WITHOUT PREJUDICE Mr Tony Abbott MP 5 Tony, 10 Whereas a marriage is to be between a man and a woman the question now is what

constitutes to be a male and what constitutes to be a woman and what constitutes to be a non specific gender/sex? What constitutes a "sex affirmation procedure"? What constitutes a person's sex may be indeterminate.? And one has to concern one selves also with the statement by the court The material before the Registrar (and the Tribunal) was to the effect that the sex affirmation procedure had not eliminated the ambiguities relating to Norrie's sex.? It is now that the reproductive organs and the genitals of a person are irrelevant as only the alleged mental perception of the person now decides what a person might be from time to time? So, a person ordinary a male in every sense merely have to assume the mental framework of being a non-specific gender person and that is it? A female may ordinary have all female biological organs and physics in every sense merely have to assume the mental framework of being a non-specific gender person and that is it? Or just hold the view to be a male and that constitutes to be a female? What about if the person holds the view to be some super human being or some creator or alien from outer space, is the Registrar of a court than required to register this person making the claim as being an alien of outer space or being say the creator of all human being? What legal status can be ascertained by this? While the N.S.W. legislation appears to prohibit a person in a marriage to undergo a sex affirmation procedure the Norrie case rather indicates that even with the sex affirmation procedure the person still somehow had not at all confirmed the sex what was supposed to have been the aim but that because of the mental perceptions of Norrie the sex was not affirmed. As such, the sex affirmation procedure cannot be deemed to be a critical issue to determine a persons gender or non-specific gender. In my view there is a critical defect in the purported sex affirmation procedure if it fails to accomplish what was set out to be achieved. Why did the experts involved to justify any medical procedure for a sex affirmation procedure not detect what really was within the perceptions/mind, etc, of Norrie? What now appears to me is that Norrie has male reproduction p\organs and female genitals and the court refer to being in an indeterminate status. Obviously without female organs Norrie can never become a female in the biological sense. Nor can a female become a male lacking the male reproduction system even if the medical profession create from skin a male genital. What this essential provides for now is that people may undergo a sex affirmation procedure to affirm what, a non-specific gender? Surely that never was the intention of the sex affirmation procedure was set out to achieve. The word affirmation I view specifically is that it is to
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Tony.Abbott.MP@aph.gov.au, info@pm.gov.au
20140412-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Norrie HCA-marriage and non-specific gender - etc

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affirm something that was deemed to exist all along. So, the so to say shrinks who are involved in justifying a sex affirmation procedure clear got it utterly wrong. We had the 60Minutes television program that reported about a male desiring to become and known as a female and underwent certain surgery and was given female hormones. Then some time down the line 60 minutes provided an update that this alleged female now was back showing a beard and wanting to be a male and not a :female. As such the shrinks involved in the sex affirmation procedure had it really utterly wrong. What astounded me was the lack of any principle legal concepts referred to by the High court of Australia in its Norrie decision as to establish if a person is a male, female or a non-specific gender/sex. We have that municipal councils provide exclusive women swimming time at council pools where women are following Islamic religious customs. Whit a person like Norrie then No0rrie could nevertheless go in the pool exclusively provided for women. And Norrie could go into the male changing rooms also. As I indicated in my previous writings, a male is a he/him and a female is her/she and I view a non-specific gender can be neither and so is an it. To hold that a non-specific gender can referred to as he/him or female is her/she makes a mockery of the non-specific gender. As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I have the view that the Commonwealth of Australia would have legislative powers to deal with this matter;
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention) QUOTE Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their own territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except that which is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given. END QUOTE

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The commonwealth of Australia is clearly empowers to provide for passports of citizens to travel abroad. The States cannot interfere with this constitutional legislative powers. Hence, no matter what the N.S.W. registrar may be directed by the High court of Australia to register, the Commonwealth of Australia is in that regard above the N.S.W. legislative powers. Therefore when it comes to passports and marriage, etc, the Commonwealth of Australia would have legislative powers to determine what constitute legally a status of a male, female and if there is such a thing as a non-specific gender/sex. We must however also acknowledge that at times a child may be born of which the genitals are not properly developed or at all. It may not be in the interest of the child to immediately demand the child be assigned a certain sexual organ (genitals) and so the Commonwealth could legislate that a child may be held to be of a non-specific gender until the childs biological status has been appropriately ascertained by what reproductive organs are within the child. As such the Commonwealth of Australia may limit the usage of a persons status as a nonspecific gender/sex for say a period of 2 years, this as to prevent a misuse of this period as to allow it to go on for unlimited time. In my view it would be essential that no child while having a status of being of a non-specific gender/sex. This I view is essential for example as to avoid any child to be ending up in prison while traveling overseas for merely entering a toilet that may be of a designated gender. Not every country may support what alternative or other statuses the Commonwealth of Australia may provide for. And, the Commonwealth could limit problems by making clear that the person designated for the time being as non-specific gender/sex however is considered to be a male or a female. This, so the person can perhaps travel overseas and use toilets confirming the usage as provided for in the passport.
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The problem we seem to have is that being of a non-specific: gender/.sex appears considering the Norries case to be now based upon nothing else but what the mental perception might be of the person concerned. This is extremely problematic. We have for example sports such as the Olympics. Are we not going to have a person with male masculine features to proclaim to be a non-specific gender/sex or to be a female and then being able to complete in female sport? It is well known that the game standards for males and females are different in golf. If we were to apply the Norrie principle then a male golfer merely has to mentally assume to be a female and then can play as a female in a female competition. In my view this kind of mental perception is hilarious and absurd. We must have appropriate legal standards to what constitute to be a male or a female or non-specific gender/sex. If anything the Norrie case has now exposed the fraud within the so called sex affirmation procedure industry, as clearly it didnt affirm anything, to the contrary it changed in this case a male to an non-specific gender./sex. Taxpayers should not have to feed the abuse of taxpayers monies to create what may be held by many to be biological freaks. Medicare should not fund such purported sex affirmation procedure where in the end it affirms nothing as in the end the mental status of the subject seems to determine what the gender/sex is or may not be at all. While the States may have legislative powers to determine the registration of births, deaths and marriages, in the end it cannot override the commonwealth legislative powers to determine what constitutes to be a male, female or a non-specific gender/sex. As I understand it the specialist and medical team involved in the sex affirmation procedure all seemed to rely upon the mental status of Norrie to change the male genitals to female genitals as this somehow was to change Norrie from a male to a female but then Norrie claims not to have the mental perception to be either a male or a female and so claimed to be a non specific gender/sex. In my view the Commonwealth of Australia ought to appeal the Norrie decision, this as none of the judges appeared to have considered how any decision by the court could upset the social status and social application of so called non-specific gender/sex. . QUOTE Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 582 (per Griffith C.J.)
That case (a previous decision of the High Court, Foggit, Jones & Co v NSW (1915) 21 CLR 357) was very briefly, and I regret to say, insufficiently argued and considered on the last day of the Sydney sitting..... The arguments which now commend themselves to me as conclusive did not find entrance to my mind. In my judgment that case was wrongly decided, and should be overruled. END QUOTE

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40 In my view, the Court failed to set out in its reason of judgment, and I view this omission was an error in law, what it held constituted a status of non-specific gender/sex. It is in my view merely social engineering by the court to somehow create a new kind of gender/sex or non-existing sex/gender without stating what principles it relied upon to establish 45 in law why Norrie was neither a male or as female. This is a backdoor manner to legislate by the Court, a reported Mason CJ conduct. The Court must remain impartial and couldnt accept a non-specific gender/sex without setting out under what special conditions, including biological relevant issues, a person could be deemed to be a non-specific gender/sex. 50 We have elected representatives to the parliament who are to express the intentions and the views of those they represent in legislative provisions within the ambit of constitutional provided
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legislative powers. Where then the legislators didnt provide for a non-specific gender/sex as no definition existed to establish a person to be a non-specific gender/sex then I view the court crossed the separation of powers and was not adjudicating but purported to legislate or use their judgment to legislate. Basically it was a gross abuse and misuse of judicial powers. While the Court did refer to that the N.S.W. legislation allowed for indeterminate registration it failed (again) to set out what in legal terms constituted a person to be in an indeterminate status. One may hold that when a male person undergoes a sex affirmation procedure to remove the male genitals and create a female genital then this person may be held to be in an indeterminate situation during the sex affirmation procedure being conducted. However, no one in his/her right mind would hold that while this sex affirmation procedure is being conducted someone then quickly goes to the Registrar to amend the registration from male to non-specific gender/sex. My concern is that those involved with the purported sex affirmation procedure may making a clear error of judgment in regard of Norrie, being an adult, then hardly can be trusted to know when it comes to an under aged person. Again, the 60 Minutes reported case underlines this. In my view all and any sex affirmation procedure must immediately stopped to go ahead as taxpayers also are entitled to know if this alleged sex affirmation procedure is actually to affirm some sex/gender or merely an abuse of taxpayers monies be used so to say to create so to say Franken stein monsters, etc. If the court were to hold that the mental perception of a person determines the sex/gender or the lack thereof then people can instantly change their sex/gender status pending then consider the following;
PROSECUTOR: Is it correct that you entered last Friday a female locker room? PROSECUTOR: Is it correct that you are a male? DEFENDANT: Yes. PROSECUTOR: What is your excuse as a male to enter a female locker room? DEFENDANT: I didnt. PROSECUTOR: You didnt enter the locker room, are you changing your evidence you gave earlier? DEFENDANT: I entered the female locker room as a female. PROSECUTOR: May I ask you inform this court how you became a female? DEFENDANT: I rely upon the Norrie case where as I understand it one merely has the mental conception to be of a certain sex or not being of a certain sex and the court then accept this. PROSECUTOR: Did you undergo any medical procedure to alter you from a male to a female? DEFENDANT: I understand from the Norrie case this is irrelevant, all one need to do is to have a certain status of the mind and that determines if a person then is a male, female or of a non-specific gender/sex. PROSECUTOR: And your status of mind was at the time of entering the female locker room? DEFENDANT: I had the status of female in my mind and so was entitled to enter the female changing room. PROSECUTOR: Did you register this with the Registrar of birth, deaths and Marriage? DEFENDANT: I am not aware that the Registrar determines the legal sex/gender status of any person. The Registrar merely records what the person may claim at the time of the registration. PROSECUTOR: And when did you consider in your mind to be a male again? DEFENDANT: I saw those fed bodies and got scared to death that I didnt want to end up like that and left then quickly and once I was outside the female locker room I realized I had the mental perception to be a male again. PROSECUTOR: If you were scared about what you had seen why then did you enter the female changing room then the following day. And is it correct that the police removed you upon complaints of the women concerned? DEFENDANT: I entered the female locker room because my mental status was again to be a woman and the bodies I saw of the women surely confirmed this to be glad to be a woman. Just that the women didnt like that I was in the female locker room and called the police. The Police refused to accept that I had the mental status to be a female and removed me and charged me. PROSECUTOR: So the police removed you?

25 DEFENDANT: Yes.

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DEFENDANT: Yes they did. They didnt accept that my mental status determines if I am a male, female or nonspecific sex. Their argument was that as I had male genitals then I was deemed to be a male regardless if I had a mental perception of being a female. PROSECUTOR: Can you inform the court as to how do you change your mental status to being a male, female or of a non-specific gender? DEFENDANT: I cannot explain this as it just happens to come up. When I come near women playing golf I just feel to be a woman and so start playing golf with them. PROSECUTOR: It is correct that you entered last Saturday the female toilets of the primary school and the girls run out of their toilets afraid of you? DEFENDANT: I was entering the toilet as a female as I was having the mental perception I was a female. Just that the girls didnt seem to accept me as a female. PROSECUTOR: Do you know what legally defines a female? JUDGE: Mr Prosecutor, I cannot allow this question and the accused doesn t have to respond to this. If you have an issue that the accused was not a female at each time the accused entered a female changing room then you have the onus to prove the accused was not a female. How do you contemplate to prove what was essential a status of the mind of the accused at each time of an incident? PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, surely this Honourable Court cannot accept that the mental status of a person determines the person to be a male, female or of a non-specific gender/sex? The accused is registered as a male. JUDGE: So was Norrie and the High Court of Australia nevertheless held that despite a sex affirmation procedure Norrie still was neither a male or a female and so was of no specific gender/sex, this even so Norrie was born with male reproduction organs. As such, unless you can establish the mental status of the accused not being that of a female, I am afraid you have no case. PROSECUTOR: In the circumstances I seek to withdraw the charges without prejudice. JUDGE: I am not prepared to do so without prejudice. The accused appeared and is entitled to a judgment in his favour where you obviously cannot prove any legal standards what constitute a person to be a male, female or of a non-specific gender/sex. I dismiss the case with cost against the State. The Defendant is free to go.

30 Pedophiles will enjoy this kind of mental status as what stops them to claim that at the time accused of unlawfully interfering with a child they themselves held to be :mentally to be a child of say 10 years old. What the High Court of Australia so to say did was to open a Pandora Box or a can of worms where whatever the mental status of a person may have been at the time will be 35 what may or may not determine the persons conduct to be lawful or not. No longer can a person be held liable as a male procuring a girl for sex, because the male may claim to have the mental perception of being a female. Even to the question of a male raping a female it may be argued that the male had the mental perception of being a female and in defiance to her perceptions the male organ nevertheless pursued an intercourse with the other 40 female. If we go any further the purported female with male organs then can blame the victim for causing this fatal attraction to the male organs of this purported female. We are so to say on a slippery slope that demand we get the Norrie judgment overturned and based judgments upon realistic legal principles. We must have legal standards to establish when is a person deemed to be a male, female or a Non-specific gender/sex. 45 When a person having male reproduction organs and male genitals can claim nevertheless to be a woman in mind, and then upon that mental perception claim can obtain a sex affirmation procedure (that actually is an oxymoron as it establish nothing) even so the person has no female reproduction organs and no female genitals, etc, and must rely upon injection of female 50 hormones, then what is really being accomplished one may ask. As such, in the case of Norrie it cannot be questioned that Norrie become an it a nongender/sex person not having all relevant male items and neither all female items to enable to claim to be either male or female and so ended up with becoming a non-specific gender/sex. The same might be claimed with females undergoing a sex affirmation procedure to become a 55 male without ever being able to have male reproduction organs.
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While the medical profession may enjoy experiments with the human race and perhaps like to construct, if not already done so, a half man-beast in the end the question must be ask should taxpayers monies be squandered on these kind of experiments at the cost of the sanity of their victims? 5 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2014/11.html
NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 (2 April 2014) Last Updated: 2 April 2014 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ NSW REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND MARRIAGES APPELLANT AND

15 NORRIE RESPONDENT

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NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 2 April 2014 S273/2013

ORDER

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1. Set aside paragraph 3(b) of the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 14 June 2013 and, in its place, order that the respondent's applications dated 26 November 2009 be remitted to the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court. 2. Appeal otherwise dismissed. 3. Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.

30 On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation J K Kirk SC with K M Richardson for the appellant (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW)) D M J Bennett QC with A J Abadee for the respondent (instructed by DLA Piper Australia) K L Walker with E A Bennett for A Gender Agenda Inc, as amicus curiae (instructed by Human Rights Law Centre)

35 Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the
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CATCHWORDS NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie Statutes Interpretation Registrar's power to register a "change of sex" under Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) Respondent underwent sex affirmation procedure Respondent applied for registration of change of sex under Act Whether Registrar has power to register change of sex to "non-specific". Words and phrases "change of sex". Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), ss 32A, 32DA, 32DB, 32DC, 32J.

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1. FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ. Not all human beings can be classified by sex as either male or female[1]. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) ("the Act") expressly recognises that a person's sex may be ambiguous[2]. It also recognises that a person's sex may be sufficiently important to the individual concerned to warrant that person undergoing a sex affirmation procedure to assist that person "to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex" [3]. When a person has undergone a sex affirmation procedure, s 32DC of the Act empowers the Registrar to register a change of sex of the person upon an application by that person. 2. The question in this appeal is whether it was within the Registrar's power to record in the Register that the sex of the respondent, Norrie[4], was, as she said in her application, "non-specific". That question should be answered in the affirmative. 3. It is convenient to begin an explanation of the reasons why that is so by referring to the material provisions of the Act while summarising the circumstances of Norrie's application to the Registrar. The Act and the application 4. The Act provides for the registration of births, deaths and marriages. Section 6 of the Act provides that the Registrar is to "establish and maintain the registers necessary for the purposes of this Act". 5. The objects of the Act, stated in s 3, include "the recording of changes of sex". Pursuant to s 43(1) of the Act, the Registrar must maintain a register of "registrable events". Section 4(1) provides that a change of sex is a registrable event. 6. The provisions of the Act relating to the registration of a change of sex are contained in Pt 5A. They are engaged by an application made by an adult or, in respect of a child, by its parent or guardian. Part 5A of the Act was inserted by the Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act 1996 (NSW) ("the 1996 Amending Act"). The 1996 Amending Act made provision for the alteration of the Register to record a change of sex in the case of persons born in New South Wales[5]. 7. The Act was further amended by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (NSW) to address the situation of people who were not born in New South Wales. This amendment added ss 32DA to 32DD and s 32J to Pt 5A of the Act. This case concerns an application made under these provisions. 8. Section 32DA provides that a person whose birth was not registered in New South Wales may apply to register that person's sex. Sub-section (1) is in the following terms: "(1) A person who is 18 or above: (a) who is an Australian citizen or permanent resident of Australia, and (b) who lives, and has lived for at least one year, in New South Wales, and (c) who has undergone a sex affirmation procedure, and (d) who is not married, and (e) whose birth is not registered under this Act or a corresponding law , may apply to the Registrar, in a form approved by the Registrar, for the registration of the person's sex in the Register." 9. Norrie was born in Scotland with male reproductive organs. In 1989 she underwent a "sex affirmation procedure". 10. A sex affirmation procedure is defined in s 32A as: "a surgical procedure involving the alteration of a person's reproductive organs carried out: p7 12-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

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(a) for the purpose of assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex, or (b) to correct or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person. " 11. Norrie considered that the surgery did not resolve her sexual ambiguity. She applied on 26 November 2009 for her sex to be registered under the Act as " non-specific". 12. Section 32DB of the Act requires that an application under s 32DA be accompanied by: "statutory declarations by 2 doctors, or by 2 medical practitioners ... verifying that the person the subject of the application has undergone a sex affirmation procedure". 13. In conformity with s 32DB, Norrie's application was accompanied by statutory declarations from two medical practitioners. Each medical practitioner stated that Norrie had undergone a sex affirmation procedure. Each also stated, in a pro forma sentence in the declaration, that he supported the application of Norrie to have her birth record altered showing the sex now to be non-specific. Despite the provision in the statutory declaration for a statement of support, it had no apparent statutory significance as it was neither required nor provided for by the Act or the regulations made under the Act. 14. Section 32DC of the Act provides for the determination of an application under s 32DA in the following terms: "(1) The Registrar is to determine an application under section 32DA by registering the person's change of sex or refusing to register the person's change of sex. (2) Before registering a person's change of sex, the Registrar may require the applicant to provide such particulars relating to the change of sex as may be prescribed by the regulations. (3) A registration of a person's change of sex must not be made if the person is married." 15. Four points should be noted in respect of these provisions. First, a sex affirmation procedure is defined by reference to its purpose, not its outcome. Section 32DA(1)(c) does not refer to a "successful" sex affirmation procedure. 16. Secondly, the function of the Registrar is principally that of recording in the Register information provided by members of the community. Section 32DB makes express provision for the verification of an aspect of the information to be provided. Further, s 32DC(1) confers a limited and specific decision-making power on the Registrar. While the Registrar may require such particulars "relating to the change of sex as may be prescribed by the regulations", neither the Act nor the regulations suggest that the Registrar's function extends to the making of any moral or social judgments; it certainly does not extend to the resolution of medical questions or the formation of a view about the outcome of a sex affirmation procedure. 17. Thirdly, s 32DA is headed " Application to register change of sex"; but s 32DA(1) expressly authorises an application by a person "for the registration of the person's sex" rather than "a change of sex". Further, the modes of determination of an application under s 32DA provided by s 32DC, which involve either registration or refusal of registration of a " change of sex", are not precisely congruent with the express terms of s 32DA(1). It is tolerably clear, however, and it was not disputed, that s 32DC speaks of the registration of, or refusal to register, a " person's change of sex" on the basis of a legislative assumption that this first registration in New South Wales of an applicant's sex may differ from an earlier record (made outside New South Wales) of that person's sex. On that basis, an application under s 32DA for the registration of the sex of a person for the first time in New South Wales falls to be determined under s 32DC by a registration of, or a refusal to register, the person's change of sex. 18. Fourthly, the 1996 Amending Act, which introduced Pt 5A (but not including ss 32DA to 32DD and s 32J) into the Act, also amended the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) by adding to that Act definitions of "recognised transgender person" (a person "the record of whose sex is altered under Part 5A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995") and "transgender person" (which is defined to include a person "who, being of indeterminate sex, identifies as a member of a particular sex by living as a member of that sex"). These definitions in the 1996 Amending Act are part of the context in which Pt 5A of the Act was enacted. Accordingly, the provisions of Pt 5A are to be applied in a context of express legislative recognition of the existence of persons of "indeterminate sex". 19. Section 32J of the Act provides that registration of a person's sex under Pt 5A is effective to deem the person to be of that sex. Importantly, it has that effect subject to other New South Wales laws. It relevantly provides: "(1) A person the record of whose sex is registered under this Part is, for the purposes of, but subject to, any law of New South Wales, a person of the sex so registered. p8 12-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

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(2) A person to whom an interstate recognised details certificate relates is, for the purposes of, but subject to, any law of New South Wales, a person of the sex stated in the certificate." (emphasis added) The Registrar's decision 20. In response to Norrie's application, the Registrar wrote to her on 24 February 2010 approving her application. The Registrar also approved an application by Norrie for the registration of a change of name. The letter of 24 February attached a "Recognised Details (Change of Sex) Certificate" and a Change of Name Certificate, each of which recorded Norrie's sex as "not specified". Later, the Registrar wrote to Norrie again, this time advising her that the Recognised Details (Change of Sex) Certificate was invalid. Norrie's Change of Name Certificate was re-issued recording Norrie's sex as "not stated". 21. Norrie lodged an application for review of the Registrar's decision in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales ("the Tribunal"). The course of proceedings The Tribunal 22. The issue before the Tribunal was whether it was open to the Registrar under s 32DC of the Act to register an applicant's sex as "non-specific". The Registrar argued that his powers were confined to registering a person's sex as either "male" or "female" [6]. 23. The Tribunal found that, as a matter of fact, Norrie does not identify as male or female, but as "non-specific"[7], and that she considers that identifying herself as male or female would be a false statement[8]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that it was not open to the Registrar to register her sex as "non-specific"[9]. In this regard, the Tribunal proceeded on the footing that "the Act is predicated on an assumption that all people can be classified into two distinct and plainly identifiable sexes, male and female ... [T]he Registrar does not have the power under section 32DC of the Act to register a change of sex by a person to 'Non specific'"[10]. 24. Norrie appealed to the appeal panel of the Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal[11].

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25 The Court of Appeal

25. Norrie appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, which allowed her appeal and ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be set aside and that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for determination[12]. 26. The Court of Appeal remitted the matter to the Tribunal because it held that the Act contemplated that Norrie might be assigned to a specific category of sex other than male or female such as " intersex", "transgender" or "androgynous"[13]. Whether the Tribunal should take that course was a matter which would depend upon findings of fact which had not yet been made as to Norrie's specific sex classification[14]. 27. The Registrar appealed to this Court pursuant to special leave granted on 8 November 2013. It was a condition of the grant of special leave that the Registrar pay Norrie's costs in this Court and that the order for costs made in her favour by the Court of Appeal not be disturbed. The arguments in this Court 28. The Registrar submitted that the Court of Appeal strayed too far from the text of the Act in reaching its conclusions. It was said that the Act does not contemplate a range of categories of sex, additional to the "opposite" sexes of male and female. In particular, the definition of " sex affirmation procedure" in s 32A suggests a process of seeking to become male or female, given that s 32A(a) states that the sex affirmation procedure is carried out for the purpose of " assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex"; and to speak of the opposite sex is necessarily to speak only of male or female. Further, the Registrar submitted, it is reasonable to expect that an intention to recognise another category of "sex" would have been expressly stated in the Act. In this regard, the definition of "transgender" in Pt 3A of the Anti-Discrimination Act does refer to a person being of an "indeterminate" sex; but, significantly, this language was not used in Pt 5A of the Act. 29. The Registrar also argued that unacceptable confusion would flow from the acceptance of more than two categories of sex given that s 32J of the Act affects the operation of other laws which assume the p9 12-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

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binary division of sex. This particular argument will be addressed after the submissions made on behalf of Norrie have been summarised. 30. Norrie submitted that the purpose of the Register is to state the truth about matters recorded in the Register to the greatest possible extent. If the Act proceeded on the assumption that every person was male or female, then s 32A(b) would be superfluous because any change of sex would fall within the scope of s 32A(a). A sex affirmation procedure described in s 32A(b) of the Act, the purpose of which is to " correct or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person ", was said to be predicated upon legislative recognition that not everyone may be classified as male or female. In this case, the sex affirmation procedure, which is a precondition of an application under s 32DA, was carried out, but Norrie's sex remained ambiguous so that it would be to record misinformation in the Register to classify her as male or female. There is evident force in this submission. 31. Norrie's counsel went further, arguing that, as the Court of Appeal accepted, Norrie might more accurately be assigned to a category of sex such as "intersex" or "transgender". On this view, the expression "change of sex" in s 32DC does not mean changing from one sex (male or female) to another (female or male): a reference to change of sex simply means an "alteration" of a person's sex so that registration of categories of sex such as "transgender" and "intersex" is within the scope of the Registrar's powers under s 32DC. This further argument goes too far; it should be rejected. 32. The Registrar's submission that the Act recognises only male or female as registrable classes of sex must be accepted. But to accept that submission does not mean that the Act requires that this classification can apply, or is to be applied, to everyone. And there is nothing in the Act which suggests that the Registrar is entitled, much less duty-bound, to register the classification of a person's sex inaccurately as male or female having regard to the information which the Act requires to be provided by the applicant. Additional categories of sex 33. As a matter of the ordinary use of language, to speak of the opposite sex is to speak of the contrasting categories of sex: male and female[15]. Yet given the terms of s 32A(b) and the context in which it is to be construed, the Act recognises that a person's sex may be indeterminate. 34. Norrie's application to the Registrar and the Registrar's determination did not give rise to an occasion to consider whether Pt 5A contemplates the existence of specific categories of sex other than male and female, such as "intersex", "transgender" or "androgynous". It was unnecessary to do so given that the Act recognises that a person's sex may be neither male nor female. 35. The Registrar's initial determination of Norrie's application was right. The appropriate record of her change of sex was from "male" (as it may be taken to have previously been recorded outside of New South Wales) to "non-specific". To make that record in the Register would be no more than to recognise, as the Act does, that not everyone is male or female and that the change to be registered was from an assumed registered classification outside of New South Wales as a male to, as Norrie's application put it, nonspecific. Ambiguities and indeterminacy 36. The Registrar's submission must be rejected at the point at which it insists that the Registrar is required to decide whether he or she is satisfied (let alone that it has been demonstrated objectively) that, despite an application showing persisting ambiguity in the sex of the applicant following a sex affirmation procedure, the applicant's sex should be recorded in the Register as being either male or female. The registration of a change of sex records the facts supplied by the application so long as the application is supported in accordance with s 32DB. 37. The provision of the Act which acknowledges "ambiguities" and the context of the 1996 Amending Act, which referred to persons of " indeterminate sex", are a sufficient indication that the Act recognises that, as this Court observed in AB v Western Australia[16], "the sex of a person is not ... in every case unequivocally male or female." 38. There is nothing in the text of the Act which gives support to the view that the Registrar must initiate, much less resolve, a dispute concerning matters of fact and expert opinions presented to the Registrar under ss 32DA and 32DB. Such a role would not be consistent with the provisions of the Act which charge the Registrar with the role of establishing and maintaining the registers by recording information provided by members of the community. 39. There may be occasions when the Registrar is prompted by the circumstances of an application to address a concern as to whether an application to record a state of affairs in the Register is made in good faith. But this is not such an occasion. There is no suggestion that Norrie's application was not made in good faith. Norrie had undergone a sex affirmation procedure and verified that fact as required by s 32DB of the Act. Norrie's application was not deficient in terms of the information required by the Act. p10 12-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

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The opinions of the medical practitioners required by s 32DB were to the same effect as Norrie's own statement. The material before the Registrar (and the Tribunal) was to the effect that the sex affirmation procedure had not eliminated the ambiguities relating to Norrie's sex. In these circumstances no question was raised by Norrie's application which required the Registrar to pursue or resolve any further issue. 40. It was open to the Registrar, in the exercise of the power conferred by s 32DC, to register Norrie's change of sex by recording the change from classification as male to non-specific. Moreover, there was no reason for the matter to be remitted to the Tribunal to make further findings of fact in order for the matter to be finally determined.

10 Section 32J
41. The submission made on behalf of the Registrar that, given s 32J of the Act, unacceptable confusion would ensue if the Act recognised more than two categories of sex or an "uncategorised" sex should be rejected. 42. The difficulty foreshadowed by this argument could only arise in cases where other legislation requires that a person is classified as male or female for the purpose of legal relations. For the most part, the sex of the individuals concerned is irrelevant to legal relations. In this regard, s 8(a) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) provides that "[i]n any Act or instrument ... a word or expression that indicates one or more particular genders shall be taken to indicate every other gender". The chief, perhaps the only, case where the sex of the parties to the relationship is legally significant is marriage, as defined in the fashion found in s 5(1) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth)[17]. 43. As the Registrar acknowledged, the circumstance that s 32J operates subject to other laws of New South Wales serves to ensure that where another Act does differentiate between male and female it will prevail over s 32J so that an individual is not left in a "legal no-man's land". The Registrar during the course of argument did not identify any particular statute which could not be construed so as to operate as intended in respect of a person whose sex was recorded in the Register as "non-specific". 44. The Registrar's argument from inconvenience should be rejected. Conclusions and orders 45. The Court of Appeal went beyond the scope of Norrie's application to the Registrar and the issue as to the Registrar's power under s 32DC raised by the Registrar's refusal to record her sex as "nonspecific". While the Court of Appeal did not proceed without encouragement from Norrie's counsel [18], it was neither necessary nor appropriate for it to accept that encouragement. It would have been sufficient for it to determine the issue raised by the determination of Norrie's application and the appeal from the Tribunal to hold that the Tribunal erred in answering the question as to the Registrar's power under s 32DC on the basis that the Act is predicated on the assumption that "all people can be classified into two distinct and plainly identifiable sexes, male and female."[19] 46. The Act does not require that people who, having undergone a sex affirmation procedure, remain of indeterminate sex that is, neither male nor female must be registered, inaccurately, as one or the other. The Act itself recognises that a person may be other than male or female and therefore may be taken to permit the registration sought, as "non-specific". 47. Accordingly, the orders of the Court of Appeal should be varied to the extent of setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal remitting the matter to the Tribunal, and ordering that Norrie's applications to the Registrar of 26 November 2009 should be remitted to the Registrar for determination in accordance with these reasons. Otherwise, the appeal should be dismissed. 48. In accordance with the conditions subject to which special leave was granted, the order as to costs made by the Court of Appeal should not be disturbed, and the Registrar must pay Norrie's costs of the appeal to this Court.

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[1] Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 at 100; Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 472 [5]-[6]; AB v Western Australia [2011] HCA 42; (2011) 244 CLR 390 at 402 [23]; [2011] HCA 42.

50 [2] Section 32A(b).

[3] Section 32A(a). [4] The respondent uses, and these reasons use, the personal pronouns "she" and "her" to refer to the respondent. p11 12-4-2014 INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0 PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by making a reservation, See also Http://www.schorel-hlavka.com Blog at Http://www.scrib.com/InspectorRikati

[5] Sections 32B to 32D. [6] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [38], [91]. [7] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [5]. [8] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [95].

5 [9] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [54].
[10] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [98]- [99]. [11] Norrie v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADTAP 53 at [20]. [12] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [207]. [13] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [200]- [205], [257], [288]-

10 [290].
[14] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [203]- [205], [277]-[278]. [15] Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 483 [59], 488-489 [76]. [16] [2011] HCA 42; (2011) 244 CLR 390 at 402 [23]. [17] In the Marriage of C and D (1979) 28 ALR 524; Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 483 [58].

15 [18] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [205]- [206].
[19] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [87].

I expect that the Commonwealth of Australia will ensure appropriate response upon the Norrie case as to avoid this to make the vulnerable even more vulnerable. The legislative powers for 20 Peace, order and good government clearly provides for the commonwealth to do as such and ensure good government is pursued by avoiding this mental obsession perception of a person being a male, female or non-specific gender pending the mental perception at each relevant time. We ought to have specific doctrines what constitutes a male, female and/or a non-specific gender/sex. 25 Will the Commonwealth of Australia tolerate this so to say social engineering by the High Court of Australia in the most irresponsible manner and undermine the basic concepts in law as well as ordinary in society what constitutes a male or female? And, obviously if a non-specific gender/sex person is neither he/him or she/her then the English language may need to be updated to it being non-specific gender.to refer to a non-gender 30 sex/gender. I look forwards to your details response, if any courtesy will eventuate as such. Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

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MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

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