STANDARD OIL COMPANY V JARAMILLO The Power of the Registry of Deeds is Ministerial, and The absolute criterion to determine

between real and personal property is NOT supplied by the civil code. Parties may agree what to treat as personal property and what to treat as real property. FACTS On November 27, 1922, Gervasia de la Rosa was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila and owner of the house of really tough materials built thereon. She executed that fine day a document in the form of a chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to Standard Oil Company of New York (by way of mortgage) both the leasehold interest in said lot and the building. After said document had been duly acknowledged and delivered, Standard Oil presented it to Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, Jaramillo opined that it was not chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this ground only. Later this confusion was brought to the Supreme Court upon demurrer by Joaquin Jaramillo, register of deeds of the City of Manila, to an original petition of the Standard Oil Company of New York, demanding a mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the proper register a document purporting to be a chattel mortgage executed in the City of Manila by Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, in favor of the Standard Oil Company of New York. The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer, and ordered that unless Jaramillo interposes a sufficient answer to the petition for mandamus by Standard Oil within 5 days of notification, the writ would be issued as prayed, but without costs. ISSUE: w/n the Registry of Deeds can determine the nature of property to be registered. w/n the Registry of Deeds has powers beyond Ministerial discretion. RESOLUTION: 1.Jaramillo, register of deeds, does not have judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine nature of document registered as chattel mortgage Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section 15 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not confer upon the register of deeds any authority whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel mortgages. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. 2.Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code does not supply absolute criterion on distinction between real and personal property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code supply no absolute criterion for discriminating between real property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Those articles state rules which, considered as a general doctrine, are law in this jurisdiction; but it must not be forgotten that under given conditions property

may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may be agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property; and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property. Other situations are constantly arising, and from time to time are presented to the Supreme Court, in which the proper classification of one thing or another as real or personal property may be said to be doubtful.] Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000 FACTS: PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would return for other machineries. Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin. Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code. Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties." ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization. Ruling: Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only. Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land.They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.” However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently

estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.” The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin NAVARRO V. PINEDA FACTS: Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro, to secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the mother while the chattel mortgage covered a residential house. Due to the failure to pay the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for the loan. On the second extension, Pineda executed a PROMISE wherein in case of default in payment, he wouldn’t ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The court decided in his favor. HELD: Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage. Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them, has been recognized, it has been a constant criterion that with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as immovable property. BICERRA V. TENEZA FACTS: The Bicerras are supposedly the owners of the house (PhP 20,000) built on a lot owned by them in Lagangilang, Abra; which the Tenezas forcibly demolished in January 1957, claiming to be the owners thereof. The materials of the house were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant. The Bicerras filed a complaint claiming actual damages of P200, moral and consequential damages amounting to P600, and the costs. The CFI Abra dismissed the complaint claiming that the action was within the exclusive (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, Abra. The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed. Having been admitted in forma pauperis, no costs were adjudged.

The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre praying that they be sentenced to pay him jointly and severally of the unpaid balance. the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors. they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of the surety company. Lopez declined to invest but agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the proposed theatre. TUMALAD V.. Whether the lower court and CA erred in not providing that the material mans liens is superior to the mortgage executed in favor of surety company not only on the building but also on the land. Therefore. But unknown to Lopez. as in this case. HELD: -The material man’s lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection. HELD: A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature would be real property. As it remained unsettled. they filed a surety bond subscribed by petitioner and therefor. The land on which the building was erected previously owned by Orosa. the corporation already obtained a loan with Luzon Surety Company as surety. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Iya filed another civil action against the spouses. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel. Valdes v.R. the land wasn’t owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real property. intended to treat the same as such. The lien was merely confined to the building and did not extend to the on which the construction was made. payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article 415. and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of the said company as counter-security. or at least. the spouses executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya. 193. the latter and president of the corporation promised to obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre. 1912 225 U. as personal properties may be the only subjects of a chattel mortgage. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC. the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants. Civil Code). The spouses weren’t able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus.S.ISSUE: Whether or not the house is immovable property even if it is on the land of another RULING: Yes. 225 U. and in case defendants fail to pay. praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners. ET. leaving a balance of P41. a resident of the same province as Lopez. but was denied.85. In the case at bar. which was being rented by Madrigal and company. To hold it the other way. Lopez tried to secure a modification of the decision. the land and building owned by the corporation be sold in public auction with the proceeds be applied to the balance. ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY V. 58 Syllabus . holding at the interest of the mortgagee over the land is superior and cannot be made subject to the material man's lien. -Generally.35. out of which the unpaid balance would be satisfied. for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land. Lopez delivered the which was used for construction amounting to P62. AL 103 SCRA 972 FACTS: Spouses Valino were the owners of a house. a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. ISSUES: Whether the material man’s lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the building is adhered to. The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC. when demolished. This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. Also. After being able to purchase the land. it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases. Central Altagracia. 1912 Decided May 13. Thereafter. -In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary. invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business. would create a situation where apermanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands. asserting that she has a better right over the property. HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation.. Due to the persistent demands of Lopez. 58 (1912) Valdes v. Orosa LOPEZ V. or the shares of stock be sold in public auction. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment. -The law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the refectionary or work was made. They had an oral agreement that Orosa would be personally liable for any account that the said construction might incur and that payment would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. The spouses didn’t own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. to be able to secure payment for indebtedness. OROSA AND PLAZA THEATREG. the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is null and void. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. He was paid only P20. though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property.848. real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon. payable on installments from Philippine Realty Corporation. paragraph 1. . Inc. But once the house is demolished. was later on acquired by the corporation. This was executed to guarantee a loan. selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel. IYA.50. a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. 1958 FACTS: -Petitioner Lopez was engaged in doing business under the trade name LopezCastelo Sawmill. 196 Submitted March 6. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot secured by the spouses. so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Lopez v. the possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion. it is obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thing—that a building is by itself an immovable property. petitioner was compelled to pay. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured.The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred.255.S. Exception. VICENCIO 41 SCRA 143 FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house. the lower court was right in. Central Altagracia. Nos. House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a different owner. The lower court held that defendants were jointly liable for the unpaid balance and Lopez thus acquired the material man’s lien over the construction. Orosa. yet by ceding. Orosa executed a “deed of assignment” over his shares of stock in the corporation. .771. Incorporated Nos. In the case at bar. the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. L-10817-18 February 28.

held that a transfer of all the property of a corporation to one advancing money to enable it to continue its business was not a conditional sale of the property. equipment. the appellant's characterization of the property as chattels is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. receptacles. The tanks merely sit on its foundation. cables. is that it be subject to appropriation. unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on foundations of cement. The petitioner’s assertion does not hold water. the record shows that the refusal to continue on account of absence of witness was not an abuse. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking. buildings. judgment was rendered against Davao Sawmill. US v Tambunting. which cannot be validly conducted under the strength of a search warrant. For purposes of taxation. The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks. A writ of execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. RPC: 1. Hence this appeal which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of the petitioner. held that the lien of the attachment of a creditor of the tenant on machinery placed by the tenant on a sugar Central in Porto Rico is superior to the claim of the transferee of an unrecorded Davao Sawmill Co. paraphernalia and several other materials used in the distribution of newspapers. Davo Sawmill agreed to turn over free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on the premises with the exception of machineries. based on the report of the Board of Assessors. property or plant. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks. ISSUE WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft HELD Art. of discretion..651.415 of the New Civil Code provides that Real Property consists of: (1) Lands. the machineries in question.308. in this case. or any other person having only temporary right. usufructuary. persons or force upon things Personal Property – anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real Property Thus. 2009 FACTS Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 155076 January 13. machinery placed on property by a tenant does not become immobilized. 3. Taking be done without the owner’s consent. Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it used. RPC: Theft is committed by any person who. capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos. and asphalt stratum as top layer. machinery may be immobilized by destination or purpose under the following conditions: General Rule: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. tangible or intangible.92. V. Exception: The tenant. PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. the transferee stood merely as a secured creditor The mere form of an instrument transferring property of a debtor cannot exclude the power of creditors to inquire into the reality and substance of a contract unrecorded. Consequently. which should generally be considered as personal property. in which the abovementioned legal provision was invoked. It must be noted that real properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. law enforcement officers searched the offices of the “We forum” and “Metropolitan Mail” newspapers. Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Art. while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. but not so when placed by a tenant. Machinery is naturally movable. A litigant cannot.308. corporeal or incorporeal. HELD: While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land. therefore. In another case decided by the Court.. the law enforcement officers seized office and printing machines. Taking be done with Intent to Gain. 5. or he intended to permanently give away the property in favor of the owner. or temporary possessor acted as agent of the owner of the premises. or intimidation of. but not so when placed by a tenant. The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft. they may nevertheless be considered as improvements in the land. any personal property. In an action brought by the Davao Light and Power Co. While not conclusive. FACTS Davao Sawmill Co. Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant.The record in this case shows that the court below did not err in bringing this case to a speedy conclusion and avoiding the loss occasioned by the litigation to all concerned. However. In this case. Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of the property. and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined”. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth. proceeded to purchase the machinery and other properties auctioned by the sheriff. Under the circumstances of this case. Petitioner avers. and when such refusal to proceed is inconsistent with his prior attitude in the case. it becomes immobilized as to that tenant and his assigns with notice. vs Castillo 61 PHIL 709 GR No. BURGOS Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement. . which shall remain with the Davao Sawmill. and. operated a sawmill. receptacles. As a rule. among others. Zeus Abrogar GR No. instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. that the seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties. petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. ISSUE Are the machineries real or personal property? HELD Art. xxx (5) Machinery. but a just exercise. In the contract of lease. shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. sand pad as immediate layer. and in view of the existence of an equity of redemption under prior transfers. stealing. enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. after all parties have acquiesced in the order setting the case for trial and the court has denied his request for continuance. the term “personal property” as used in Art. During the course of the search. 4. Under the general law of Porto Rico. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20. L-40411 August 7. since it was not placed on the land by the owner of the said land. US v Genato*). There be taking of Personal Property. Said Personal Property belongs to another. or intimidation of persons nor force upon things. a usufructuary. 2. In the case at bar. so long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.308. Elements of Theft under Art. usufructuary. it is familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle may be considered as personal property. the machinery should be considered as Personal Property. the term real property may include things. property or plant. although it does not become so as to creditors not having legal notice of the lease. refuse to proceed with the trial on the ground that the time to plead has not expired. although required by law to be recorded in order to be effective against third parties. with intent to gain but without violence against. This being the case. made of steel plates wielded and assembled on the spot. RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. usufructuary. and not subject to be reviewed on appeal except in cases of clear error and abuse. The land upon which the business was conducted was leased from another person. No violence against. but a contract creating security for the money advanced. “machinery. a tenant places it there pursuant to contract that it shall belong to the owner. MERALCO wished to oppose this assessment as they averred that the tanks are not real properties. Davao Light and Power Co. Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon.370. Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioner’s assertion that real property were invalidly seized under the disputed warrants. 1935 A tenant placed machines for use in a sawmill on the landlord's land. as Personal Property. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code. antennae.. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works” are considered immovable property. unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. or any other person having only temporary right. when. On the land. roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems “Forces of Nature” which are brought under the control of science. or any person having only a temporary right. Held: No. and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) – “a method of outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines. The granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. on liquidation of the assets. however. it was ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement.

The City Assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. and their sole function is to support/carry such wires. PD 464. receptacles. 501). The sheriff. To secure the collection of receivables. FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing. © are not machineries. Sec.. 328) where Meralco's steel towers were exempted from taxation. and that the Civil Code definitions of real and personal property in Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable in this case. MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. enhances. 2013 Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals & City Assessor of Pasay GR No. wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise. The lease contract stipulated that upon demand. vs. the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. as long as no interest of 3rd party would be prejudiced. The CA reversed the order of the CFI. Following these classifications. Manila Electric Co. and even if they are.3 thereof. ordinary wear and tear excepted. The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the City Assessor's imposition of the realty tax on Board of Assessment Appeals QC v MERALCO Posted on June 22. interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of appropriation. Vicencio. MERALCO's steel towers should be considered personal property. Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals Posted on June 24.C. The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of the offended party.651. Q. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property: (1) Lands. ISSUE: Whether the dryer is an immovable property HELD: NO The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. 1977 that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Ses. and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer of P11.9 of respondent's franchise is determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated. then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT’s telephone system. the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property which can be the object of theft under Art. usually cylindrical piece of wood. Therefore. an upright standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported. . in its gas stations located on leased land. 1955. vs Jaramillo. machinery. MERALCO paid the amount under protest.. decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. the operators shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment in good condition as when received. and apparatus attached to the real estate…includes the physical facilities available for production…installation and appurtenant service facilities. Parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature is a real property. including land. does not become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. instruments. 116 Phil. 308 of the RPC. the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses. What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS. augments. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under the said article. The Assessor appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as personal property. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though they might be considered personalty. The exemption granted to poles as quoted from Part II. Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise. HELD Sec. xxx (3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner. The Board held on June 3. and other improvements not specifically exempted in Sec. V. it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials and a machinery – Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer). Thus the case at bar. as used in Act No. an appeal was taken to the QC Board of Assessment Appeals. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. buildings. because the same are necessary to the operation of the gas station and have been attached/affixed/embedded permanently to the gas station site. mechanical contrivances. through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities constituteSubtraction. It is evident that the word “poles”. Wearever defaulted thus the properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.. the QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. beauty. after the restraining order was lifted. receptacles or instruments. 1964 FACTS On November 15.The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature. In the instant case. Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls. where the gas station is located. City Assessor. should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation. ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be the subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. 2013 Board of Assessment Appeals. L-50466 May 31. xxx (5) Machinery. ISSUE WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement should be subject to realty tax. Art. as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted. INC. instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. The steel towers were considered personalty because they were attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as the tools and equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. The poles should be taken and understood as part of MERALCO's electric power system for the conveyance of electric current to its consumers. roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. (119 Phil. MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting 5 highvoltage transmission wires.651. vs Meralco 10 SCRA 68 GR No. ISSUE Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or personal properties? HELD Pole – long.2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due on real property. After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations.86. Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. “It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property” (Standard Oil Co. The subject machines and equipment are taxable improvement and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. that if a house of strong materials can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. buildings. was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer. Par.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. 44 PHIL 630). Moreover. comparatively slender. It should be noted that the steel towers: (a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.3 of the Real Property Tax Code provides the following definitions: k) Improvements – a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition…more than mere repairs or replacement of waste…intended to enhance its value. appliances. 1982 This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. and not included in the enumeration of real properties. The lessor of the land. they are not intended for an industry to be carried on in the premises. However. L-15334 January 31. object of metal or the like. FACTS Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. (b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner – they can be separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. PLDT merely encodes. timber. 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code. And treating it as a chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage. which required respondent to pay P11. or utility m) Machinery – machines.

A.750. Inc. Berkenkotter. in he sugar central with which said machinery and equipment had been incorporated. • August 21. San Andres andNebraska Streets. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment was approximately P100. containing an area of 9.. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. A. • But due to reasons which do not appear in the record.A. of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to “machinery. When the government took steps to make it land again. steel railway. and while the mortgage constituted on said sugar central to Cu Unjieng e Hijos remained in force. utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill.689.. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22. 25545 and 25547.450 square meters. and (3) that the sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the purchaser who was supplied the money. A. proposed to the plaintiff. now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots. the Mabalacat Sugar Co. converted them into real property by reason of their purpose. as improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Civil Code). Pampanga. only the right of redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co. B. Is Republic Act No. HELD: No error was committed by trial court. and cannot therefore be registered. more or less. particularly theGovernor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila. to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment. part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea.000. Furthermore. A may be said to have abandoned the same. president of said corporation. that in case B. improvements. Salas V Jarencio (1972)Ponente: Esguerra. 1.. 1919—the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Green. B. brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminaryinjunction to restrain. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES . in lieu of another of less capacity. For the foregoing considerations. As soon as the land had been recovered A took possession of it. 111. Inc. it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because. as essential and principal elements of a sugar central. B. the fact that B. as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof • The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was officiallytransmitted to the President of the Philippines the following day.000 against said corporation for unpaid salary.” If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co. to which a copy wasfurnished to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of thePhilippines. excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporatecapacity. liquid containers. (2) that the fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the latter’s credit.. 4329 issued on in favor of the City of Manila after the landin question was registered in the City's favor.8 square meters. Such bill was enacted for social justice purposes. paragraph 5.. a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and land “with all its buildings. Inc. said machinery and equipment would become security therefor. from furtherimplementing Republic Act No. instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. apparatus. overnment v.. Cu Unjieng e Hijos. 4118. 2. was able to purchase the same. for on December 20. promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the mortgagees. so that instead of milling 150 tons daily. Green bound himself to the plaintiff B. • June 20. considered as an abandoned road. in proposing to him to advance the money for the purchase thereof. prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants. president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co. Appellants contention: the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company.H. decided to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment. 29. from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. H. The additional machinery and equipment are included in the first mortgage. the City of Manila made acomplete turn-about. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment. Antonio J. the terminal portion of one of its streets... v. Issues and Decisions: 1. Having become part of the sea or the seashore. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land.. rendered judgment in Case No. under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.Legal Doctrine: Regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of amunicipality. for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production.000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B. and praying for the declaration of Republic ActNo. Berkenkotter agreed to the said proposition and delivered to him a total sum of P25. Aug.. sugar-cane mill. we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central. Green. With the loan of P25. obtained from the defendants.A. it is valid. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character.BERKENKOTTER FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff. Inc. Article 334. The lot’s sale was therefore valid. Inc.declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as LotNo. and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central. . it became property for public use. such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants. Inc.000. it could produce 250. Issue: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer? HELD: Yes. Inc. together with whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan.. Green from giving them as security at least under a second mortgage.. Green. Green should fail to obtain an additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider thefeasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida.L. the Mabalacat Sugar Co. the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessary be permanent. because the street has already been withdrawn from public use. 112 FACTS: In 1896. Villegas. subject to the right of the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos under the first mortgage. therefore. Inc. steel railway. that theybe sold to their currently landless occupants. its status as public dominion remained unchanged. applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75.A. J. purchased the additional machinery and equipment now in litigation. does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply with the right of redemption. Berkenkotter. because in letting it remain submerged.” Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted. telephone line. in 1968. The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal(Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain. Cabangis – 53 Phil. A is not entitled to the land. 1975 FACTS: The City Council of Cebu. in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein. 4118 as unconstitutional. and accordingly has become patrimonial property. B. telephone line. 18. B. Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed..containing an area of 7. after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar central. A owned a parcel of land. Berkenkotter to hold said machinery and equipment as security. Later it authorized the sale thru public bidding of the property.whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes Facts: • February 24. for its sugar industry. in his capacity asthe City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized publiccorporation. the land can be registered in the name of the buyer. as nothing could prevent B.R. HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO . dismissing said plaintiff’s complaint against Cu Unjieng e Hijos et al Mabalacat Sugar Co. H. acting asa land registration court. 1964—RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and approved by the Presidentpursuant to the request. Inc.. A. Green failed to obtain said loan. Record No. the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. constitutes a permanent improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877.O. owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat. G.750 and said credit of P22. 1960—the Municipal Board. As to the alleged sale of said machinery and equipment to the plaintiff and appellant after they had been permanently incorporated with the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co.. was not permanent in character inasmuch as B. The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a.. 1966. The Torrens Title expressly states thatthe City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land • September 20. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Issue: the ownership of the reclaimed land. Bercilles – L-40474. but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay. A. it isthe property of the State. was transferred thereby. 1920 –Title No. presided by then Vice-Mayor AntonioVillegas. without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.

v. has notshown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private orpatrimonial property. Ct. [NOTE: For public use if ANYBODY can use. 29 Sup. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned. as long as the purpose is for a public service (governmental service like public education. 1912. 53 S. 338. PEA also sought to have 290. Argued October 30. ed.Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO. Art. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI. the properties would be of public dominion. 56 L.. BUT if we follow the law of Municipal Corporations (and not the Civil Code). Decided November 11. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3. since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial. The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in itsprivate or corporate capacity with its own funds. The possession of a municipality. HELD: No. Mr. JEREMIAH J. 2nd paragraph itself says “without prejudice to the provisions (or PRINCIPLES) of special laws. whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. No. 13] of the town. properties. does not exceed $25.000. – L-24440. It is this law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. 424 of the Civil Code. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This suit was brought by the Archbishop of Manila to recover a square in the municipality of Victoria. Meneses | Torres. and on the other in that of the custom by which the plaza is of the essence of a [226 U. Consequently. 12. they are available to the general public). they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. • TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Ct. City of Zamboanga.R. are alienable lands of the public domain. HARTY. 31 Sup.S. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. and Ker & Co. but the land not occupied by them was declared by the supreme court to constitute the public square or plaza [226 U. but this title should be deemed tobe held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the Cityof Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation Therefore. the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns.S. and high school playgrounds.' We doubt whether the affidavits do not imply the same admission. Rep.000 for the land in dispute. local administration). Appt. b) If the Civil Code classifi cation is used. Furthermore. Coudert and Harry W.S. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES. Philippine Islands. Issues: a) Are the properties mentioned. conformably with Art. • Lunod et al filed a complaint alleging that there exists in favor of their rice fields a statutory easement for more than 20 years before 1901 and praying that Meneses be ordered to remove the obstructions that impede the passage of water through Paraanan.it is valid. as was done in Santos v. 'notwithstanding the fact that. 13. 12 MGR. Secondly. under Art. 432. Rep. 2. it appears that the value of the parcel of land for which judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant municipality. Rep. But the result is the same if we go further. 599. 226 U. 424. Couden.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. 2. 28.S. HARTY v. Felix Frankfurter for appellee and defendant in error. [NOTE: Had they been owned by the STATE. and could not be with any seriousness. ownership of 77. and the others seemingly mean that the parcel of land with the church buildings included is worth $30.000. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed. and whether the action should not be dismissed on that ground. They should fall under the control of the State. The suit is like an ordinary action at law. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.S.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. 420. the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. 223 U. L. 55 S. only the high school playgrounds are for public use (in the sense that generally. Carino v.]. such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2.000 on the manifestly untenable ground that the church edifices are deprived of free egress and ingress by the decision.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands. The plaintiff brought a writ of error and appealed. and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. Frederic R. public health. therefore. 1912. Philippine Islands. and all the rest are PATRIMONIAL (since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. 1968 FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga del Norte andZamboanga del Sur). the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE. v. the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted astrustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exerciseof its legitimate powers. devoted to public uses.” The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. 14] town. 1908 FACTS • Plaintiifs (Appellees) Nicolas Lunod and 7 others are owners of farmlands on the upper estates near a lake (Calalaran). otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. 449.S. Affidavits to that effect are offered.Ratio:1.Is Republic Act No. the buildings being valued at $25.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay. Ct. Paraan is the only outlet of water to the river from the lands of Lunod et al during rainy season. No. 32 Sup. that the supreme court was not authorized to review the evidence under 497 of the Philippine Code. since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290. Mr. 595. Republic Act No. such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of itsinhabitants. for public service if only AUTHORIZED persons can use. There is no question of law before us. 635 . now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA. and although we were invited to consider it on the one side in the light of the relation of the church to the community. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. and damages thereto resulting from the aforesaid judgment. • In 1901 Meneses converted the land in Paraan to a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net prevented the free passage of water through Paraan causing flood and damage of plantations in the upper estates. excepting those acquired with its own funds in its privateor corporate capacity. they are patrimonial. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. ISSUE . Ct.000. Rep. a private corporation. Lunod et al vs. 334. • Defendant-Appellant Higno Meneses is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land in Paraanan adjoining said lake on one side and a river on the other. 884. either under the dueprocess clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. and Plff. Van Dyke for appellant and plaintiff in error. 463 . 4118does not.212 U. 284. for it hardly was argued. 623. exclusive of the value of the adjoining parcel of land with the church and convent situated thereon. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157. 12. properties for public use or patrimonial? b) Should the city pay for said properties? HELD: a) If we follow the Civil Code classifi cation. a private corporation. 212 U. 664. 890. and they are admitted to be church property. and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. and the order allowing the writ purports to do so on affidavits of the plaintiff and two others. it is the property of the State. leaving $5. The 592. or that this court can consider whether it was right in finding the preponderance of evidence to be on the defendant's side. J. in Err. since they are not for public use. the legislature can transfer itsadministration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Messrs. 268 . L. the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. 29 Sup. we can do neither.S. et al. 456 .S. by admission of counsel for plaintiff. title to which is recognized to be in the plaintiff. they would not have been patrimonial but would have been properties of public dominion — for this would include public service. 12 (1912) 226 U. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. Appeal and writ of error dismissed. 4223 | August 19. and can be brought to this court only by writ of error. The presumption is that such land came from the State upon thecreation of the municipality. There is a motion to dismiss the writ of error also.000. The affidavit of the plaintiff puts the value of the land in controversy at over $25. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building. G. on the ground that the value of the real estate in controversy does not exceed $25. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA. Mar.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain.]. Holy Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church. Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that — “All buildings. Firstly. 221 U. suffer from any constitutional infirmity Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. par. The appeal must be dismissed.’’ Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. 53 L.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. The City of Manila. ed. 594. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI. hospital and leprosarium sites. although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple. certain school sites. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA. The church of the town and its parish house stand in this square. The evidence was contradictory. ed. Jover y Costas v. If it failed to getfrom the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as itspatrimonial property. of the ownership of 77. while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial. ed.

R. for the delivery of the amount of P13. Thus. Hence. True. undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt secured according to the yearly balance. RATIO • Where a statutory easement exists between adjoining estates. for the purpose of preventing the salt waters of the river flooding (at high tide) not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake.R. dikes. the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Notwithstanding the fact that NPC only occupied the sub-terrain portion. and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision. Was there taking of the property considering that the owners were deprived of their beneficial use and enjoyment of the same. No. For this reason. But Lunod et al cannot prevent the defendant from building works to prevent his lands against influx of waters. Is the contention correct? Why? No. and amended on 23 March 1928. Section 9. This is so because. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process. in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. the payment of the bonus being made at once. or otherwise. NPC contended that if ever it is liable. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry. it should be made to pay the value of the land from the time it constructed the tunnels. Ibrahim. The valuation should be based at the time of the discovery of the construction of the underground tunnels. No. 2007 The NPC constructed underground tunnels on the property of the respondents without their knowledge and consent and without any expropriation proceeding. VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY. G. than the money equivalent of said property. petitioner continued their development and construction.. • Since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water.. Talisay-Silay Milling [G. PLDT. June 29. The complaint further prays that the sugar central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus. occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossess the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use. ET AL. Article III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property. descend from more elevated lands.R.. Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title it presented. 168732. The manner in which the easement was created by the NPC. or any other device. irrigation ditches. no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. the nature of the easement practically deprived the owners of its normal beneficial use. private respondents as actual possessors. was indebted to the PNB. It contended that it constructed an easement on the property. et al. JUNE 29. the circumstance of which is not found in the case facts. and never determines the actual title to an estate. and to pay Bachrach Motors HELD: Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. v.WON Meneses can be permitted to obstruct the flow of waters through his lands. if he has in favor priority in time.] En Banc. Inc. which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying for it. validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over the property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. and other similar works of the government or any public enterprise. • The Civil Code allows that every owner may enclose his property by means of walls. Romualdez (J): 7 concurring Facts: On 22 December 1923. he has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. In view of this. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. fences. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of their parcel of land into a subdivision. First. Noteworthy. NPC could have. neither shall the owner of the latter construct any work that may increase the easement. the court advised that it is perhaps useful and advantageous to all parties that Meneses be made to build a another dike in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan. 20 (1969)). 168732. The owners are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Thereafter. Ibrahim.. violated the due process rights of the owners as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Inc.EMINENT DOMAIN . by a resolution passed on the same date.850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable on 30 June 1930. . To secure the payment of its debt. Inc. G. September 17. or in part from time to time. it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the same. landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA. Title is not involved. 2007). Whatver may be the character of his prior possession. aqueducts. entitled to just compensation? Yes. Secondly. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law. the aforesaid central. Using this standard. et al. but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. NPC took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. as the owners of the property thus expropriated. it is liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s property.. the improvements introduced in no way contributed to an increase in the value of the land. (NPC v. when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded. but his right is limited by the easement with which his estate is charged. Bachrach Motors v. NPC V. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and without the intervention of man. are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less.R. such evidence doesn’t responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. 2007). the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable? Yes. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under that mortgage. but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the river during the heavy rains. the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. 35223.. free of charge. The owners. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense.. Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property. NO. or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment. The court must then see to it that the taking is for pubic use. an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the bank. 1931. (NPC v. it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for the land. Private respondents were occupying the land and petitioner advised them to vacate but they refused. In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize the owners’ ownership of the sub-terrain portion. <It seems Mariano Lacson Ledesma is indebted from Bachrach Motor. and had funds which might be so used. But. hence. No. dividends. It did not notify the owners and wrongly assumed that it had the right to dig the tunnels under their property. to mortgage their land to the bank.. 168732. IBRAHIM.> Bachrach Motor Co. Section 112 of the Public Land Act provides that land granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways. Andaya’s transfer certificates of title contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act. June 29. thereby impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates. at any time. the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to the property. It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law. the owner of the lower lands must not construct any work that may impair or obstruct an easement which consists in receiving the waters which naturally. The underground tunnels imposed limitations on the owners’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprived them of its ordinary use. “Taking”. and in expropriation cases. (Rep. the Court of Appeals declared that all Republic needs to do is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay any just compensation. it succeeded in inducing its planters. G. violence or terror. Significantly. as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma. HELD NO. though. can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. 136 Phil. To it to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be grossly unfair. Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation.

the phrase “u otras analogas” refers only to rents or income.Rule 70. sown or planted in good faith. according to the annual balance. for it amends substantially the judgment sought tobe executed and is. for how much. that the present suit us barred by res judicate by virtue of the decision of theMunicipal Court.Neither party appealed. The Municipal Court over-stepped itsbounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forcedlease". "II. Upon discovery.. Right of remotion onlyavailable if he chose the latter and the owner of the buildingcannot pay The owner of the land. However. payable by the lesseeto the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent isdue. according to the resolution of the central granting it. and thetime to which the option may be exercised In the decision of Judge Felix. Bonus not a civil fruit.rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portionwith the rights of a possessor in good faith. and certain kinds of income." 2. Agustin Dumlao GR L57348 16 May 1985Facts: Depra is the owner of a parcel of land to which Dumlao. Hence.a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. after havingchosen to sell his land. as well as theperiod of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise theiroption either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land. the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co.After hearing. Besides. and the defendants as lessees. not an income of the land The amount of the bonus.is null and void. He is entitled to such remotion only when. Thus. thus the Municipal Court rendered it judgment that reads:Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with theplaintiffs. which is anencumbrance on real property. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null andvoid The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove theirbuildings from the land belonging to Hilario and Dres only becausethe latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land. upon the other hand. Hilario and Dres prayed foran order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to paythe Ignacios for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot. Useful expenses shall be refundedto the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. or other similar sources of revenue. Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning theownership of a parcel of land. in accordance with article361 of the Civil Code. all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. the judgment rendered by Judge Felix hasnever become final.Furthermore. And upon conclusion of the hearing. third. or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) arestraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by JudgeNatividad. and within whattime may the option be exercised. either to pay for the building or to sell his land to theowner of the building. with costs against Hilarion and Dres. 448. may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance. In the Municipal Court. Sec. the income from perpetual or life annuities. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land.In the trial court it was proven that Dumlao was a builder in goodfaith. Article 361 provides that “The owner of landon which anything has been built.DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null andvoid ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession. whereas decisions affecting lease. Depra did not accept the paymentof rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the MunicipalCourt. to wit: the rent of a building. TalisaySilay answered the complaint that Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s credit (P7. itsDecision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to thesubject complaint for Queting of Title. The PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus. Felipe Natividad).076.00) pesos a month. or sell to them the residential lot forP45. in the last instance. PNB appealed.” The “civil fruits” the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things. these particulars havingbeen left for determination apparently after the judgment hasbecome final.. is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he ispaid the value of his building. for after the judgment hasbecome final. over thedisputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters.500) belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchase it. Inc. for the adjectives “otras” and “analogas” agree with the noun “rentas. Judiciary Act of 1948. the proper rent. under article 453.Depra then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao. livingin an adjoining lot.the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidencepresented by the parties.After the trial of the case. The judgmentin a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them thesum of P2. It is neither rent of buildings. the cause of action was thedeprivation of possession. and it ordered the central to deliver said sum to Bachrach Motors. 2. underarticle 361. offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. furthermore. Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First. Sec. no additions can be made thereto and nothing can bedone therewith except its execution.the latter admitted the encroachment but alleged.500 part of the credit in question. proceeds from lease of lands. acted without jurisdiction. but it failed todetermine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they areerected as well as the periods of time within which the option maybe exercised and payment should be made. without express finding as to costs. for a"builder in good faith" under Article 448. which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. After such hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. has the option. shallhave the right to appropriate as his own the work. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7. in a motion filed in the same CFI (now handled byrespondent Judge Hon. after the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453and 454.shall have the rightto . it is not civil fruits of that land. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainercase "shall not bar an action between the same parties respectingtitle to the land.” as do also the other adjectives “perpetuas” and “vitalicias. Rules of Court).02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma’s bonus. theperson who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase invalue which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof. 7. the rule on res judicata would not apply due to differencein cause of action. jurisdiction overwhich belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)(Sec. the other party fails to pay for the same. Original decision did not become final as it failed todetermine the value of the buildings and of the lot. is not based upon the value. which is something quite distinct from and independent of the property referred to. the motion was granted by Judge Natividad. Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of theDecision of theMunicipal Court. and the lease shall commence on the day that this decisionshall have become final. the rent of land. the proceeds from leases of lands. 44(b). as lessors. had built a kitchen that encroached an area of 34square meters. Moran) Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaintagainst Damian. or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code.the sheriff being ignorant as to how. for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma authorizing the central to deliver to him the sum of P7.. sowing orplanting. had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11. 1. while in the action to quiet title. Depra’s mother wrote ademand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment. and. 1. As the bonus is not obtained from the land. even if the Decisionwere valid.the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their ownexpense and to restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot. ART. the rights of both parties were welldefined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. Whether or not the Municipal Court’s decision was null and void abinitio because it has no jurisdiction over the case?II.Francisco Depra vs. second. the period of time within which the Ignacios may payfor the land. as it found no merit in the appeal. partly rice-land and partly residential. but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured.Issue:I. Furthermore.500. Whether or not the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRAconform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law. According to the context of the law. butonly the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until suchexpenses are made good to him. Article 453 providesthat “Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. a lease is an interest in real property. the causeof action was based on ownership. we hold the same to be null and void. IGNACIO v HILARIO (1946. and. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell hisland to the owner of the building. it having left matters to be settled for itscompletion in a subsequent proceeding. 3. importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property. and the one who sowed. The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by JudgeNatividad and ordered the lower court to hold a hearing in theprincipal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildingsand of the residential lot where they are erected. and that the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void. a "possessor in good faith"under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448?Held:I. The procedure is erroneous.000 for the buildings. matters which remainedunsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the present case. therent to be paid is five (P5. the lower court under Judge Alfonso Felix. The encroachment was discovered in a relocationsurvey of Depra’s property.” He cannothowever refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land andcompel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where itis erected. Since the Municipal Court. The owner of the land on which anything has been builtsown or planted in good faith. 7. and certainty no authority isvested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial discretion. 4.129). Right of retention of builder in good faith The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned byanother. the rents of buildings. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by purchase in good faith. And execution cannot be had.Subsequently.She then filed a case of Unlawful Detainer against Dumlao.

as Lot No. Respondents. FACTS: Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. RO-72 (138). Because of constantly flowing water. sowing or planting.However. IAC Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain. 5 as he had manifested before theMunicipal Court. (Article 361. Navarro. et al. the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building. After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA’s lot made on November 2. The landowner cannot refuse both toappropriate or sell the land. owns an adjoining lot. he attempted registry again. then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. If such be the case. the otherparty fails to pay for the same LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA VS. The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease. 310. 311 has only 230 square meters. the Municipal Court. have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners. DEPRA V. Borbon. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative. the alleged sketch plan of the resurvey was not presented in evidence. or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement.00 from the filing of the complaint until they actually vacate the same. The more workable solution. Itwas assumed that the wife’s mother was the owner of the land.appropriate as his own the works. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No. petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the land in question is part of the adjoining land. et al. the court shall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing supplied)Pursuant to the foregoing provision. Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment. 311 of the resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party plaintiff. Lot No. His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. SARMIENTO V. 448. He is entitled to such removal only when... it would seem. his mother. DEPRA has the option either topay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen. In such case. Upon the other hand. Iloilo. 6 In this case. Then a new party surfaced. respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. And what is more. and the one who sowed.e.and the one who sowed. 310. but DEPRA refused to sell. It is this property he sought to register. the court shall fix the terms thereof. Article 448 of the new). Insuch case. RO-72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land. orto oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. The court conceded in the MCs decision that Dumlao is a builder in good faith. afterhaving chosen to sell his encroached land. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same application. DUMLAO fails to pay forthe same. was identified as Lot No. on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. or to sell theencroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. according to petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contiguous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest? Held: Petitioners' stand is untenable. The Director of Lands. buy that portion of the house standing on their land. as owners of the land. He is entitled to suchdemolition only when after having chosen to sell the land. stating the he leased part of the property sought to be registered. Gregorio Bongato's lot. and to compel the builder to removeit from the land on which it is located. Rivera. and in the proper case. The spouses then consigned the amount in court. and to sell theencroached part of his land. Sarmiento did not exercise any of the options.which would eventually transfer to the spouses. the proper rent. expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo. The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public domain (remember. and should they fail to do so. It cannot be registered. 50 Phil. the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith. claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a portion of his land. even if the accretion results from rivers emptying into the sea. and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court. their predecessor in interest. et al. the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA’s property. therefore. Yumul vs. if the owner of the land doesnot choose to appropriate the building or trees after properindemnity. In that survey.However. Pascual . i. Held: Owner of the land on which improvement was built by another in good faith is entitled to removal of improvement only after landowner has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same. he shall pay reasonable rent. Of course. accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). extra land of about 17hectares (that’s about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the northern most section of the property. The Petitioners alleged that the said property became a subject of a cadastral survey due to conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and incase of disagreement. The story begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on the northern section of his existing property. defendant-appellant. AGANA129 SCRA 122 FACTS: While Ernesto Valentino was still courting his wife. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in interest as part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title No.. it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered by the Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in interest. But that manifestation is not binding because it wasmade in a void proceeding. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees." without more. HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. after payment to the builder of necessary and useful expenses. acted without jurisdiction. afterpayment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. situated in the municipality of Dumangas. then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. he shall pay reasonable rent. 13). Agustin Dumlao. Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question. In this case. petitioners. old Civil Code. plus attorney's fees and costs. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy. Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. is the owner of a parcel of land registered. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new). The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith. then the court shall fix the same. Sarmiento filed an ejectmentsuit to which the trial court found out that the spouses arepossessors in good faith and ordered Sarmiento to exercise optionbased on Art 448. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. His current registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay River. while the sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No. However. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. Res judicata doesn’t apply wherein the first case was for ejectment and the other was for quieting of title. DUMLAO had expressed his willingness topay for the land. sowing or planting.. ART. AURORA BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ GR L-12486 31 AUG 1960 Facts: The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square meters of residential land which they have inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos Bongato and Eusebia. the proper rent.. has become inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it.1972. vs. which belonged to their predecessor in interest. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. It turned out thatSarmiento was the owner of the land. 791. and. THE COURT OF APPEALS. Said title has not been contested up to the present. the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Factsin the Court of First Instance. is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have thekitchen removed. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. When DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot. The former were ordered by the to vacate and deliver it to said respondents and to pay a monthly rental of P10. latter’s motheroffered a lot for the construction of house by the spouses. 64 Phil. It was thus error for the Trial Court tohave ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession.ISSUE: Whether or not Sarmiento can refuse to exercise the givenoptions HELD: Negative. however. Well settled is the rule that a Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of the period within which it may be impugned (Reyes. after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548. or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. were found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. After trial. He cannot refuseto pay for the encroaching part of the building. filed an action for Unlawful Detainer. In 1960. DUMLAO 136 SCRA 475 FACTS: Francisco Depra.

During the appeal. the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by specialworks expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of land. (2) that it bemade through the effects of the current of the water. Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. public domain). Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. We agreewith the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers…. the Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case. Hermenegilda AbejoRivera. the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title. private respondents submit the fact of accretion without human intervention because thetransfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete. Alluvion must be theexclusive work of nature. Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperialand Mario C. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the waterin the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on theside of the pilapil facing the riverThe reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is tocompensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. while old. petitioner. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility. DE GUIA.R. The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore whatever right he had over the subject properties. and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacentto the banks of rivers.City of Manila. there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the currentof the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. When the private respondents transferred theirdikes towards the river bed. ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens system.xxx…xxx…xxx… However. MANUEL T. The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the Government. 120864 CASE DOCTRINES . Unfortunately. Vicente. (Cortes v. on account of his ten limited financial situation. it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. It is under two meters of water. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. The lower and appellate court allowed registration but this was opposed by the government. Pascual’s heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. and thus. Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3. form part of the public domain. the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute. This excludes from Art. If there’s any land to be claimed. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible. (BUT the confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved. If estates bordering onrivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions. This law. Theland sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on thefishpond adjoining it. or for the coast-guard service. said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements. HELD: There is no accretion if by man-made causes. claim. or for the establishment of special industries. and the deed. it is proper that therisk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. Unfortunately. On 1975. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. The Apellate court granted petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers. HELD: It cannot be registered. Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the property during the redemption period. OF THE PHIL. two indispensable requisites must concur. Furthermore. Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. representedby his Attorney-in-Fact. Hence. the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. This is land of Public domain. the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part of public domain. he had lost whatever right ha had over the lots. (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river. CA. it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. The matter went to the SC. his original land registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. REP. Registration cannot be allowed.lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. ET. PROPERTY) To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE. REPUBLIC V. vs. and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. VS.Petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because whatactually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of theMeycauayan River. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes absolute. Manila Bay is a sea. PDIC (CIVIL. ABEJO.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. No. encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown in fact invalid or inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. AL. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo and certification of sale. REDEMPTION.Article 457 of the NCC. ISSUE/S: WON there was accretion HELD: There is no accretion. 1866 provides as follows: Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea.2003 Oct 8 1st Division G. In the instant case. the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the saidproperty was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.On the other hand. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request. It was only 15 years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Azucena Tancinco Reyes. Stated simply. FACTS: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco. 10 Phil. hence. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effectof the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. Clearly thus. in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition tothe application for registration. Thisexcludes from Art. namely: the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of action. requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particularprovision is said to have taken place. CA 132 SCRA 514 FACTS: Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. if there is any accretion to speak of. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible. 567). holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and declared as private property capable of alienation. the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property fromthe destructive force of the waters of the river LUCASAN V. not manila bay. Certainly. The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Tancinco filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.: Case Doctrine: The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river isindispensable. They are the registered owners of parcel of lot bordering on the Bocaue and Meycauyan rivers. Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. The law is clear on this. respondents. and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house. In the lattercase. the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells inthe house. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME. and recovery of ownership (accion dereivindicacion). However. plaintiffsappellees. the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. if thesubject is a residential house.4. fruits. right of enjoyment The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. on August 17. Vicenta. However. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz. 1876. Abejo’s contentions: 1. FACTS:Petition for Review on Certiorari. ownership over approximately 39.CA decision: affirmed the RTC.if there is an agreement to lease the house. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents.In case the coowners agree to lease a building owned in common. and there is no lease agreement. they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion.Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person. purpose Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person.3. 5. accion publiciana. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer (accion interdictal). The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. as a necessary consequence of such recognition.Issue 1: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner.220 square meters Notes (Case Digests Property) DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJO’s damage and prejudice. the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the buildingin favor of private respondent. A co-owner has noright to demand a concrete. No. a nuncupative will in Vigan. DE GUIA alleged:1. asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39. /adsum RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL. Francisca. use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND. but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.if there is an agreement to lease the house.R. the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtainrecognition of the co-ownership. or agree to lease it. defendants-appellants. wereiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior topartition as follows:It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned.Ruling: Article 487 of the Civil Code provides. and products thereof. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.Co-owner may file an action against a co-owner. if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners. they exercise the right of dominion. the only effect of such actionis a recognition of the co-ownership. Thus. the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar). her sole and universal heirs of all her property.611 square meters as well aspay damages. RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. Prior to her death. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-ownedproperty. the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the propertybecause as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinatepart of the property.611 square meters out of the FISHPOND’s total area of 79. which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess. It held that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the . surnamed Ortiz y Felin. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Co-ownership.5. The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physicalpossession only. ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole. however. It would be unjust to require the co-owner topay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property. and there is no lease agreement. falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as heronly heir. The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house. Ilocos Sur.However. where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-ownersfor the exploitation of an industry. all thatthe co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. which is truly abstract becauseuntil there is partition. 4. In 1888. Accion dereivindicacion. vs. if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners. ABEJO shall exercise an equalright to possess. ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying orsegregating their respective portions. 1912 Nov 18 1st Division G.xxxxFollowing the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.As such. executed. they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession.2. Calixta. judicial or extrajudicial partition is theproper recourse. Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom. Thus. the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. however.To recapitulate. 4656 FACTS: Appeal by bill of exceptions.2. Hence. The plaintiff cannotseek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. which seeks the recovery of ownership. In the lattercase. the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. named Manuel. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIAfrom the FISHPOND. Moreover. whereby she made her four children. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set bylaw. specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division iseffected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion. all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extentpossible. ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him topossess the entire FISHPOND. judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND betweenABEJO and DE GUIA. “*a+ny one of the co owners may bring an action in ejectment.Ruling: The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equalshares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking. recovery of possession (accion publiciana). such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. a co-owner cannot retain it for his usewithout paying the proper rent. the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses. However. all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extentpossible.Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DEGUIA. ince a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA.Issue 2: WON it is proper for a co-owner to pay for rents while using the property. Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. ABEJO’s ownership of the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and clai med ownership over anundivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA’s sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as abuilder in good faith.In Hermogena G. Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan. However. they must bear the consequences. the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the propertyand should share in its net profits. Each co-owner maydemand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownershipunder certain conditions.Simply stated. without judicial authorization.RTC decision: in favor of Abejo. As co-owners. in 1875 and 1882. to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. if thesubject is a residential house.” This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. and Matilde. Conversely. the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed. he is the owner of the ½ undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered Register of Deedsof Bulacan. also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trialcourt. Conversely. nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement.In his Answer. but also againstanother co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. respectively. However. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased. Hence. we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a coowner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. If they fail toexercise any of these options. leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.

Vicenta Ortiz. RULING: Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: “Each co-owner may use the things owned in common. Hence this appeal. Grace. al. FACTS: Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.200 each. As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters. nor did she prevent the latter from living therein. thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. Respondents have not lost their right to redeem. Art. and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. joint ownership over the pro indiviso property. 2004 . CA. with a few modification.REDEMPTION BY A CO-OWNER Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership. and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano. the 30-day period has not even begun to run. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo. SC held that ½ of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1. Admittedly. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. Norma. BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.” Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story. CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case.) Also rent was awarded 1. RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. the country was in a turmoil. The defendant Matilde. Antonia. 222 SCRA 736. Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. the coownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.CO-OWNERSHIP Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand. owing to the insurrection. FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. by so doing. Lina. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership. this petition. therefore. much less. that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered. provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it. and for this reason. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu. were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties. Lina. Grace Gosengfiao. CFI denied the motion. nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned. in the house of joint ownership. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano. ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the coowned property. ISSUE: A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial? ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY: B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent? RULING: A) YES. but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coowner of the property. Severo. Corollary to this rule. Thus. OCAMPO et al vs. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent. these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta. especially during several years when.R. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares. Jr. Emma. as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent. MARIANO V. the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property. et. 150707 April 14. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement. but the record shows no proof that. Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners. defendant. until a division be made. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs. Francisco died in without paying the debt. In other words. That motion was denied by the lower court. The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired. After their father’s death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905. it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter. Emma. for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors. It is the discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the defendants. Carlos. for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property. Norma. B) YES. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. the case was then remanded to the trial court. in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house. in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. CA | GOSIENGFIAO. In his lifetime. for the reason that. when she left these Islands for Spain. No. her sister Vicenta. Lina. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. and were in the care of the last named. ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership? HELD: No. because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. and. Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. and Matilde Ortiz. it will not end to the existing state of coownership. a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default. nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. Ester. thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. CA for Grace Gosiengfia. plaintiff. in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. AGUILAR V. OCAMPO et al Leave a comment OCAMPO et al vs.. the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants. assisted by her husband. did not injure the interests of her coowner.defendant party. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3.200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate. either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand. it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. and Jacinto. designed for use as a dwelling. but later they agreed on equal shares. Francisco. OCAMPO et al G. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others.

they acquired 3parcels of land and. in lieu thereof aTCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee. It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property — commencing in 1948 and eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 1984 — it was only after 1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof NOTES: 1. Adolfo Ocampo declared his “exclusive ownership” of the property. peaceful. As mentioned earlier. The Deed of Donation. its revocation or rescission cannot be effected. petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself. requiring Fidela and Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering said properties. that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs . and that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof. fraternal affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. however. absent any legal ground therefor. sufficient means for their own support and that of all their relatives who. as she had no more property against which she had an interest to declare.and. both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters. a parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua. in full ownership or in usufruct. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property 5. adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest. Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question. that in 1987. in *the+ concept of owner without any claim of other persons. ‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses. which is the prior document. Likewise. Hence this petition. Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984. the law provides that donors should reserve. this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration. petitioners could not show any title. Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed. On the other hand. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings.”20 2. they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable and unjustified actuations. between the parties and their successors in interest. public. at the time of the declaration. 4. are by law entitled to be supported by them. the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property? HELD: WHEREFORE. in this Deed of Absolute Sale. At any rate. one of the original petitioners in this case. petitioner. they should have relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim. Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered as a declaration against interest. no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement] SULPICIO CARVAJAL. Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating that she. The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to writing. had been paying real estate taxes on the property. such as: 1. since her right over the property had already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. 3. Fidela. they begot ten (10) children. The document dated in 1948. a donation is final. Having filed an action involving property. Once perfected. tax receipt or document to prove their ownership. left the following properties. Fidela could not have acknowledged co-ownership. the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled and. 2 of them. brothers and sisters. executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties. “having been acquired by purchase*. respondents. lived. Without any proof. 3. Camarines Sur ‘that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them. she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land. is clearly inconsistent with the document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by petitioners. further ordering Fidela and Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs . and that Fidela had entered the property.FACTS: The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo. A donation may in fact comprehend the entire property of the donor. A statement may be admissible as such a declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify. Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement of co-ownership. because a co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others. That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito. In this case. at the time of the acceptance of the donation. all to the exclusion of petitioners.+ and *having+ been in [his] continuous. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS. and Felicidad are respondents herein. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of another who accepts it. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement — assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven — the property had already been donated to Belen. 2. and even put up businesses on the property. was acknowledged before a notary public. referring to the subject property. Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. the same failed. The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership. Co-ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia. The CA affirmed with modifications (for damages) the said ruling. vs. an agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon. who is now represented by her heirs. and there can be. Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim. and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. upon their death. the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest. ‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo. In addition to the TCT presented. ISSUE: At bottom. 3) at the time of the declaration. Jul . both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents. 2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant. co-ownership among the parties cannot be presumed. Thus. To be sure. and 4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true The Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant Fidela. On the other hand. Respondent Belen proved that in 1953. on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor. and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners. lot a is the subject of this case. ‘In their complaint. actually occupied it. The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following properties. as owner. between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. the Petition is hereby DENIED. ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the TCT. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were blood relatives. that because of their relationship. Only one of them. that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so.

He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete. CA: . by possession for over 30 years. MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots. married to Blas Sorono b) Tito Dignos ¼ share in the two lots. 1. both dead. represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim. maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA. who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter. which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. The Republic. specific. except when personal rights are involved. Before partition. each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate. and assuming arguendo that it did not have just title. CAAs successor-in-interest. Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. REPUBLIC VS. to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security. to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Lapu-lapu City. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents 2. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO G. ¼ share in the two lots. Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by a co-heir. Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in BailonCasilao v. the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. Faustina. 2008 FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in four equal shares: a) Francisca Dignos. through acquisitive prescription. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15. In the case at bar. Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold. 1964. meter land originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds.8 sq. Petitioner occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children.00 until the property is surrendered to them.25 Facts: EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS who are husband and wife. The land subject of the controversy is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos. the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. shall be limited. Espique in favor of respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. NO. Hence. Held: The respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute. having bought the same from Evaristo G. After their death their five children. acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. An individual co. Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored. namely: Maria. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO Leave a comment REPUBLIC VS. 1964. c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents and d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents ¼ share in the two lots ¼ share in the two lots. However. consisting of 150. Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title. Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot. exclusive. a co-heir can only sell his successional rights. or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.R. and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. that is. No. assign or mortgage it. erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families. situated in Poblacion. with respect to the co-owners. The trial court found for respondents. 171571 March 24. pro-indiviso. Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value. respectively. Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition of the ¼ share of Tito Dignos. shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 1967 and which respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo on April 15. The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. continuous. by mandate of the same article. upon the partition of the estate subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. more or less. who was awarded ¼ share in the two lots. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage. meters. neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute. They also demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property all P40. Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. In 1996. the present petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: 1. What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. Ratio: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code. sold the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled ”Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale” without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots. assign or mortgage it. Respondent court’s ruling that the sale by Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. it had. had instituted a complaint before the CFI for ejectment and recovery of possession against SULPICIO CARVAJAL. the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the coowners. the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents HELD: the petition is denied It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees. it has been in open. Tayug. petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches. the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo. alleging that they are the owners of a parcel of commercial land. Evaristo.owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. and notorious possession thereof. Pangasinan. for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code. At all events. and he may therefore alienate.

Petitioners’ insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. ReyesFacts:Lourdes Reyes was the widow of Rodolfo Reyes. coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. or work. Kee no longer had any right over the subje ctproperty and must pay rentals for its use. is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos. Jardinico filed acomplaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ofBacolod City.The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract with Kee has rescinded for Kee’s failure to pay installments. wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots were registered: x x x x That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have been lost and/or destroyed… and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS. Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation.R.Article 160 then prescribes that all properties of the marriage are presumed tobe conjugal and covered by the CPG unless . any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale. The burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it.Lourdes. Milagros. The property was designated as Lot 9. undertake and agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession. herein petitioner a parcel ofland at Pleasantville Subdivision. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith. COURT OF APPEALSG. having been the default propertyregime during the time of Lourdes' marriage. The property regime applicable is the CPG. their heirs. it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share. In 1975. Thus. only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred. to whom he allegedly "put into custody" some of the couple's conjugal properties. and.herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser. Such properties include the following. Rodolfo. or as salary of the spouses. Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused. Hence spouses Kee had their residence.however. he was no longer so and must pay rentals from the time thathe was given notice to vacate the lot. if not ordinary. Joaquino. could not make a valid claim of ownership. in the course of their marriage. be considered by the court in rendering judgment. contends that she purchased the mentioned properties in her exclusive capacity. whether the acquisition be for the partnership. At any rate. rents or interests received or due during the marriage. Bacolod City. then extraordinary. thus: rebutted and proven otherwise. the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to thesale. died and was later represented by her children with Rodolfo. not of the actual purchase price. Phase II. TorresEnterprises. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith ashe was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT null and void. registered under Joaquino's name. Inc. 8.a store and other improvements constructed on the wrong lot.This is because under the aforementioned codal provision. NO. thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. the trial court granted Lourdes' complaint. does not lie. The appellate court was not informed of this deal. successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law x x x x NOTES: As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be ¼ of the prevailing market value. or for only one of the spouses. Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition.(3) The fruits. without prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest. Subsequently. the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. Subject properties fall squarely within the said categories.Issue:WON the properties in question were conjugalWON the petitioner's common-law relationship with Rodolfo validates her claim ofownershipHeld:Yes. 79688 253 SCRA 10 FEBRUARY 1. however. since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates. which is only ¼ undivided share of the two lots. PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. because the funds used to pay thehouse off was sourced from Rodolfo's earnings as part of the conjugal partnership. having been married in 1947 in Manila. due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity.Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C. Said properties specifically include his earnings and retirement benefits from working as the Vice Presidet and Comptroller of Warner Barns and two cars. Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos. and that damages be awarded. (2) the property. the CA likewise held that the property had been paid outof the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes.T. or of either of them. Octavianohowever mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. Lourdes then prayed that the properties be declared conjugal.As to Joaquino's claim of having the benefit of co-ownership conferred by the common-law relationship under Article 144 of the Civil Code (in connection with Article 148 of the Family Code). having failed to prove that she was financially capable and that she purchased said properties in her exclusive capacity. This decision is. However. It furtherruled that the award of rental was without basis. That the HEIRS-VENDORS. however. since. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription.Even if assuming that he was in good faith. The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. assigns and successors. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled thatpetitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless of the outcomeof the decision. therefore. Jurisprudence holds that for Article 144 to apply. Upon appeal to the CA. as enumerated by Article 153:(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund. that she had was never a beneficiary of the latter's earnings. (1) the respondents received just compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government. As mentioned earlier. Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kee’s wife Donabelle to inspec t Lot No.Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement butthey failed. the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale. such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be considered dismissed and withouteffect. Issue: From the foregoing. CTTEI through an employee. J. that Milagrossurrenders the possession thereof. And since Rodolfo and Joaquino were incapacitated to marry due to Rodolfo's marriage with Lourdes. Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his and hisignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein petitioner and CTTEI.As early as 1923. along with the fact that she had children with him. this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his. an auto repair shop. she cannot validly invokethe right conferred. 2. But to no avail. on the other hand. the law is not on its side. and that her living together with Rodolfo for nineteen (19) years. that she had no knowledge of the Rodolfo's first marriage. had illicit relations with one Milagros Joaquino. to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice. the couple must not have any legalimpediment to contract a marriage. the sale by the vendor. 1996PONENTE: PANGANIBAN. (CTTEI) which is the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner. Under the contract Keewas allowed to take possession of the property even before full payment of the price.Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deedof sale. so it claims. Milagros reiterated her stand and questioned the findings of the trialcourt. and that the amount herein stated was used to pay off theloan and monthly mortgage of a house in Paranaque. provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of Petitioner is not without any remedy. It was in fact due to thenegligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. NO. Joaquino vs. Eldred laterdiscovered that the property he purchased had improvements introduced therein by respondent WilsonKee. the Court reiterated that the said provision is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage.(2) That which is obtained by the industry. however. their heirs.

Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8.The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years which had expiredsometime in 1959 but that the heirs allowed Bomedco to continue usingthe land because one of them was then an employee of the company. but not ownership. To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k.Bomedco.75 worth of wines.. No. and subsequently. for several years. the owners of the nearby hacienda.Since the contract of pledge was valid. had been using the said roads to transport their products. In 1912.which was delivered to a third person (R. a perfect contract of pledge underarticles 1857 and 1863 of the Civil Code. Having held the property by virtue of an easement. For forty years.Garcia as the depositary. Garcia bygiving him the warehouse keys. Rodriguez) of the bankReyes. 1905.Peterson levied upon P30 000 worth of the goods pledged to the bank. 2003 FACTS: The respondents in this case were the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez Sr. X x x A person cannot have an easement on his own land.IssuesWas the contract of pledge between BEP and Reyes to secure a loan valid?Was Reyes still in possession of the pledged property. Two roads pass through the said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and the Nanca-Victorias Road. and after the depositoryappointed with common consent of the parties had taken possession of thesaid property. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest onthe land but grants no title thereto. . P30 000 Easement – Right of Way – Public Highway Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in Victorias. itself. 1905. Reyes was no longer in possession of the pledgedproperty. Third. that it is nowhere nearby a road nor does it border a road. Reyes turned over the goods to R. these receiptsshowed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of waygranted to it.R. This isbecause after the pledge had been agreed upon.. Sierra) by common consent of the debtor and creditor. asugar company. Cuaycong then averred that the road is a public highway.On October 19. claimed that it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot when it bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that theheirs were already barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years. Garcia. First it was shown that in the Torrens title held by Benedicto. he wasnot aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him. Juan Garcia (yes. or may be.Sierra was the third person appointed by common consent of BEP (creditor)and Reyes (debtor). an agent specificallyappointed by the bank. under thesupervision of an agent (in this case. constituted on the corporealimmovable property of another. The heirs subsequently inherited the land. Mortgaging several of his properties2. Cuaycong et al. incessant withoutthe intervention of any act of man. Garcia. as stipulated in the March 4contract of loan. after the pledge. Neither can it declare that the 30. related to Ramon) brought an actionagainst Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat. Benedicto appealed. Its upkeep was solely supported by the road users for their benefits. The property was pledged to secure a debt2. the terms of the pledge. However. But in 1911. Sierra)who would take care of them for BEP. unless such possession is accompanied by theintent to possess as an owner. parted with the possession of his personal property.2. it was only in 1912 that Cuaycong et al filed their suit. It exists onlywhen the servient and dominant estates belong to two differentowners. No. Jardinico is presently only allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. The lot was likewise declared for tax purposesunder the name of the company. . the narrow lot where the railroad tracks (existent even prior tothe sale to decedent) lay. It was shown that the road was in existence since 1885. the other evidence shown pertain to Dacuman-Toreno Road. The contract in question was. Neither did Cuaycong et al acquired a right of private easement. there was no evidence which shows that the land is of the nature of a public highway.The trial court rejected the evidence presented by Bomedco (as it wasonly a Xerox copy of an unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedcohad already acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property in good faith for more than10 years.each of whom had a duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goodswere stored. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the contract withCTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate thepresumption of good faith. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot. the road was closed in 1911. The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public highway. x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes ove r another’s property. it having been conclusively shownthat the pledgee (BEP) took charge and possession of the goods pledgedthrough a depositary (Sierra) and a special agent (Rodriguez) appointed by it. 954.38.liquors and canned goods).year period of extraordinary prescription started from that year. The property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person (in thiscase. a builder in good faith? Held: Yes. Fourth.On the same day. in fact. an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden ofproving that Kee was a builder in bad faith.On September 29. Reyes executed a publicinstrument1.depriving the latter of possession of the same. An easement is continuous if its use is. and that the pledgee (BEP). The contract complies with all the requisites of a valid pledge contract. BogoMedellin Milling Co. Reyes could no longer dispose of the same because BEP wasthe only party allowed to do so through Sierra and Rodriguez. Sheriff James Peterson entered the warehouse where thegoods pledged to BEP were stored under the custody of the depositary. HELD: No. Benedicto decided to close the road and began asking for toll fees for wagons passing through their hacienda. the road was not maintained by the local government. The lower court ruled that Cuaycong et al and their predecessors in interest had been using the said road since time immemorial yet they only showed evidence that it was in use in 1885 but no other evidence to show a further time of usage was ever shown to prove their claim. The symbolic transfer of the goods through delivery of the keys to thewarehouse where the goods were stored was sufficient evidence to show thatSierra. Bomedco only had a right of easement over the land as shown bytax receipts wherein it declared. to hold possession over the goods pledged in favor of thebank under the direct supervision of Rodriguez. which were stored at a warehouse he rented inManilaBEP and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia(depositary) for safekeeping. The land was possessed by decedent who had also paidtaxes thereon. received and collected theproceeds of the goods as they were sold.since all of the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his generalright of ownership. Inc.00. but the lower court declared that Cuaycong et al do have a right of way over the Nanca-Victorias Road. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and isinsufficient to vest title. The legality of the pledge was not affected by the fact that the goodsremained in the warehouse formerly rented by Reyes the pledgor. like the easement of draineage andit is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man. BEP and Reyes substituted Luis Sierra in place of R. the mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. was able to obtain title to Lot No. An easement or servitude is a real right. on the other hand. His total debt was therefore P226 117. and the property pledgedappeared in a public instrument3. the depositary appointed by both BEP and Rodriguez.Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent. Reyes was already indebted to thebank for P84 415.ISSUE: 1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of the land throughextraordinary acquisitive prescription? 2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco hadacquired title over the use of the land? RATIO/HELD: 1. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which ruled thatBomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed andcontinuous use of the land.00. 124699 July 31. like the easement of right of way. but it was not shown as a public highway. The date of execution. or the payment of their value. Cuaycong claimed that they have a right of way over the said NancaVictorias Road considering that they have been using it since time immemorial. Bomedco cannot nowassert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner.00. CFI Manila ruled against Reyesand Agtarat for P15 000. for the benefit of another thing or person. Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP) executed a contract of loan infavor of Francisco Reyes for P141 702. Sierra. therefore. BEP had symbolic possession of the same. thereby making thecontract defective?Held The contract was valid. by virtue of which the owner has torefrain from doing. v CA G. 1905. there was no encumbrance attached to the hacienda. or must allow someone to do something on hisproperty. Negros Occidental. There was no adverse possession by the government. The lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-Toreno Road for the other parties were in default. Petitioner further contends that Kee wasnegligent as a provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson (1907)FactsOn March 4.Good faith is based on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance ofany flaw or defect in is title. who purchased an unregistered parcel of land located in Cebu from FelicianaSantillan (seller). Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. BEP had a better right to the goodscompared to J. was legallyplaced in possession of the goods. convenience and interest. The Court ordered either the return of the improperlylevied goods. ISSUE: Whether or not Cuaycong et al were able to establish their right over the Nanca-Victorias Road. Cuaycong et al sued Benedicto. the property to be a “central railroad right of way” or “sugar railroad right of way” when itcould have declared it to be “industrial land” as it did for the years 1975 and 1985.Moreover. Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90 591. Second. Therefore. asprescribed by the Civil Code: 1.

is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. For to be entitled to such kind of easement. The Court ruled that the just compensation in the amount of only 10% of the market value of the property was not enough to indemnify the incursion on the affected property. Tabisula contended that :1: Sps. The problem arose when latter asked from the Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. bomedco did not exercise any of the abovementionedoptions in order for it to acquire title over the railroad right of way GARGANTOS V. 8974). Tabisula based on the deed of sale’s intended road right of way. The complaint alleged the public purpose of the Northwestern Luzon Project. (Underscoring supplied) Thus. the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title. insofar as consistent with this rule. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The use of the word “shall. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house contructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate. it is clear that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: “they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale. and at the time of the sale of the first estate. Lupon but it was in vain which constrained Sps. The owner. Feeling betrayed by said act of Sps. thus. 649.R.EASEMENT FACTS: Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots.” which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification. Silvestre Bautista. The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they “shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not a disposition of real property.. there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be established. One lot was sold to Tengtio.. Art. that which is subject thereto. herein Sps. 650. (2) proper indemnity must be paid. there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house. CA. R. Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided for in the deed of sale Ruling: The Sps. thus . doors. the servient estate. viz: Art. which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. Alfredo Cabande. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property. Besides. and without adequate outlet to a public highway. VALDES Facts: Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land. 6395. Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways. whol sold to Uy Veza. An easement or servitude is “a real right constituted on another’s property. September 12 2008 [Eminent domain. xxxx This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.”. Tabisula of an easement on the “western side of the Tabisula’s lot. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property.” Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. Sps. Valdez to file a case for specific performance against the Tabisulas with the RTC. NAPOCOR assailed the CA's reliance on the commissioners’ report in fixing just compensation based on the full market value of the affected properties. The titles of ownership. Issue: WON the Sps. (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s own acts. Valdez ‘shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters *sic+ wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale’. after payment of the proper indemnity. SDC. and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule. and 2: they could not have agreed to providing petitioners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located. as well as the urgency and necessity of acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land. viz: Art. RTC rendered a Decision based on the report. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. or of other rights over immovable property. determination of just compensation] FACTS: Napocor sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way over certain parcels of land situated in four towns of the province of Bulacan for the construction and maintenance of its 500 KV Transmission Line project in Northern Luzon. as in the case at bar. NAPOCOR contends that only an easement of right-of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed. Valdez. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The Sps. Only PFI. 160725. RTC dismissed the Sps.or b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legaleasement of right of way (see orig case for the requirements)The point is. or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable. ISSUE: Whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to the affected owners. a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties. Sps Valdez are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way.” The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads: Art. Since the Sps. which adjoining properties have access to two public roads . ordering payment of just compensation by Napocor to name respondents with legal interest of 6%/annum until finality of the Decision and at 12%/annum from its finality until full payment. the easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs. Moldex and the heirs of Trinidad filed their respective answers raising the issue of just compensation of their property to be expropriated. G. as amended and the implementing regulation of R. A report submitted to the RTC recommending that the compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on the fair market value of P 600/sq m for properties belonging to Moldex and P 400/sq m for properties belonging to the rest of the respondents. Solid Development Corporation. Contained in the deed of sale is a stipulation that the Sps. it appearing that the Sps. Jose Ortega Jr. The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate.A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of the land if: a) it hadsubsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for thecontinued use of the land under the principles of voluntary easements. they have no right to demand the grant by the Sps. No. which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons. From the allegations in Sps Valdez’ complaint. by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.A. which was erected long before the subject property was sold to the Valdez’s. Art. So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides: Art. (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Heirs of Trinidad. On appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was established RULING: Yes. should be construed as merely permissive where. the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway. Valdez’s complain. corporeal and immovable. Moldex Realty Inc. It filed a special civic action for eminent domain before the trial court against the registered owners or claimants of parcel of lands affected. windows which serve as passages for light and view. only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be paid to the affected property owners (Section 3A. CA affirmed RTC decision in all respects except for the period during which the interest of 12% per annum would accrue. and. Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads. the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for. no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning. where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 709. Valdez are not entitled to the right of way. There are two kinds of easements according to source – by law or by the will of the owners. No. 613. . Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon.A. Sps. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. RULING: No. Again. 708. Napocor vs Purefoods Corp. Valdez and family also are the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property. Valdez were again turned down. (Underscoring supplied) Art. Yan Yung opposed for it would block his window and impair his right of loght and view. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not included in this sale” could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose. Valdez reported the matter the brgy.

Section 3(a) of R. the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners. however. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six lot. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. reserving donor's rights to amend. the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and affection. G. or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Torts and Damages – Element – Quasi Delicts David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea. he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage. but CA reversed. INC. must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. In addition to the market value of the portion taken. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation of property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation. spouses Gestopa. or some person for whose acts it must respond. strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal.” and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. Years later. to construct. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA. was able to earn P2. the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location. however. No. are not required to be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime. To four parcels of land. Once a . to six parcels of land in favor of respondents. However. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal. is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. as amended.50 a day – all said. Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. The common carriers plying routes to (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.A. then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted. In an effort to explode the said caps. EN BANC (Carpio Morales. v. stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. The aforementioned rule. including those already existing. this time inter vivos. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals. in various experiments and in multiple attempts. “The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another. and the implementing rule of R. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. was guilty. with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. since it has a different application to a donation mortis causa. operate and maintain common bus. apart from that franchised to Lucena. Taylor at the time of the accident was well—-grown youth of 15. said rule is not binding on the Court. Also. J. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way. it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper. he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer). How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits. copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper.ACCEPTANCE IN DONATION Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries. finance.) The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. a clear indication of a donation inter vivos. he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2. reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. tried to explode the caps. Inc. At the same time. ISSUE: Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa RULING: It was donation inter vivos. 160725 LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL. if any. they executed a donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. INC. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. CA FACTS. on the other hand. the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value. Subsequently. the Court has not been enlightened. No. contained in the deed of donation. the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. Bus terminals per se do not. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal. FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. FACTS: Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners. Inc. No.jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. being in the form of a will. and similar expressions of support from the private sector. however. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. 452 SCRA 174 (2005). From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena. JAC LINER. 6395. impede or help impede the flow of traffic. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap. show clearly that he knew what he was about. the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Inc. and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.R. cancel. however. Taylor was mature well beyond his age. In the case at bar. One day in 1905. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. and eventually revoking the donation. it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant. they are liable for damages due to the company’s negligence. the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena.” GESTOPA VS. Categories: Constitutional Law 1. hence." In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings. (2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children.Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. to the remaining part of the property.A. they executed another donation. establish. and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos. In the subject ordinances. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The weight of popular opinion. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. Inc. City Ordinance 1778. and (4) respondent's acceptance. Donations mortis causa.

The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of twopages. 1984. With the partible estate thus determined. At first. which shall not include those imposed in the will. the Province of Zamboanga. Consequently. whatever was built on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new fitting location. Catalina. CASE: QUILALA vs. the lack of an acknowledgment by thedonee before the notary public does not also render thedonation null and void. which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. In the present case. and it was made in a public document. with the evidence then before the court. Zamboanga Del Sur. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it was made personally or through an agent. and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. exceeded by 494. therequirement that the contracting parties and their witnessesshould sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is notabsolute. the first page of theinstrument. as the said parcel of land was too small for the construction of the planned Bagong Lipunan School Building. on the condition that said land shall be used exclusively and forever for educational purposes. trial court’s order of dismissal sustained. Petitioner Ricky Quilalaalleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. at the time he made them. Certainly. The exchange of the donated lot for a bigger lot was done in pursuance with the condition that they (Silim and Mangubat) imposed. Article 908. there was no acceptance byVioleta of the donation in a public instrument. 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots. GERVACIO LAGUA October 30. claiming to beCatalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civildegree of consanguinity instituted an action for thedeclaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos . To determine the legitime. who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots.888 sq. the specification of the location of the signatureis merely directory . LeonoraAlcantara. respondents Gliceria Alcantara. Violeta Quilalalikewise died on May 22. In 1957. Catalina Quilala (donor) executed a"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of VioletaQuilala (donee) over a parcel of land located in Sta. and for thecancellation of the TCT in the name of Violeta Quilala. the same was set forthmerely on a private instrument.the second page of the deed of donation. it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here. 1983. Remember: the lot was exchanged with a bigger lot to give way for the construction of Bagong Lipunan Elementary School and for no other reason. i. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. The fact that one of the parties signs onthe wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The donee and the otherwitness signed on the right hand margin. having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. deducting all debts and charges.e. paragraph 2 of PD No. m. and two instrumental witnesses.Meanwhile. . Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD.75 sq. was signed by the donor and onewitness on the left-hand margin. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school. andis signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala andVioleta Quilala. the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained. It was dismissed for prescription. it can hardly be seen that. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. In fact. the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11. was never built thereon. then. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure thateach and every page of the instrument is authenticated bythe parties.R No. 1941. The issue arose when the donators found out that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma took the land for himself and constructed his house thereon.donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. Silim and Mangubat sought to have the donation declared null and void on the ground that the condition of the donation was violated. it ruled that there was a valid acceptance in accordance with Arts.75 sq. m. Anent the second contention concerning the non-fulfillment of the consideration. the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. 1969 FACTS: Sometime in 1917. Surely. and on the right-hand margin the signaturesof Violeta Quilala and the other witnessOn November 7. there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. Cipriano died in 1958. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot. The decisionwas affirmed by the CA. Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son. Gervacio. which it was conditioned on.ISSUE: Whether or not the donation executed by Catalina infavor of Violeta is validHELD: valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by the donor Below the terms and stipulations of the donation. which the spouses failed to invoke. However. RULING: YES. BONIFACIA MATEO vs. The fact that itwas acknowledged before a notary public converts the deedof donation in its entirety a public instrument. Thus. It cannot be considered a private document inpart and a public document in another part . When appealed. the donor.the Acknowledgment appearing on the second pagementioned only the donor. Cruz. The marriage was celebrated on May 15. but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share. which states merely thatCatalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary publicand acknowledged that the donation was her free andvoluntary act and deed. the parcel of land was used precisely for school purposes.. 1981.: 132681 December 3. 2001FACTS:On February 20. the trialcourt ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge heracceptance before the notary public. shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation. all donations subject to collation would be added to it. herein respondent Gervacio.deed of donation has been accepted. the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established. by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death.In the same vein.The trial court rendered a decision declaring null and void thedeed of donation of real property inter vivos executed byCatalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala. but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name. m. While the case was pending. except for officiousness or ingratitude. executed a deed of exchange in favor of a new and suitable location. it is theconveyance that should be acknowledged as a free andvoluntary act. and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494. in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious. The Court upheld the validity of the donation.Simply put. On July 31. leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter. To be sure. and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir. The first page contains the deed of donation itself. the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. the Court ruled that contrary to Silim and Mangubat’s argument. Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. on which theAcknowledgment appears.Manila and registered in her name. The requirement is designed to avoid thefalsification of the contract after the same has already beenduly executed by the parties. The trial courtfound that since it was acknowledged before a notary publiconly by the donor.We disagree. To the value of the hereditary estate. The secondpage contains the Acknowledgment. ALCANTARA TOPIC: MAKING ANG ACCEPTANCE OF DONATIONG. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious. from any convenient part of the lots. There appear on the left-hand marginof the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and oneof the witnesses. 1529.As provided for in Section 112. the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered. Alejandro died. The fact thatthe donee was not mentioned by the notary public in theacknowledgment is of no moment. Catalina Quilala died. Municipality of Malangas. Hence. In 1923. Firstly. However. LEON SILIM AND ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT (2001) Silim and Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached. The instrument should be treated inits entirety. it cannot be revoked. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. a contracting partyaffixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certifythat he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon atthe time of signing. through its division superintendent. HELD: Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will. Catalina Quilala. Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes. and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.