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Your Last Name 1 Failure of IMF Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa: Nigeria and Zambia Cases Dynamics of globalization

and strengthening of economic and political ties between different countries lead to growing interdependence between national economies and markets. Undoubtedly, these processes cannot have only positive outcomes: global market tend to draw clear distinction lines between leaders and outsiders. Such division is obvious for the realistic paradigm of international relations that suggests a state of permanent war of all against all; however, it is not as obvious as Hobbes may have seen it since all the countries try to implement their national interests using means other than war. Still, war in any forms means that there are winners and losers. Consequently, powerful countries strive to retain their position by preserving economic inequality of countries so that there would always benefit from the market situation. Marxists (and new-Marxists) tend to absolutize such vision, arguing that developed capitalist countries oppress weaker economies so that to support their inferior position. Undoubtedly, they may have captured the view right, but that's only the part of the picture since, for example, liberal paradigm and consequent liberal policies are designed to help the developing countries, uniting efforts of the global political and economic community via various international institutions, such as International Monetary Fund or World Bank. These organization serve as certain accumulators of capital financial, political, economic so that to use them for the proper organization of the global economic development and avoidance of severe problems. Surely, IMF or World Bank do not have political capacities to dictate the policies to the global community or define the path of national economies, but still they are capable of acting in local cases with certain countries dealing with concrete issues. Due to the capacities, get through the investments by the members of global community, these organizations have modeled policy recipes for solving

Your Last Name 2 different kinds of problems concerning economic development of a country. One of the most famous of them is known as Washington consensus suggesting that there are ten specific economic policy practices, that should be implemented in developing countries, suffering from severe crisis. These prescriptions were used by both International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These ten commandments of international economic institutions included discipline of fiscal policy (so that there were no large deficits), direction of public spending towards development of services (like health care, education, etc.), market determination of interest rates and exchange rates, trade liberalization (especially of imports), stimulation of foreign direct investments, sale of state enterprises, cancellation of regulations that block market development, introduce strong legal guaranties for property rights (Williamson, 1989). These principles also lie within the structural adjustment policies implemented by the International Monetary Fund to introduce free market and corresponding political agenda. Nevertheless, structural adjustment policies are not panacea, meaning that they cannot solve all the problems in the country's economy, as well as they can even fail to achieve anything. Primarily, the very nature of this approach is ambiguous since it forces a targeted country to follow IMF instruction to liberalize one's economy and to get new loans from the organization (or another forms of benefits, like lower interest rates for current loans). On the obvious level, these requirements are designed to ensure that the loan given will be used efficiently. Hence, these Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) aim at transforming the economies of the third-level countries to become more opened to the global market and more oriented on the cooperation on the international level. The underlying logic is in concentration on production and trade in order to stimulate the economy (Greenberg, 1997). The failure of such policies in African countries showed that SAPs are not a tool that could be applied universally. Moreover, it showed that to certain extent these policies

Your Last Name 3 represent the soft powerof the major IMF donors like the U.S., Japan and UK since they are designed and constructed by Western politician and bureaucrats, alienated from the local peculiarities and specifics. As it will be shown later on the cases of Zambia and Nigeria, one of the main reasons for IMF Structural Adjustment Policies is the distorted post-colonial economic development in Africa, and critical self-assurance of Western world concerning their views upon proper economic policies as well as certain clash of civilization issues within international economics. First of all, we should look at Africa as a geopolitical and geoeconomical entity. From the historical point of view this continent has changed dramatically during the last hundred years. On the one hand, decolonization led to modernization and certain social and economic development, whereas on the other hand, it stimulated further social differentiation, increased the influence of transnational corporations onto the continent and led to the confrontation of European and local traditional cultures (Varnis, 1990). Independence make new African countries face new unknown challenges: they were used to the external economic stimuli, i.e. mother country's demands which defined the model of economic performance. Hence, colonial economics worked as raw materials sources and market for the mother country's production. The sovereignty did not change these traditional schemes at once and they still remain one of the most important for the economic structure (Drysdale and Blake, 1985). Political independence made internal factors more important, but still they lack influence to define the path of structural transformation of the economy and industry, import substitution and export orientation activities. Hence, the early start of independent economies (1950-60s) was marked with extensive exploitation of the available natural resources. The initial idea was to trade enough money to conduct modernizations and decrease dependency on import.

Your Last Name 4 Nevertheless, African countries remained one of the least industrialized among the developing countries, despite high pace of industrial growth (Drysdale and Blake, 1985). Primarily the industries were designed to process agricultural and mineral resources and produced certain consumer goods. Consequently, new independent economies preserved dependency for import of capital goods and industrial technologies. This fact lies in the foundation of African economic problems: lack of technologies, size of industries, disproportion between existing resources and corresponding industrial potential and, of course, unequal distribution of income. Hence, one of the most noteworthy parameters of the development of the new African economies is the unfinished process of creating industries that could stimulate selfsufficiency of the countries. Extractive industries remained the most developed and most lucrative, especially due to the fact the foreign investments were mainly directed into mining (Sandbrook, 1985). Consequently, the crisis on the global resource market hit Africa the hardest due to a kind of chain reaction: demand for raw materials falls down, African countries get less currency, national industries stop, countries need to borrow money. Here IRF steps in so that prevent African countries from economic, political and social failure, and, simultaneously, establish certain control over the available resources. Generally, Structural Adjustment Programs had to face not only severe financial and economic problems, but also internal political affairs, intrigues and destructive practices. In this case we may observe a kind of clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996) since the organization of political power and communication, principles of authority functioning were very different from the Western ones and grown out of the traditional views and beliefs of the local societies. In African countries political doctrines as well as judicial norms were valid as long as they corresponded with the will of the current ruler. Certain researches argue that the

Your Last Name 5 reason for some leaders to accept IMF Structural Adjustment Programs was not only to help the country in the crisis, but also to pursue personal or group (clique) interests (Simon, 1995). Consequently, donor programs and funds were also invested in the development and growth of the African elite. This may be well seen on the case of Nigeria, one of the most populated countries on the continent, one of the largest oil suppliers that suffers from chaotic civic war periods and turmoils. The beginning of 2012 was marked with protests and strikes against the president's decision to cancel subsidies for petrol and other fuels, which result in a short paralysis of Nigerian economy. This shock therapy was introduced instead of the previously promised 4-steps cancellation process. Voluntarism of elites, ambiguous policies of IMF and difference between Western and African approaches to business and policies that is the main reasons for IMF failures in Nigeria. Today this country is one of the world's most important exporters of the qualitative raw oil, being the fifth oil supplier for th U.S. and the 12th among the world oil leader, having the extraction level about 2 million barrels per day similar rate to Kuwait or Venezuela (Campbell, 2012). But this oil prosperity does not bring social welfare and Nigeria remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. Powerful corporations of the world operate here from well-known Shell, Chevron or Mobil to the Chinese state oil companies but the vast majority of the population have to struggle every day for living. This oil dependence is one of the consequences of the IMF policies in the 1980s. The Structural Adjustment Program, designed for Nigeria, went along with general Washington consensus recommendations pack. These policies aimed at restructuring of Nigerian economy, shifting the focus from agricultural dependence towards the oil one (Anyanwu, 1992). Generally speaking, IMF prepared a pack of policies to modernize Nigerian economy,

Your Last Name 6 break down the old-fashioned patterns of economic system, establishing capitalist approach towards doing business and developing the economy. Researches stress the fact that SAP for Nigeria aimed at deconstruction of traditional means of accumulation so that to introduce free-market ones (Obadan and Ekuehare, 1989). Even a brief overview of the Nigerian SAP in the 1980s shows that IRF did not take into account local peculiarities and specifics, being sure that general recommendations will work again. These included practically standard package of reforms and policies (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1986): strengthening of demand management policies; the adoption of measures to enhance domestic production and enlarge the supply base of the economy; the introduction of a realistic exchange rate policy by embedding a Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market; restructuring of the tariff regime so that to promote industrial diversification; payments liberalization and progressive trade; diminishing of administrative control over the market; change in pricing policies for public enterprises; sell of public sector enterprises. Various opponents of International Monetary Fund label such approach as misguiding, simultaneously stating that IMR accumulates great potential, practically dictating fiscal and economic policy in the target countries, which is why it has been even labeled as a proconsular force (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). Undoubtedly, such policies are the result of a certain contract between IMF and state authorities but in the case of African countries we cannot talk about such negotiation in liberal-democratic way, where partners are equal and respectful. This one is an opposite case, where IMF has literally all the leverage not to mention financial, intellectual and political capital behind the organization. Also, it is clear that IMF refusal to approve country's economic policies makes the last an unwanted actor on the international stage since other international aid agencies, transnational corporations or

Your Last Name 7 banks will hardly be willing to cooperate with a country that received a black mark from the IMF. The case of Nigeria proves that self-assurance of IMF and its resistance to take into account local realities (such as state leadership's corruption and voluntarism) led to the fact that SAPs failed in this country. First of all, an observer should point out the fact that Nigeria refused to develop its oil rectification potential, despite having considerable natural resources. This led to the fact that practically all the petrol (vitally required for transportation and other industries) became imported. Primarily, the citizens were protected from the high petrol prices by government subsidies, which, as it was mentioned before, are to be removed under the Structural Adjustment Program. Thus, January 1, 2012, became the critical day for Nigeria: President Johnathan canceled all fuel subsidies, which is why petrol prices increased by almost three times (Outchikere and Ukwu, 2012). These measures were explained by the Central Bank management, stating that the money received would be contributed to the social sphere and to potential infrastructural development, bringing prosperity to Nigeria and preventing economic turmoil (Muhammad, 2012). Despite the government expectations, prosperity did not become the evident outcome since people began to strike. At first, President tried to calm down the population by proclaiming re-establishment of the former prices (but they still were two times higher that they used to be), but then state leadership used army to keep the order. Undoubtedly, these events may hardly be connected with IMF at the first sight. Nevertheless, the connection starts to clear up when investigating the problem more thoroughly. Just some days before this petrol crisis, Nigeria was visited by IMR director Christine Lagarde, arguing that President Johnathan's reforms canceling price control aim at

Your Last Name 8 the best for Nigeria, which is why IMF supports it and hopes for fruitful partnership (Lagarde, 2011). Moreover, Reuters also spread the message that IMF persuaded Western and Central Africa countries to cancel fuel subsidies as inefficient measure of poverty prevention and source of corruption and smuggling (Ahmed and de Costa, 2011). These events prove that IMF could not evaluate properly local realities (or, as a possible case, may understand it very well). The first point of analysis shows that IMF tries to apply standard schemes of Washington consensus to specific African case, not taking into account dangerous social outcomes and absence of democratic traditions of decision-making (since the President used armed forces to suppress potential protests and opposition for his policies). Focusing on economic policies, IMF underestimated problems embedded into political culture and social norms and practices. Given their aim at developing free market, liberal economics and deregulation, they did not take into account the effect of such policies onto social and political life, where state authorities may have used the situation to increase their benefits while worsening the situation for the vast majority of population. The other point of view on this case may have conspiratorial connotations. For example, some may see parallel lines between shock therapy cases in post-Soviet countries (like Ukraine, Poland or Russia), which gave certain benefit for transnational corporations in privatization of former state enterprises (Olubi, 2012). Thus, implementation of the SAPs may as well be regarded as a mechanism of developed industrialized Western countries to establish or re-establish their economical dominance in the third-world countries. Additional suspicion appears due to the fact that Nigeria sells petrol to its citizens much more expensive that other oil rich countries (like Kuwait, Oman or Saudi Arabia); hence IMF is aware of the fact that cancellation of petrol subsidies will not change the corrupted state power elite (Olubi, 2012).

Your Last Name 9 W. Engdahl suggests another possible interpretation of the situation (2012), arguing that if IMF and World Bank were truly interested in the proper development of Nigerian economics they would have primarily supported oil and oil rectification industries so that the country was not forced to imported purified oil products wasting public money. The scientists gives a hint that such IMF policy reflects geopolitical game with China since the easiest way for Nigeria to develop oil industry was to sign an agreement with China to attract investments in the rectification industry. Hence, we may observe a kind of clash of civilizations (but in economic, not cultural way), where a third-world country becomes a chess board for two powerful actors (one can remember cases of cold war, when a lot of African and Asian countries suffered from USSR USA confrontation). Engdahl (2012) concludes, that reality was the opposition to the best choice since the corrupted powerful clique inside the Nigerian national petrol corporation and government, which used to get immense income from subsidies system, doubled or even trebled it and, of course, they opposed building of the Chinese rectification plant that may have stopped their prosperity. Hence, we may suppose that there was hidden geopolitical game, supported by the clash of civilizations triangle (Western pragmatism versus African traditionalism versus Chinese expansionism) and certain IMF self-assurance. Despite being designed to help Nigerian citizens overcome poverty, liquidation of subsidies made more harm to the social system: as the manager of Nigerian Central Bank states, 90 percent of almost 150 million population lives beyond any margins of poverty, managing to survive with less than $2 per day (Olubi, 2012). This contrast in the results achieved and get shows that IMF totally misunderstood the nature of Nigerian social and economic system, or put geopolitical interests higher than well-being of local citizens. It is indeed hard to question IMF competence due to the clearness of the fact that cancellation of

Your Last Name 10 subsidies will provoke immense price growth not only for petrol, but for consumer goods. Arguments of the government and IMF were the following: liberalization of fuel market gives economy more money that could be used by the state in order to restore social infrastructure. Nevertheless, this ideal logic could not be implemented within corrupted public administration system. As Nigerian Leadership Sunday newspaper desperately stated, prices for consumer goods increased with fuel prices growth, but they did not decrease back, which obviously led to a kind of economic shock (especially for small business) and growing unemployment (Outchikere and Ukwu, 2012). The analysis of the previous Nigeria-IMF cooperation cases, in 1980-90s, shows pretty similar picture: political discourse is full of positive intentions, thoroughly developed policies and strong desire to built liberal and strong Nigerian economy, whereas political reality ends in corruption and continuing worsening of the people's quality of life. J. Anyanwu states that The IMF and the World Bank economic policy packages, embodied in SAP, provide overt encouragement to the fostering of an unregulated, dependent, capitalist development model in Nigeria. In this process the advanced nations are perpetrating the present inequitable division of labor... while they preach deregulation, decontrol, free trade and the elimination of subsidies to poor nations like Nigeria, they themselves control their foreign trade and maintain welfare schemes... (1992, p. 20). Consequently, the case of Nigeria shows that IMF can hardly be regarded as an ideal international organization from the liberal theory point of view. The policies suggested by IMF and World Bank were primarily based upon the interests of industrially developed countries, whereas the real reforms in the developing countries were just a rhetoric part of the agreements. Undoubtedly, the previous statement may seem arguable, however, the outcomes of the IMF policies clearly showed the distribution of benefits. Hence, the case of Nigeria

Your Last Name 11 inspires the researches to analyze IMF in international relations from the realistic point of view as being a tool to preserve the distribution of labor and markets. Real problems of countries (political and social as well as economic) remain the issue to be resolved by internal efforts. There is no doubt that reforms in the sphere of macroeconomic policy are among the hardest to implement, especially in the circumstances of sustainable international pressure, unstable situation in the region (which is true about Sub-Saharan Africa for the last decades) and lack of democratic and rational decision-making traditions. Surely, transition towards free and open market in case of African countries is more complex due to the fact that for years these territories have suffered from economic mismanagement and inappropriate policies, creating structural macroeconomic imbalances (Saasa, 1996). The case of SAPs in Nigeria show that scope of these reform packages is defined not only by objective factors (like real economy problems, unemployment, import dependence, etc.), but also by several subjective factors (such as corruption within ruling clique, unclear IMF intentions, local political and economic culture). The case of Zambia shows additional troubles of IMF programs in the African regions, proving immense self-assurance of the organization. Similarly to Nigeria, Zambia used to be an agrarian country, relying onto traditional systems of production and distribution. The government for a lot of years operated within a pan-territorial pricing system, selling all maize products at the same price, regardless to the location of production (Colliere and Gunning, 1999). Consequently, the liberalization of the market, inspired by IMF standard reform package, broke the stability on the agricultural market, redistributing income so that the farmers from the remote areas became even poorer. Hence, we can see again that IMF has neglected quite an obvious consequence of its action, designing the program.

Your Last Name 12 The SAPs, acitve in the 1980s, did not show sustainable success. Performance of the Zambian economy in the 1991-1993 period was generally poor. These years, following the active implementation of the IMF recommendations, should have already shown their first results. Nevertheless, the value of manufacturing output decreased by 10 percent in 1990 compared to the 8 percent increase in the previous year, which could be explained by the such factors, as (Saasa, 1996, p. 19): reduced ability of most manufacturing firms to import the needed raw materials and requisite equipment; poor plant rehabilitation record; and liquidity problems due to low profit margins and prohibitively high interest rates on commercial loans. If IMF tried to adapt its programs to the local peculiarities, these outcomes may have been averted or at least resulted differently. For example, IMF could have suggested to postpone financial liberalization so that the adjustment of the fiscal system was not forced to deal with the excessive burden of the interest payments increase. In case of gradual approach to the reforms, financial liberalization could have been conducted after the achievement of fiscal adjustment so that the inflation could decline gradually and under control (Colliere and Gunning, 1999). Nevertheless, IMF failed to create a step-by-step program for the unstable and weak African economy, so in Zambia capital account convertibility and interest rate liberalization were introduced to the economy before the situation was stable. Consequently, with the high inflation rate and liberalization of domestic markets the prices jumped high almost at once. Obviously, this led to the fact that the real value of taxes was severely diminished and the government was forced to cut on public spending much more that it had been designed by IMF program. Undoubtedly, the organization tried to reason their approach, stating that the urgent need for liberalizing the economy, which had been stifled by controls, was

Your Last Name 13 so great that the potential short-run costs were probably unavoidable (Botchwey et al., 1998, p. 139). Nevertheless, we may observe the situation similar to Nigerian one: powerful and experienced organization missed rather obvious predictions. These flaws in program design (which make us doubt analytical capacities of IMF) show that the local background was not researched thoroughly enough, or, again, one can suspect International Monetary Fund in improper intentions. Cases of Zambia and Nigeria lack planning for the outcomes and consequences, which created temporary decrease of both aggregate growth and public expenditure. Consequently, the very design of the program was primarily weak and did not take into account the avoidable negative social effects (especially on poverty). Despite the doubtful implementation of the reforms, in 1998 the IMF published a series of statements, boasting about African economic renaissance and a certain turnaround in growth performance (Colliere and Gunning, 1999). Nevertheless, such claim may seem a little bit early and unreasoned. Analyzing the data, one can see that real GDP per capita grew by 1.4% in 1996, but by 1997, growth slowed to 0.4%, and in 1998, per capita incomes fell by 0.8% (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). Hence, if there was an "economic renaissance" for Africa, it appears to be dead during early childhood. This difference between IMF intentions, Zambian economic reality and further IMF statements gives more evidence to doubt real developmental capacities of the organization. Surely, one should take into account another important (but hardly the most influential) actor the government. With a small pause a period when the liberalization policies were temporarily abandoned (1987-88) the government attempted to stick to the reform steps suggested by IMF (Saasa, 1996). Despite all the public policy efforts to achieve the goals set mainly by the Fund, the state authorities indeed lacked experience, knowledge and analytical and managerial capacities to implement the designed reforms properly. To

Your Last Name 14 some extent this is also an IMF failure since the organization did not manage to evaluate real capacities of local managers, leaving them with uneasy tasks and unclear mechanisms to implement them. For example, aiming at IMF goal of privatization, the program set too ambitious expected results, neglecting low institutional capacities and lack of resources that slowed down the process. Zambian government, inspired by IMF program, planned to sell during 1995 113 companies (75% of all parastatals) but in fact only 13 enterprises were sold (Saasa, 1996). Thus, various strategic and structural problems made the adjustment process ambiguous and inefficient, so that the government did not get positive feedback from the citizens, losing its inclination towards the reforms. Zambian government tried to show some character in relations with IMF. In 1983-87 the Fund and the World Bank were implementing Structural Adjustment Program, demanding various structural changes within Zambian economy. These measures aimed at forcing the government to cut public expenditures so that to be able to pay for the loans (previously given by these organizations) (Colliere and Gunning, 1999). According to standard IMF recommendations, Zambia was suggested to cancel price control over grain and fertilizers, devalue national currency so that to stimulate export to the global market, break limits for import, used for national producers protection. At first, Zambian government agreed to implement these policies, but very soon it became clearer that local industries would not survive the competition with the foreign goods. Being under considerable social pressure, Zambian government decided to oppose IMF and World Bank, rejecting to implement their recommendations, quitting SAP in 1987 (Saasa, 1996). This protest experiment has survived for a year, before the investors started to strike back. The IMF and World Bank loans were stopped as well as loans issued by international creditors. The latter even demanded to give the money back. Hence, Zambian

Your Last Name 15 government could not oppose such pressure from international organizations especially, without financial injections and was forced to get back to the program. Consequently, financial injections make target countries kind of loans addicts since reforms and development can be achieved only with a constant money flow from the donors to the country. This thesis is explored and explained by Dollar and Svensson (2000) who analyzed Zambia among other African countries. The World Banl approved four SAP loans at the total sum of $212 million. After their completion, the Bank conducted a performance analysis, rating three out of these four loans as unsuccessful, meaning that the reforms that should have been supported by this money failed to be implemented properly. Hence, researches conclude that such results were largely predictable since Zambia at that time did not have conditions favorable to reforms and the government had not been democratically elected (Dollar and Svensson, 2000). Hence, international institutions once again proved that they lack intellectual and analytical capacities to design programs for countries outside the Western outlook system. Despite cultural and political differences, International Monetary Fund aims at standardization of economic life, trying to shape it according to Western notions. Both Nigerian and Zambian cases show failure of attempts to reorganize traditional practices into the modern ones. Nevertheless, failing to transform local institutions, the Fund at least stimulates and promoted the expansion of Western corporations into the developing countries. Liberalization of international trade in Zambia seriously weakened local textile industry, where employment fell by 43% in the period from 1991 to 1998 (Naiman and Watkins, 1999) so only large enterprises survived. Additionally, both IMF and World Bank oppose stateowned enterprises, recommending privatization. Consequently, a lot of state-owned or semistatal firms are given to private or corporative hands under the pressure of IMF. This

Your Last Name 16 may also be regarded as a continuation of global corporatization, promoted by international economic institutions. Thus, IMF and World Bank clearly have certain intentions and do not hesitate to use pressure onto target countries. Moreover, analyzing this via the prism of clash of civilizations, one can regard these cases as forced westernization via economical measures. Using financial and industrial dominance, Western countries implicitly regard themselves as more developed in other spheres such as cultural and social. Consequently, international economic institutions, such as International Monetary Fund or World Bank (that generally represent Western position) regard their actions and programs as a helpful hand, being absolutely sure that they suggest the correct path of development. Nevertheless, this excessive self-assurance leads to the failures in implementing various policies in the regions with the cultural and social schemes other that usual Western ones. Washington consensus is a perfect symbol of such arrogance of international economic institutions. Being named consensus, it in fact reflect the positions only of certain part of economists, scientists and politicians. The place of its birth, Washington, shows that the center of this consensus in deep within the Western (or Euro-Atlantic) cultural and civilizational paradigm. Moreover, this geopolitical connection of the Western civilization (the U.S. and Europe) creates one of the most powerful international actors, which makes it attractive for minor players. From this point of view, Washington consensus becomes a set of rules that a country should follow in order to join the success club. But in case of developing countries, it turns into a mechanisms of implicit enthrallment of weak economies so that they would serve as convenient sources of raw materials and considerable distribution markets. Summing up the cases of Nigeria and Zambia, we may sketch several reasons of SAPs

Your Last Name 17 failure on the African continent (primarily, in the Sub-Saharan Africa). As we have observed, International Monetary Fund and World Bank did not put enough efforts to design programs that would be efficient in the African conditions, being absolutely sure that their recommendations could serve as a universal recipe. The policy package, aimed at liberalization of the market, did not take into account the distorted scheme of previous development of these economies, that used to be colonies and, thus, were dependent on import and exported mainly raw materials. Undoubtedly, rational analysis may suggest a kind of conspiracy in a neo-Marxist style, when rich countries use their power to suppress developing countries so that to retain the wealth and influence. Nevertheless, the reality shows quite a different situation. So, international economic organizations like International Monetary Fund or World Bank are much more complex that simply capitalism promotion organizations they are large bureaucratic structures that also suffer from typical bureaucratic problems in the case of African SAPs, they decided to use well-known schemes being sure that they would work, without proper brainstorming and research. Hence, one of the key reasons of such failure is a kind of bureaucratic self-assurance, supported by political element. The political element in this case goes along with Huntington's idea of clash of civilizations - adapted to the economic sphere. Western (or Euro-Atlantic) civilization, having concentrated immense political and financial capital, has a prejudice towards other civilizations especially African, that has retained a lot of traditional elements and has not advanced much in technological development. Thus, Western politicians are sure that their paths and models of development are the best and, consequently, others should adjust to them. As a result, the failure of IMF policies in the Africa is caused by mutual misunderstanding and dubious intentions of local governments and international institutions.

Your Last Name 18 List of References 1. Ahmed, I., da Costa, K. (2011). Nigeria: IMF Pushing the Country to End Subsidy - Report, 30 December 2011, accessed in http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300791.html. 2. Anyanwu, J.C. (1992). President Babangida's Structural Adjustment Program and Inflation in Nigeria. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 7, 1: 5-24 3. Botchwey, K., P. Collier, J.W. Gunning and K. Hamada (1998). Report by a Group of Independent Experts: External Evaluation of the ESAF. Washington, DC: IMF. 4. Campbell, J. (2012). Nigerias Turmoil and the Outside World, January 12, 2012, accessed in http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/01/12/nigeria's-turmoil-and-theoutside-world/ 5. Colliere, P., Gunning, J. W. (1999). The IMF's role in structural adjustment. WPS, 99/18, June. 6. Dollar, D., Svensson, J. (2000). What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes? The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 466. (Oct., 2000), pp. 894-917.

7. Drysdale, A., Blake, G.H. (1985). The Middle East and North Africa, Oxford University Press US. 8. Engdahl, F. W. (2012). Geopolitical stakes in Nigeria: Curious role of the IMF. Russia Today, 29 January 2012, accessed in http://rt.com/news/oil-subsidy-nigeriaimf-955/ 9. Greenberg, J. B. (1997). A Political Ecology of Structural-Adjustment Policies: The Case of the Dominican Republic. Culture & Agriculture, 19 (3): 85-93

Your Last Name 19 10. Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster. 11. Lagarde, C. (2011). Statement by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde at the Conclusion of her Visit to Nigeria, IMF, Washington, Press Release No. 11/478, December 20, 2011, accessed in http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11478.htm. 12. Muhammad, M. (2012). Nigeria: Billions Siphoned by Corruption Could Have Been Used to Maintain Fuel Subsidy, Inter Press Service, January 11, 2012, accessed in http://www.globalissues.org/news/2012/01/11/12407. 13. Naiman, R., Watkins, N. (1999). A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief. CEPR. 14. Obadan, M. I., Ekuehare, B. U. (1989). The Theoretical Bases of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Nigeria: An Appraisal, International Social Science Journal, Vol XII, No 2, May, 211-222. 15. Olubi, O. (2012). Fuel subsidy: International conspiracy against Nigerians, National Daily, 15 January 2012, accessed in http://nationaldailyngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2825:f uel-subsidy-international-conspiracy-against-nigerians&catid=306:businessnews&Itemid=561. 16. Otuchikere, C., Ukwu, C. (2012). Nigeria: Aftermath of Subsidy Crisis Food Prices Hitting Roof Tops, 22 January, 2012, accessed in http://allafrica.com/stories/201201231627.html. 17. Saasa, O.S. (1996). Policy Reforms and Structural Adjustment in Zambia: the Case of Agriculture and Trade. SD Publication Series, Office for Sustainable Development

Your Last Name 20 Bureau for Africa. 18. Sandbrook, R. (1985). The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, Cambridge University Press. 19. Simon, J. L. (1995). State of Humanity, Blackwell Publishing. 20. Varnis, S. (1990). Reluctant aid or aiding the reluctant?: U.S. food aid policy and the Ethiopian Famine Relief. 21. Williamson, J. (1989). What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in: Williamson, John (ed.): Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, Washington: Institute for International Economics 1989.