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Until the turn of the 20th century, the foreign policy of the United States usually held to the

ideals set forth by George Washington. The actions through which that strategy was abandoned, then, are of keen interest to any student of foreign affairs. The Fourteen Points were statements of opinion by Wilson right before the end of WWI. Given during a speech on January 8th, 1918. In general, they were statements of intended policy just as much as they were posturing statements. In addition, they were made to dramatize and make clear the role that the United States wished to have in an enduring peace process. The points relating to the settlement of affairs in Europe are remarkable; mainly because they address a direct interest and involvement for the U.S, a break with tradition. Each of the proposals merits individual examination. 1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. Unlike other statements of this type, this one seems to be partly sincere; the negotiations conducted to settle the first World War, while unilateral, were transparent; later U.S policy, of course, broke from this trend. 2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. This is in response to submarine warfare and blockades during the war, nothing else, and while it condemns those, it leaves open the possibility of international restrictions. 3. The removal, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. Pushing free trade between most major powers is almost an unprecedented step in an age where tariffs are still a dominant form of economic policy, but Wilson did so. 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. This provision names no specific countries, but its implementation and enforcement are mainly left to upcoming arms treaties. 5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. In contrast to U.S policy just a few decades before, which was in the vein of No one gets colonies in the West except us, and we dont care elsewhere, this statement is drastically

different. The idea of self-determination for the colonized is unusual. 6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. The dramatic prose at the end here is interesting, but this statement also reflects a desire for self-determination for other countries. 7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. This is both a condemnation of the invasion of Belgium and the beginning of the concept of normalcy for Europe. 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development. 11. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. 12. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories

inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. These are mostly the same as 7#. Before moving on to the last point, the one encouraging the formation of the League of Nations, it would be useful to discuss overall themes in the other points, and the unified policy that they represent. Since the United States became capable of wielding power overseas, it has tried to do so, most notably in the series of colonial conquests in Central and South America around the turn of the century. Wilsons Fourteen Points represent two significant departures in U.S foreign policy. First, active and continuing engagement with Europe, and second, support for slow transition away from colonialism and mercantilism, and towards more self-determination for more countries, freer trade, and the assurance of autonomy for nations newly formed. In previous years, the U.S had been fully content to leave Europe alone, and heed Washingtons advice against foreign entanglement, with small exceptions to force European powers out of South America. Regardless of whether European powers listened to them, the Fourteen Points made clear Wilsons desire to be a force in European affairs, and a positive influence in the region. And on the subject of national autonomy, the Fourteen Points make U.S opinions very clear, and are another divergence. Part of it is a new willingness to intervene in European affairs, and part of it is essentially a statement that the United States will take the lead in shaping what Europe will look like after the war is over.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. This is the most important of any of Wilsons provisions. The other thirteen Points will be incorporated into treaties signed soon after the war, easily enough, but the League Of Nations and the continual attempts to form it are deserving of deep study.

The League of Nations was the product of the fourteenth point, the product of Wilsons desire never to repeat the Great War and a large dose of optimism that international agreements and communication could solve war and disputes. After the formation of the League, its function was impeded when the United States did not join; the Senate refused to approve the necessary treaty. Peace ensued until the Spanish conflict, but more by accident and because of the destruction of the war than the League.