic structures. So when agriculture is the main way of working in the European Middle Ages, and that economy is made up of working peasants and land-owning nobility, all politics, theology, art, and science evolve from that system of social production. Marx says that Catholic Christianity (St. Thomas Aquinas) of the medieval period simply reflects the hierarchy, chivalry, and monarchy of European economics of the Middle Ages (feudalism). Protestant Christianity, with its individualistic views of Christ and salvation, its work ethic and piety, reflect emerging capitalism. History flows through economic systems with corresponding social classes, for Marx: (1) primitive (tribal) communism where all are "hunters and gatherers"; (2) antiquity (Greek and Roman) where owners are slave owners and workers are slaves: (3) medieval feudalism with peasants and landlords: (4) capitalism with industrial working proletarians and industrial-owning capitalists or "bourgeoisie"; (5) socialism when the working-class revolution sets up the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and (6) communism, in which technology produces such abundance that no work is necessary and all economic classes disappear. Marx's vision of future communist society is so heavenly (prosperity, leisure, freedom, happiness, harmony) that it is no wonder that many people followed it. The realities of poverty, disease, war, and work paled next to Marx's vision of a bright future in communism. Of course, to get to this perfect society, one had to overthrow capitalist democracy first. This would require the unutopian practices of conspiracy, sabotage, violent revolution, and brutal suppression of resistance and dissent; but for Marx, this was necessary to reach the heaven of the communist state. People were not sinful or imperfect, and once the ideal society was achieved, they would become unselfish, kind, loving, and cooperative.

- 94 Most of Marx's historical analysis has to do with the next great social transition—from capitalism to socialism. This results from the "forces of production" (socialized technology) outstripping the "relations of production" (private property and wealth, wage labor, and social classes). Specifically, utilizing the labor theory of value, Marx sees the workers not getting the full payment for their work, causing a "crisis of overproduction" (or recession/depression) that shuts down the economy, causing a workers' revolution, establishing socialism. The government of dictatorship of the proletariat leads society from socialism to communism, following an outburst of productivity by "liberated" workers. Because all economic periods have states that are dictatorships of the ruling (owning) class, this socialist dictatorship is really more democratic than liberal democracy. Unemployment is eliminated; universal education, medical care, housing, and old age pensions are instituted; and the prosperity of socialism leads other capitalist societies to collapse. The historical relativism of morals and ethics makes adhering to bourgeois values (honesty, respect for rights, nonviolence) unnecessary for socialist revolutionaries: Stealing, killing, kidnapping, lying, terrorism are all justified if they advance the revolution. A new socialist ethics (and New Socialist Man) will emerge in this new historic epoch. The old capitalist, acquisitive, greedy, selfish, individualistic human will become the socialist, sharing, caring, collectivist, generous, peaceful, humane person. War will end. The experience in the socialist countries did not confirm Marx's positive vision. Instead, they displayed economic stagnation, oppressive governments, and social alienation far worse than that experienced in liberal capitalist countries. Marxism—the ideological development of Marx's theories and their practice in different nations—attempts to explain this disparity between Marx's ideal and communism's reality. Some blame the surrounding capitalist-imperialist countries; others blame poor leadership (Stalin) or bureaucracy. But after 70 years of disaster, communist regimes abandoned the Marxist system. The Soviet Union returned to a quasi-capitalist, republican system; China instituted freemarket reforms; and Cuba declined into poverty and despair. The theories of Karl Marx seduced and deceived millions of people and caused enormous human suffering. Questions remain as to why the promise of Marxist communism failed so miserably. Traditional Christian political thought (St. Augustine) would say it ignored the reality of human sin; British liberalism (John Locke) would say it denied natural rights; Freudian psychoanalysis would say it did not understand human nature. Whatever the answer, the political thought of Karl Marx is one of the great episodes in Western political theory. Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "Karl Marx, political philosophy of." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 95 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95) were friends and collaborators who were appalled at the price paid by many human beings to make industrial society work. In the 1840s they began their analysis of capitalism, the middle-class, and contemporary society with a critique of the conditions of working life. This analysis was to have a profound influence on future social thought. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party of February 1848, the most influential work in the history of socialism, the two men summarized their position on the idea of historical development, the importance of the economic mode of production, the role of class struggle, and the nature of social and political change. Engels' father was a wealthy German manufacturer, and the son went to Manchester, England in 1842 to work in one of the branches of his father's business. He stayed until 1844 and in that year wrote The Condition of the Working Class in England. In the book he catalogued the horrible conditions of labour during the industrial revolution and placed the blame on the system and on the bourgeoisie. No one can be complacent about a situation which injures and cripples so many workers for the benefit of a single class. It is tragic that so many industrious workers are injured in the factories and are condemned to a lifetime of poverty and hunger. Their middle-class employers must bear the sole responsibility for this disgraceful state of affairs. A fine list of diseases and injuries due solely to the revolting greed of the middle classes! Simply in order to fill the pockets of the bourgeoisie, women are rendered unfit to bear children, children are crippled, while grown men are stunted and maimed. The health of whole generations of workers is undermined, and they are racked with diseases and infirmities. Let us recall a few of the more barbarous cases [brought to light by the Factories Enquiry Commission's Reports.] Stuart reports that children were dragged naked out of bed by overseers and driven with blows and kicks to the factories, their clothes over their arms. Blows had at first aroused them from their slumbers, but before long they were asleep again over their work. A case is reported of a wretched child being roused by a shout from the foreman, when the machinery had stopped working. Still half asleep, the child, with eyes still closed, automatically went through the motions of working the silent machine. We read of

- 96 children who were too tired [when the day's work was over] to go home, but hid themselves under the wool in the drying room, only to be driven from the factory by blows from a strap. We read of hundreds of children who come home from the factory every evening so tired that they cannot eat their supper from lack of sleep and lack of appetite. Their parents found them on their knees at their bedside, where they had fallen asleep while saying their prayers.... Should one not detest the middle classes, who so hypocritically boast of their humanity and sacrifice, while really they are concerned solely with filling their pockets? When I speak of the 'bourgeoisie' in this chapter I am referring not only to the middle class proper but also to the so-called aristocracy. This is because the privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy affect their relations with the middle classes rather than with the workers. Since all other privileges sink into insignificance when coupled with the privilege of property, the workers regard both bourgeoisie and aristocracy together as a single property-owning class. The only difference between the middle classes (in the narrower sense) and the aristocracy is this: the former come into direct contact with the factory workers, some of the miners and (if they are farmers) with the agricultural labourers. But the latter have relations only with certain miners and with the farm workers [but not with the factory operatives]. I have never seen so demoralized a social class as the English middle classes. They are so degraded by selfishness and moral depravity as to be quite incapable of salvation. And here I refer to the bourgeoisie proper ... The middle classes have a truly extraordinary conception of society. They really believe that all human beings (themselves excluded) and indeed all living things and inanimate objects have a real existence only if they make money or help to make it. Their sole happiness is derived from gaining a quick profit. They feel pain only if they suffer a financial loss. Every single human quality with which they are endowed is grossly debased by selfish greed and love of gain. Admittedly the English middle classes make good husbands and family men. They have also all sorts of so-called 'private virtues'. In the ordinary daily affairs of life they seem to be as respectable and as decent as the members of any other middle class. One finds them better than Germans to deal with in business. The English do not condescend to that petty haggling which characterises the German trader with his pathetically limited horizon. But what is the use of all that? When all comes to all what really matters to the Englishman is his own interest and above all his desire to make money. One day I walked with one of these middle-class gentlemen into Manchester. I spoke to him about the disgraceful unhealthy slums and drew his attention to the disgusting condition of that part of the town in which the factory workers lived. I declared that I had never seen so badly built a town in my life. He listened patiently and at the corner of the street at which we parted company he remarked: 'And yet there is a great deal of money made here. Good morning, Sir'...

- 97 The middle classes in England have become the slaves of the money they worship. Even the English language is permeated by the one idea that dominates the waking hours of the bourgeoisie. People see 'valued' in terms of hard cash. They say of a man: 'He is worth £10,000', and by that they mean that he possesses that sum. Anyone who has money is 'respectable'. He belongs to 'the better sort of people'. He is said to be 'influential', which means that what he says carried weight in the circles in which he moves. The spirit of petty bargaining permeates the whole language. Everything is expressed in commercial terms or in the categories of the science of economics. The English judge every aspect of life in terms of 'supply and demand'. The English middle classes believe in absolutely unbridled freedom of competition, consequently the principle of 'laissez faire' is allowed to dominate government and administration, medicine, education and even religion—for the authority of the Established Church is rapidly declining. The bourgeoisie believe that free competition should be absolutely unchecked. The State should have no power whatsoever to interfere with this holy principle. The bourgeois ideal is a society in which there is no 'State' at all to exercise any authority—a state of anarchy comparable with that in friend Stirner's 'society', where everybody can exploit everybody else to their heart's content. But the English middle classes cannot do without the State just as they cannot do without the workers. They need the State to keep the workers in order. Nevertheless the bourgeoisie do everything to prevent the State from interfering in any way with their own affairs... Marx, in 1844, discussed the concept of the alienation of labour. What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently of the individual—that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity—in the same way the worker's activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is the loss of his self...

- 98 The Manifesto of the Communist Party was a powerful polemic based upon an analysis of historical change. A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies. Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries? Two things result from this fact. I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power. II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself. To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guildmasters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations. The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with clash antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms: Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat...

- 99 The bourgeoisie was the controlling class in industrial society, and Marx and Engels praised it in the Manifesto as a historical advance. We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange. Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and selfgoverning association in the mediaeval commune; here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations... The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers. The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation. The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society... The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country...

- 100 The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation... The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life... The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steamnavigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour? We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class... The two men theorized that the proletariat will develop consciousness, overthrow the bourgeoisie, and establish a new society. But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians. In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed—a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piece-meal, are a commodity, like very other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market. Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him...

- 101 Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is... The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories, ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages. At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie. But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trade Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

- 102 Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the everexpanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years. This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up ,again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hours' bill in England was carried. Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie. Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress. Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole. Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product....

- 103 The aims of the communists, then one of the many branches of socialism, were made clear: In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole? The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement... The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat... The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property:... You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its nonexistence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society... The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

- 104 The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat... We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production. These measures will of course be different in different countries. Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable. 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels. 5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan. 8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture. 9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country. 10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the

- 105 organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all... In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time. Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries. The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE! Sources: Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), pp. 188, 189, 311-12, 312-13; Robert Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 74, 473-74, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480-82, 483, 484, 486, 488, 490-91, 500.

- 106 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Darwin, Charles From: Encyclopedia of World History: Age of Revolution and Empire, 1750 to 1900, vol. 4. The famous British naturalist Charles Darwin traveled around the world, wrote several books, and developed the theory of natural selection and evolution. Charles Robert Darwin was born on February 12, 1809, in Shrewsbury, Shropshire, in the west of England. His father, Robert Darwin, was a wealthy doctor and financier, and his mother Susannah (née Wedgwood) died when he was eight years old. He was a grandson of Erasmus Darwin, a prominent physician, on his father's side and Josiah Wedgwood, from the pottery family, on his mother's side. Charles Darwin went to Shrewsbury School and then to the University of Edinburgh to study medicine; he also learned how to stuff birds by a freed South American slave who worked at the Edinburgh Museum. His father was disappointed at his son's lack of progress at Edinburgh and decided to move him to Cambridge. Darwin proceeded to Christ's College, where he had the idea of becoming a clergyman and studied theology. It was during this time that he started collecting beetles and developing a keen interest in entomology. With the H.M.S. Beagle sailing to South America to chart the coastline, Darwin decided that he might join the crew as an unpaid assistant to the ship's captain, Robert FitzRoy. Darwin realized that it would give him an unparalleled opportunity to study the geological features of many islands around the world, as well as to study wildlife. He had been inspired by accounts of the German explorer Alexander von Humboldt. His father was unhappy about the idea of a two-year voyage (it later turned out to last for five years), but Josiah Wedgwood, his grandfather, supported the trip. Darwin set off on December 27, 1831, collecting and sending back large numbers of natural history specimens. The ship stopped at the Cape Verde Islands, and Darwin proceeded to study oyster shells and note the changes in the land. On arriving in South America, at Bahia (modern-day Salvador), Darwin went to study the rain forest. He was angered by the treatment of the slaves in Brazil. He spent some months in the rain forest and then in July 1832 went to Montevideo, Uruguay, which was going through one of its many conflicts after

- 107 becoming independent. Darwin met the Argentine dictator General Juan Manuel de Rosas and found the way the Argentine government treated the people of Tierra del Fuego bordering on systematic extermination. The Beagle sailed to the Falkland Islands and then back to Argentina. In October 1833 Darwin caught a fever in Argentina and in July 1834 fell ill in Valparaíso. He spent a long time in Chile, climbing the Andes and studying the fossils in the Andean foothills. Darwin went to Peru and to the Galápagos Islands. Darwin proceeded on to Tahiti, New Zealand, and Australia, although he never went to the settlement in the north of the country that now bears his name. In New Zealand, he was saddened at the treatment of the Maoris and even more disappointed in the way he saw the aboriginal people of Australia being treated. The Beagle then headed off to the Indian Ocean, where the ship called in at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Already formulating his idea of animal species developing over very long periods of time, Darwin started to try to draw some conclusions on the final leg of his journey back to England, where he landed in October 1836, returning to Shrewsbury to rejoin his family. Darwin began cataloging all the different species, and in a talk at the Zoological Society, the famous ornithologist John Gould told the audience that the birds on the Galápagos Islands were not a mixture of species but all ground finches that had adapted differently. This helped fuel Darwin's ideas of evolution and natural selection. He became influenced by the ideas of Thomas Malthus and also by Harriet Martineau, a Whig political activist. Darwin developed the Malthusian ideas to form "natural selection," by which, when an area was overpopulated, the strongest would survive; he never used the term "survival of the fittest," although many later writers attributed it to him. During the 1840s Darwin was refining his concept of evolution but initially had no intention of immediately publishing his treatise on natural selection. By 1854 Darwin had finished working out the order in which many species had evolved and had written about 250,000 words when, on June 18, 1858, he received a letter from Alfred Russel Wallace, an English socialist and natural history enthusiast who was in the Malay Archipelago. Wallace raised a similar idea of evolution to that of Darwin, with extracts of both scholars' work read at the Linnean Society on July 1, 1858. This encouraged Darwin to finish his book, which he called On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Darwin retreated to the North York moors when the book was released on November 22, 1859. There were 1,250 copies printed, and the entire stock had been oversubscribed by orders received by booksellers. As Darwin had suspected, the book caused a storm of protest, and he kept a book of press cuttings, review articles, satires, parodies, and caricature cartoons. Dissenters saw merit in his book, but the members of the Anglican community at Cambridge were upset at Darwin's ideas, which they saw as directly challenging those in the Bible. Darwin, had deliberately not stated that he believed that humans had evolved from

- 108 apes, but this was what many of his readers interpreted, with many reviewers talking about "men from monkeys." This denied the special status of humans, but Darwin found support from Thomas Huxley, writing his own book Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature, which was published in 1863. However, Richard Owen, the head of the British scientific establishment, condemned the book, as did Sedgwick and Henslow, who had been tutors to Darwin at Cambridge. Darwin's work was acknowledged in Prussia, where the zoologist Ernst Haeckel alerted the king of Prussia, who awarded Darwin a medal. Some German theorists were soon to go further, using the concept of evolution to develop ideas of Social Darwinism by which one type of man was more advanced than another. Darwin became increasingly unwell and took to his bed for many months during the 1860s. However, he continued to write more books, with six new editions of On the Origin of Species, and also some new works such as Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868. He wrote The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, which was published in 1871, and his The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals was published in the following year. From 1876 until 1881 Darwin wrote his autobiography for his grandchildren. He had married his cousin Emma Wedgwood, the marriage service being an Anglican ceremony that was arranged in order to suit the Unitarians. He and his wife had 10 children, three of whom died young. He had an angina seizure in March 1882 and died on April 19. A funeral was held at Downe, where he had lived, and on April 26 he was interred at Westminster Abbey, close to the last resting places of John Herschel and Isaac Newton. Although some historians still debate whether it was Darwin or Wallace who first came up with the concept of evolution, Darwin is the person credited with the idea and the person who did the most to advance it to a stage where it is widely accepted around the world. Text Citation: Corfield, Justin. "Darwin, Charles." In Ackermann, Marsha E., Michael Schroeder, Janice J. Terry, Jiu-Hwa Lo Upshur, and Mark F. Whitters, eds. Encyclopedia of World History: Age of Revolution and Empire, 1750 to 1900, vol. 4. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2008. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 109 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Charles Darwin (1809-82) was the giant of the natural sciences of the nineteenth century. His work The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, published in 1859, caused an immediate sensation and changed the dialogue about how we think about human nature, nature itself, and biological relations. His concept of evolution and the supporting material he presented to substantiate it have shaped research in the biological sciences for over a century. In the first edition of The Origin of Species Darwin discussed what he intended to do. When on board H.M.S. Beagle, as naturalist, I was much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the inhabitants of South America, and in the geological relations of the present to the past inhabitants of that continent. These facts seemed to me to throw some light on the origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers... In considering the Origin of Species, it is quite conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on their embryological relations, their geographical distribution, geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion that each species had not been independently created, but had descended, like varieties, from other species. Nevertheless, such a conclusion, even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified, so as to acquire that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which most justly excites our admiration. Naturalists continually refer to external conditions, such as climate, food &-c., as the only possible cause of variation. In one very limited sense, as we shall hereafter see, this may be true; but it is preposterous to attribute to mere external conditions, the structure, for instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak, and tongue, so admirably adapted to catch insects under the bark of trees. In the case of the misseltoe, which draws its nourishment from certain trees, which has seeds that must be transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of certain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with its relations to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of external conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant itself...

- 110 It is, therefore, of the highest importance to gain a clear insight into the means of modification and coadaptation. At the commencement of my observations it seemed to me probable that a careful study of domesticated animals and of cultivated plants would offer the best chance of making out this obscure problem. Nor have I been disappointed; in this and in all other perplexing cases I have invariably found that our knowledge, imperfect though it be, of variation under domestication, afforded the best and safest clue. I may venture to express my conviction of the high value of such studies, although they have been very commonly neglected by naturalists. From these considerations, I shall devote the first chapter of this Abstract to Variation under Domestication. We shall thus see that a large amount of hereditary modification is at least possible; and, what is equally or more important, we shall see how great is the power of man in accumulating by his Selection successive slight variations. I will then pass on to the variability of species in a state of nature; but I shall, unfortunately, be compelled to treat this subject far too briefly, as it can be treated properly only by giving long catalogues of facts. We shall, however, be enabled to discuss what circumstances are most favourable to variation. In the next chapter the Struggle for Existence amongst all organic beings throughout the world, which inevitably follows from their high geometrical powers of increase, will be treated of. This is the doctrine of Malthus, applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form. This fundamental subject of Natural Selection will be treated at some length in the fourth chapter; and we shall then see how Natural Selection almost inevitably causes much Extinction of the less improved forms of life, and induces what I have called Divergence of Character. In the next chapter I shall discuss the complex and little known laws of variation and of correlation of growth.... No one ought to feel surprise at much remaining as yet unexplained in regard to the origin of species and varieties, if he makes due allowance for our profound ignorance in regard to the mutual relations of all the beings which live around us. Who can explain why one species ranges widely and is very numerous, and why another allied species has a narrow range and is rare? Yet these relations are of the highest importance, for they determine the present welfare, and, as I believe, the future success and modification of every inhabitant of this world. Still less do we know of the mutual relations of the innumerable inhabitants of the world during the many past geological epochs in its history. Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and dispassionate

- 111 judgement of which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertained—namely, that each species has been independently created—is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; but that those belonging to what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification. Darwin's discussion on the struggle for existence,was among his most controversial sections. A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly_ survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force _to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage. Although some species may be now increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would not hold them. There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate, that if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for his progeny... In looking at Nature, it is most necessary to keep the foregoing considerations always in mind—never to forget that every single organic being around us may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers; that each lives by a struggle at some period of its life; that heavy destruction inevitably falls either on the young or old, during each generation or at recurrent intervals. Lighten any check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number of the species will almost instantaneously increase to any amount. The face of Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force... Natural selection came to be a term used in many areas, and unsettled many in its assumption that nature is not always benign. If during the long course of ages and under varying conditions of life, organic beings vary at all in the several parts of their organisation, and I think this cannot be disputed; if there be, owing to the high

- 112 geometrical powers of increase of each species, at some age, season, or year, a severe struggle for life, and this certainly cannot be disputed; then, considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all organic beings to each other and to their conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think it would be a most extraordinary fact if no variation ever had occurred useful to each being's Rwn welfare, in the same way as so many variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised. This principle of preservation, I have called, for. the sake of brevity, Natural Selection. Natural selection, on the principle of qualities being inherited at corresponding ages, can modify the egg, seed, or young, as easily as the adult. Amongst many animals, sexual selection will give its aid to ordinary selection, by assuring to the most vigorous and fiest adapted males the greatest number of offspring. Sexual selection will also give characters useful to the males alone, in their struggles with other males. Whether natural selection has really thus acted in nature, in modifying and adapting the various forms of life to their several conditions and stations, must be judged of by the general tenour and balance of evidence given in the following chapters. But we already see how it entails extinction; and how largely extinction has acted_ in the._ world's history, geology plainly declares. Natural selection, also, leads to divergence of character; for more living beings can be supported on the same area the more they diverge in structure, habits, and constitution, of which we see proof by looking at the inhabitants of any small spot or at naturalised productions. Therefore during the modification of the descendants of any one species, and during the incessant struggle of all species to increase in numbers, the more diversified these descendants become, the better will be their chance of succeeding in the battle of life. Thus the small differences distinguishing varieties of the same species, will steadily tend to increase till they come to equal the greater differences between species of the same genus, or even of distinct genera... Darwin knew that he was changing things, that he was making a "revolution." When the views entertained in this volume on the origin of species, or when analogous views are generally admitted, we can dimly foresee that there will be a considerable revolution in natural history... A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will be opened, on the causes and laws of variation, on correlation of growth, on the effects of use and disuse, on the direct action of external conditions, and so forth...

- 113 In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history. Authors of the highest eminence seem to be fully satisfied with the view that each species has been independently created. To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the individual. When I view all beings not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled. Judging from the past, we may safely infer that not one living species will transmit its unaltered likeness to a distant futurity. And of the species now living very few will transmit progeny of any kind to a far distant futurity; for the manner in which all organic beings are grouped, shows that the greater number of species of each genus, and all the species of many genera, have left no descendants, but have become utterly extinct. We can so far take a prophetic glance into futurity as to fortell that it will be the common and widely-spread species, belonging to the larger and dominant groups, which will ultimately prevail and procreate new and dominant species. As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Silurian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of equally inappreciable length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection. It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.

- 114 While Darwin tried to steer clear of controversy surrounding theology and social systems, he followed The Origin of Species with another massive and important work in 1871, The Descent of Man. Here he speculated on human nature. ... The main conclusion here arrived at, and now held by many naturalists who are well competent to form a sound judgment, is that man is descended from some less highly organised form. The grounds upon which this conclusion rests will never be shaken, for the close similarity between man and the lower animals in embryonic development, as well as in innumerableints of structure and constitution, both of high and of the most trifling importance,—the rudiments which he retains, and the abnormal reversions to which he is occasionally liable, are facts which cannot be disputed. They have long been known, but until recently they told us nothing with respect to the origin of man. Now when viewed by the light of our knowledge of the whole organic world, their meaning is unmistakable. The great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm, when these groups or facts are considered in connection with others, such as the mutual affinities of the members of the same group, their geographical distribution in past and present times, and their geological succession. It is incredible that all these facts should speak falsely. He who is not content to look, like a savage, at the phenomena of nature as disconnected, cannot any longer believe that man is the work of a separate act of creation. He will be forced to admit that the close resemblance of the embryo of man to that, for instance of a dog—the construction of his skull, limbs and whole frame on the same plan with that of other mammals, independently of the uses to which the parts may be put—the occasional re-appearance of various structures, for instance of several muscles, which man does not normally possess, but which are common to the Quadrumana—and a crowd of analogous facts—all point in the plainest manner to the conclusion that ,lean is the co-descendant with other mammals of a common progenitor... The belief in God has often been advanced as not only the greatest, but the most complete of all the distinctions between man and the lower animals. It is however impossible, as we have seen, to maintain that this belief is innate or instinctive in man. On the other hand a belief in all-pervading spiritual agencies seems to be universal; and apparently follows from a considerable advance in man's reason, and from a still greater advance in his faculties of imagination, curiosity and wonder. I am aware that the assumed instinctive belief in God has been used by many persons as an argument for His existence. But this is a rash argument, as we should thus be compelled to believe in the existence of many cruel and malignant spirits, only a little more powerful than man; for the belief in them is far more general than in a beneficent Deity. The idea of a universal and beneficent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been elevated by long-continued culture.... I am aware that the conclusions arrived at in this work will be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but he who denounces them is bound to shew why it is more irreligious to explain the origin of man as a distinct species by descent from some lower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than to explain the birth of the individual

- 115 through the laws of ordinary reproduction. The birth both of the species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events, which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance. The understanding revolts at such a conclusion, whether or not we are able to believe that every slight variation of structure, the union of each pair in marriage,—the dissemination of each seed,—and other such events, have all been ordained for some special purpose.... The advancement of the welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem: all ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their children; for poverty is not only a great evil, but tends to its own increase by leading to recklessness in marriage. On the other hand, as Mr. Galton has remarked, if the prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless marry, the inferior members tend to supplant the better members of society. Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence consequent on his rapid multiplication; and if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men; and the most able should not be prevented by laws or customs from succeeding best and rearing the largest number of offspring. Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest part of man's nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, &c., than through natural selection; though to this latter agency may be safely attributed the social instincts, which afforded the basis for the development of moral sense. The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely, that man is descended from some lowly organised form, will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to many. But there can hardly be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians. The astonishment which I felt on first seeing a party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will never be forgotten by me, for the reflection at once rushed into my mind—such were our ancestors. These men were absolutely naked and bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled, their mouths, frothed with excitement, and their expression was wild, startled, and distrustful. They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild animals lived on what they could catch; they had no government, and were merciless to every one not of their own small tribe. He who has seen a savage in his native land will not feel much shame, if forced to acknowledge that the blood of some more humble creature flows in his veins. For my own part I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon, who descending from the mountains, carried away in triumph his young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs—as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, offers up bloody sacrifices, practises infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and is haunted by the grossest superstitutions.

- 116 Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of having been aboriginally placed there, may give him hope for a still higher destiny in the distant future. But we are not here concerned with hopes or fears, only with the truth as far as our reason permits us to discover it; and I have given the evidence to the best of my ability. We must, however, acknowledge, as it seems to me, that man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature, with his god-like intellect which has penetrated into the movements and constitution of the solar system—with all these exalted powers—Man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin. Source: Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, edited by J.W. Burrow (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 65, 66-69, 116-17, 119, 169-70, 455, 456, 458-60; Darwin, edited by Philip Appleman (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), pp. 264-65, 275-76.

- 117 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Fredrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Nietzsche, philosophy of From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Nietzsche is one of the most compelling and controversial philosophers of the Modern era, whose thought has had a profound effect on many post-Modern thinkers. Born in Saxony, Prussia, Nietzsche was raised in a devout Christian home. His father, a Lutheran minister, died when Nietzsche was five years old. Nietzsche attended the boarding school of Pforta where he studied religion, literature and classical languages, and philosophy. In 1864, Nietzsche attended the University of Bonn, and the next year, he transferred to the University of Leipzig, continuing his studies in classical philology. It was during his studies at the universities of Bonn and Leipzig that Nietzsche abandoned Christianity. Nietzsche was appointed to his only university post, as professor of classical philology at the University of Basel in Switzerland, at the age of 24, but he retired 10 years later due to ill health. For the next 10 years, Nietzsche wrote a large number of works, including Beyond Good and Evil (1886), On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), and Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883– 85), until becoming mentally ill. Nietzsche's writings explore the place of moral and aesthetic value in human existence through a merciless critique of Judeo-Christianity and traditional metaphysics captured in the phrase "God is dead." Nietzsche's philosophy is notoriously difficult and often misunderstood. With respect to questions of knowledge, Nietzsche believed that truths are the artificial results of creative acts of interpretation, and not natural essences or objective facts that exist apart from interpretation. Consequently, knowledge can never be impartial because it is always constructed from some particular point of view. Nevertheless, Nietzsche did not adhere to a simple relativism that all interpretations are equally good. Even though knowledge is the product of certain interpretations of reality, Nietzsche argued that some points of view or interpretations are more valuable than others. In particular, those interpretations that promote what Nietzsche called the will to power—the universal venting of life and the basic drive of individuals to control their own intentions and actions—have more value for human existence than interpretations that inhibit will to power. In Nietzsche's view, values reflect the different capabilities of individuals to exert their force or power toward some goal, expressed in different moral codes.

- 118 Nietzsche argued that Christian morality represents a "slave" or "herd" morality that is destroying the health and strength of humanity in general and of noble persons or "free spirits" in particular. Noble types exhibit a "master" morality that celebrates powerful, aristocratic individuals and the virtues of strength, courage, individuality, and risk-taking; slave morality, however, esteems the common person and the virtues of humility, meekness, self-denial, and prudence. Master morality is characterized by the act of self-affirmation, and slave morality is characterized by the act of other-negation, driven by resentment of the free and powerful. Parts of Nazi ideology were thought to be influenced by the ideas of will to power and master morality. Historically, Nietzsche suggested, slave morality has become the dominant value system with the result that society now valorizes sameness and obedience and condemns difference and independence. Nietzsche therefore believed that Christian morality takes on a secular form in the leveling ideologies of egalitarianism and democracy. He contended that the modern notions of equal worth and equal rights are signs of mass weakness, generated by fear of naturally superior individuals. Modern democratic societies, he believed, have developed out of the triumph of slave morality in its struggle against the master morality. According to Nietzsche's metaphysics, however, the struggle of the common person against the aristocratic person is also a struggle against life itself. For Nietzsche, inequality is an inherent phenomenon of life, and inequality should be allowed to thrive between humans because some are superior and others are inferior. In Nietzsche's view, the democratic denial of inequality has led to a progressive degeneration of human excellence. In response, Nietzsche recommended the disciplined pursuit of an individual self-creation that transcended the norms of conventional morality. Text Citation: Sheldon, Garrett Ward. "Nietzsche, philosophy of." Encyclopedia of Political Thought. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2001. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc. Nietzsche, Friedrich From: Germany: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present, European Nations. Friedrich Nietzsche was an important critic of German society, culture, and politics. He was opposed to the contemporary systematic philosophy of his time. A profoundly critical genius, he led a radical revolt against the values and traditions of Western civilization and Christianity. He believed that the vital forces of Western civilization had become so weakened in the 19th century that traditional values had lost their validity ("God is dead"), which left man to face a decadent and meaningless world ("nihilism"). Nietzsche sought to solve this problem and the dangers in himself by preaching a new gospel. Man must create his own values, using his will for self-conquest, which meant not so much a "superman," but an overcomer, as critic Walter Kaufmann prefers, an overman. For Nietzsche, the individual's faithfulness to himself and self-

- 119 realization alone mattered, which was to be accomplished through overcoming and self-discipline. Nietzsche was severely critical of German society. He feared that Germans would become infatuated with their military victory over the French in 1871. He considered it an illusion that the German victory was due to the superiority of German culture, an idea he thought threatened the health of the German mind in favor of the German Empire. Nietzsche never equated, as did most German scholars and writers, cultural creativity and military power. Although he had praised Otto von Bismarck for his victory over the Austrians for leadership in Germany, he severely criticized Bismarck for his policies in the 1870s. Nietzsche distrusted the state and rejected German nationalism. He had contempt for the use of force and condemned the armaments race in which Germany was involved, which proved his independence from an age in which the cult of violence was rapidly spreading. He praised French civilization as superior to German culture and criticized the philistinism of the German middle class. As for the idea that the materialistic worldview of modern science was the only acceptable one, Nietzsche countered that it was "stupid and naive." In all of his works Nietzsche tried to provide a new meaning for existence in a world interpreted by Darwinian evolutionary theory, which he believed had destroyed the foundation for human dignity. Humankind could no longer be seen as created in the image of God but was a product of chance in nature, a creature without purpose or value. If life had no meaning in itself, then Nietzsche believed, humanity had to create meaning so as not to decline into nihilism and ultimately barbarity. He critiqued the traditional values of Western civilization found in Judaism and Christianity in A Genealogy of Morals (1887), and in The Antichrist (1888) he sought to help Europeans create a new set of values. These he found in the idea of "the will to power" through which humans can dominate and master themselves. He offered a concept of overcoming self by which the ideal person, a "superman," or perhaps better, an "overman," masters existence, orders passions, and forms character. The person of this ideal world would create a personal standard of value. Christianity's denial of self he considered to be prideful and constituted a "slave morality." To the contrary, Nietzsche proposed self-assertion and the elimination of the consciousness of guilt. Text Citation: Biesinger, Joseph A. "Nietzsche, Friedrich." Germany: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present, European Nations. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2006. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 120 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Fredrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Rejecting both traditional religion and modern science as the bases of truth and meaning, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) demanded that philosophy in the West open itself to different ideas. He emphasized myth, art, and individual will, as he abandoned much of the inherited philosophical tradition from the ancient world and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Nietzsche found contemporary morality to be limiting to human potential. He praised the superior individual, disliked democracy and nationalism, and challenged the validity of the Christian conception of the deity. His work, a sometimes startling probe into all that was human, introduced much that became characteristic of the twentieth century. In Beyond Good and Evil (1885), Nietzsche turned around the usual conceptions of truth and falsehood, philosophy and dogma. The falseness of a given judgment does not constitute an objection against it, so far as we are concerned. It is perhaps in this respect that our new language sounds strangest. The real question is how far a judgment furthers and maintains life, preserves a given type, possibly cultivates and trains a given type. We are, in fact, fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest judgments are the most indispensable to us, that man cannot live without accepting the logical fictions as valid, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the absolute, the immutable, without constantly falsifying the world by means of numeration. That getting along without false judgments would amount to getting along without life, negating life. To admit untruth as a necessary condition of life: this implies, to be sure, a perilous resistance against customary value-feelings. A philosophy that risks it nonetheless, if it did nothing else, would by this alone have taken its stand beyond good and evil. What tempts us to look at all philosophers half suspiciously and half mockingly is not so much that we recognize again and again how innocent they are, how often and how easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short their childishness and childlike-ness—but rather that they are not sufficiently candid, though they make a great virtuous noisy to-do as soon as the problem of truthfulness is even remotely touched upon. Every one of them pretends that he has discovered and reached his__opinions through the self-development of cold pure divinely untroubled dialectic (in distinction to the mystics of every rank who, more honest and fatuous, talk about "inspiration"), whereas, at bottom, a pre-conceived dogma, a notion, an "institution," or mostly a heart's desire,

- 121 made abstractand refined, is defended by them with arguments sought after the fact. They are all of them lawyers (though wanting to be called anything but that), and for the most part quite sly fenders._of-.their prejudices which they- christen "truths"—very far removed they are from the courageous conscience which admits precisely this; .. . One must test oneself to see if one is meant for independence and for command. And one must do it at the right time. Never avoid your tests, though they may be the most dangerous game you can play, and in the end are merely tests at which you are the only witness and the sole judge. Never remain tied up with a person—not even the most beloved. Every pers"mi is a prison and a tight corner. Never remain tied up with a fatherland—not even when it most suffers and needs help (it is somewhat less difficult to untie one's heart for a victorious fatherland). Never remain tied-up_with._.compassion—not even compassion for a superior human being into whose rare torture and helplessness chance has given us an insight. Nor with a science, not even if it lures us with the most precious findings that seem to have been stored up for us alone. Never remain tied up with our own emancipation, that delicious bird-like distance and strangeness which soars ever higher and sees more and more spread out below; the danger of things that fly. Nor with our own virtues which would sacrifice the whole of us to some one thing, to our hospitality, for example. This is the danger of dangers to superior and lavish souls who spend themselves extravagantly and almost indifferently, turning the virtue of liberality into a vice. One must kmQw to conserve oneself. That is the most rigorous test of independence. A new species of philosopher is coming up over the horizon. I risk baptizing them with a name that is not devoid of peril. As I read them (as they allow themselves to be read—for it is characteristic of their type that they wish to remain riddles in some sense), these philosophers of the future have a right (perhaps also a wrong!) to be called: Experimenters. This name itself is only an experiment, and, if you will, a temptation. Will they be new friends of "truth," these coming philosophers? Most probably, for all philosophers thus far have loved their truths. But surely they will not be dogmatists. It must run counter to their pride and their taste that their truth should be a truth for everyman, this having been the secret wish and ultimate motive of all dogmatic striving. "My judgment is my judgment, to which hardly anyone else has a right," is what the philosopher of the future will say. One must get rid of the bad taste of wishing to agree with many others. "Good" is no longer good in the mouth of my neighbor. And how could there be a "common good"! The expression contradicts itself: what can be common cannot have much value. In the end it must be as it always was: great things remain for the great; abysses for the deep; delicacies and tremors for the subtle; and, all in all, all things rare for the rare!—. . Nietzsche attacked democracy and nationalism. Call it "civilization" or "humanization" or "progress"—this present-day distinction which is being sought for Europeans; or call it simply, without praise or blame, by its political formula: the democratic

- 122 movement in Europe. Behind all the moral and political foregrounds which such formulas designate, there is going on an immense physiological process whose current is running strong. The process_ of the mutual assimilation of Europeans, their growing separation from the conditions which give rise to climatically determined and caste-bound races, their increasing independence of any definite milieu that would seek to inscribe itself on their bodies and souls with centuries of unvarying demands. In other words, the gradual appearance of an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of human being who, physiologically speaking, has a maximum of adaptability as his typical excellence. This process of the "European in progress" might be slowed up by some great relapses, but it would more Tffan gain in vehemence and depth what it might lose in time. The still raging storm and stress of "national. feelings" is one of these forces, likewise the presently emerging anarchism. The whole process will probably end with results least expected by its naive furtherers and admirers, the apostles of "modern ideas." The same new conditions which will, on the average, bring about an equalization and mediocritization of man, a useful, hardworking, adaptable herd-animal of many uses, are also disposed in the highest degree to the creation of exceptional men of most dangerous and fascinating quality. For while the adaptability which is constantly tested in changing conditions and which begins its work anew with each generation, almost with each decade, offers no possibility for a powerful type; while the total impression that these future Europeans will make will probably be one of manifold, gossipy, willpower-poor and extremely employable workers who need a boss, a master who gives. them commands, as they need their daily bread; while in other words, the democratization of Europe will amount to the creation of a type prepared in the subtlest sense for slavery—the individual, meanwhile, the exceptional, case, the strongman, will turn out to be sir ger and richer than he has probably ever been, thanks to the lack of prejudice in his schooling, thanks to the enormous varied practice he can get in skills and disguises. I meant to say that the democratization of EurODe isat the same time an involuntary arrangement for the training of tyrants—taking the word in every sense, including its most intellectual.... Conventional morality and religion were challenged through the image of Dionysos, a Greek god of fertility and wine, who was associated with dancing, ecstasy, and the abandonment of rational limits. As for morality, on the other hand, could it be anything but a will to deny life, a secret instinct of destruction, a principle of calumny, a reductive agent- the beginning of the end?—and, for that very reason, the Supreme Danger? Thus it happened that in those days, with this problem book, my vital instincts turned against, ethics and founded a radical counterdoctrine, slanted esthetically, to oppose the Christian libel on life. But it still wanted a name. Being a philologist, that is to say a man of words, I christened it rather arbitrarily—for who can tell the real name of the Antichrist?—with the name of a Greek god, Dionysos...

- 123 The "ascetic" ideal, one of self-sacrifice and giving up one's own will, was challenged by Nietzsche in one of his last major works, The Genealogy of Morals (1887). Until the adventrof the ascetic ideal, man, the animal man, had no meaning at all on this earth. His existence was aimless; the question, "Why is there such a thing as man?" could not have been answered; man willed neither himself nor the world. Behind every great human destiny there rang, like a refrain, an even greater "In vain!" Man knew that something was ,lacking; a great vacuum surrounded him. He did not know how to justify, to explain, to affirm himself. His own meaning was an unsolved problem and made him suffer. He also suffered in other respects, being altogether an ailing animal, yet what bothered him was not his suffering but his inability to answer the question "What is the meaning of my trouble?" Man, the most courageous animal, and the most inured to trouble, does not deny suffering per se: he wants it, he seeks it out, provided that it can be given a meaning. Finally the ascetic ideal arose to give it meaning—its only meaning, so far. But any meaning is better than none and, in fact, the ascetic ideal has been the best stopgap that ever existed. Suffering had been interpreted, the door to all suicidal nihilism slammed shut. No doubt that interpretation brought new suffering in its wake, deeper, more inward, more poisonous suffering: it placed all suffering under the perspective of guilt.... All the same, man had saved himself, he had achieved a meaning, he was no longer a leaf in the wind, a plaything of circumstances, of "crass casualty": he was now able to will something—no matter the object or the instrument of his willing; the will itself had been saved. We can no longer conceal from ourselves what exactly it is that this whole process of willing, inspired by the ascetic ideal, signifies—this hatred of humanity, of animality, of inert matter; this loathing of the senses, of reason even; this fear of beauty and happiness this longing to escape from illusion, change, becoming, death, and from longing itself. It signifies, let us have the courage to face it, a will to nothingness, a revulsion from life, a rebellion against the principal conditions of living. And yet, despite everything, it is and remains a will. Let me repeat, now that I have reached the end, what I said at the beginning: man would sooner have the void for his purpose than be void of purpose.... Sources: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), pp. 4-5, 47-49, 174-75; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy [and] The Genealogy of Morals (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 11, 298-99.

- 124 CHY4U – The West & the World – Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for A’s Title Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements:     Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings  Inferences (reading between the lines)  Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that you already know something about).  Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.