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ARISTOTLE
POLITICS
TRANSLATED BY

S

BENJAMIN JOWETT
WITH INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INDEX BY

H. W.

C.

DAVIS, M.A.

FELLOW OF BALLIOL

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON
1908

PRESS

HENRY FROWDE,
LONDON, EDINBURGH,

M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

NEW YORK

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
THE
may
life

of Aristotle, so

far as

it

illustrates this treatise,

He was by birth a Greek, but a native of the small city of Stageira which stood upon the fringe of the Greek world ; he was therefore well
be summarized in a few words.

fitted by his origin to be an impartial, yet sympathetic critic, of the more famous city-states of Greece. In his youth he studied philosophy at Athens under Plato, thus coming at the

most impressionable period of his life into close relations with the profoundest thinker whom Greece had yet produced. After the death of Plato (347), he quitted Athens to spend some years in the service of the new race of monarchs whose
mission
at the
it

was

to diffuse

Greek

culture through the East and

same time

to complete the destruction of all that

was

most valuable and

characteristic in the political life of Greece.

At
city

the court of Hermias, the obscure tyrant of the obscure of Atarneus, Aristotle had the opportunity of observing

the once great, but then decadent, despotism of Persia, to In 343 or which he makes some references in the Politics.

342 he migrated to Macedonia, joined the court of Philip, and acted for three years or so as tutor to the youthful Alexander. The results of his experience in Macedonia,
and the
pupil

of the political teaching which he gave to his perhaps be inferred from the comments which, in several passages of the Politics, he passes on monarchies and tyrannies. About the year 335, on the eve of Alex
drift

may

ander s great campaigns of conquest, the philosopher turned his back on Macedonia we may infer from what he says of
;

empires, that while he realized their possible services to

civili-

2
zation,

Introduction
he was
still

more

alive

to

the

dangers, moral

and
state.

other,

which beset the path of a His sympathies were with the

military
past,

and aggressive
;

not the future
;

with

with Plato Sparta and Athens rather than with Macedon rather than with Alexander. down at Athens, he Settling became the leader of a philosophic school, the director of
a brilliant
friend

academy

;

but he incurred the
naturally

odium
in

to

which

a

of Macedon was

exposed

the

city of

Demosthenes.

In 323, after the death of his pupil and patron,

if

he was driven into exile by a prosecution for impiety which, he had faced it, would probably have brought upon his head
the
fate

of Socrates.

He

died in

the

following year

at

Chalcis, a

Macedonian stronghold.

The

semi-barbarians, of

whose

future he doubted, had been

the Greeks,
to interpret

whose highest thought
and to vindicate.

more generous to him than it had been his life-work
not the place to

Of

his literary
It is

work

in

general this

is

at expounding in enough speak. the light of his own philosophic principles all the sciences which were then recognized, and that he followed consis

to say that

he aimed

method, of which the Politics are a conspicuous illustration, of combining induction with deductive reasoning
tently the

from

first

principles,

and

of testing

his

own

conclusions

by a comparison with popular opinions and those of other
teachers.

Encyclopaedic knowledge has never, before or since, gone hand in hand with a logic so masculine or with But it is in dealing with the moral speculation so profound.
rather than the natural sciences that he
is

greatest,

most ade

quately equipped with facts, and most interested in his subject. Of his work in the moral sciences the final results are

The incorporated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. two treatises are intimately connected. In the Ethics he

Introduction

3

discusses the nature of individual happiness or well-being ; in the Politics he treats of the state as one of the chief means

through which the individual attains to happiness. object of the Politics is both practical and speculative

The
;

to

explain the nature of the ideal city in which the end of happi ness may be completely realized ; to suggest some methods of making existent states more useful to the individual citizen

than they were in Aristotle s time, or had been in the past. Aristotle is not, strictly speaking, the founder of political In the age of Pericles, and earlier still, statesmen science.

and philosophers had theorized about the origin of society, the relative merits of various constitutions, and other kindred
topics.

Though

Socrates

was more concerned with

ethics

than with politics, he applied the powerful solvent of his dialectic to many of the political ideas which were fashionable

The conceptions of utility as the ideal which the statesman should pursue, and of scientific knowledge as the indispensable equipment of the statesman, would seem to have
in his day.

had

their birth in the Socratic circle. Plato, the pupil of Socrates, not content with developing the suggestions of his

master and with giving to the Socratic formulae a deeper meaning, essayed a more systematic discussion of the nature

of the

state

and

its

right organization.
it

In the Republic he

describes the state as

would appear

by philosophers ; in the Laws his age a model more practicable and more nearly related to the experience of the past a model which the legislator for
;

founded and governed he offered to the statesmen of
if

a

new colony might

follow without undue violence to

Greek

Although the views of Plato are prejudices and opinions. sharply, and not always justly, criticized by Aristotle, the influence of the Republic and the Laws is perceptible in many
places of the Politics

where they are not mentioned. B 2

4
The
if

Introduction

Politics, in fact, would not be so valuable as they are they expressed the views of an individual man of genius and nothing more. Here as elsewhere it is not the least of

Aristotle s merits that

he epitomized the best thoughts of

a nation and of a stage in
political

human

history.

He

respected the

of the past, both the statesmen and the theorists 5 he was loth to admit that any institution or polity which had stood the test of time could be altogether bad.
thinkers

of his

Hence he appears before us as a mediator in the controversies own and the preceding ages. It is his wish to lay bare

the grain of truth which exists at the core of every political practice and belief. interprets even those ideals with which

He

sympathy. And so we learn from him what the various types of the city-state signified to the Greek mind ; we are admitted under his guidance to the penetralia of their

he

is least in

political thought.

history of the Greek city-state we can study for our with fewer sources of information, it is true, than Aristotle had at his command, but also with a more critical
selves,

The

appreciation of their value and a

more

scientific

method of

interpretation than was to be learned in Athenian schools of the fourth century. are too in a better position than

We

Aristotle to see the true place of the city-state in the evolution

of society, to appreciate

its

limitations, to
its failure.

condemn

its

evils,

and to draw the moral from

We

know, what he

does not appear to have suspected, that the careers of his Macedonian patrons had sealed the death-warrant of the
skill

community which he regarded as the highest that human was capable of framing. Ampler experience has shown
us that slavery
is

not the indispensable basis of a civilization,

nor commerce always degrading to the individual and destruc In the modern world we have tive of national morality.

Introduction

f

before us communities which, in defiance of his prophecies, have become extensive without becoming disunited. By his

own methods of induction and comparison we can refute some of the laws which he regarded as immutable. His account of the Still we must start from Aristotle.
be supplemented and corrected, but not super governing ideas of any polity are always best expressed by those to whom they stand for the absolute and of final truth ; and there is no form of polity which the student
city-state

may

seded.

The

political science

Just because

it is

should study with more care than the city-state. comparatively simple, just because it is unlike

the states with which

we

are personally acquainted,

it

contains

the key to many modern problems. Aristotle is the best inter preter of an essential link in the chain of political development.

But he

is

who

states the

something more than case of Greece.

this,

more than

a

Greek

He

is

also a philosopher

and a student of human nature.

His views

as to the origin

and ultimate structure of society, as to the aims of civic life, as to the mutual obligations of the state and the individual, as
to the

nature of political justice,

all

have a value which

is

It is often difficult to independent of his historical position. follow his discussions of these and cognate subjects. His are stated with extreme conciseness, and the train arguments

of thought which leads him from one topic to another is often But those who have the patience to wrestle far from clear. with his text will find
refutations of fallacies
it

in

it

theories of perennial value, and
are always re-emerging.

which

Nor

is

merely from his more abstract disquisitions that such lessons are to be extracted. While there could be no greater mistake
than to apply his criticisms of democracies and aristocracies to modern governments which go by the same names, without
stopping to enquire

how

far the

names have changed

their

6
meanings,
criticisms,
it

Introduction
is

on the other hand often apparent that these
the necessary qualifications have been made,

when

are as true of the present as they

were of Greece.

Of

this

an illustration
their causes

may

be found in the account of revolutions and
fifth

which forms the

book of the

Politics.

The
work.

Politics

should probably be regarded as an unfinished There are not infrequent repetitions ; some subjects
to treat are never treated
;

which the author promises

and we

are sometimes at a loss for the connecting link between suc

cessive books or The traditional parts of the same book. order of the books is probably not that which Aristotle con

The pre templated, and has been altered by most editors. sent translation follows the order of Bekker s first edition ;
the numbering of the books in his octavo edition of

1878 has

been given
first.

in

brackets wherever

it

differs

from that of the
have been sug
is

None of

the rearrangements which

gested

are completely satisfactory.
will

Whichever of them
at

adopted, the reader
earlier are

find

that

The only proved at a later should be treated as a quarry of arguments and theories rather than as an artistically constructed piece of
Politics
literature.

positions assumed stage of the argument.

an

studied by the collection and com which bear upon the same topic. It is hoped that for this purpose the subject-headings in the Index, which is abridged from that of the translator, may
It
is

best

parison of

all

the passages

be of service.

A

brief analysis

is

prefixed to the translation

with the object of explaining the thread of the argument, where such a thread exists, of indicating the natural divisions of the
text,

The

and of enumerating the chief topics of discussion. thanks of the editor are due to the Master of Balliol
proof of this Introduction.

for his kindness in revising the

H. W. C. DAVIS.

BOOK
cc. I, 2.

I.

Definition

and

structure of the State.

The

state is the highest

the highest good.
will appear if
(c.

How

it

form of community and aims at differs from other communities
it

we examine
is

the parts of which

is

composed

i).

It consists

The

household

of villages which consist of households. founded upon the two relations of male and
;

female, of master and slave

it

exists to satisfy

man
a

s daily

wider village, community, of needs. The state aims at satisfying all the needs of range men. Men form states to secure a bare subsistence; but the
needs.
a wider
satisfies

The

ultimate object of the state

is

the good

life.

The

naturalness

of the

state is

proved by the faculty of speech in man.

In

the order of Nature the state precedes the household and the
individual.
It is

founded on a natural impulse, that towards

political association (c. 2).

cc.

3-13.

Household economy.
Children

The Slave.

Property.

and Wives.
since the state
slavery.
is

Let us discuss the household,
of households
(c.

composed
slave is

3).

First as to
is

The

a piece of property

which

animate, and useful for action

production (c. 4). Slavery is natural ; in of the natural universe we find the relation every department of ruler and subject. There are human beings who, without
possessing reason, understand
(c. 5).
it.

rather than

for

These

are natural slaves
are not natural
;

But we

find persons in slavery

who

slaves.

Hence

slavery

itself

is

condemned by some

but
to

they are wrong. a master (c. 6).

The natural slave benefits by subjection The art of ruling slaves differs from that

of

8
ruling free

Analysis
men
but calls for no detailed description; any one
it

who

is

a natural master can acquire

for himself (c. 7).

As

to

property and the

modes of

acquiring
is

it.

This

subject concerns us in so far as property

substratum to the household
that form of finance
sake.

(c.

8).

an indispensable But we do not need
for its

which accumulates wealth
It has

own

This

is

unnatural finance.

means of exchange.

by the invention of coined money. Natural and unnatural finance are often

been made possible It accumulates money by

treated as though they were the same, but differ in their aims
(c.

9)

;

also in their subject matter
fruits
is

;

for natural finance is

only concerned with the
(c.

of the earth
to the

and animals
householder;

10).

Natural finance

necessary

he must therefore know about

live stock, agriculture, possibly

about the exchange of the products of the earth, such as

wood and
exist,
(c.

minerals, for money. Special treatises on finance and the subject should be specially studied by statesmen

ii).

Lastly,

we must

discuss and distinguish the relations of

husband

to wife, of father to child (c. 12).
call for

In household
;

management persons persons for more than
inferior kind

more

attention than things

free

slaves.

Slaves are only capable of an

of

virtue.

there are several
trained
in
virtue.

kinds of virtue.

Socrates was wrong in denying that Still the slave must be
education of the free

The

man

will

be

subsequently discussed

(c. 13).

BOOK
cc.

II.

1-8.

Ideal Commonwealths

P/alo, P/jaleas, Hippodamus.

To

ascertain the nature of the ideal state
states of history

we should

start

by examining both the best

and the best that

Analysts
theorists

9

Otherwise we might waste our have imagined. time over problems which others have already solved. Among theorists, Plato in the Republic raises the most
fundamental questions.

He

desires to abolish private property

and the family (c. i). But the end which he has in view is He wishes to make all his citizens absolutely alike ; wrong. There but the differentiation of functions is a law of nature.
can be too

much

unity in a state (c. 2).
are wrong.

And

the means by
abolition

which he would promote unity

The

of

property will produce, not remove, dissension.

Communism

of wives and children will destroy natural affection (c. 3). Other objections can be raised ; but this is the fatal one

To descend to details. The advantages to be (c. 4). expected from communism of property would be better secured if private property were used in a liberal spirit to
relieve

the wants of others.

Private
to

property makes

men
as

happier,

and

enables

them

cultivate

such

virtues

generosity. Republic makes unity the result of uni the citizens, which is not the case. The formity among sense of mankind has always been against Plato, and good

The

experiment
(c- 5)-

would

show

that

his

idea

is

impracticable

Plato sketched another ideal state in the Lavus

;

it

was

meant

to be

more

practicable than the other.

In the

Laws

he abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new
state

larger

and too

large.

He

forgot

to

discuss

foreign

relations,

and to

fix a limit

of private property, and to restrict

the increase of population,

and to distinguish between

ruler

The form of government which he proposed and subject. was bad (c. 6).

r

o

Analysis

the main
to

Phaleas of Chalcedon made equal distribution of property feature of his scheme. This would be difficult
effect,

and

would

not

meet the

evils

which Phaleas

had

in

mind.

Dissensions arise

inequality

of wealth.

His

state

from deeper causes than would be weak against
the rich

foreign foes.
satisfy the

His reforms would anger
(c. 7).

and not

poor

Hippodamus, who was not a
at

practical

politician,

aimed

symmetry.

In his

state

there were to be three classes,

three kinds

of landed property, three sorts of laws.

He

also proposed to (i) create a Court of Appeal, (2) let juries
qualify their verdicts, (3) reward those

who made

discoveries

of public

utility.

His

classes

and his property system were

badly devised. Qualified verdicts are impossible since jurymen may not confer together. The law about discoveries would

encourage

men

to

tamper with the Constitution.
;

Now

laws

when

obsolete and absurd should be changed
(c. 8).

but needless

changes diminish the respect for law
cc.

912. The

best

existent states

Sparta, Crete,

and

Carthage

Greek lawgivers.

The women

are too influential

Their Spartans cannot manage their serf population. and too luxurious. Their property

the citizen
in

system has concentrated all wealth in a few hands. body has decreased. There are points to
the

Hence
criticize

Ephorate, the

Senate,

the

Kingship,

the

common
only

meals, the Admiralty.
fit

The
in

Spartan and his
is

state are

for war.
financial

Yet even

war Sparta

hampered by the want
in their

of a

The
but
are

system (c. 9). Cretan cities resemble Sparta

constitutions,
better

more

primitive.

Their common meals are

Analysis
But the Cosmi are worse than the Ephors. managed. Cretan constitution is a narrow and factious oligarchy
cities are
(c.

1 1

The
;

the

saved from destruction only by their inaccessibility

ro).

is highly praised, and not without be compared with the Spartan it is an It lays stress upon oligarchy with some democratic features. wealth ; in Carthage all offices are bought and sold. Also,

The

Carthaginian polity
It

reason.

may

;

one

man may hold

several offices together.

These
is

are

bad

features.

But the discontent of the people

soothed by

schemes of emigration (c. n). Of lawgivers, Solon was the best

;

conservative

when

About Philolaus, Chapossible, and a moderate democrat. rondas, Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is
little

to be said (c.

1

2).

BOOK
cc.

III.

1-5.
are
;

The

Citizen, civic virtue, and the civic body,
?

How
denizen

we

to define a citizen

He

is

more than

a
is

mere
ordi

private rights

do not make a

citizen.

He

sits on juries narily one who possesses political power ; who and in the assembly. But it is hard to find a definition which To define him as the son of applies to all so-called citizens.

citizen parents is futile (c. i).

Some

must have been
political

justly acquired.

But he
(c.

say that his civic rights is a citizen who has
Similarly the state

power, however acquired

2).

is defined by reference to the distribution of political power ; when the mode of distribution is changed a new state comes

into existence (c. 3).

is

one

The good citizen may not be a good man the good citizen who does good service to his state, and this state may
;

12
be bad
in

Analysis
principle.

In a constitutional state the good citizen

knows both how
is

to rule

and
rule.

how

to obey.

The good man
citizen

one

who

is

fitted to

But the

citizen in a constitu

tional state learns to rule

by obeying orders. Therefore

ship in such a state

is

a moral training (c. 4).

Mechanics

will not be citizens in the best state.
rule.

Extreme
But
cir

democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this

cumstances oblige them to do
(c-

this.

They have no

choice

5).

cc.

6-13.

The

Classification

of Constitutions
;

;

Democracy

and Oligarchy

Kingship.
;

The
instinct,

aims of the state are two

to

satisfy
life.

man

s

social rule

and

to

fit

him

for

the good
in

Political

differs

from that over slaves

aiming

primarily at the

good

of those

who

are ruled (c. 6).

Constitutions are bad or good
is,

according as the

common

welfare
are

or
:

is

not,

their aim.

Of good

Constitutions

there

three

Monarchy, Aris
:

tocracy, and Polity.

Of

bad there are also three

Tyranny,

Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy.

The bad

are perversions

of the good (c. 7). Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the numeri cal proportion of the rulers to the ruled. Democracy is the
rule

of the poor;

oligarchy

is

that

of the
;

rich

(c.

8).

Democrats take Equality
that political rights

for their

motto

oligarchs believe

wealth.

But both
is

sides

should be unequal and proportionate to miss the true object of the state,
to
9).

which

virtue.

Those who do most
(c.

deserve the greatest share of power
principle,

promote virtue On the same

Justice

is

not the will of the majority or of the

wealthier, but that course of action

which the moral aim of

Analysis
the state requires (c. 10).
likely to

1 3

But
?

are the
It

Many

or the

Few
to

be the better rulers
highest
offices

would be unreasonable

give

the

to

the
fits

Many.
them

faculty of
judicial

criticism

which

But they have a for deliberative and

The good critic need not be an expert ; power. experts are sometimes bad judges. Moreover, the Many have But the governing a greater stake in the city than the Few.
body, whether laws (c. n).
distributed
?

Few or Many, must be held in check by the On what principle should political power be
Granted that equals deserve equal shares
?

are these equals

Obviously those
(c.

be of service to the state
in the

12).

who who are equally able to Hence there is something
;

claims advanced by the wealthy, the free born, the

But no one of these classes should noble, the highly gifted. be allowed to rule the rest. state should consist of men

A

who
cism

are equal, or nearly so, in wealth, in birth, in moral

and

intellectual excellence.
is

The

principle

which underlies Ostra
state,
if a

plausible.

But

in the ideal

pre-eminent

individual be found, he should be
cc.

made

a king (c. 13).

1418. The Forms

of Monarchy.

Of Monarchy

there are five kinds, (i) the Spartan, (2) the

Barbarian, (3) the elective dictatorship,

(4) the Heroic,

(5)

Absolute Kingship

(c.

14).

The

last

of these forms might

appear the best polity to some ; that is, if the king acts as the For he will dispense from the law in embodiment of law.
the spirit of the law.

But

this

reserved for the

Many.
;

Monarchy
is

power would be less abused if arose to meet the needs

of primitive society
objectionable
(c.

it

now
It

obsolete and on various grounds

15).
to

subjects equals

the

tends to become hereditary; it rule of an equal. The individual

1

4

Analysis
single

monarch may be misled by his passions, and no
can attend to
all

man
case

the duties of government

(c.

1

6

).

One

alone can be imagined in which Absolute

Kingship would be

just(c. 17).

Let us consider the

origin

and nature of the best
call

polity,

now

that
1

we have
8).

agreed not to

Absolute Kingship the

best (c.

BOOK
cc. I

IV

(VI).

10.

Variations of the main types of Constitutions.

Political science should study (i) the ideal state, (2) those

which may be the best obtainable under special circum For stances, and even (3) those which are essentially bad.
states

the statesman must sometimes
stitution (c. i).

make

the best of a bad

Con

state, Kingship Bk. Ill, c. 14 fol.). Let us begin by dealing with the other four and their divisions, enquiring also when and why they may be desirable (c. 2).

Of

our six main types of
(cf.

and Aristocracy have been discussed

First

as

to

Democracy and Oligarchy.

The common

view that Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the main types of Constitution is at variance with our own view

and wrong

(c.

3).

So

is

the view that the numerical propor
difference between these

tion of rulers to ruled

makes the
the

two

types

;

in a

Democracy

Many

are also the poor, in an

Oligarchy the

Few

are

also

the wealthy.

In every state
the most funda

the distinction between rich

and poor

is

mental of class-divisions.
are important types
in the character
;

Still Oligarchy and Democracy and their variations arise from differences

of the rich and the poor by
four kinds.

whom

they are

ruled.

Of

Democracies there

are

The

worst, ex-

Analysis

i $

treme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to Of of the people overrides all law (c. 4). all, and the will too there are four kinds; the worst is that in Oligarchies

which
by law

offices are hereditary
(c. 5).

and the magistrates uncontrolled

These

variations arise under circumstances

which may be

briefly described (c. 6).

Aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form, that in which the best men alone are citizens (c. 7).
Polity
is

Of

a

but inclines to the Democratic side.
tocracies
are
really

compromise between Democracy and Oligarchy, Many so-called Aris
Polities
(c.

8).

There

are

different

ways of effecting the compromise which makes a Polity. The Laconian Constitution is an example of a successful com
promise
(c. 9).
is

Tyranny
and (2) the
in

of three kinds: (i) the barbarian despotism,
;

elective dictatorship have already been discussed
is

both there
in

rule according to

law over willing subjects.
is

But

of one
cc.

man

(3) the strict form of tyranny, there over unwilling subjects (c. 10).

the lawless rule

11-13.

Of the

Best State both

in

general and tinder special

circumstances.

For the average
mean between the
will be supreme.

city-state

the best constitution will be a

rule

No

of rich and poor ; the middle-class state will be well administered unless

the middle-class holds sway.
in large

The
Hence

middle-class
in

is

stronger

than in small states.

Greece

it

has rarely

attained to

power ; especially as democracy and oligarchy were aided by the influence of the leading states (c. n). No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest
class in the state.

Hence Democracy and Oligarchy

are the

1

6

Analysis
in

only constitutions possible
the
legislator

some

states.

But

in these cases
(c.

should

conciliate

the

middle-class

12).

Whatever form of
to be noted
cc.

constitution be adopted there are expedients
in preserving
it

which may help
to

(c.

1

3).

1416. How
legislator
(a)

proceed

in framing

a Constitution.

The
ticular
;

The
of

must pay attention to three subjects in par Deliberative Assembly which is different in
constitution
(c.

each

form

14).

(I)

The

Executive.

Here he must know what
of them

offices are indispensable

and which

may be conveniently combined in the person of one also whether the same offices should be supreme magistrate
;

in

every state

;

also

which of the twelve or more methods of

making appointments should be adopted in each case (c. 15). The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds (f)
of law-courts,
procedure
(c.

their

spheres of

action,

their

methods of

16).

BOOK V
cc.

(VIII).
their causes in general.

14. Of Revolutions,
states are

and

Ordinary

founded on erroneous ideas of
revolution.

justice,

which lead

to

discontent and
to

Of

revolutions
to

some

are

made
hands.

introduce a

new

Constitution, others

modify the
in

old, others to put the

new

Both

working of the Constitution Democracy and Oligarchy contain
to revolution, but

inherent flaws

which lead

Democracy

is

the

more

stable

We

of the two types (c. i). may distinguish between the frame of mind which

fosters revolution, the objects for

which

it

is

started,

and the

provocative causes (c. 2).

The
may

latter

deserve a more detailed

account

(c.

3).

Trifles

be the occasion but are never

Analysis
the true

1

7

cause of a sedition.

One common

cause

is

the

aggrandizement of a particular class ; another is a feud be tween rich and poor when they are evenly balanced and
there
is

no middle-class to mediate.
:

As

to the

manner of

effecting a revolution

it

may

be carried through by force or

fraud (c. 4).
cc.

5~ 12

-

Revolutions in particular States, and
revolutions

may

be avoided.

(a) In Democracies revolutions
tion

may

arise

from a persecu

of the rich

;

or

when

a demagogue becomes a general, or
(c. 5).

when
(3)

politicians

compete for the favour of the mob

In Oligarchies the people may rebel against oppression ; ambitious oligarchs may conspire, or appeal to the people,
or set up a tyrant. by the feuds of
their

Oligarchies are seldom destroyed except own members ; unless they employ

a mercenary captain,

who may become

a tyrant

(c. 6).

(c)

In Aristocracies and Polities the injustice of the ruling class may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristo
cracies

ambitious

may also be ruined by an unprivileged class, or an man of talent. Aristocracies tend to become
Also they
are
liable

oligarchies.

to

gradual

dissolution

;

which

is

true of Polities as well (c. 7).
:

The

best precautions against sedition are these

to avoid

and frauds upon the unprivileged ; to maintain good to watch destructive agen feeling between rulers and ruled cies to alter property qualifications from time to time ; to let
illegality
;

;

no individual or

class

become too powerful
;

;

not to

let

magis
(c. 8).

tracies be a source

of gain

to

beware of class-oppression

In

all
;

magistrates

tice

we

should require loyalty, ability, and jus should not carry the principle of the constitution

we

sis Analyst
to extremes
;

we

should educate the citizens in the

spirit

of

a constitution (c. 9).
(fi)

The

causes which destroy and the means which pre
separately.

serve a
first

Monarchy must be considered

Let us

distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. combines the vices of Democracy and Oligarchy.
is

Tyranny
Kingship But both

exposed

to the

same defects as Aristocracy.

these

kinds of

Monarchy

are especially endangered

by the

insolence of their representatives and by the fear or contempt

which they inspire in others. Tyranny is weak against both external and domestic foes Kingship is strong against inva Moderation is the best sion, weak against sedition (c. 10).
;

preservative of Kingship.

Tyranny may

rely

on the

traditional

expedients of demoralizing and dividing its subjects, or it may imitate Kingship by showing moderation in expenditure, and
courtesy and temperance in social relations, by the wise use of ministers, by holding the balance evenly between the But the Tyrannies of the past have rich and poor (c. n).

been short-lived.
Plato
quate
;

s

discussion of revolutions in the Republic

is

inade

e.g. he does not explain the results of a revolution

against a tyranny, and could not

do so on

his theory
in

;

nor

is
;

he correct about the cause of revolution
nor does

an Oligarchy
varieties

he distinguish between the
(c.

different

of

Oligarchy and Democracy

12).

BOOK
cc.

VI

(VII).

i8.

Concerning the

proper organization of Democracies
Oligarchies.

and

(A) Democracies

differ inter se (i)

according to the character

of the citizen body, (2) according

to the

mode

in

which the

Analysis
characteristic

1

9

features
first

Liberty

is

the

principle

of democracy are combined (c. i). The results of of democracy.
supreme, and that

liberty are that the numerical majority is

each

man

lives as

he

likes.

From

these characteristics
(c. 2).

we
In

may
men,

easily infer the other features
it is

of democracy

oligarchies

not the numerical majority, but the wealthier

who

are supreme.
is

Both these

if principles are unjust

the supreme authority

to be absolute

and above the law.
their

Both

numbers

and
it

wealth

should

have

share

of

influence.
justice,

But

is

hard to find the true principles of
still

political
(c. 3).

and harder

to

make men

act

upon them

The best Democracy (cf. Bk. IV, c. 4). is (i) an Agricultural Democracy, in which the magistrates are elected by, and responsible to, the citizen body, while
has four species

each

office

importance.

has a property qualification proportionate to its These democracies should encourage agriculture

by

legislation.

The

next best

is

(2) the Pastoral

Democracy.
is

Next comes
(4) the

(3) the Commercial

Democracy.

Worst of all

Extreme Democracy with manhood

suffrage (c. 4).

To found a Democracy. it we must the poor from plundering the preserve prevent rich ; we must not exhaust the public revenues by giving pay
It is harder to preserve than to

performance of public duties ; we must prevent the of a pauper class (c. 5). growth (B) The modes of founding Oligarchies call for little ex Careful organization is the best way of preserving planation.
for the

these

governments

(c.

6).

Much

depends on the military

arrangements ; oligarchs must not make their subjects too powerful an element in the army. Admission to the governing body should be granted on easy conditions. Office should be

made

a burden, not a source of profit (c. 7).

c 2

2O
Both
in oligarchies

Analysis

and democracies the right arrangement of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary in state ; others are peculiar to every special types of state
(c. 8).

BOOK
cc.

VII

(IV).
individuals

13.

The

Summum Bonumfor
for states

and

states,

Before constructing the ideal state
is

we must know what
individuals.

the most desirable

life

and

True
virtue,

happiness flows from the possession of

wisdom and

virtuous

and not from the possession of external goods. But a life must be equipped with external goods as

instruments.
individuals (c.

These laws hold good of both
i).

states

and
in

But does the highest
action
?

virtue consist

contemplation or in

The

states

of the past have

lived for action in the shape of

war and conquest. But war cannot be regarded as a reasonable object for a state (c. 2). virtuous life implies activity, but activity may be speculative

A

as well as practical.

Those

are

a practical politician as degrading.

wrong who regard the life of But again they are wrong
good
(c. 3).

who

treat political
cc.

power

as the highest

4-12.

A picture of the Ideal State.
and the
should
be
as

We
make

must begin by considering the population

territory.
it

The

former

small

as

we can

without sacrificing independence and the capacity for a moral life. The smaller the population the more

manageable

it

will be

(c.

4).

The
with

territory

must be

large
living

enough
liberally

to

supply

the

citizens

the

means of
of

and

temperately,

with

an

abundance

leisure.

Analysis
The
tion
city

21
(c. 5).

should be in a central position
the
sea
is

Communica
and military
If the

with
;

desirable

for

economic

reasons

but the moral effects of sea-trade are bad.

state has a marine, the port

town should be

at

some distance

from the

city (c. 6).

The
high

character of the citizens should be a

mean between
;

that

of Asiatics and that of the northern races
spirit

intelligence

and
in

should be harmoniously blended as they are
races (c. 7).

some Greek
of the
state

We
who

must distinguish the members
are necessary as
its

from those
it.

servants,

but no part of

There must be men who
to bear

are

able

to

provide food,

to

practise the arts,

arms, to carry
religion,

on the work of exchange, to supervise the state to exercise political and judicial functions (c. 8).
these classes

But of

we

should exclude from the citizen body (i) the
Warriors,

mechanics, (2) the traders, (3) the husbandmen. rulers, priests remain as eligible for citizenship.
persons
different

The same
but
at

should
periods

exercise

these

three

professions,

of

life.

confined to them

(c. 9).

Ownership Such a distinction between

of land

should

be

a ruling

and a subject nothing new.
of

class,

It
in

based on a difference of occupation, is in still exists Egypt, and the custom
Crete and Italy proves that it formerly the valuable rules of politics have

common

meals

existed there.

Most of

been discovered over and over again in the course of history. In dealing with the land of the state we must distinguish

between public demesnes and private estates. Both kinds of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of a servile The site of the city should be chosen disposition (c. 10).
with regard (i) to public health, (2) to
(3) to strategic requirements.
political convenience,

The

ground-plan of the city

22

Analysis

should be regular enough for beauty, not so regular as to make defensive warfare difficult. Walls are a practical neces
sity (c.

n).

in the city cc.

It is well that the arrangement of the buildings should be carefully thought out (c. 12).

13-17.

The Educational System of the Ideal

State, its aim,

and early

stages.

The

nature and character of the citizens must be determined

to pursue.

with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the perfect

exercise of virtue, the latter term being understood not in the
conditional, but in the absolute sense.
virtue of this kind
(c.
1

Now

a

man

acquires

3).

by the help of nature, habit, and reason Habit and reason are the fruits of education, which
to obey when young Rule is their ultimate
is

must therefore be discussed.

The
and to

citizens rule

should

be
are

educated
older.

when they

and highest function.
the

Since the good ruler

the same as

good man, our education must be so framed as to produce
man.
all

the good
fit

It should

develop^
life
;

all

man

s

powers and

him

for

the activities of
activities

but the highest powers

and the
education.

highest

An

must be the supreme care of education which is purely military, like the
principle (c.

Laconian,

neglects this

14).

The

virtues

of

peace (intellectual culture, temperance, justice) are the most war is nothing but necessary for states and individuals
;

a

means towards securing peace.
next
all

But education must follow
the
the

the natural order of

human development, beginning with
with
(c.

body,

dealing
last

the

appetites,

and

training

intellect

of

15).
legislator

To

produce a healthy physique the

must

fix

Analysis
the

23

age of marriage,

parents,

regulate the physical condition of the provide for the exposure of infants, and settle the

duration of marriage (c.

16).

He

must also prescribe a

physical training for infants and young children.

For

their

moral

education the
;

overseers

very young should be committed to these should select the tales which they are told,
the pictures, plays, and statues which they seven years of age should be the period
intellectual training (c. 17).

their associates,
see.

From

five to

of preparation for

BOOK
cc. 1-7.

VIII (V).
continued.
Its

The Ideal Education

Music and

Gymnastic.

Education should be under state-control and the same for
all

the citizens (c. i).

It

should comprise those useful studies

which every one must master, but none which degrade the mind or body (c. 2). Reading, writing, and drawing have
always been taught on the score of their
producing
valour.
utility
;

gymnastic as
but
it

Music

is

taught

as a

recreation,

serves a higher purpose.
is

The

noble employment of leisure

the highest aim which a

man

valuable for this purpose.

The same may

can pursue ; and music is be said of drawing,

and other subjects of education have the same kind of value
(c. 3)-

Gymnastic is the first stage of education but we must not develop^ the valour and physique of our children at the Until puberty, expense of the mind, as they do in Sparta.
;

and for three years
(c.

after,
it

bodily

exercise

should be light

were a mere amusement, should not be taught to children ; they would do better by listening
4).

Music,

if

24
to

Analysis
professionals.

But music

rational

better critics
riper

enjoyment (c. 5). By and are given a suitable occupation. age they should abandon music ; professional
;

moral discipline and a learning music children become
is

a

When
skill is

of
not

for

them

(c. 6).

The

nor should they be taught difficult instruments various musical harmonies should be used for

different purposes.

Some

inspire virtue, others valour, others

enthusiasm.

The ethical harmonies are those which children The others may be left to professionals. The should learn. The Phrygian is Dorian harmony is the best for education.
bad; but the Lydian may be
beneficial to children.

Cetera desunt.

THE
EVERY
state
is

POLITICS
I

BOOK
is

a community

of some kind, and every ! 1
a view to
;

community mankind always
think

established with
act
if

in
all

order

good.

But,

some good for which they 1252 communities aim at some good,
to

obtain

that

a

the state or political community, which

is

the highest of

all,

and which embraces

all

the

rest,

aims,

and

in

a

greater

degree than any other, at the highest good. Now there is an erroneous opinion l that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ,
not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects.

2

For

example, the ruler over a few
the manager

is
;

called a master

;

over more,

of a household

over

a statesman or king, as if there
a great
is

number, were no difference between
larger

a

still

household and a small

state.

The

distinction
is

which
:

made between

the king and the statesman
is

as follows
;

When

the government

personal, the ruler

is

a king

when,

according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But
as will

all

this is a mistake

;

for governments differ in kind,

be evident to any one who considers 2 which has hitherto according to the method

the

matter
us.
i

guided

departments of science, so in politics, the comshould always be resolved into the simple elements or pound least parts of the whole. must therefore look at the
in other

As

\

We
foil,

1

Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 E

a

Cp.

c. 8.

I.

26
I. 1 elements
*

Logical Analysis of the State
of which the
in

state is
differ

may
any

see

what they
1
.

composed, in order that we from one another, and whether

scientific

distinction can be

drawn between the

different

kinds of rule

2
2

He who
origin,

thus considers things in their
a
state

first

growth and
obtain

whether

or

anything
first

else,

will

the

clearest

view of them.

In the

place (i) there must be
;

a union of those

who

cannot exist without each other

for

example, of male and female, that the race may continue ; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but
because, in

common

with other animals and with plants,

man

kind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of
themselves.

And

(2) there

must be

a union of natural ruler

and subject, that bdtlfrnay be preserved.
foresee with Ins

For he who can

mind

is

by nature intended to be lord and

master,
3

and he

who
;

can

work with
has

his

body

is

a subject,

and by nature a slave
Nature,

hence master and slave have the same
distinguished between
is

1252 b interest.

however,

the
the

female and the slave.

For she

not niggardly,

like
;

smith

who

fashions the Delphian knife for
for a single
for use,

many

uses

she
/

makes each thing
best

made when intended

and every instrument is one and not for many uses.

4 But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them
:

they are a

community of

slaves,

male and female.

Wherefore

the poets say,
It
1

is

meet that Hellenes should

rule

over barbarians

2
;

Or, with Bernays, how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
3

Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

Growth of the State
as if they

27
slave

thought that the barbarian and the

were

I.

2

by nature one.

Out of

these

two

relationships between
first

man and woman,
is

5

|

master and slave, the family when he says,

arises,

and Hesiod

right

First house and wife and an
for the

ox

for the plough

1
,

ox

is

the poor

man

s slave.

The

family

is

the associa-

(

by nature for the supply of men s every-day \ wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas com and by Epimenides panions of the cupboard [o/iocriTrvovs], 2 2 the Cretan, companions of the manger [6/ioKa7rovy].
tion established

But when
aims
at

several

families

are

united,

and the association
j

something more than

the supply

of daily needs,
the most natural 6

\

then comes into existence the village.

And

form of the

village appears to

be that of a colony from the

family, composed of the children and grandchildren,
said to be

who

are

suckled with the same milk.

And

this is the

reason
;

why

Hellenic

states

were

originally

governed by

because the Hellenes were under royal rule before kings came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family they is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of

they were of the same blood.

the family the kingly form of government prevailed because As Homer says [of the
:

7

Cyclopes]

Each one

gives law to his children and to his wives

V

For they
1

lived dispersedly, as

was the manner

in

ancient

et Di. 405. Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) 6/*oKUTTVOVS, companions of the hearth.

Op.

2

3

Od.

ix. 1

14, quoted by Plato, Laws,

iii.

680, and

in

N. Eth.

x. 9.

1

3.

28
I.

Ma?i a

Political

Animal

2

Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, times. because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the
forms of the Gods, but their ways of
life

to

be like their

own.
8

When
the state

several villages are united in a single

community,
self-sufficing,

perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite

comes

into existence, originating in the bare needs
in
if

of

life,

and continuing
therefore,
is

existence for the sake of a good

life.

And

the
it

earlier
is

forms

of society are

natural, so

the state,
is

for

the end of them, and the thing
is

[completed] nature
fully developed,

the end.
its

For what each

when

we

call

nature,

g of a man, a horse, or a family.

whether we are speaking Besides, the final cause and
is

of a thing

is

the best, and to be self-sufficing

the end

and ?end the best. Hence it is evident that and that man is by nature a
above humanity, or below

the state
political
is
is

is

a

creation of nature,

animal.

And

he

who by
either

nature and not by mere accident
it
;

without a
the

state, is

he

Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,
10

whom Homer
war
;

denounces

the outcast

who

is

a

lover of
in

he may be compared to an unprotected piece of draughts. game

the

Now
as

the reason

why man

is

more

of
is

a political animal

than bees or any other gregarious animals

evident.
,

Nature,

we

often

say,

only
1 1

animal
3
.

makes nothing in vain 2 and man is the whom she has endowed with the gift of
whereas
-

speech

And

mere sound
12.

is

but an

indication

Ml.

3

ix.63.

Cp.

c.

8.

Cp.

vii.

13.

12.

Man
(for
their nature

a

Political
is

Animal

29
2

of pleasure or pain, and
attains

therefore found in other animals I.

to

the perception of pleasure and

pain and
further),

the intimation of

them
is

to one

another, and

no

the power of speech
inexpedient,
it

intended to set forth the

expedient and
unjust.

and likewise the just and the
of

And

is

a characteristic

man

that he

alone

evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a

has any sense of good and

family and a state.

Thus
and
prior

the

state is

by nature
since
for

clearly prior to the

family

to
to

the the

individual,

the

whole
if

part

;

destroyed,

equivocal sense,

when
to

except in an speak of a stone hand ; for But things are destroyed the hand will be no better.
there
will

be

example, no foot

the

of necessity 13 whole body be
is

or hand,

as

we might

and we ought not working and power are the same when they are no longer say the same, but only that they have the same name. The 14 that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the proof
defined

by

their

;

that they

individual
sufficing
;

is

that the individual,
is

when

isolated, is not self-

and therefore he

like a part in relation to the

whole.

But he who
he

is

unable to live in society, or
for himself,

who

has

no need because he
beast or a

is sufficient

must be

either a

god

:

is

implanted in
the state
perfected,

all

men by

social instinct is no part of a state. nature, and yet he who first founded

A

was the
is

greatest of benefactors.

For man, when
armed

1

the best of animals, but,

when separated from
since

I

law and
is

justice,

he

is

the worst of

all

;

injustice 16
\

more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may
the use for the worst ends.

Wherefore,

if

he have not

virtue,

he

30
I.

The Parts of
of lust and gluttony.

the

Household

2

is

the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most

full

But

justice

is

the

bond of men
is

in

states,

and the administration of justice, which

the determina

tion of

what

is

1

just

,

is

the principle of order in political society.
is made up of households, before we must speak of the 2 management The parts of the household are the
it,

3

Seeing then that the state
speaking of the state
2
.

1253 b of the household

persons

who compose
in its

and a complete household consists

of slaves and freemen.
everything
/

Now we
;

should begin by examining
first

least

elements

and the

and

least parts

/ a

of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father We have therefore to consider what each and children.
I mean the is and ought to be : of master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child. [I say ya/juKr) and 76*1/07101777-1*17, there being no words for the two latter notions which ade-

of these three relations
relation

3 quately

And there is another element represent them.] of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which,
household management, others, according principal part of it ; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.
according to some,
to
is

identical with

a

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better For some are 4 theory of their relation than exists at present.
of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves,

and the
set
8
,

political
all

are
1

the same.

and royal rule, as I was saying at the out Others affirm that the rule of a master

3
3

Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. 4. Reading with the MSS. oiKOfo/^ cts.
Plato in Pol. 258 E
foil.,

referred to already in c. I.

2.

Slavery
over slaves
is

Necessary
exists

3 i I.

contrary

to nature,

and that the distinction
by
law
only,
is

3

between slave

and

freeman

and not
therefore

by nature
unjust.

;

and being an interference with nature

Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household ; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all,
unless he be provided with necessaries.

4

And

as in the arts

which have a

definite sphere the

workers must have their

own
2

proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so
it is

in the

are

of various sorts

management of a household. Now, instruments some are living, others lifeless in the ;
;

rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man,

a living

instrument

;

for

in

the arts the servant a
so,

is

a kind

of instrument.
for maintaining

Thus,
life.

too,

possession
in the

is

an

instrument

And

arrangement of the

family, a slave is a living possession,

and property a number
is

of such instruments

;

and the servant
all

himself an instrument,

which takes precedence of

other instruments.

For

if 3

every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus,
or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet
,

of their own accord entered the assembly of the
if,

Gods

;

manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen
in like

would not want
ever,

servants, nor

masters slaves.

Here, how- 1254
whilst
for

a

another

distinction

must be

drawn

:

the instruments *

commonly

so called are instruments
is

of production,

a possession

an instrument of action.
1

The

shuttle,

Horn.

II.

xviii.

376.

32
I.

Slavery

//

it

also

Natural?

4

it,

example, is not only of use, but something else is made by whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use.
as

Further,

production

and action

are

different

in

kind,

and both
5

require

instruments, the

instruments which

they

But life is action employ must likewise differ in kind. and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of
action
[for

he
is

ministers

to

his

master

s

life].

Again, a

possession spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not a part of something else, but wholly belongs only The master to it; and this is also true of a possession. is he does not belong to the master of the slave only
;

him, whereas the slave
6 but

is

nature

wholly belongs to and office of a slave

not only the slave of his master, him. Hence we see what is the
;

he

who
is

own

but another s and yet a man,
to

is by nature not his by nature a slave and
;

he may be said
being,
is

belong to another who, being a
possession.

human

also

a

And
action,

a

possession
separable

may

be

defined

as

an

instrument

of

from the

possessor.

5

But

is

there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave,

and for

whom
all

such a condition

is

expedient and right, or
?

rather is not

slavery a violation of nature
difficulty

There
2
i\
1

is

no

in

answering

this

question,

on

1

For that some should grounds both of reason and of fact. rule and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but from the hour of their birth, some are marked expedient
;

out for subjection, others for rule.

And
subjects

whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and
is

subjects, that rule for

the better

which
over
is

is

exercised over better
is

example,

to rule

men

better than to
is

rule over wild beasts.

The work

better

which

executed

Slavery
by
better

Justified

3 3
is I.

workmen

;

and where one man rules and another
In
are
all

5

ruled,

they

may

be said to have a work.

things

which form
parts,

a composite

whole and which
discrete,

made up of

whether continuous or

a distinction between

Such a 4 the ruling and the subject element comes to light. not in them only ; duality exists in living creatures, but
it

originates

in

the constitution
life,

of the universe
is

;

even

in

things
1

which have no
1

there

a

ruling

principle,

as

in

musical

harmony

.

But we are wandering from
restrict ourselves to the

the

subject.

We

will, therefore,

living
:

creature which, in the first place, consists of soul and body and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the But then we must look for the intentions other the subject.

5

of nature

in

things which

retain

their

things which are corrupted.

And

nature, and not in therefore we must study
state

the

man who

is

in the

most perfect

both of body and

soul, for in

him we
or

shall

see the true relation of the

two

;

although in bad
appear to
rule

corrupted
soul,

natures

the body will

often 1254 b

over the

and unnatural condition.

First then

because they are in an evil we may observe in living 6
;

creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule
soul rules the
lect rules

for the
intel

body with

a despotical rule,

whereas the

the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule.
is

And

it

clear that the rule

of the soul over the body, and

of the mind and the rational element over the passionate is natural and expedient ; whereas the equality of the two or the
rule

of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of men for tame animals have a better
;

7

nature than wild, and

all
;

tame animals are better off when
Again,

they are ruled by
1

man
Or,

for then they are preserved.
of harmony [in music].

DAVIS

D

34 Slavery
I.

Both Sides of the Question
inferior
;

5 the male
the

is

one

rules,

by nature superior, and the female and the other is ruled ; this
all

and
of

principle,
is

8 necessity, extends to

mankindo

Where

then there

such

a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use
their body,

are

by

nature slaves,

and who can do nothing better), the lower sort and it is better for them as for all

9 inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.

For

he who can
I

be,

and therefore

is

another

s,

and

he

who

i

participates in reason

enough

to apprehend, but not to have,

I

reason,

is

a slave by nature.

Whereas
;

the lower animals

cannot

And
is

obey their instincts. indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals
apprehend
they
;

even

reason

not very different
life.

for both with their bodies minister to
like to distinguish

10 the needs of

Nature would

betweep.

the
for
for

bodies of freemen and
servile

labour,

making the one strong the other upright, and although useless
slaves,

such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally : for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of
freemen.

And

doubtless if

men

differed

from one another

in

the mere forms of their bodies as

much

as the statues of the
that the inferior class

Gods do from men, all would acknowledge
I 1

should be slaves of the superior.
in

And
!

if there is a difference

the body,
is

how much more
some men
latter

in the soul

But the beauty of the
is

1255 a

body

seen,

whereas the beauty of the soul
are

not seen.

It is

clear, then, that

by nature
is

free,

and others

slaves,

and that for these

slavery

both expedient and

right.

6

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words
slavery and slave are used in

two

senses.

There

is

a slave

Slavery
I
is

Both Sides of the Question
by nature.

3

f
I.

or slavery by law as well as

The

law of which

Q

But supposed to belong to the victors. as they would an orator who many jurists impeach, brought forward an unconstitutional measure they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence
is

speak taken in war

is

a sort of convention, according to which whatever
2

this right

:

and

is

superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave

and subject. of opinion.
with means,

Even among philosophers

there

is

a difference

The
may
:

origin of the dispute,
is

and the reason

why

3

the arguments cross,

as follows

:

Virtue,

when

furnished

be deemed to have the greatest power of and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to that is the imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice ?

doing violence

question.

And,
is

in order to

make

a distinction between them, 4
:

some

assert that justice is benevolence

to

which others reply

If of a superior. the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. if the notion that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of that justice
rule

nothing more than the

a just rale of a superior], the alternative

[viz.

that

no one

because plausibility, *] that not even the superior in virtue ought to rule, or it implies be master. Some, clinging, as they think, to a principle of 6

should rule over others

has no force or

justice (for

law and custom are a sort of
is

justice),

assume that

by law, but they are not consistent. For what if the cause of the war be unjust ? No one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave.
slavery in
justified

war

j I

Were

this the case,

men of

the highest rank would be slaves

and the children of slaves

if they or their parents chance to Wherefore Hellenes do 6 have been taken captive and sold.
1

CP

.

a.

D

2

3"

I.

6

not

like

to

call

themselves slaves, but confine the term to
in

barbarians.
natural

Yet,

using this language, they really
at
first
;

mean the

must be spoke admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. 7 The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard them
slave of
for
it

whom we

selves as noble everywhere,

and not only
noble

in their

own

country,

but they

deem

the

barbarians

only

when

at

home,

thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and

freedom, the one absolute, the other

relative.

The Helen

of Theodectes says

:

Who
8

sides sprung

would presume to call me servant who am on both from the stem of the Gods ?

What

slavery,

does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and noble and humble birth, by the two principles of
?

1255 b good and evil

They
nature,

think that as

men and
But

animals,

so from

men and animals beget men a good man springs. good
it,

this is

what

though she may intend

often fails

to accomplish.

9

We

see then that there

is

some foundation

for this differ

ence of opinion, and that some actual slaves and freemen are
not so by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and
right for the one to be slaves

and the others

to be masters

:

the one practising obedience, the others exercising the autho10 rity which nature intended them to have.
authority
is

The

abuse of this

injurious to both

;

for the interests of part

and

of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Where the relation between them is natural they arc friends

whole

x

,

1

CP

.

c.

4.

5.

The
and have a

J(ule

of the Household
where
it

37

common

interest, but
is true.

rests

merely on law I. 6

and force the reverse

The
rule
all

previous remarks are quite enough to
is

show

that the

7

of a master

not a constitutional rule, and therefore that

the different kinds of rule are not, as
1
.

some

affirm, the

same with each other
subjects

For

there

is

one rule exercised over

who are by nature free, another over subjects who by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head whereas constitutional rule
are
:

is

a government of freemen and equals.

The

master

is

not

2

called a master because

a certain

he has science, but because he is of and the same remark applies to the slave character,
Still

and the freeman.

there

may

be a science for the master
science of the slave

and a science

for the slave.

The

would

be such as the

man of Syracuse

taught,

who made money by

instructing slaves in their ordinary duties.

And

such a know- 3

ledge

may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more neces
sary, others

of the more honourable sort
slave,

;

as the proverb says,

slave

before

master before master.

But

all

such 4

branches of knowledge are servile.

There

is

likewise a science
;

of the master, which teaches the use of slaves
as such
is

for the master

of them.
wonderful

concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use Yet this so-called science is not anything great or
;

for the master

need only

know how

to order that

which the

slave

must know how

to execute.

Hence
toil,

those 5

who

are in a position

which places them above

have

stewards

who

attend to their households while they occupy
politics.

themselves with philosophy or with
acquiring slaves, I

But the

art

of

mean of justly
foil.,

acquiring them,

differs
2.

both

Plato Pol. 258 E

referred to already in c. I.

3 8
I.

Property
art

What
or

Place in the Household
art

7 from the

of the master and the

of the
the

slave,

being

a species of hunting

war

J

.

Enough of

distinction

between master and
1256
a

slave.

Let us now enquire
art

into property generally,

and

into the

of money-making, in accordance with our usual method 2 been [of resolving a whole into its parts ], for a slave has shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether
the art of money-making
a household or a part of
last,
is
it,

the

same with the

art
it

or instrumental to

of managing and if the ;
shuttles is

whether

in the

way

that the art of

making

instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the
casting of bronze
is

way

that the

instrumental to the art of the statuary, for

2

they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material ; and by material I mean
the substratum out of which any

work

is

made

;

thus wool

is
it

the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary.
is

Now

easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of money-making, for the one uses the
material

which the other provides.

And

the art which uses
art

household stores can be no other than the

of household

management.

There
is

is,

however, a doubt whether the art of

money-making
3 art.

a part of household

management or
;

a distinct

[They

appear to be connected]

for the

money-maker

has to consider whence money and property can be procured; there is but there are many sorts of property and wealth
:

husbandry and the care and provision of food
4 these parts of the
there are

in general
?

;

are

money-making

art or distinct arts

Again,

many

sorts

kinds of lives both of animals and

of food, and therefore there are many men ; they must all have

food, and the differences in their food have
1

made
c.

differences
3.

Cp.

vii.

14.

21.

a

Cp.

i.

Property
in

l{ests on
life.
;

a Physical Basts 39
beasts,

their

ways of

For of

some

are gregarious, I.
is

8

others are solitary

they

live in the

way which

best adapted 5

to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or her

bivorous or omnivorous

:

and

their habits are

determined for

them by nature
jj

greater facility
individuals

such a manner that they may obtain with the food of their choice. But, as different
in

have

different

tastes,

the

naturally pleasant to all of

them

;

and therefore the

same things are not lives of

carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ
selves.

among them
and get
;

In the
are

lives

of

men

too there

is

a great difference. 6
idle life,

The

laziest

shepherds,

who

lead an

their subsistence

without trouble from tame animals

their

flocks having to
ture,

wander from place

to place in search of pas

they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of Others support themselves by hunting, which is living farm.

7

of different kinds.

Some, for example, are pirates, others who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which
;

there are

fish,

are fishermen,

and others

birds or wild beasts.

The

greater

live by the pursuit of number obtain a living from

the fruits of the

soil.

Such
those
1

are the

modes of
is

subsistence 8

which

prevail

among

whose industry
there

employed
is

1 immediately upon the products of nature , and whose food

not acquired by exchange and retail trade

is

the shep- 1258 b

herd, the husbandman, the pirate, the fisherman, the hunter.

Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employ ments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another :
thus the
life

of a shepherd
are similarly
require.

may

be combined with that of

a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter.

Other 9

modes of
needs of

life

combined

men may
1

any way which the in the sense of a bare Property,
in
is

Or,

whose labour

peisonal.

4-Q

Property

"Natural

Acquisition

I. 8 livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both For 10 when they are first born, and when they are grown up.

some animals bring

forth,

together with their offspring, so
;

much food
of
this the

as will last until they are able to supply themselves

vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance ; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply

1 1

of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals,
plants exist for their sake,
for the sake of

and that the other animals exist

not
12

all,

at least

man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if the greater part of them, for food, and for the

provision of clothing and various instruments.

Now

if

nature

makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in must be that she has made all animals and
of man.
a natural

vain, the inference

plants for the sake
art

And
art

so, in

one point of view, the
it

of war

is

of acquisition, for

includes hunting, an art

which we ought

to practise against wild beasts,

and against

men who, though
submit
13
;

intended by nature to be governed, will not 1 for war of such a kind is naturally just
.
"

Of
natural

the ait of acquisition then there

is

one kind

which

is
.

and

Either

we

2 part of the management of a household must suppose the necessaries of life to exist pre

is

a

viously,

or the art of household

management must provide
use of the family or
;

a store of
14

them

for the

common

state.

They

are the elements of true wealth
is

for the

amount of

property which

although Solon

in

needed for a good life is not unlimited, one of his poems says that,
to riches has been fixed for
vii.

No
1

bound
5,

man

V
management
v.

Cp.

c. 7.

and

14.

21.
is

2

of

a

Or, with Bernays, household.

which by nature
3

a part of the

Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Solon, 13.

71.

Property
But there
is

Money-making
is in

41
the arts
;

a boundary fixed, just as there

for I.
in
!

8

the instruments of any art are never unlimited,

either

5

number or

size,

and wealth may be defined as a number of

instruments to be used in a household or in a state.

And
is

so

we
is

see that there

is

a natural art of acquisition

which

prac

tised

by managers of households and by statesmen, and what the reason of this.

There

is

another variety of the art of acquisition which
art

is

9
a

of making money, and 1257 has in fact suggested the notion that wealth and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is

commonly and rightly called the

often identified with

it.

But though they are not very

different,
is

neither are they the same.

The

kind already described

given by nature, the other

gained by experience and art. Let us begin our discussion of the question with the fol- a
is
:

lowing considerations

everything which we possess there are two uses : both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for

Of

one

is

the proper, and the other the improper or secondary
it.

use of
for
a

For example,
;

a shoe is used for wear,

and

is

used
gives 3

exchange
in

both are uses of the shoe.

He who

exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an
shoe
object of barter.
for the
arises
at

The same may

be said of

all

possessions,

art

of exchange extends to all of them, and it 4 first in a natural manner from the circumstance
little,

that

some have too
had

others too much.

Hence we may

infer that retail trade is not a natural part

making

;

it

been so,

men

of the art of moneywould have ceased to exchange
in the first

when they had enough.

And

community, which

5

42
I.

Property
is

Coined

Money
For
the
;

9

is

the family, this art

obviously of no use, but only begins

to

be useful

when

the society increases.

members

of the family originally had all things in common in a more divided state of society they ] still shared in many things, but

which they had to give in ex change for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still 6 practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one
they were different things
another the necessaries of
life

l

receiving wine, for example,
like.

in

and nothing more; giving and exchange for corn and the

This
is

sort of barter is not part of the
is

money-making
satis-

art

and

not contrary to nature, but
s natural

needed for the

7 faction

of men

wants.

The

other or more complex

form of exchange grew out of the simpler. When the in habitants of one country became more dependent on those of
8 the surplus,

what they needed, and exported money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men
agreed to employ
in

another, and they imported

their dealings

with each other something
easily

which was

intrinsically

useful

and

applicable

to

the

Of purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. this the value was at first measured by size and weight, but in
process of time they put a stamp upon of weighing and to mark the value.
1257 b
it,

to save the trouble

When

the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the

barter of necessary articles

arose
;

the other
at

art

of moneyprobably

making, namely,

retail

trade

which was

first

a simple matter, but became

more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the
Originating in the use of coin,
generally thought to be chiefly

10 greatest profit might be made.

the art of
1

money-making
Or, more simply,

is

shared in

many more

things.

Property: True Notion of Wealth
concerned with

43

and money

be the art which produces wealth I. it, and to having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of
;

coin,

because the art of money-making and

retail

trade are
is

concerned with coin.
a

Others maintain that coined money

n

mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, which would have no value or use for any of the purposes of daily life if another commodity were substituted by the users.

And,

indeed, he

who

is

rich in coin

may

often be in want of

necessary food.

But how can that be wealth of which a man

may have
Midas
that

a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like

in the fable,

whose
him

insatiable prayer turned everything
?

was

set before

into gold

Men

seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of

1

2

making money than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural wealth and the natural art of moneymaking
are a different thing
;

in their true
;

form they are part
retail

of the management of a household the art of producing wealth, not
exchange.
coin
there
is
is

whereas
in

trade

is

And

it

way, but by seems to be concerned with coin ; for
every

the starting-point and the goal of exchange.

And

13

no bound to the wealth which springs from this art of money-making As in the art of medicine there is no
.

limit to the pursuit

of health, and as in the other arts there

is

no
at

of their several ends, for they aim their ends to the uttermost ; (but of the accomplishing
limit to the pursuit

means there
which
money.

too, in this art
is

a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, of money-making there is no limit of the end, wealth of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of
is

But the

art

of household management has a limit
1

;

14

Cp.

c. 8.

14.

44 ^Money-making
I.

in

Excess Unnatural
is

9

the unlimited acquisition of

money
all

not

its

business.

And,
;

therefore, in one point of view,

wealth must have a limit

nevertheless, as a matter of fact,

we

find the opposite to be

the case

;

for
limit.

all

money-makers increase

their

hoard of coin
is

without

The
e.

source of the confusion

the

near

15 connexion between the two kinds of money-making;

in either,
is

the instrument

[i.

wealth]

is

the same, although the use
;

for each is a use different, and so they pass into one another J of the same property but with a difference accumulation is
,
:

the end in the one case, but there

is

a further end in the other.

Hence some

persons are led to believe that making

money

is

the object of household management, and the whole idea of
their lives is that they
1

6 without limit,

or at any rate not to lose

ought either to increase their money The origin of it.
that they are intent upon living only,
;

1258

a this disposition in

men

is

and not upon

living well

and, as their desires are unlimited,

they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be Even those who aim at a good life seek the without limit.

means of obtaining bodily pleasures

; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in and so there arises the second species of making money
:

17

For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they money-making. seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment and, if
;

they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of money-making, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty
in a

manner contrary
is

to nature.

The

quality of courage, for

example,
fidence
;

not intended to
is

make money,

but to inspire con
general
s

neither
;

this

the aim of the

or of the

physician s art
18 health.

but the one aims at victory and the other at

Nevertheless,
1

some men

turn

every quality or art
y

Reading KTTjatws XF/ a

Money-making:
into

the
;

True IQnd
this
all

4?
9

a

means of making money

they conceive to be I.
things must

the end, and to the promotion of the end
contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of money-making, which is unnecessary, and why men want it and also the
;

necessary art of money- making, which
different

we

have seen to be

from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having
a limit.

have found the answer to our original question 1 , 10 Whether the art of money-making is the business of the

And we

manager of a household and of the statesman or not their business ? viz. that it is an art which is presupposed by them.
f

For

political science

does not make men, but takes them from
;

nature and uses

them

and nature provides them with food

from the element of

earth, air, or sea.

At
who

this stage begins

the duty of the manager of a household,
;

has to order the
2

he may be compared to the things which nature supplies weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know

what

sort

of wool

is

good and

serviceable or bad and un
it

serviceable.

Were

this otherwise,

would be

difficult to see

why
of a

money-making is a part of the management household and the art of medicine not ; for surely the
the art of
a household

members of
have
life

must have health

just as they

must

or any other necessary.

And

as from one point 3
state

of view the master of the house and the ruler of the

have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician ; so in one way the art of household

management,

in

another
1

way
Cp.

the

subordinate
i.

art,

has

to

c. 8.

4<*

IQnds of Money-making

I.

But, strictly speaking, as I have 10 consider about money. already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand

by nature that which
;

for the business of nature is to furnish food to
is

born,

4 remains over in the parent

money

out of fruits the

and the food of the offspring always l Wherefore the art of making and animals is always natural.
.

Of
said,

two

sorts

of money-making one, as I have just

is
:

a part of household

management, the other
censured
for

is

retail

trade

the former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind
is

1258 b of exchange which

justly

;

it

is

unnatural,

and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which

makes
5

a gain out

of

it.

of money itself, and not from the natural use For money was intended to be used in exchange, but
at

And this term usury [TOKO?], of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the Wherefore of all modes of making money this is parent.
not to increase
interest.

which means the

birth

the most unnatural.

11

Enough has been

said about the theory of

money-making

;

2 The discussion proceed to the practical part. of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be

we

will

now
in

engaged
useful

them

practically is illiberal
are,

and irksome
the

2
.

The

parts of money-making

first,

live-stock,

which

are

most

profitable,

and

knowledge of where, and

how, as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return.
2

A man ought to know which
1

of these pay better than others,

Cp.
Or,

c. 8.

10. are free to speculate about

2

We

them, but

in

practice

we

are

limited

by circumstances.

(Bernays.)

K^inds of Money-making
and which pay best one place and some
in particular places, for
in another.

47
better in I. 11

some do

Secondly, husbandry, which

may
of

be either

tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and

fish,

or fowl, or of any animals which

may

be useful to

man.

These

are the divisions of the true or proper art of 3

in

Of the other, which consists money- making and come first. the first and most important division is commerce exchange, commerce by sea, commerce (of which there are three kinds
by land,
safer or
selling
in

shops

these again differing as they are the second
is

more

profitable),

usury,

the third,

service

for hire
arts,
still

of

this,

one kind

mechanical

the other in
third
sort
first

employed in the 4 unskilled and bodily labour.
is

There

is

a

of money-making

intermediate
is

between

this

and the

or natural

mode which

partly

natural, but is also

concerned with exchange of the fruits and Some of these latter, although other products of the earth. bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable ; for example, they

wood and

minerals.

The

art

of mining, by which minerals

5

are obtained, has

many

branches, for there are various kinds

of things dug out of the earth.
I

Of

the several divisions of

money-making speak generally; a minute considera tion of them might be useful in practice, but it would be
tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.

now

Those occupations
the
is

are

most
;

truly arts in

which there

is

g

the least element of chance

body
is

is

they are the meanest in which most deteriorated, the most servile in which there
illiberal

the greatest use of the body, and the

in

which

there

the least need of excellence.

Works

have been written upon these subjects by various

7

persons; for example,

by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting,

48
I. 11 while

Economic Tales
others have treated of other branches
for
;

any one who
writings.
It

1259

a

cares

such

matters

may

refer

to

their

would be well
in

also to collect the scattered stories of the
in

ways

which individuals have succeeded
all

8 for

this is useful to persons

who

amassing a fortune ; value the art of making
of universal
his reputa-

money.

There

is

the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and

his financial device, application, but
is

which involves a

principle

attributed to

him on account of

9 tion

for

wisdom.

He

which was supposed to

was reproached for his poverty, show that philosophy was of no use.

According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of
olives in the coming year ; so, having a little capital, he gave earnest-money for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid

against him.

When

the harvest-time came, and
let

many wanted

them

at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if
all at

once and of a sudden, he

them out

10 they like, but that their ambition

is

of another

sort.

He

is

supposed to have given a striking proof of his
I

was

saying,

his device for
is

wisdom, but, as getting money is of universal

application,

and

It is an art often practised

nothing but the creation of a monopoly. by cities when they are in want of

11

money ; they make a monopoly of provisions. There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited
with him, bought up all the iron from the iron mines ; after wards, when the merchants from their various markets came
to buy, he

was the only

seller,

and without much increasing

12 the price

Which when Dionysius he gained 200 per cent. heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but

Household Government
that

49
I.

he must not remain
a

at Syracuse, for

he thought that the

11

man had discovered
injurious to his

way of making money which was

own

interests.

He

had the same idea

as

Thales
selves.

;

they both contrived to create a monopoly for them And statesmen ought to know these things ; for a 13

state is often as

much

in

for

obtaining

it

as a household, or even

want of money and of such devices more so hence some
;

public

men

Of

devote themselves entirely to finance. household management we have seen 2 that there are 12

three parts

one

is

the rule of a master over slaves, which
s
,

has been discussed already
third of a husband.

another of a father,

and the

A
free,

husband and father

rules over wife

and children, both

but the rule differs, the rule over

his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. 1259 b

For although
the male
is

there

may be

exceptions to the order of nature,

by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and

more immature.
rule

But

in

most

constitutional states the citizens 2

and are ruled by
differ at all
4
.

turns, for the idea of a constitutional

state implies that the natures

do not
other
is

of the citizens are equal, and Nevertheless, when one rules and the
to create a difference of
titles

ruled

we endeavour

outward

forms and modes of address and

of respect, which

may

be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan 6 . The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but 3
there the inequality
is

his children is royal, for

The rule of a father over permanent. he receives both love and the respect

due to age, exercising a kind of royal power.
1

And
a

therefore
3.
j.

Reading tvprj^a with Bernays.
Cp. c. 3-7. Cp. Herod, ii, 172, and note on this passage.
DAVIS
4
ii.

Cp.

c.

s
6

2.

6;

iii.

17.

4.

E

jo
1.

Virtue in the Subject Classes
appropriately called

12 Homer has

Zeus

father of

Gods and

For a king is the men, because he is the king of them all. natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same
kin or kind with them, and such
is

the relation of elder and

younger, of father and son. Thus it is clear that household management attends more 13 to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to

human
2 to

excellence more than
call

to the excellence of property

which we

wealth, and to the virtue of freemen

more than

the virtue of slaves.
is

A

question

may

indeed be raised,

whether there

any excellence

at all in a slave

instrumental and ministerial qualities

beyond merely whether he can have
;

the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like

or

3

whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from
;

freemen

?

On
it

the other hand, since they are
to

men and

share

in reason,
.
,

seems absurd

|

A similar question

say that they have no virtue.

may

be raised about
:

women and

children,

whether they too have virtues ought a woman to be tem and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, perate
4 and intemperate, or not
?

So

in general

we may ask

about

the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For a noble nature is equally
required in both, but if so, why should one of them always Nor can we say that rule, and the other always be ruled ?
this is a question

and subject
degree
5
;

is

a

of degree, for the difference between ruler difference of kind, and therefore not of
strange
is

yet

how

the

supposition

that
!

the one

For if ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well ?

Virtues not the same for All
f the subject,

5-1

how

can he obey well

?

If he be licentious I. 13
It is evident,
virtue,
a

and cowardly, he

will certainly not

do

his duty.

therefore, that both

of them must have a share of

but

varying

according to their various natures.
in

And

this is at 6

once indicated by the soul,

which one
virtue

part naturally rules,

and the other
tain to

is

subject,

and the

of the ruler

we main

be different from that of the subject ; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part.

Now,
nature.

it

is

obvious that the same principle applies generally,
all

and therefore almost

things rule and are ruled according to
rule differs
;

But the kind of

the freeman rules over 7

the slave after another manner from that in which the male
rules over the female, or the

man

over the child

;

although
pre-<|

the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are For the slave has no deliberative^ sent in different degrees.
faculty at
all
;

the

woman
it is

has, but

it

is

J

without authority
it

l

y

and the child has, but

immature.

So

must necessarily 8

be with the moral virtues also ; all may be supposed to partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by Hence the ruler ought each for the fulfilment of his duty.
to have moral virtue in perfection,
for

his

duty

is

entirely

that of a master artificer,

and the master

artificer is

reason

;

the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of
virtue virtue

which

is

belongs to

Clearly, then, moral 9 proper to each of them. all of them ; but the temperance of a man
justice
2
,

and of a woman, or the courage and
a

of a man and of
the same; the
in

woman,

are not, as Socrates maintained

courage of a
obeying.

man
if

is

shown

in

commanding, of a

woman
who

And

this holds

of

all

other virtues, as will be
detail, for those
2

more
say

10

clearly seen
1

we

look at them in
inconclusive.

Or, with Benuys,

Plato

Meno, 71-73.

E

2

?2
I.

The Slave and
that
virtue

the Artisan
a

13 generally
soul, or in

consists

in

good disposition of the

doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves.

Far
1 1

better than such definitions is their

mode of

speaking,

who, like Georgias *, enumerate the must be deemed to have their special
says of

virtues.

All classes
;

attributes

as the poet

women,
Silence
is

a

woman

s

2

glory

,

child is imper and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himfect, 3 12 self alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher and in
is
,

but this

not equally the glory of man.

The

like

manner the

virtue

of the slave
is

is

relative

to a master.

Now we
life,

determined that a slave
will

useful for the wants of

and therefore he

obviously require only so
failing in his

much

virtue as will prevent

him from

cowardice and intemperance.

Some

duty through one will ask whether, if

what we

are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in
fail in their

the artisans, for they often
13 duct.

But

is

there not a great difference in the
;

work through miscontwo cases?
the artisan
is less

For the

slave shares in his master s life

closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave, [i. e. is under the direction

of a master].

The meaner

sort

of mechanic has a special

1260 b and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature,
14 not so the shoemaker or other artisan.
It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of excellence in the

slave

;

but not merely because he possesses the art which trains
4
.

Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ

him

in his duties

1

Plato

Meno, 71-73.

2
*

Soph. Aj. Cp.
c.

29.3.

8

His father

who

guides him

(Bernays),

7.

4.

End of
command
only
*,

Preliminary Enquiry
more
in

5-3
I. 3.3

for slaves stand even

need of admoni-

tion than children.

The

relations

several virtues,

what

of husband and wife, parent and child, their 15 in their intercourse with one another is

pod, and what
escape the
:

is evil,

evil, will

and how we may pursue the good and have to be discussed when we speak of
For, inasmuch as every

the different forms of government.

amily
sarts

is

a part of a state,

of a family, the virtue

and these relationships are the of the part must have regard to
therefore

the virtue of the whole.

And

women and

children
,

must be trained by education with an eye to the state 2 if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference
in the virtues
for

of the

state.

And
.

they must

make

a difference

:

16

the

children

grow

up to be citizens,

and half the

free

persons in a state are

women 3

Of these
let

matters, enough has been said

us speak at another time.

of what remains, 14 Regarding, then, our present
;

enquiry as complete,
first, let

we

will

make

a

new

beginning.

And,

us examine the various theories of a perfect
vi. 2

state.

1

Plato Laws,

777.
3

Cp.

v. 9.
vi.

11-15
B.

;

viii.

i.

r.

Plato Laws,

781

BOOK
II. 1

II

OUR

nity is best

purpose is to consider what form of political commu of all for those who are most able to realize their

must therefore examine not only this but ideal of life. other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed
states,

We

that
let
1

what

and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem is good and useful may be brought to light. And
;

we

no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them x at all want to philosophize at the expense of truth we
;

only undertake this enquiry because

all

the constitutions with

which we are acquainted are
a

faulty.

We

will begin with the natural beginning
:

fThree alternatives are conceivable
f must either have (i)
f

The members

of the subject. of a state

all

things or (2) nothing in

common,

or

1261

a

common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the state is a community, and must at any rate have a common place one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who
(3)

some things

in

3 share in that one city.
all

But should a well-ordered
be,
in

state

have

things, as
?

far as

may

common,

or

some only and

not others

For

the citizens might conceivably have wives
in
2
.

and children and property
in

common,

as Socrates proposes
is

the

Republic of Plato

Which

better,
?

our present

condition, or the proposed
1

new

order of society
ao<pifa6ai

Or, as Bernays, taking irdfrajs with

fiov\o^it cav

we
>

are anxious to
2

make
c.

a sophistical display at any cost.

Rep.

v.

457

False Conception of Unity
There
are

yj

many

difficulties

in

the

community of women. II. 3

principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution does not appear to be established by his argu

The

ments

;

to the state, taken literally,
limit

and then again as a means to the end which he ascribes it is impossible, and how we are to
it is

and qualify

nowhere precisely

stated.

I

am

speak-

a

\j^

ing of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates pro that the greater the unity of the state the better. Is ceeds,
it

not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state ? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from
being a state,
it

an individual

;

for the family

becomes a family, and from being a family, may be said to be more one

than the state, and the individual than the family.

So

that

we
it

ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is 3

not

made up only of
;

men

for similars

so many men, but of different kinds of It is not like do not constitute a state.

a military alliance,
its

of which the usefulness depends upon even where there is no difference in quality. quantity Foi in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the
question
is is

the same as about the scales of a balance
?

:

which

the heavier

In like manner, a state differs from a nation, whenever

in

a nation the people are not dispersed in villages, but are in the condition of the Arcadians ; in a state the elements out of

which the unity
the Ethics
2
,

is

to be

formed
*,

differ in kind.

Wherefore 4

the principle of reciprocity
is

have already remarked in And among freemen the salvation of states.
as I

and equals
1

this is a principle

which must be maintained, for
a

Or,

reciprocal proportion.

N. Eth.

v. 8.

6.

C/

-4<.

(>

o ^
;

\

\

f5
II.

Plato s J(epublic:

2 they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of suc5 cession.

The result is that upon this plan they all govern manner of government is] just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters.
;

[but the

6

And
is

it is

clearly better that, as in business, so also in politics

there should be continuance of the

same persons where
it

this

1261 b

possible.

But where

this is not possible

natural equality of the citizens,

and

by reason of the would be unjust that

any one should be excluded from the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad *), then it is better,
instead of
all

holding power, to adopt a principle of rotation,

equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers gave place
7 to

them

2
.

Thus

the one party rule and the others are ruled

in turn, as if

manner there
it

they were no longer the same persons. is a variety in the offices held by them.
is
;

In like

Hence

is

evident that a city

not by nature one in that sense

which some persons
greatest

affirm
is

and that what
in

is

said to be the
;

good of
in

cities

reality

their

destruction

but
3
.

surely the
8

good of things must be
is

that

which preserves them

Again, of the

another point of view,
clearly not
;

this

extreme unification

state

sufficing than an individual,

good for a family is more selfand a city than a family, and

a city only

comes

into being

when

the

community

is

large
to be

enough

to be self-sufficing.

If then self-sufficiency

is

desired, the lesser degree of unity is
greater.

more

desirable than the

3
1

But, even supposing that
Cp.
PI.

it

were best for the community to
2

Rep.

i.

345-6.
Cp.
Pi.

Cp.

i.

12.

2;

iii.

17.

4.

Rep.

i.

352.

False Conception of
;

Unity

57

i

have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means II. 3 indicated by the fact of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time, which, according to
Socrates
*,

is is

the sign of perfect unity in a state.

For

the 2

word

all

ambiguous.

vidual says

mine

and

If the meaning be that every indi not mine at the same time, then

perhaps the result at which Socrates aims

may be

in

some

degree accomplished own son and his own wife,
;

each

same person his and so of his property and of all
will call the
is

man

that belongs to him.

This, however,

not the

way

in

which

people would speak

who had
all

their

wives and children in
each.

common

;

they would say

but not

In like man- 3

ner their property

would be described

as belonging to them,
is

not severally but collectively.
the term
it is

There

an obvious fallacy
both,

in

all

:

like

some other words,
in

odd,

even,
logical
in the
it

ambiguous, and

puzzles.

That

all

argument becomes a source of persons call the same thing mine

sense in which each does so
impracticable
[i.
;

may be a
all

fine

thing, but

is

or if the

words

are taken in the other sense

e.

the sense which distinguishes
in

from

each

],

such

no way conduces to harmony. And there is 4 unity another objection to the proposal. For that which is common
a

to the greatest

number has the least care bestowed upon it. one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the Every common interest ; and only when he is himself concerned as
an individual.

For

besides other considerations, everybody

is

,

more inclined
fulfil
;

to neglect the duty

which he expects another

to

as in families

many

attendants are often less useful than

a few.

Each

citizen will

have a thousand sons

who

will not 5

be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son
1

PI.

Rep.

v.

462

c.

5-8

Plato s Republic:
will

II.

3 of anybody, and
a

therefore

be

neglected by

all

alike.

Further, upon principle, every one will call another mine or not mine according as he is prosperous or the
this

reverse

;

however small a

fraction he

may

be of the whole

number, he will say of every individual of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the city, such a one is mine,
such a one his
tive
; ;

and even about

this

he

will

not be posi
to have a

for

it

is

impossible to

know who chanced
it

child, or whether, if

one came into existence,
to be able to say

has survived.
about every

6

But which

is

better

mine

one of the two thousand or the ten thousand
use the
7

citizens, or to

word
For

mine

in

the ordinary and

more

restricted

sense

?

usually the

same person

his son

whom

another calls his

by one man brother or cousin or kinsman
is

called

or blood-relation or connexion by marriage either of himself

or of

some

relation

of

his,

and these relationships he

distin
;

guishes from the tie which binds him to his tribe or ward and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody
8 than to be a son after

Plato s fashion Nor is there any of preventing brothers and children and fathers and way mothers from sometimes recognizing one another ; for chil
!

dren are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be
9 finding indications of their relationship to one another.
;

Geo

they say that in Upper graphers declare such to be the fact Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the chil dren

who

are born are assigned to their respective fathers
J
.

on

the ground of their likeness

And

some women,

like the

females of other animals

for

example mares and cows

have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their

1

Cp. Herod,

iv.

180.

Community of Women and Children
parents,

$"9

as

was the case with the Pharsalian mare
.

called II.

3

Dicaea (the Just) 1 Other evils, against which
voluntary as well

it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides,

4

as involuntary,

quarrels and

slanders,

all

most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when
which
are

there

is

no

relationship.

Moreover, they are much more

likely to occur if the relationship is

have

occurred, the customary

unknown, and, when they expiations of them cannot
it

be made.

Again,
the

how

strange

is

that Socrates, after

2

having made

children

common, should

hinder lovers

from carnal intercourse only, but should permit familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother,
than

which

nothing

can

be

more unseemly,
is

since

even

without them, love of this sort
too, to forbid intercourse for

improper.

How

strange, 3

no other reason than the violence

of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

This

suited to the

community of wives and children seems better husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they
in

4,
)

have wives and children
to

common, they

will

be bound 1262 b

one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel 2 In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which
.

5

good laws ought to have, and the
in

intention

of Socrates

making these regulations about
itself.
3

women and

children

would

defeat

of states

good friendship and the preservative of them against revolutions ;
1

For

we

believe to be the greatest

Cp. Hist. Anim.
13.

vii.
*

6, p.

586

a.

13.
viii. I.

Cp.

vii.

10.

Cp. N. Eth.

4.

6o
II.

Plato
is

s

Republic:
greatly lauds as

4

neither

there anything

which Socrates so
all

the

unity of the state

which he and

the world declare

to be created

mends
sium
in
7
2
,

*

But the unity which he com by friendship. would be like that of the lovers in the Sympo
as Aristophanes says, desire to
"of

who,

grow

together
to

the

excess

their

affection,

and from

being two

become one, in which case one or both would certainly Whereas [the very opposite will really happen ;] in perish.
having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say my son, or the son As a little sweet wine mingled with my father a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so,
a state

8

V

in
is

this

sort of

community, the idea of relationship which

based upon these names will be lost ; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or
the
9

son
the

about

the

father,

or brothers

about

one another.

Of

two

qualities
is

which

chiefly inspire regard

and
it

affection

that
f

a thing

your own and
this.

that

you love

neither

can exist in such a state as

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of
guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank
will be
4
,

very difficult to arrange

;

the givers or transferrers

cannot but
10 to

know whom

whom.

And

the previously

they are giving and transferring, and mentioned evils, such as

assaults,

unlawful loves,

homicides, will happen more often
transferred
to

amongst those
or

who

are

the lower

classes,
;

have a place assigned to them among the guardians for they will no longer call the members of any other class
1

who

Cp.

c.

2.

a
4

Symp. 189-193.
Rep.
iii.

3

Cp.

c. 3.

415.

Community of Property
brothers,

6\
will II.

and children, and

fathers,

and mothers, and

4

not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and

children, let this be our conclusion.

Next
their

let

us consider what should be our arrangements 5
:

about property

possessions

should the citizens of the perfect state have This question may in common or not ?
the enactments about
that the

2

be

discussed

separately from

women
children 1268 a
is

and children.
belong

Even supposing

women and

to individuals, according to the

custom which

at

present universal,

may

there not be an advantage in having and

using possessions in
(l) the
soil

common

?

Three cases

are possible

:

may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is
the
practice of

some

nations.

Or
in

(2),

the

soil

may be
form

common, and may be cultivated
divided

common,
to

but the produce
;

among

individuals for their private use
is

this is a

of

common

property which

said

exist

among

certain
alike

barbarians.

Or

(3), the soil

and the produce may be

common.

When

the husbandmen are not the citizens, the case will 3
;

be different and easier to deal with

but

when

the citizens

till

the ground themselves the question of ownership will give a

world of trouble.

If they do not share equally in enjoyments

>.

and

toils,

those

complain of

who labour much and get little will necessarily those who labour little and receive or consume
is

|

much. There
having
things

always a
in

difficulty in

men

living together
in

and 4

common,

but

especially

their having

common
an
the

property.

The

partnerships of fellow-travellers are
;

for they generally fall out by example to the point way and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So

6z
II. 5 with servants
:

Plato s Republic :
we
are

most

liable

to

take offence at those
into

with
life.

whom we

most frequently come

contact in daily

5

some of the disadvantages which attend of property ; the present arrangement, if im community proved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems.
are only

These

the

i

Property should be
general
interest
will
rule,
*,

in
;

a
for,

certain

sense

common,

but,

as a

<{

private
will

when

every one has

a

distinct

men

not complain of one another, and they

make more
his

progress, because every one will be attending

to

own

business.

And

yet

among

the good, and in
will

respect of use,

Friends,

as the proverb says,

have

all

things

common

V

Even now
it

there

are traces

of such a

principle,

showing that
states, exists

is

not impracticable, but, in well-

ordered

already to a certain extent and

7 be carried further.

For, although every
will place
at

man

has his

may own

property,

some things he

the disposal of his

friends, while of others

he shares the use with them.

The

Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another s slaves, and horses and dogs, as if they were their own ; and when they
happen to be
in

the

country,

they appropriate in the fields
It is clearly better that property
it

8 whatever provisions they want.

should be private, but the use of
business of the legislator
disposition.
is to

create in

common and men this
;

the special

benevolent

Again,
feels a

1263 b

when
is

a

man

how immeasurably greater is thing to be his own for the
;

the pleasure,
love of self
in
3

a

feeling

implanted
is

by

nature

and
;

not given
this,

vain,
is

9 although selfishness
1

rightly censured

however,
iv.

not

2

Cp. Rep.

ii.

374.
3

Cp. Rep.

424

A.

Cp. N. Eth.

ix. S.

6.

Community of Property
the mere love of
self,

63
excess,
all,

but the love of self in
;

like

II. 5

the miser s love of

money

for

all,

or almost

men

love

money, and other such objects
there
is

in a measure.

And

further,

the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to

friends or guests or companions,

which can only be rendered

when
the

a

man has

private property.

The
state.

advantage
Two"

is

lost

by 10
are

excessive

unification
:

of the
first,

virtues

annihilated in such a state
(for
it

is

an honourable action to
secondly,

temperance towards women abstain from another s wife
liberality in the
all

:

for temperance sake);

matter

ofj

property.
will

No
;

one,

when men have
example

things in
liberality

common,
do any
is

any

longer

set an

of

or

liberal action

for liberality consists in the use

which

made

of property l

.

Such

legislation
;

may have

a

specious
it,

benevolence
to

men
in

readily listen to

and are

appearance of easily induced

iji
:

believe that

some wonderful manner
s

become everybody
heard

everybody will 2 is friend, especially when some one
evils

.

denouncing

the

now

existing

in states,

suits

about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of
private property.
different cause

\

however, are due to a very ia the wickedness of human nature. Indeed,
evils,

These

we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have
private property.

.

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears
1

13

Cp. N. Eth.

iv. i.

I.

a

Rep.

v.

464, 465.

64
II.

Plato
be quite impracticable.

s

Republic:

5
;

to

The

error of Socrates

must be
starts.

^
\v y

attributed to the false notion of unity

from which he

I*

Unity there should
but in a state

be,

both of the family and of the

state,

I

some

respects only.
attain

For

there

is

a point at

which

may

state, or at which,

such a degree of unity as to be no longer a without actually ceasing to exist, it will

become an
15 or

inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, which has been reduced to a single foot. The rhythm as I was saying, is a plurality a which should be state,
,

united and
is

made

into a

community by education

;

and

it

strange that the author of a system of education,

which

improve his

state virtuous, should expect to by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which and Crete respecting common meals, whereprevail at Sparta

he thinks will make the
citizens

1264
1

a

by the

legislator

6

common.

Let us remember
;

has [to a certain degree] made property that we should not disregard the
in the multitude

experience of ages

of years these things,
;

if

for they were good, would certainly not have been unknown almost everything has been found out, although sometimes do not use the they are not put together ; in other cases men

17

knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on we could see such a form of government in the for the legislator could not actual process of construction
this subject if
;

form a

state at all

without distributing and dividing the citizens

into associations for
tribes.

common

meals, and into phratries and

But

all

this

legislation

ends

only

in

forbidding

agriculture to

the guardians,

a prohibition

which the Lace

daemonians try to enforce already.
1

8

Again, Socrates has not
1

said,
2.

nor
2.

is

it

easy to decide,

Cp.c.

Miscellaneous Criticisms
what
state.

65

in

such a community

will

be the general form of the II. 5

The

citizens

who

are not guardians are the majority,

and about them

nothing

has

been

determined

:

are

the

husbandmen,
besides the
to

too, to

be

common own ? and individual or common ?
have his
all

have their property in common ? Or, land which he tills, is each individual
are
their

wives

and children to

If, like the guardians, they are to 19

have
or

things in
will

common,

in

what do they

differ

from them,

they gain by government ? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans,

what

submitting to their

who
arms.

give their slaves

but forbid
If,

the same institutions as their own, them gymnastic exercises and the possession of

like other cities in respect

on the other hand, the inferior classes are too of marriage and property, what will
it
?

2o

be the form of the community ? Must states in one *, each hostile to the other
consist

not contain two
2

One

class will
;

of the

guardians,

who

are

a

sort

of watchmen

another, of the husbandmen, and there will be the artisans and
the other citizens
2
.

But

[if so]

the evils

which Socrates

affirms

8

the suits and quarrels, and all 21 to exist in other states, will says indeed that, having so

exist equally

among them.

He

good an education, the

citizens will not

need many laws, for

4 example, laws about the city or about the markets ; but then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes 33

husbandmen owners of the land upon condition of their paying a tribute *. But in that case they are likely to be much
the
1

Cp. Rep.

iv.

422

E.

Or (with Bernays), He makes the guardians into a mere occupying while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real garrison,
a

citizens
*

;

see note.
v.

Rep.
DAVIS

464, 465.

*

Rep.

iv.

425

D.

Rep.

v.

464

c.

F

66
II. 5

Plato
and

s

Republic:
than
the

more unmanageable

conceited
]
.

Helots,

or

23 Penestae,

whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this,
or slaves in general

And

what
the
is
it

will be the education, form of government, laws of lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined neither easy, though very important, to discover what should
:

be the character of the inferior classes,
the guardians 1264 b
24 is to

if

the

common

life

of

be maintained.

Again,
private
will see

if

Socrates makes the

women common, and
see to

retains

property, the
to

men
2
?

will

the
will

fields, but

who

the

agricultural
in

class
?

common 2

the happen have both their property and their wives it is absurd to argue, from Once more
if
;

house

And

what

the

analogy of the animals, that men and women should 3 for animals have not to manage follow the same pursuits
;

25 a

government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger ; for he makes the same

household.

The

I

persons always rule.
turbance

And
But

if

this

is

often a cause of dis

among

the meaner sort,
?

how much more among

high-

26

spirited
rulers

warriors

that
is

the persons
;

whom

he

makes

must be the same
mingles
in the souls

evident

for the gold

which the
same

God

of men

is

not at one time given to
:

one, at another time to another, but always to the

as

he says, God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth but brass and iron in those who are 27 meant to be artisans and husbandmen Again, he deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought
;

V

to
1

make
Cp.

the whole
2.

state
2

6

happy

.

But the whole cannot
are bracketed
A.
5

c. 9.

These words
iii.

by Bekker.
iv.

8

Cp. Rep.

v.

451

D.

*

Cp. Rep.

415

Rep.

419, 420.

Criticisms

6j

be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy II. 5 1 In this respect happiness is not like the even happiness
.

principle

but

in

numbers, which may exist only none of the parts ; not so happiness.
in

in

the whole,

And

if the 28

guardians are not happy,
or the

common
has

people.
all

who are ? Surely not the The Republic of which
difficulties,

artisans,

Socrates
quite
as

discourses
great.

these

and

others

The
later

same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato

s

6

work, the

briefly

Laws, and therefore we had better examine In the the constitution which is therein described.
all

Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in

a

few questions

only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state.

The

population

is

divided into two classes
;

one of husbandlatter
is

2

men, and the other of warriors a third class of counsellors and

from
rulers

this

taken

of the

state.

But

3

Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and
artisans are to have a share in the government,

and whether

they,

too,

are to carry

arms and share

in

military service,

or not.

in the education

women ought to share of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the
certainly thinks that the

He

education of the guardians.

In
is

the

Laws

there

is

hardly

1265 a
"*

anything but laws

;

not

much

said about the constitution.

This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary the other or ideal form. type, he gradually brings round to

For with
property,

the exception of the community of women and he supposes everything to be the same in both
1

5

Cp.

vii.

9.

7.

F 2

6%
II.

Plato s
;

Laws:
;

6

states

there

is

to

be the same education

the citizens of

both are to be

live free

from

servile occupations,

and there are to
is

common

meals

in both.

The

only difference

that in the
,

1 and Laws, the common meals are extended to women 2 the warriors number about 5000 but in the Republic only IOOO 3
, .

6

The

discourses of Socrates are never commonplace
;

;

they

always exhibit grace and originality and thought tion in everything can hardly be expected.
overlook the fact that the number of

but perfec

We

must not

5000

citizens, just

now

mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylonia, or some other huge country, if so many persons are to be sup ported in idleness, together with their women and attendants,
7

who

will

be a multitude

an ideal]

many times we may assume what we
4
.

[In framing wish, but should avoid

as great.

impossibilities
It is said

[in

the

Laws]

that the legislator ought to have
.

his eye directed to

But neighbouring him 6 if the state
,

the people and the country 5 countries also must not be forgotten by

two

points,

for

which he

legislates is to

have a true

political

8

must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to
life
.

7

For

a state

be the best, either for individuals or states

8
,

still

a city should

be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating. There is another point Should not the amount of pro be defined in some clearer way ? For Socrates says perty
:

1

Laws,

vi. iv.

781.

2

Laws,

v.

737

E.

s

Rep.
Cp.
Cp.

423 A (but
2.

see note
6

on

this passage).

* 6

vii. 4.

c. 7.

7

14.

Cp.

Perhaps Laws, 703-707 and 747 D (?). 8 vii. 6. Cp. vii. c. 2 and 3. 7.

Criticisms
that a

6y
him II. 6

man should have
this

so

much
is

property as will enable

to live temperately

\ which

only a

way of

saying

to live

well

;

But

a

man may

would be the higher or more general conception. better 9 live temperately and yet miserably.

A

definition

would be
him

that a

man must have

so

much

property
2
;

as will enable
if the

to live not only temperately but liberally
;

will

combine with luxury toil be associated with temperance. For liberality and tem

two

are parted, liberality will

perance are the only virtues

3

which have

to

do with the use

of property.

A

man cannot

use property with mildness or

courage, but temperately and liberally he

may

;

and therefore
property.

the practice of these virtues

is

inseparable from

an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and 10 * not regulating the number of the citizens ; the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently
is

There

equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be 1265 b But [in Plato s imaginary state] n the case in existing states.
greater care will be required than

now

;

for

among
is in

ourselves,
is

whatever

may distributed among them, and
if the property

be the number of citizens, the property
therefore no one

always
but,

want ;

were incapable of division [as in the Laws], the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing.

One would have

thought that

it

was even more necessary

to

1

2

limit population than property;

and that the

limit should be

fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children,

and of
ject,
1

sterility

in

married persons.

The

neglect of this sub- 13
is

which

in existing states is so

common,

a never-failing

i. v. 737 D. Cp. vii. 5. and reading apfrai with the MSS., or, reading with Omitting * But see Laws, v. 740. Bekk. ttts alptrai, eligible qualities.

Laws,

"

3

fs

7o
II.

Plato s

3

Laws:
;

6 cause of poverty among

the citizens

and poverty

is

the parent

of revolution and crime.

Pheidon the Corinthian, who was
legislators,

one of the most ancient

thought that the families

and the number of

citizens

ought to remain the same, although
been of different sizes
is
;

originally all the lots

may have

but in
in our

14 the

Laws, the opposite
is
1
.

principle

maintained.

What

opinion

the right arrangement will have to

be explained

hereafter

There
tell

is

another omission in the

Laws

;

Socrates does not
;

us

how

the rulers differ from their subjects
2
.

he only says

that they should be related as the
15 are

warp and the woof, which

made out of

different

wools

He
3
,

allows that a
but
?

man

s

whole property may be increased

fivefold

why

should not

his land also increase to a certain extent

Again, will the

good management of a household be promoted by his arrange ment of homesteads ? for he assigns to each individual two
1

6 homesteads in separate places

4
,

and

it is

difficult to live in

two

houses.

system of government tends to be neither demo nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, cracy

The whole
is

which

usually called a polity, and

armed

soldiers.

Now,

if

is composed of the heavy he intended to frame a constitution

which would

suit the greatest

number of

states,

he was very

likely right, but not if

he meant to say that this constitutional
first

form came nearest to his
17 prefer the

or ideal state

;

for

many would
aris

Lacedaemonian,

or, possibly,

some other more

tocratic government.
1

Some,
ii
;

indeed, say that the best consti16.

Cp.
fulfilled.
a
1

vii.

5.

i

;

10.

15

;

but the promise
3

is

hardly

Laws,

v.
v.

734

E,

735

A.
vii.

Laws,

v.

744

E.

Laws,

745, but cp. infra,

10.

II.

The Form of Government
tution is a combination

71

of

all

existing forms, and they praise the II.

Lacedaemonian

1

because

it is

made up of

oligarchy, monarchy,

democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council
of elders
the
oligarchy,

while the democratic
;

element

is

represented by the Ephors
the people.

for the

Ephors

are selected

from

however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common In the Law 2 , it is meals and in the habits of daily life.
Others,

"

maintained that the best state
tyranny,

is

made up of democracy and
all,

which
all.
;

are either not constitutions at

or are the
.

worst of

But they

are nearer the truth
is

who combine
is

many forms

for the state

better

which

made up of
nothing but

(

j

more numerous elements.

The

constitution proposed in the
all
;

Laws

has no element of monarchy at

it

is

This oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. s for although is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates
;

19

the appointment of them by lot from

among those who have

been already selected combines both elements, the way in * which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly

and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavour to have
the greater
richest classes

number of the magistrates appointed out of the and the highest officers selected from those
oligarchical 20 also
in

who have
features.

the greatest incomes, both these are

The

oligarchical
6
;

principle
all

prevails

the

choice of the council

for

are compelled to choose, but
first

the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the
1 3

a

Cp.

iv.

7
vi. vi.
vi.

;

7.

4

;

9.

7-92

vi -

75 6 E
12.

;

C P- iv - 7

1(5-

Laws,
* 8

755, 763 E, 765.

Laws,
Laws,

764 A

;

and Pol.

iv. 9.

;

14.

756 B-E.

72
II.

P/afo

j

Laws:

6

class,

and of an equal number out of the second class and out
class, but

of the third

not

in this latter case to all the voters
;

of the third and forth class
out of the fourth class
21 second.
l

and the selection of candidates
only compulsory on the first and there ought to be an equal

is

Then, he says

that

number of each

class selected.

Thus

a preponderance will

be given to the better sort of people,

who

have the larger

incomes, because
22

many of the lower classes, not being compelled, will not vote. These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar
polities,

tend to

show

that states like Plato s should not be

composed of democracy and monarchy.
danger
in

There

is

also

a

electing
;

the

magistrates out of a body
but a small

themselves elected

for, if

who are number choose to com
Such
is

bine, the elections will always go as they desire.

the

constitution

which

is

described

in

the

Laws.

7

persons,

Other constitutions have been proposed ; some by private others by philosophers and statesmen, which all
to

come nearer
Plato
s.

established or existing

ones than either of

No

one else has introduced such novelties as the
children, or public tables for

community of women and
2

women
In

:

other

legislators

begin

with

what

is

necessary.
is

the

opinion of some, the regulation of property
I

the chief point

of

all,

that being the question

upon which

all

revolutions turn.

,

This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have
equal possessions.

3

He

thought that

in

a

new colony

the

1266

b equalization

might be accomplished without
a
state

difficulty, not so
;

easily

when

was already established

and that then

the shortest
1

way of compassing the desired end would be for

Omitting either rov rtraprov or rav rtrdprttiv,

Phaleas

Equality of Properly

73

the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for II. 7 the poor not to give but to receive them.

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, 4 accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed \ any citizen to possess more than five times the

minimum

qualification.

But those who make such laws should
that the legislator also fix the

5
i

remember what they are apt to forget who fixes the amount of property should
of children
;

number

I

for, if

the children are too

many

for the property,

the law must be broken.
law,
it

And,

besides the violation of the

is

a
;

become poor
revolutions.

bad thing that many from being rich should for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up

That

the equalization of property exercises an 6

influence

on

political society

was

clearly understood even

some of the old
as he pleased

legislators.

Laws were made by
in states

by Solon and
land

others prohibiting an individual from possessing as
;

much

and there are other laws
:

which forbid

the sale of property
is

among
is

the Locrians, for example, there
sell

a law that a

man

not to

his property unless he can
befallen him. 7

prove unmistakably that

some misfortune has

Again, there have been laws
the original lots.

which enjoin the preservation of

Such

a law existed in the island of Leucas,

and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification.
Again, where there
is

equality of property, the

amount may

be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be Clearly, then, the legis living either in luxury or penury. lator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, 8
but at moderation in their amount.
this

And
he

yet, if

he prescribe

moderate amount equally to
1

all,

will be

no nearer the

c.

6.

15.

74
II.

Phaleas^
;

7 mark
t

for

it

is

not the possessions but the desires of mankind
l
,

which

require to be equalized

and

this is impossible, unless

a sufficient education is provided will probably reply that this is
that, in his opinion, there

But Phaleas by the state. and precisely what he means
;

ought to be
Still

in states,

not only equal
tell
is

9 property, but equal education.
will be the

he should
;

us

what
in

character of his education
all, if
it is

there

no use

having one and the same for
10 poses

of a sort that predis-

men

to avarice, or ambition, or both.

Moreover,

civil

troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but

out of the inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. 1267 a the

For

quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honour ; as the poet says

common people

The bad and good
1 1

alike in

honour share
is

V
;

There

are crimes of

which the motive

want

and for

these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to
12

is

be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want not the sole incentive to crime ; men desire to gratify some

passion which preys upon them, or they are eager to enjoy the
pleasures which are unaccompanied with the pain of desire, and therefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these three disorders ? Of the first,

moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance ; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their
desires
13

nowhere but

in

philosophy

;

for

all

other pleasures

we

are dependent

on others.

The

fact is that the greatest

crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity.
1

Men
319.

do

Cp.

c. 5.

12.

a

II.

ix.

His

Errors and Omissions
may

75
;

not become tyrants in order that they

not suffer cold

II. 7

and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills Thus we see that the a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant.
avail only against petty crimes. another objection to them. They are chiefly But to promote the internal welfare of the state. designed

institutions

of Phaleas

There

is

M

the legislator should consider also
nations,

its relation
l

to neighbouring

and to

all

who

are outside of

it

.

The government
;

this

must be organized with a view he has said not a word.
perty
:

to military strength

and of

And

so with respect to pro- 15

there should not only be enough to supply the internal
state,

wants of the
without.

but also to meet dangers coming from

property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders ; nor yet so small
that the state is unable to maintain a

The

war even

against states

Phaleas has not iG of equal power, and of the same character. 2 that a cer laid down any rule ; and we should bear in mind
tain

amount of wealth

2

is

an advantage.

The

best limit will

probably be, not so much as will tempt a more powerful neigh There bour, or make it his interest to go to war with you.
is

i

7

a story that Eubulus,

when Autophradates was going
to

to

besiege Atarneus, told
tion

him

consider

how
I

long the opera

would

take,

and then reckon up the cost which would
For,
said he,

be incurred in the time.
a smaller

am

willing for

These sum than that to leave Atarneus at once. on Autophradates, and words of Eubulus made an impression
he desisted from the
siege.
is

One
that
1

advantage gained by the equalization of property
prevents the citizens from quarrelling.
c.

18

it

Not

that the

Cp.

6.

2

7.

Or reading

o TI,

what amount of wealth.

76
II. 7 gain
in

Phaleas and Hippodamus
this direction is very great.

For the nobles

will be

dissatisfied because

they think their
j

they do not due; and this is
J
.

receive the honours

which

often found to be a cause

9

of sedition and revolution
is

And

the avarice of

mankind

one time two obols was pay enough, but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end ; for it is of the nature
insatiable
;

at

of desire not to be
the gratification of o
it.

satisfied,
2

and most men

live
2

The

beginning of reform
to
train

is

only for not so

much

to

equalize

property as

the nobler sort of

natures not to desire more,
getting

and

to

prevent the lower from

more

;

that

is

to say, they

must be kept down, but not
is

at illtreated.

Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas
for

imperfect;
rich also in

he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abun

dance of what are called his movables.

Now

either

all

these

22

things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on It would appear that them, or they must all be let alone.

is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a part But if there is a law that 23 of the population of the city.

Phaleas
all

artisans are to be public slaves,
,

it

should only apply to those
at

8 as at Epidamnus, or engaged on public works the plan which Diophantus once introduced.

Athens on
Phaleas

From
8
1

these observations any one
right in his ideas.

may judge how

far

was wrong or

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a
Cp.
10.
a/trj,

native of Miletus, the

2
3

Or, reading with Bernays

the

Putting

a

comma

after

eircu

remedy for such evils. and removing the comma

after

Hippodamus
laid out the Piraeus

His

Constitution
of planning

and Laws 77
and who also II. 8
for dis

same who invented the

art

cities,

a strange man, a

whose fondness
of
life,

tinction

led

him

into

general eccentricity

which
hair

made some think him

affected (for he
;

would wear flowing

and expensive ornaments and yet he dressed himself in the same cheap warm garment both in winter and summer) he,
;

besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature,

was the

first

person not a statesman

who made

enquiries about

the best form of government.

The

city

divided into three parts

of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens one of artisans, one of husbandmen,
state.

2

and a third of armed defenders of the

He

also divided 3

the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third
private
: the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, He also 4 the third was the property of the husbandmen.

divided his laws into three classes, and no more, for he main
tained
injury,

that

there

are

three

subjects

of

lawsuits

insult,

and homicide.

He

likewise instituted a single final

which all causes seeming to have been decided might be referred ; this court he formed improperly He was further of opinion 1268 of elders chosen for the purpose.
court of appeal, to
that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given
5 by the

a

use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet

on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal but, if he partly
;

acquitted and partly condemned, he
ingly.

was

to distinguish accord

the existing law he objected that it obliged the be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. judges to He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the 6 good of the state should be rewarded ; and he provided that

To

78
II.

Hippodamus
who
at

His
died
in
if

Confusions
battle

8

the children of citizens
tained

should be main

the public expense, as

such an enactment had

never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens l As to the magistrates, he would have 7 and in other places. them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes
already mentioned, and those

who were

elected were to watch

over the interests of the public, of strangers and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of

Hippodamus.

There

is

not

much

else.

of these proposals to which objection may be is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, 8 taken, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the
first

The

government.

artisans neither

But the husbandmen have no arms, and the arms nor land, and therefore they become all
is

9 but slaves of the warrior class.
all

That they should share in an impossibility ; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must
the offices

be taken from the class of those

who

carry arms.

Yet,

if

the

two other classes have no share
they be loyal citizens
?

It

may

government, how can be said that those who have
in the

arms must necessarily be masters of both the other
but this
ic ous
;

classes,

not so easily accomplished unless they are numer and if they are, why should the other classes share in the
is

government
and they can

at

all,

or have power to appoint

magistrates
in

?

Artisans there must be, for these are wanted
live

every

city,

by

their craft, as elsewhere

;

and the hus

bandmen,
might
their

too, if they really provided the warriors with food,

But in the have a share in the government. of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of republic
fairly

own,

which

they
1

cultivate
ii.

for
c.

their

private

benefit.

Cp. Thuc.

46.

Courts of
Again, as to this

Law:

Inventions

79
8
1 1

common

land out of which the soldiers are II.

maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen,

although the legislator intended to

make

a distinction

between

them.

If,

again,

there are to be other cultivators distinct

who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands and those of the
both from the husbandmen,
public as
:

12

well, they will have a difficulty in supplying the of produce which will maintain two households and 1268 b quantity in this case, should there be any division, for why, they

might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same lots ? There is surely a great confusion in all this.
Neither
judges,
is

the law to be
issue

commended which
is

says that the 13

when a simple
arbitrator.

laid before

them, should dis
is

tinguish in their judgment; for the judge
into

thus converted

an

Now,

in

an

arbitration,

although the

many, they confer with one another about the but in courts of decision, and therefore they can distinguish law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains
arbitrators are
;

to prevent the judges

from holding any communication with
will there not be confusion if the

one another.

Again,

judge 14
as the

thinks that damages should be given, but not so
suitor

much

demands

?

He

asks, say,

for twenty minae,

and the

judge allows him ten minae, or one judge more and another In this way they will go less ; one five, another four minae. on apportioning the damages, and some will grant the whole

and others nothing how is the final reckoning to be taken ? 15 Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or condemna
:

tion

is

compelled to perjure himself,

if

the indictment

is

quite

8o

Should

Laws
;

be

Changed?

II. 8 simple and in right form

for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not

owe

the twenty minae.

He

only

is

guilty of perjury

who
and

thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae,
yet
1

condemns him.
reward those
is a

6

To
safely

who

discover anything which

is

useful to

the state

proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and

This question perhaps even lead to political commotions. It has been doubted whether it is or is not involves another.
expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus for,
;

17 if

under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the
constitution.
iS perhaps

But, since
better

we
a

have touched upon this subject,
little

we had
is

go

into detail,

for,

as

1

was

there saying,

a difference of opinion,

and

it

may sometimes
;

seem
arts

Such changes in the other desirable to make changes. and sciences have certainly been beneficial medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and science have

19 change

And, if politics be an art, departed from traditional usage. must be necessary in this as in any other art. The need of improvement is shown by the fact that old customs
are

For the ancient exceedingly simple and barbarous. Hellenes went about armed * and bought their wives of each

20 other.

The

remains of ancient laws which have come
;

down
a

1269 a to us are quite absurd

for example, at
if

Cumae

there

is

law

about murder, to the effect that

the accuser produce a certain
his

number of witnesses from among
1

own kinsmen,

the accused

Cp. Thucyd.

i.

c.

5 and 6.

Should Laws be Changed?

81

shall be held Again, men in general desire the good, II. 8 guilty. and not merely what their fathers had. But the primaeval 21 1 inhabitants , whether they were born of the earth, or were

the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary foolish people among ourselves 1 2 (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born

men)

;

and

it

would be ridiculous

to rest contented with their

notions.

Even when laws have been
impossible that
;

written
in
all

down, they

ought not always to remain unaltered.

As

other arts, so in 22
things should be

making a

constitution,

it

is

precisely set

down

in writing

for enactments

must be uni
.

versal, but actions are

infer

concerned with particulars 8 Hence we that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed ;
at the

but

when we look

great caution
lightly
is

would seem

matter from another point of view, to be required. For the habit of 23

small,
left
;

changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better
the citizen will not gain so

be

much by

the change as he

will lose

by the habit of disobedience.
;

The

analogy of the 24

arts is false

a change in a law

is

a very different thing from
to

a change in an art.

For the law has no power

command

j

obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws
enfeebles the

power of the law.

Even

if

we admit

that the 25

laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in And are they to be changed by anybody who every state ?
1

Or, referring

<5/io/ous

to

"frj-fevtTs,

earth or were the survivors of
(o/joj ovs)

some

destruction,

whether they were born of the who were no better

than earth-born men,

may

be supposed to have been ordinary

foolish people.
2
3

Cp. Plato, Laws,
Cp. Plato,
DAVIS
Polit.

iii.

677 A;
A.

Polit.

271 A; Tim. 22

c.

295

O

82
II.

Sparta:

the
?

Helots;
These
are very important

8

likes, or

only by certain persons
;

questions

and therefore we had better reserve the discussion

of them to a more suitable occasion.

9

in all
|

In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed governments, two points have to be considered ; first,
particular

whether any

law

is

good or bad, when compared

;!

!

with the perfect state ; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set
before his citizens
*.

2

That

in a

well-ordered state the citizens

should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in
seeing
slaves,

how

this leisure is to be attained.

they are liable to rebel.]

The

[For, if you employ Thessalian Penestae
in like

have often risen against their masters, and the Helots

manner against the Lacedaemonians,

for

whose misfortunes

3 they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this 1269 b k| n d has as the reason probably yet happened to the Cretans
;

is

that the neighbouring

cities,

even when at war with one

another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions

not being for their interest, since they themselves have a de 2 Whereas all the neighbours of the pendent population
.

Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, are their enemies [and the Helots are always revolting to
In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves them]. occurred at a time when the Thessalians were still at war with
the

neighbouring Achaeans,

Perrhaebians,

and Magnesians.
for, if

4 Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or

management of

slaves is a troublesome affair

;

not kept

in hand, they are insolent,

their masters, and,
1

if

and think that they are as good as harshly treated, they hate and conspire
a

Or

himself (Bernays).

Cp.

c. 10.

5.

Licence of the
against them.

Women
when

8 3

Now

it

is

clear

that

these are the re- II.
i

9

suits the citizens

of a state have not found out the secret of

managing

their subject population.
5

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the

For a husband and a wife, being jood order of the state. each a part of every family, the state may be considered as
about equally divided into men and women those states in which the condition of the
the city
l
;

and, therefore, in
is

women

bad, half
this is 6

may

be regarded as having no laws.

And

what has

actually

happened

at

Sparta

;

the legislator wanted to

make the whole

state

out his intention in
the

hardy and temperate, and he has carried the case of the men, but he has neglected

women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly
ealued,

7

especially

if

the citizens

fall
all

under the dominion of

their wives,

after the

manner of

warlike races, except the

and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting 8
Celts

Ares and Aphrodite, for
ove either of

all

warlike races are prone to the

men

or of

women. This was exemplified among
;

:he Spartans in the

days of their greatness

many

things were
it
?

mnaged by their women. But what whether women rule, or the rulers are
result is the

difference does

make

9
I

ruled by

women
which

The
of no of

same.

Even
and
is

in

regard to courage,

is

ase in daily life,
:he
jvil

needed only

in war, the influence

Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous.

The

10

showed
in

itself in the
cities,

Theban

invasion,

when,

unlike the

women

they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaeother
1

Cp.

i.

13.

16.

G

2

84
II.
1270
a

Sparta: Inequality of Property
existed from the earliest times, and

;

9 monian women

was

onl

what might be expected.
daemonians,
first

For, during the wars of the Lace

against the Argives, and afterwards again

the Arcadians and Messenians, the

men were

long away from
infr

home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves
the legislator s
a soldier s
life

hand,
(in

already prepared by the discipline o
are

which there

to receive his enactments.
;

But,

many elements of virtue) when Lycurgus, as traditio

says,

wanted

to bring the

women

12

and he gave up the attempt. for what then happened, and

They, and not

under his laws, they resisted he, are to blam
i

this defect in the constitution

clearly to be attributed to them.

We

are not, however, con
is

sidering
13

what

is

or

is

not to be excused, but what

right o

and the disorder of the women, as I have already said not only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, bu

wrong

;

tends in a measure to foster avarice.

mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on th While some of the Spartan citizens 14 inequality of property.
have quite small properties, others have very large ones ; henc the land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is
another fault
in their

The

laws

;

for,

although the legislator rightlj

holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he
15 allows

anybody who

likes to give

and bequeath

it.

Yet both
oi

practices lead to the

same

result.

And
;

nearly two-fifths

the whole country are held by

women

number of heiresses and
tomary. dowries at
It

to the large

owing to the dowries which are cus

this is

would surely have been

better to have given nc

all, or, if

any, but small or moderate ones.

As

the

law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege ol
1

6 giving her

away descends

to his

heir.

Hence, although

the

Criticism
country
is

of the Ephoralty

85-

1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, II. 9 number of Spartan citizens [at the time of the Theban invasion] fell below 1000. The result proves the
able to maintain

the whole

faulty nature

sank under a single defeat

of their laws respecting property ; for the city the want of men was their ruin. ; days of their ancient kings, 17

There

is a

tradition that, in the

they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to

and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of indeed, at one time population was experienced by them is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Sparta Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have
strangers,
;

been better to have maintained their numbers by the equaliza tion of property. Again, the law which relates to the pro- 18 creation of children is adverse to the correction of this
inequality.

For the
and there

legislator,

wanting

to

have

as

many

1270 b

Spartans as he could,
families
;

is

encouraged the citizens to have large a law at Sparta that the father of three

sons shall be exempt from military service, and he
four
if

who
as

has

from

all

the burdens of the state.

Yet

it is

obvious that, 19
it

there were many children, the land being distributed many of them must necessarily fall into poverty.

is,

The Lacedaemonian
point
in
;

constitution is

defective

in

another

I

mean the Ephoralty.

This magistracy has authority
all

the highest matters, but the Ephors are

chosen from the

the people, and so

office is apt to fall into the

hands of very

poor men, who, have been many examples

being badly off, are open to bribes.
at

There

2}

Sparta of this evil in former times ; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin

And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them through
the state.
;

86 Sparta: Criticism of the Council of Elders;
II.

9
21

their

influence

the

constitution

has

deteriorated,
a

and from

being

an

aristocracy

has turned

into

democracy.

The

Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest
office,

and the

result,

whether due

to
if

the legislator or to a constitution
it

22 chance, has been advantageous.

For

is to

be

permanent,

all

the parts of the state must wish that
1
.

should

exist and be maintained

This

is

the case at Sparta, where

the kings desire permanence because they have due honour in
their

own persons ; the nobles are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue) and
;

23 the people in the Ephoralty, for

all

are eligible to
is

it.

The
is

election of

Ephors out of the whole people

perfectly right,

but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which

Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men. and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but accordtoo childish.
24 ing to written rules, and to the laws.
is

Their way of
in

life,

too,

not in

accordance with the

spirit
;

of the constitution

have a deal too much licence

whereas,
is

they the case of the

other citizens, the excess of strictness

so intolerable that

they run

away from the law

into

the

secret

indulgence of

sensual pleasures.
25

Again, the council of elders

is

not free from defects.

It

may

be said that the elders are good
virtue
;

men and

well trained in

manly

and

that, therefore, there is an

advantage to the

state in having

them.

But
life
is

that judges of important causes

should hold office for
1271
a

not a good thing, for the mind

grows old
educated

as well as the body.
in

And when men
;

have been

such a manner that even the legislator himself
1

Cp.

iv. 9.

10

v. 9.

5.

Further Criticisms
cannot trust them, there
are well
partiality
is

87

real danger.

known
in

to have taken bribes

public affairs.
;

And

of the elders II. 9 have been guilty of 2 ^ therefore they ought not to

Many

and

to

;

be irresponsible

yet at Sparta they are so.

But

(it

may be

All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors. replied), Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we main tain that the control should be exercised in some other manner.
Further, the
childish
;

mode
it

in

which the Spartans
1

elect their elders is 27

and

is

improper that

the person to be elected

should canvass for the office;
pointed, whether he chooses or
clearly indicates the

the worthiest should be ap
not.

And

here the legislator 28
in

same

intention

which appears

other

parts of his constitution ; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the

elders

;

for

no one would ask to be elected
avarice, almost

if

he were not.
passions,

Yet ambition and

more than any other

are the motives of crime.

Whether kings

are or are not an advantage to states, I will 29
2
;

consider at another time

they should at any rate be chosen,
life

not as they are now, but with regard to their personal

and
3

himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men ; at least he shows
conduct.
legislator

The

For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.
a great distrust of their virtue.

Neither did the
phiditia,

first

introducer of the
well.

common
as
in

meals, called
1

regulate

them

The

entertainment ought to 3

have been provided
1

at the

public
as

cost,

Crete

8
;

but

Reading TO avrov, not rov,
Cp.
iii.

Bekker, 2nd
10.

edit.,

apparently by

a misprint.
2

14

foil.

s

Cp.

c.

7, 8.

8 8
II.

Sparta :
and some of them

Further Criticisms
is

9 among
bute,

the Lacedaemonians every one

expected to contri

are too poor to afford the
is

expense

;

32 thus the intention of the legislator

frustrated.

The common

meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing For the manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular.
very poor can scarcely take part in them ; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed
to retain their rights of citizenship.

33

The

and with justice

law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, it is a source of dissension, for the kings are ;
*,

perpetual generals

and

this office

of admiral

is

but the setting

up of another king.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws 2 against the 1271 b 3* intention of the legislator, is likewise justified ; the whole con,

Istitution

has regard to one part of virtue only

the virtue of
so long as they

the soldier, which gives victory in war.

And

were

at

attained empire they

war, their power was preserved, but when they had s fell for of the arts of peace they knew
,

nothing, and had never engaged
35 than war.

in

any employment higher

There
fallen.

is

they have
for

another error, equally great, into which Although they truly think that the goods
are to be acquired by virtue rather than

which they contend
vice,

by
36

they

err in

supposing that these goods are to be pre

ferred to the virtue

which gains them.
;

Once more
there
is

:

the revenues of the state are ill-managed

no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spar
tans, they
1

do not look closely
Reading
di Si ois.
3

into

one another
2

s contributions.
i.

Laws,

630.

Cp.

vii.

14.

22.

Sparta and Crete
The
result
;

89
is

which the

legislator has

produced

the reverse of II.
his

9

beneficial

for he has

made

his city poor,

and

citizens 37

greedy.

Enough

respecting the Spartan constitution, of

which these

are the principal defects.

The
most

constitutions of the Cretan cities nearly resemble the

10

Spartan, and in

some few

points are quite as

good

;

but for the

part less perfect in form.

The

older constitutions are

generally less elaborate than the later, and the
is

Lacedaemonian
2

said to be,

and probably

is,

in a

very great measure, a copy

Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charilaus, went abroad and spent a long time in Crete. For the two countries are
of those
in Crete.

According

to tradition,

nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the

Lacedae

monians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabi-

3

day the Perioeci, or subject population of are governed by the original laws which Minos enacted. Crete, The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in
tants.

Even

to this

Hellas, and to be well situated

;

it

extends right across the

sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled ; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and 4

Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, sub duing some of the islands and colonizing others ; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus. 5 The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The
Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the 1272 and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common
meals,
a

other,

which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not and the Cretans have the same word, andria phiditia but
;

90
II.

Crete

and Sparta
meals [or syssitia] Further, the two constitutions
;

10

the use of which proves that the

common

6 originally

came from
[in

Crete.

are similar
is

many

particulars]

for the office of the

Ephors

the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in

number.
are

The

elders, too,

answer to the elders

in Crete,

who

7

termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in
the ecclesia, but
it

can only

ratify the

decrees of the elders

and the Cosmi.

The common
so

than the Lacedaemonian

meals of Crete are certainly better managed for in Lacedaemon every one pays
;

much
in

per head, or, if he

fails,

the law, as I have already

explained, forbids
8

him

to exercise the rights

of citizenship.

But
all

Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of the fruits of the earth, of cattle, of the public revenues, and
is

of the tribute which

paid by the Perioeci, one portion
to

is

assigned to the gods and

the service
so
that

of the

state,

and

another to
9 children are

the
all

common

meals,

men,

women, and
stock
1
.

supported out of a

common

The

many ingenious ways of securing moderation in which he conceives to be a gain ; he likewise encourages eating the separation of men from women, lest they should have too
legislator has

many

children,

whether

this is a

and the companionship of men with one another good or bad thing I shall have an oppor
at

tunity of considering

another time

2
.

But

that the Cretan

common

meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian

there can be no doubt.

On

the other hand, the
1

Cosmi

are even a worse institution
2

Cp.

vii.

10.

10.

vii.

1

6

(?).

Cretan Cosmi

and Elders

91
1O

than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the II. I0 Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in good. Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of advantage.
the people, having a share in the highest office, want the state *. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of to be

permanent

certain families,

elders out of those

and not out of the whole people, and the who have been Cosmi.

The same
has

criticism

been

already

may be made about the Cretan, which made about the Lacedaemonian elders.
and
life

n

Their

irresponsibility

tenure

is

too great a privilege,

and their arbitrary power of acting upon their and dispensing with written law, is dangerous.

own judgment,
1

It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not For there is no discontented at being excluded from it.
profit to

2

be

made

out of the office

;

and, unlike the Ephors, 1272 b

the Cosmi, being in an island, are

removed from temptation.
evil

The remedy

by which they correct the

of this

institu- 13

tion is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy

than to a constitutional
pelled

state.

For

the

Cosmi

are often

ex

by

a conspiracy of their
;

own

colleagues, or of private
their

individuals

and they are allowed also to resign before

has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is

term of

office

a very unsafe rule.
office

Worst of
will

all

is

the suspension of the 14

of Cosmi,

a

device to which the nobles often have not submit to justice.

recourse

when they
of

This shows

that the Cretan government, although possessing

some of the
a

characteristics

a

constitutional

state,

is

really

close

oligarchy.
1

Cp. supra,

c.

9.

21.

Carthage:
II.

Merits and

10

The

Cretans have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they

get together a party
their friends !5

among

the

common

people and gather

What
when
as
I

is this

and then quarrel and fight with one another. but the temporary destruction of the state and
?

dissolution of society

A

city is

in

a

dangerous condition
But,

those

who

are willing are also able to attack her.
said, the island

have already
;

of Crete

is

saved by her

situation
1

distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian
;

6 prohibition of strangers

and the Cretans have no foreign

dominions.
in Crete,

This

is

the reason

why

the Perioeci are contented

But whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough
of the government of Crete.

11

The
state in

Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent
differs
it

form of government, which

from that of any other
is

several respects, though

in

some very

like

the

Lacedaemonian.

Indeed,

all

three states

the Lacedaemonian,

the Cretan, and the Carthaginian

nearly resemble one another,

and
2

are very different
institutions
is

from any others.
excellent.

Many

of the Carthaof their

ginian

are

The

superiority

constitution

proved by the fact that, although containing an
;

the Carthaginians element of democracy, it has been lasting have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have

never been under the rule of a tyrant.
3

Among
mon

the points in which the Carthaginian
:

constitution

resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following
tables of the clubs

The com
whereas the

answer

to the

Spartan phiditia, and
;

their magistracy of the

104

to the

Ephors

but,

Ephors

are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Cartha
this is an

ginians are elected according to merit

improvement.

Defects of the Constitution

93

elders,

They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of II. 11 who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta.

Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same 4 family, and this an ordinary one, but if there is some dis
tinguished family they are selected out of
it

and not appointed
have great
worth, do
at 1273
a

by seniority power, and therefore,

this

is

far
if

better.

Such

officers
little

they are persons of

a great deal of harm,

and they have already done harm

Lacedaemon.

Most of

the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for 5

which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have men
tioned.
tional

But of the

deflections

from aristocracy and constitu.

government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine

whether they
but

will or will not bring a matter before the people,

they are not unanimous, the people may decide And 6 whether or not the matter shall be brought forward.

when

whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes

may oppose
That

it

;

now

this is not permitted in Sparta

and Crete.
7

have under them many matters should be co-opted, that they should choose important the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than
the magistracies of five

who

other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and
after they

hold

office)

these are oligarchical features
lot,
all

;

their

being without salary and not elected by
points, such

and any similar
tried

as the practice of having

suits

by the

magistrates

\ and not some by one
at
1

class of judges or jurors

and some by another, as
Cp.
iii.

Lacedaemon,
;

are characteristic of
at end.

1.

10, II

and see note

94
II. 11 aristocracy.

Carthage a Plutocracy
The
is

:

Carthaginian

constitution

deviates

from

aristocracy and

inclines to oligarchy, chiefly

on a point where
in

popular opinion

on their side.

For men

general think

that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but
for their wealth
:

a

man, they
If,

say,

who

is

poor cannot rule well

9

he has not the
their wealth

leisure.

then, election of magistrates for

be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for

merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the
constitution of Carthage
is

comprehended

;

for the

Cartha

ginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them their kings and generals with an eye both to merit

and
10

to wealth.

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from Nothing is aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class,
not only when in
office,

but

when
in

out of office, should have leisure
;

and not demean themselves
tion should be first directed.

any way
if

and

to this his atten

Even

wealth, in order to secure leisure,

you must have regard to yet it is surely a bad thing

that the greatest offices, such as those of kings
11

and generals,

should be bought. wealth

The law which

allows this abuse makes

of more

account than virtue, and the whole state

becomes

avaricious.

For, whenever the chiefs of the state
the other citizens are sure to follow
first

deem anything honourable,
12

1273 b their example; and, where virtue has not the

place, there

Those who have aristocracy cannot be firmly established. been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the
habit of repaying themselves
;

and

it is

absurd to suppose that

a poor and honest
a lower
not.

has incurred a great expense will Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best

stamp of

man will man who

be wanting to

make

gains,

and that

Preserved by Occident
[d/H0Ta/Jxu"J.

9 y

And

even

if

the legislator does not care to II. 11

protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure
leisure for those in office
1
.

It

would seem

also to be a

person should hold

many

offices,

bad principle that the same 13 which is a favourite practice

among the one man 2
.

Carthaginians, for one business

The

legislator

is better done by should see to this and should not

appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker.

Hence, where the

state is large,

it is

more

in

accordance both 14

with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons.
For, as I was saying, this arrangement
is

more popular, and

any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner per have a proof in military and naval matters the formed.

We
all.

;

duties of

command and of

obedience in both these services

extend to

of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but 15 they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by their wealth, which enables them from time to time to send out some
portion

The government

of the

s

people

to

their

colonies.

This

is

their

panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favours them, but the legislator should be
able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents.

As

things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the people 16

revolted from their rulers, there

would be no way of restoring

peace by legal methods.
1

Cp.
8

c.

9.

2.

Or, removing the

comma

after

Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 A. wXovrew, and adding one after pfpos,

*

their

by enriching one portion of the people after another whom they send to colonies. Cp. vi. 5. 9, which tends to confirm this way of

taking the words.

96
II. 11

Solon
is

and

the

Athenian Constitution

Such

the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and

Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

12

Of

those

who

never taken any part at

have treated of governments, some have all in public affairs, but have passed
;

their lives in a private station

about most of them, what was

worth

telling has been already told.

Others have been law

givers, either in their

own

or in foreign cities,

whose

affairs

2

they have administered ; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions ; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution
I

have already spoken.
a

As

to Solon,

he

is

thought by some

put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different
to have been

good

legislator,

who

elements of the

state.

According

to their view, the council

of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magis1274 a tracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The
truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy
3 existed before the time of Solon,

and were retained by him,
all

but that he formed the courts of law out of

the citizens,

thus creating the democracy, which
is

is

the very reason

why he

supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have When the law courts 4 destroyed the non-democratic element.

sometimes blamed.

For

in giving the

grew powerful,

to

please the people,

who were now

playing

the tyrant, the old constitution

was changed

into the existing

democracy.

Areopagus
5

Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the they also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the
;

democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems however to be the result of circumstances, and not to

Famous Lawgivers
have been intended by Solon.

97
12

For

the people having been II.

instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian

War

*,

began to get a notion of

itself,

and followed worthless

Solon himself demagogues, to have given the Athenians only that appears power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was
the better class opposed.
for without it they would have been ; of slavery and enmity to the government. All the 6 magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of
2

whom

absolutely necessary
in a state

wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae (because they kept a yoke of oxen), or

from a third
class

of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth who had no share in any magistracy. Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epiclass

were labourers

zephyrian,

own
Italy

city

Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in
Sicily.

and

Some
first

3

persons attempt
person

to

make out

that ^

Onomacritus was the
s

who had any

special skill in

legislation

,

and that

he,

although a Locrian by birth, was
lived in the exercise of his prophetic

trained in Crete,

where he

art ; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of But their account is quite inconsistent with 8 Zaleucus.

chronology.

There was
Philolaus,

also

a

Theban

legislator,

whose name was

the Corinthian.

This Philolaus was one of the Olympic
horror of the incestuous passion
a

family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the
victor,
1

who
v. 4.

left

Corinth
viii. 6.

in

Cp.

8;

u.
make

Cp.

iii.

II.

8.

out an unbroken series of great legis lators, Onomacritus being considered the first.
to

8

Or (with Bernays),

DAVIS

H

Famous Lawgivers
II. 12 which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days.
9

The
not.
this

inhabitants

still

point out their tombs,

which

are in full

view of one another, but one looks towards Corinth, the other
Tradition says that the two friends arranged them in way, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the
;

land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb 1274 b that
[

Philolaus

Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of
might.

it

This

is

the reason

why

they settled

at

These Laws of Adoption. children, which they call the laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots.
11

In the legislation of Charondas there except the laws about false witnesses.
instituted actions for perjury.

is

nothing remarkable,

He
are

is

the

first

who

His laws

more exact and
of our modern

more

precisely expressed

than even

those

legislators.

12

Characteristic of Phaleas
Plato, the

is

the equalization of property; of

community of women, children, and property, the common meals of women, and the law about drinking, that
the sober shall be masters of the feast
soldiers to acquire
1
;

also the training of

by practice equal

skill
2

with both hands, so
.

that one should be as useful as the other

13

Draco has

left

laws, but he adapted them to a constitution
in

which already existed, and there is no peculiarity which is worth mentioning, except the greatness and
of the punishments.
Pittacus, too,

them

severity

was only
671 0-672

a lawgiver,
is

and not the author of
peculiar to him, that, if
a
j

a constitution
1

;

he has a law which
ii.

Cp. Laws,

A.

Cp. Laws,

vii.

7940.

Famous Lawgivers
a

99
be

drunken man strike another,

he

shall

more heavily II.

2

1 punished than if he were sober ; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expedi ency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts

of violence.

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws
Thrace.
but there

to the Chalcidians of
;

14

Some of them
is

relate to

homicide, and to heiresses

And

here

nothing remarkable in them. let us conclude our enquiry into the various con
either actually exist, or have been devised by

stitutions

which

theorists.
1

Cp. N. Eth.

iii.

5.

8.

H

2

BOOK
III. 1

III

HE who would
government must

enquire into the nature and various kinds of

first

of

all

determine

What

is a state

?

At

present this is a disputed question.

Some

say that the state has
,

done a

certain act

;

others, no, not the state

but the oligarchy
is

or the tyrant.

And

the legislator or statesman
;

concerned

entirely with the state
a

a constitution or government being an
state.

arrangement of the inhabitants of a
posite, and, like

But a

state is

com
;

any other whole, made up of many parts

these are the citizens,

who compose
?

it.

It is evident, thereis

1275 a fore, that

we must

begin by asking,

Who

the citizen, and
again there

what

is

the meaning of the term

For here

may

He who is a citizen in a demobe a difference of opinion. 3 cracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who
have obtained the name of citizen
manner, we may
say,
first,

in

any other accidental
is

that

a citizen

not a citizen

4 because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and nor is he a citizen who has no legal slaves share in the place
;

right except that of suing

and being sued

;

for this right

may

Even resident be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. aliens in many places possess such rights, although in an for they are obliged to have a patron. imperfect form ;
5

Hence they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the
1

CP

.

c. 3.

i.

The
duties.

Definition
or to old

of Citizenship in Theory 101
relieved

register,

men who have been

from

state

III. 1

Of these we

do not say simply that they

are citizens,

but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the
other, that they are past the age, or something

of that sort
is

;

the precise expression

is

immaterial, for our meaning

clear.

Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned
raised and answered about deprived citizens

may

be

and about

exiles.

But the

citizen,

whom we

are seeking to define, is a citizen in

the strictest sense, against
taken,

whom

and

his special characteristic is that

no such exception can be he shares in the

administration of justice, and in offices.

Now of offices

some 6

have a limit of time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval ; others have no limit of time for example, the office of dicast or ecclesiast 1 It may, indeed, be argued that these are not 7
.

magistrates at all,
in the

and that

their functions give
it

them no share

those

who

government. surely have the supreme power do not govern.
this,

But

is

ridiculous to say that

Not

to

dwell further upon

which

is

a purely verbal question,
including both dicast and
call it

what we want
ecclesiast.

is

a

common term

Let

us, for the sake

terminate office,

of distinction, and we will assume that those

inde

who

share in

such

office

are citizens.
citizen,

This

is

the most comprehensive 8

definition

of a

and best

suits all those

who

are generally

so called.

But we must not

forget that things of

which the underlying
first,

notions differ in kind, one of them being

another second,

another third, have,

when regarded

in this relation, nothing,

or hardly anything, worth mentioning in
1

common.

Now we
of the

9

Dicast

= juryman

and judge

in

one

:

ecclesiast

= member

ecclesia or

assembly of the citizens.

102 The Definition of Citizenship
III. 1 see that governments differ
in

in Practice
some of them

kind, and that
;

1275 b are prior and that others are posterior
or

those which are faulty
to

perverted

are

necessarily

posterior

those which are
will

(What we mean by perversion perfect. The citizen then of necessity explained *.)
10 form of government
1

be

hereafter

differs

under each

;

and our
;

definition is best adapted to the

citizen

of a democracy

but not necessarily to other states.

For

in

some

states the people are not

they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones
suits are distributed in turn

acknowledged, nor have and ;

among

the magistrates.

At

Lace-

daemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about con tracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the
elders are judges of homicide,
11

and other causes

are decided
at

by other magistrates.
2

A

similar principle prevails
all

Car

thage

;

there certain magistrates decide

causes.

We may,

indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include

these states.

[But
it

strictly
is

taken

it

only applies in democracies.]

In other

states

the holder of a determinate, not of an

indeterminate, office

who

legislates

and judges, and to some

or

all

such holders of determinate

offices is reserved the right

j2 things.

of deliberating or judging about some things or about all The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up. He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or

judicial administration of

of that
!

state

;

any state is said by us to be a citizen and speaking generally, a state is a body of
life.

citizens sufficing for the purposes of

2

But

in practice a citizen is defined to be
;

one of

whom

both
;

the parents are citizens say to

others insist on going further back

two or three or more grandparents. This is a short and practical definition ; but there are some who raise the
1

Cp.

c. 6.

ii.

a

Cp.

ii.

ii.

7.

Difficulties
further question
:

Created by Devolutions
this third or fourth ancestor

103
came
to III.

How

2

Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said Mortars are made by the and the citizens of Larissa are also a manu mortar-makers,
be a citizen
?

factured article, made, like the kettles which bear their

name
really 3

the magistrates [Xapio-atot], by
simple,
for
if,

V

Yet the question

is

according to the definition just given, they
,

shared in the government 2 they were citizens. [This is a better definition than the For the words, born of other.]
a father or mother,
the
first

who

is

a citizen,

cannot possibly apply to

inhabitants or founders of a state.
is

There

a greater difficulty in the case of those

who have

been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in
tribes a

number of strangers and
in these cases
is,

slaves

and

s

resident aliens.

The
is,

doubt

not

who

is,

but whether he,

who

4
a

ought to be a citizen ; and there will still be a further 1276 doubt, whether he who ought not to be a citizen is one in fact, for what ought not to be is what is false and is not.

Now,
hold

there are

some who hold

office,

and yet ought not to

5

although they rule unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office he who holds a judicial or legislative
office,

whom we

call rulers,

office fulfils

our definition of a citizen.

It is evident, there

fore, that the citizens about
1

whom

the doubt has arisen must

An
Cp.

untranslatable play
a magistrate
c.

upon the word kjiuovpyol, which means
artisan.

either
2 3

or

an

i.

12.

a

Inserting KOI before pfToiKOvs with is omitted, as in all the MSS., we

Bekker
must
:

in his second edition.

If

translate
or,

he enrolled in
in tribes

tribes

many

metics, both strangers

and

slaves

he enrolled

many

strangers,

and metics

who had been

slaves.

1

04

When
;

is

a State the Same

f

III. 2 be called citizens
a question

whether they ought

to be so or not is
1
.

which

is

bound up with the previous enquiry
is

3

A parallel
a certain act

question
is

raised respecting the state whether
;

or

is

not an act of the state

for example, in

the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy.
2

In such cases persons refuse to
contracted them

fulfil

their contracts or

any

other obligations on the ground that the tyrant, and not the
state,
.

;

they argue that some constitutions are

established

by

force,

and not for the sake of the common

good.
too

But

may

this would apply equally to democracies, for they be founded on violence, and then the acts of the

3

democracy will be neither more nor less legitimate than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into
another

When
?

shall
It

we

say that the state

is

the same, and

when

would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants ; for the soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants
different

4 may
is

live in one This, however, place and some in another. not a very serious difficulty ; we need only remark that the

word

state

is

ambiguous, meaning both state and

city.

It is further

asked

:

When

are men,
city

living in

the same

place,

to be regarded as a

single

what

is

the limit

?

5 Certainly not the wall

of the

city, for

you might surround
city,

all

Peloponnesus
circuit,

with

a wall.

But a

having

such vast

would contain

a nation rather than a state, like

Baby

which, as they say, had been taken for three days before 6 some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This
lon
,

2

difficulty

may,

however,
;

with

advantage

be

deferred

3

to

another occasion
1

the statesman has to consider the size of
i. 3
2

Cp.

c.

i.

Cp.

ii.

6.

6.

Cp.

vii. c.

4 and

c. 5.

When
nation or not.

is

a State the Same?
it

the state, and whether

should consist of more than one III. 3

Again,

shall

we

say that while the race of inhabitants, as
is

well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city

also

the same, although the citizens are always dying and being
born, as

we

call rivers

and fountains the same, although the

water

we
a

Or shall always flowing away and coming again ? say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the
is
?

same, but that the state changes

For, since the state

is

1276 b

community of citizens united by sharing in one form of government, when the form of the government changes and
becomes
different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And 8

manner we speak of every union or composition elements, when the form of their composition alters
in

this

ot

;

for

example, harmony of the same sounds
accordingly as the

is

said to be different,

Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state 9 consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and may

be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabi tants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another
question,

whether a state ought or ought not to ments when the form of government changes.

fulfil

engage

There
1
.

is

a point nearly allied to the preceding

:

Whether
same or
first

the virtue of a

good man and

a good citizen

is

the

not

But, before entering on this discussion,

we must

obtain

some general notion of the
is

virtue of the citizen.

Like

the sailor, the citizen
sailors

a

member of

a community.
is

Now,

2

have different functions, for one of them
1

a rower,

Cp. N. Eth.

v. a.

ii.

The Good
III.

Man
;

and
fourth
is

4

another a
described
definition

pilot,

a

third

a look-out man, and a

by some

similar

term

and while the precise
him,
definition applicable to

of each individual
at the

s virtue applies exclusively to

there

is,

same

time, a
all

common
of them a

them

all.

For they have

common
is

object,
differs

which
from

3 is safety in navigation.
I

Similarly,

one citizen

another, but the salvation of the

community
is

the
;

common
the virtue

business of them
|

all.

This community

the state

of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of

which he

is

a member.
it

If,

then, there are

many forms

of

government, cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that 4
the good citizen need not of necessity possess the which makes a good man.
virtue

is

evident that the virtue of the good citizen

5

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the perfect state. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and each citizen is expected
to

do

his

own
all

business well, and must therefore have virtue,
the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the

1277 a inasmuch as
citizen

and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen thus, and thus only, can the
state

be perfect

;

but they will not have the virtue of a
that in the

good

man, unless
6

we assume

good

state

all

the citizens

must be good.
the

Again, the state may be compared to the living being as first elements into which the living being is resolved are
:

soul

and body, as the soul

is

made up of

reason and appetite,

the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so out of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the
state
is

composed

;

and,

therefore,

the

virtue

of

all

the

the
citizens

Good
the

Citizen
same,
is

107
4

cannot

possibly be

any more than the III.

excellence of the leader of a chorus

the same as that of the
I have said

performer

who

stands by his side.

enough

to 7

show why
But
good
this

the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and

always the same.
will there then be

no case

in

which the

virtue of the
?

citizen

and the

virtue

of the good man coincide

To

good citizen, but] that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man. And some persons say that
even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind ; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and
military exercises
?

we answer

the [not that

8

As

Euripides says

:

No As

subtle arts for

me, but what the

state

requires

V

though there were a special education needed by a ruler.
is

If then the virtue of a good ruler

the same as that of a

good 9

man, and

we assume

further that the subject is a citizen as

well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue

of the good

man cannot be always

the same, although in

some

cases [i.e. in the perfect state] they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this
difference

which made Jason say

was not

a tyrant,

a private station.

that he felt hungry when he meaning that he could not endure to live in But, on the other hand, it may be argued 10

that

men

are praised for

knowing both how to
if

rule

and

to obey,
is

and he

is

said to be a citizen of approved virtue

how who

able to

do both.

Now

we
it

man

to be that

which

rules,

and the

suppose the virtue of a good virtue of the citizen to

include ruling and obeying,
1

cannot be said that they are
in Stobaeus,

Fragment from the Aeolus, quoted

45. 13.

io8
III.

The Good Man and
Since, then,
it is

4
11

equally worthy of praise.

occasionally held

that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and

not the same things, and that the citizen must
in both
;

know and
is,
2
,

share

the inference

is is

obvious

1
.

There

indeed, the

rule of a master

which

concerned with menial offices
to perform these, but
:

the

master need not

know how

may employ

12

them anything else would be degrading; and by anything else I mean the menial duties which vary much in character and are executed by various
others in the execution of
classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen,
as their

name

signifies, live

who, by the labour of their hands
:

1277 b under

these

the

mechanic

is

included.

Hence

in

ancient

times, and

among some

nations, the

share in the government

a privilege

working classes had no which they only acquired

13 under the extreme democracy.

Certainly the
citizen

good man and
8
;

the statesman and the
crafts

good

ought not to learn the

of inferiors except for their

own

occasional use

if

they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a distinc tion between master and slave.
14

This
is a rule

is

not the rule of which
is

we

are speaking

;

but there

of another kind, which

exercised over freemen and

equals by biith

a constitutional rule,

which the

ruler

must

he would learn the duties of a general of under the orders of a general of cavalry, or cavalry by being the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders
learn by obeying, as

of a general of infantry, or by having had the command of a company or brigade. It has been well said that he who
15 has never learned to obey cannot be a
1

good commander.
is

The

Viz. that

some kind of previous subjection
14.

an advantage to the
Cp.
viii. 2.

ruler.
2

Cp. infra,
i.

Cp.

7.

2-5.

5.

the

Good
how

Citizen

109
4
and

two are not the same, but the good
of both
;

citizen ought to be capable III.

he should know

to govern like a freeman,

how
tinct

to obey like a freeman

these are the virtues of a citizen.

And, although
include both
will not

the temperance and justice of a ruler are dis- 16
subject, the virtue
is

from those of a
;

for the

good man, who

free

of a good man will and also a subject,

distinct kinds

have one virtue only, say justice, but he will have of virtue, the one qualifying him to rule, the
1

other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of
differ . For a man would be thought a 17 he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man ; and

men and women
coward
if

indeed their part
different, for the

in

the

duty of the one
Practical

management of the household is is to acquire, and of the

other to preserve.
the ruler
a
:

wisdom only
all

is

characteristic

of

it

would seem

that

belong to ruler and subject. certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion ; he may be com pared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the
flute-player or user

other virtues must equally The virtue of the subject is

l%

of the

flute

8
.

From

these considerations

may be

gathered the answer to

the question, whether the virtue of the good
as that of the

man

is

the same

good

citizen, or different, and
4
.

how far the

same,

and

how

far different
still

There

Is he only a true citizen

remains one more question about the citizen 6 who has a share of office, or is the
:

? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of

mechanic to be included

1

Cp.

2
i.

13.

9.

Cp. Rep.
i
;

iv.

3

428.
a
;

Cp. Rep. x. 601 D,
14.
8.

E.

*

Cp.

c. 5.

10

;

c.

18.

iv. 7.

vii.

no

Are Mechanics

Citizens ?
.

l l And if none of III. 5 ruling and obeying which makes a citizen the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are

they to be placed
1278
a 2

?

For they

are not resident aliens,

and they

are not foreigners.

To

this objection
in

may we

not reply, that

there
slaves
It

is

no more absurdity

excluding them than in excluding

and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes ? must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be

who are necessary to the existence of the state ; for example, children are not citizens equally with grown up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up,
citizens
3 are only citizens in a qualified sense.

Doubtless

in ancient

times, and among some nations, the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now.

The

best form of state will not admit

them

to citizenship

;

but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of
a citizen will apply to

some

citizens

and freemen only, and

4 not to those

who work

for their living.

whom

toil is a

necessity, are either slaves

The who

latter class, to

minister to the

wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community. These reflections carried a little
further will explain their position
;

and indeed what has been

said already is of itself explanation enough.
5

Since there are

many forms of government

there

must be

many

varieties
;

subjects

of citizens, and especially of citizens who are so that under some governments the mechanic and

the labourer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example,
1 Or, for this man (i.e. the meaner sort of man) is a citizen and does oi OVTOS jroAtTT;?). not exercise rule (see below, 3, d 5 According to the way of taking the passage which is followed in the text, euros =

o t\ wv T ty Toiavrrjv dptTrjv
Pdvavcros.

:

according to the second way,

it

refers to

Different

iQnds of

Citizens

1 1 1
(if there

in aristocracy or the so-called

government of the best

III.

be such an one), in which honours are given according to virtue and merit ; for no man can practise virtue who is living
the
life

of a mechanic or labourer.

In oligarchies the

qualifi-

6

cation for office is high,

and therefore no labourer can ever be

a citizen

;

but a mechanic may, for
there

many of them

are rich.
office 7

At Thebes 1
who had

was a law that no man could hold

not retired from business for ten years. In many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens ; for in

some democracies a man

is

be a citizen [and his father an alien]
is

a citizen though his mother only and a similar principle
;

applied to illegitimate children
is

;

the law

is

relaxed

when

8

there

a dearth of population.

But when the number of
male or a female slave

citizens increases, first the children of a

are excluded

and

at last

then those whose mothers only are citizens ; the right of citizenship is confined to those whose
;

fathers

and mothers are both
as
is

citizens.
;

Hence, and he is a

evident, there are different kinds of citizens
in the highest sense

9

citizen

honours of the

state.

In the

who shares in the of Homer [Achilles poems

complains of Agamemnon treating him] like some dishonoured 2 for he who is excluded from the honours of the stranger ;
state is

no better than an

alien.
is

But when

this exclusion is

concealed, then the object

to deceive one s fellow-country

men.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the 1278 same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already I0 adduced prove that in some states the two are the same, and
in others different.

b

When
4.

virtue

of every citizen which
1

they are the same it is not the is the same as that of the good
a
II. ix.

Cp.

vi. 7.

648.

ii2

Government True and Perverted

III. 5 man, but only the virtue of the statesman and of those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the

conduct of public affairs. 6 Having determined these questions, we have next to con sider whether there is only one form of government or many,

and

if

many, what they

are,

and

how many, and what

are the

differences between them.

A constitution
\

is

the arrangement of magistracies in a state 1 ,

especially of the highest of

where sovereign
2

in the state,

The government is every all. and the constitution is in fact the
in

government.

For example,

democracies the people are
;

supreme, but in oligarchies, the few
that these

and, therefore,
:

we

say
in

two forms of government
what
is

are different

and so

other cases.
First, let us consider

the purpose of a state, and

how many
3 society is

forms of government there are by which human have already said, in the former regulated.

We

when drawing a distinction between and the rule of a master, that man is household-management And therefore, men, even when by nature a political animal.
part of
this
treatise
,

8

they do not require one another s help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure
4 of well-being.
viduals

This
states.

is

certainly the chief end, both of indi

and of

And

also for the sake

of mere

life

(in

which there

is

possibly

some noble element) mankind meet

together and maintain the political community, so long as the
5 evils

we

all
1

of existence do not greatly overbalance the good 3 And see that men cling to life even in the midst of
.

Cp.

c. I.

i

;

iv. i.
3

10.

3

Cp.

i.

2.

9, 10.

Cp. Plato, Polit. 302

A.

Government True and Perverted
misfortune,

113
6

seeming to find

in

it

a

natural

sweetness and III.

happiness.

There

is

no

difficulty in distinguishing the various

kinds of

authority; they have been often defined already in popular works 1 The rule of a master, although the slave by nature 6
.

and the master by nature have

in reality the

same

interests, is

nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of

the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the
slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him.

On

7

the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of
a household,

which we have
first

called household-management, is

exercised in the
for the

instance for the

good of the governed or

both parties, but essentially for the of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, 1279 a good gymnastics, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally

common good of

concerned with the good of the artists themselves 2 . (For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise The 8 gymnastics, and the pilot is always one of the crew.)
trainer or the pilot considers the

good of those committed

to
of,

his care.

But,

when he

is

one of the persons taken care

he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the pilot is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.

And
ciple

when the state is framed upon the prin- 9 : of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they In the order of nature every ought to hold office by turns. one would take his turn of service ; and then again, somebody
so in politics
else

would look

after his interest, just as he, while in office,

had looked

after

theirs*.

[That was
a
ii.

originally the

way.]
be IO

But nowadays,
1

for the sake of the advantage

which
i.

is to

Or,

in our popular works.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

341

D.

Cp.

a.

6, 7.

ii4

Classification

of Governments

III. 6 gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office;
in

that

case

we may be

sure that they
is

would be hunting

ii after places.

The

conclusion

evident: that governments,
interest, are constituted

which have
in

a regard to the

common

accordance with
;

fore true forms

of justice, and are there but those which regard only the interest of
strict principles

defective and perverted forms, for they are whereas a state is a community of freemen. despotic, 7 Having determined these points, we have next to consider

the rulers are

all

how many forms of government
and
are
2

there are, and

what they
at

are

;

in

the

first

place what are the true forms, for

when they
once
be

determined the

perversions

of them

will

apparent.

The words

constitution and government have the

same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few,
or of many.

The

true

forms of government, therefore, are

those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule

with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions *. For citizens, if
they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the advantages of a state. Of forms of government in which one rules, we
3 call that
;

,

royalty

which regards the common interests, kingship or that in which more than one, but not many, rule,
;

aristocracy [the rule of the best]

and

it

is

so called, either

because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But

when

the citizens at large administer the state for the
1

common

Cp. Eth.

viii.

10

Classification
interest,

of Governments
called

up
a III.

the government
[n-oAirtta].

is

by the generic name
is a

7

constitution

And
:

there

reason for this use of
;

language.

One man

or a few

may

excel in virtue

but of 4
it

virtue there are

many kinds
difficult for

and as the number increases
to attain

becomes more

them

perfection in every 1279 b

kind, though they

may

in military virtue, for this is in

found

in

the

masses.

Hence,
citizens.

a

constitutional

government the

fighting-men have the supreme power, and those

who

possess

arms are the

Of
follows

the
:

of royalty, tyranny

above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as of aristocracy, oligarchy ; of
;

5

constitutional government, democracy.

For tyranny

is

a kind
;

of monarchy which has
;

in

view the interest of the monarch

only oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy ; democracy, of the needy : none of them the common good

of

all.

But there are
and
it

difficulties

about these forms of government,

8

will therefore be necessary to state a little

more

at

length the nature of each of them.
a

For he who would make

philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not

regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything,
but to set forth the truth in every particular.
I

Tyranny, as
of a master

2

was

saying,

is

monarchy exercising the
;

rule

over political society
the

oligarchy

is
;

when men of property have

government

in

their

when
rulers.

the indigent,

democracy, the opposite, and not the men of property, are the
first

hands

And

here arises the

of our

difficulties,
is

and

it

3

relates to the definition just given.

For democracy
But what
in their
if

said to

be the government of the many.

the
?

many

are

men of

property and have the power
is

hands

In like

manner oligarchy

said to be the
i

government of the few; but

a

ii6
III. 8 what
if

Oligarchy

and Democracy Defined
they

in their

the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power In these cases the hands because are stronger ?

distinction

which we have drawn between these

different

forms

of government would no longer hold good. 4 Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly
an oligarchy
is

said to

be that in which the few and the

wealthy, and a democracy that in which the
5 poor are the rulers

many and

the
if

there will

still

be a

difficulty.

For,

the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned,

how

shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their re

spective states

?

6

The argument seems
or in democracies, the

to

show

that,

whether

in oligarchies

number of the governing body, whether

the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich

everywhere are few,
there
7
is

and the poor numerous.

But

if so,

a misapprehension

of the causes of the difference

between them.

1280

a

For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a demo
cracy.
for

But

as a fact the rich are

few and the poor many

:

few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the
oligarchical
in the state.

and democratical

parties respectively claim

power

9

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and

Political Justice
democratical.

For

all

men

cling to justice

of some kind, but III. 9

their conceptions are imperfect

whole
and

idea.

and they do not express the For example, justice is thought by them to be,
not,

,

t

is,

equality,

however, for

all,

but only for equals, f
is,

f

And

inequality is thought to be,

and

justice

;

neither

is 2

this for all,

but only for unequals.

When
The

the persons are

omitted,

then

men judge
in

erroneously.

reason

is

that

they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people
are

bad judges

their

own

case.

And

implies a relation to persons as well as to things,
distribution, as I

whereas justice 3 and a just
1
,

have already said in the Ethics

embraces

and things, they acknowledge the equality of the but dispute about the merit of the persons, chiefly for things, because they are bad the reason which I have just given
alike persons

judges in their
parties to the
justice,
justice.

own

affairs

;

argument

are speaking of a limited

and secondly, because both the and partial
in

but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute

For those who

are

unequal

one respect,

for 4

example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all ; and any who are equal in one respect, for example freedom, But they leave out consider themselves to be equal in all.
the capital point. regard
to

For

if

men met and
share in

associated

out of 5

wealth only,

their

the state would be

proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of
2 hundred minae, 2 whether of the principal or of the profits But a state 6 as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine.

a

,

1 3

N. Eth.

v. 3.

4.

Or, with Bernays,

either in the case of the original

contributors

or their successors.

1 1

8

The End of
life,

the

State
life

III. 9 exists for the sake of a good
:

and not for the sake of

only were the object, slaves and brute animals only form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share might in Nor does a state happiness or in a life of free choice.
if life

and security from injustice 1 nor for then yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have
exist for the sake of alliance
, ;

commercial
7

treaties

with one another, would be the citizens of

True, they have agreements about imports, and en gagements that they will do no wrong to one another, and But there are no magistracies 1280 b written articles of alliance.

one

state.

common

to the

contracting parties

who

will

enforce their

engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care that the citizens of the other
are such as they ought to be, nor see that those

who come

under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at but only that they do no injustice to one another. all,
8

Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration [the larger question of] virtue and vice in states.

Whence

it

may

be further inferred that

2

virtue

must be the

serious care of a state

which

truly deserves the

name 2

:

for

[without
alliance

this

ethical
differs
live

end] the community becomes a mere
only in place from alliances of which
;

which

the

members

apart

and law

is

only a convention,

a

surety to one another of justice/ as the sophist
says,
just.

Lycophron

and has no

real

power
for

to

make

the citizens good and

9
1

This
Cp.
Or,
c.

is

obvious
4.

;

suppose

distinct

places,

such

as

i.

2

virtue

must be the care of a state which

is

truly so called, and

not merely in name.

The End of
not be one
intermarry,

the State

119

Corinth and Megara, to be united by a wall, still they would even if the citizens had the right to 10 city, not

HL

9

which

is

of

states.

Again,

if

one of the rights peculiarly characteristic men dwelt at a distance from one

another,

but

not so far off as to have no intercourse, and

there were laws

among them

each other

in their

that they should not wrong exchanges, neither would this be a state.
is

Let us suppose that one man

a

carpenter,

another a

husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand nevertheless, if they have nothing in
:

common

but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not

constitute a state.

Why

is

this

?

are at a distance

from one another

:

Surely not because they for even supposing that

r i

such a community were to meet in one place, and that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his
state,

and that they made
;

alliance with

one another, but only

against evil-doers

still

an accurate thinker would not

deem

this to be a state, if their intercourse

with one another was of
It is clear
\i

the

same character

after as before their union.
is

2

then that a state

not, a

mere

society,

having a

common
state

1

place, established for the prevention

of crime and for the sake

1

of exchange.
cannot exist;
a state,

These
but
is
all

are conditions without

which a

which

a

community of well-being
a

of them together do not constitute in families and

aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and selfsufficmg^
life..

Such

among Hence

those
arise

who
in

live
cities

community can only be established in the same place and intermarry.
family

13

connexions,

brotherhoods,

common
They

sacrifices,

amusements which draw men together.
for friendship is the motive
life,

are created

by friendship,
is

of society.

The end

the good

and these are the

I2O
III. 9 means towards
it.

Sovereignty

And

the state

is

the union of families and

M villages
/ Our

having for an
a

end

a perfect

and

self-sufficing life,
life *.

by

which we mean

happy and honourable
is

conclusion, then,

that political society exists for the

And i5*sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. who contribute most to such a society have a greater they share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom
or nobility of birth but are inferior to
or than those

them

in

political virtue

;

who exceed them
has been said
it

in

wealth but are surpassed

by them

in virtue.

From what

will be clearly seen that all the

partisans of different forms of
justice only.

government speak of a part of
to be the

10

There
power
in

is

also

a

doubt as to what
Is
it

is

supreme

the state:
?

the multitude?

Or

the wealthy?
?

Or

the good

Or

the one best

man

?

Or

a tyrant

Any
conse

of these
quences.

alternatives

seems to

involve

disagreeable

number, divide
is

If the poor, for example, because they are more in among themselves the property of the rich,
?

not this unjust

No, by heaven
[i.

(will be
it.

the reply), for

2

the lawful authority

e.

the people] willed

But

if this is

not

injustice,
all

division]

Again, when [in the first pray what is ? has been taken, and the majority divide anew the
it
?

property of the minority, is that they will rain the state
ruin of those

not evident,

if this

goes on,

Yet

surely,
is

virtue is not the

who

possess her, nor
this

justice destructive of

a state

2
;

and therefore
If
it

3 be just.

were,

all

law of confiscation clearly cannot the acts of a tyrant must of necessity

he only coerces other men by superior power, But is it just, then, as the multitude coerce the rich. just
be just
;

for

1

Co.

i.

2.

8; N. Eth.

i.

7.

6.

2

Cp. Plato, Rep.

i.

351. 352.

the People Sovereignty of
that the

121

what

if

few and the wealthy should be the rulers ? And III. 10 is they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people
?

this just

If so,

the

other

case

[i.

e.

the

case of the

majority plundering the minority] will likewise be just.
there can be no doubt that
unjust.
all

But 4

these things are

wrong and
?

Then ought
But
in that case

the good to rule and have supreme power

everybody
one set of

else,

being excluded from power,

will be dishonoured.

For the

offices

of a

state are posts

of

honour; and

if

must be deprived of them.
best
for

men always hold them, the rest Then will it be well that the one
is
still

5

man should
the

rule

?

Nay, that

more

oligarchical,
is

number of those who

are

dishonoured
it

thereby

increased.

Some one may
is

say that

is

bad for a man,
passion,
to

subject as he

to

all

the accidents of

human

have the supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help
us out of our difficulties
*
?

Not

at

all

;

the same conse

quences will follow.

Most of
occasion.

these questions
principle

may
the

be

reserved

for

another 11
to

The

that

multitude

ought

be

supreme rather than the few best
contain an element of truth.

is

capable of a satisfactory

explanation, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to

For

the many, of

whom

each
1281 b

individual is but an ordinary person,

when they meet together

may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many
contribute is
purse. better than

a

For each

individual

dinner provided out of a single among the many has a share

of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they
1

Cp.

c.

ii.

20.

122
III. 11 become
in a
;

Reasons for and against
manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, that is a figure of their mind and disposition.
are better judges than a single

and senses
3

Hence

the

many
;

man of music

and poetry for some understand one part, and some another, There is 4 and among them, they understand the whole.
similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of
a
art

from

realities,

because in them the scattered elements are
if

combined, although,
or
5 in

taken separately, the eye of one person

some other
the picture.

feature in another person

would be

fairer

than

Whether
all

democracy, and to

principle can apply to every bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather,
this
it

by heaven, in some cases
will be asked,

is

impossible of application
;

;

for

the argument would equally hold about brutes
it

do some men

differ

and wherein, from brutes ? But there
is

may

be bodies of

men
if so,

about

whom
is

our statement

neverthe-

6 less true.
raised,

And

the difficulty which has been already

and also another which

akin to

it

viz.

what power

should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens,
are not rich
7

who

There
offices

is

and have no personal merit are both solved. still a danger in allowing them to share the great
state, for their folly will

of

lead
is

them

into error,

and

their dishonesty into crime.
letting

But there

a danger also in not
are

them

share, for a state in

which many poor men
be
full

8

excluded from
only

office will necessarily
is

of enemies.
deliberative

The
and

way of

escape

to assign to

them some
Solon
x

judicial functions.
legislators

For

this reason

and certain other

give

them the power of
1

electing to offices, and

of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow
Cp.
ii.

12.

5.

the People Sovereignty of
them
to hold office singly.

123

they meet together their III. 11 are quite good enough, and combined with the 9 perceptions
better class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the

When

pure would be), but each individual, an imperfect judgment.

left to

himself, forms

On

the

other hand,

the popular 10

form of government involves
place,
it

certain difficulties.

In the

first

healing
heal
his

might be objected that he who can judge of the of a sick man would be one who could himself
disease,

and make him whole
;

that

is,

in

other
arts.

words, the physician

and so

in

all

professions

and

1282

a.

As,

then, the physician

physicians, so ought

men

ought to be called to account by in general to be called to account
are of three kinds:

by their peers.
is

But physicians
is

there ir

the apothecary, and there

the physician of the higher

class, art
:

and thirdly the
in
all

intelligent
is

man who has
a
class
;

studied the
attribute

arts

there

such

and we

the power of judging to

them

quite as

much

as to professors

of the
elections

art.
?

Now, does
For a
knowledge;
a

not

the same principle apply to 12

right election can only be

made by those

example, will choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in matters of steering and, even if there be some occupations and arts with which private persons are familiar, they certainly
geometrician,
;

who

have

for

cannot judge better than those

who know.

So

that,

according 13

to this argument, neither the election calling

of magistrates, nor the

of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. 14
are to a great extent

Yet possibly these objections
our old answer, that
if the

met by

people are not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those

124
III. 11

Reasons for and against
have special knowledge
as

who
or

better.

Moreover, there are
or in

a body they are as good some artists whose works

are judged of solely,
selves, but

the best manner, not by

them

by those

who do
in

not possess the art
is

;

for example,

the knowledge of the house

not limited to the builder
the master,

only

;

the

user,

or,

other words,

of the

house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter,

15

and the guest will judge better of a This difficulty seems now to be
there
is

feast than the cook.
sufficiently

answered, but

persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account another akin to
it.

That

inferior

of the
I

magistrates

is

the greatest

of

all.

And

these,

as

was

saying, are functions

which

in

some

states are assigned

to the people, for the assembly

16

Yet persons of any
qualification,
sit

in

is supreme in all such matters. and having but a small property the assembly and deliberate and judge,

age,

although for the great officers of
generals, a high qualification
is

state,

such as controllers and

required.

This

difficulty

may

be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible.
17

For the power does not
or
ecclesiast,

reside in

the

dicast,

or

senator,

but

in

the

court

and

the

senate,

and the
or

assembly,

of which
only

individual

senators,

or ecclesiasts,
for

18 dicasts, are

parts or

members.

And

this reason

the

many may
;

claim to have a higher

authority than the

few

for the people,

and the senate, and the courts consist of

many persons, and their property collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great
offices.

But enough of

this.

Equality
The
that

and
first

Inequality
*

discussion of the
that laws,

question

shows nothing so III. 11
!

clearly as

when good, should be supreme; and
or
magistrates

9

the

magistrate

should

regulate

those

matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle
2 But what are good laws has ao embracing all particulars not yet been clearly explained ; the old difficulty remains 3 .
.

The

goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws is of necessity relative to the constitutions of states. But if so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws,

21

and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws. In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially and 13
above
all

in the highest
is

of

all

4

this is the political

science
j

of which the good
interest.

words, the common All men think justice to be a sort of equality ; and
justice, in other
B

to a certain extent

which have been

laid

they agree in the philosophical distinctions down by us about Ethics 6 For
.

they admit that justice is a thing having relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there still re-

3

mains a question
difficulty

equality or inequality of what?
political

Here

is

a

which the

philosopher has to resolve.

For

very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought
to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence,
in

difference

whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other between him and the rest of the community ; for

that those

who

differ in

any one respect have
if this is

different rights

and claims.

But, surely,

true, the complexion or 3

height of a man, or any
1

other advantage, will be a reason
2
4

Cp. Cp.

c.
c.

10.

i.

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 10.
;

4.
i.

3 *

10.

5.
I.
6

Cp.

i.

i.

i

N. Eth.

I.

I.

Cp.

c. 9.

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 3.

12.6
III. 12 for
his

Conflicting

Claims
rights.

obtaining a greater share of political

The

4 error here lies

the other arts

upon the surface, and may be illustrated from When a number of flute-players and sciences.

are equal in their art, there is no reason

why

those of them

who

are better born should have better flutes given to

them

;

for they will not play any better

on the

flute,

and the superior
is
it

instrument should be reserved for him
artist.

who

the superior
will be

If what I

am

saying

is

still

obscure,

made

5 clearer as

player

we proceed. For who was far inferior

if there

in

birth

were a superior fluteand beauty, although

may be a greater good than the art of fluteand persons gifted with these qualities may excel the playing,
either of these
flute-player in a greater ratio than

he excels them

in his art,

1283

a still

he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence

6 in flute-playing,
principle any
if a

which they do

not.

Moreover upon
other.

this

good may be compared with any

For

given height, then height in general

either against height or against freedom.

may be measured excels in Thus if

A

height more than
excellent

B
;

in virtue,
all

and height
will

in

general

is

more

than

virtue,

things
a

be

commensurable
is

[which

is

absurd]

for
is

if

certain

magnitude

greater

than some other,
7

it

clear that

some other

will be equal.

there

But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than
the arts.

in
is

For

if

some be slow, and others
little

swift,

that

no reason
;

why
in

the one should have
contests

and the others
is

much
8

it

is

gymnastic

that such excellence

rewarded.

Whereas

the rival claims of candidates for office

can only be based on the possession of elements which enter

to
into the composition

Sovereign
of a
state,

Power

127
etc.].

[such as wealth, virtue,
or
rich,

III. 12

And

therefore

the noble, or freeborn,
;

may with

good reason claim office a freemen and tax-payers
:

for

holders of offices must be

state can be

no more composed

But if wealth 9 entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are J for without the former a state cannot exist equally so
;

at all,

without the

latter not well.
is

If the existence of the state
it

alone to be considered, then
at least,

13

would seem that
;

all,

or

some

of these claims
life,

are just

but, if
2
,

we

take into account a good
virtue

as I have
claims.

already said

education and

have

superior

As, however, those who

are equal in one thing ought not to
|

be equal in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to be unequal in all, it is certain that all forms of govern-

ment which

rest

All men have a claim

on either of these principles are perversions. in a certain sense, as I have already

2

admitted, but they have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the

common
title

element of the state
in

;

also they are generally
free claim

more

trustworthy

contracts.
;

The

under the same

as the noble

for they are nearly akin.

And

the noble

are

citizens in a truer sense

than the ignoble,

since

good
.

birth is always valued in a

Another reason

is,

that

man s own home and country 8 those who are sprung from better
is

3

ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility

excellence

of race.
justice has

Virtue, too,

may
6
.

be truly said to have a claim, for
*

been acknowledged by us to be a social
all

virtue,

and
1 8

it

implies
iv.
i.

others

Again, the
8
6

many may

urge their 4

Cp.

4. 6.
7.

12-16.
*

Cp.

Cp.

i.

3.

16.

Cp. c. 9. 14, 15. 15. Cp. N. Eth. v. i.

128
III. 13 claim

Conflicting
against

claims to
for,

Power
collectively,

the

few

;

when taken

and

compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and 1283 b better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the
other classes

who make up
;

a state, are

all

living together in

the same city
5

will there,
?

or will there not, be any doubt
at all in

who
For

shall rule

No

doubt

determining

to rule in each of the above-mentioned
states are characterized

who ought forms of government.

bodies

by differences in their governing one of them has a government of the rich, another of the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all

6 these elements coexist.

How

are

we

to decide
:

?

Suppose
consider

the virtuous to be
their

very few in

number

may we

numbers

in relation to their duties,

and ask whether they
all

are

enough

to administer the state, or

must they be so many as

will

make up

a state

?

Objections

may be urged

against

7 the aspirants to political

power.

For those who found
the rest,

their

claims on wealth or family have no basis of justice; on this
principle, if

clear that

any one person were richer than he ought to be the ruler of them.

all

it is

In like manner

he

who

is

very distinguished by his birth ought to have the

8 freeborn.

all those who claim on the ground that they are In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like for if one citizen be better than difficulty occurs about virtue the other members of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same principle of justice, should rule

superiority over

;

over them.

And

if

the people are to be supreme because they

are stronger than the few, then if one

man, or more than one,

but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many. 9

All
the

these considerations

appear

to

show
rule,

that

none of
all

principles on which men claim to

and hold

Conflicting
other

Claims

to

Power

129

those

men who

in subjection to them, are To III. 13 strictly right. claim to be the masters of state on the ground I0

of their virtue or their wealth, the
that they themselves

many might
but

fairly

answer

are often better
individually,

and richer than the
collectively.

few

I

do not say

And

ir

another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws

ought
classes

to legislate

or of the

with a view to the good of the higher many, when the case which we have
[i.

mentioned occurs

e.

when
is

all

the

elements coexist

1

].

Now
of

what

is

just or right

to be interpreted in the sense 12
is

what

is

equal
is

;

and that which

right in the sense

of being equal advantage of the

to be considered

with reference to the

state,

and the

common good
in

of the citizens.

And

a

citizen

is

one

governed. but in the best state

He

differs

governing and being under different forms of government, 1284 he is one who is able and willing to be
shares

who

a

governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, 13 although not enough to make up the full complement of a
state,

whose

virtue

is

so pre-eminent that the virtues or the the rest admit of no comparison with

political capacity

of

all

his or theirs, he or they can be

a state

;

for justice will not be

done to the

no longer regarded as part of superior, if he is

reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity. Such an one may
truly

be deemed a
is

God among

men.

Hence we

see that 14

necessarily concerned only with those who are legislation in birth and in power ; and that for men of pre-eminent equal
1

Cp.

4.

DAVIS

K

130

The One Best

Man
:

III. 13 virtue there is no law they are themselves a law. Any one be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them would
they would probably
the
lions
retort what, in the fable

of Antisthenes,
?

said

to

the

hares

[

where are your claws
latter

],

when
15

in the council

of the beasts the

and claiming equality for all. And states have instituted ostracism ; equality
their

began haranguing for this reason democratic
is

above

all

things

aim, and

therefore

they
the

ostracise

and banish

from

the city for a time those

who seem

to predominate too

much
or

through their wealth,
1

or

number of

their friends,
tells

6 through

any other
left

political influence.

Mythology

us that
;

the Argonauts

Heracles behind for a similar reason

the

ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would have been too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore

those

who denounce tyranny and blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held altogether just in

17

their censure.

The

story

is

that Periander,

when

the herald

was

sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off
till

the tallest ears of corn

The

he had brought the field to a level. the meaning of the action, but came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the
herald did not

know

x

g state

1
;

and

this is

a policy not only expedient for tyrants to them,

or in

practice confined

but

equally
is

necessary in

oligarchies

and democracies.
acts

Ostracism 2

a measure of the

same kind, which
19 prominent
cities

citizens.

by disabling and banishing the most Great powers do the same to whole

and nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, no sooner had they obtained a firm Chians, and Lesbians
;

grasp of the empire, than they humbled their
1

allies

contrary

Cp.

v. 10.

a

13.

Cp.

v. 3.

3.

Ostracism
to treaty
;

131
HI. 13
when
their spirit has 1284 b

and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the
nations,

Medes, Babylonians, and other

been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness. The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns

all

20

forms of government, true as well as false ; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may
adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest do so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the arts 21

and sciences

1
;

for the painter will not allow the figure to

have a foot which, however beautiful, is not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorusmaster will allow any one

who

sings louder or better than
3

all

the rest to sing in the choir.

Monarchs,

too,

may
.

practise
if

22

compulsion
their

and

still

live in

harmony with

their

cities,

2 Hence government is for the interest of the state there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in where favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice.

It

would

certainly be better that the legislator should

from the 23

first

so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should
evil

endeavour to correct the

by

this or

some

similar measure.

The

been fairly applied in states ; principle, however, has not for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted 24

forms of government, and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that In the perfect state there would be it is not absolutely just.
6 9. vii. 4. 10 Rep. iv. 420. 7 Cp. v. 3. Or, Monarchies do not differ in this respect (i. e. the employment of compulsion) from free states, but their government must be, etc.
; ; ;

1
2

K

2

III. 13 great doubts about the use of
in strength,

it,

not

when
in

applied to excess

wealth,

popularity, or
is

the like,

but

when used
what
is

against 25 be done

some one who
with him
?

pre-eminent
will

virtue,

to

Mankind

not say

that such an

one is to be expelled and exiled ; on the other hand, he that would be as if men should ought not to be a subject claim to rule over Zeus on the principle of rotation of
office.

The
ruler,

only alternative

is

that

all

such a
nature,
for
life.

according to what seems to be the order
like

should joyfully obey of
in their state

and that men

him should be kings

14

The

preceding

discussion,

to the consideration of royalty,

by a natural transition, leads which we admit to be one
.

of the true forms of government 1 Let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or country should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government ;

2

bad for others.

and whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be But first we must determine whether there is

1285

a

It is at/ easy to see that one species of royalty or many. there are many, and that the manner of government is not the

same
3

in all

of them.
royalties according to law, the

(i)

Of
is

Lacedaemonian

is

thought to

answer best to the true pattern
not
absolute,

;

but there the royal

except when the kings go on an then they take the command. Matters of 4 religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly office is in truth a kind of generalship, irresponsible and perpetual.

power

expedition, and

The
1
ii.

king has
9.

not the power of

life

and

2

death,

except

29.
rtvi

2

Omitting tv

BacnXdq, which

is

bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd

edit.

Varieties of I^ingly l^ule
when upon
is

133
manner of III. 14

a campaign and in the field

;

after the

the ancients
patient

which

is is

described in
attacked in

when he

Homer. For Agamemnon the assembly, but when the
life

army
death.

goes out to battle he has the power even of

and
5

Does he
I find a

not say

?

When
shall save

man

him from

skulking apart from the battle, nothing the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is

death

V
:

a generalship for life This, then, is one form of royalty and of sucli royalties some are hereditary and others elective.

(2)

There

is

another sort of monarchy not

uncommon
But more
than

6

among
servile

the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny.
is legal

even this

and hereditary.
than

For

barbarians, being

in

character

Hellenes,

and

Asiatics

Europeans, do not

rebel against a despotic government.

Such

7

royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are 2 by nature slaves ; but there is no danger of their being Wherefore overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal.

such as a king and not such as a tyrant employ, that is to say, they are composed of 3 For citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries
also their guards are

would

.

j

kings

rule

according

to
;

law over

voluntary

subjects,

but
their

/

tyrants over involuntary

and the one are guarded by
there

fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them.

These
third (3)

are

two forms of monarchy, and

was

a 8

which existed

in ancient Hellas, called

an

Aesymas an
is legal,

netia or dictatorship.

This may be defined generally
monarchy,

elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian
1

II.

ii.

391-393.
2.

The

last clause is

not found in our Homer. Cp.
v.

a

Cp.

i.

4.

10.

10.

134
III. 14 but
differs

%J ngs
from
it

in

the

Heroic
Sometimes the
until

in

not being hereditary.

9 office is held for

certain

duties

sometimes for a term of years, or For example, have been performed.
life,

the

Mitylenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, 10 were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet.

who

And

Alcaeus himself says
chose Pittacus tyrant,
for

in

one of his

l

irregular songs

*,

They

and he reproaches

his fellow-citizens

having

made

the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless

1285 b and ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.
1 1

These forms of government have always had the character of despotism, because they possess tyrannical power ; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their
subjects,

they are kingly.
is

(4)

There

a fourth species of kingly rule
legal,

that of the

heroic times

which was hereditary and

and was exer-

12 cised over willing subjects.

For

the

first
;

chiefs were bene

they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them ; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was
inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which

factors of the people

2

in arts or

arms

required a priest.

They

also decided causes either with or

and when they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their !3 power extended to all things whatsoever, in city and country,
without an oath
;

as well as in

foreign parts ; but at a later date they relin quished several of these privileges, and others the people took

from them,
1

until

in

some

states nothing
a

was
Cp.

left

to

them
3.

Or,

banquet-odes,

fftfdXta.

v. c. 10.

Is Monarchy a
but the

Good?

13 f
14

reality

sacrifices ; and where they retained more of the III. they had only the right of leadership in war beyond

the border.

These, then, are the four kinds of royalty.

First the 14

monarchy of the heroic ages
a general

;

this

was exercised over volun
;

tary subjects, but limited to certain functions

the king

was

and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary
despotic government in accordance with law.

A third

is

the

power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator;
elective tyranny.
is

this is an

The

fourth

is

the Lacedaemonian, which
perpetual.

in

fact

a generalship,

hereditary and

These 15

four forms differ from

one another

in

the

manner which

I have described.

There

is

a fifth form of kingly rule in
all,

which one has the

disposal of

just as each tribe or each state has the disposal

of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly
rule

of a

city,

of a house, so kingly rule is the household management or of a nation, or of many nations.
these forms

Of

we need

monian and the absolute royalty a region between them, having

only consider two, the Lacedaefor most of the others lie in ;
less

15

power than the
is

last,

and
2

more than the
points
:

first.

Thus

the enquiry

reduced to two

first, is it

advantageous to the state that there should

be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn ? Secondly, is 1286 a
it

well that a single
?

man should have
question
falls

things

The

first

the supreme power in all under the head of laws

rather than of constitutions

equally exist under

for perpetual generalship might ; any form of government, so that this

3

1 3

6

Is not the J(ale of

Many
this

Better

?

III. 15 matter
royalty
sider,

may
is

be dismissed for the present.
;

a sort of constitution
briefly to

The other kind of we have now to con
involved in
it.

and

run over the

difficulties
it

We
4
in

will begin

by enquiring whether

is

more advantageous
.

to be ruled

1 by the best man or by the best laws The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances ; and

that for any science to abide
in

by written

rules is absurd.

Even

Egypt the physician

is

allowed to

alter his

treatment after

the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk.

Hence

it is

5

argued that a government acting according to written laws is Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with plainly not the best.
the general principle which exists in law
ruler
;

and he

is a

better

from passion than he who is passionate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man.
is

who

free

6

Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an
individual will be better able to advise in particular cases.

whom we

in

turn

make

reply

:]

A

[To

king must legislate, and

laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining
their

authority.

[Yet a further question remains behind
all,
?

:]

When
7

the law cannot determine a point at

or not well,

should the one best

man

or should

all

decide

According to

our present practice assemblies meet,

judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is cer But the state is made up of tainly inferior to the wise man.
sit in

many
1

individuals.
is

And

as a feast to

which
by

all

the guests

contribute

better than a banquet furnished
Polit. pp.

a single
c.

man
2.

2
,

Cp. Plato,

293-295.

2

Cp. supra,

n.

Constitutional History of Greece
so a multitude
individual.
is

137
HI. 15

a better judge of

many

things than any

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few
are like the greater quantity of water

;

they 8

which

is less

easily cor

rupted than a

little.

The
but

individual

is liable to

be overcome

by anger or by some other passion, and
necessarily perverted
;

then his

judgment

is

it

is hardly to be supposed that a

great

number of persons would all get into a passion and go Let us assume that they are 9 wrong at the same moment.
freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but
is

gaps which the law

obliged to leave.
multitude,

Or,

if

the filling up such virtue is

scarcely attainable by the
that the majority are

we need

only suppose

which
the

will

good men and good citizens, and ask be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or
are
all

many who
is

good

?

Will not the many

?

But, you 1286 b

will say, there

man
rule

may be parties among them, whereas the one To which we may 10 not divided against himself.
is

answer that their character

as

good

as his.

If

we

call

the

of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for
states than

royalty,
x
,

whether the government

is

supported by

force or not

provided only that a number of

men

equal in

virtue can be found.

The
virtue

first

reason, because of old,

governments were kingships, probably for this when cities were small, men of eminent

n

were few.
2
,

They were made
benefits

benefactors

and

men.

But when many

kings because they were can only be bestowed by good persons equal in merit arose, no longer

enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a

commonwealth, and
1

set up a constitution.
2

The
Cp.
c.

I2 ruling class
14.

Cp.

infra,

15.

12.

138

Constitutional History of Greece

III. 15 soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public
treasury
j

riches

became the path
up.

to honour, into

and so

oligar

chies naturally

grew

These passed
;

tyrannies and
in

tyrannies into democracies
classes
to

for love of gain
to diminish their

the ruling

was always tending
the

number, and so

strengthen

masses,

who

in

the end set

upon
cities

their

masters
13 increased

and
in

established
size,

democracies.

Since

have

no other form of government appears to
.

be any longer possible 1 Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states, how about the family of the
king
?

Are

his

children to succeed
else,

14 better than

anybody

that

will

him ? If they are no be mischievous. But

[says the lover of royalty] the king, though he might, will

not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is to be expected, and is too much to ask of human hardly
nature.
is to
1

There
;

is

also a difficulty about the force

which he

5 aid

employ should a king have guards about him by whose he may be able to coerce the refractory ? but if not, how
he administer his kingdom
?

will

Even

if

he be the lawful

sovereign
still

nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law.

who does

16 In the case of a limited
in

answering

this question

monarchy there is not much difficulty the king must have such force as
;

will

be more than a match for one or more individuals, but

The ancients observed not so great as that of the people. this principle when they gave the guards to any one whom
Thus, when Dionysius they appointed dictator or tyrant. asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only a certain number.
1

Cp.

iv. 6.

5; 13.

10.

The
At
will
;

J^ule of

One

is

thought Unnatural 139
III. 16
a

this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry

respecting the king

who

acts solely according

to

his

own

he has now to be considered.
1
,

The

so-called limited

monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already

remarked

is

not a distinct form of government, for under
as, for

all

governments,
there
is

example,

in a

democracy or aristocracy,

may be a general holding office for life, and one person often made supreme over the internal administration of

a state.

2 magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus , and also at Opus, but in the latter city has a more limited

A

power.

Now,
is

absolute
all

monarchy, or the arbitrary

rule

of

3

a sovereign over
equals,
is

the citizens, in a city which consists of

thought by some to be quite contrary to nature ; it argued that those who are by nature equals must have the

same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the
offices

of

state, is as

bad as for

different bodily constitutions

to

have the same food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every 3 one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their

turn.

We

thus arrive at law

;

for an order
is

of succession
\

implies law.

And

the rule of the law

preferable to that
it

of any individual.

On

the same principle, even if

be better 4

for certain individuals to govern, they should be

made only

guardians and ministers of the law.

For

magistrates there

must

be,

this is admitted

;

but then
all

men

say that to give
is

authority to any one

man when
man

are equal

unjust.

There

may indeed
law trains
1

be cases which the law seems unable to determine,
?

but in such cases can a
officers for this
15.
2.

Nay,
a

it

will be replied, the 5

express purpose, and appoints them
Cp.
v. i.

Cp.

c.

10, ii

;

4.

7.

140

Law

the

True
left
it

~Ruler
undecided by
to
it

III. 16 to determine matters which are
best of their judgment.

to the

Further

permits them

make any
suggests.

amendment of the
[But
still

existing laws

which experience

He who they are only the ministers of the law.] bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason
alone rule, but he
beast
;

who

bids

man

rule

adds an element of the

for desire is a wild beast,
rulers,

minds of
6 law
is

and passion perverts the The even when they are the best of men.

reason unaffected by desire.
call in

We are told

that a patient
is is

should
J

a physician

;

doctored out of a book.
clearly not in point
;

he will not get better if he But the parallel of the arts

for the physician does nothing contrary
;

to reason

and takes a
spite

from motives of friendship he only cures a patient fee whereas magistrates do many things from
;

indeed, if a man suspected the with his enemies to destroy him league 8 for a Even bribe, he would rather have recourse to the book.

and

partiality.

And,

physician of being

in

1287 b

when they are sick, call training-masters when they are in
physicians

in

other physicians, and other training-

training,

masters, as if they could not judge truly about their

and might be
9 neutral
1
,

influenced

by their

feelings.

own case Hence it is

evident that in seeking for justice

men

seek for the mean or

and the law

is

the mean.

Again, customary laws

have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written
law, but not safer than the customary law.

Again,

it

is
;

many
nates
;

things

by no means easy for one man to superintend he will have to appoint a number of subordi
it

and what difference does

make whether

these sub

ordinates always existed or were appointed by
1

him because he

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 4,

7.

Many
needed them
?

better than
I

One
the

141
men
are I0

If,

as

said
is

before

J
,

good man has III. 16

a right to rule because

he

better,

then two good

better than

one: this

is

the old saying,
2
;

two going together
and the prayer of Agamemnon,

would

that I

had ten such counsellors

s
!

And
judges
is

at
4
,

this

who

day there are some magistrates, for example have authority to decide matters which the law
decide in the best manner whatever
can,

unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law would
it

command and

could.

and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule.

But some things

n

For matters of
included in
decision
is

detail

about which

legislation.

men deliberate cannot be Nor does any one deny that the
man, but it many judges, and not one who has been trained by the law
left

of

such

matters

must be

to

argued that

there should be
ruler
B

only.

For every
;

12

judges well

and

it

would

surely seem strange

that a person

or act better with
indeed,
selves
it

should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, two hands or feet, than many with many ;
is

already the practice of kings to

make

to

them

make

For they eyes and ears and hands and feet. of those who are the friends of themselves colleagues

many

and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch 13 and of his government ; if not his friends, they will not

do what he wants
equality
1
;

;

but

friendship

implies

likeness

and

and, therefore, if
2

he thinks that friends ought to
3

Cp.

c.

13.

25.
5

II.

x.

224.

II. ii.

4

372.
9.

<5

SiKaarrjs.

Cp.

for similar

arguments

c.

15.

142
III. 16
rule,

Yet there

may
rule.

be an Exception who
are equal to himself

he must think that those
himself ought to

and
con

like

These

are the

principal

troversies relating to

17

But may not
others?
relation

all

this
is
a.

monarchy. be true in some cases and not
natural justice
or,

in

^or

there

of a master to his servants,

and expediency in the again, of a king to his
;

subjects, as also in the relation of free citizens to one another

1288

a

no such justice or expediency in a tyranny \ or in any other perverted form of government, which comes into being contrary to nature. Now, from what has been said,
whereas there
is
it is

2

manifest that, where

expedient nor just that one

men are alike and equal, it is neither man should be lord of all, whether
Neither should a good
;

there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself
is

in the place

of law.

man be

lord

over good men, or a bad man over bad nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular
case, 3

which

I

once more recur

have already mentioned, and to which I will 2 But first of all, I must determine what
.

natures are suited for royalties, and

what

for an aristocracy,

and what for a constitutional government.
4

A

people

who

are

by nature capable of producing a race
political
3

superior in virtue

and

government

;

and a people

talent are fitted for kingly submitting to be ruled as free

men by men whose
1

virtue renders

them capable of
fitted to

political

Or,

for there

are

men who
by
for

are

by nature

be ruled by a

master, others to be ruled
tutional government,

a king,

others to live under a consti

and

whom

these several relations are just and

expedient
etc.
8
3

;

but there are no

men

naturally fitted to be ruled by a tyrant,

c.

13.

25, and

5, infra.
t>

Omitting the words irXijOos repetition from the previous clause.

irt<pvK(

(ptptiv,

which appear to be a

The Rule of

the

Best
:

Man

143

command are adapted for an aristocracy who are suited for constitutional freedom

while the people III. 17 are those among
2

whom
rule

there naturally exists
in turn

1

a warlike multitude

able to

and to obey

by a law which gives office to the

well-to-do according to their desert.
family, or

But when

a

whole

5

some

individual,
all

virtue as to

surpass

happens to be so pre-eminent in others, then it is just that they

should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as 6 3 I said before , to give them authority is not only agreeable to
that

ground of right which the founders of
or
oligarchical,

all states,

whether
are

aristocratical,

or

again

democratical,

accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim of excellence, although not the same excellence), but accords

For it would not 7 with the principle already laid down be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or The require that he should take his turn in being governed.
.

4

whole

is

naturally superior to the part,
is

and he who has
part.

this

pre-eminence
if so, the

in the relation
is

of a whole to a

But 8

only alternative

that he should have the supreme

power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respect
ing royalty and
its

various forms, and this is the answer to the
it is

question, whether whom, and how.

or

is

not advantageous to states, and to

We
best,

maintain that the true forms of government are three,
is

18

and that the best must be that which

administered by the

and
1

in

which there
iv.

is

one man, or a whole family,
"

Omitting Kal
Cp.
Or,
c. 9.

Cp.

c. 7.

4.

*
4

15.

but differing in the

manner already

laid

down.

144
III. 18 or many persons,

The

Perfect State
in

excelling

virtue,

and both

rulers

and
*,

subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled

in

showed such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. 2 that the virtue of the at the commencement of our enquiry
good man
is

We

necessarily the
state.

same as the

virtue

of the citizen

of the perfect

Clearly then in the same manner, and

by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, he will frame a state [which will be truly good] whether
1288 b aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a good

statesman and king.
2

Having
being and

arrived at these conclusions,
state,

we must proceed
it

to

speak of the perfect
is

and describe how

comes

into

established.
. .

He who
3
.

would proceed with the

enquiry in due manner.
1

Bekker
2
3

Omitting KOI ap\ttv, which s 2nd edit.
Cp.
c.

is

inserted,

without MS. authority, in

4.

Retaining
avrrjs

the words of
rrp>

the"HVISS.,

AvayKr)
ffKf\f/iv,

5?)

rciv fj.t\\ovra

ntpl

TroirjoaaOai
in his

irpoCTjitovaav

which are omitted by

Bekker

2nd

edit.

BOOK
IN
all

IV
the
that

arts

and

sciences

which embrace the whole of IV. 1
it

any subject, province of
appertains
to

and are not
a
single
art

restricted to a part only,

is

or

science

to

consider

all

a

single

subject.

For example, the
the
suitableness

art

of

gymnastic considers

not

only

of different
is

modes of
which

training to different bodies (2),

but what sort

absolutely the
that
is

best (i)

(for

the absolutely best

must

suit

by nature best and best furnished with the and also what common form of training is And if a man adapted to the great majority of men (4). does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in

means of

life),

3

gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any

The sa"me principle equally holds lower degree of either (3). in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and
in the arts generally
1
.

Hence

it

is

obvious that government too

is

the subject 3

of a single

science,

which has

to

consider what

kind of

government would be best and most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and
also

what kind of government
the best
is

is

adapted to particular states.

For

often

unattainable,
to

and therefore the true
be acquainted,
not only

legislator

and statesman ought
is

with (i) that which
1

best in the abstract,

but also with

The numbers
in

in this

paragraph are made to correspond with the

numbers

the next.

1

46
that

Political Problems
which
is

IV. 1(2)

best

relatively

to

circumstances.

We

4 should be able further to say

how
it

a state

under any given conditions (3);

both

may how it

be constituted
is

originally
;

formed and, when formed, how
the supposed state being so
is

may

be longest preserved

far

from the very best that

it

best

unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the very neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an ;

inferior type.

5

He

ought, moreover, to
is

know

(4) the form of govern
;

ment which

best suited to states in general

for political

writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often un6 practical. should consider, not only what form of

We
is

government

best,

but also what
all.

is

possible and

what

is

easily attainable

by none but the most perfect

There
;

are

some who would have

for this

many

natural advantages

1289 a are required.

Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they
are living, they

extol
.

some one

in

particular,

7

the

Lacedaemonian 1

Any change

for example of government which

has to be introduced should be one which
willing and able

men
in

will be both

to adopt, since there is quite as

much

trouble

in the reformation

of an old constitution as

the establish

ment of a new one,

just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn.

And
man

therefore, in addition to

the qualifications of the states

already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies 8 for the defects of existing constitutions 2 This he cannot
.

do unless he knows how many forms of government there
are.
It
is

often

supposed that there

is

only one kind of
this
is

democracy and one of oligarchy.
and, in order to avoid such mistakes,
1

But

a mistake

;

we must
2

ascertain
4.

what

Cp.

ii.

6.

16.

Cp.

differences

there are in

the constitutions of states, and in

IV. 1

how many ways

they are combined.

The same

political 9

insight will enable a

man

to

know which laws
;

are the best, for the laws

and which are suited to different constitutions
are,

and ought to

be, relative to the constitution,

and not the

constitution to the laws.
offices in a state,

A constitution

is

the organization of I0

and determines what

is

to be the governing

But * laws body, and what is the end of each community. are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitu
tion
: they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So that we must know the number and varieties of the ir

1

several

laws.

For

forms of government, if only with a view to making the same laws cannot be equally suited to all

oligarchies

and

to all democracies,

and there

is

certainly

more

than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy. In our original discussion 2 about governments we divided

2

them

into

three

true

forms

:

kingly rule,
three

aristocracy, and

constitutional

government,

and

corresponding

per

versions
rule

tyranny,

oligarchy,

and

democracy.

Of

kingly

and

of aristocracy we
into the

enquiry

perfect

state

have already spoken, for the is the same thing with the
since both imply

discussion of the

two forms thus named,
with

a principle of virtue provided

external

means.

We

have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be
established
3
.

In

what follows we have

to

describe

the

so-called constitutional
1

government, which bears the common
themselves
distinct,

Or

,

laws, though

in

show
3

the character of

the constitution.
2

Book

iii.

7

;

N. Eth.

viii

10.

Cp.

iii.

17.

8.

L

2

148
IV. 2 name of
all

constitutions,

and

the other

forms, tyranny,

2

oligarchy, and democracy. It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, That which is the and which is the next in badness.

perversion

of the

first

and most divine

is

necessarily the

1289 b worst.
exist

And

just as a royal rule, if not a

mere name, must

so tyranny,

by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily
;

the farthest removed from a well-constituted form
is

oligarchy

a little better, but a long

way from

aristocracy,

and democracy

is

the

most

tolerable of the three.
*

3

A

writer

who preceded me has
is

already

made

these

distinctions, but his point of view

not the same as mine.

lays down the principle that of all good constitutions which he would include a virtuous oligarchy and the (under
like)

For he

democracy
is

is

the worst,

but the

best of

bad ones.

Whereas we
one oligarchy
only less bad.
4

maintain

that they are all defective,

and that

not to be accounted better than another, but

Not

to pursue this question further at present, let us begin

2 how many varieties of states there by determining (i) are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several) ;
(2)"

what
is

constitution
in

is

the most generally acceptable, and

what

after the perfect or eligible degree other aristocratical and well-constituted form of govern any

the

next

4

ment
adapted
1

if

any other there be
states
in
4

which
5
;

is

at

the

same time

to

general
2

(3)

of the other forms of
8

Plato, Polit.

303

A.,

c.

4-6.

c.

7-9 and u.

*

Or,

which

is

the perfect state; and besides this what other there is aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted
after
5

to states in general.

c. 12.

A

Table of Contents

149

For democracy may IV. 2 government to whom each is suited. meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. 5
In the next place (4)
a
1

man ought

to proceed

we have to consider in what manner who desires to establish some one
whether of democracy or of
2

among these
oligarchy
;

various
lastly,

forms,
(5)

having briefly discussed these 6 to the best of our power, we will endeavour to subjects

and

ascertain

whence

arise

the

ruin

and preservation of

states,

both generally and in individual cases, and to what causes they are to be attributed.

The
is

reason

why
state
all

there

are

many forms of government 3

that every

contains

place

we

see that

states are

many elements. In the first made up of families, and in
must be some
3
;

the multitude of citizens there
poor, and

rich

and some

some

in a

middle condition
3
.

the rich are heavypeople,

armed, and the poor not
are

Of

the

common
and

some

a

husbandmen,
are

and

some

traders,

some

artisans.

There

also

among the

notables

differences

of wealth

and property

for example, in the

number of horses which

they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength 3
lay in the cavalry

were

oligarchies,
;

in

wars against their neighbours

and they used cavalry 4 as was the practice of the
in

Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the
river

Maeander, and of other peoples

Asia.

Besides 4

differences of wealth there are differences of rank

and

merit,

1

Book
Or,

vi.

2

Book

v.

3

and again both of rich and poor some are armed and some are
either iro\if*ovs with v. tr.

unarmed.
4

Reading

(Moerbek) and Bekk. 2nd
c.

edit.,

TToAtfuous with the

Greek MSS.

;

cp.

13.

10;

vi.

c.

7.

i.

i 5-0

Why forms
are

of Government Differ
of aristocracy

IV. 3 and
1290
a

there

some other elements which were mentioned
in

by us

w h cn
of

treating
state
l
.

we enumerated
sometimes
the
is

the
all,

essentials

a

Of

these elements,

sometimes
5

the

lesser

and sometimes
It

greater

number,

have

a

share in the government.

evident then that

there must be
since

the

many forms of government, differing in kind, parts of which they are composed differ from
in

each other

kind.
all

For

a constitution

is

an organization

of offices which

the citizens distribute

among themselves,

according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some common them or some power common to equality subsisting among

6 both.

There must

therefore be as

many forms of government

as there are
superiorities

modes of arranging the
and other

offices, according to the of the different parts of inequalities

the state.

There
as

men

and

generally thought to be two principal forms : of the winds that there are but two north say and that the rest of them are only variations south
are

7

of these, so of governments there are said to be only two forms For aristocracy is con democracy and oligarchy.
sidered
a to

be

a

kind of oligarchy,

as being

the

rule

of

few,

and the so-called

really a

west
wind.

a

government to be democracy, just as among the winds we make the variation of the north, and the east of the south
constitutional

Similarly

of harmonies

there
;

are

said

to

be two

kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian

the other arrangements

of the scale are
8

comprehended under one
the better

of these

two.

About forms of government
But
in

this is a very favourite notion.

either
1

case

and

more exact way
cp. vii. 8.

is

to

Not

in

what has preceded, but

Democracy and Oligarchy
distinguish,
true forms,

if i
are

as

I

have

done,

the

one or two which

IV. 8

and

to

regard the others as perversions, whether

of the most perfectly attempered harmony or of the best form of government we may compare the oligarchical forms to the severer and more overpowering modes, and the demo
;

cratic to the It

more relaxed and
as

gentler ones.

must not be assumed,
is

some
1
,

are fond of saying, that
in

4

democracy
indeed
is

simply

that

form of government
for
in

which
and

the greater number are sovereign
in

oligarchies,
;

every government, the

majority rules

nor again
a

oligarchy that form of government in

which

few are
2

sovereign.

Suppose 1300, and that of these 1000 are

the whole population of a city to be
rich,

and do not allow and
in all

the remaining
respects their
will

300 who
equals,
a

are poor, but free,

other

share of the

government

no one

In like manner, if the 3 say that this is a democracy. poor were few and the masters of the rich, who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority h ;e no share of office, an oligarchy.

Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the 1290 b form of government in which the free are rulers, and it is oligarchy in which the rich only an accident that 4 the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise
;

offices were given according to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy ; for the number of tall or good-

a

government

in

which the

stature, as is said to

looking

men

is

small.

And

yet oligarchy and

are not sufficiently distinguished merely
teristics

of wealth

and freedom. and
Cp.
iii.

democracy by these two charac Both of them contain

5

many

other

elements,
1

therefore
8.

we must

carry

our

3-7.

if2 The State Compared
IV. 4
analysis further,
in

to

the

Animal

and say that the government is not a de which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who art not free, as at Apollonia, on the

mocracy
Ionian

Gulf,

and

at

Thera

(for

in

each

of these

states
in

the nobles,

who were

also the earliest settlers,

were held

chief honour, although they were but a few out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government,

because they exceed in number ; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed

6 of large But the form property before the Lydian War. of government is a democracy when the free, who are also

poor
rich
in
7

and the majority,

govern,

and the noble govern, they being number.
I

and oligarchy when the at the same time few

have said that there are many forms of government, and
explained to what causes the variety is due. more than those already mentioned, and what they

have

Why

there are
are,

starting

and whence they arise, I will now proceed to consider, from the principle already admitted \ which is that

8 every state consists, not of one, but of

many

parts.

If

were going to speak of the
should
first

different species

of animals,

we we

of

all

able to every animal, as for

determine the organs which are indispens example some organs of sense

and instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion. As suming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but
that there

may

be differences

in

them

I

mean

different kinds

of mouths,
organs

and

stomachs,

and perceptive and locomotive
of animals.
i.

the possible

combinations of these differences will
varieties

necessarily furnish

many
1

(For animals

CP

.

c. 3.

Essential Elements of the State

1^3
IV. 4

cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or

of

ears.)

And when
many

all

the

combinations are exhausted,

there will be as

sorts

of animals as there are combina

tions of the necessary organs.

In

like

manner the forms of 9
I

government which have been described, as
said, are composed, not of one, but of

have repeatedly
elements.

element

is

the food-producing class,

men

;

a second, a class

One many who are called husband of mechanics, who practise the arts
;

1291

a

without which a city cannot exist
absolutely

of these arts some are
to luxury or to the
i

necessary,

others

contribute

grace of
I
in

life.

mean those
commerce

The third class is that of traders, and by traders who are engaged in buying and selling, whether
or in retail trade.

A fourth class
make up
the

is

that of the

serfs or labourers.

The

warriors

fifth class,

and

they are as necessary as any of the others, if the country is not to be the slave of every invader. For how can a state which

n

has any

title

to the

name be of

a slavish nature
is

?

The

state is

independent and self-sufficing, but a slave
pendent.

the reverse of inde

Hence we

see that this subject, though ingeniously,

has not been satisfactorily treated in the Republic a . Socrates 12 that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are says
these are a weaver, a husbandman, and a builder afterwards, finding that they shoemaker, are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to
absolutely

necessary;

a

;

look after the necessary animals ; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the
necessaries of
life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he does not admit into the state a military class until the
1

1

3

Rep.

ii.

369.

i

f4

Essential Elements of the State
increased in size, and
s
is

IV. 4 country has
its

beginning to encroach on

Yet even whereupon they go to war. amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state, there must be some
neighbour
land,

one
14

who

will dispense justice

and determine what

is

just.

be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration
as the
soul

And

may

of of

justice,
political

and

in

deliberation,

which

is

the special business
essential to the
life.

common

sense,

these are

more

state than the parts

which minister

to the necessaries of

15

Whether

their several functions are the functions of different

citizens, or

of the same

for

it

same persons
terial

are both warriors

may often happen that the and husbandmen is imma

to the argument. The higher as well as the lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, and if so, the military element must be included. There are also

the wealthy
1

who

minister to the state with their property
class.
;

;

6 these

form the seventh

The

eighth class

is

that of

magistrates and of officers
rulers.

for the state cannot exist without

And

therefore

some must be
and

able to take office

and to

17 serve the state, either always or in turn.

There only remains

judge between dis If the fair distinguishing them. just putants ; and equitable organization of all these elements is necessaiy to 1291 b states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of
deliberate

the class of those

who

who

we were

now

J

8 statesmen.

Many are of opinion that different functions can be combined in the same individual 1 ; for example, the war rior may be a husbandman, or an artisan ; or again, the coun
sellor a judge.
1

1

And

all

claim to possess political

ability,
etc.

and

Or,

Different functions appear to be often combined,

Varieties of Democracy

iff
IV. 4

But think that they are quite competent to fill most offices. the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time.

For

this reason the rich

and the poor are regarded

in

an 19

a state. Again, because the rich especial sense as parts of are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they the other prevails appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or Hence arises the common form the government. they democracy opinion that there are two kinds of government

and oligarchy. l that there are many differences 20 I have already explained Let of constitutions, and to what causes the variety is due.

me now show
ceded.

that there are different forms both of
will

democracy

and oligarchy, as

indeed be evident from what has pre

For both

in the

common
;

people and in the notables 21

various classes are included

of the
;

common

people, one class

are husbandmen, another artisans

another traders,

who

are

employed in buying and selling class, whether engaged in war or
fishermen.

;

another are the seafaring in trade, as ferrymen or as

(In

many

places any one of these classes forms
;

quite a large population

for example, fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant sea men at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the

classes already mentioned

may be added
needy

day-labourers,

and

those who,
leisure, or

owing

to

their

circumstances,

have no
;

those

who

are not free of birth

on both sides

and

there

may be

other classes as well.

The

notables again

may

22

be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education,

and similar differences.

Of

forms of democracy
1

first

comes

that

which

is

said to

be based strictly on equality.
Cp.
iii.

In such a democracy the law
c. 6.

i

$6
it is

Extreme Democracy
just for

IV. 4
23

says that be rich l

nobody

to be poor,

and for nobody to

For

if

and that neither should be masters, but both equal. are chiefly liberty and equality, as is thought by some,
;

to be

found

in

democracy, they

will be best attained

when

all

persons alike share in the
since

the people are the
is

majority

decisive,

government and the opinion of the such a government must necessarily be
majority,
is

to the utmost.

And

24 a democracy.
is

Here then

one sort of democracy.

There

another in which the magistrates are elected according to

a certain property qualification, but a

low one

;

he

who

has

the required amount of property has a share in the govern-

1292

a

ment, but he

who

loses his property loses his rights.
all

Another
no
dis

kind

is

that in

which

the citizens

who

are under

government, but still the law is In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is 25 supreme. admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before.
qualification

share in

the

A
in

fifth

form of democracy,

in other respects the

same,

is

that

which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme This is 26 power, and supersede the law by their decrees.

For in of affairs brought about by the demagogues. democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens
a state

hold the

first

place,

and there are no demagogues

;

but where

the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one and the
;

many have
27 collectively.

the power in their hands, not as individuals, but

Homer

says that,

it is

not good to have a rule

1 that the poor should no more Or, reading apxtw with Victorius, The emendation is not absolutely necessary, govern than the rich. though supported by vi. 2. 9, law yap TC) [irjOtv fj.d\\ov dp\tiv rovs

airopovs
tear

rj

TOVS fvirupovs

/J.i)Se

Kvpiovs tlfat /*wovs

dAAu

iravras

(

iffov

dpidfj.6v.

Extreme Democracy
*

if?
4

of many , but whether he means this corporate rule, or the IV. rule of many individuals, is uncertain. And the people, who is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law,
seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot
the flatterer
relatively
is
;

of democracy being to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms
;

held in honour

this sort

of monarchy.

The

spirit

of both

is

the same, and they alike 28

exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens.

The

decrees

of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant ; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other.

Both have great power
demagogue
describing.

the flatterer

with

democracies

of the

with the tyrant, the kind which we are

The demagogues make
all

the decrees of the people 29

override the laws, and refer

And

therefore they

grow

things to the popular assembly. great, because the people have all

things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes

of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, 30 those who have any complaint to bring against the magis
trates

say,

let

the people be judges

;

the people are too

happy to accept the invitation ; and so the authority of every office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all ; for where the
laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law 31 to be supreme over all, and the magistracies and the ought

So that if government should judge only of particulars. be a real form of government, the sort of constitu democracy
tion in a

which

all

things are regulated by decrees
a
.

is

clearly not

democracy

in

the true sense of the word, for decrees relate

only to particulars

1

II. ii.

204.

*

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 10.

7,

iy 8
IV. 5
These then
oligarchies,

Varieties of Oligarchy
are

the different kinds of democracies.
are different kinds

Of

too,

there

one

where the

office is so high that the poor, qualification for although they form the majority, have no share in the govern

property

ment, yet he
1292 b

who
is

acquires a qualification
there
is

may

obtain a share.

Another

sort

when

a qualification for office, but

a high one, and the vacancies in the governing

body
all

are filled

by co-optation.
2 if

If the election

is

made

out of

the qualified

persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy,

out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy.
is

Another

sort of
is

oligarchy

when

the son

succeeds the father.

There

a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in

which the magistrates

are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned

form of democracy among

democracies

;

and

in

fact

this

sort of oligarchy receives the

name of

a dynasty (or rule of

powerful families).
3

These
cies.

are the different sorts of oligarchies

and democra

It

should however be remembered that

in

many

states

1

the constitution which

is established by law, although not democratic, owing to the character and habits of the people,

may
4 but

be administered democratically, and conversely in other

states the established constitution

may
:

incline to
spirit.

democracy,

may

be administered in an oligarchical
after
;

This most

often

happens change at once
encroaching a

a revolution

at first

governments do not the dominant party are content with
for

The laws which upon their opponents. existed previously continue in force, but the authors of the
little

revolution have the

power
1

in their hands.

6

From what

has been already said
Cp.
v. i.

we may

safely infer that

8.

Stages of Democracy
there
are so

i

f9

oligarchies.

many different kinds of democracies and of IV. 6 For it is evident that either all the classes whom
share in the government, or

we mentioned must
not others.

some only and
2

When

the class of husbandmen and of those

who

possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the For the citi government is administered according to law.

zens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure ; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend
assemblies only

when

necessary.

Since they

all

obtain a 3

share in the government
fication

when they have

acquired the quali
is

which

is

fixed by the law,

nobody

excluded

the

exclusion of any class would be a step towards But leisure cannot be provided for them unless oligarchy.
absolute

revenues to support them. This is one sort of and these are the causes which give birth to it. democracy, Another kind is based on the mode of election, 1 which
there are
naturally

comes next

in order

l
;

in this, every

one to whose

birth there is

government

if

no objection is eligible, and may share in the he can find leisure. And in such a democracy 4
is

the supreme power

vested in the laws, because the state has

no means of paying the citizens. third kind is when all freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not actually share, for the reason which has been already given ;
so that in this form again the law must rule.

A

A
all

fourth kind 5

of democracy is that which comes latest In our own day, when cities have states.
original size,

in

the history of 1293 a

far

outgrown

their

and

their revenues

have increased,

the citizens

have a place in the government, through the great prepon derance of their numbers ; and they all. including the poor

who

receive pay,

and therefore have
1

leisure to exercise their
it.

Or,

which

is

proper to

i

do

Stages of Oligarchy
share in the administration.

IV. 6

6 paid, the

Indeed, when they are have the most leisure, for they are people not hindered by the care of their property, which often fetters
rights,

common
who

the rich,

are thereby prevented

from taking part
state is

in the

assembly or
7

in the courts,

and so the

governed by the

poor,

who

are a majority,

and not by the laws.

So many

kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these
necessary causes.

Of
is

oligarchies,

one form

is

that in

the citizens have

some

property, but not very

which the majority of much and this
;

the

first

form, which allows to any one

who

obtains the

8 required

amount the

right of sharing in the government.
it

The

sharers in the government being a numerous body,
that the law

follows

portion as they are further

must govern, and not individuals. For in pro removed from a monarchical form
in

of government, and

respect of property have neither so

much
little

as to be able to live without attending to business, nor so as to

need

state support,

9 and not claim to rule themselves.
in the state are

they must admit the rule of law But if the men of property

fewer than

in the

former case, and

own more
For the

property, there arises a second form of oligarchy.

stronger they are, the
object in
classes

claim, and having this themselves select those of the other view, they are to be admitted to the

more power they

who

government
this

;

but, not

being as yet strong

enough

to rule without the law, they

make
inten

10 the law represent their wishes.
sified

When
their

by a further diminution of
in

power numbers and increase

is

of their property, there arises a third and further stage of
oligarchy,
their
11

own

which the governing class keep the offices in hands, and the law ordains that the son shall
father.

succeed

the

When,

again,

the

rulers

have

great

Aristocracy

s

the Pure

and

the

Mixed

161
IV. 6

wealth and numerous friends, this sort of dynastia or family despotism approaches a monarchy ; individuals rule and not
the law.

This

is

the fourth sort of oligarchy, and

is

analogous

to the last sort of democracy.

There

are

still

two forms besides democracy and oligarchy

;

7

one of them

universally recognized and included among the four principal forms of government, which are said to be
is

(l) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, and (4) the socalled aristocracy or

government of the
this is not

best.

But there

is

also

a

fifth,

which

retains the generic
;

name of

polity or constitu

tional

government

common, and

therefore has not

been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the dif ferent kinds of government ; like Plato in his books about the 1293 b
state,
is

rightly applied to the

The term aristocracy they recognize four only. form of government which is de

2

scribed in the first part of our treatise : for that only can be rightly called aristocracy [the government of the best] which is a government formed of the best men absolutely,

and not merely of men who are good when
standard.

tried
is

by any given
absolutely the

In the perfect state the good
citizen
;

man

same as the good
citizen
is

whereas

in

other states the good

ment.

only good But there are some
differing
;

relatively to his

own form

states

differing

of govern from oligarchies
constitu

3

and also
tional

from the

so-called

polity or

government

these are termed aristocracies,

and

in

them magistrates are wealth and according ment
is

certainly chosen, both according to their to their merit. Such a form of govern

is

not the same with the two just

now

mentioned, and

For indeed in states which do not 4 termed an aristocracy. make virtue the aim of the community, men of merit and
virtue reputation for
DAVIS

may

be found.

And

so where a govern-

M

1

62

Mixed
1

Constitutions

IV. 7 ment has
thage
to
,

regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Car
is

that

aristocracy
three,

;

and also where
as at

it

has regard only
virtue

two out of the

Lacedaemon, to

and

5

and the two principles of democracy and virtue There are these two forms of aristocracy temper each other. in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third
numbers,

form, viz. the polities which incline towards oligarchy. I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. 8
I put

them

in this order, not
is

government above-mentioned
fall

to be regarded as a perversion
aristocracies.

because a polity or constitutional any more than the

The

truth

is,

that they

all

short of the most perfect form of government,
perversions,

and so
(sc.

they are reckoned among
the
a

and other forms

really
2

perverted forms)
.

are perversions
I will

of these, as

I

said before
I

Last of
in

place

last

speak of tyranny, which the series because I am enquiring into the
all

constitutions

of

states,

and

this

is

the

very

reverse

of

a constitution.

Having explained why I have adopted this order, I will of which the proceed to consider constitutional government nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy
;

3

have been defined.

For

polity or constitutional

government

may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy ; but the term is usually applied to those forms
democracy, and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompani4 ments of wealth. Moreover, the rich already possess the
of government which incline towards
external advantages
crime, and
1

the want of which

is

a temptation

to

hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen.
ii.

Cp.

II.

*

5-10.

Cp.

iii.

7.

Mixed
And
the
best

Constitutions

163

inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to IV. 8 of the citizens, people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen. Now 129 4 a
it

appears to

be an impossible thing that the

state

which

5

governed by the best citizens should be ill-governed *, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should
is

be governed by the best. But we must remember that good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good govern

ment.
is

For

there are

two

parts of

good government

;

one 6

the actual

obedience of citizens to the laws, the other

part is the goodness of the laws

which they obey

;

they

may obey bad laws as well as good.
a further subdivision
;

And

there

may be

they

may obey

either the best laws

which

are attainable to them, or the best absolutely.
distribution of offices according to merit is a special 7

The
is

characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy
virtue,

as wealth

is

of an oligarchy,

and freedom of a

of them there of course exists the right democracy. of the majority, and whatever seems good to the majority of
In
all

those

who

share in the government has authority.
is

Generally, g

however, a state of this kind

called a constitutional govern

ment [not an aristocracy], for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich, who commonly take the place of the
noble.

And

as there are three grounds on
in the

which men claim
of the two
is

9

an equal share

government

freedom, wealth, and virtue
last,

(for the fourth or

good

birth is the result
it

being only

ancient

wealth and virtue)
is

clear that the

admixture of the two elements, that

to

say,

of the rich
;

and poor,

is to
1

be called a polity or constitutional government
Omitting dAXd
novrjpoKpa.rovp.tvrjv.

M

2

Aristocracy
IV. 8 and
the

and
is

Polity
be
called

union

of the three

to

aristocracy

or
of

the government of the best, and

more than any other form
ideal,

government, except the true and name.
10

has a right to this

Thus
and

far

I

have described the different forms of states

monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, what they are, and in what aristocracies differ from that the two one another, and polities from aristocracies

which exist besides

latter are

not very unlike

is

obvious.

9

how by the side of oligarchy and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional govern ment springs up, and how it should be organized. The nature of it will be at once understood from a comparison of
Next we have
to consider

oligarchy and democracy
characteristics,
2

;

we must

ascertain their different

together, like

and taking a portion from each, put the two the parts of an indenture. Now there are three
effected.

modes

in

which fusions of government may be

The

nature of the fusion will be

by an example of the manner in which different governments legislate, say con In oligarchies they cerning the administration of justice.
intelligible

made

do not serve as judges, and but in democracies they give fine the rich. 3 pay to the poor and do not (i) the union of these two modes * is a common or middle term between
impose a
fine

on the

rich if they

to the poor they give

no pay

;

Now

1294 b them,

and

is

therefore

characteristic

of a

constitutional

This is one government, for it is a combination of both. mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two : thus democracies
require no property qualification,

or only a small one, from
a

members of the assembly,
1

oligarchies
c. 13.

high

one

;

here

CP

.

6.

Polity
neither of these
is

the

common

term, but a

mean between them. IV. 9
is

(3) There

is

a third mode, in which something

borrowed 4

from the oligarchical and something from the democratical For example, the appointment of magistrates by principle.
lot
is

democratical,

democratical again
oligarchical
tional state,

when
there

and the election of them oligarchical; there is no property qualification,
is.

when

In the aristocratical or constitu-

5

one element will be taken from each

from

oli

garchy the mode of electing to offices, from democracy the Such are the various modes of 6 disregard of qualification.
combination.

There
same
those
is

is a true

state

may be termed
use both

union of oligarchy and democracy when the either a democracy or an oligarchy ;

who

names evidently
fusion there
in
it.

feel

that

the

fusion
;

complete. both extremes appear

Such a

is

also in the

mean

for
7

The Lacedaemonian
In the
first

constitution,
it

for example, is often described as a

democracy, because
place the

has

many

democratical features.

youth

receive a democratical education.

For

the sons of the poor

are brought up with the sons of the rich,
in

who

are educated

such a manner as to make

it

possible for the sons

of the

poor to be educated like them.
in the following period

A

similar equality prevails 8
citizens are
;

of

life,

and when the
is

grown up no distinction between the

to

manhood

the same rule
rich

observed

there

is

and poor.

In like manner

they all have the same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can afford. Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest 9
offices

of

states,

and

in the

the Senators and share
1

in

other they share the Ephoralty.
ii.

l
;

for they elect

By

others the

Cp.

9.

21.

1

66
constitution
is

Tyranny
said
to be

IV. 9 Spartan

an oligarchy, because

it

has many oligarchical elements. That all offices are filled election and none by lot, is one of these oligarchical by
characteristics
;

that the a

ment

rests with

power of inflicting death or banish and there are few persons is another
;

10 others.

In a well attempered polity there should appear to be both elements and yet neither ; also the government should rely on itself, and not on foreign aid, nor on the good will of
a

majority of foreign

states

disposed

when

there

is

a vicious
all

they might be equally wellform of government but on

the general willingness of

classes in the state to maintain

the constitution.

Enough of
and
in

the manner in which a constitutional government,
aristocracies ought to be framed.
still

which the so-called

10
a

Of
that
it

the nature of tyranny I have

to speak,

in

order

may

have

its

place in our enquiry, since even tyranny is

reckoned by us to be a form of government, although there is not much to be said about it. I have already in the former
part of this treatise
to
J

the

most usual

discussed royalty or kingship according meaning of the term, and considered

whether

it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty should be established, and whence, and how it

arises.
2

When speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms of tyranny, which are both according to law, and therefore easily pass into royalty. Among Barbarians there are elected
monarchs who exercise
were also elected
in

a

despotic

power;
called

despotic rulers

ancient Hellas,

Aesymnetes or
one
as I

3 dictators.

These monarchies, when
exhibit
certain differences.
1

compared with

another,

And

they

are,

iii.

14-17.

Polity
said before,
royal,
in

167
monarch
rules accord-

so

far

as the
;

IV. 1O

ing to law and over willing subjects
in so

but they are tyrannical

far as

he

is
is

despotic and rules according to his
also a third kind of tyranny,

own
the

fancy.

There

which

is

most

typical form,

and

is
is

the

monarchy.
individual

This tyranny
which
is

counterpart of the perfect just that arbitrary power of an 4

responsible to no one,

and governs
to
its

all

alike, whether equals or advantage, not to that of

betters, with a view
its

own

subjects,

and therefore against
it,

their will.

No

freeman,

if

he can escape from

will

endure

such a government.

The

kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the

reasons which I have given.

We
for

have

now

to enquire

what
life

is

the best

constitution 11

most

states,

and the

best

for
is

most

men, neither

assuming a standard of virtue which
nor an education which
is

above ordinary persons,

exceptionally favoured by nature
ideal state
life

and circumstances, nor yet an
only,

which

is

an aspiration

but having regard to the

are able to share,
in general

and to

which the majority the form of government which states
in

can attain.

As

to those aristocracies, as they are a

called, of which
lie

we were

just

now

speaking, they either

beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states,

or

they approximate to the so-called constitutional govern And in ment, and therefore need no separate discussion.
fact the

conclusion at which

we

arrive respecting all these

forms rests upon the same grounds. said in the Ethics J that the happy
to
life

For
life

if

it

has been truly 3
life

is is

the

according then the

unimpeded virtue, and that which is in a mean, and in
1

virtue a
13.

a mean,
attainable

mean
2.

by every

N. Eth.

vii.

1(58

The

T^ule

of the Middle Class
And
life

IV. 11
1295
b

one,

must be the

best.

the
to

same

criteria

of virtue
;

and vice apply both
constitution
is in

to cities

and

constitutions
*.

for the

a figure the

of the city

4

Now
is

in

all

states there are three elements

;

one class
a mean.

is

very rich, another very poor,

and a third

in

It

admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and there
it

fore
in

will

clearly be best to possess
;

the gifts of fortune
life

moderation
to

for
to

in

that

condition of

men

are

most
in

5

ready

listen

reason.

But he who

greatly excels

beauty, strength, birth or wealth, or on the other
is

hand who
it

very poor, or very weak, or very

much

disgraced, finds

difficult to

follow reason

2
.

Of

these two the one sort

into violent

petty rascals.

and great criminals, the others into And two sorts of offences correspond

grow rogues and
to

them

8
,

the one committed

The
as

petty

rogues
civil,

from violence, the other from roguery. are disinclined to hold office, whether
their aversion to

military

or

and

these

two

duties

is

great an injury to the state as their tendency to crime.

6 Again, those
strength,

who have

too

much of

the goods of fortune,
willing

wealth,

friends,

and

the like, are neither

nor able to submit to authority.
for

The

evil

begins at

home

:

when they

are boys, by reason of the luxury in
*,

which

they are brought up habit of obedience.
7

they never learn, even

at

school, the

On

the other hand, the very poor,

who

are in

the opposite extreme, are too degraded.

So

that the

one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically ; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like
slaves.

Thus

arises a city, not

of freemen, but of masters
;

and
1

slaves, the

one despising, the other envying
7, 8.
2

and nothing
421
c,

Cp.
3

iii.

3.
viii

Cp.
4

PI.

Rep.

iv.

D

ff.

Laws,

831

E.

Cp.

v. 9.

13.

The
can be more
than this
:

J^ule

of the Middle Class
and good fellowship
to friendship
;

fatal

to friendship

in states

IV. 11

for

good fellowship tends But a
and

when men

are at enmity with one another,

share the

same

path.

they would rather not even 8 city ought to be composed, as far
;

as possible, of equals

similars

middle

classes.

Wherefore the
citizens
is

and these are generally the city which is composed
;

of middle-class
are, as

necessarily best governed

they

we

say, the natural elements of a state.
is

And

this is

the class of citizens which

most secure

in a state, for
;

they

do

not, like the poor, covet their

others covet theirs,

goods nor do 9 as the poor covet the goods of the rich ;
neighbours

and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves
plotted against, they pass through
life

safely.

Wisely then

did Phocylides pray

Many
Thus

things are best

in

the

mean

;

I desire

to be

of

a middle condition in
it

my

city.

is

formed by
is

citizens

manifest that the best political community is 10 of the middle class, and that those states

are likely to be well-administered, in
large,

which the middle

class

and larger
class

if possible

than both the other classes,
;

or at any rate than either

singly

for

the addition of the

scale, and prevents either of the Great then is the good extremes from being dominant. fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and

middle

turns the

n
a

sufficient

property

;

for

others nothing,
a

there
;

where some possess much, and the 1296 may arise an extreme democracy, or
tyranny

pure

oligarchy

or a

may grow

out

of either

extreme

either out of the
;

of an oligarchy

but

it is

most rampant democracy, or out not so likely to arise out of a middle
I will explain

and nearly equal condition.

the reason of this 12

170
IV. 11

The Middle
when
I

Class is rarely

Supreme
The
is

hereafter, speak of the revolutions of states *. mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other

free

from faction

;

and where the middle class

is

large, there

13 are least likely to be factions

and dissensions.

For a

similar

reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large ; whereas in small
states
it is

easy to divide

all

the citizens into
to leave
2

two

classes

who

are either rich or poor,

and

*4

And

democracies

are

safer

and

nothing in the middle. more permanent than
is

oligarchies, because they

have a middle class which

more
;

numerous and has a greater share in the government for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an
15 end.
is

A
;

proof

of the

superiority

of

the

middle

class

that

tion

legislators have been of a middle condi and for example, Solon, as his own verses testify

the best

;

Lycurgus, for he was not a king
all legislators.
1

;

and Charondas, and almost

6

These
reason

considerations will help us to understand
are
either

governments
is

democratical or oligarchical.

why most The
in

that the middle class is
party,

seldom numerous
rich or the

them,

and whichever

whether the

common

people,

transgresses the

mean and predominates, draws the govern
arises either oligarchy or

ment
17

to itself,
is

and thus

democracy.

There

another reason

the poor and the rich quarrel with
better, instead

one another, and whichever side gets the
establishing a just or

of

T

g

popular government, regards political supremacy as the prize of victory, and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an Both the parties oligarchy.

which had the supremacy
1

in

Hellas
a

looked
v.
i.

only to the
7.

Cp. Bk.

v.

Cp.

15;

6.

The Goodwill of
interest

the

Stronger

171
IV. 11

of their

own form of government, and own

established in
;

states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies

they

thought of their

advantage, of the public not at

all.

For

19

these reasons the middle form of government has rarely, if
ever, existed,
all

who

ever ruled in Hellas

and among a very few only. was induced

One man

alone of

to give this

middle

constitution to states.

But

it

has

now become

a habit
;

the citizens of states, not even to care about equality
are

all

among 1296 men

b

seeking for dominion,

or,

if

conquered,

are willing to

submit.

What
it

then
is

is

the best form of government, and
;

what makes ao

the best,

evident

and of other

states, since

we

say that
it

there are
is

many kinds of democracy and many of
first

oligarchy,

not difficult to see which has the
in

and which the second

or any other place

the order of excellence,
is

now
that

that

we have determined which
is

the best.

For

which ai
and

nearest

to
is

the

best

must of necessity be
from
it

better,

that

which

furthest

worse,

if

we

are
:

judging
I

absolutely and

not

relatively

to

given conditions

say

relatively to given conditions,

since a particular government

may

be preferable for some, but another form

may

be better

for others.

We
ment
is

have

now

to consider

what and what kind of govern- 12
I

suitable to

what and what kind of men.

may

begin

by assuming,

as a general principle

common

to all

govern

ments, that the portion of the state which desires permanence ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse.

Now

every city
I

quality

is composed of quality and quantity. By mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by

numbers. quantity, superiority of
the classes

Quality
state,

may

exist in one of
in

a

which make up the

and quantity

the

172
IV. 12
other.

The Goodwill of
For example,
the

the

Stronger
may be more
in

meanly-born

number than the well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall short in
3 quality

and

and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity Where the number of the poor is more than quality.
;

proportioned to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who
If, for example, the husbandmen compose it in each case. exceed in number, the first form of democracy will then

arise

;

if

the artisans and labouring class, the last

;

and so with

the intermediate forms.

But where the
fall

rich

and the notables

exceed

in

quality

more than they

short in quantity, there

oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms according
to the kind of superiority possessed

by the oligarchs.

4

The
his

legislator should

government; if middle class let him look
1
.

always include the middle class in he makes his laws oligarchical, to the
;

if

he makes them democratical,
1

he should equally by his laws try
the state

to attach this class to

There only can

the government ever be stable

1297 a where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and
5 in that case

there will be no fear that the rich will unite with

the poor against the rulers.
willing to serve the other,

For
and
if

neither of

them

will ever

be

they look for some form of
find

government more
than
in
this, for

suitable to both, they will

none better

the rich and the poor will never consent to rale

The arbiter is turn, because they mistrust one another. always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an 6 arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political
elements, the
1

more

lasting will be the state.
vuftots,

Many
win

even of
over

Or,

if

irpoadytaOai can govern Tofs

to

this class

to his laws.

The
those

Policy
form

of Oligarchies
aristocratical

173

who

desire to

governments make IV. 12
to the rich, but

a mistake, not only in giving too
in

much power

attempting to overreach the people.

There comes
evil,

a time

when

out of a false good there arises a true

since the
state

encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the

than those of the people. The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are five in number; they relate to (l) the assembly; (2) the
magistracies; (3) the courts of law; (4) the use of arms
(5)
;

13

gymnastic exercises.
to
all,

(l)

The
fine

assemblies are
are

thrown
non-

open

but

either

the

rich

only
is

fined for

attendance,
(2)

or a

much

larger

inflicted

upon

them.

As

to

the

magistracies,

those

who

are

qualified

by

2

property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. (3) In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or,
as in the laws of Charondas, a large fine
rich,
is

inflicted

on the

and

a smaller

one on

the

poor.

In

some

states all 3

citizens

who

have registered themselves are allowed to attend
;

the assembly and to try causes

but

if after registration

they

do not attend

assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are The intention is that through fear imposed upon them. of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then
in the

they

cannot

sit

in

the

law-courts

or

in

the

assembly.

(4) Concerning the possession

of arms, and (5) gymnastic 4

exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit.

For

the poor are

not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having

them
for

;

and

in like

manner no penalty
at

is inflicted

on the poor

non-attendance

having nothing to
are liable to a fine,

fear,

gymnasium, and consequently, do not attend, whereas the rich they
the

and therefore they take care to attend.

174 Military Basis of
IV. 13
5 in

the Constitution
legislators,

These

are

the

devices

of oligarchical

and

democracies they have counter devices.
attending the

They

pay the poor

for

assemblies and the law-courts, and they

6 inflict

no

penalty

on

the

rich

for

non-attendance.
the

It

is

obvious that he

who would

duly

mix

two

principles should

combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and the rich fined if they do not
attend, for then
all will

take part

;

if there is

no such combina-

1297 b tion, power will be in the hands of one party only. ? government should be confined to those who carry arms.
to

The

As
laid

the

property qualification,

no absolute rule can be
is

down, but we must see what

the highest

qualification

sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the

number of those

who

8 excluded.

have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those Even if they have no share in office, the poor,

provided only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will be quiet enough.

But

to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy
in
;

9 thing, since a ruling class

is not always humane. And of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed

time

when

fed, they

are
is

willing

enough
those

to

fight.

In

some

states the

government
serving,

vested,
in

not only in

those

who
;

are actually

but also

who have

served

among

the

Malians, for
latter,

example, the governing body consisted of the while the magistrates were chosen from those actually

10

on

service.

And

the earliest government which existed

among

the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the

up

knights

(for

strength
*)

and superiority
;

in

war

at

that

time

depended on cavalry
1

indeed,
3:

without discipline, infantry
vi - 7!

Cp.

iv. 3.

The

Distribution of Political
was no

Power 17?
military

are useless, and in ancient times there

know- IV. 13

ledge or tactics, and therefore
in their cavalry.

the

But when

cities

strength of armies lay increased and the heavy

armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government ; and this is the reason why the states, which we call congovernments, have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical
stitutional

n

and royal ; their population being small they had no consider able middle class ; the people were weak in numbers and
organization,

and

were therefore

more

contented

to

be

governed.
I

have explained

why

there are various forms of govern-

r2

ment, and

why

there are

more than

is

generally supposed

;

for democracy, as well as other constitutions, has more than one form : also what their differences are, and whence they arise, and what is the best form of government, speaking

generally,

and
;

to

whom
this

the various

forms of government
explained.
basis of discussion

are best suited

all

has

now been

Having thus gained an appropriate
will

we 14

proceed to

speak of the points which follow next in

order.

We

will consider the subject not only in general but

with reference
elements, and

to

particular states.

All
to

states

have three

the

good law-giver has
state.

regard

what

is

expedient for each
state is

they are well-ordered, the well-ordered, and as they differ from one another,

When
is

element first (i) which secondly (2) which is concerned with the magistrates and determines what they should be, over whom they should exercise authority, and what
constitutions differ.

What

the

a

deliberates about public affairs

;

should be the

mode of
?

electing

them; and

thirdly (3)

which

3

has

judicial

power

IT 6
IV. 14

Forms of the Deliberative Power
deliberative element has authority
in
in
;

The
inflicts

matters of war
it

and peace,

making and unmaking alliances
exile,

passes laws,

death,

confiscation,

audits

the

accounts

of

All these powers must be assigned either to all magistrates. the citizens or to some of them, for example, to one or more
magistracies
4
;

some of them

or different causes to different magistracies, or to all, and others of them only to some. That

all things should be decided by all is characteristic of this is the sort of democracy equality which the people desire. But there are various ways in which all may share
;

in the

government
are

;

they

may

deliberate, not all in

one body,

but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian.

There

meet and

deliberate,

other states in which the boards of magistrates but come into office by turns, and are

elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions of

the state, until every

one has obtained
hand,
are

office

in his

turn.

The
the
5

citizens,

on

the other

assembled only

for

purposes of legislation, and to consult about the conand to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In stitution,

another variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly,
but meet only to elect magistrates, to

pass laws,

to advise

about war and peace, and to

make

scrutinies.

Other matters

are referred severally to special magistrates,

6 by

vote or

by

lot

out

of

all

the citizens.

who Or

are elected
again,

the

citizens

meet about

election to offices

and about

scrutinies,

and

deliberate concerning

war or

alliances,

while other matters are

administered by the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote *. I am speaking of those magistracies in
7

which

special
is

knowledge

is

required.

A

fourth

form

of

democracy

when

all
1

the citizens meet to deliberate about
Cp.
vi. 2.

5.

In Democracies and Oligarchies
everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only

177
make IV. 14

the preliminary enquiries
last

;

and that

is

the

way

in

which the

and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is
present administered.

at

All these modes are democratical.

On

the other hand, that

some should
is

deliberate about
like the

all is

oligarchical.
cratical,

This again

a

mode which,

demo-

8

has

many

forms.

When

the deliberative class, being

elected out of those

who have

a moderate qualification, are

numerous and they respect and obey the law without alter ing it, and any one who has the required qualification shares
in the

government, then, just because of this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only selected in- 1298 b dividuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations
of the
state, then,

although, as in the former case, they observe
is

the

when those who have

Or, again, 9 of deliberation are selfpower elected, and son succeeds father, and they and not the laws are supreme the government is of necessity oligarchical.

law, the

government

a pure oligarchy.

the

Where,
matters

again, particular persons

have authority

in particular 10

for example,

when

the whole people decide about

peace and war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate everything else, and they are elected either by vote or by lot
there
*

the form of government

is

an aristocracy or polity

*.

And
by

if

some questions

are

decided by magistrates elected
lot,

vote,

and others by magistrates elected by

either

absolutely or out of select candidates,

or elected both by

vote and by lot
1

these practices are partly characteristic of an

omitting

Reading with several of the MSS. apiaroKparia rj ttoXntia, and (Jiiv. Or, with Bekker s text, apiaroKparia p\v r) no\tr(io,
is

the government
DAVIS

an aristocracy.

N

178
IV. 14
1 1

In Democracies and Oligarchies
government, and partly of
a

aristocratical

pure constitutional

government.

These

are the various forms of the deliberative

body

;

they

And the correspond to the various forms of government. of each state is administered according to one or government
1

2

other of the principles which have been laid down.
is

Now
the

it

for

the interest

prevalent notion of

democracy, in laws), with a view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law. For in oligarchies the
rich

according speaking of that extreme form of which the people are supreme even over the
it

of democracy,
(I

to

most

am

who
attend.

are

wanted
fine,

to be judges are
in

under pain of a
to

whereas
this

And

compelled to attend democracies the poor are paid practice of oligarchies should be
assemblies, for they

adopted by democracies
will advise better if

in their public
all

they

deliberate together

the people
It is also

13 with the notables

and the notables with the people.
those

a

good
vote
;

plan that

who

deliberate

should

be elected

by

classes

or by lot in equal numbers out of the different and that if the people greatly exceed in number
political training,

those
all,

who have

pay should not be given to

but only to as

many

as

would balance the number of the
in

notables, or that the
14 by
lot.

number

excess should be eliminated

But

in

oligarchies either certain persons should be

chosen out of the mass,
appointed
probuli

or
in

a

class

of

officers

should be
are

such as exist

some
;

states,

who

termed

and guardians of the law

and the citizens should

occupy themselves exclusively with matters on which these have previously deliberated for so the people will have
;

a share in the deliberations of the state,

but will not be able

*5 to

disturb

the

principles

of the

constitution.

Again,

in

The Executive
oligarchies

179
IV. 14

either the people ought to accept the measures of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to them ; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision should
rest

with the magistrates.

The

opposite of what

is

done

in

governments should be the rule in oligarchies ; the veto of the majority should be final, their assent not final,
constitutional
jut the proposal

should be referred back to the magistrates.

Whereas
course
;

in constitutional

governments they take the contrary 16
;

the few have the negative not the affirmative power

the affirmation of everything rests with the multitude.

1299 a

These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative,
that
is,

the supreme element in states.
will

Next we
offices
;

proceed

to

consider

the

distribution

of 15

this, too,

being a part of politics concerning
:

which

many
what

questions arise

What

shall their shall

number be

?

Over
?

shall they preside,

and what

be their duration

Sometimes they last for six months, sometimes for less ; sometimes they are annual, whilst in other cases offices are
held for
still

longer periods.
;

Shall they be
if for

for life or for

a long term of years

a short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and over again, or once Also about the appointment to them from whom only ?
or,

are they to be
first

chosen,

be in a position to

by whom, and how ? say what are the possible
of government.
offices
?

We

should

2

varieties

of
are

them, and then

we may

proceed to determine which

suited to different forms

But what
is

are to be

included under the term
quite so easily answered.

That

a question not

For

a political
is

community requires
chosen by vote or
first

many
by
are

officers

;

and not every one who

lot is

to be regarded as a ruler.
priests,

In the

place there
political

the

who must

be distinguished

from

N

2

i8o
IV. 15
officers
;

What

Constitutes

an

Office?

masters of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors,

3 are elected

by vote [but
the citizens

still

they are not political officers]

Some
either

duties of superintendence again are political, extending
to
all

in

a single sphere of action,

like

the office of the general who superintends them when they are in the field, or to a section of them only, like the
inspectorships

of

women

or

of youth.

Other

offices

are

concerned with household management, like that of the corn measurers who exist in many states and are elected officers

There

are also menial offices

which the

rich have executed

by

4 their slaves.
to

Speaking

generally, they are to be called offices

which the duties

are assigned of deliberating about certain

measures and of judging and commanding, especially the last; for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate. But the
question is not of any importance in practice ; no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word, although such problems have a speculative interest.
5

What
to
its

kinds of

offices,

and how many, are necessary to the

existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce
well-being,
all

are

much more important
more

considerations,

6 affecting

states, but
it

especially small ones.

For

in

great states
office

possible, and indeed necessary, that every should have a special function ; where the citizens are
is

numerous, many may hold
vacancies occur in

office.

And

so

it

happens that

some

offices
;

only after long intervals, or

the office

is

held once only

1299 b better done which receives of the sole
7

and certainly every work is 1 and not the divided,
,

attention of the worker.
to

But

in

small states
,

it

is

necessary

2 since the small combine many offices in a few hands number of citizens does not admit of many holding office
:

1

Cp.

ii.

a.

6,

2

Cp.

vi. 8.

What
for

Constitutes

an

Office
?

?
yet

1 8 1

who

will there

be to succeed them

And

small
;

IV. 15

states at times require the

same

offices

and laws

as large ones

the difference

is

that the one

want them
there
is

often, the others only

after long intervals.

Hence

no reason

why

the care 8

of many
for

offices

they will
is

should not be imposed on the same person, not interfere with each other. When the

population

small, offices should be like the spits
1
.

which

also

serve to hold a lamp

We

must

first

ascertain

magistrates are necessary in every state, and also
are

how many how many

not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful, and then there will be no difficulty in judging what offices can be

combined

in one.

We

should also

know when

local tribunals

9

are to have jurisdiction over

many

different matters,

and when

authority

: for example, should one order in the market and another in some other person keep or should the same person be responsible everywhere ? place, Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects

should be centralized

with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom I mean to say, should one person see to good they deal
:

order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the

women, and so on
should
the
in

?

magistrates

Further, under different constitutions, be the same or different ? For
oligarchy,
aristocracy,

i

example,
should

democracy,
the

monarchy,

although they are elected, not out of equal or similar classes of citizens, but different constitutions in aristocracies, for differently under
example, they are chosen from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free or are
-.here

there be

same magistrates,

different offices proper

"to

different constitutions 2 ,

and

1

Cp. Note on

i.

a.

a

3.

See note.

1

82

The Executive under
?

IV. 15 may For

the same be suitable to some, but unsuitable to others
in

some

states

it

may

be convenient that the same office
in

should have a more extensive,
11 sphere.

other
to

states

a

narrower

Special
:

offices

are

peculiar

certain

forms

of

for example, that of probuli, government [to oligarchies] which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is.

There must be some body of men whose duty
measures for the people
in

is

to prepare

order that they

may

not be diverted

from

their business

;

when
:

these are few in number, the state

inclines to an oligarchy

or rather the probuli must always be

12 few,

and are therefore an oligarchical element.
institutions
;

But when

both

exist in

a

state, the probuli are a check

on the council

for the counsellor is a democratic element,
oligarchical.

but the probuli are
council disappears

Even the power of the
taken that extreme

when democracy has

1300
j

form, in which the people themselves are always meeting and This is the case when the 3 deliberating about everything.
a

members of the assembly

are wealthy or receive pay for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for themselves. magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or any similar office, is
;

A

suited to an aristocracy rather than to a

democracy

;

for

how

can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors ? Neither is it an oligarchical office ; for the

wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled.
14

Enough of

these matters.
offices.

I

will

now
three

enquire into the

appointment of

There

are

questions

to

be

answered, and the combinations of answers give all possible differences first, who appoints ? secondly, from whom ? and
:

15 thirdly,

how?

Each of

these three
or

may

further

differ

in

three

ways:

(i) All the citizens,

only some,

appoint;

Different Constitutions
(2) Either the magistrates are chosen out of
all

183
or out of

IV. 15

some who
or

are distinguished either

by

a property qualification,

by

birth,

or

merit,

or

for

some

special

reason,

as

at

Megara

only those were eligible

who had

returned from exile
;

and fought together against the democracy

(3)

They may

be appointed either by vote or by lot. Again, these several 16 modes may be combined ; I mean that some officers may be
elected by some, others by

and others out of
lot.

Each

all, and some again out of some, and some by vote and others by all, of these differences admits of four variations.

17

(i) Either
all

all

may

elect out
all

of

all

by vote, or

all

out of
as,

by

lot

;

and either out of

collectively or

by sections,

for example,

by

tribes,

and wards, and
;

phratries, until all the

citizens have been
all

gone through
in

or the citizens

may be
if

in

cases eligible indiscriminately, and in

some cases they may
Again, (2)
all

be elected by vote, and

some by

lot.

only 18

some
of
all

appoint, they

may

appoint out of

by

vote,

or out

some by lot, and one way and some in another ; I mean if they are appointed by all they may be Thus there will appointed partly by vote and partly by lot be twelve forms of appointment without including the two
by
lot
;

or out of

some by

vote, out of
in

some

offices

may

be appointed

1

.

combinations

in the

mode of

election.

Of these
is

varieties

two 19
all

are democratic forms, namely,

when

the choice
lot,

made by
is

the people out of
say,

all

by vote or by

or by both, that

to

some by
all

do not
out of
lot
1

and some by vote. The cases in which they appoint at one time, but some appoint out of all or
lot

some by vote or by lot or by both (I mean some by and some by vote), or some out of all and others out
i.

e.

partly out of

all

and partly out of some, and partly by vote and
16. 6).

partly

by

lot (see infra c.

184
IV. 15 of some both by
out of
all

The Executive
lot

and

vote, are characteristic

of a polity or

20 constitutional government.

That some should be appointed
by both,
is

by vote or by

lot or

oligarchical,

and

still

more

oligarchical

when some
or again

are elected

from

all

and some
all

from some.

That some should be

elected

out of

and

some out of some,
1

some by vote and others by

300 blot,

21 inclines to

of a constitutional government, which an aristocracy. That some should be chosen out of some, and some taken by lot out of some, is oligarchical 1 l though not equally oligarchical ; oligarchical, too, is the
is

characteristic

appointment of some out of some in both ways, and of some out of all. But that all should elect by vote out of some is
aristocratical.

22

These
and
in

are the different

ways of

constituting magistrates,
different

this

manner

officers

correspond to

forms

of government : which are proper to which, or how they ought to be established, will be evident when we determine
the nature of their powers
2
.

By powers

I

mean such power
power
:

as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of

the country

;

for there are various kinds of
is

the power

of the general, for example,

not the same with that which

regulates contracts in the market.

16
to

Of
be

the three parts of government,

the

judicial

remains

considered, and

this

we

shall

divide on

the

same

the varieties points on which principle. the persons from whom they are of law-courts depend appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, and the
are three

There

manner of
taken from
1

their appointment.
all,

I

or from

some only

?

mean, (l) are the judges (2) how many kinds of

2

are bracketed by Bekker in both editions. Omitting noi with some MSS. and the old translator.

These words

Different

Modes of Appointing Judges

185*

law-courts are there? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or

IV. 16
2

by

lot

?

First,

let

me
They

determine

how many
number
:

kinds of law-courts

there are.

are eight in
;

One

is

the court of

audits or scrutinies

a second takes cognizance of [ordinary] offences against the state ; a third is concerned with treason
against the

government; the fourth determines disputes re specting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by private
persons ; the fifth decides the more important civil cases ; the sixth tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds, 3
(a) premeditated, (&) unpremeditated, (c) cases
guilt is

in

which the

disputed be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who justice are tried after their return ; such as the Court of
;

confessed but the justice

is

and there may have fled from

Phreatto
rarely

is

said to be at Athens.

But cases of

this

sort

The different kinds happen at all even in large cities. of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different courts. of these there 4 (7) There are courts for strangers :
are

two

subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their disputes

with one another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be
(8) courts for small suits about

sums of a drachma up

to five

drachmas, or a

little

more, which have

to be determined, but

they do not require

many

judges.
5

Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the courts for homicide and for strangers I would rather speak
:

of

political cases,

which, when mismanaged, create division and

disturbances in states.

Now
which
I

if all

the citizens judge, in

all

the different cases

have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or

1 8

6
a

Different
certain

Modes of Appointing Judges
who
de

IV. 16 when
cide

class of causes are tried, the judges

1301

a

them may be appointed, some by vote, and some by lot. These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the
are elected

6

whole people, and there will be likewise four modes, if they from a part only for they may be appointed from
;

some by vote and judge in all causes or they may be or they appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes
; ;

may be
by
lot,

elected in

some cases by

vote,

and

in

some cases taken
the

or

some

courts, even

when judging

same

causes,

may

be composed of members some appointed by vote and some by lot. These then are the ways in which the aforesaid

judges
7

may be appointed. Once more, the modes of appointment may

be combined,

some may be chosen out of the whole people, for example, the others out of some, some out of both same tribunal may be composed of some who were elected
I

mean, that

;

out of

all,

and of others who were elected out of some, either

by vote or by lot or by both. In how many forms law-courts can be established has 8
been considered.

now
all

The

first

form,

viz.

that

in in

which the
which
is
;

judges are taken from all the causes are tried, is democratical

citizens,
;

and

the second, which
causes,

com
the

posed of a few only
third, in

who

try

all

oligarchical
all

which some courts
certain

are taken

from

classes,

and

some from
tional.

classes only, aristocratical

and constitu

BOOK V
THE
in

design which
l
.

we

proposed to ourselves

is

now

nearly

V.

1

completed

Next

in

order follow the causes of revolution

states, how many, and of what nature they are ; what elements work ruin in particular states, and out of what, and

into

what they mostly change

;

also

what are the elements of

preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and

by what means each state may be best preserved questions remain to be considered.
In the
that in the
first

:

these

place

we must assume

as

our starting-point

2

many forms of government which have sprung up 2 there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and
proportionate
equality,
I

although

mankind

fail
.

in

attaining

have already explained 3 them, Democracy, 3 for example, arises out of the notion that those who are
as indeed

equal in any respect are equal in

all

respects

;

because

men

are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal.
is

based on the notion that those
all

who

are unequal

Oligarchy in one
is,

respect are in

respects unequal

;

being unequal, that

in

property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely.

The

democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be 4
1

Cp.
Cp.

iv. c. 2.
s

8 8

Reading xai with the MSS. and Bekker
iii.

1st ed.

9.

1-4.

1 8 8

Devolutions
all

.-

their Causes

V.

1 equal in

things

;

they are
5 inequality.

unequal,

claim too

while the oligarchs, under the idea that much, which is one form of
a

All these forms of government have

kind of

tried justice, but,

and,

therefore,

by an absolute standard, they are faulty ; both parties, whenever their share in the
their preconceived ideas,

government does not accord with

6 stir Those who excel in virtue have the best up revolution. 1301 b r jght of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed
1

absolutely unequal)
7 inclined

,

but then they are of

all

men

the least

to

do so

2
.

There
;

is

also

a superiority

which

is

claimed by

men of rank

for they are thought noble because
.

z Here they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors 8 then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains

of revolution

;

and hence

arise

two

sorts of changes in govern

ments

;

the one affecting the constitution,

when men seek

to

change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into demo
cracy, or

from

either of

them
;

into constitutional

government or

aristocracy, and conversely

the other not affecting the con

stitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get 4 9 the administration into their own hands Further, there is
.

a question of degree

;

an oligarchy, for example,

may become

more or
cratical
;

less oligarchical,

and

in like

and a democracy more or less demomanner the characteristics of the other

forms of government
10 Or, the revolution
constitution
a

may be more or less strictly maintained. may be directed against a portion of the
the
at

only,
office
iii.

e. g.
:

establishment

or

overthrow of

particular
1

as
25.
9.

Sparta

it

is
2

said that
c.

Lysander

3

Cp. Cp.

13.
8.

iv.

Cp. Cp.

4.

12.
3.

iv. 5.

The Desire of Equality
the ephoralty.

189
1

attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias

V.

1

At
to

Epidamnus,
this

too, the

change was

partial.

For

instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council
;

was
1 1

appointed

but

day the magistrates are the only

members of the

ruling class

who

are compelled to

Heliaea when an election takes place, 2 single archon [survives, which] is another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an in
equality in

go to the and the office of the

no proportion, for instance, a per petual monarchy among equals ; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.
is

which there

Now
by the
three

equality is of
I

first

mean sameness

two kinds, numerical and proportional or equality in number or size
ratios.

;

13

;

by the second, equality of
over two
is

equal to the

For example, the excess of excess of two over one
;

whereas four exceeds two
exceeds one, for two
is

in the

same

ratio

in

which two
is

the same part of four that one

of

As I was saying before 3, men agree 13 two, namely, the half. about justice in the abstract, that it is treating others according
to their deserts, but there is a difference

of opinion about the
that if they are equal

application of the principle
in

;

some think

any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are Hence there 14 unequal in any respect they are unequal in all.
are

two
;

principal forms of government,

garchy

for

numbers are
a

democracy and oli good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and 1302 a more common. In what city shall we find
virtue
?

hundred persons of good birth and of

whereas the

poor everywhere abound.

should be ordered, and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not simply
a
state
1

That

Cp.

vii.

14.
8

20.

*

Cp.

iii.

16.

i.

CP

.

2j

iii.

9.

1-4.

1

90

The Great Source of Involution
;

V.

1 a
15

good thing the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and,
as they begin badly, cannot
is
fail

to

end badly.

The
;

inference

that both kinds of equality should be

employed

numerical

in

some
Still

cases,

and proportionate

in others.

democracy

appears to be safer
.

and
2

less liable to revo-

16 lution than oligarchy

For

in oligarchies

there

is

the double

danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also 3 with the people ; but in democracies there is only the danger

of a quarrel with the oligarchs.
tioning arises

No

dissension worth

men

among

the people themselves.

And we may

further remark that a government

which

is

composed of the

middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to 4 and is the safest of the imperfect forms of oligarchy
,

government. 2 In considering
arise,

how
of

dissensions and political
ascertain the beginnings

revolutions

we must

first

all

and causes
be

of them which

affect constitutions generally.

They may
is

said to be three in
line

number
want

;

and we have now

to give an out

of each.

We

to

know

(l)

what

the feeling

?

a

and (2) what are the motives of those who make them ? The (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels ?
universal

and chief cause of
;

this revolutionary feeling has been

already mentioned

viz. the desire

of equality, when

men

think

that they are equal to others
or, again,

who

have more than themselves;

the desire of inequality and superiority,

when con

ceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have
3 not

more but the same or

less

than their inferiors
just.

;

pretensions

which may and may not be
1

Inferiors revolt in order
c. 6.
17

3

Cp. Cp.

iv.

ii.

-

14.
4

Cp.

c. 5.

Omitting

before

ruv

6\iycui>.

Devolutions
that they

191
The

may be

equal,

and equals that they may be superior. V. 2
creates revolutions.

Such

is

the state of

mind which

motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, the authors of them want or the fear of dishonour and loss
;

to divert
friends.

punishment or dishonour from themselves or their

The
which

causes and reasons of these motives and dis- 4

positions
I

have mentioned, viewed

seven, and in

men, about the things which one way, may be regarded as another as more than seven. Two of them 5
are excited in
in

have

been

already

noticed

: ;

but

they act in a

different

manner, for

men

are excited against one another
not, as in the

by the love
I

of gain and honour

case

which

have just

supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing 1302 b
others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them.

Other causes

are 6

insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate

increase in

some

part of the state

;

causes of another sort are
trifles,

election intrigues, carelessness,
larity

neglect about

dissimi

of elements.
share insolence and avarice have in creating revolu-

What
tions,

3

and

how

they work,

is

plain

enough.

When

the

magistrates are insolent and grasping

they conspire against

one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of
individuals or of the public.
influence
It is evident,
it is

again,

what an

3

honour exerts and how

a cause of revolution.

Men

who

are themselves dishonoured
rise in rebellion
is
;

honours
deserved
merit.

the honour or dishonour

and who see others obtaining when un
to
3

unjust,

and just when awarded according

Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the
1

Supra

2, 3.

1

92

Causes of Devolutions
and the power of the government
;

V. 3

state

this

is

a condition of

affairs

out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family

oligarchy.

And,

therefore,

in

some

places,

as

at

Athens

But how and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism *. much better to provide from the first that there should be
no such pre-eminent individuals instead of into existence and then finding a remedy.
4
letting

them come

Another cause of

revolution

is

fear.

Either

men have

committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating
their
2

enemy
them.
;

.

Thus

at

Rhodes

the

notables

conspired

against the people through fear of the suits that were brought
5 against

Contempt
for

is

also a cause of insurrection

and

revolution

example,
in

in

oligarchies

when those who

have no share

majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state ; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of

the state are the

Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to At Megara the fall of the democracy was due its ruin.
to

a defeat occasioned

by disorder and anarchy.

And

at

Syracuse the democracy was overthrown before the tyranny of Gelo arose ; at Rhodes before the insurrection.
6
Political

revolutions

also

spring from a

disproportionate

increase in any part of the state.

For

as a

body

is

made

up of
in
its

many members, and every member
3
,

proportion
nature if

grow ought symmetry may be preserved, but loses the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the
that
;

to

1303

a

body two spans
1

and, should the abnormal increase be one of
2

Cp.

iii.

13.

15.
3

Cp.

c.

5.

2,

Cp.

iii,

13.

21.

Occasions of Devolutions
quality as

193

well
:

as

of quantity,

another animal

even so a state has
often
in

may even take the form of V. 3 many parts, of which
;

some one may
number of poor

grow imperceptibly
in

for example,

the

democracies and

constitutional states.

And
as at

this disproportion

Tarentum, from a defeat
slain
in

may sometimes happen by in which many of
with
the lapygians

an accident,
the notables
after

7

were

a

battle

just
in

the

Persian

War, the
a

constitutional
;

government

consequence

becoming

democracy

or, as

was the case

at

Argos, where

after the losses inflicted in

the Battle of the Seventh

Day

by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, the Argives were com and at pelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioeci
:

of their infantry in the Athens, when, times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the
after frequent defeats
roll

of

citizens.

Revolutions
in other

arise

from
l

this

cause

in 8

democracies as well as
to so great an extent.

forms of government, but not
the rich

When

grow numerous

or

properties increase, the form of government changes into an

oligarchy or a government of families.
also

Forms of government

9

without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing

change

sometimes even

their magistrates, they

were
to

in the habit

carelessness,

took them by lot, because the electors of choosing their own partisans) or owing when disloyal persons are allowed to find
;

their

way

into the highest offices, as at

the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy

Oreum, where, upon was

overthrown,

and changed by him into a constitutional and

democratical government.

1

Reading

tinttipcov.

O

1

94
Again,
I

Occasions of Devolutions
the
revolution

V. 3
10

may

degrees
into the

;

mean

that a great

accomplished by small change may sometimes slip
;

be

constitution through neglect of a small matter
for

at

Ambracia,
at
first,

instance, the

qualification

for office,

small

was

eventually

reduced

to

nothing.

For

the
the

Ambraciots thought that same as none at all.
1 1

a small qualification

was much

Another cause of

revolution

is

difference of races
;

which do
is

not at once acquire a

common
it

spirit

for a state

not the

growth of
either
at

a day, neither is

a multitude brought together

by accident.

Hence

the reception of strangers in colonies,

the time

of their
;

foundation or
for example,
in

afterwards, has

generally produced revolution

the

Achaeans
hence

who
12 the

joined the Troezenians

the foundation of Sybaris,
;

being the more numerous, afterwards expelled them
curse
fell

upon

Sybaris.

At
;

Thurii

the

Sybarites

quarrelled with their fellow-colonists

thinking that the land

belonged to them, they wanted too
driven out.
in

much of

it

and were

At Byzantium

the

new

colonists were detected

a conspiracy,

people of Antissa,

and were expelled by force of arms ; the who had received the Chian exiles, fought
;

with them, and drove them out

and the Zancleans,

after

having received the Samians, were driven by them out of The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, 13 their own city.
after the introduction

revolution

;

the

of a fresh body of colonists, had a Syracusans, after the expulsion of their
strangers

1303 b

tyrants,

having admitted

and mercenaries to the
;

the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, people were nearly all expelled by them.
14

Now,

in

oligarchies the masses

make

revolution under the

Occasions of Revolutions

195-

idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before,

V. 3

they

are

equals,

and have

not

an

equal

share,

and

in

democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.

Again, the situation of
the country
is

cities is a

cause of revolution

when

15

of the

state.

not naturally adapted to preserve the unity For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenae did

not agree with the people of the island ; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians ; at Athens, too, the
inhabitants of the Piraeus are
live in

more democratic than those who
as
in

the city.

For

just

war,

the impediment of 16

though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a
a ditch,
city.

The
;

greatest opposition

is

confessedly that of virtue

and vice

next comes

that of wealth

and poverty

;

and

there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of

which

one

is this

difference of place.

In revolutions the
interests

occasions
Trifles

may
are

be

trifling,

but

great

4

are

at

stake.

most important when

they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse ; for the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a lovequarrel of

The

story

is

two young men, who were in the government. that while one of them was away from home

a

his beloved

was gained over by

his companion,

and he to
then drew

revenge himself seduced the other s wife.
all

They

the

members of the

ruling class into
learn

their quarrel

and

made

a revolution.

We

from

this story that

we

should 3

be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The mistake lies in the beginning as the proverb says,

Well begun

is

half done

so an error at the beginning,

O

2

1

9

6

Occasions of

"Revolutions^

V.

4 though quite small, has the proportion of a half to the whole In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city 4 matter. is involved, as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian War.

The

occasion was

the

division of an

inheritance

;

one of
father s

two brothers

refused to

give an account of their
:

property and the treasure which he had found

so the poorer
in

of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted
the popular party, the other,
classes.
5

his cause

who was

very rich, the wealthy

At

Delphi,
all

1304

a

beginning of

again, a quarrel about a marriage was the the troubles which followed. In this case the

bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her.

Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure [among his offerings]
6 he had been robbing the temple. pute about heiresses

while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that At Mitylene, too, a dis

and led

to the

war with the Athenians
wealthy
citizen,

was the beginning of many misfortunes, in which Paches took

their city.

A

named Timophanes,
in

left

two

daughters; Doxander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them
for

his

sons,

but

he was rejected

his

suit,

whereupon

7

he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of similar quarrel about whom he was proxenus) to interfere. an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the father of

A

Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus this was the beginning of the Sacred War. marriage-quarrel
;

A

was

also

the

cause

of a

change

in

the

government of

Epidamnus.
to a

A

certain

man

person whose father,

bethrothed his daughter secretly having been made a magistrate,
latter,

fined the father of the girl,

and the

stung by the

insult,

and

the

Manner of

Effecting

Them

197
V. 4

conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the
state.

Governments

also

change into oligarchy or into democracy 8

or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or

some other

section of the state, increase in

power or renown.

Thus
reins

at

Athens

the

reputation

the Areopagus, in the Persian

by the court of seemed to tighten the War,
gained

of government.
*,

On

the other

hand, the victory of

Salamis

which was
fleet,

gained by the
for the

common

people

who

served in the

and won

Athenians the empire of

the sea, strengthened the democracy.

At Argos,

the notables, 9

having distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the demo At Syracuse, the people having been the chief cracy.
authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed
the constitutional government into democracy.

At

Chalcis,

the

people,

uniting

with

the

notables,

killed

Phoxus
,

the

tyrant,

and then seized the government.

At Ambracia 2

the

people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in

expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to

themselves.

And

generally,

it

should be remembered that 10
state,

those

who

have secured power to the
magistrates,

whether private

citizens,

or

or

tribes,

or

any other part or

section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions.

For

either

envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to
remain on a level with others.
Revolutions break out

when

opposite parties, e.g. the rich

n

and the poor,
1

are

equally balanced,
;

and there

is

little

or 1304 b

8

Cp. ii. 12. 5 Cp. supra c. 3.

viii.

6.

II.
c.

10, and infra

10.

16.

198

Occasions of Revolutions
;

V. 4 nothing between them
12 superior, the other

for, if either

party were manifestly

for this

would not risk an attack upon them. reason, those who are eminent in virtue do not

And,
stir

up

insurrections, being always a minority.

Such

are the beginnings

and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.
Revolutions are effected
fraud.
in

two ways, by force and by
making the

Force may be applied

either at the time of

13 revolution or afterwards.

Fraud, again, is of two kinds ; for sometimes the citizens are deceived into a change of (i) government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against

their will.

This was what happened

in

the case of the

Four

Hundred, who
king

deceived the people by telling them that the

would provide money for the war against the Lace daemonians, and when the deception was over, still endeavoured
to retain the government.

(2) In other cases the people are
afterwards,

persuaded

at

first,

and

by

a repetition of the

persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained.

The

revolutions

which

affect

constitutions generally spring from
*.

the above-mentioned causes

5

now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.
Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the in temperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity
lay
to

And

information

against rich

men

until

they compel them

combine

(for a

common

danger unites even the bitterest

2

stir up the people them. The truth of this remark is proved by a against At Cos the democracy was overthrown variety of examples.

enemies), or coming forward in public they

because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined.
1

Cp. supra

c.

2.

I.

Revolutions in Democracies
At Rhodes
multitude,

199
V. 5

the demagogues not only provided pay for the

but

trierarchs the

them from making good to the sums which had been expended by them ;
prevented

and they,

in

against them,
1

consequence of the suits which were brought were compelled to combine and put down the

democracy

.

The democracy

at

Heraclea was overthrown 3

shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came

back

in a

the same manner the democracy at
there the

Much in 4 body and put an end to the democracy. 2 Megara was overturned ;
demagogues drove out many of the notables
in

order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same 1305 a
thing happened with the democracy of

Cyme which was

over

thrown by Thrasymachus.
states the

And we may

observe that in most 5

changes have been of this character. For sometimes

the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, either wrong the notables and so force them to combine
;

they

make

a division of

their

property, or diminish their

incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have
their wealth to confiscate
8
.

Of

old, the

demagogue was
into tyrannies.
.

also a general, and then

demo-

6

changed were originally demagogues 4 They are not so now, but were then ; and the reason is that they were generals they
and not
orators, for oratory
in

cracies

Most of

the ancient tyrants

7

had not yet come

into fashion.

Whereas
1 3

our day,
4.

when
*

the art of rhetoric has
2

made such
15.
viii.

Cp. supra c. 3. Cp. infra c. 8.

Cp.
10.

c. 3.

5,

and

iv.

15.

20.

Cp.

c.

4

;

Plato, Rep.

565

D.

2OO
V.

The Demagogue and

the

Tyrant

5 progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of
military matters prevents
8 rate instances to the contrary are

them from usurping power at any few and slight. Formerly
;

tyrannies were
great

more common than they
in

are

now, because
;

power was often placed

the hands of individuals

thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Pryl tanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters
.

Moreover,

in

those days,
fields,

when

cities

were not
;

large,

the

people dwelt in the
9 if

busy

at their

work

and

their chiefs,

they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity,

and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of
the plain
2
,

and Theagenes

at

Megara slaughtered

the cattle

of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they
10

had put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich ; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the
people.
latest

tion

Changes also take place from the ancient to the form of democracy for where there is a popular elec of the magistrates and no property qualification, the
;

aspirants for office get hold of the people,
11 last

and contrive
less

at

even to set them above the laws.
for this state of things
is

A

more or

com

plete cure

for the separate tribes,

and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates. These are the principal causes of revolutions
cracies.

in

demo

6

There

are

two patent causes of revolutions
First,
c.

in oligarchies

[one coming from without, the other from within the govern

ment]
1

:

(i)

when
5.

the oligarchs oppress the
-

people,

Cp. infra

IO.

See Herod,

i.

59.

Devolutions in Oligarchies
for

201

anybody is good enough to be their champion, V. 6 especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as 1305 b Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But 2 revolutions which commence outside the governing class may
then
be further subdivided.

Sometimes, when the government
is

is

very exclusive, the revolution
the wealthy class

who

brought about by persons of are excluded, as happened at Massalia
3

and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first
the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted
in
;

for

some places father and son, in others elder and younger At Massalia the oli brothers, do not hold office together.
garchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged
to

600.

At

Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a con- 4

siderable change.

For

the notables

fell

out

among

themselves,

because only a few shared in the government ; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son could not hold office together,
brothers,

and,

if there

were several

people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who

only the eldest was admitted.

The

were divided, and division

The

is always a source of weakness. of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the government.

city

5

of revolutions in oligarchies one is (2) Of internal causes the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of 6 play the demagogue.

two

sorts

:

either (i) he practises

upon the oligarchs them

selves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number,

202
V. 6
there

Their Causes External and Internal
may be
a

demagogue among them,

as at

Athens

the

party of Charicles predominated among the Thirty, that of
in the Four Hundred) or (2) the oligarchs may the demagogue with the people. This was the case at play where the guardians of the citizens endeavoured to Larissa,

Phrynichus

;

gain over the people because they were elected by

them

;

and

such

is

the fate of

elected, as at

which the magistrates are Abydos, not by the class to which they belong,
all

oligarchies in

but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they

may

7

be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club or, again, where the law-courts are inde
;

pendent of the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favour, and so they

happened at Heraclea in Pontus. whenever any attempt is made to Again, oligarchies change narrow them for then those who desire equal rights are comchange the constitution
;

this

;

8 pelled to

call in

the people.

Changes
waste
their

in the

oligarchy also

occur when
extravagant
1306
a

the oligarchs
living
;

either try to

make
*

private property by then they want to innovate, and themselves tyrants, or install some one else

for

in the tyranny, as

as at

Amphipolis
colonists,

Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and a man named Cleotimus introduced Chalstirred

cidian

and when they arrived,

them up

the rich. 9 against

Aegina the person who carried on the negotiation with Chares endeavoured to revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party among the oli
sometimes they rob garchs try to create a political change the treasury, and then, either the other oligarchs quarrel with
;

For

a like reason in

the thieves, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, or they with
the

other

oligarchs.

But an oligarchy which i C P c. 3. 13.
.

is

at

unity

Oligarchy , Dangers
with
itself is not easily

in Peace

and War 203
;

destroyed from within

of

this

we V. 6

may

see

an example at Pharsalus, for there,

although the 10

few in number, they govern a large city, because have a good understanding among themselves. they Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy
rulers are
is

created within the original one, that
is

is

to

say,

when
all

the

n

whole governing body
in the highest offices.

small and yet they do not

share

Thus at Elis the governing body was and very few ever found their way into it, because, although in number ninety, the senators were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the
a small senate
;

Lacedaemonian
alike in

elders.
in peace

Oligarchy
;

is

liable

to

revolutions 12
able to

war and

in

war because, not being

trust the

people, the

oligarchs are

compelled to hire

mer

cenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth or if there are more than one they make themselves into generals
;

a

company of

tyrants

*.

Sometimes the

oligarchs,

fearing

this danger, give the people a share in the
their services are necessary to

them.
parties

from mutual

distrust, the

two

government because And in time of peace, 13 hand over the defence

of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two This happened factions who often ends the master of both. at Larissa when Simosand the Aleuadae had the government,

and

at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead 14 to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another.

Of

quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned

2

some

another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras over ; turned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been
instances
1

bwaoTtia.

2

Cp.

c.

4.

5-7.

204
V. 6 wronged
J

Revolutions in Oligarchies

5

about a marriage. revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts
a charge of adultery
;

A

upon

in

both cases the punishment was

just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon

1806 b Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias ; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the
1

6 agora.

Many
;

oligarchies

have

been

destroyed

by

some

members of
despotism Chios.

the ruling class taking offence at their excessive
for

example,

the

oligarchy

at

Cnidus and

at

Changes of

constitutional

governments,

and also of

oli

garchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or other
magistrate to persons

having a certain

money

qualification,

17 often occur by accident.

The
in

qualification

may have been

originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in

such a manner as to include
in

an oligarchy a few only, or

a

constitutional

government the middle class.

But

after

a time of prosperity, whether

arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as large, and then everybody participates in every office this
;

happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes 18 quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in
oligarchies.

We

must remark generally, both of democracies and

oli

garchies, that they sometimes change,

not into the opposite

forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class I mean to say, from those forms of democracy
;

and oligarchy which are regulated by law arbitrary, and conversely. 7
share in the honours of the state

into those

which

are

In aristocracies revolutions arc stirred up
;

when

a

few only

a cause

which has been

Involutions in Oligarchies
already

20 y
V. 7

shown

to

affect

oligarchies

;

for

a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy,

is

an aristocracy is the government

of a few,
wealthy
;

although the few are the

virtuous

and not the

hence the two are often confounded.

And

revo-

2

and must happen, when the majority of the people are high-spirited, and have a notion
lutions will be
likely to happen,

most

that they are as

good

as their rulers.

Thus
the

at

Lacedaemon
of

the so-called Partheniae,

who were

[illegitimate] sons

the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected,

were sent away
occur

to

colonize Tarentum.

Again, revolutions

when

great

men who

are at least of equal merit are
3

dishonoured by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta or, when a brave man is excluded from
:

the honours of the state, like Cinadon, the Spartans under Agesilaus
;

who

conspired against
are very

or, again,

when some

poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the

Messenian
entitled

War

;

this is
;

Good Order

proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, 4 for he speaks of certain citizens who 1807 a

were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of
the land.
is

great,

Again, revolutions arise when an individual who and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as at Lace
in

daemon, Pausanias, who was general
like

the Persian

War, or
5

Hanno

at

Carthage.

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the con stitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former,

the ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy
in

;

the

latter,

virtue,

of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and For to com but especially democracy and oligarchy.
is

bine these

the endeavour of constitutional governments

;

20 6

Devolutions in Aristocracies^
from polities by the addition of virtue
are

etc.
J
,

V. 7 and most of
6 differ

the so-called aristocracies have a like aim
;

but

hence some of

them
incline

more and some

less

permanent.

Those which
and those

more

to oligarchy are called aristocracies,

which

incline to

democracy

constitutional governments.

And

therefore the latter are the safer of the

two

;

for the greater

the number, the greater the strength, and
7

when men

are equal

they are contented.

But the

rich, if the

government gives
;

them power,
general,

are apt to be insolent

and avaricious

and, in

whichever way the constitution

inclines, in that direc

tion

it

changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional

government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, an oliBut the process may be reversed, and aristocracy 8 garchy.

may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the consti
tution to take an opposite form.

In like manner constitutional

governments change ciple of government
for every

into oligarchies.
is

The

only stable prin

equality according

to proportion,

and
2
,

man
I

to enjoy his

own.
at

9

What
reduced,
notables

have just mentioned actually happened
for office, qualification

Thurii

where the

though

at first in

high,

was

and

the

magistrates

increased

number.

The

had previously acquired the whole of the land for the government tended to oligarchy, and contrary to law But the people, who had been they were able to encroach.
;

trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the
oligarchs, until those to

who had

too

much gave up
governments
;

their land.

Again, since

all

aristocratical

incline to oli

garchy, the notables are apt to be grasping

thus at Lacedae3
,

mon, where property has passed
1

into
12.

few hands
3

the notables
9.

Cp.

iv. c.

a

7.

Cp,

c. 3.

Cp.

ii.

14,

Involutions in
can do too

Mixed Governments
and are allowed to marry

207
whom v. 7

much

as they like,

city of Locri was ruined by a marriage they please. connexion with Dionysius. but such a thing could never have

The

happened in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy. I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are Jr J In aristocracies, above all, they are of 1307 occasioned by trifles
.

D

a gradual

and imperceptible nature.

The

citizens begin

by

giving up

some

part of the constitution,

ease the government change something else

and so with greater which is a little

more important,
of the
state.

until

At

they have undermined the whole fabric Thurii there was a law that generals should
five

1 2

only be re-elected after an interval of

years, and some men who were popular with the soldiers high-spirited young of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they
easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands ; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them.

would

Whereupon

the magistrates

who had

and who are called councillors,

at first

charge of these matters, 13 determined to resist,

but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one

law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the But other changes soon followed which they in constitution. vain attempted to oppose and the state passed into the hands
;

of the revolutionists

who

established a dynastic oligarchy.

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from
without
;

^

the

latter,

when

there

is

some government

close at

hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenian and
the Lacedaemonian supremacies
;

the Athenians everywhere

1

c.

4

.

r.

208
V. 7
put

The Preservation of
down
the
1
.

States

oligarchies,

and the

Lacedaemonians the

democracies
I have

now

explained what are the chief causes of revolu
in states.

tions

and dissensions

8

have next to consider what means there are of pre In the serving states in general, and also in particular cases.
first

We

place

it

is

evident that if
shall also

destroy states,

we

we know the causes which know the causes which preserve
and destruction
is

them

;

for opposites produce opposites,
.

the

2

2 opposite of preservation In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of

obedience to law,

more

especially

in

small

matters

;

for

transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state,
just as the constant recurrence
3

of small expenses

in

time eats

up a fortune. and therefore
fallacy

The
is

change does not take place all at once, not observed ; the mind is deceived, as in the
if

which says that

each part

is

little,

then the whole
in another, for

is little.

And

this is true in
all

one way, but not
little,

the whole and the

are not

although they are

made up

of
4

littles.

In the

first

place,

then,

beginning of change, and
L308
a

rely

upon the
3
,

political

should guard against the second place they should not devices of which I have already
in the

men

spoken
5

proved by

invented only to deceive the people, for they are Further we note that experience to be useless.
as aristocracies

oligarchies as well

may

last,

not from any

inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and
1

Cp.

iv.

ii.

18.
8

2

Cp. Nic. Eth.
I.

v.

I.

4.

Cp.

iv. 13.

How

to

avoid Revolution

209
V. 8

with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the
leading spirits

among them

1
.

They

should never wrong the

ambitious in a matter of honour,
a matter of
their
;

or the

common

people

in

money and they should treat one another and fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality 6
to

which the friends of democracy seek
multitude
is

establish

for the

Hence,

if

not only just but likewise expedient among equals. the governing class are numerous, many democratic
are useful
;

institutions

for example,

the restriction of the
all

tenure of offices to six months, that
equal rank

those

who

are of

Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore

may

share in them.

demagogues are very 2 already remarked
.

likely to arise

among them,
into

as

I

have
oli- 7

The

short tenure of office prevents

garchies and
families
;

aristocracies
is

from

falling

the

hands of

when
begets

not easy for a person to do any great harm his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession
it

tyranny

in

oligarchies

and democracies.

For

the

aspirants to tyranny are either the principal

men of
in

the state,
oligarchies
offices,

who

in

democracies

are

demagogues
or those
3
.

and

members of

ruling houses,

who

hold great

and have a long tenure of them
States are preserved

when

their destroyers are at a distance, 8

and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them

makes the government keep
ruler

in

hand the

state.

Wherefore the

who

has a care of the state should invent terrors, and

bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens
their guard, and,
like sentinels in a

may

be on

night-watch, never relax

their attention.
1

He

should endeavour too by help of the laws 9
a

vi.

7.

4.

Supra

c.

6.

6.

8

Cp.

c.

5.

6.

AVIS

P

210
V. 8

How
who

to

avoid Devolution

in

to control the contentions

and quarrels of the notables, and to

prevent those

being drawn

in.

have not hitherto taken part in them from No ordinary man can discern the beginning

of
10

evil

J
,

but only the true statesman.

As

to the change
2

produced

in oligarchies

and constitutional

governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of
the

increase

of money,

it

is

well

to

compare the general

valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those
cities in

which the census
fifth

is

1308 b cities every third or
greater or

year.

taken annually, and in larger If the whole is many times

many

times less than

when

the rates were fixed at

the previous census, there should be power given by law to
raise or
11

Where

in the

lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. absence of any such provision the standard is

raised, a constitutional

and an oligarchy
the standard
is

is

government passes into an oligarchy, narrowed to a rule of families where
;

lowered,

constitutional

government becomes

democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy.
12 It
is

a principle

common

to

3

democracy, oligarchy

,

and

every other form of government not to allow the dispropor tionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for
a long time rather than great honour for a short time.

For

men

are easily spoilt

if this rule is

not every one can bear prosperity. But not observed, at any rate the honours which are
;

given
at
1

all at

once should be taken away by degrees and not

all

once.
Cp.
3

Especially should the laws provide against any one
2

c.

4.

1-3.
at

Cp.

c.

3.

8;
with

c. 6.

16-18.

Or,

adding
s

fiovapxift

monarchy,

many MSS. and

Bekker

first

edition.

Oligarchy
having too

and Democracy

21

I

money

;

if

much power, whether derived from friends or V. 8 he has, he and his followers should be sent out of
1
.

And since innovations creep in through the 13 of individuals, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with
the country
private life

the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other.

And

for a like reason an increase of prosperity in any part of

the state should be carefully watched.
for this evil is

The

proper remedy 14
affairs

always to give the

management of
;

and

offices

of

state to opposite

elements

such opposites are the

and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to way thus an end will be put to the increase the middle class
virtuous
is

to

:

revolutions

which
all

arise

from

inequality.

But above
2

every state should be so administered and so 15
its

regulated by law that

magistrates cannot possibly

make

money

In oligarchies special precautions should be used this evil. For the people do not take any great 16 against offence at being kept out of the government indeed they are
.

rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private
ausiness

but what irritates them

is to

think that their rulers
;

are stealing the public
for

money

;

then they are doubly annoyed
profit.

they lose both honour and

If office brought no 17

profit,

combined
wishes

then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be for both notables and people might have their 1309 ;
gratified.

a

All would be able to hold

office,

which

is

the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates,

which

is

the aim of aristocracy.
is

And

this

result

may be

18

accomplished when there
1

no possibility of making money
a

Cp.

c. 3.

3;

iii.

13.

15.

Cp.

c.

13.

14.

P 2

212
V. 8
when

Oligarchy
;

and Democracy Preserved
want
to have

out of the offices
there
is

for the poor will not

them

nothing to

be gained from them

they would
rich,

rather be attending to their

own

concerns

;

and the

who

do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them and so the poor will keep to their work and grow
;

rich,

and the notables

will not be

governed by the lower

class.

19 In order to avoid peculation of the public

money, the transfer

of the revenue should be made
citizens,

different

at a general assembly of the and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the And honours brotherhoods, companies, and tribes.

20 of being

should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation In democracies the rich should be incorruptible.
spared
;

their

incomes

not only should their property not be divided, but also, which in some states are taken from them

imperceptibly,

prevent the wealthy citizens,

should be protected. even

It is
if

a

they are willing,

good thing to from

undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an oligarchy,

on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and
lucrative offices should

go to them

;

if

any of the wealthy

classes insult them,
1

the offender should be punished

more
*.

severely

than one of their

own

class

for a like offence

Provision should be
not by tance
21
;

made

that estates pass by inheritance

and

gift,

for in this

and no person should have more than one inheri way properties will be equalized, and more
competency.
in

It is also expedient both in an oligarchy to assign to those who have less share in the government (for example, to the rich in

of the poor
a

rise to

democracy and

a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality or The latter of state. preference in all but the principal offices
1

Or,

than

if

he had wronged one of

his

own

class.

by Loyalty

and Moderation

213
V. 8

should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class.

There
to
fill

are three qualifications required in those

who

have

the highest offices
constitution
;

(l)
(2)

first

of

all,

loyalty to the

9

established

the

greatest

administrative

capacity

;

(3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each
;

form of government

for, if

what

is

just is not the

same

in all

governments, the quality of justice must also differ.

There

may

be a doubt however,

when

all

these qualities do not meet a

in the

same person, how the

selection is to be
is

made
and

;

suppose,

good general the constitution, and another man
should

for example, a

a bad

man and
is

not a friend to 1809 b
just,

loyal

which

In making the election ought we not to consider two points ? what qualities are common, and what
are rare.

we choose ?
Thus

in the choice

his skill rather than his virtue

but

many have

virtue.

of a general, we should regard for few have military skill, 3 In keeping watch or in any office of
;

stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of

observed;

a sort It

which

all

men

possess.

may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if 4 he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities
alone will
j

make him do what

is

for the public interest.
in

But
se!f-

may
|

not

men have

both of them and yet be deficient

I

control ? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public ?

Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enact- 5 Iments are held to be for the interest of states, all these preserve
[states.

And

the great preserving principle

is

the one which

214
V. 9
lias

Preservatives of
to have a care that the loyal
disloyal.

been repeatedly mentioned

6 citizens should

outnumber the

Neither should we
is

forget the mean,

which

at

the present day
:

lost sight

of

in

perverted forms of government

for

many

practices

which

appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies.
7

Those who

think that

all

virtue is to

be found in their
;

own

party principles push matters to extremes
sider that disproportion destroys a state.

they do not con

A nose which varies
still

from the

ideal

of straightness to

a

hook or snub may
;

be

of good shape and agreeable to the eye but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to
be a nose at
all

on account of some excess
;

in

one direction or

defect in the other
8

human body.
states.

The

of every other part of the same law of proportion equally holds in
this is true

and

Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government,
but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an

9 having none at

extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by all. Wherefore the legislator and the states

man ought
what

to

know what

democratical measures

save

and

democracy, and what oligarchical measures save For neither the one nor the other an oligarchy. or destroy can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are
destroy a

included in
1310
a

it.

If equality of property
;

is

introduced, the state

must of necessity take another form
to excess

for

when by laws

carried

one or other element

in the state is ruined, the

con

stitution is ruined.

10

There

is

an error

common
iv.

both

to

oligarchies and

to

democracies:

in the latter the
1

demagogues, when the multii
;

Cp.

12.

vi.

6.

2.

Oligarchy

and Democracy

2iy

:ude are above the law, are always cutting the city in
quarrels with the
rich,

two by V. 9 whereas they should always profess to
;

be maintaining their cause

just as in oligarchies, the oligarchs

should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For
there are cities in

n

which they swear
all

I will be an

the people, and will devise
I can
;

the

harm

against

enemy them which

to

opposite feeling

but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very in the form of their oath there should be an
;

I will do no wrong to the express declaration people. But of all the things which I have mentioned, that which

most contributes

to the

permanence of constitutions
1
,

is

the

adaptation of education to the form of government
in

and yet

our

own day
of no

this

principle is universally neglected.

The

12

best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state,
will be
avail unless the
spirit

young are trained by habit and
if

education in the

of the constitution,

the laws are

democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are
oligarchical.

For

there

may

be a want of self-discipline in

states as well as in individuals.
in the spirit

Now,
is

to have been educated 13

of the constitution

not to perform the actions in

which oligarchs or democrats

delight, but those

by which the

existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an
oligarchy live in luxury
2
,

but the sons of the poor are hardened

by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution s And in democracies 14 of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of
.

freedom which
1

is

contradictory to the true interests of the
2

Cp.

i.

13.

15.
3

Cp. Cp.
PI.

iv.

IT.

6.

Rep.

viii.

556

D.

2

1

6
For two

Origin of

Tyranny

V. 9
15

state.

principles are characteristic of democracy, the

Men think that government of the majority and freedom. what is just is equal and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will ; and that freedom and equality mean the
;

doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, according to his
fancy.

But

this

is

all

wrong

;

men should

not think
;

it it

slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution
is

for

their salvation.
I

have

now

discussed generally the causes of the revolution
states,

and destruction of and continuance.

and the means of

their preservation

10
1310 b
2

to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its and preservation. What I have said already other forms of government applies almost equally respecting to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the
I

have

still

destruction

nature of an aristocracy,

and

a

tyranny

is

a

compound of
;

oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms
therefore
evil

it

is

most

injurious to its subjects, being

made up of two

3 errors

forms of government, and having the perversions and of both. These two forms of monarchy differ in their

very origin.

The
their

appointment of a king
against the people,

is

the resource of
is

the better classes

and he

elected by

them out of

own number,
in

because either he himself or
;

his family excel

virtue

and virtuous actions

whereas a

tyrant

chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured.
is

4 History

shows

that almost

all

tyrants have been

demagogues

who
e

gained the favour of the people by their accusation of the notables *. At any rate this was the manner in which the
1

Cp.

c. 5.

6; Plato, Rep. 565

D.

Origin of Tyranny
tyrannies arose in the days

217
in

when

cities

had increased

power.

V. 10

Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and

Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates for in ancient times the civil or people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether

become despots.

;

religious,

a long tenure.

Others arose out of the custom
individual

which

oligarchies

had of making some
if

supreme over

the highest offices.

had no

difficulty,

1 In any of these ways an ambitious man 6 he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he

had the power

in his
2

the officers of state

hands already, either as king or as one of Thus Pheidon at Argos and several
.

others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants ; Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired
the tyranny by holding great offices. Leontini, Cypselus
sius at Syracuse,

Whereas Panaetius

at

at Corinth, Peisistratus at

Athens, Diony-

and several others
demagogues.

who

afterwards became

tyrants,

were

at first

And
it

so, as I

was

saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for 7

based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his 3 or on these claims with family, or on benefits conferred
is
,

power added to them. For all who have obtained this honour have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and
nations
;

8

some, like Codrus, have prevented the

state

from

being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the

Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings
idea of a king
1

4
.

The

9
a

is

to be a protector of the rich against unjust 1311
is

Retaining TOVTOIS, which apparently by mistake.
2

omitted in Bekker

s

second edition,
c. II.

Cp.

c. 5.

8.

3

Cp.

iii.

14.

12.

4

Cp.

2.

2i

8

Tyranny) Oligarchy , Democracy
against insult and oppression.

V. 10 treatment, of the people
a tyrant,

Whereas

as has often been repeated,

has no regard to any
;

public interest, but only to his private ends 10
sure,

his aim

is

plea-

the aim of a king,
;

honour.
is

Wherefore

also in their

desires they differ

the tyrant

desirous of riches, the king,

of what brings honour.

And
] .

the guards of a king are citizens,

but of a tyrant mercenaries
TI

That tyranny has
oligarchy
is

all

the

vices

both

of democracy and

is
;

wealth

of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end wealth only can the tyrant maintain either (for by
evident.

As

his

therefore deprive
injuring

Both mistrust the people, and guard or his luxury). them of their arms. Both agree too in
the people

12 dispersing
art

them.

From democracy

and driving them out of the city and tyrants have borrowed the
notables and

of making war upon the

destroying them
are rivals

secretly or openly, or of exiling

them because they
;

and stand
against
13

in the

way of

their

power

and also because plots
this
class,

them
2

are contrived

by men of

who

either

want

to rule or escape subjection.

Hence Periander

advised

Thrasybulus

to cut off the tops of the tallest ears of corn,

meaning that he

must always put out of the way the

citizens

who

overtop the rest.

And
;

so, as I have already intimated,

the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in

other forms of government

subjects attack their sovereigns

out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly
treated by them.
is insult,
r

And
is

of

injustice,

the

most common form

another

confiscation of property.

4

The

ends

sought

by

conspiracies
are the

against

monarchies,
as

whether tyrannies or
1

royalties,

same

the ends

sought by conspiracies against other forms of government.
Cp.
a
iii.

14.

7.

Cp.

iii.

13.

16.

The Overthrow of Monarchies
Monarchs have
desire to
all

219
V. 10

great wealth and honour

which
are

are objects of

mankind.

The

attacks

made sometimes
office
;

against their lives,

sometimes against the

where the
sort of 15

sense of insult

is

the motive, against their lives.
stir

Any

many) may up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not from
insult (and there are

ambition.

For example, the attempt made upon

the Peisis-

of the public dishonour offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the
tratidae arose out

tyrant

for his sister s sake,

attack for the sake of

Harmodius.

and Aristogeiton joined in the conspiracy was also

A

16

formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him whether 1311 b
by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted

by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult
;

for his wife

had been carried off by Evagoras

son.

Many

17

conspiracies have originated in

shameful attempts made by

sovereigns on the persons of their subjects.
attack of Crataeus upon Archelaus
;

Such was the

he had always hated the

connexion with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him
either of them, but broke his

the king of Elymaea,

word and married the elder to when he was hard pressed in a war

against Sirrhas and Arrhibaeus,

and the younger to his own son Amyntas, under the idea that he would then be less likely to quarrel with the son of Cleopatra Crataeus made this
slight a pretext for attacking

Archelaus, though even a less

reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrange-

220
V. 10 ment was
1

The Overthrow
And
from
a like

of Monarchies

the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the

8 king.

motive Hellanocrates of Larissa con

spired with him ; for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he

thought that the connexion between them had originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of Parrhon, too, power.

and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him

when
l

a child.

19

Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill
officers

injured

and royal princes by whom they have been Thus, at Mitylene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthalidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who
of
state
1
.

had been beaten and torn away from
20 slew him.

his wife

by Penthilus,

In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack ; he was

enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged ; for the poet had been irritated at some remark

made by Decamnichus on
which have
21"

the foulness of his breath.

Many

other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies
arisen

from similar causes.

Fear

is

another motive which has caused conspiracies as

well in monarchies as in

Thus Artapanes
fearing that he
his orders
1

more popular forms of government. conspired against Xerxes and slew him,

would be accused of hanging Darius against he being under the impression that Xerxes would
persons too, even of those connected with the govern taking TUIV irepi, etc. with the subject.

Or

:

Many

ment

or the royal family,

caused by Insult, Fear, Contempt
forget

221

what he had

said in the

middle of a meal, and that the V. 10

offence

would be

forgiven.
is

Another motive

contempt, as in the case of Sardanapulus, 22

whom some

one saw carding wool with his women, if the story-tellers say truly ; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else *. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius 23
because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised Even by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk.
the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack

him out of con
in

tempt

;

for the confidence

which he reposes

them breeds

contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt 24 the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the
;

danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands.

Thus

generals of armies attack monarchs

;

as, for

example,

Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus, again,
Seuthes the Thracian conspired general he was.
against

Amadocus, whose

And

sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, 25

like Mithridates,

who

conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly

out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.

Bold

natures, placed

by their sovereigns

in a high military
in the

position, are

most
;

likely to

make the attempt

expecta

tion of success

for courage is

union

of the two inspires

emboldened by power, and the them with the hope of an easy

victory.

causes.

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise from other There are men who will not risk their lives in the 26 of gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless hope
1

Cp.

i.

11.

8.

222
V. 10
27

Overthrow of Monarchies
will

regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action

which

make them famous and honourable

in the

world

;

they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name.

It is rare,

however, to find such

men

;

he

who would
fail.

kill

a tyrant

must

28 be prepared to lose his life if he

He

must have the

resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying, that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed ; such a death would be

welcome
attain.

to him.

But

this is

a temper to

which few can

29

Once more,

tyrannies,

like

all

other

governments,

are

1312 b destroyed from without by

form of government. will to attack them
30 principle
;

some opposite and more powerful That such a government will have the
clear
if
;

is

for

the
can,

two
do

are

opposed

in

and
is

all

men,

they

Democracy
Hesiod,
for the

also antagonistic to

what they will. tyranny, on the principle of
is

Potter hates Potter,

because they are nearly akin,

extreme form of democracy
alike

tyranny
to

,

and royalty
because
therefore the

and aristocracy are both

opposed

tyranny,

they are constitutions of a different type.

And

Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well
governed.
31

Again,
reigning

tyrannies

are

destroyed

from within,

when
as

the

family are divided

among themselves,
;

that

of

Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the
son of Gelo and led him into excesses
rule in his
in

order that he might

name.

Whereupon

the family conspired to get rid
;

of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny

but the party

who

con-

Especially of
1

"Tyrannies

223
10

spired
out.

In

with them seized the opportunity and drove them all V. the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, 32

attacked and expelled

him with the

assistance of the people

;

he afterwards perished himself. There are two chief motives which induce men to attack
tyrannies
inevitable,

hatred

and

contempt.
is

Hatred of
frequent

tyrants

is

and contempt

also

a

cause of their

destruction.

Thus we
have lost

see that
their

most of those who have 33

acquired,
inherited
2
,

have retained
it,

almost

at

power, but those who have once ; for living in luxurious
offer

ease, they have
tunities

become contemptible, and
assailants.

many oppor

Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes 34 even more ready to strike the angry are more impetuous in
to their

making an
insulted.

attack, for they

do not

listen to reason.

And men
are

are very apt to give

way

to their
is

passions

when they

To
is

this

cause

to be attributed the fall of the

Peisistratidae

and of many others.
pain,
is
8

Hatred
which
.

is

more reasonable, 35

but anger

accompanied by
the

is

an impediment to

reason, whereas hatred

painless

In

a word,

all

causes

which I have mentioned as
oligarchy,

destroying the last and most

unmixed form of

and

the extreme form of democracy,

may be assumed
Kingly
therefore,
rule

to affect

tyranny

;

indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies

distributed
affected

among

several

persons.
is,

is
;

little
it

36

by external causes, and generally destroyed from within.
in

lasting

is

And
Bekker

there are
(i)

two ways

which the destruction may come about;
1

when

the 1313 a

Omitting
a 8

KO.-T

inserted by
iii.

in

2nd ed.

Cp. Plato, Laws, Cp. Rhetoric,
ii.

695.
31.

4.

224

Overthrow of Monarchies

V. 10 members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much
37 after the fashion of a tyranny,

and to extend

their authority
;

contrary to the law.

There
*

are

now no
is

royalties
rule
in

monarchies,

where they
matters

exist, are

tyrannies.

For the
supreme

of a king
all

is

over voluntary subjects, and he
;

important
equality,

but in our
is

own day men

are

more upon an

and no one

so immeasurably superior to others as to repre

sent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office.

Hence

mankind
obtains
38 a tyrant.
tion
is

will not, if they can help,

endure
is

power by force or fraud

at

and any one who once thought to be
it,

In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruc the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and,

although possessing not tyrannical but only royal power, are Their overthrow is then readily apt to outrage others.
effected
;

for there is an
to have him,

end

to the king

when

his subjects

do not want
like

but the tyrant lasts, whether they

him or

not.
is

The
and the
11

destruction of monarchies
like causes.

to be attributed to these

And
causes;

they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite or, if we consider them separately, (l) royalty is

The more re preserved by the limitation of its powers. stricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired ; for then they are more moderate and not so
despotic in their
2 subjects.

ways

;

and they are

less

envied by their

This

is

the reason

why

the kingly office has lasted
for a similar reason
it

so long

among

the Molossians.

And

has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further
1

Omitting KCU with Bekker

s

2nd ed.

Preservation of Monarchies
limited by

22.5
particularly

Theopompus

in various

respects,

more

V. 11

by the establishment of the Ephoralty.

He

diminished the

power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not
less,

but greater.

There

is

a story that

when

his wife

once

3

asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons
a royal
father,

power which was

less than

he had inherited from his
I leave

to

he replied, No indeed, for the power which them will be more lasting.
to

As

(2) tyrannies,

opposite ways.

One

they are preserved in two most 4 of them is the old traditional method in
their

arts

Of such government. have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the There Persians in the administration of their government.
which most tyrants administer
Periander of Corinth
is

said

to

5

are

also

the ancient

prescriptions
is

for
;

the
viz.

preservation

of

a tyranny, in so far as this

possible
;

that the tyrant

should lop off those who are too high men of spirit : he must not allow
;

he must put to death
meals,
clubs,

common

he must be upon his guard against 1313 b education, and the like which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence anything among his subjects ; he must prohibit literary assemblies or
other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means
to prevent people

from knowing one another (for acquaintance Further, he must compel the 6 l l inhabitants to appear in public and live at his gates ; then
begets

mutual

confidence).

he

will

know what

they are doing
to be

;

if

under, they
practise

will learn

humble.

they are always kept In short, he should
all

these and the like Persian and barbaric arts which

have the same object.
1

A
Or,

tyrant should also endeavour to
at their doors.

7

PAVIS

o

226
V.
11

The

Devices of Tyranny
his subjects says or does,

know what each of
employ
spies,

and should

like the

female detectives

at

Syracuse, and

the eavesdroppers

whom

Hiero was
;

in the habit

of sending to

for the fear of informers any place of resort or meeting from speaking their minds, and if they do, prevents people
8

they are more easily found out.
to

Another
citizens
;

art

sow

quarrels

among

the

friends

of the tyrant is should be

embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the Also he should impoverish his rich with one another.
subjects
1
;

he thus provides money for the support of his

and the people, having to keep hard at work, are The Pyramids of Egypt afford 9 prevented from conspiring. also the offerings of the family of an example of this policy
guards
,

;

Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos all these works were alike intended to occupy the
;

10 people

and keep them poor.

Another

practice of tyrants is

to multiply taxes, after the

who

at Syracuse, contrived that within five years his subjects should bring

manner of Dionysius

into the treasury their

whole property.

The

tyrant

is

also

fond of making war in order that his subjects may have some And whereas thing to do and be always in want of a leader. the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the character
istic

of a tyrant
all
2
.

is

to distrust his friends, because to

he knows
all

that

men want

overthrow him, and they above

have

the power
1

Reading r\ Tf with Bekker s 2nd ed. This, which is probably the meaning of the passage, cannot be The addition is required of some elicited from the text as it stands.
2

such phrase as avT^v Ka6f\ffv, which
authority.

is

not wholly without manuscript

The Ways of Tyranny and of Tyrants 227
Again, the
evil
all

practices of the last

and worst forms of V. 11

democracy
given to

are

found

in

tyrannies.
in the

Such
hope

are the

power

ir

women

in their families

that they will

inform against their husbands, and the licence which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters ; for
slaves

and

women do

not conspire against tyrants

;

and they

are of course friendly to tyrannies

and

also

to

democracies,
the people too
12

since under

them they have

a

good time.

For

would

fain be a

the tyrant,
is

monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the flatterer is held in honour ; in democracies he
;

the

demagogue

and the tyrant also has his humble com
him.
1314
a

panions

who

flatter

Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a free

man

in

him

will

demean himself by
flatter
;

flattery

others, but they do not

are useful for bad purposes

anybody. nail knocks out

; good men love Moreover the bad

13

nail,

as the

It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every proverb says. one who has dignity or independence ; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his

independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is 14 that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with

them and Such

invites

them

to his table

;

for the one are enemies,

but the others enter into no rivalry with him.

preserves his power

and the arts by which he no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, 15 (l) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a meanare the notes of the tyrant
;

there

is

spirited

man

will not conspire against

anybody: (2) the crea-

Q

2

228
V. 11

Preservation of Tyranny
among them
;

tion of mistrust
until
is

for a tyrant is not

overthrown
;

men

begin to have confidence in one another

and

this

they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and

the reason

why

tyrants are at

war with the good

;

do not inform against one another or against other men
action, for

:

16 (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of

no one attempts what

is

impossible, and they will

not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be

summed
takes

up,

and

to

one or other of them
distrust

all

his ideas

may

be

referred: (l) he

sows

17

away their power ; This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved and there is another which proceeds upon
;

among subjects; (2) he he humbles them. (3)
his

18 a

different

principle of action.

The
as

nature of this

latter

method may be gathered from which destroy kingdoms, for
kingly power
is

a comparison

of the causes
destroying

one

mode of
more more

to

make

the office of king
is to

tyrannical, so

the salvation of a tyranny
a king.

make

it

like the rule of

But of one thing the tyrant must be

careful

;

he

must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up
19 his tyranny.

But though power must be retained

as

the

foundation, in all else the tyrant

1314 b the character of a king.

should act or appear to act in In the first place he should pretend

a care of the public revenues, and not waste a sort presents of
at

when

they see their

money in making which the common people get excited miserable earnings taken from them and

lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists.

He

should

The
give an account of
(a practice

Beneficent Despot

229

what he receives and of what he spends V. 11

which has been adopted by some tyrants) ; for then he will seem to be the manager of a household rather
than a tyrant
;

nor need he fear that, while he

is

the lord of 20
a policy is

the city, he will ever be in want of money.

Such

much more advantageous
home, than
to leave

for the tyrant

when he goes from

behind him a hoard, for then the garrison

remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power ; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason
to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the

who

one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place, he should appear to collect taxes and to require
public services only for state purposes
a fund in case
;

21

and that he may form

of war, he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and

when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if
he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a states
Neither he man, and produce the impression that he is one. nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least
offence against

22

are his subjects,

modesty towards the young of either sex who and the women of his family should observe
towards other

23

a like self-control

women

;

the insolence of

women

many tyrannies. In the indulgence of he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, pleasures
has ruined

who

not only begin at

dawn and

pass whole days in sensuality,

but want other

men

to see them, that they
lot.

may admire

their

happy and blessed

In these things a tyrant should be 24

especially moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices

230
V.
11 to the world

Preservation of Tyranny
;

for

a
;

drunken
not so he

despised and attacked

and drowsy tyrant is soon who is temperate and wide
the very reverse of nearly

awake.

His conduct should be

25

He everything which has been said before about tyrants. to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not ought a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should
appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the
for if

1315

a

Gods

;

men think

that a ruler

is

religious

and has a reverence

for the

Gods, they

are less afraid of suffering injustice at his

hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on 26 his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought
foolish.

And

them think

that they

he should honour men of merit, and make would not be held in more honour by

The honour he the citizens if they had a free government. should distribute himself, but the punishment should be in27 flicted
is

by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which taken by all monarchs not to make one person great ; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look If after all some one has to be sharply after one another.

made

great,

he should not be a

man of bold
to strike.
it

spirit

;

for such
if

dispositions are ever
is

most inclined
1
.

to be deprived of his power, let

28 not taken

from him
outrage
;

all at

once

any one be diminished gradually, The tyrant should abstain

And

from

all

in

particular

from personal violence and

from wanton conduct towards the young.
especially careful of his behaviour to

He

should be

men who

are lovers of

honour

;

for as the lovers of
is

money
the
is

are offended

when

their

property
29 virtuous

touched,
their

so are

lovers of honour

and the

when

honour
1

affected.
12.

Therefore a tyrant

Cp.

c. 8.

ought either not to use force
only to
others
;

at all, or

he should be thought V. 11

employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed
from
affection,

and not from the insolence of power, he should compensate the appearance of dis honour by the increase of honour. Of those who attempt assassination they are the most 30 dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched who do
to arise

and

in general

not care to survive,

if

they effect their purpose.

Therefore 31
think that
for

special precaution should be taken about

any

who
;

either they or their relatives

have been insulted

when

men
less

are led

away by passion

to assault others they are regard
It is difficult to

of themselves.
;

As
for a

Heracleitus says,

fight against anger

And
and of

whereas

states

buy revenge with life consist of two classes, of poor men 32
will

man

V

rich, the tyrant

should lead both to imagine that they

are preserved
rule,

and prevented from harming one another by his and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach

his government ; for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens ; either party added to the force which he already has, will to

make him

stronger than his assailants.
details
;

But enough of these
policy of the tyrant
is

what should be the general 33

obvious.

He

ought to show himself to

his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of the master of

a household
is theirs,

and of

a king.

He

but should be their guardian

should not appropriate what 1315 b he should be moderate, ;
;

not extravagant in his

way of

life

he should be the com

For 34 panion of the notables, and the hero of the multitude. then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because
1

Fragm. 69

(ed.

Mullach).

232
V. 11 he
of
over

Short Duration of Tyrannies
men
*

will rule over better

whose
is

spirits

are not crushed,

men

to

whom
is

he himself

not an object of hatred, and
too will be more
or at
least

whom
;

he

not afraid.

His power
be virtuous,
let

lasting.

Let
and

his disposition
if

half

virtuous

he must be wicked,

him be

half wicked

only.

12

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon this continued for a hun
;

dred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws ;

and
care
2

in various

ways gained the favour of the people by the which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular,

believed, he

was respected for his military ability. If report may be crowned the judge who decided against him in
;

the games

and, as

some

say, the sitting statue in the

Agora

of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. similar story is told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have

A

allowed himself to be
pagus.
3

summoned and

tried before the

Areo

Next

in duration to the

tyranny of Orthagoras was that of

the Cypselidae at Corinth,

which lasted seventy-three years
Periander
three.

and six months
forty-four, 4

:

Cypselus reigned thirty years,

and

Psammetichus the son of Gordius
:

Their continuance was due to similar causes
a popular

Cypselus was

man, who
;

during the whole time of his rule never

had
5

a

body-guard

was

a great soldier.

and Periander, although he was a tyrant, Third in duration was the rule of the
it

Peisistratidae at Athens, but
tratus

was

interrupted

;

for Peisis

was twice driven
1

out,

so that during three-and-thirty
i.

CP

.

5.

2.

Criticism of Plato
years

233
his

he

reigned

only

seventeen

;

and

sons reigned

V. 12

eighteen
that of

altogether

thirty-five
at

years.

Of

other tyrannies,

Hiero and Gelo

Even
in all
;

this,

Syracuse was the most lasting. was short, not more than eighteen years 6 however,

for
;

Gelo continued

tyrant for seven years,
for ten years,

and died

in

the eighth

Hiero reigned

and Thrasybulus
In
fact,

was driven out

in the eleventh

month.

tyrannies

generally have been of quite short duration.
I

have

tutional

now gone through all the causes by which consti- 7 governments and monarchies are either destroyed or 1316
J
,

a

preserved.

In the Republic of Plato but

Socrates treats of revolutions,

not well,

for he

mentions no cause of change which
first

peculiarly

affects

the

or perfect state.
all

He

only says 8

things change and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of four to three, and this when com
cycle
;

that nothing is abiding, but that

in a certain

bined with a figure of

five gives

two harmonies
solid)
;

(he means

when

the

number of

this figure

becomes

he conceives

that nature will then produce bad
to education
;

men who
well

will not submit
likely

in

which

latter

particular

he may very
be some

be not far wrong, for there

may

men who
is

cannot be educated and made virtuous.

But why

such 9

a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather

common
being at

to all
all ?
2

states,

nay to everything which comes into
is

Or how
things

the

state

specially

changed by
all

the agency of time, which, as he declares,

makes

things

change

?

And
2
,

which did not begin together, change

together
1

for example, if something has
546. note

come

into being the

Rep.

viii.

a

Placing a

of interrogation

after

fj.tTa(3d\\fiv.

Or

:

And

234
V. 12 day

Criticism of Plato

it will change with it. should the perfect state change into the Spartan ? Further, why 10 for governments more often take an opposite form than

before the completion of the cycle,

one akin to them.
other changes
;

The same

remark

is

applicable to the

he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again
1 1

into a tyranny.

for a

democracy
a

than into

yet the contrary happens quite as often ; even more likely to change into an oligarchy Further, he never says whether monarchy.
is

And

tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it And changes. the reason is, that he could not very well have told : for there
is

no rule

;

according to him

it

should revert to the

first

and

12 best,

and then there would be

a complete cycle.

But

in point

of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of
Cleisthenes
;

into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at

Chalcis

;

into

into aristocracy, as at Carthage,

democracy, as that of Gelo did at Syracuse and the tyranny of Charilaus
;

13 at

Lacedaemon.

Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny,
in Sicily
;

like

most of the ancient oligarchies
that
at

for example,

the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panaetius
;

Gela

into the

Rhegium

into the tyranny

tyranny of Oleander ; that at of Anaxilaus ; the same thing has

14 happened in

many

other states.

And

it

is

absurd to suppose

that the state changes into oligarchy merely because [as Plato

in the period

of time which, as he says, makes

all

things change, things

which did not begin together change together. Bekker in his 2nd edition has altered the reading of the MSS. Sid re
TOV xpovov to Sia ye TOV \povov.
with either reading
;

The

rendering of the text agrees

that of the note with the reading of the

MSS.

only.

Criticism
1

of Plato

235-

of money, V. 12 says ] the ruling class are lovers and makers and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor 13 1 6 b should have an equal share in the government with themselves.

Moreover,

in

many

oligarchies there are laws against

making

money

in

trade.

But
had a

at Carthage,
;

which
to this

is

a democracy,

there is no such prohibition
ginians have never

and yet

day the Cartha

revolution.

It is absurd too for

him

15

to say that an oligarchy is

two

cities,

one of the

rich,

and the

other of the poor

2
.

Is not this just as

much

the case in the

Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or in which all are not equally

good men ? Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, 16 and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a demo and a democracy may cracy, if the poor form the majority
;

change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the other in

Once more, although the causes of revolutions are 17 3 numerous, he mentions only one , which is, that the very citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though
different.

he thought that
rich.

all,

or the majority of them, were originally

: though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution ; And an 18 but, when anybody else, it is no great matter.

This

is

not true

oligarchy does not

more often pass

into a

democracy than
if

into

any other form of government. of the honours of
state,

Again,

men

are deprived

make

revolutions, and change although they have not wasted

and are wronged, and insulted, they forms of government, even
their substance because they

1

Rep.

viii.

550

E.
3

a

Rep.

viii.

551

D.

Rep.

viii.

555

D.

2

3

o"

Criticism of Plato
they liked

V. 12 might do what

of which extravagance he declares
*.

excessive freedom to be the cause
Finally, although there are

many forms of

oligarchies and

democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though
there were only one form of either of them.
1

Rep.

viii.

564.

BOOK
WE have
or supreme

VI
VI. 1

now

considered the varieties of the deliberative

power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and whicli of them are adapted
forms of government l the destruction and preservation of
to different
.

We
states,

have also spoken of

how and from what
a

causes they arise

2
.

Of democracy
the

and
it

all

other forms of government there are

many modes of
;

kinds

and

will be well to assign to

them

severally

organization which are proper and advantageous

to each, adding
over,

what remains
3
;

to be said about them.

More-

3

we ought

to consider the various combinations of these
for such combinations

modes themselves

make

constitutions

overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to demo
cracies
4
.

When
I

I

considered,

and thus

speak of the combinations which remain to be 4 far have not been considered by us,
as these
:

mean such

when

the deliberative part of the

government and the election of officers is constituted oligarthe law-courts aristocratically, or when the chically, and
courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical,

and the election to

offices aristocratical, or
in the

when

in

any other

way
I

there

harmony composition of a state. have shown already what forms of democracy are suited
is
1

a want of

5

Bk.

iv.

14-16.
iv.

2

Bk.

v.
iv. 8.

3

Cp. Bk.

7-9.

Cp.

3.

2

3

8

VI.

1 to particular

cities,

and what of oligarchy to particular peoples,

and to

whom
we

6 Further,
is

each of the other forms of government is suited. must not only show which of these governments

the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to con
1

sider

how

these

and other forms of government are

to

be established.
First of
all

let

us speak of democracy, which will also

bring to light the opposite
7 called oligarchy.

For

the purposes of this enquiry

form of government commonly we need

to ascertain all the elements

and characteristics of democracy,

since from the combinations of these the varieties of
8 cratic

demo-

government

arise.

There

are several of these differing

from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (i) has been already mentioned 2 differences of popu
lation
;

for the popular element

may

consist of husbandmen,
if

or of mechanics,

or of labourers, and

the

first

of these

be added to the second, or the third to the two others,
not only does the democracy become better or worse, but
9 very
nature
is
:

its

be mentioned

second cause (2) remains to changed. the various properties and characteristics of

A

democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There
is

to establish 10 an
all

an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes some new form of democracy, or only to remodel
existing one
3
.

Founders of

states try to bring together

the elements which accord with the ideas of the several
;

constitutions

but this

is a

mistake of theirs, as I have already
the destruction and preservation
*

remarked
1

4

when speaking of
iv. iv.

Cp.
3

2. i.

5.
4

Cp.

iv. 4.

21.

Cp.

7.

v. 9.

7.

The Nature of Democracy
of
states.

239
VI.
1

We

will

now

set

forth the requirements, ethical

character,

and aims of such

states.
is

to the

The basis of common
1
.

a democratic state

liberty

;

which, according

2

opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such 1317 b

a state

this they affirm to be the great

end of every demo
2

cracy

ruled in

principle of liberty is for all to rule and be and indeed democratic justice is the application turn,

One

of numerical not proportionate equality ; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the
majority approve must be the end and the just.
it is

Every
in a

citizen,

said,

must have

equality,

and therefore

democracy

more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to
the poor have

3

be the principle of their
live as

state.

Another

is

that a

man should

This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman ; and, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark
likes
.

he

2

of a

slave.

This

is

the second characteristic of democracy, 4

whence has
if possible,

arisen the claim
or,

of

men

to be ruled to
rule

if this
it

is

impossible,

by none, and be ruled

in turns

;

and so

coincides with the freedom based upon

equality [which was the first characteristic]. 3 Such being our foundation and such the nature of de-

5

the election mocracy, its characteristics are as follows : of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over
each, and each
to
all offices,

3

in

his turn over
all

all

;

that the appointment

or to

but those which require experience and
foil.
2

1

Cp. Plato Rep.

viii.

557

Cp.
beginning
),

v. 9.

15.

3

Or (taking apxh

in

the sense of

foundation,

and such being the principle from

Such being our which we start, the

characteristics of

democracy

are as follows.

240
VI. 2

The

Characteristics of

Democracy

skill \ should be made by lot ; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one ; that no one should hold the same office twice, or not often, except

in the case

of military

offices

;

that the tenure of

all

offices,

of as many as possible, should be brief; that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge in all matters, or in most, or in the greatest and most
or

important

and private contracts
over
all

such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, that the assembly should be supreme ; or at any rate over the most important, and causes,
2
.

6 the magistrates over none or only over a very few
institutions, a council is the

Of
there

all

most democratic
the citizens, but
its

3

when

is

not the means of paying
paid even this
is

all

when they

are

robbed of

power

;

for the people then

draw
7

all
4
.

cases to themselves, as I said in the previous dis-

cussion
for

The
;

next characteristic of democracy
law-courts,
to be

is

payment
is

services

assembly,

magistrates,
;

everybody
not to

receives

pay,
all,

when
then

it

is is

had

or

when

it

be had for

it

given to the law-courts and to the

stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at

any of them who are compelled to have their meals And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, together.
least to

wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be
8 the opposite of these

low

birth, poverty,
is

mean employment.

Another note
1318
a

perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be
is

that

no magistracy

elected

by
to
iv.

lot
all

and no longer by
democracies
6.
;

vote.

These

are

points
in

common
Cp.
3

but democracy and
2
*

demos

14.

See note.

Cp.

iv.

15.

II.

Cp.

iv. 6.

5.

Democratical Justice
their truest

241
principle

form are based upon the recognized
all

of VI. 2

should count equally ; for equality implies that the rich should have no more share in the govern ment than the poor \ and should not be the only rulers, but
that
in
all

democratic justice, that

should rule equally according to their numbers

2
.

And

this

way men
in

think that they will secure equality and

freedom

their state.

Next comes
tained
?

the question,

How

is this

equality to be ob-

3

Is

the qualification to be
shall be equal to a

so distributed that five
?

hundred rich

thousand poor

and

shall

we
?

give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred
or, if this is

not to be the mode, ought we,

still

retaining the

same

ratio, to take equal

the control of the elections

numbers from each and give them s and of the courts ? Which,
is

a

according to the democratical notion,
constitution
crats say
this

the juster form of the
?

or one based on numbers only
is

Demo
agree,

that justice

that to

which the majority
;

oligarchs that to which the wealthier class

in their opinion

the

decision should

be given according to the amount of
is

property.
injustice.

In both principles there

some

inequality

and

3

For

if justice

is

the will
all

person

who

has more wealth than

of the few, any one the rest of his class put
or if justice
4
,

together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the
sole
will

power

but this would be tyranny
I

;

is

the

of the majority, as

was before saying

they will

unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority.
Transposing dtrupovs and tinropovs, with Bekker
Cp.
iv. 4.

To

4

1

s

2nd ed.

*

22.
for

3 Reading with Bekker s 2nd ed. aiptatwv from conjecture See note. 5iatptauv. which is the reading of the MSS.

4

Cp.

iii.

10.

I.

DAVIS

R

242
VI. 3
find a principle

Democratical Justice
of equality
in

which they both agree we must

enquire into their respective ideas of justice.
in saying that whatever is decided by the of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted but majority not without some reserve since there are two classes out of

Now

they agree

:

;

which a
is

the poor and the rich, that composed, to be deemed law on which both or the greater part
state is
;

5

is approved have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining

of both agree

and

if

they disagree, that which

by the majority, that

is

by those

who

four of the rich join with the party of the poor,

and the

of the poor with that of the rich ; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides
remaining
five

6 are added up, are the greatest, should prevail.
out to be equal, there
is

If they turn

no greater

difficulty than at present,

1318 b

when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although
it

may be

difficult in

theory to

know what
for

is

just

and equal,

the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear
if like,

who
l

can,

they always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger 1 for none of these things
greater,
.

encroach,

is

far

the weaker

are

care

4

Of the
discussion

four kinds of democracy, as
2
,

was

said in the previous
first in

the best

is

that
all.

which comes
I

order

;

it is

also the oldest

speaking of them according For the best to the natural classification of their inhabitants.

of them

am

material of
1

democracy

is

an agricultural population
2

3
;

there
22.

is

Or,

care nothing for the weaker.
*

Cp.

iv.

4.

Cp.

iv. 6.

2.

The
no
difficulty in

best I(ind

of Democracy
cattle.

243
4

forming a democracy where the mass of the VI.

people live by agriculture or tending of

Being poor,

2

they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the
life they are always work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of govern

assembly, and not having the necessaries of
at

ment or
for the

A

where no great gains can be made out of them, x many are more desirous of gain than of honour . is that even the ancient were patiently endured proof tyrannies
office

3

endure oligarchies, if they are allowed by to work and are not deprived of their property ; for some of
them, as they
still

them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover they have the power of electing the magistrates 4 and calling them to account 2 their ambition, if they have
;

any,

is

thus satisfied
all

;

and

in

some democracies, although they
whole people, as
at

do not

share in the appointment of offices, except through

representatives elected in turn out of the

Mantinea, yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be 5

it is

Hence regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. both expedient and customary in such a democracy that
should elect to
offices,

all

and conduct

scrutinies,

and
filled

sit in

the law-courts, but that the great offices should be
election

up by

and from persons having a

qualification

;

the greater

requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for

which a

qualification is required, then those

who

are

marked

out by special

Under such a 6 ability should be appointed. form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well the offices will always be held by the best persons ; the (for
1

people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of
iv.

13.

8.

2

Cp.

ii.

12.

5.

R

2

244
VI. 4
the good).

The Agricultural Democracy
The good and
the notables will then be satisfied,

for they will not be governed

by men who are

their inferiors,

and the persons elected
7

will rule justly, because others will call

them

to account.

Every man should be responsible

to others,

nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases ; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain
1319
a

the evil

which

is

inherent in every man.

But the

principle of
;

responsibility secures that

which

is

the greatest good in states

the right persons rule
8

and

are prevented

from doing wrong,
people are drawn
states

and the people have
from a certain
class.

their due.

It is evident that this is the

best kind of democracy, and

why? because the
ancient laws of

The

many

which

making the people husbandmen were excellent. provided either that no one should possess more than a
aimed
at

They
certain

quantity of land, or that, within a certain distance
9

if

he did, the land should not be

from the

town or the

acropolis.

Formerly

in

many

states there

was

a law forbidding any one
1
.

to sell his original allotment

of land
is

There

is

a similar law

attributed to

Oxylus, which

to the effect that there should
s

be a certain portion of every
10 not

man

property on which he could

useful corrective to the evil of which borrow money. I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are
all

A

of them husbandmen.

For

their properties are

reckoned
2

in

the census, not entire, but only in such small portions

that

even the poor
11

may have more

than the amount required

*.

Next

best to an agricultural, and in

many

respects similar,
;

are a pastoral people,
Cp.
2
ii.

who

live

by their flocks

they are the

7.

7

.

Or,

that the

qualification

of the poor

may

exceed that of the

rich.

The
aest trained

inferior t^inds

of Democracy

24 j
4

out.

The

people of

of any for war, robust in body and able to camp VI. whom other democracies consist are far 12
;

nferior to them, for their life is inferior

there

is

no room for

moral excellence
je

any of their employments, whether they mechanics or traders or labourers. Besides, people of this 13
in

come to the assembly, because they are con about in the city and in the agora ; whereas tinually moving lusbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet,
class can readily

or equally feel the want of assembling together.

Where

the 14

is no territory extends to a distance from the city, there in making an excellent democracy or constitutional difficulty

government, for the
country ought not to meet
;

people are compelled

to

settle in

the

and even

if there is a

town population the assembly

when

the country people cannot come.

We

15

nave thus explained

how
;

the
is

first

and best form of democracy and the population which 1319 b

should be constituted

it

clear that the other or inferior

sorts will deviate in a regular order,
is

excluded will

at

each stage be of a lower kind.

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long The more general unless well regulated by laws and customs.
causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government

have

now been

pretty fully considered

l
.

In order to constitute 16

such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making
citizens not only of those
illegitimate,

and of those

who are legitimate, but even of the who have, only one parent a citizen,

whether father or mother 2

for nothing of this sort cornes ; amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which dema- 17 gogues proceed ; whereas the right thing would be to make
1

CP

.

v. 5.

Cp.

iii.

5.

7.

246
VI. 4 no more
to go.

The
additions

Construction

and

when

the number of the commonalty exceeds

that of the notables or of the middle class,

beyond

this not

excess of this point the state becomes dis orderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the
in

When

democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene ; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye.
1

8

Measures
to

like those

which Cleisthenes 1 passed when he wanted

19

power of the democracy at Athens, or such were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes
increase the
as

and brotherhoods should be established
families should be restricted

;

the private rites of
into public ones
;

and converted

in short, every contrivance should be

adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connexions.

20 Again, the measures

which
;

are taken by tyrants appear

all

of

them
and

to be democratic

such, for instance, as the licence per

mitted to slaves (which
also that of

may
2
.

be to a certain extent advantageous)
children,
a

women and

body

government supporters, for most persons would rather live than in a sober manner.

to live as he likes

Such

and the allowing every will have many
in a disorderly

5

The mere

establishment of a democracy

is

not the only or

principal business of the legislator, or of those

who wish

to

create such a state, for any state,

however badly

constituted,

may
2

last one,

two, or three days
it.

;

a far greater difficulty is the

preservation of

The

legislator should therefore

endeavour to

have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states 3 ;

he should guard against the destructive elements, and should
1

CP

.

iii.

2.

3;

v. 3.
3

2

5.

CP

.

v.

ii.

ii.

Cp. Bk.

v.

Preservation of Democracy
make
all

247
will contain

laws, whether written or unwritten,

which

VI. 5
1320
a

the preservatives of states.

He

must not think the

truly

democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give
the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which
will

make them

last longest

*.

The demagogues
2

of our

own

3

day often get property confiscated
to please the people.
state at heart should counteract

in the

law-courts in order

But those who have the welfare of the
them, and make a law that the

property of the condemned which goes into the treasury should Thus offenders will be as much not be public but sacred.

they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as 4
afraid, for

few as possible, and heavy penalties should be
those

inflicted

on

who

bring groundless accusations

;

for

it is

the practice

to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all equally attached to the state, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies. Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the 5

citizens are very

numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble
paid,

unless they are

and

to

pay them when there are no

revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property-tax and confiscations and cor
rupt practices of the courts, things

which have before now

overthrown many democracies) ; where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the
law-courts should consist of

many

persons,

but
:

sit

for a

few

days only.

This system has two advantages
the poor are paid

first,

the rich 6

do not
selves

fear the expense, even although they are unpaid

them

when
1

;

and secondly, causes are better
2

Cp.v.

u.

2, 3.

CP

.

v.

5.

5.

248
VI. 5
tried,

A

Patriotic

Nobility

for wealthy persons,

although they do not like to be

long absent from their
7

days to the gogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute
the surplus
;

own affairs, do not mind going for a few Where there are revenues the dema law-courts.

the poor are always receiving and always wanting
for such help is like water

poured into a leaky of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of 8 the democracy ; measures also should be taken which will
true friend

more and more, cask. Yet the

give

them

lasting prosperity

;

and as

this is equally the interest

of

all

classes, the

proceeds of the public revenues should be
if possible,
little

accumulated and distributed among them,
quantities as

in

such

may

enable them to purchase a

farm, or, at any

1320 b rate,

make

a beginning in trade

and husbandry.
all,

And

if this

9 benevolence cannot be extended to

money should be dis

tributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in

the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies
;

and should

in return be

excused from useless public services.

By

administering the

state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections

of the

people
10

;

their policy

is

from time to time to send some of

them
is

into their dependent towns,

where they grow

rich

J
.

It

worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work.
also

The example
of imitation,
1 1

for,

of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving by sharing the use of their own property with

the poor, they gain their
all

good

will

2
.

Moreover, they divide

their offices into

two

classes, one-half of them being elected
;

by vote, the other by lot the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better
1
"

Cp.

ii.

ii.

15.

Cp.

ii.

5.

S.

The various I^inds of Oligarchies 249 A like result may be gained by dividing the administered.
same
offices

VI. 5

\ so as to have

two

classes of magistrates, one

chosen by vote, the other by lot. Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies 6
ought to be constituted.

From
ing

these considerations there will be no difficulty in see
oligarchies.

what should be the constitution of

We

must

put together in our minds each form of oligarchy by reasoning

from

its

opposite, calculating the structure of each in relation

to that of the opposite democracy.

The

first

and best attempered of oligarchies

is

akin to a con- 2

government. In this there ought to be two standards the lower of qualification ; the one high, the other low
stitutional

qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the

higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed should have the rights of citizenship. The nature qualification of those admitted should be such as will make the entire 3

governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the
people.

The

principle,

narrowed

a

little,

gives another form

of oligarchy ; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy,

badness.
sailors

which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its 4 For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with

may undergo many mishaps and

survive them, whereas

sickly constitutions

the very least

and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by mistake, so do the worst forms of government 1321

a

require the greatest care.

The
(for

populousness of democracies 5
is to democracy in the whereas the preservation
s

generally preserves

them

number
;

place of justice based on proportion)
1

Reading

rfjs avTijs a.px^s

with Bekker

and ed.

Hoiv
VI. 6 of an

to

Organise an Oligarchy

oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz.

good order.
7

As

there are four chief divisions of the

common
;

people
so also

husbandmen,
the

mechanics,

retail

traders,

labourers

there are four kinds of military forces
infantry,

the cavalry, the heavy
J

light-armed

troops,

the

navy

.

When

the

country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely
to be established.

For the

security of the inhabitants depends

upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep The second form of oligarchy prevails when there horses.
are heavy infantry
2
2
;

for this service is better suited to the rich

But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic and nowadays, when they are so if the two parties the oligarchy are often numerous, quarrel,
than to the poor.
;

worsted by them in the struggle. remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine
a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests being lightly armed, they An fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry.
;

A

3

oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes
raises a

power against

itself.

And

therefore, since the ages

of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young,
taught the agile movements of light-armed troops ; and some, when they grow up, should be selected out of the youth, and
4

become light-armed warriors
also yield a share in the

in reality.

The

oligarchy should

government

to the people, either, as I
3
,

said before, to those
1

who have
2
3

a property qualification
s

or, as

Cp.

iv. 3.

2, 3.

Reading dir\iTi)v with Bekker
Cp.
c. 6. 2.

1st ed.

in

the case of

Thebes

,

to those

who have

abstained for a
or, as at

VI. 7

certain

number of years from mean employments,

Massalia, to

men of

merit

who

are selected for their worthi
5

The magistracies ness, whether [previously] citizens or not. of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the
governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offence at the privileges of their rulers when they see that

It is fitting also that 6 they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent
sacrifices or erect

some

public edifice,

and then the people who
like

participate

in

the entertainments,

and

to

see

the city

decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire

an alteration in the government, and the notables will have

memorials of their munificence.
but the fashion of our

This, however,

is

anything 7

modern
;

oligarchs,

who

are as covetous

of gain as they are of honour

oligarchies like theirs

may

be

well described as petty democracies.
in

Enough of the manner 1321 b which democracies and oligarchies should be organized. Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their 8
.

number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have 2 No state can exist not having the necessary already spoken
offices,

and no

state can

be well administered not having the

offices

which tend

to preserve

harmony and good
s
,

order.

In

2

small states, as

we have

already remarked

there need not be

many of them, and we should
First

but in larger there must be a larger number,
carefully consider

which

offices

may

properly

be united and which separated.

among necessary
i

offices is that

which has the care of
2

3

CP

.

iii.

5.
3

7.

CP

.

iv.

15.

CP

.

iv. 15.

5-7.

2^2
tracts

Offices
;

the Criminal Executive
con

VI. 8 the market

a magistrate should be appointed to inspect

and to maintain order.

For

in

every state there must

inevitably be buyers

and

sellers

who
to

will supply

one another

s

wants

;

this is the readiest
fulfil

way

make

a state self-sufficing

and so
4 state
1
.

A

the purpose for which men come together into one second office of a similar kind undertakes the super

and embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries and other concerns of a like nature.
vision
5

This

is

commonly

called the office of City-warden,

and has

various departments, which, in

more populous towns,

are shared

among
is

different persons, one. for

example, taking charge of the

6 walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbours.

There

another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the

country

:

the

magistrates

who

hold this

office

are

called

Wardens of

the country, or Inspectors of the woods.
is

Besides

these three there

a fourth office of receivers of taxes,

who

have under their charge the revenue which they distribute among the various departments ; these are called Receivers or
7 Treasurers.

Another

officer registers all private contracts,
all

and
all

decisions of the courts,

public indictments,
office again is

and also

preliminary proceedings.
divided, in

This

sometimes sub
all

which case one
are

officer is

appointed over

the rest.

These
8

officers

called

Recorders or Sacred Recorders,

Presidents, and the like.

Next

to these

comes an

office

of which the duties are the

most necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of
1

Cp.

i.

2.

8

;

Nic. Eth.

v. 6.

4;

PI.

Rep.

ii.

369.

Offices

Military and Civil
;

fines from those who are posted up according to the registers VI. 8 and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office 1322 a arises out of the odium which is attached to it ; no one will

undertake

it

unless great profits are to be made, and any one
Still

who
;

does

is

loth to execute the law.

the office

is

necessary
;

for judicial decisions are useless if they take

no

effect
it

and

if

society cannot exist without them, neither can

exist with

out the execution of them.

It is

an office which, being so 10

unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided

among
an

several taken

from

different courts.

In

like

manner

should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are registered as public debtors.
effort

Some
offices

sentences should be executed by officers
;

who have

other

functions
;

penalties for

new

offences should be exacted by

new
for

and as regards those which are not new, when one
;

court has given judgment, another should exact the penalty

example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed

by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be
exacted

ir

when

less

odium attaches
is

to the exaction of

them

;

but a double odium

incurred

when
and

the judges
if

who

have

passed also execute the sentence,

they are always the
all.

executioners, they will be the enemies of

In many places one magistracy has the custody of the prisoners, while another executes the sentence, as, for example, It is well to separate off the jailorthe Eleven at Athens.
ship,

12

and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioner but
;

good men do

they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it ; for they themselves require a
all

guard, and are not

fit

to

guard others.

There ought not

there- 13

2^4
VI. 8
but
it

Offices

Military and Civil

fore to be a single or

permanent officer set apart for this duty ; should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are
should take charge of

organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting
in turn
it.

These
first
:

are the indispensable officers,
in

and should be ranked

next

order follow others, equally necessary, but of

14 higher rank,

are the offices to

and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such which are committed the guard of the city,

and other military functions. Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to In some states there are muster and marshal the citizens.

many such
1

offices

;

in others there are a

few only, while small

5 states are content with

one

;

these officers are called generals

1322 b or commanders.

Again,

if a state

has cavalry or light-armed
it

troops or archers or a naval force,

will

sometimes happen

that each of these departments has separate officers,

who

are

called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of infantry.

And
these

there are subordinate officers called naval and military captains,

and captains of horse

;

having others under them

:

all

!6 are included in the department

of war.

Thus much of military

command.
But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the money, there must of necessity be another office which

public

examines and audits them, and has no other functions.
officers are called
T~

Such

by various names
Besides

Scrutineers,
all

Auditors,
is

Accountants, Controllers.
another which
is

these offices there
this,

supreme over them, and to

which

in a

democracy presides over the assembly, is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures. For that

power which convenes the people must of necessity be the In some places they are called probuli, head of the state.

Offices

of Religion

Summary
8

because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy VI. more commonly councillors 1 These are the chief political 18
.

offices.

Another
of religion
;

set

of

officers is

concerned with the maintenance

and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in
priests

19

larger ones there are a great

many

besides the priesthood

;

for

example, superintendents of sacrifices, guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these 20
there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the
public
priests
;

sacrifices,

such
city.

officers derive their dignity

except any which the law assigns to the from the public hearth
are

of the
2

They

sometimes called archons, sometimes
21

kings

,

and sometimes prytanes.

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows : offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with
the city, with the harbours, with the country
;

also with the

courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of

sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies

and accounts of magistrates

;

lastly,

there are those which pre

side over the public deliberations of the state.

There

are like- 22

wise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good
order
:

such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of
;

the laws, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics
also superintendents of gymnastic

of other similar spectacles. democratic offices ; for example, the guardianships of
1

and Dionysiac contests, and 1323 Some of these are clearly not 23

a

women

Cp.iv. 15.

ii.

2

Cp.

iii.

14.

14.

2f6
VI. 8 and
children
1

Summary
the poor, not having any slaves, must employ
children as servants.

both their
24

women and
:

Once more

there are three forms of the highest elective

offices in states

guardians of the law, probuli, councillors,
aristocratical, the

of these, the guardians of the law are an

the council a democratical institution. probuli an oligarchical,

Enough of

the different kinds of offices.
1

Cp.

iv.

15.

13.

BOOK

VII
VII. 1

HE who would duly enquire about the best form of a state while ought first to determine which is the most eligible life this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be
;

uncertain

;

for, in the

natural order of things, those

may

be

expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. ought there-

We

2

fore to ascertain, first of
life,

all,

which

is

the most generally eligible
or
is

and then whether the same

life is

not best for the state

and for individuals.

Assuming

that

enough has been already said

in exoteric

discourses concerning the best

life, only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute 3 the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them

we

will

now

\ viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who 4 has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice
into three classes

who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest
or prudence,
friend for the sake of half a farthing,
in

and

is

as feeble

and

false

mind

as a child or a

madman.

These

propositions are 5
2
,

universally
1 2

acknowledged as soon as they are uttered
i.

but

men

Op. N. Eth.

8.

2.

Omitting
edition.

liia-ntp,

which

is

bracketed

by

Bekker

in

his

second

Goods of Fortune, and Goods of
VII.
1 differ about the quantity which
superiority of this or that good.
is

the Soul
relative

desirable or the

Some

think that a very
set

moderate amount of virtue
desires of wealth,

is

enough, but

no

limit to their

and the like. property, power, reputation,

6

To whom we
that

reply by an appeal to facts,

which

easily prove

1323 b

by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or
virtue

mankind do not acquire or preserve

both,

is

more

often found with those

who

are

most highly

cultivated in their

mind and

in their character,

and have only

a moderate share of external goods, than

among those who
of experience, but,

possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in

higher qualities
if reflected
7

;

and

this is not only matter

reason.

upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any
all

other instrument \ and
that where there
is

things useful are of such a nature
either

too

much of them they must
is
is

do harm,

or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every
the soul, the greater
8
it is,

good of

also of greater use, if the epithet

useful

as well as

noble

appropriate to such subjects.

No

proof
in

is

required to

show
is

that the best state of one thing

relation to

another

proportioned to the degree of excel
to those states are

by which the natures corresponding so that, if the separated from each other
lence
:

soul

is

more noble

than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either
9 has a similar ratio to the other.

Again,

it is

for the sake of

the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible
at all,

and

all

wise

men ought
1

to choose

them

for the sake of

the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them.

CP

.

i.

8.

15.

Virtue the Source of Happiness
Let us acknowledge then
wise action.
is

279
much of VII.
Ic

that each one has just so

1

happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and

God

is

a witness to us of this truth

l
;

for

he

in

happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of

necessity lies the difference between
for external

good fortune and happiness; come of themselves, and chance is the author goods

2 is just or temperate by or through chance . In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and

of them, but no one

u

which

acts rightly

;

and rightly

it

right actions,

and neither individual nor

cannot act without doing state can do right actions
the courage, justice, and 12

without virtue and wisdom.

Thus

wisdom of
qualities

a

state

have the same form and nature as the

which give the individual who possesses them the
just,

name of

wise,

or temperate.
suffice

by way of preface: for I could not 13 avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them ; these must be reserved for
another discussion.

Thus much may

Let us assume then
states, is

that the best

life,

both for individuals and
con- 1324
over,

the

life

of

virtue, having external goods enough for

the performance of

good

actions.

If there are any

who

a

trovert our assertion,

we

will in this treatise pass

them

and consider

their objections hereafter.

There remains

to be discussed the question,
is

Whether

the

2

happiness of the individual
different
?

the same as that of the state, or

Here

again there can be no doubt

no one denies
2

that they are the same.
1

For those who hold
;

that the well-being
xii.

Cp.

c. 3.

10

N. Eth.
Ethics
i.

x. 8.

7
6.

;

Met.

7.

a

9.

S 2

26 o
VII. 2 of

Is Contemplation best^ or Action ?
who

the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches the happiness of the whole state, and those
value

make

most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city
3
is,

the happier

it

is.

Two
(i),
is

points

here present themselves
is

for consideration

:

first

which

the

more

eligible life,

that of a citizen
alien

who

a

member of
ties
;

a state, or that of an
(2),

who

has no political

and again

which

is

the

best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either

on the supposition that

political privileges are given to all,
?

or

4 that they are given to a majority only
state

Since the good of the

and not of the individual

is

the proper subject of political

thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political dis cussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our
enquiry.
5

Now

it

is

evident that the form of government

is

best in

which every man, whoever he is, can But even those who agree happily.
of virtue
is

act for the best
in

and

live
life
life

thinking that the

the most eligible raise a question, whether the
is

of business and politics

or

is

not more eligible than one
I

which

is

wholly independent of external goods,

mean than

a contemplative life,

which by some

is

maintained to be the

6 only
life

one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives the of the philosopher and the life of the statesman appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in
the pursuit of virtue,

both in our

own and

in

other ages.
;

Which

is

the better

is

a question of no small

moment

for

7

the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think

The

Policy

of

War and

Oppression

261
VII. 2

that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice,
to exercise a constitutional rule over

them, even though not

unjust, is a great

impediment to a man s individual well-being. Others take an opposite view they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits
;

of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as Others, again, are of opinion that by private individuals.
arbitrary
*

and tyrannical
in

rule alone consists with

happiness
*

;

indeed,

some

states the entire

aim of the laws

is

to give

men

And, therefore, 9 despotic power over their neighbours. in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in although
a chaotic state,
still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the maintenance of power system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed
:

with a view to war

2
.

And

in all nations

which

are able to 10

power is held in esteem, for ex ample among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate Celts.
gratify their ambition military

the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where
obtain the honour of wearing as

we

are told that

men
1 1

many

armlets as they have served

There was once a law in Macedonia that he who campaigns. had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the
Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast.

Among the Iberians, whom a man has slain
are fixed in the earth
1

a warlike nation, the number of enemies
is

indicated by the number of spits which round his tomb ; and there are numerous

12

Or, inserting
in

KOLL

translator),

some cases the

before vufjuav (apparently the reading of the old entire aim both of the constitution and the

laws.
2

Cp. Plato, Laws,

i.

633

ff

262
VII. 2
practices

War
among

not the Supreme

End
some of them
to a reflecting

other nations of a like kind,

established by law and others by custom.

Yet

13

must appear very strange that the statesman should be considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over always How can that which others, whether they will or not.
it

mind

is

not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the
?

legislator
justice,

Unlawful
there

it

certainly

is

to rule without regard to

for

may be might where

there
;

is

no

right.

The
is

other arts and sciences offer no

parallel

a physician

not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot

14 the passengers in his ship. a despotic government
affirm to be unjust
is

Yet many appear
their

to think that

a true political form,

and what men
case they are

not

ashamed of

and inexpedient in practising towards

own
;

others

they

demand

justice

for themselves, but

where other men are concerned

15 they

care

unless the one party
to serve, in
all

Such behaviour is irrational; nothing about it. is born to command, and the other born
which case men have
a right to

command, not
are

indeed
to

their
;

fellows,
just

but only

those

who

intended

be

subjects

as

we ought
that

not to

hunt mankind,

whether for food or
intended
1

sacrifice,

but only the animals which are
is

for

food

or

sacrifice,

to

say, such

wild
city

6 animals
a

as

are eatable.

And

surely there

may

be a

1325

happy
(for

in isolation,

which we

will

assume

to be well-governed

it is

quite possible that a city thus isolated

might be well-

administered and have good laws) ; but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of Hence all that sort of 17 enemies thing must be excluded.

we
to

see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally

be

deemed honourable,
but

are

not the

supreme end of

all

things,

only

means.

And

the good

lawgiver should

The
enquire

False

and True Idea of a
and
races
life,

T(uler

26$

how

states

of men
in the

and

communities VII. 2
is

may
same

participate in a

good

and

happiness which

attainable
;

His enactments will not be always the by them. and where there are neighbours J he will have to deal

18

with them according to their characters, and to see what The end at which duties are to be performed towards each.
the best

form of government should aim may be properly
2
.

made

a matter of future consideration

Let us now address those who, while they agree that the 3 about the manner life of virtue is the most eligible, differ
of practising
think that the
it.

For some renounce
of the freeman
all

political

power,

and
of
life

life

is

different

from the

life

the statesman and the best of

;

but others think the

of the statesman best.

The argument
cannot do

of the

latter

is

that

he

who

does

nothing

well,

and that virtuous
:

To both we say with happiness. you The first class are right and partly wrong. in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble
activity is identical

are partly right

a

in

having the use of a

slave,

in

so far as he

is

a slave;

or in issuing

commands about

necessary things.

But

it

is

an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference

between the
there
is

rule over

freemen and the rule over slaves as

between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of
this
tivity

treatise

3
.

And

it

is

equally a mistake to place inac- 3

above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble.
1

Cp.

ii.

6.

a

7;

7. 3

14.

CP

.

c.

14.

Cp.

i.

c.

5,6,7.

VII. 3

But perhaps some one, accepting these premisses, may
maintain that supreme power
is

still

the best of

all

things, because

the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number If so, the man who is able to rule, 4 of noble actions.
instead of giving up anything to his neighbour, ought rather to

take

away

his

power

;

and the father should make no account
;

of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend they should not bestow a thought on one another in com parison with this higher object, for the best is the most

There might be some eligible and doing well is the best. 1325 b truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers But this can never be ; and hence we 5 attain the chief good.
infer the view to be false.

For

the actions of a ruler cannot
as

really be honourable, unless he

is

much

superior to other

men

as a

husband

is

to a wife, or a father to his children,

or a master to his slaves. the law can

And

therefore he

who

violates

never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals share alike in the honourable and the just, as is just

6

and equal. But that the unequal should be given and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary and nothing which is contrary to nature is good.
fore, there is

to equals, to nature,
If,

there

any one

l

superior in virtue

and

in the

performing the best actions,

him we ought

to

power of follow and

7 obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as
virtue.

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for 8 the Not that a life city collectively, and for individuals.
of

action

must necessarily have
1

relations to others, as
1

some

Cp.

iii.

13.

25, ana

7.

7.

The
persons

Conditions of the Perfect State
think,

2.65

nor

are

those

ideas

only

to

be

regarded

VII. 3

as practical

which

are pursued for the sake of practical results,

but

much more

the thoughts and contemplations which are

independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous is an end, and even in the case activity, and therefore action,

of external actions the directing
to act.

mind

is

most

truly

said

necessary that states which are 9 cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive ;
Neither, again,
is it

be activity also in the parts ; there are many ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this 10
for there

may

were otherwise,

God

and the universe,

who
1 ,

have no external

actions over and above their

far enough energies Hence it is evident that the same life is from perfection. best for each individual, and for states, and for mankind

own

would be

collectively.

Thus
I

far

by way of introduction.
other

have

discussed
first

remains, the

In what has preceded of government ; in what point to be considered is what should be the

4

forms

conditions of the ideal or perfect state

;

for the perfect state
life.

2

cannot exist without a due supply of the means of
therefore
tions
2
,

And
certain

we must
but

presuppose

many

purely imaginary condi
will

nothing impossible.

There

be

a

number
like.

of citizens, a country in

which

to place them,

and the
artisan 3

As
is

the weaver or shipbuilder
for his

or

any other
in

must have the material proper
as this
nobler),

work (and

proportion 1326 a

better prepared,

so will the result of his art be

so the

statesman or legislator must also have the

materials suited to him.

First
1

among
c. i.

the materials required
10.

by the statesman
2

is

4

Cp.

Cp.

ii.

6.

7.

266
VII. 4
population
:

The Number of
he
will consider

the Citizens

what should be the number and

character of the citizens, and then

what should be the

size

and character of the country.
state in order to be

Most persons think
;

that a
if

are right, they have
5 state.

happy ought to be large but even no idea what is a large and what

they

a small

the size of the city by the number whereas they ought to regard, not their ; has number, but their power. city too, like an individual, a work to do ; and that city which is best adapted to the

For they judge of

of the inhabitants

A

fulfilment

of

its

work

is

to
in

be

deemed

greatest,

in

the

same sense of the word great
called greater, not as a

which Hippocrates might be man, but as a physician, than some one

6 else

numbers,

who was taller. And even if we reckon greatness by we ought not to include everybody, for there must
in cities
;

always be
foreigners

a multitude

of slaves and sojourners and

but

of the
of the

state,

we should include those only who are members and who form an essential part of it. The number

which produces numerous

proof of the greatness of a city ; but a city artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded
latter is a

7

with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very can rarely, if ever, be well governed ; since all populous city cities which have a reputation for good government have a
limit

of population.

We

may

argue on grounds of reason, and

8 the
is

same

result will follow.
;

For law

is

order,

and good law

but a very great multitude cannot be orderly : to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine

good order

power
9
is

of such a power as holds together the universe.

Beauty

number and magnitude *, and the state which com bines magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most
realized in
1

Cp. Poet.

7.

4.

The Number of
beautiful.

the Citizens
is

2.67
is

To

the size of states there

a limit, as there

to

VII. 4

other things, plants, animals, implements ; for none of these 10 retain their natural power when they are too large or too small,
but they either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled.

For

example *,
at all,

a ship

which

is

only a span long will not be a ship
;

nor a ship a quarter of a mile long

yet there

may be

a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which
will
still

when

In like manner a state 1326 b be a ship, but bad for sailing. composed of too few is not as a state ought to be, self;

sufficing

when of
it is

too many, though self-sufficing in

all

mere

necessaries,

a nation and not a state, being almost incap

able of constitutional government.

For who can be

the general

of such a vast multitude, or voice of a Stentor ?

who

the herald, unless he have the

A

state then

only begins to exist

when

it

has

attained

good life in the political com But, munity : it may indeed somewhat exceed this number. as I was What should be saying, there must be a limit.
a population sufficient for a

1

2

the limit will be easily ascertained by experience.

For both
special

governors and governed have duties to perform ; the functions of a governor are to command and to judge.
if

But

13

the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices
to
;

according
characters

merit,

then

they

must know

each

other s

where
election

both
will

the

they do not possess this knowledge, to offices and the decision of lawsuits
the
population
is

go wrong.

When
at

very large they
clearly

are

manifestly settled

haphazard,

which

ought

not to be.

Besides, in an overpopulous state foreigners and 14

metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out ? Clearly, then, the best limit of the population
1

Cp.

v. 9.

7.

268
VII. 4 of
a state
is

The

Situation of the City
number which
suffices for the

the largest

pur

poses of

life,

and can be taken

in at a single view.

Enough

5

concerning the size of a city. Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the
state
is
:

every one would agree in praising the
entirely self-sufficing
;

state

which
state

most
is

and that must be the
have
all

which
nothing
as
2

all-producing,
sufficiency.

for to

things and to want
it

is

In size and extent

should be such

may

enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally

of leisure *. Whether we are right or down this limit we will enquire more precisely 2 hereafter when we have occasion to consider what is the a matter which is much right use of property and wealth disputed, because men are inclined to rush into one of two
in

the enjoyment
in

wrong

laying
,

:

3

extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury. It is not difficult to determine the general character of
the territory which
is there are, however, some required on which military authorities should be heard they points tell us that it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and Further, we require that easy of egress to the inhabitants.
; ;

13 27 a

the land as well as the inhabitants of

whom we

were just now

speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the
position of the city, if

we could have what we

wish,

it

should

4 be well situated in regard both to sea or land.
is

This then

one principle, that it should be a convenient centre for the protection of the whole country : the other is, that it should
be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any other products.

6

Whether
1

a
ii.

communication with the sea
6.
a

is

beneficial
infra
(,?).

to

Cp.

9.

Cp.

c.

8-10

Proximity of the Sea, Good, or Evil?
a well-ordered state or not asked.
It is
is a

269

question

which has often been VII. 6

argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order (for a maritime people will always have
a

crowd of merchants coming and
is

going), and that intercourse
2

by sea

inimical
it

considerations,
a view to safety
city

good government *. Apart from these would be undoubtedly better, both with
to
to the provision

and

of necessaries, that the

territory should be connected with the sea ; the 3 defenders of a country, if they are to maintain themselves

and

against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land

and

they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use

by sea

;

and even

if

both.

Moreover,
is

it is

necessary that they should import from 4

own country, and that they should export what they have in excess ; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.
abroad what
not found in their

Those who make themselves
do so
desire
for the sake of revenue,
profit

a market for the world only and if a state ought not to
to

of this kind

it

ought not

have such

an

emporium.

Nowadays we

often see in countries and cities 5

dockyards and harbours very conveniently placed outside the and they are kept in dependence by city, but not too far off;
walls and
similar fortifications.
Cities thus situated

mani

the benefit festly reap

any harm which

is

of intercourse with their ports ; and likely to accrue may be easily guarded

against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine

who

may

hold communication with one another, and who may not. There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate 6
1

Cp. Plato, Laws,

iv.

704

ff.

270
VII. 6
1327 b

The Character of
is

the Citizens
city
;

naval force

advantageous to
their
their

a

the

citizens require

such
be
if

a

force for
to

own

needs, and they should also
in

formidable

neighbours

certain

cases

*,

or,

necessary, able to assist

them by

sea as well as by land.

7

The
is

relative

proper number or magnitude of this naval force is for if her function to the character of the state
;

to take a leading part in politics

be commensurate

her naval power should with the scale of her enterprises. The
.

2

population of the state
8 there is

need not be much increased,
:

since

the no necessity that the sailors should be citizens marines who have the control and command will be freemen,
also
to

and belong

the

infantry;

and wherever there

is

a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will Of this we see always be sailors more than enough. The city of Heraclea, for instances at the present day.

example, although small in comparison with many others, can Such are our conclusions respect 9 man a considerable fleet. the territory of the state, its harbour, its towns, its ing
relations to the sea,

and

its

maritime power.

7

Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will This is proceed to speak of what should be their character.
a subject
casts
his

which can be
eye

easily

on

the

more celebrated

understood by any one who states of Hellas,
in

and generally on the distribution of races
2

the habitable

world.

Those who
are full

live in a cold

climate and in [northern]
intelligence

Europe
skill
;

of

spirit,

but wanting in

and
have

and therefore

they

keep

their

freedom,

but

no

political

others.
1

and are incapable of ruling over Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and
organization,
6.
7.
s first

Cp.
2

ii.

Reading noXtrtKuv with the MSS. and Bekker

edition.

The
in a state
is

Character of the Citizens

271

inventive, but they are wanting in spirit,

always
race,

which

and therefore they are VII. 1 But the Hellenic 3 of subjection and slavery. situated between them, is likewise intermediate
l
.

in character,
it

being high-spirited and also intelligent
is

Hence

continues free, and

the best governed of any nation, and,

if it

could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the

world.

There
;

are also similar differences in the different tribes 4

of Hellas

for

some of them

are of a one-sided nature,

and

are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a

And clearly those whom happy combination of both qualities. the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected
to be both intelligent

and courageous.

Some

[like

Plato

2

]

5

say

that

the

guardians

whom
know.

they know, fierce

should be friendly towards those towards those whom they do not
the quality of the soul which begets 1328
;

Now,

passion

is

a

friendship and inspires affection
is

notably the spirit within us

more

stirred

against our friends
are

and acquaintances than

against those
are despised

who

unknown
;

to us,

when we

think that

we

by them

for

which reason Archilochus, com- 5

plaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these

words,

For wert thou not plagued on account of

friends

3 ?

The power

of

command and
this quality,
is it

the love of freedom are in
is

all

men based upon Nor invincible.
fierce

for passion

commanding and

right to say that the guardians should be j

towards those

whom

they do not know, for
;

we ought
not

not to be out of temper with any one
1

and a lofty
*

spirit is
ii.

Rep. 375. 435 , 436 Cp. Plato, Rep. Or : For surely thou art not plagued on account of thy friends ? The line is probably corrupt. Better to read with Bergk, av -yelp Sr/ wapit.
8
<]>i\cav

iv.

A.

dir&yx*o,

for

thou indeed wert plagued by

friends.

272
VII. 7
fierce

The Passionate Nature
by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers.
this, as

And
8

I

was saying

before,

is

a feeling

which men

strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands as indeed is reason
:

show most

able

;

for, besides the actual

injury,

they seem to be de
one.

prived of a benefit by those
saying,

who owe them

Hence

the

Cruel

is

the strife of brethren

a
;

and again,

9

They who love Thus we have nearly
of the citizens of our
their territory.
I

in

excess also hate

in

excess

1
.

determined the number and character

state,

and also the
for
2
.

size

and nature of
not to require

say

nearly,

we ought

the same minuteness in theory as in fact

8

As
site

in

other natural compounds the conditions of a
are not necessarily organic parts of
it,

compo

whole

so in a state

or in any other combination forming a unity not everything
2 is

a part,

which

is a

necessary condition
necessarily

3
.

The members

of

an

association

have

some one thing the same

3 for

all, in which they share equally or unequally ; But where example, food or land or any other thing. there are two things of which one is a means and the other

and common to

receives

an end, they have nothing in common except that the one what the other produces. Such, for example, is the

relation in

which workmen and
and
the
builder
is

tools stand to their

work

;

the
4 the

house
art

of the builder

have nothing in common, but And for the sake of the house.
but property,
is

so states require property,

even though living
state
;

beings are included in
1

it

4
,

no part of a
2 *

for a state is
9, infra.

Eurip. Frag. 51 Diiulorf.
3

Cp. 12.
i.

Cp.

iii.

5.

2.

Cp.

4.

2.

The Necessary
not
a

Conditions of a State
beings only, but a
life

273

community of
is

living

community VII. 8
5

of equals, aiming
happiness
practice of virtue,

at the

best

possible.

Now, whereas
little

the highest good, being a realization and perfect

which some

attain,

while others have

or none

of

it,

the various qualities

of

men

are clearly the

reason

why

there are various kinds of states and
;

many forms
happiness in

of government
different

for different

men
life

seek

after

ways and by

different

themselves different modes of

means, and so make for 1328 b and forms of government.

We
will

the existence of a state, for what

must see also how many things are indispensable to 6 we call the parts of a state
be

found among them.

Let us then enumerate the
what we want
:

functions of a state, and
First, there

we

shall easily elicit
;

must be food
;

secondly, arts, for life requires 7
for

many instruments thirdly, there must be arms, members of a community have need of them in
maintain
authority

the

order to

both
;

against

disobedient

subjects

and

against external assailants

fourthly, there must be a certain
internal
first,

amount of revenue,
purposes of war of religion, which
;

both for

needs
there

and

for

the

fifthly,
is
all,

or rather

must be a care
;

commonly

called worship

sixthly,

and

most necessary of
is

there must be a

power of deciding what
just in

for the public interest,

and what

is

men

s dealings

with one another.

These
need.

are the things

For

a state is not a

which every state may be said to 8 mere aggregate of persons, but
l

a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life ; and if any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible state then 9 that the community can be self-sufficing.

A

1

Cp. supra,

c. 5.

I.

DAVIS

X

274
VII. 8 should

The Necessary
be

Conditions of a State
and and

framed with a view to the fulfilment of these

functions.

There must be husbandmen

to procure food,
priests,

artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and l judges to decide what is just and expedient.

9

Having determined these
to consider
tion.
cillor,

points,

we have

in the

next place

of occupa ought Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, coun
all

whether

to share in every sort

judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons ? or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals and others common to
all
?

The

question, however, does not occur in every state
saying,
all

;

2

as

we were

may be shared by
2
;

all,

or not

all

by

all,

but only
states,

some by some

and hence
all

arise the differences
all,

of

for in democracies

share in
since

in oligarchies the

3 opposite practice prevails.

we are here speaking of the best form of government, and that under which the state will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said,

Now,

cannot exist without virtue
state

s ),

it

clearly follows that in the

which

is

best governed the citizens

who

are absolutely

and not merely relatively just men must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical 4 Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is 4 to virtue
.

1328 a

necessary both for the development of virtue and the perform

ance of

political

duties.
is in a state

Again, there
of councillors,

a class of warriors, and another

who

advise about the expedient and determine

matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of
a state.

Now,
1

should these two classes be distinguished, or

5 are both functions to be assigned to the

same persons
second edition.

?

Here

2

Cp.

iv.

Reading SiKai&v with Bekker 3 4 and 14. Cp. c. 8. 5.

in his
*

Cp. Plato, Laws,

xi.

919.

The Governing
again there
is

Classes

27?
in

no

difficulty in seeing that

both functions will

VII. 9

one way belong to the same,

in another, to different persons.

To

different persons in so far as their
life,

to different ages of

for the one requires

employments are suited wisdom, and the
it

other strength.

But on the other hand, since

is

an im

possible thing that those

who

are able to use or to resist force

point of view the persons are the

should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this same ; for those who carry
fate

arms can always determine the

of the constitution.

It 6

remains therefore that both functions of government should be
entrusted to the same persons, not, however, at the same time,

but in the order prescribed by nature,

men

strength and to older

who has given to young men wisdom. Such a distribution

of duties will be expedient and also just, for it is in accordance with desert. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of
property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should

7

be

in

class

whereas mechanics or any other good circumstances whose art excludes the art of virtue have no share in the
;

state. This follows from our first principle, for happiness can not exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all *.

And

clearly property should be in their hands, since the hus- 8
will

bandmen

Of the
the

of necessity be slaves or barbarians or Perioeci 2 . classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and
in

manner

which

their office is to be regulated is obvious.

No
the

husbandman or mechanic should be appointed

to

it ;

for 9

should receive honour from the citizens only. Now since the body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the

Gods

warriors and the councillors

worship of the
1

Gods
27,

and it is beseeming that the ; should be duly performed, and also a
2

Cp.

ii.

5.

28

Cp.

infra, c. 10.

13, 14.

T

3

2 VII. 9

j6

Warriors
in

Councillors
service for those

Priests

rest

provided

their

given up active life

to the old

who from age have men of these two classes should

be assigned the duties of the priesthood.
10

We
of
all

what the

have shown what are the necessary conditions, and parts of a state husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers
:

kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the And these parts of the state are the warriors and councillors.
are distinguished severally

from one another, the
in others not.

distinction

being in

some cases permanent,

It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers 1329 b that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the

1O

warriors should

be

separated from the husbandmen.

The
in

system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and

was
2

established, as tradition says,

by a law of Sesostris

The institution of common Egypt an d of Minos in Crete. tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as
old as the reign of Minos, and in Italy far older.
historians say that there

3

The

Italian

was

a certain Italus king of Oenotria,

from
the

whom

the Oenotrians were called Italians, and
Italy to the

who

gave

promontory of Europe lying between the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one
4 another only half a

name of

day

s

journey.

They

say that this Italus

converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and
besides other laws which he gave them,
their

was the founder of

our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his.

common

meals

;

even

in

5

On
are

the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici,

who
! ,

now,

as of old, called

Ausones

;

and on the side towards
the

lapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtis
1

Retaining the reading of the MSS., which Bekker
s.

in

his

second

edition has altered into Stpiris, a conjecture of Goettling

Ancient Egypt-) Crete, Italy
Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. of the world originally came the institution of
the separation into castes [which
for the reign of Sesostris is

277

From this part VII. 10 common tables
;

was much

older] from Egypt,

of Minos.

It is true indeed that these

of far greater antiquity than that and many other things 7
in the

have been invented several times over *
or rather times without
to have taught

course of ages,

number

;

for necessity

may be supposed

men

the inventions which were absolutely re

and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by
quired,

degrees.

And we may

infer that in political institutions the
2

same

rule holds.

Egypt

witnesses to the antiquity of

all

8

things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the

most

ancient

;

and they have laws and a regular constitution [existing

should therefore make the best from time immemorial]. s and try to supply use of what has been already discovered
,

We

defects.

those

have already remarked that the land ought to belong to 9 who possess arms and have a share in the government *, and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them ;
I

and I have determined what should be the extent and nature

Let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the territory. of the land, and the character of the agricultural class ; for
I

do not think
1

that property ought to be
iii.

common,
1074

as

some

Cp. Plato, Laws,
ii.

676

;

Aristotle,

Metaph.

xi. 8.

b.

10; and

Pol.
2

5.

l6(note).
i.

Cp. Metaph.
ii.

I.

16; Meteor,

i.

14.

352

b.

19; Plato, Timaeus,

656, 657. 3 Reading, with Bekker in his second edition, tvprjutvots which may have been altered into flprjfj.fvots from a confusion of (iprjrcu irpintpov
:

22 B; Laws,

in
4

9

infra.
c. 9.

Cp. supra,

5-7.

278
VII. 10
1330
a

Private Landholders
l
,

Common

hleals

maintain
a

but only that by friendly consent there should be
use of
it
;

common

and that no

citizen should be in

want of

subsistence.

As to common meals,
10 ordered city

there

is

a general

agreement that a wellwill hereafter explain

should have them

;

and we

what

are our

own

reasons for taking this view.
all

They
yet
it

ought,
is

however, to be open to

the citizens

2
.

And
sum

not

easy for the poor to contribute the requisite
private means,

out of their

11

The and to provide also for their household. of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. expense The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public
and the other
private,

and each part should be subdivided,

half of the public land being appropriated to the service of

the

common

to defray the cost of the while of the private land, half should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that each

Gods, and the other half used
meals
;

citizen having

two
is

lots

they

may

all

of them have land
in

in
s
,

both
it

places

;

there

justice

and fairness

such a division
in their

and

1

2

tends to inspire unanimity among people wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are
too ready to
are

the

border

come

to

so cautious

that they
is

blows with their neighbours, while others quite lose the sense of honour.
law
in

Wherefore there

a

some

places

which forbids those

who

dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbours, on the ground that their interests
13 will pervert their

then, the land
1

judgment. For the reasons already mentioned, should be divided in the manner described.

Cp.

ii.

5.

:!

Cp. Plato, Laws,
ii.

in

Rook

6.

C P ii. 9. 31. 745, v/here the same proposal is found. Aristotle, 15, condemns the division of lots which he here
2
.

v.

adopts.

The Land and
The
very best thing of
all
all

its Cultivators
that the
1

279
for if

would be

husbandmen should VII. 10
spirited,

be slaves, not

of the same race

and not

they have no

they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The
spirit

next best thing would be that they should be Perioeci of foreign race 2 , and of a like inferior nature ; some of them should be 14
the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates

of

men of

property, the remainder should be the property of

the state and employed on the explain what
is

common

land

s
.

I will hereafter

the proper treatment of slaves, and

why

it

is

expedient that liberty should be always held out to
the reward of their services.

them

as

We

have already said that the city should be open to the 11
to the

land and

sea

4
,

and

to

the

as possible.

In respect of the place
it,

whole country as far itself our wish would

be to find a situation for
first,

fortunate in four things.
:

The
2

health

this is a necessity

cities

which

lie

towards the

east,

and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, next in healthfulness are those which are are the healthiest
;

sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter.

The
latter

site

of the

city

should likewise be convenient

both 1330 b

for political administration
it

and for war.
easy
egress
to

With
the
difficult

a

view to the 3

should

afford

citizens,

and

at the

same time be inaccessible and
5
.

enemies

of capture to There should be a natural abundance of springs
in the

and fountains

town

or, if there is a deficiency

of them,

great reservoirs

may be

established
fail

for

the

collection

of

rain-water, such as will not
1

when

the inhabitants are cut
*

Cp. Plato, Laws,
Cp.
ii.

vi.

777.

Cp.
Cp.

c. 9. c. 5.

8.
3.

3

7.

23.
5

Repetition of

c. 5.

3.

28 o
VII. 11

The

City: Sanitary

Conditions

off from the country by war. Special care should be taken 4 of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on

the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to
are exposed,

which they
;

and secondly, on the use of pure water this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support
5 are

of the body contribute most to health, and among these water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is

a

want of pure water, and the supply

is

not

all

equally good,
is

the drinking water ought to be separated from that which

used for other purposes.

As

to strongholds, varies
:

what

is

suitable to different
is

forms of

government
6

thus an acropolis

suited to an oligarchy
;

or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy
aristocracy,

neither to an
places.

but

rather

a

number of strong

The

arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more convenient if the streets are
regularly laid out after

the

modern fashion which Hippoit

damus

1

introduced
building,

;

but for security in war the antiquated
difficult for strangers to get

mode of
out

which made

of a town and for assailants to find their

way

in,

is

7 preferable.

A
it

city

building as

:

is

should therefore adopt both plans of possible to arrange the houses irregularly,

The whole town

what are called clumps. should not be laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions ; thus security and beauty will be combined.

husbandmen

plant their vines in

8

As

to

walls,

those

who

2

say

that

cities

making any
cities

pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite

out of date in their notions
1

;

and they may see the
Cp. Plato, Laws,
vi.

Cp.

ii.

8.

i.

778, 779.

Military Requirements
which prided themselves on
there
is
little

.

281
VII. 11
9

this

fancy confuted by facts.

True, courage shown in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character but the superiority of the and not much superior in number
;

besiegers
resist,

may be and and too much

often
for

beyond the power of men to the valour of a few ; and if they
is a

are to be saved

wall will

and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest 1331 be the best defence of the warrior, more especially
catapults

now

that

and

to such perfection.

To

siege engines have been brought have no walls would be as foolish 10

as to choose a site for a
level

town

in

an exposed country, and to should

the heights

;

or as if an individual were to leave his

house unwalled,

lest

the

inmates

become cowards.
surrounded
cities

Nor must we
by walls

forget that those

who have

their cities

11

may

either take advantage of

them or

not, but

which

are unwalled have

no choice.

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental,
as well as useful for warlike purposes,

modern
all

inventions.

For

as

the

assailants

and adapted to resist of a city do

12

they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should
already

make use of any means of defence which have been
discovered, and should devise and invent others,

for

when

men
them.

are well prepared

no enemy even thinks of attacking

As
built

the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers
suitable intervals,
at

12

at

and the body of
tables,

citizens
will

must

be

distributed

common

the

idea

naturally
tables
:

occur that

we

should establish some of the

common

in the guardhouses.

The

the principal

common

arrangement might be as follows tables of the magistrates will occupy

2

282
VII. 12
a suitable place,

Public Buildings
and there also
will be the buildings appro
in the

priated to religious worship except

case of those rites

which the law or the
1

3 special

locality

.

The

Pythian oracle has restricted to a site should be a spot seen far and

wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the Near this spot should be established an neighbourhood.
agora, such as that

which the Thessalians
trade should

call

the

freemen

s

4 agora

;

from

this all

be

excluded,

and no

mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, It would be unless he be summoned by the magistrates.
a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of
5 the elder

men were performed

there.

For
2
,

2

in

this noble

practice

different

ages should be

separated

and

some of

the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown

agora]

up men remain with the magistrates [i. e. for the presence of the magistrates ;

in
is

the freeman s
the best

mode

There should of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. also be a traders agora, distinct and apart from the other, in
a

situation

which

is

convenient for the reception of goods

both by sea and land.

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another section of the citizens, viz. the priests, for whom
public
7

tables

should

likewise be provided in

their

proper

place

near the

temples.

The

magistrates

who

deal

with

summonses, and the like, and those who have the care of the agora and of the city respectively,
contracts, indictments,

ought to be established near the agora and in some public place of meeting ; the neighbourhood of the traders agora the upper agora we devote to will be a suitable spot
; 1

Cp. Plato, Laws,

v.

738

;

-

Or

this institution should

viii. vi. 759, 778 848. be divided according to ages.
;

The End of
the
life

the State
is

and

the

Means

283
VII. 12

of

leisure, the other

intended for the necessities of

trade.

The same

order should prevail

1

in the country,

for there 8

too the magistrates, called by

and by others Wardens houses and common tables while they are on duty

Inspectors of Forests, of the Country, must have guard

some

; temples should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated,

some
But

to
it

Gods, and some to heroes. would be a waste of time

for

us to linger

over 9

details like these.

The

difficulty

is

not in imagining but in

carrying
like,

them

out.

We

may

talk about

them

as

much

as

we

but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present.

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to 13 determine out of what, and what sort of, elements the state

which

is

to be

There
them

are
is

two things

happy and well-governed should be composed. in which all one of well-being consists
;

2

the choice of a right end and aim of action, and

the other the discovery

of the

actions

which are means

towards

means and the end may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they
it
;

for the

to attain it ; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to themselves a bad end, and some times they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine ;
fail

physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and
also the

In

all arts

means which they use may not effect the desired end. and sciences both the end and the means should be
all men manifestly 3 but to others, from attaining,

equally within our control.

The
desire,

happiness and

well-being

which

some have the power of
1

Reading

vtytfjojaffai

with Bekker

s first

edition.

284 The Good Life Requires External Goods
VII. 13 some accident
1332
a

or defect of nature, the attainment of
for a

them

is

not granted

;

good

life

requires a supply of external
are in a

goods,

in

a

less

degree

when men

good
state.

state, in

4 a greater degree
again,

when they

are in a

lower

Others

possess the condition of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our
object
is to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly

who

ascertain the nature of happiness.
5

Ethics if the arguments there adduced of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute.
,

We have said in the

J

are

6

And
in

I

used the term

conditional

to express that

which
is

is

indispensable, and
itself.

absolute

to express that
;

which

good

Take

the case of just actions
a

just punishments

and chastisements do indeed spring from
they are good only because
it

good

principle, but

we

cannot do without them

would be

better that neither individuals nor states should

7

need anything of the sort but actions which aim at honour The conditional and advantage are absolutely the best.
action
is

only the choice

2

of a lesser

evil

;

whereas these are

the

foundation and creation of good.

A

good man may
ills

make
of
life

the best even of poverty and disease, and the other

but he can only attain happiness under the opposite ; 3 conditions As we have already said in the Ethics 4
. , 1

Cp. N. Eth.

2

2 and cp. c. 8. i. x. 6. 15 7. Retaining the MSS. reading a peffis with Bekker s
; ;

5, supra.
first

edition.

3
1

N. Eth.

i.

10.
4.

12-14.
4, 5
;

N. Eth.

iii.

E. E.

vii.

15.

4

;

M. M.

ii.

9.

3.

The Good Life Requires External Goods
the

285"

good man good

is

he to whom, because he
his

is

virtuous, the

VII. 13

It is also plain that his use 8 good. of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense

absolute

is

good.

This makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instru
ment and not
It

to the skill of the performer. follows then from what has been said that some things

the legislator must find ready to his

hand

in a

state,
:

others

he must provide.

say May 9 our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed

And

therefore

we

can only

with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknow ledge her power) : whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge

and purpose. city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in
our state
enquire
all

A

the citizens share in the government a

;

let

us then

how
all

man becomes
would be
involved.

virtuous.

For even

if

we

could 10

suppose

the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them,
better, for
in

yet the latter
virtue

the virtue of each the

of

all is

There

are three things

which make men good and
*.

virtuous:

these are nature, habit, reason

In the

first

place, every
;

one
the

1 1

must be born a man and not some other animal
second place, he

in

must have a

certain

character,

both
in

of

body and
at birth, gifts

soul.

But some

qualities there is

no use

having

for they are altered by habit, and there are some 1332 b of nature which may be turned by habit to good or

bad.

Most

animals lead a
are
1

life

of nature, although

in lesser 12

particulars

some

influenced
Cp. N. Eth. x.

by habit as
9.

well.

Man

6.

28 6
VII. 13 has

How Men

become Good
man
1

reason, in addition, and

only

.

Wherefore

nature,

habit, reason must be in harmony with one another [for they

do not always agree]
13 nature, if

;

men do many
them

things against habit and

reason persuades

that they ought.

We

have

already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator 2 All else is the work
.

of education
instruction.

;

we

learn

some

things by habit and

some by

14

subjects,

Since every political society is composed of rulers and let us consider whether the relations of one to
other should interchange or

the

be permanent

3
.

For the

education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer
2

given to this question.
in the

Now,

if

some men excelled others

same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general, having in the first place a great
advantage even in their bodies, and secondly in their minds, so that the superiority of the governors 4 over their subjects

was patent and undisputed 4
once for
3
all

,

it

would

clearly be better that
K
.

the one class should rule and the others serve
this
is

But

since

unattainable,

and kings have

no marked

superiority over their subjects,

found among the Indians,

it

is

such as Scylax affirms to be obviously necessary on many

grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same
treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand For [if the government 4 which is not founded upon justice.

be unjust] every one in the country unites with the governed
1

Cp.

i.

2.

10.

3

Cp. supra,

c.

3

7.

4.

Cp.

iii.

6.

9.

Or, taking rois dp\o/j,tvois with to their subjects.
*

*

<pavfpdi> }

was undisputed and patent

Cp.

i.

5.

8;

iii.

13.

13.

Same Persons
in the desire to

Jailers

and
it is

Subjects

287
VII. 14

have a revolution, and

an impossibility that

members of the government can be so numerous as to be Yet that governors stronger than all their enemies put together.
the

should excel their subjects
be effected, and in what

is

undeniable.
will

How

all

this is to

way they

respectively share in

the government, the legislator has to consider. The subject has been already mentioned *. Nature herself has given the principle of choice when she made a difference between old

5

and young (though they are really the same in kind), of whom she fitted the one to govern and the others to be governed.

No

one takes offence at being governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, espe
cially if

he will enjoy the same privilege
conclude

when he

reaches the

required age.

We

that

and governed are

identical,

from one point of view governors 6 And and from another different.

therefore their education must be the

same and

also different. 1333 a

For he
first

who would
all

learn to
to

command
2
.

well must, as

men
the

say,
first

of

learn

obey

As

I

observed

in

rule which is for the sake part of this treatise, there is one of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the

ruled

3
;

the former

is

a despotic, the latter a free government. 7

Some commands
in the intention

differ

not

in

the

thing

commanded,
to

but

many

with which they are imposed. apparently menial offices are an honour

Wherefore,
the
free
differ
in

youth by whom they are performed ; for actions do not as honourable or dishonourable in themselves so much as

the

end and intention of them.
of the citizen and ruler
1 8

is

But since we say * that the virtue 8 the same as that of the good man,
2

Cp.

c.

9.

5.

Cp.
*

iii.

4.

14.
5.

Cp.

iii.

6.

6.

Cp.

iii.

4 and

10.

288
VII. 14 and

Who must Learn
same person must

Rule by Obedience
first

that the

be a subject and then

become good men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life.
a ruler, the legislator has to see that they 9

Now
in

the soul of
in

man

is

divided into two parts, one of

which has reason
itself,
is

itself, and the other, not having reason able to obey reason \ And we call a man

good because he has
10 matter of

the virtues of these
is

two

parts.
is

In

which of them the end
doubt to those

more

likely to

be found

no
in

who

adopt our division;

for

the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists
for the sake

superior

is

that

of the better or superior, and the better or The reason too, in which has reason.
speaking,
is

our ordinary
1 1

way of

divided into two parts, for
,

and a speculative reason 2 and there must be a corresponding division of actions ; the actions of the
there
is a

practical

naturally better principle are to be preferred

by those
all,

who

have
is

it

in their

power

to attain to both or to

for that

always to every one the most eligible which is the highest 13 attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided
into

two

parts, business

and

leisure

3
,

actions into those
13

which are necessary and

war and peace, and all useful, and those

which

are

honourable.
class

And

the

preference given to one

of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other ; there must be war for the sake
or the other

of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these
1

Cp. N. Eth.

i.

13.
i.

1

8, 19.

a

Cp. N. Eth.
3

vi.

5: ii.
6.

4.

N. Eth.

x. 7.

The Spartan Ideal
laws
;

Criticised

289
his

points the statesman should keep in view

when he frames
and

VII. 14

he should

consider the parts of the soul
all

their

functions, and above
also

the better and the end

;

he should 14

remember the

diversities

of

human

lives

and actions.
b

For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure 1333 and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and In such principles useful, but what is honourable is better.
children and persons of every age

which requires education
the

should

be

trained.

Whereas even

Hellenes of the 15

present day,
legislators

who are reputed to be best governed, and the who gave them their constitutions, do not appear

have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to
to
all

the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those

which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many 16 modern writers have taken a similar view they commend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for
:

making conquest and war

his sole aim

*,

a

doctrine

which

may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumu- 17
lating the
all

goods of fortune

;

and on

this

those

who have

written about the
their
in

ground Thibron and Lacedaemonian consti
the

tution

have

praised

legislator,

because

Lacedae
power.

monians,

by

a training

hardships,

gained great

But surely they
has

are not a

happy people now that

their empire 18

passed
is

away,

nor

was
if,

their

legislator

right.

How

while they are continuing in the observances of his laws and no one interferes with them
ridiculous

the result,

they have lost the better part of

life.

These

writers further 19

1

Plato,

Laws,

i.

628, 638.

290
VII. 14

Spartan or Military Ideal
of government which the legislator should government of freemen is noble, and implies

err about the sort

approve, for the

more

virtue than despotic

government

.

Neither

is

a city to

be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised
trains

because

he

his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their
for

20 neighbours,
principle

there

is

great

evil

in

this.

On

a

similar

any citizen

the power in his monians accused king Pausanias of attempting 2 although he had so great honour already. No such principle and
,

who could, would obviously try to obtain own state the crime which the Lacedae

no law having
21 right.

this object is either statesmanlike or useful

or

For the same things

are best both for individuals

and

for states,

to implant in the

and these are the things which the legislator ought Neither should men minds of his citizens.

study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved ; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second
1334 a
place obtain empire for the

good of the governed, and not
to

for

the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third
place
22

they

should

seek

be

masters

only

over

those

who

deserve to be slaves.

Facts, as well as arguments, prove
all

that the legislator should direct

his

military

and other

measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of For most of these military states are safe only while peace.
they are
at

war

3
,

but

fall

when they have acquired
their
in
is

their

empire

;

like

unused iron they lose
the legislator

And
15

for this

time of peace. edge he never having to blame,

taught them how

to lead the life of peace.
is

Since the end of individuals and of states
1

the same, the
10
;

Cp.

i.

5.

a.
s

2

Cp. Cp.
ii.

v.

i.

7.

4.

9.

34.

Spartan or Military Ideal
end of the best man and of the best
the same
;

291

state

must also be VII. 15

it is

therefore evident that there ought to exist in
;

both of them the virtues of leisure
often repeated,
leisure
is

for peace, as has been
toil.

the end of war, and leisure of

But

2

be promoted, not only by those in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business *. For many neces
cultivation

and

may

virtues

which

are

practised

saries

of

life

have to be supplied before

we

can have leisure.

Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure There is no for truly, as the proverb says,
:

leisure for slaves,

are

the

slaves

of any

and those who cannot face danger like men invader. Courage and endurance
virtue

3

are required for business and intellectual

for leisure,

temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and
the leisure which comes with peace tends
insolent.

to

make them
and to be 4

Those, then, who seem

to be the best off

of every good, have special need of justice and temperance for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest ; they above
in the possession
all

will

need philosophy and temperance and
leisure
is

justice,

and

all

the

more the more

they have,

living in

the midst
the state 5

of abundance.
that

There

no

difficulty in seeing

why

would be happy and good ought
be disgraceful in
it is

to have these virtues.

If

it

men

not to be able to use the goods of

life,

peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use

them

in

to show excellent qualities in action and war, time of peace and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves.
1
i.

e.

not only by some of the speculative but also by some of the

practical virtues.

U

2

292

Need of a Higher
1
.

Ideal of Life
manner of

VII. 15 Wherefore we should not
the Lacedaemonians

practise virtue after the

For

they, while agreeing wich other

1334 b rnen in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the
rest

of mankind

in

thinking that they are to be obtained by the

practice of a single virtue.

And

since these

goods and the

enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues of which they are the end, we must

now

consider

how

and

by

what means they

are

to

be

attained.
7

We have already determined that nature and habit and reason
are required
2
,

and what should be the character of the citizens

has also been defined by us. whether the training of early
habit,

But we have
life
is

still

to consider

to

be that of reason or

for these

will

then form the best of harmonies.
fail

two must accord, and when in accord they Reason may make
in attaining the highest ideal
evil influence

mistakes and
8 there

of

s

life,

and
is

may
from

be a like

of habit

3
.

Thus much

clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, generation
starts

a beginning,

are related to another end.

and that the ends of some beginnings Now, in men reason and mind are

the end towards which nature strives, so that the generation

9

and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with In the second place, as the soul and body a view to them.
are two,
rational

we

see also that there are
irrational
4
,

two

parts of the soul, the
states

and the

and two corresponding

And as the body is prior in order of reason and appetite. to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. generation
1

*

Cp.
8

ii.

9.

34.

Cp. 13

12.

Or,

and yet a

man may
1

be trained by habit as

if

the reason had not

so erred.

Cp. N. Eth.

i.

13.

9

ff.

Nature and Habit Prior
The
proof
is

to

Treason

293
in

that anger

and

will

and desire are implanted

VII. 15

children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are as grow older. Wherefore, the care of the

developed they )ody ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow : none the less our care of it must
>e

for the sake

of the reason, and our care of the body for the

sake of the soul \

rames of the children
>ossible,

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the 16 whom he is rearing may be as good as
his first care will be about marriage
at

what age
?

should his citizens marry, and
egislating

who

are

fit

to marry

In

3

on

heir relative
ind that they

he ought to consider the persons and that there may be no disproportion in them, ages,
this subject

the case

if

the

may not differ man is still

in their bodily

powers, as will be

able to beget children while the

woman

is

unable to bear them, or the

woman

able to bear while

he man

is

unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels

ind differences

between married persons.

Secondly, he must

consider the time at which the children will succeed to their
>arents

for 3 ; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, hen the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from heir affection, or to be of Nor ought they 1335 a any use to them.

o be too nearly of an age ; to youthful marriages there are many the children will be wanting in respect to their abjections
larents.

who

will

seem

to be their contemporaries,

and disputes

will arise in the

management of the household. Thirdly, and 4 Jhis is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must nould to his will the frames of newly-born children. Almost
ill

these objects

may
1

be secured by attention to one point.
is

Since the time of generation

commonly
iii.

limited within the 5

Cp. Plato, Rep.

410.

294
VII. 16 age of
6

The Physical Foundation
seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the woman, the commencement of the union should con-

case of a

form to these periods. The union of male and female when in all other is bad for the procreation of children ; animals the offspring of the young are small and ill-developed,
too young
is

and generally of the female sex, and therefore also in man, as proved by the fact that in those cities in which men and
are
;

women
7

accustomed
in

to

marry young, the people are small

and weak

childbirth also younger
;

women

suffer

more,

and more of them die

some persons say

that this

was the

meaning of the response once given to the Troezenians Shear not the young field ] the oracle really meant that [ died because they married too young it had nothing to many
;

8

do with the ingathering of the harvest. temperance not to marry too soon ; for
early are apt to be
is

It also

conduces to

:

women who marry
too the bodily frame
is

wanton

;

and

in

men

stunted if they marry while they are growing (for there

9 a time

when

the growth of the body ceases).
l

Women should
age,

marry when they are about eighteen years of
seven-and-thirty
10 decline in
children,
if
;

and men
life,

at

then they are in the prime of

and the

the powers of both will coincide.
their birth

Further, the

takes

place at

the

time

that

reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime,
fathers are already
in

may when the

the decline of

life,

and have nearly

reached their term of three-score years and ten. Thus much of the age proper for marriage the season of
:

the year should also be considered

;

according to our present

1 1

custom, people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they are right. The precepts of physicians and natural
philosophers about generation should also be studied by the
1

Omitting

ff

p.iicpov.

Regulations Concerning Marriage

29?
VII. 16

parents themselves ; the physicians give good advice about the right age of the body, and the natural philosophers about

the winds

;

of which they prefer the north to the south.

1335 b
12

What

constitution in the parent is
is

most advantageous to
will hereafter consider

the offspring

a subject

which we

when we speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few general remarks at present. The temperament of
an athlete
is

not suited to the

life

of a

citizen, or to health, or

of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between
to the procreation

them.

A

man

s constitution
is

should be inured to labour, but 13

not to labour which

excessive or of one sort only, such as is athletes ; he should be capable of all the actions practised by of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.

Women who

are with child should be careful of themselves

;

14

The they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. first of these the legislator will easily carry into prescriptions
by requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the gods who preside over
effect
. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep unexercised, for the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth.

birth

1

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a 15 law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too
many
(for in our state population has a limit),
in excess,

when

couples

have children

and the

exposure of offspring, let and life have begun ; what

of feeling is averse to the abortion be procured before sense
state

may

or

may

not be lawfully done in
life

these cases depends on the question of

and sensation.

And

now, having determined at what ages
1

men and women

16

Cp. Plato,

Laws,

vii.

789.

2p<5

Regulations Concerning Marriage
how
long they
*
;

VII. 16

are to begin their union, let us also determine
shall continue to beget

and bear offspring for the

state

men

17

who are too old, like men who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and mind the children of very old men are weakly. The limit, then, should be the age which is the
;

prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven
years,
is

about

2

fifty

;

at four or five years later,
;

they should

and from that time forward only cohabit with one another for the sake of health, or for some
cease from having families
similar reason.
!g

As
or

to

adultery,

let

it

be held disgraceful for any

man

woman

to be unfaithful

when they

are married,

and called

1336 a husband and wife.

If during the time of bearing children of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished anything with a loss of privileges in proportion to the offence s
.

17

After the children have been born, the manner of rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily
strength.
It

would appear from the example of animals, and

of those nations
the food
ings
2
;

who

desire to create the military habit, that
in
it is

which has most milk

best suited to

human

be

but the less wine the better,
all

Also

they would escape disease. the motions to which children can be subjected at their
if

early age are very useful.

But

in order to preserve their tender

limbs

from

distortion,

some

nations

have had recourse to
their

mechanical

appliances which straighten accustom children to the cold from their

bodies.

To

earliest years is also

3

an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and Hence many barbarians hardens them for military service.
1

a

\tiTovpftii

.

Cp. Solon, Fragm. 25 Bergk.
viii.

3

Cp. Laws,

41.

Education of Infants
stream
only.
all

297

have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold VII. 17 ; others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper

For human

nature should be early habituated to endure
it

which by habit must be gradual.

can be

made

to

endure

;

but the process

And

children,

from

be easily trained to bear cold. them in the first stage of life.

may

warmth, Such care should attend

their natural

The
its

next period lasts to the age of

five

;

during this .no 4

demand should be made upon the

child for study or labour, lest

growth be impeded ; and there should be sufficient motion to This can be secured, prevent the limbs from being inactive.

among other ways, by amusement,
be vulgar or tiring or riotous.

but the

amusement should not

The

Directors of Education, as 5

they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the
children hear
*,

for the sports of children are designed to prepare
life,

the

way

for the business of later

and should be for the most

part imitations

of the occupations which they will hereafter pur
.

sue in earnest

2

Those

are

wrong who

[like Plato]

in the

Laws

6

attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner,
exercise their bodies
similar to that
3
.

Straining

the

voice has an effect

produced by the retention of the breath in
Besides other duties,
the

violent

exertions.

Directors

of

7

Education should have an eye to their bringing up, and should take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves.

For

until

they are seven years old they must
at this early age, all that is

live at

home

;

1335

1>

and therefore, even

mean and low

should be banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, 8 there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to
1

Plato, Rep.

ii.

377

ft.

a

Plato, Laws,
vii.

i.

643;

vii.

799.

3

Plato,

Laws,

792.

298
VII. 17
drive

Maxima

Debetur Pueris Reverentia
;

away than indecency of speech
is

for the light utterance

of shameful words

akin to shameful actions.

The young

never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of especially should freeman who is found saying or doing what is the sort. 9

A

forbidden,

if

he be too young as yet to have the privilege of

a place at the public table, should be disgraced and beaten, and

an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should
10 also banish pictures or tales
rulers take care that there be

which

are indecent.

Let

the

whose

unseemly actions, except in festivals the law permits even

no image or picture representing the temples of those Gods at
ribaldry,

and

whom

the

law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age But on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives.
1 1

the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical

Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine ; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences
of such representations. have made these remarks in a cursory manner

12

We

-they

1 enough for the present occasion ; but hereafter we will return to the subject and after a fuller discussion determine

are

whether such
13

liberty should or should not be granted,
if at all.

and

in

Theodorus, the tragic actor, was right in saying that he would not allow any other actor, quite not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself,
because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. And the same principle of association applies universally
to things as well as persons, for

what way granted,

we always

like best

whatever

H comes

first.
1

And

therefore youth should be kept strangers to
viii. 5.

Unfulfilled promise ,?), but cp.

21.

The Impressions of Early Tears
all

299

that is bad,

hate.

When

the five years have passed away, during the

and especially to things which suggest vice or VII. 17 two

following years they must look on at the pursuits which they
are hereafter to learn.

There

are

two periods of

life

into 15

which education has
puberty, and

to be divided

from seven to the age of
are not always right
*

onwards

to the age of one-and-twenty.
*

poets]

who

divide ages by sevens

[The we
:

1337 a

for the deficiencies of nature are
to
fill

should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature ; what art and education seek
up.
first enquire if any regulations are to be laid 16 about children, and secondly, whether the care of them

Let us then

down

should be the concern of the state or of private individuals which latter is in our own day the common custom and in the
third place,
1 2

what these regulations should

be.

Cp. supra, c. 16. 17. Reading ov /mAcDs, with the
second edition,
are in the

MSS. and Bekker
but

s

first

edition

:

or, reading ov KO.KWS, a conjecture of Muretus,
in his
etc.

which Bekker has adopted

main

right

;

we

should also observe,

BOOK
VIII.
1

VIII

No

one will
above

attention
2

all

doubt that the legislator should direct his to the education of youth, or that the

neglect of education does

harm

to states.

The

citizen should

be moulded to suit the form

he

lives

l
.

For each

of government under which government has a peculiar character

which
it.

originally

formed and

which continues

to

preserve

The

character of democracy creates democracy, and the

character

of oligarchy creates

oligarchy

;

and always the
art

better the character, the better the government.

Now
training
3 for the

for

the

exercise of any
are

faculty or
;

a

previous
therefore

and

habituation

required

clearly

practice of virtue.
it is

And

since the whole city has

one end,

manifest that education should be one and the

same
not

for
as

all,

and that

it

should be public, and not private

at present,

children separately,
sort

when every one looks after his own and gives them separate instruction of the
;

which he thinks best

the training in things which are of
all.

4

common interest should we suppose that any one

be the same for

Neither must

they all of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this particular the Lacedaemonians
are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their

of the citizens belongs to himself, for belong to the state, and are each of them a part

children, and

make education
of state

the business of the state

2
.

2

That education should be
be an
1

affair

is

regulated by law and should not to be denied, but what should
a

Cp.

v. 9.

11-16.

Cp. N. Eth.

x. 9.

13.

What

is

a Liberal Education ?

301
VIII. 2

be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be
considered.

For mankind

things to be taught,

are by no means agreed about the whether we look to virtue or the best life.

Neither

is

it

clear

whether education

is

more concerned
existing praca

with intellectual or with moral virtue.
tice
is

The

perplexing

should proceed

one knows on what principle we should the useful in life, or should virtue,
;

no

or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training
all

;

three opinions have been entertained.
is

Again, about the 1337 b
start

means there

no agreement

;

for different persons,

ing with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally

disagree about the practice of children

it.

There can be no doubt

3

should be taught those useful things which thaf are really necessary, but not all things ; for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal ; and to young children
should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will And any 4 to them without vulgarizing them. art, or science, which makes the body or soul or occupation,

be useful

mind of the freeman
of
virtue,
is

less

fit

for

the practice or
call

exercise
vulgar 5

vulgar

;

wherefore

we

those

arts

which tend
ments, for
also

deform the body, and likewise all paid employ There are they absorb and degrade the mind.
to
arts quite proper for a

some
only

liberal
in

freeman to acquire,

but

a

certain

degree,

and

if

he

attend

to

them

too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, the same
evil

effects

will

follow.

The
a great

object

also
;

which a man 6
if

sets

before

him makes
for his

difference
*

he does or

learns
friends,

anything

own

sake

or for the sake of his

or with a view
1

to excellence,

the

action

will

not

Cp.

iii.

4.

13.

302
VIII. 2 appear
same

What
illiberal
;

is

a Liberal Education?

but if done for the sake of others, the very

action

will

be

thought

menial

and

servile.

The

received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarked \
are partly of a liberal

and partly of an

illiberal character.

3

customary branches of education are in number four ; (i) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, they are Of (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing.
these, reading
for the purposes

The

and writing and drawing are regarded as useful of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic
Concerning music
cultivate
it

exercises are thought to infuse courage.
2

a doubt

may

be raised

in our

own day most men
it

for the sake of pleasure,

but originally
herself,

was included
been often

in

education,

because

nature

as

has

said,

requires that

we should
;

use leisure well
3 first principle

for,
all

be able not only to work well, but to 2 as I must repeat once and again , the
is leisure.
;

of

action

Both

are required, but

leisure is better than occupation

and therefore the question
to

must be asked
leisure
?

in

good

earnest,

what ought we
be

do when

at

for

amusing ourselves, But if this is then amusement would be the end of life.
Clearly

we ought

not to

4 inconceivable,
is

needed more than

and yet amid serious occupations amusement at other times (for he who is hard
need

at

work has

of relaxation,

and

amusement

gives

relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), at suitable times we should introduce

1338

a

amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and Leisure of itself gives from the pleasure we obtain rest.
pleasure

and

happiness

and enjoyment
As

of

life,

which

are

5 experienced,
1

not by the busy man,
a

but by those
I,

who

have

3 supra.

in vii. 15.

2,

and N. Eth.

x. 6.

The Use of Music
leisure.

303
men

For he who
;

is

occupied has

in

view some end which VIII. 3
all

he has not attained

but happiness

is

an end which

deem
This

to be

accompanied with pleasure and not with pain.

however, is regarded differently by different and varies according to the habit of individuals ; the persons, pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from
pleasure,

the noblest sources.

It is clear, then, that there are branches 6

of learning and education which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued
for their

own

sake

;

are useful in business are to be for the

whereas those kinds of knowledge which deemed necessary, and exist

sake of other things.

And

therefore our fathers 7
its

admitted music into education, not on the ground either of
necessity or
in in
it is utility, for

not necessary, nor indeed useful

the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful

money-making,

in

the

management of

a household, in the

nor like drawing, of the works of artists, judgment nor again like gymnastic, which gives health and strength ; for neither of these is to be gained from music. There
political life,

and in acquisition of knowledge
useful for a

more

correct

remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in
leisure
;

which appears

to have been the reason of its introduc
it

tion, this

being one of the ways in which
;

is

thought that
says
,

a freeman should pass his leisure

as

Homer

How
inviting

good

is

it

to invite

men

to the pleasant feast

and afterwards he speaks

of others

whom

he describes as

The
1

bard

who would
Aristotle,

delight

them

all

V
xvii.

Or,

to invite Thalia to the feast,

possibly

intended

by

an interpretation of the passage though of course not the original
2

meaning.

Od.

385.

304
VIII. 3 And
in

Educational Studies
another place Odysseus says there
life s
is

no better way of

passing

than

when
hear the voice of the minstrel
that there
is

Men
TO
It
is

hearts are merry and the banqueters in the hall,

sitting in order,

V
in

evident, then,

a

sort of education

which parents should
necessary, but because

train their sons,
it is

not as being useful or

liberal

or noble.

Whether

this is

of one kind only, or of more than one, and if so, what they are, and how they are to be imparted, must hereafter be
1 1

determined.

Thus much we
;

are

now

in a

position to say that

the ancients witness to us

for their opinion

may

be gathered

from the

fact that

music

is

one of the received and traditional
it

branches of education.

Further,

is

clear

that

children

should be instructed
reading and writing

in

some

useful things

for example, in

not only for their usefulness, but also

because
12 them.

many With

other sorts of knowledge are acquired through a like view they may be taught drawing, not

to prevent their
in

making mistakes

in their

own
it

purchases, or

order that they
selling

may

not be imposed upon in the buying
but
rather

1388 b or

of

articles,

because

makes them

To be always judges of the beauty of the human form. seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted
13 souls
2
.

Now

it

is

clear

that in

education habit

before reason, and the body before the

mind

;

must go and therefore

boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates in them the proper habit of body, and to the wrestling-master,

who

teaches them their exercises.
states which in our own

4

Of those

day seem to take the greatest

care of children,

some aim

at

producing in them an athletic

habit, but they only injure their
1

forms and stunt their growth.
Op. Plato, Rep.
vii.

Od.

ix. 7.

2

525

ff.

Physical Education
Although
the

Lacedaemonians have not

fallen

into

this

VIII. 4

mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises

which they think
as

will

make them courageous.

But

in truth, 2

we have

often repeated, education should not be exclusively

directed to this or to any other single end.

And

even

if

we

suppose the Lacedaemonians .to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals
courage
is

found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but

with a gentle and lion-like temper.

There
eat

are

many
as

races 3

who

are

ready enough to

kill

and

men,

such

the
1
;

Achaeans and Heniochi, who both
and there are other inland

live

about the Black Sea

tribes, as bad or worse,

who

all live

It is notorious that the 4 by plunder, but have no courage. while they were themselves assiduous Lacedaemonians,

in their laborious drill,

were superior to others, but now they
exercises.
their

are beaten both in

war and gymnastic
depend on

For

their

ancient superiority did not
their youth,

mode of

training

but only on the circumstance that they trained

them

at

a

time
is

when

others did

not.

Hence we may
should have the
will

5

infer that
first

what
;

noble, not

what

is brutal,

place

no wolf or other wild animal
;

face a really

noble danger
parents

who

such dangers are for the brave man *. devote their children to gymnastics

And
while

6

they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them ; for they make them useful to the state in one quality
only,

and even

in this the

to others.

We

argument proves them to be inferior should judge the Lacedaemonians not from
are
;

7

what they have been, but from what they
ave rivals

for

now

they

who compete
vii.
.5.

with their education

;

formerly they

ad none.
Cp. N. Eth.
5AV1S
2.
2

Cp. N. Eth.

iii.

6.

8.

X

306
VIII. 4
It is

Gymnastic

an admitted principle that gymnastic exercises should be employed in education, and that for children they should
be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful
toil,

8 lest

the

growth of the body be impaired.
training
in

The

evil

of

excessive

early

years
victors;

is

strikingly
for not

proved

by

1339 a the example of the
or three of

Olympic

more than two

their early training

them have gained a prize both as boys and as men ; and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted

9 their constitutions.

When

boyhood

is

over,

three

years

should be spent in other studies ; the period of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict
regimen.
their

Men

minds and with

ought not to labour at the same time with a their bodies ; for the two kinds of
the labour of the body

labour are opposed to one another

impedes the mind, and the labour of the

mind the body.

5

Concerning music there are some questions which we have already raised ; these we may now resume and carry further
;

and our remarks
2

will serve as a prelude to this or

any other

discussion of the subject.
nature of music, or
it.

It

is

not easy to determine the

any one should have a knowledge of Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation,

why

like sleep or drinking,

which

are not

good

in themselves, but

are pleasant,
3 as
2

and

at
?

the

same time
therefore

make

care

to

cease,

Euripides

says

And
all

men
s
,

rank them with

music, and
to

make use of

three

sleep

drinking, music

which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds
and habituate us
1

to

true pleasures as our bodies are
2

made by

vii. 537 B. Bacchae, 380. Reading (with Bekker s 2nd ed.) virvy, a correction which seems necessary, and is suggested by vnvov uai fj,fOi]s above.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

3

Music

$07

Or shall we say that VIII. 5 gymnastic to be of a certain character ? * it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation,

which

is

a third alternative

?

Now

obviously youth are

not to be instructed with a view to their amusement, for learn
ing is no pleasure, but
intellectual
is

enjoyment

suitable to
is

Neither accompanied with pain. of that age, for it boys

is is

the end, and that which
or end.

the sake of the
are

But perhaps it amusement which they
up.

imperfect cannot attain the perfect may be said that boys learn music for 5
will have when they should they learn themselves, and

grown

If so,

why

not, like the

and instruction which
surely skilled

Persian and Median kings, enjoy the pleasure is derived from hearing others ? (for 6
persons

who have made music
will

the business

and profession of
those

their lives

who

practise only to learn).

be better performers than If they must learn music,

on the same principle
is

absurd.

character,

they should learn cookery, which even granting that music may form the the objection still holds why should we learn

And

7

:

ourselves
a correct

?

Why

cannot

we

attain

true pleasure
like

and form 1339 b

judgment from hearing others,

the Lacedae

monians

?

for they, without learning music, nevertheless can

correctly judge, as they say, of
again,
if

good and bad melodies.
to

Or 8

music

should

be

used

promote

cheerfulness

and refined

intellectual

enjoying the performances of others ? may illustrate what we are saying by our conception of the Gods ; for in the poets Zeus does not himself sing or play on the lyre. Nay, we call

why

should

we

enjoyment, the objection learn ourselves instead of

still

remains

We

professional

performers vulgar

;

sing unless he were intoxicated or in jest.

no freeman would play or But these matters 9

may be

left for

the present.

X

2

308
VIII. 5

The Pleasure of Music
first

The

question

is

whether music

is

or

is

not to be a part

of education.
sion,

Of
is
it
it ?

the three things mentioned in our discus

which

Education or amusement or
be reckoned under
all

intellectual

enjoyment, for

may

three,

and seems
is

10 to share in the nature of all

of them.
is

Amusement
and

for the

sake of relaxation, and relaxation
it

of necessity sweet, for
toil,

is

the

remedy of pain caused by
is

intellectua

enjoyment
not
11 is

universally

acknowledged

to

contain an elemen
for

only

of the noble but of the
both.

pleasant,

happiness

All men agree that music is one o the pleasantest things, whether with or without song ; as

made up of
says,
is

Musaeus

Song

to mortals of

all

things the sweetest.
it

is introduced into socia good and entertainments, because it makes the hearts o gatherings men glad so that on this ground alone we may assume tha

Hence and

with

reason

:

12 the

young ought

to be trained in

it.

For innocent
life,

pleasures

are not only in

harmony with the

perfect end of

but they

also provide relaxation.

end, but often rest

whereas men rarely attain the by the way and amuse themselves, not only

And

with a view to some good, but also for the pleasure s sake, it may be well for them at times to find a refreshment in music.
13 It

for

sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, the end probably contains some element of pleasure,
;

though not any ordinary or lower pleasure
since every pleasure
*.

but they mistake

the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the
other,

has a likeness

to

the

end of

action

For

which we

nor do the pleasures have described exist, for the sake of any future
the end
is

not eligible,

good but of the

past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of
1

Cp. N. Eth.

vii.

13.

6.

Music and Morals
past toils

309
this

and pains.
seek

And we may
happiness from

infer

to be the

VIII. 5

reason

why men
is

common

pleasures. 14

But music
toil,

pursued,

not

only as
recreation.

an alleviation of past

And who can say 15 whether, having this use, it may not also have a nobler one ? In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all 1340
but also as

providing

a

(for the pleasure

given by music

is

natural,

and therefore

adapted to

and characters), may it not have also It must 16 some influence over the character and the soul ?
all

ages

have such an influence
that

if characters are affected
is

by

it.

And
;

they

are

so

affected

proved

by

the

power which
for

the songs of

Olympus and of many

others exercise

beyond
is

question they inspire enthusiasm, an emotion of the ethical part of the soul.

and enthusiasm
Besides,

when
or

17

imitations, unaccompanied by melody Since, then, music rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy. is a and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and pleasure,

men

hear

even

hating aright, there

is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions
*. Rhythm and melody supply imitations 18 of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance and of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall short of

and noble actions

the actual affections, as

we know from

our

own

experience,

for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change.

The
is

habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations 19 2 not far removed from the same feeling about realities ; for
if

example,
its

any one delights
only,
it

in

the

sight

of a statue
the
sight

for

beauty
1 7

necessarily
iii.
iii.

follows

that
ii.

of

Cp. Plato, Rep.
Cp. Plato, Rep.

401, 402; Laws,
395.

658, 659.

310
VIII. 5
20 as taste or touch,

The Harmonies
No
other sense, such
;

the original will be pleasant to him.

has any resemblance to moral qualities in sight only there is a little, for figures are to some extent of a moral character, and all participate in the feeling [so far]
about them.

21 but signs

Again, figures and colours are not imitations, of moral habits, and these signs occur only when the

body

is

under the influence of emotions.
is

The
far

connexion of

them with morals

slight,

but in

so

as there is any,

young men should be taught to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus \ or any other painter
or statuary
22 even in

who

mere melodies

On the other hand, expresses moral ideas. 2 there is an imitation of character, for
differ

the

musical

modes

essentially

from

one

another,

and those
1340 b

Some

hear them are differently affected by each. of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called
others
others,

who

Mixolydian,
harmonies,

enfeeble
again,

the

mind,
a

like

the

relaxed
settled
;

produce

moderate and

temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian
23 the

The whole subject Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. has been well treated by philosophical writers on this branch
of education,

and they confirm
apply
to

The same
24

principles

character of rest,

their arguments by facts. 3 some have a rhythms others of motion, and of these latter again,
:

some have

a

more

vulgar, others a nobler

movement.

Enough

has been said to

show

that music has a

power of forming the

character, and should therefore be introduced into the education
25 of the young.

The

study

is

suited to the stage of youth, for

young
is

persons will not, if

they can help, endure anything which

not sweetened by pleasure, and music has a natural sweet1

Cp. Poet.

2.

2
3

;

6.

2

15.
iii.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

398, 399.

Rep.

399

E,

400,

The Harmonies
ness.

511
affinity

There seems

to be in us a sort

of

to harmonies

VIII. 5

and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul
is

a harmony, others, that she possesses

harmony.
the question

And now we
has

have

to
,

determine

which 6
be
is

been

already

raised

whether

children

should

themselves taught to sing and play or not.
a

Clearly there

considerable difference
It

made
is

in

the character by the actual
if

practice of the art.

difficult,

not impossible,

for

those

who do
and the

not perform to be good judges of the perform
2
.

ance of others
to do,

Besides, children should have something

2

children in

of Archytas, which people give to their order to amuse them and prevent them from
rattle

breaking anything in the house, for a young thing cannot be quiet.
to the infant

was a

capital

invention,

The

rattle is a

toy suited

for children of a larger growth.

mind, and [musical] education is a rattle or toy conclude then that they

We

3

should be taught music
critics but

in

such a

way

as to

become not only

performers.
is

The

question what

or
;

is

not suitable for different ages
is

may be easily
music
is

answered

nor

there

any

difficulty

in

meeting the objection of those
vulgar.

who

say that
first

the study

of

We

reply (l)

in the

place, that they 4

who

and that they should begin to practise early, although when they are older they may be spared the execution ; they must have learned
are to be judges
also be performers,
to appreciate

must

what

is

good and

to delight in

it,

thanks to

the knowledge which they acquired in their youth.
effect (2) the vulgarizing

As

to 5

which music

this

is

a

question

[of degree],

supposed to exercise, which we shall have no
is

difficulty in
1
<

determining,
5-8-

when we have considered
a

to

what
t

5-

Cp. supra,

c. 5.

7.

312

The Gentleman Musician
are

VIII. 6 extent freemen who

being

trained

to

political

virtue

should pursue the art, what melodies and what rhythms they should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be 1341 a

6

employed in teaching them to play, for even the instrument makes a difference. The answer to the objection turns upon these distinctions for it is quite possible that certain methods
;

of teaching and learning music do really have a degrading effect. It is evident then that the learning of music ought
not to impede the business of riper years, or to degrade the

body or render

it

unfit for civil or military duties,

whether for

the early practice or for the later study of them.
7

The

right measure will be attained if students of music stop

short of the arts

which

are practised in professional contests,

and do not seek

to acquire those fantastic marvels

of execution

which
8

are

now

the fashion in such contests, and from these
education.

have passed

into

Let the young pursue

their

studies until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and

rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which every slave or child and even some animals find pleasure.

From

these principles

we may

also infer

what instruments
which
to be

9 should be used.

The

flute,

or any other instrument

equires great

skill,

as for

example the harp, ought not

admitted into education, but only such as will make intelligent students of music or of the other parts of education.
Besides, the flute
effect
;

is

not an instrument which has a good moral

it

is

too exciting.

The
there

proper time for using

it

is

when

the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief
1

10 of the

passions

.

And

is

a

further objection; the

impediment which the flute presents to the use of the voice detracts from its educational value. The ancients therefore
1

CP

.

c.

7.

3.

Musical Instruments
were right
in

313
and freemen, VIII. 6

forbidding

the flute to youths

although they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence,
being also elated with their success, both before and after the

u

Persian

War, with more

zeal than discernment they pursued
flute into

every kind of knowledge, and so they introduced the
education.

At Lacedaemon
flute,

there

the Chorus with a so

and

at

was a Choragus who led Athens the instrument became
it.

12

popular
is

that

most

freemen could play upon
tablet

The

popularity

shown by the

which Thrasippus dedicated
Later expe
really

when he

furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides.

rience enabled

men

to judge

what was or what was not

conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several 13 other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the

sambuca, and 1341 b triangle, heptagon, intended only to give pleasure to the There is hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand *. a meaning also in the myth of the ancients, which tells how
many-stringed
the like
lyre,

the

which

are

Athene invented the
not a

flute

and then threw
that the

it

away.

It

was 14
the

bad idea of
it

theirs,

Goddess
;

disliked
still

instrument because
reason

made the

face ugly
it

but with

more

may we

say that she rejected

because the acquirement
the mind,
since
to

of flute-playing contributes

nothing to
art.

Athene we

ascribe

knowledge and

Accordingly we
the professional
fessional

reject the professional instruments

and also 15

mode of
that

education in
is

music

and by pro

we mean

which

the performer practises the

art,

adopted in contests, for in this not for the sake of his own

improvement, but

order to give pleasure, and that of a vulgar For this reason the execution of such sort, to his hearers.
in
1

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

399

D.

314
VIII. 6 music
1

The Professional Musician
is

not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and
is

6 the result

that the performers are vulgarized, for the
is

end

at

which they aim
formers

bad 1

.

The

vulgarity of the spectator tends

to lower the character of the music

and therefore of the per

he makes them what they are, and ; they look to him fashions even their bodies by the movements which he expects

them 7

to exhibit.

We

have also to consider rhythms and harmonies.
all in

Shall

we

use them

education or

make

a distinction

?

and

shall the

distinction be that

which
it

is

education, or shall
is

be some other

made by those who ? For we

are engaged in

see that music

produced by melody and rhythm, and we ought to know what influence these have respectively on education, and

whether
2

we

should prefer excellence

in

melody or excellence

in

But as the subject has been very well treated by rhythm. many musicians of the present day, and also by philosophers who have had considerable experience of musical education, to
these
shall

we would

refer the
it

only speak of

now

more exact student of the subject we after the manner of the legislator,
;

having regard to general principles.
3

We

accept the division of melodies proposed by certain

philosophers into ethical melodies,

melodies of action, and

passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they say, a

mode
but

or

harmony corresponding
is

to

it.

But

we

maintain

further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one,

of many benefits, that

to

say,

with a

education, (2) purgation (the

word

purgation

we

view to (i) use at present
",

without explanation, but
will treat the subject
1

when hereafter we speak of poetry we music may also with more precision)
;

2

Cp. Poet.

c. 6.

Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 700. though the promise is really

unfulfilled.

The Power of Music
serve (3) for
intellectual

317
and
all

enjoyment,
It is
clear,

for relaxation

for

VIII. 7

recreation after exertion.

therefore, that

the

harmonies must be employed by us, but not all of them in the same manner. In education ethical melodies are to be preferred,
but

we may

listen to the

they are performed by others.
fear, or, again,

melodies of action and passion when For feelings such as pity and 4

enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls,
less influence over
all.

and have more or

Some

persons

fall

into a religious frenzy,

whom we

see disenthralled by the use of
.

mystic melodies, which bring healing and purgation to the soul

Those who

are influenced

by pity or fear and every emotional 5
in

nature have a like experience, others in their degree are stirred

by something which specially affects them, and all are manner purged and their souls lightened and delighted.

a

The

melodies of purgation likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind. Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which 6

who perform music at the theatre should be invited to But since the spectators are of two kinds the compete. one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed
those

of mechanics,

labourers

and the

like

there

ought

to

be

7

contests and exhibitions instituted for the relaxation of the

second class

also.

And

the melodies will correspond to their

minds

minds are perverted from the natural state, so there are exaggerated and corrupted harmonies which are
;

for as their

in like

manner a perversion.
natural to him,

A

man

receives pleasure from

and therefore professional musicians be allowed to practise this lower sort of music before an may audience of a lower type. But, for the purpose of education, g as I have already said, those modes and melodies should be
is

what

employed which are

ethical,

such as the Dorian

;

though

we

may

include any others which are approved by philosophers

3

1

6

The Dorian, Phrygian,
a

VIII. 7 who have had
9
*

musical

education.

The

Socrates of the

Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along 1342 b with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute ;
for the Phrygian
is

to the

modes what
are

the flute

is

to musical

instruments
10

both

of them

exciting

and

emotional.

Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to
Poetry proves
this, for

the Phrygian than to any other harmony.
11

The

example,

is

acknowledged

to be Phrygian, a fact of

dithyramb, for which the

connoisseurs of music offer
things,

many

proofs, saying,

among
it

other
his

that Philoxenus,

having

attempted to

compose

Tales
f2

2

as a dithyramb in the

Dorian mode, found

impossible,

back into the more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the

and

fell

mean followed, and whereas the Dorian
that our youth should be taught the
13

is

a

mean between the
3

other harmonies [the Phrygian and the Lydian

],

it is

evident

Dorian music.

Two
what
is

principles have to be kept in view

what

is

possible,

becoming

:

at

these every

man ought

to aim.

But

even these are relative to age ; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the severe melodies, and nature
herself seems to suggest that their songs should be of the
14

more relaxed kind.

Wherefore the musicians likewise blame

Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under the idea that they are intoxicating ; not in the
excite ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to And so men), but because they have no strength in them.
1

Plato,
3

Rep.
c.

iii.

399.

Retaining the

MS.

reading
3

/j.v6ovs.

Cp. Poet.

c.

2.

7.

Cp.

5.

22.

and Lydian Modes
with a view to a time of
life

317
grow
old,

when men

begin to

VIII.

they ought

to practise the gentler

harmonies and melodies as

well as the others.

And if there be any harmony, such as the 15 above all others appears to be, which is suited to Lydian children of tender age, and possesses the elements both of order
and of education,
clearly

[we ought

to

use

it,

for]

education

should be based upon three principles
the becoming, these three.

the mean, the possible,

INDEX
6, 13. Abydos, v. 6, Account, power of calling magis in Sparta exercised by trates to,

Aesymnetes, the, or dictators of
ancient Hellas, iii. 14, 8-io, 14; iv. 10, 2 always received a guard, iii. 15, 16.
;

the Ephors,

ii.

9,

26

;

given

by Solon to the people, ib. 12, 8; and justly 5; iii. 11, claimed by them, iii. 1 1 when exercised by all, a mark of
;

Agamemnon,
16, 10.

iii.

5,

9

;

14,

4;
7,

Agesilaus,
3-

King

of Sparta, v.

democracy,
55
11.
4. 5-

iv.

14,

4-6

;

vi. 2,

Agriculture, the employment fol lowed by the greater part of

Achaea
Achaea
3-

[in Peloponnerus],

v. 3,

mankind,
ib. Ii,

i.

8,

7

;

works upon,

Achaeans, the
Achilles,
iii.

3. [Pthiotis], ii. 9, (in Colchis), viii. 4,

ancient legislation to encourage, vi. 4, 8-10.
7;
10. Alcaeus, iii. 14, Alcyone, mother of Diocles the 8. Corinthian, ii. 12,

5,

9.

Acquisition, the art of, (i) the i 1 2 ; 1 1 2 natural, i. 9, includes war [in certain cases] 12 and hunting, i. 7, 5 8, 21 a part of house vii. 14,
, ,
;

Aleuadae, the, at Larissa,
13-

v. 6,

Aliens,

resident,

how

distin

;

;

;

guished from citizens, iii. i, obliged to have a patron,

4;
ib.
;

hold
8,

management,
9>

i.

4,

i
;

;

has a limit, ib.8, 14; 9, 13-18: (\\)that which is contrary to nature, in cluding (a) exchange which goes beyond the need of life, i2-55 Jo, 4; ",3;
2;
9>

i3-!5; 1-4; ii,

J

-8

I0
>

enrolled by Cleisthenes in the tribes, ib. 2, 3; admitted to citizenship at Syracuse, v. 3,
13-

Alliance, an,

how
3
;

different
iii.

from
6-8.

a

state,

ii.

2,

9,

Almsgiving, demoralizing effects
of, vi. 5,

7.

(/>)

4 ; ii, 3; usury, ib. 10, trade, ib. 9, 4; 10, 4; ii, 3 ; (d) service for hire, ib. ii, 3 : (iii) the intermediate
(<:)

Alternation in office, character istic of constitutional govern

ments, i. i, 4-7; iii.
9, 10;
vi. 2,

2;
4,

12,
2,

2;

ii.

2,

10, 14-17;

6,

kind,

ib.

Adamas,
Admiral,
9,

4. v. 10, office

16,

3;

17,

4;

18.

2,5;
(?

vii. 14,

1-5.

of (at Sparta),
21
;

Amadocus

king of the Odry24.
2.

33v. 6,
9.

sians), v. 10,
v. 10,

Aegina, iv. 4, Aenos, in Thrace,

18.

Amasis, king of Egypt, i. 12, Ambition, a cause of crime, ii.

7,

320
; ;

Index
Apollodorus of Lemnos, i. ii, 7. Apollonia (on the Adriatic), iv. 4,
5-

28 encour 10-14, 18 9, aged by the Spartan law-giver,
ib. 9,

28;
ii.

a motive of revolu
10, 18
;

tions,

7, v. 3,

v. 7,

4;

Apollonia (on the Euxine),
13;
ib. 6, 9.

v. 3,

10,

5.

Ambracia,
16.

10; 4,

9; 10,

Appeal, a court

of,

allowed by
4.

Hippodamus,
8. 13; 6, the Little (? father of

ii.

8,

Amphipolis,

v. 3,

Amyntas

Appetitive principle, the, of the soul, i. 5, 6; iii. 4, 6; 16, 5;
vii. 15, 9, 10. Arbitrator, the judge should not be made into an, ii. 8, 13; the middle class the arbitrators of the state, iv. 12, 5.

Philip), v. 10,

16.
of,

Anaxilaus, tyranny

at

Rhethe
10,

gium,
Andria,
5-

v. 12,

13.

ancient

name of
at Sparta,
ii.

common meals

Androdamas, of Rhegium,

ii.

12,

HAnclros,
ii.

9,

20.

Animals, the, intention of Nature 10in denying speech to, i. 2, 12; under the dominion of man, ib7 5 tame better than wild,
5>

3, II. Arcadia, ii. 2, 3; ib. 9, Archelaus, king of Macedonia, v. 10, 17-20. Archias of Thebes, v. 6, 15. 6. Archilochus, quoted, vii. 7, the duties of, vi. 8, 20 Archons,
;

only differ from slaves in not being able to apprehend their various reason, ib. 9
ib.
;

the single Archon at Epidami 12. v. i, nus, iii. 16, Archytas, of Tarentum, viii. 6,
;

2.

;

modes

of

life,

ib.

8,

4-6;

supply their offspring with food in different ways, ib. 10; cre ated for the sake of man. ib.

Areopagus, the, at Athens (see Council of Areopagus). Argo, the, iii. 13, 16. Argos, use of ostracism at, v. 3, the political changes after 3
;

9-12; produce offspring sembling their parents, ii. 3, cannot form a state, iii. 9, lead a life of nature, not
vii.

re

9

;

6 of
;

12; the parts reason, 13, of animals an illustration of the parts of the state, iv. 4, 7-9 ; the offspring of young animals often small and ill-developed,
vii. 16,

ib. 3, the oli 7 garchical revolution after the battle of Mantinea, ib. 4, 9; the tyranny of Pheidon, ib. 10, 6 of the Argives to enmity the Lacedaemonians, ii. 9, 3,

Hebdome,

;

;

ii.

Ariobarzanes, v. 10, 25. characterized Aristocracy,

by

6.
v. 12,

Antileon, tyrant at Chalcis,
12.

Antimenides, brother of Alcaeus,
iii.

14,

9.

election for merit, ii. ii, 9, i ; ii ; iv. 8, dis 7 ; v. 7, tinguished from the perfect state, as being a government of men who are only good relatively to
2 (but the constitution, iv. 7, 5) so called because cp. iii. 4, the best rule or the best interests of the state are consulted, iii. 7,
;

12. Antissa, in Lesbos, v. 3, Antisthenes, iii. 13, 14. Aphytaeans, the (in Pallene),
vi. 4,

10.

Index
i 3; not a perversion, iv. 8, analogous to oligarchy (i) be cause the few rule, v. 7, I (2) because birth and education
;

321
13,14; Hi.
5,
;

vii. 9,

3, 7

12; 5; vi.4, artisans some
;

;

times public slaves, ii. 7, 22 only admitted to office in de
mocracies, iii. 4, acquire wealth, ib.
ib.

commonly accompany
iv. 8,

wealth, to royalty as a of the best, ib. 10, government 2 ; preferable to royalty, be cause the good are more than 10; hcfw distin one, iii. 15,
3;

12;

often

6; 5, question whether they are

the
citi

zens, 5 ; necessary to the existence of the state, iv. 4, 9, 21 ; not a part of the state, vii.
4,

guished

from

oligarchy

and

6
3-

;

should be debarred from
s

constitutional government, iv. 7 ; 8; 14, 10; v. 7, 5~9(cp.ii.
1J
>

the
Arts,

Freemen
the,

Agora,

ib. 12,

5-!);

usually degener
iii.

require

instruments,
lifeless,
i.

ates into oligarchy, 11; iv. 2, 2; 15,

7,

5

;

both living and

4

;

v. 7,

7;

some

causes of revolutions in 8, 7; aristocracies, v. 7 the means of their preservation, ib. 8, 5-7
; ;

arts subservient to others, ib. 8, a 10, 1-4; the arts have a limit in their means
;

though not
14
;

in their end, ib. 8,
;

aristocracy less stable than con
stitutional

government,

ib.

7,

and the end ought

6 ; liable to danger because the rich have too much power, ib. la, 6; might be combined

both the means to be within our control, vii. 13, 2 amount of knowledge which a freeman
9,

13

;

is

permitted

in the arts,
i.

i.

ii,
viii.

with democracy if the magi strates were unpaid and office open to all, ib. 8, 17 (cp. vi. 4,
magistracies peculiar to 10; vi. 8, aristocracy, iv. 15, 22, 24; aristocratical modes of appointing magistrates and 20, 21 16, 8; judges, iv. 15, practice of trying all suits by the
6)
;
;

i; viii. 2, 5; cellence in them,
2
>

degrees of ex

n,
in,

6;

5>6;

changes

advan
;

18 ; iii. 15, tageous, ii. 8, 4 the analogy of, not to be ex tended to the laws, ii. 8, 24 ; iii. 15, 4; exist for the benefit of those under them, iii. 6, 79 by whom should the artist
;

same magistrates, aristocratical, ii. n, 8; iii. i, 10; the
people naturally suited to an
aristocracy, 17, 3-7. Aristogeiton, conspiracy of Harmodius and, v. 10, 15. 6. Aristophanes, ii. 4, Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncestians, v. 10,
17.
iii. 1 1
iii.

be judged? ib. ii, 10-14 (cp. viii. 6, 1-4) the arts aim at some good, iii. 12, i; justice
;

Art, works of, wherein different

from

realities,
v.

,

4.

of the different claims to political superiority illustrated from the arts, ib. 12, 4-8; law of pro 21 ; portion in the arts, ib. 13, the problems of the arts, an illustration of the problems ot politics, iv. i, 1-4; the arts have to supply the deficiencies
of Nature,
vii.

Artapanes,

10,

21.

17,
;

15.
;

Artisan, the employments of the, devoid of moral excellence, i. 1 3,

iv. 3* the Asia, ii. 10, 3 3 Asiatics better fitted for slavery

322
;

Index
;

6 than the Hellenes, iii. 14, 2 cannibal tribes in vii. 7,

tyrants,

iii.

2,

3;

v. 12,

5;

Asia, viii. 4, 3. .\ssembly, the, payment of, evil of the practice, ii. 7, effects 19;

the use of ostracism, v. 3, 3 number of (cp. iii. 13, 15) sailors in the population, iv. 4,
;

6 vi. 2, how they 5 may be counteracted, vi. 5, 5; power monopolized by, in ex treme democracies, iv. 6, 5
iv. 6,
; ; ;
i4>

citizens introduced by Cleisthenes, iii. 2, 3; the tribes redivided by him, vi. 4, 17 treatment of the subject cities by
; ;

21

new

7;

v. 5,

10

;

6,

17; 9,

15 (cp. ii. 14; 4, 12, ii, 12); meet 4; v. n, ings should be infrequent, vi. 5, 5 (cp. iv. 14, 4, 5); charac ter of, in the different kinds of

vi. 2,

5;

Athens, 13, 19 democratical governments forced upon the allies by the Athenians, iv. ii, 1 8 v. 7, 14 great losses of
iii.
;

;

;

democracies,
2,

iv. 14, 4-7 vi. 5-7; in oligarchies, iv. 14, 8-1 1 (cp. iii. i, 10) pro
; ;

the nobilityin the Peloponnesian War, v. 3, 7 difference of sen timent between the Athenians and the citizens of the Piraeus, ib. 15 origin of the war h
; ;

tween Athens and Mitylene.
defeat of the Athe: to Sicily, ib. government of the Four
4,

vision in case of equal voting in 6 : at Car assemblies, vi. 3,

6

;

expedition

thage,
ib. 10, ib. ii,

ii.

n,
;

7
6.

ii,

5-6; 6;

in Crete, at Sparta,

dred, ib.

13

;

6,

6;
;

Thirty,
7,

ib. 6,

6

rise

Astyages, 24. Atarneus (in Mysia), ii.

v. 10,

17.

sistratus to the tyranny, i, 6 his trial befc 10,
;

Athene, Athens
teries
ii.
1

viii. 6,

13.

Areopagus,

ib.

12,

2;

;

2,

payment of the dicascommenced by Pericles, vi. 2, 4 (cp. iv. 6, 5
;

6); evil effects of the practice, ii. 7, 19; plan introduced by Diophantus for the regulation of the public slaves, ib. 23 maintenance at the public ex of the children of citizens pense

spiracy of Harmodius anc togeiton,ib. 10, 15; magis of the Eleven, vi. 8, 1 1 Athlete, the temperament of au, not suited to the life of the
.

;

Athletics
cises.

citizen, vii. 16, 12; viii. 4. see Gymnastic Exer
:

Attalus,
5-

v. 10,

16.

who had
6

fallen in battle, ib. 8,

Ausones,

the,

or Opici,

vii.

10,

the Solonian constitution, ; ib. 7, i-6; iii. ii, 6; 12, 8 the Areopagus (see Council of Areopagus) the Court of effect of Phreatto, iv. 16, 3 the Persian war upon Athens,
; ; ;

Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,
ii7>

17-

ii. 1

2,

5

;

v. 4,

8

;

viii. 6,

1 1

;

Avarice, encouraged at Sparta, 11. 9, 13, 28, 37; at Carthage, ib. ii, ii a frequent cause of 28; of crime, ib. 7, 19; 9,
;

introduction of flute-playing at Athens after the Persian war, viii. 1 1 the legislation of Draco, 6, ii. 12, 13; the expulsion of the
;

revolution, v. 2,

5; 3,

i.

Babylonia, ii. 6, 6; Babylon, iii. 3, 5; Babylonians, ib. 13, 19.

Index
Bacchiadae.the, at Corinth,
8.
ii.

12,

Barbarians, the, do not distin guish the female and the slave,
4; generally under kingly 6 (cp. iii. 14, 6) ; regarded by the Hellenes as
i-

5-10; iv. 7, 4; v. 12, 14; never had a revolution, ii. n, v. 12, 2, 15; 14; never under a tyranny, ii. ii, 2 (but
cp.v. 12, 12) the kingspartly chosen for ability, ii. 1 1, 4-9; influence of wealth, ib. 9-13; plurality of offices, ib. 13 the magistrates judges in crim
;

2,

rule, ib.

6 ; their natural slaves, i. 6, nobility not recognized by the Hellenes, ib. 7; prevalence of
barter among them, ib. 8, Barter see Exchange.
:

;

inal cases, ib.
1 1
;

7

;

iii.

i,

10,

5.

honours paid to military merit, vii. 2, 10; the con
spiracy of custom of

Basilidae, the, v. 6,

5.

Hanno,
sending

v.

7,

4

;

Bequest, freedom of, at Sparta, ii. 9, 14; should be forbidden by law, v. 8, 20. ^irth, illegitimate, not a disinalification for

out

the

poorer
ii.

n,

citizens to the colonies, 15 ; vi. 5, 9 ; treaties

between the Carthaginians and
the Tyrrhenians, iii. 9, 6. 6. Catana, ii. 12, Cavalry, importance of, in the
ancient oligarchies, iv. 3, 3 10 vi. 7, i 13, (cp. the government of the knights in
; ;

citizenship in
iii.

ktreme democracies,

5,

7

;

*-4,i6.
<:,thelslandsofthe,vii.i5,4.

ruled according to re by the soul, i. 5, 4-7 ; body of the freeman not ays distinguished by nature n that of the slave, ib. 10; j beauty of the body more bvious than that of the soul, the interest of, identiib. ; cal with that of the soul, ib. 6, 10; the goods of, for the sake of the soul, vii. i, 8, 9; prior to the soul, ib. 15, 10; must not be educated at the same time as the mind, viii. 3, 13
,

the,

Eietria, v. 6,
Celts, the, 17,
3ii.

14). 7; vii. 2,

9,

10;

r

Chalcidian

cities,
ii.

and

n

Sicily),
ib.

the (in Italy 6; (of 12,
iv. 3,

Thrace),

14.

Chalcis, in Euboea,
ib. 12,

3;

12. v.4, 9; Chares, the Athenian
v. 6,

general,

9.
i.

of Paros, a writer on Agri
culture,

;

u,

7.

4,

9-

Body, habit
the citizen,
13-

of, to
vii.

be required in
12
;

Charicles, leader of a party among the Thirty at Athens,
v. 6,

16,

viii. 3,

6.
ii.

Charilaus, king of Sparta,
iv.

10,

Byzantium,

4,

21

;

v. 3,

1 2.

2; v.
aiirvoi

u,

12.
o//o-

Charondas, used the word

Camicus, ii. 10, 4. Carthage, the constitution of, analogous to those of Lacedaemon and Crete, ii. ii, i, 5 an aristocracy with oligarchical and democratical features, ib.
;

for the
i.

members of a
legislated for

family,

2,

5;

Catana and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily, ii. 12, 6 said to have been the
;

disciple

of Zaleucus,

ib.

7

;

Y 2

324
the
first

Index
to
ib.

make laws

against
;

ib. 6,

2

;

their toys. ib.

;

their
vii.

ii; famous for the accuracy of his legislation, ib. to the middle class, belonged iv. ii, 15; compelled the rich

perjury,

crying not to be checked,
17.
see
6.
s

Children, Plato

to attend the law-courts,
3-

ib. 13,

and Children. Children, Guardians of, iv. 22. 9, 13; vi. 8,
Chios,
v. 3,
iii.

Women

community

of,

15,

Child, the, relation of,
2 parent, i. 2, virtue of, ib. 13, like a king by
;

and the
i
;

13,
;

19

;

iv. 4,

21

;

the 3-12; ruled the elder or
3,

12

6,

16.

Chones,
vii.

the, in southern Italy,
5.

10,

i ; 6; 7, 12, parent, ib. 2, 3; has the deliberative faculty,

Chytrum, a part of Clazomenae,
y. 3,

but immature, I0 )IS.

ib. 13,

7 (cp.vii.

Cinadon,

15v. 7,
2

3-

Citizen, the,

must both
;

rule
2
;

and
ii.

Children, ought to be educated with regard to the constitution, i. 13, 11-15; viii. 15; v. 9, i ; recognized in certain coun
tries

obey, i. I, 4-7; ii,
16;
vi.

12,
iii.

2,

14;
;

4,

io13,

5,

i

6,
2,
vii. 9,

9-11;
3;
17,

12;
2,

16,

4;
14,
ii.

by

their

resemblance to
ii.
;

5;
;

4-8;

the 3, parents, 9 children of citizens who died in battle reared at the public ex
their

1-8
7
1 2,

must have
7
;

a; ii,
;

leisure, 9, 10, 12; vii. 9, 4, to the state, belongs

6; children, in pense, ib. 8, what sense citizens, iii. i, 5 2 education of the chil 5, 8 bad dren of kings, ib. 4, education of the children of the
; ; ;

viii. i,

necessityof defining 4; the word, iii. i, 2 foil. ; children and old men, in what sense
citizens, ib.

5

;

5,

2;

resi

rich, iv. II,

4-8;

v. 9,

11-

15; licence permitted to chil dren in democracies and tyran 20 nies, vi. 4, exposure of
;

dence and legal rights, inade 4, 5; quate definitions, ib. i, not enough that the parents were citizens, ib. 2, 1-3 the citizen must share in the ad
;

deformed children, vii. 16, 15; way in which children should be
17; they should not see or hear anything indecent, ib. 19-21 7-11; viii. 5, what their education should
reared, ib.
;

ministration of the state, ib.
differs

i,

3-5; 5; 13, 12; 5-12; 2, under each form of gov ib. i, ernment, 9; 5, 5; 13, 2 the question 12; iv. about citizens admitted after a
7>

;

include, viii. 2 ; 3 ; ought to learn music
ing, ib. 3,
2 foil.
;

why

they

and draw

degree to which they should carry musical 1-8 must proficiency, ib. 6, not carry gymnastic exercise too must not labour with far, ib. 4
;
;

revolution, iii. 2, 3-5 ; the is it virtue of the good citizen identical with that of the good
:

man?

ib.

4;

5,

10;

18

;

vii.

8, the virtue of the citizen 14, in the perfect state, iii. 4, 5 ;

body and mind
restlessness of

at once, ib.

9;

young children,

12 ; not all citizens who 13, are necessary to the state, ib. 5, vii. 9, 10; the artisans 2;

Index
not to be citizens, iii. 5 ; 3; nor the sailors, vii. 6,
8
;

vii.

9,
7,

tages, vii.
ties,
iii.

6

;

commercial trea
6.

9,

of the citizen the 3 ; the character in the citizens, ib. 7 ! necessary their habit of body, ib. 16, 12;
is

the

life

Common
how

best

?

ib.

2

;

viii. 3,

13; 4-

Citizenship, rights of, conferred on strangers in early times at Sparta, ii. 9, 17; lost at Sparta, by failure to contribute to the
10, meals, ib. 32 7 given to persons of ille gitimate birth in extreme de 16; mocracies, iii. 5, 7; vi. 4, exclusion from, sometimes con cealed, iii. 5, 9; easily pre tended in a large state, vii. 4,
;
!

vii. 10, 1-8; they should be arranged, ib. 10-12 ; the young not allowed to share in them, ib. 17, of the magistrates, vi. 2, ; i of the priests, 7 ; vii. 12,

tyrant to, v. n, lished in Italy,

meals, hostility of the 5; first estab

u

;

vii.
",

12,
3;

6;

(at

Carthage),

ii.

common

(in Crete), ib. 5,

15;

14-

the original of the Spartan, ib. 10, 5 maintained at the public cost, ib. 7-10; (at Sparta), make property to some degree common, ib. 5, 15 ; badly regu lated, ib. 9, 31, 32; 10, 7; anciently called andria, ib. 10,
;

City, the

:

see State.
v. 3,

5-

Clazomenae,
13-

15.

Community
11,

of

women and

chil

Cleander, tyrant of Gela, v. 12,
Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, v.
12,
,

dren, the, proposed
i,

by Plato,
ii.

3;

arguments against,
ib.

3; 4;
10,
9.

of property,

5;

vii.

i, 12.

the Athenian,
18.

iii. 2,

3

;

vi. 4,

Cleomenes (king of Sparta),
7-

v. 3,

Confederacy, difference between a, and a state, ii. 2, 3; iii. 9, 6-8. Constitution, regard must be had
to the, in education,
v. 9,
i.

Cleopatra (the widow of Perdiccas), v. 10,
17.

13,

15;

Cleotimus, leader of a revolution
at Amphipolis, v. 6, 8. Clubs; at Carthage, ii. u, 3; at Abydos, v. 6, 6, 13; hated by tyrants, ii. n, 5.

11-15; viii. i; the best constitution supposed by some to be a combination of all exist
ing forms, ii. 6, 17 (cp. iv. I, 6; 7, 4; 9, 7); the per manence of a constitution only secured by the consent of all
classes,
12,
vi. 6,
ii.

Cnidus, v. 6, 4, 16. Codrus, king of Athens, v. TO, of Carthage, ii. 1 1 Colonies,
,

8.
1

9,

22;

iv. 9,

io;

9 oligarchies formed colonies by the first settlers, iv.
5>

yi-

i

5 ; in

6; v. 8,
2
;

5; 9,

5-10;
later,

7,

4

;

older constitu

tions
11.

more simple than
i;

dissensions in, a cause of 5 4, revolutions, v. 3, 11-14.
;

contentment with a constitution not always a proof
io,

Colophon,
15-

of,

iv. 4,

5

;

v. 3,

of

its

excellence,
2,

Commerce,
its

divisions of,

i. 1 1

,

3

;

(but cp. c. ii, constitution the
ent,
iii.

ib. io, 12 15); in each

citizen

differ

advantages

and

disadvan

i,

9;

5,55;

13,

12;

Index
iv.

7,

2

;

relation of the con
state,
iii.

ib. 10,

2,6; called by the
;
, ,

stitution
i; 3,

and the 956, i;
55
i,
i
;

i,

I0

!

3.
iii.

2; iv. i, 7, definition of the
6,
I
;

ob Cretans, avSpia, ii. 10, 5 ject of the institution ii. 5 15; better managed in Crete than at

word,

iv. i,

Lacedaemon,

ib.

9,

30-33;

10; 3, 5; the constitution the life of the state, iv. n, 3; the people naturally suited to

10, 7-9; frequency of sedi tion in Crete, ib. 10, 14, 15 ; slaves in Crete forbidden

each constitution,
ally

iii.

17;

the

constitution sometimes

nomin

gymnastic exercises and the use of arms, ib. 5, 19; thePerioeci
Crete well managed, ib. 9, 3; governed by the 15, 16 laws of Minos, ib. 10, 3 ana of the Cretan Perioeci with logy the Helots, ib. existence 5
in

unchanged
3,

after

a revolu

4 (cp.v. i, 8); the encroachments of the rich
often more dangerous to the constitution than those of the

tion, iv. 5,

!o,

;

;

;

poor,
to the
v. 9,

iv. 12,

6; life according constitution no slavery,
vii. 3,

of caste in Crete,

vii. 10,
ii.

i.

Custom, power
iv.
5>

of,

8,

24;

15;
iii.

1-3.

Corinth,

9, 9; tyranny of Timophanes, v. 6, 1 2 tyranny of the Cypselids, ib. 10, 6; n, 9; its duration, ib. 12, 3,4; family of the Bacchiadae, ii. 1 2,
;

3; vii. 13, sort of justice, i. 6,
i.

11-13; a
5.
7.

Cyclopes, the,

2,

in Aeolis, v. 5, Cypselids, the, v. n,

Cyme,

4.

9; ib. 12,

3,4-

8.

Cypselus of Corinth,
2.

v. 10,

6

;

Cos, v.5, Cosmi, the

(in

Crete),

to

the

3Cyrene, vi. 4,

12,

17, 18.
v.

Ephors, ii. 10, 6-14. Cotys, king of the Odrysians in v. 10, 18. Thrace, Council of Areopagus, the, ii. 1 2,
2,

Cyrus,

king of Persia,

10,

8, 24.

4; v. 4,

8;

12,

2.

Daedalus, i. 4, Dancing, viii. 5,

3.
3.

Councillors and warriors, the two highest classes in the state, iv. 4, 10-17; vii. 4, 4-7J 8 75 4-10. 9, Crataeus, one of the assassins of
>

Daphnaeus,
10.

of Syracuse,

v.

5,

Darius,
21.

son of Xerxes,
v. 10,

v.

10,

Decamnichus,

20.

Archelaus, v. 10, 17. Crete, favourable position of, ii. 10, 3,12,16; visit of Lycurgus 2 the Cretan constitu to, ib. tion the original of the Lace daemonian, ib. 1-3; analo
;

Deliberation, the right to share in, essential to the citizen, iii. i ; 6-12; 2, 5; 13, 12 (cp.
vii. 8,

Delphi,
knife,

7). v. 4,
2,

5
3.

;

the Delphian

i.

gous to the Carthaginian, ib. 1 1, i the attention of the legis lator directed solely to war, vii.
;

Demagogues, the authors and flatterers of the extreme demo
cracy,
ii.

12,
v. 9,

4-6;
10
;

iv.

4,

2,

9

;

the

common

tables in

troduced into Crete by Minos,

25-31; 12; vi. 4,

ii,

ii,

15-17;

confiscate

Index
the property of the rich, v. 5, 5; vi. 5, 3; often bring about revolutions, v. 3, 4; 5, !-5j in ancient times became

327
4; 13,
vi. 4,

means of their
12,
v.

preservation, iv. 12 5-8; 14,

;

6-io; 10, tyrants, ib. 5, 4, 6 in oligarchies, ib. 6, 5.
:

17; 5; democracy (especially the extreme form) apt to pass into tyranny, iv. n, 8;
ii
10,
;

v.

5,

6-io;

8,

7

;

Demiurgi, magistrates
iii.

at Larissa,

2,

2.

30; Plato censured for supposing that the change is
necessarily to tyranny, v. 12, Athens the champion of 10;

Democracy, the government of
the
iii.

many
7,

in their

own

interests,

5; 8,

2; iv. ir,

17;

democracy
18;
v. 7,

in

Hellas,

iv.

ii,

akin to tyranny, iv. 4, 27; v. 10, 11,30, 35; n, 12; the only possible government in 12; iv. 6, large states, iii. 15, 10 (cp. vi. 5, 5; 13, 5); the perversion of constitutional

14; the democratic principle represented at Sparta by the Ephoralty, ii. 6, 17 ; 10 iv. 9, 9; 21; lo, 9, characteristics of democracy
;
:

liberty

and equality
6; 9,

for all,

iii.

government, iii. 7, 5; iv. 2, i, 2; Plato wrong in calling democracy the worst of good constitutions, but the best of

8, 7; iv. 4. v. i, 3; 8,
vi.
2,

22, 23; 8,

7;

14, 15;

1-4,
iv.
9>

954,
ii.

20;
7;

the
12,
vi.

use of the lot,

ii,
*5>

bad ones,

iv. 2,

3

;

insuffici
2.

3;
large
11,
v. 8,

45

!95

ency of the common definitions iof democracy, iii. 8; iv. 4, more forms of democracy 6; than one, iv. i, 8 ; 4, 20
22;
vi. i,
iv.

employment of a number of magistrates, ii
8
5>

;

.

14

;

short tenure of office,
vi.

n,
2
;

20; 12, 3; 13, 12; the forms enumerated,

ment of
12,
2
>

6; 2, 5, the citizens, ii.
iv. 6,

8; pay
7>

*9;
vi.

4;

5; 9,

2;

4,

22-31;

6,

1-7; 12,

3; 14,
of the last
12,
iv-

1-7; vi. 4; growth and worst form, ii.
4,
v.

6, 7 ; 5, 5 ; carelessness in the admission of artisans and

4;
6,

iii.

12;
5,

6,9-n;
6-n;
6,

persons of illegitimate birth to 12 5, citizenship, iii. 4, 7,
;

5;

8

;

vi. 4,

16; licence allowed
children, v- ii,
4,

4.

6-8; 9, 10; vi. 3, 5-9; 15-20 (cp. v. 10, 12; n,
11)
;

to

women and
II
;

vi.

20;

ostracism

democracy more stable
iv.

oiiginally a democratic institu
tion, iii. 13, 15; v. 3, 3; democratical tricks to keep the power in the hands of the

than oligarchy, 6 i, 15; 7,
cies
:

n,

causes of revolution in democra

(cp^v.

3,

14; v. 8);
vi. 4,

anarchy,
;

v. 3,

5

;

17
3,

demagogic
9,

practices, v.
;

4; 5;
;

10

vi. 5,

5;

disproportionate increase, v. 3, 6-8 dissatisfaction of the
10, notables, 14 (cp. 7, 1 8); long tenure or greatness of office, v. 5, 8 the 8, 7
ii.
; ;

people, iv. 13, 5 suggestions for the improvement of demo 12; vi. 5, cracy, ib. 14, 51 1 the magistrates peculiar to
; ;

democracy,

ib.

iv. 15, ii 17, 24; democratical

;

vi. 8,

modes

of appointing magistrates and 8; judges, iv. 15, 19; 1 6,

328
character

Index
and powers of the
ib. 14,
;

assembly,
ib.

the 1-7 best material of a democracy,
6,
2
;

vi.

4,

i

;

the

of uniting the state, ii. 5, 1821 special, for the ruler, iii. 4, 8 (cp. vii. 14, confers a 6) claim to pre-eminence in the
;
;

position suitable to a democracy, vii. n, 5; democracy always supported by the sailors and
i, 2. light armed, vi. 7, Derdas (? King of Elymaea),

state,

iii.

13,

i

(cp. c. 9,

14,

8, 9; iv. 8, 2-5); 15; 12, of the excellence Spartan iv. 9, viii. i, education, 7
;

v.

10,

16.

4 (but cp. viii. 4, bad education of the
;

1-7)

;

rich, iv.

Devices, political, of oligarchies
iv. 13, 8 ; their inntility, v. 8, 4. Diagoras, an Eretrian, v. 6,

and democracies,

i14.

6 v. 9, II, 13 ; hostility of the tyrant to education, v. n, education necessary to 5
;

supplement habit,
17,

Dicaea,
3,
9-

the Pharsalian mare,
ii.

15

;

vii. 13, 13; the special business viii.

of the legislator,
13,

i,

i

;

Dicasteries, the Athenian,
4-

wrong notions
;

of

education

Dictators
Diocles,

:

see

ii.

Aesymnetes. 8-1 1. 12,

Dion, v. 10, 23, 28, 31, 32. n, Dionysiusthe Elder, i. ii, iii. 16; v. 5, 8, 12; 15, 10 10, 6 10. TO; 7, n,
; ;

prevalent in Hellas, vii. 14, 15 ; 6 ; the periods viii. i, 3 4, of education, vii. 17; viii. 4, 7~9 necessity of a common 3 system of education, viii. i,
!

(cp.

ii.

7,

8

;

and

iv.

9,

7

;

Dionysius the Younger, v. 23, 28, 31, 32.

10,

Diophantus,
;

ii.

7,

23.

Directors of Education, vii. 17, of Gymnastics, vi. 8, 5, 7
22.

should education have an ethical or a practical aim ? viii. 253; 5; should it include music? ib. 6 what instruments 3 5 and harmonies are to be used ? ib. 6, 8-16; 7; education not to be directed to a single
; ; ;

Dorian

Harmony, Harmony.
;

the

:

see

Dowries, ii. 7, 3 9, 15. Doxander, v. 4, 6. 13. Draco, ii. 12, Drawing, a branch of education,
viii. 3,
i, 12.

2 ; the proper end, ib. 4, place of gymnastics in education, ib. 3, 13 4 the education of mind and body not to be carried
;

;

on together,

ib. 4,

9

;

writers
ib.

upon musical education,

5,

Dynasty, or

Family Oligarchy

:

see Oligarchy.

ii, 14; 2, 3, 8, 23; 7, musical education a kind of rattle to older children, ib. 6, 2 the three principles of edu
;

Ecphantides (the ancient comic
poet),
viii. 6,

cation, ib.

7,

15
vii.

:

Directors
5, 7-

12.

of Education,

17,
v.

Education, may be directed to a wrong end, ii. 7, 8, 9; must have regard to the
constitution,
ii
;

Egypt,
vii. 10,

iii.

15,

4;

n,

9;
1 1.

1-6, 8. Eleven, the, at Athens,
Elis, v. 6,
1 1.

vi. 8,

i.

13,

15;

v. 9,

viii.

i

;

the great

means

Elymaea,

v.

10,

17.

Index
Empire, unnecessary to the hap
piness of states,
vii.
;

329

253;

14,

12-22.

End, the, the completed nature of each thing, i. 2, 8 has no
;

limit in the arts, ib. 8,

13

;

may
13ii.

14 9, agree or disagree
; ;

ib. 6 7, equality either numerical or proportional, iii. 128 iv. 12, 1-4; v. i, states must not be 16 ; vi. 3 based on one kind alone, v. i, 14 denied to the weak by the
; ; ;

strong,

vi. 3,

6.

with the means, vii. 13, 2 contains an element of pleasure,
viii - 5,

Equality of property, proposed 12. by Phaleas, ii. 7 ; 12,
Eretria, iv. 3,

3

;

v. 6,

14.

Ephialtes,

12,

4.

Ephors, the, a democratic element at Sparta, ii. 6, 2017 9,
;

Erythrae, Ethiopia,
7,

v. 6, iv. 4,

5.

4.
ii.

Eubulus (tyrant of Atarneus),
!? Euripides, v. io,
i.

22; 10, 10; iv. 9, 9; their corruption and licence, ii. 9, 12; greatness 19-24; io, of their power, ib. 9, 20 v. n, 2; the mode of their
;

20
8;
2. I.

;

quoted,
15;

2,

4;
8

iii.
;

4,

vii. 7,

viii. 5,

v. 9, 2.

election childish, ii. 9, 23 ; have the right of calling the to account, ib. 26; magistrates try suits respecting contracts,
iii.

Europe, vii. 7, Euryphon, ii. 8,

io (cp. ii. 9, u, 23 established by Theopomas a check on the royal pus 1-3; corre power, v. n, spond to the Cosmi in Crete, ii. 6, io, 12; to the magis 10, tracy of 104 at Carthage, ib.
i,
j ;

Eurytion, v. 6, 15. Euthycrates, aPhocian, v. 4, 7. Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in v. io, 16. Cyprus,
Evil,
i.

7)

2,

12.

Exchange,

(i) according to nature (barter of necessaries), i9 3, 4! ( 2 ) 2-7; contrary to nature (retail trade),
i>

i.

9, 3-

1-4, 9-12

;

io,

4;

n,

11,

3ii.

Epidamnus,
i; v. i,

7,

23
;

;

iii.

16,
5.

io, ii

4,
i.

7.

Epimenides, of Crete,
;

2,

Executive element, the, in the 2 state, iv. 14, 15; vi. 8. 16 ; Experience, value of, ii. 5,
;

Equality, how related to justice, iii. v. i, 13, ii, 12 9; 12
;

vii.

io,

8.

Exposure of deformed children,
justifiable, vii.

2

;

9,
;

1-6
longer

14; vii. 3, 5; 14, (the true kind) no desired in Hellenic
ii,

16,

15.
of, iv.
vi.

Extremes,

danger
12,

ii,
5,

16-19;
1-4.

4-6;

states, iv.

4-10, 19; v,
liberty
iii.

9, 5-10; equality and the aim of democracy, 7
;

8,
i,

Faction, frequency of, in Crete,
ii.

iv.

4,

22;

8,

7;

v.

i3; 8, 6; 9>i45 vi. 2, 4, 9; the desire of equality a cause of sedition, v. i, 3-8 ;
3, 2,

io, 14-16 ; evil effects of, in Hellas, iv. u, 16-18 ; a

cause of revolution
chies, v. 6,
in
i,
;

in

oligar

3;

3,

attained

creates

when 2; contentment,

less 9 democracies, iv. u, 6. 6; 7, 15.

common
14;
v.

33

Index
;

Family, the, the village a colony 6 of, i. 2, 5) ; (cp. c. 9,

composed of three relations which are sanctioned by nature,
ib. 2,
X
3>

2 foil.
J

;

3,

1-3; 12;

5

!

governed by the elder

or parent
2,

who
i;

is

6;

7,

their king, ib. 12, 3; different

kinds of rule within the family, ib. 12 ; the family apart of the
state, ib.

13,

15

the

state

more

ii. 5 ; 9, self-sufficient
;

the slave, i. 2, 2-4 3, 4; 6 not always outwardly 5 distinguished by nature from 10 rule over him, ib. 5, freemen more noble than rule 2 vii. 3, 2 ; over slaves, ib. will never willingly 14, 19 submit to the tyrant, iv. 10, 12; has a natural 4; v. ii, 6 ; iii. 16, right to rule, ii. 2, 2, 3 ; must not be ashamed to obey his lawful superiors, v.
; ; ; ; ;

;

8. than the family, ii. 2, Family oligarchy : see Oligarchy. Family quarrels, a cause of

9,

revolutions,

v.
3.

4,

5-7

;

6,

2; 14, 11-14; vii. 3, 1-5 (cp. iv. ii, 6); may have a certain knowledge of the arts, viii. 2, 5,6; may be al

J4; 10,
5

Father and child, relation of, i. i-3; J 2. i-5 3, 2, Female, the, by nature different from the slave except among
barbarians, i. 2, 3,4; subject by nature to the male, ib. 5,
i; 13, 7; tendency 7; 12, of the female to produce off like the parents, ii. 3, spring the union of male and 9
:

to share in the pleasures of music, ib. 5, 7Friendship, weakened by com the munism, ii. 4, 5-9 6 ; iii. motive of society, ib.
;

lowed

9,

!3; iv7 (cp- vi. 5, 7-11); implies equality, iii.
",.

16, 13 ; friendship among the citizens hated by the tyrant, v.

n,
"
5>

5

;

friendship at Sparta,

7-

female formed in obedience to a natural instinct, i. 2, 2 the relation of male and female part of the household, ib. 3, 2
;

;

12,

i.

[See

Woman.]

Gela, v. 12, 13. Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 3, 10, 12, 5 31 5,6. General, the, learns command by
; ;

Finance, importance of, to the the 13; statesman, i. ii, finances of Sparta badly man 36 aged, ii. 9, suggestions for the regulation of state
;

obedience,

iii.

4,

14; generals

often became demagogues in an cient times, v. 5, 6-10 ; have often attacked their masters, ib.

finances, v. 8,

15-19;
13
;

vi.

5.

Four Hundred, government of
the, at Athens, v. 4,
6, 6.

wise generals com 10, 24 bine light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy infantry, vi.
;

7,

2.

Freedom, supposed by Hellenes
not to exist
i.

Generalship,
9,
3:

a rare quality, v.

among
;

barbarians,

2,

4

;

why men
state,
iii.

6 is a reason 6, claim authority in a 8; 13, 9, 14 12,
;

Gerusia

see

Council of Elders.
his

God, happy by reason of

own

2-5.

[.Ste

Liberty.]

Freeman,

the, in his relation to

10 ; 10; 3, nature, vii. i, alone able to hold together the 8. universe, ib. 4,

Index
Gods,
the, supposed to be under a king because mankind origin 12, 3; 7 ally were, i. 2, their statues more beautiful than
;

22 ; gives the affirmative power 16 ; the to the many, ib. 14,

mode
is

in which it arises, ib. 9 causes of revolution to which it
;

ordinary human forms,

ib. 5,

10.

subject,

v. 7,

3,

Good, absolute and
13,

relative, vii.
its

16-18;
ii
;

6-8; 6, 5-9; means of

5-8the, the
i
;

Good,
i.

aim of the
7.

state,

10, preservation, ib. 8, more stable than aristocracy,
6.
of,
i

i,

ii.

2,

ib. 7,
of,

Good and
made

evil,

the sense

racteristic of

man,
8.

i.

2,

cha 12;

Government, forms
be criticized,
the legislator
iv.
i,
ii.

how
;

to
i
;

9,

iv.

the test of freedom and

must know
differ

all,

slavery, ib. 6,

5-8;
iii.

according

Goods, the three kinds of, vii. i, external goods not to 2-5 be preferred to virtue, ii. 9, 6; 35; vii. i, 5-9; 15,
;

to the character of the

supreme
;

not the cause of happiness,
i,

vii.

10; 13, 8. Gordius, father of Psammetichus,
3. tyrant of Corinth, v. 12, 10 Gorgias of Leontini, i. 13,
iii.
;

13, 5; i are 2-4; based on partial justice only, iii. 9, 6; v. 1-4, 15; 17, 2; vi. 3, 1, 1-4; are all

authority,
iv.

6,

i;

8,

14,

perversions of the perfect state, i ; may be divided into true forms or perversions, iii. I,
iv. 8,

2,

2.
2,

8-io;

6,

ii

;

7
;

;

18;

iv.

Government, the Constitutional,
called in ancient times
cracy,
7,
i i7>

demo
;

i their suc 1-3; 8, cessive changes in ancient times, iii. 1

iv. 13,

1 1

;

its rarity, ib.

15,
;

11-13;
s
v. 12,

iv. 13)

9~

i

(cp. c.

n,

16)

one of
;

2

Plato

theory

of change
influence

the true forms of government,
3
( C P- iv. 8,

i)

how

distinguished from aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy, iv. 7 ; 8; 14, 8-io; v. 7, 5-7;
vi.
i,

5-18 ; wrong, of increased population upon forms of government, iii. 15, 11-13; iv. 6, 5; vi.5, 5; the worst forms the most pre

3
ii.

(cp.
6,

ii.

ii,
iii.

5-9);
7,
iii.

composed of the heavy-armed
soldiers,

carious, vi. 6, 4; common error that forms of government

16

;

4;
17,

17,

4;
;

iv.

I3,io;
vi.

the people

to

whom

it is

adapted,
4,

can be reduced to two oli garchy and democracy, iv. 3, 6-8 sense in which this is
;

4

suited to a large country

true, ib. 4,
vi. i,

19;

v. i,

14 (cp.

population,

14; cha

racterized by the alternation of 2 ; 12, rulers and ruled, i. i,

the people adapted to each form of government, iii. 17; the magistrates suited to
6)
;

2;
4,

ii.

2,

io,

4-7; ii, 14; 14; 6, 9; 16,
14,
I

iii-

each,
17,

iv.

2;
i.

15, 11-13 ; vi. 8, 24; the judicial arrange
ii.

17,
7,

4;
i)
;

vii.

by the combination of the vote and the lot in the election
of the magistrates, iv. 15,

T 5 (cp.

ments,
ii
;

ii,
1

7
i,

;

iii.

i,

10,

iv.

6,

8; the military
2.

force,

vi. 7,

19-

Government, writers on, often un-

33*

Index
Harbours, should be separated from the city, vii. 6, 1-6.

5 ; have ex practical, iv. i, tolled the Lacedaemonian con

stitution, ib.

6;vii.i4,

16, 17.

in Plato s the, Guardians, Republic see Plato. Gymnastic, like other arts, has
:

Harmodius, v. 10, Harmonies, the, iv. 5, 16-25 7;

15.
3,

7

;

viii.

undergone improvement,

ii.

8,

18; includes various kinds of training, iv. i, i, 2. Gymnastic exercises, forbidden
to slaves in Crete, in discouraged
ii.

soul said to be, or to possess, viii. 5, 25. Harmony, the Dorian, iii. 3, 8 ;
i

Harmony, the
y

-

3>

and
7,

7 produces a moderate settled temper, viii. 5, 22 ;
>

5,

19;

oligarchies

jected
ib.
7,

re 8-13: the Lydian 3 by I lato in the Republic,
;

among the poor, iv. 13, 4; one of the recognized branches of education, viii. 3, i; carried to excess at Lacedaemon, ib. 4,
1-7 suggestions for their i-G arrangement, vii. 13, should be of a lighter kind for Directors children, viii. 4, 7
;

9,

14;
15
:

suitable

children, ib.

to the Mixo-

Lydian
gian,

;

effect, ib. 5,
iii.

has a sad and grave 22 the Phry
:

;

8; iv. 3, 7; 2 2 ; inspires enthusiasm, viii. 5 should not have been 7, 9
3,
,

;

:

retained by Plato, ib.

7,

9-13.

of, vi. 8,

22.

Hebdome,
v. i,

v. 3,

7.

Heliaea, court

of, at

Epidamnus,

Habit, the strength of law derived from, ii. 8, 24; one element of virtue, vii. 13, 11-13 15. must go before reason in 7
; ;

ii.

Hellanocrates of Larissa, v. 10,
18.

education,

viii.

3,

13.

Hanno,

v. 7,

4.

Happiness, independent of exter nal goods, vii. i, 10 13, 8; the happiness of the whole de pendent on the happiness of the 10 ii. parts, i. 6, 27; 5,
; ;

Hellas, influence of the climate of, on the national character, vii. 7) I natural superi ority of Hellenes to Barbarians,
~4>

i.

2,
-

4;
7)

6,

6;

iii.

14,

6;

v

3 ; differences of the various Hellenic tribes, vii. 7,

4

s

barbarous laws

among

happiness propor tioned to virtue, vii. i, 10; 8, 3, 7; 13, 5 9. 5; the perfect happiness of the divine 10; 3, 10; the nature, ib. i, happiness of men and states the ib. 2 the happiness same, 3 of states not dependent on em pire over others, ib. 2, 14-18;
9,

vii.

7

;

!

the ancient Hellenes, ii. 8, 20; the Hellenes formerly under royal rule, i. 2, 6; iii. 15, 11.
iv. 13,

10

;

changes in govern
increase of
15,

ment caused by the
population,
6,
;

;

;

or on size, ib. 4, 4-11 happi ness implies virtuous activity, ib. 3, 1-3 ; is the worthy
;

11-13; iv. 10-12; vi. 5, 5J. J3, rise of the heavy-armed 5 in importance, iv. 13, 10; effects of the Persian war upon
iii.

Hellas,
viii.

ii.

12,

5

;

v.

4,

8;

employment of
3-6
;

leisure, viii. 3,

growth of the Athenian empire in Hellas, iii.
6,
r

ii

;

5.

9~ r 5-

3)

9

division of Hellas be>

Index
tween Athens and Lacedaemon,
iv.

333
a passage
is

also cited,

viii.

8 ; v. 7, 14 smallness of the middle class

n,

1

:

3,

8,

which does not occur

in

n, 7, 1619; lack of great men, v. 10, effects of the cultivation 37 of rhetoric, ib. 5, 7; wrong notions of education, iv. n, 6
in later Hellas, iv.
; ;

Homer. Honour, inequality in, a cause
our
revolutions,
ii.

of

7,

20;

v. 2,

2; 3,

10-13, J 82, 14; 4,

vii.

15; viii. i, 3; 2, rago for flute playing in Hellas after the Persian War,
14,
2
:

8-io; 12, 18; the remedy for this, v. 8, 26, 12; n, 27 ; the citizen must share in
the honours of the state, iii. 5, 4, 5); honour 9 (cp.c. 10, less desired by men than wealth, iv. I3,8; v. 8, 16; vi. 4, 3
(cp. vi. 7,
7).

viii. 6,

12.
ii.

Helots,

5,

22:9,

2

;

10,
viii.

4, 16.

Heniochi, the, in Pontus,
4,
3i.

Household management, the art of, distinguished from the rale
of a master,
i.

Hephaestus,
6,

4,

3.

i,

2

;

3,

4
1-3

;

Heraclea, in Pontus,
2, 3, 7,

v. 5, 8.

3

;

7,

i

;

iii.

6,

6, 7;

divided
;

15;

vii. 6,

Heracleides of Aenos,v. 10,
Heracleitus, v.

18.

into three parts, i. 3, i ; how related to 12,

n,
v. 3,

31.
9.

making,
9,
i,

ib. 3,

3

;

8,

money1,2;
1-4;

Heracleodorus,
Heracles,
iii.

13-18;
i

10,
8,

13,

16.
v. 3,

includes the natural art of ac
9.

Heraea

(in

Arcadia),

quisition, ib. 4,

;

Hesiod,quoted,i.2,5; v.io,3o. Hestiaea (the later Oreus) in Euboea, v. 3, 4, 4. 9 Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 10, 31; n, 7; 12, 5, 6. 8. Hipparinus, v. 6, 5. Hippocrates, vii. 4, Hippodamus, of Miletus, ii. 8,
;

15; 1-3;
9>

J

-8
is

;

T

,

131-4; ii,
ib.

has a
18;

limit,

9,

14,

more concerned

with virtue than with wealth, i ; the ib. 13, parts of men

and

women

in, different,

iii.

4,

i

;

vii.

n

17; exists for the benefit of those under it, ib. 6, 6, 7.

t

g.

Homer, calls Zeus Gods and men,
quoted,
II.
ii.

the father of
i.

12,

2;

ib.

204 372

; ;

iv. 4,
iii.

27

;

16,

10

;

Husband and wife, relation of. [See Male and Female. ] Husbandmen, are sometimes 8 would be hunters, i. 8, better suited for Plato s com munism than the guardians, ii.
;

v.
ix.

39 I ~3; ib. 14, 63; i. 2, 9;

5J

4,

4;

make
i,

the best form of
2
;

democracy,
I0
9; 10
3
;
; ;

iv. 6,

12,

3

;

ib.
ib.

319
;

;

7
iii.

vi. 4,

8-10
8

;

furnish
8
10,

good
13,

x.

xviii.

648 224 ib. 376
; ;

5, 16,
i.

sailors, vii. 6,

;

should not be
;

citizens, ib. 9,

4.

14
9,

;

Odyss. ix. 7 ; viii. 3, 9 ib. 14; i. 2, 7; xvii. 385 ; viii. 3, 9 :

nor admitted to office, ib. 9 should be excluded from
;

the Treemen sAgora, ib.i2,3. Husbandry, a part of the natural

334
art of

Index
money-making,
3; ii,
2.
i.

8,

3

;

10,

lapygia, v. 3,
Iberians, the, India, vii. 14,

7
vii. 3.

;

vii.

2,

10, 11.

5.

lence, i. 6, 4 different m men and women, ib. 13, in 3, 9 the ruler and the subject, ib. 16-18; con 2-8; iii. 4,
; ;

sists in equality, iii. 9,

I

;

12,
3
;

i;

13,

12

;

vii.

14,

Inheritance, sale ofan, forbidden, 6 ; (at Sparta\ ib. 9, iithe divi 20) 14 (cp. v. 8, sion of an, may be a cause of
7>

;

cannot be the destruction of the 2 cannot be state, iii. 10, united with the love of conquest,
;

vii.

revolution, v. 4, Instruments, best

4.

when made for

one use,

i.

2,

3;

may be

either
;

of 2, 7-18 the ordinary notions of justice, vi. 3, 6; vii. 2, 14; all claims to rule based upon partial and
;

selfishness

are 2 living or lifeless, ib. 4, used either in production or in
action,
ib.

relative

justice
;

only,
i, 3,

iii.

9,

1-6, 15
i; vi. 2,

v.

2-6
1-4.

;

9,

4-6;

are never

2;

unlimited in the arts, ib. 8, the slave a living 14, 15 instrument, ib. 4, 2, 6.
;

Ionia,

v. 10,

6.

King, the, not the same with the a statesman, i. I, ought to be chosen for merit (as at
;

Ionian Gulf, the, vii. 10, 5. leader Iphiades, a party
v. 6,

at

14. Abydos, 2. Istros, v. 6, of Oenotria, vii. 10, Italus, king
3-

ii, Carthage), ii. 9, 4 29 receives a special education, iii. 8 be justified in put 4, may
;
;

;

ting 22

down
;

his
ii,

rivals,

ib.

13,

Italy,

>ii.

10,

2-6.

is the champion of the better classes against the people, v. 10, 3 ;

v.

27

;

often

supreme
iii.

in

religious

Jason, tyrant ofPherae, iii. 4, 9. Judges, not allowed to commu
nicate with each other,
13
in
;

matters,

20

;

13 ; vi. 8, should he have a military
14,
iii.

should not hold
25
;

ii. 8, office for

force?
7 rior

15,

14-16;

is

guarded by the
;

life, ib. 9,

necessary, even

v. 10,

citizens, ib. 14, 10.

beginnings of the iv. 4, state, 13, 14; the various modes of appointing ib. 16, them, 5-7 ; provision for an equal division of opinion 6 those vi. 3, among judges, who inflict penalties to be different from those who see to
the
first
;

King, the true, or natural supe
of
the
citizens,
iii.

13,

13, 24, 25;
3, v. 10,

6

;

unknown
37.

17, 5-8; vii. in later Hellas,

[See Royalty.]

their execution, ib. 8,

8-u.
bond of
;

Justice, the sense of, peculiar to

King, a, the Gods why supposed to be under, i. 2, 3. 7 ; 12, Kings, the, of Crete (in ancient ii. 10, 6; of Carthage, times), of Mace ib. n, 3-6, 9, 10
;

man,

i.

2,

12

;

men

in states, ib.
3<

the 16

donia,
viii. 5,

v. 10,
;

iii.

12,

sians, ib.

3; (cp. iv. 4, 9; J 13); sometimes denned as benevo

5
:

;

daemon]

8; oftheMolosn, 2 of Persia, of Sparta [see LaceKings, the ancient,
;

Index
sometimes became tyrants,
10,
5.
v.
12>

Knights, the, at Athens, ii. 12, 6 ; at Eretria, v. 6, 14.

ii.

3, 10 (cp. v. 13, 14; v. 7, T 5) ! number of heiresses, decrease in popu 9, 15 ;

lation, ib.

ment of large

Lacedaemon

frequent wars of the Lacedaemonians with their
;

14-19; encourage families, ib. 14; of strangers, ib. 10, expulsion admitted to 15 ; strangers

neighbours,
difficulties
ib.

ii.

9,

3, 1

1

;

their

with

the

2-4 (cp. ib. 5, 1 1 Messenian Wars, ib. v. 3. 4! the conspiracy of
;
7>

Helots, 22) ; the

citizenship in ancient times, ib. 17 ; licence of the Lacedae 9,

monian women, ib. 5-13 the Lacedaemonian constitution
:

2 ; of the Partheniae, v. 7, Pausanias, ib. i, ioj 7, 4; vii. 14, 20; ofCinadon,v. 7, of Lysander, ib. T, 10; 3 ; 2 ; the putting down of the 7, 30; the subject tyrants, ib. 10, cities governed in the oligar chical interest by the Lacedae

a combination of various forms of government, ib. 6, 16, 17; 22 an aristocracy with an 9,
;

element of democracy, iv. 7, 4 re 20 ; 10, 10) (cp. ii. 9, garded by some as a democracy, iv. 9, by others as an oligarchy,
;

18; v. 7, monians, iv. n, 14 friendship among the Lacedaemonians, ii. 5, 7; agriculture forbidden to them,
;

6-io; often considered the next best to the ideal state, ii. 6 its resem 16 ; iv. i, 6, blance to the Cretan, ii. 10, 4-7 ; to the Carthaginian,
;

17; simplicity of life among them, ib. 6, 17 ; iv. 9, 6-9; of the Lacedae excellence
ib.
viii.

1 1, 3-5 ; the arrangement of the law-courts at Lacedaemon,

ib.

an aristocratical
iii.

feature, ib.
;

7

;

monian education, i, 4 {but cp.
4,

iv.
vii.

9,

7

j

viii.

i);

2,19; music not com
;

the attention of the legislator directed solely vii to war, ii. 9, 34. 35
i,

10,

ii

5

-

2,

Lace it, viii. 5, 7 daemonian training only ad
prised in

9; 1-7

14,
:

16-22

;

viii. 4,

imperfections of the
ii.

Lacedaemonian monarchy,
29, 30;
v. ii,

9,

vantageous while other nations did not train, ib. 4, 4-7 rage for flute-playing at Laceafter the Persian War, daemon
;

n,

3,

4; limited
iii.

powers of the kings,
ii.

14,

3;

ib. 6,

12

;

error of the Lace
in thinking the

daemonians

ob

jects of their desire preferable to the virtue which gained them, ii.

an heredi 9, 33 iii. tary generalship, 1.2; l6 4. s, *4; i s 14. i origin of their power, 8 reason of its long v. 10, 2: the continuance, ib. n,
2; their office
; : ;

35 (CP- vii distrust in the
9>

-

J

5)

!

spirit of

Gerusia
29; ii,

criticized,

ii.

9,

25:

Lacedaemonian bad 30 government, ii. 9,
;

ii v.6, faults and merits of the Epho;

4, ii

management
36
;

of the revenue, ib. frequency of corruption, ib. 12; accu 19, 26; 10, mulation of property, ib. 9,

ralty,

ii.

6,

17; 9,
10, 12
;

26;

10,

ii,

19-24, 3;
as
v.

established by

Theopompus

a check on the royal power,

33*
IJ
>

Index
2,
ii.

3;
9,

miral,

the office of ad the com 33
:

rule? iii. 15, i-io; 16 ; should the law ever be changed
ii.

?

mon
T 5. iv. 9,

tables,

why
ii.

instituted, ib.

8,

16-25
5)
:

(cp.

iii.

15,

6,

5: 6
8
;

>

J 7; 9, not so well

3 r ,32

;

7

;

16,

Laws, the, cannot

managed
32
;

as

in

Crete,

9,

10,

7, 8 -

provide for circumstances, ii. 8. 22; iii. n, 19; 15, 4-8; 16, 4-13; should be supreme,

Lamet.ic Gulf, the,

vii. 10,

3.

and the magistrates only
interpreters,
5,
iii.
;

their
16,

Land,

the,

should be divided into
vii.
:

ii,
4,

two portions,

10,

n(but

10-12

iv.

19; 31

;

are

15) Hippodamus s cp. ii. 6, division of, ii. 8, 3, 12; it be cultivated should by the

relative to the constitution, but distinct from it, iii. n, 20 ;

owners? ib. 5, 3, 18, 19; 8, vii. 9, 8-13 1-4; 10, 1 at Sparta, had fallen 3, 14 into the hands of a few, ii. 9,
;
;

must be obeyed 9, 10 and must be good, iv. 4, 30
iv. i,
; ;

8,

5,6.

Law, the, or convention, by which prisoners of war become slaves,
i-

T
I4>

5-

6,

i, 5.

Landowners, small,
aged,
vi. 4,
iii.

to be

encour
6, 13.
:

Law,
iii.

unwritten, importance of,
9.

8-10.
2
;

16,

Larissa,

2,

v. 6,

Laws, the, of Hellenic cities gene
rally in

Law, the, of Oxylus, vi. 4, 9 Laws, the, of Androdamas,
12,

a chaotic

state, vii. 2,

9.

ii.

Laws,

14; of 6-8, ii
;

Charondas,
iv.

ib.

Law
and
iv.

13,

2

;

of

the, of Plato (see Plato). Courts, the, oligarchical democratical tricks with,
;

13; of Lycurgus (see Sparta) ; of Minos, ii. 10, i of Phaleas, ii. vii. 10, 3 12 of Philolaus, ib. 12, 7 8-io; of Pittacus, ib. 12, of of Plato (see Plato) 13 1-6; iii. Solon, ii. 7, 6 1 2, n, 8; of Zaleucus, ii. 12, 6. Law, the, derives its force from 24 ; a surety of habit, ii. 8, 8 justice (Lycophron), iii. 9,

Draco,
;

ii.

12,

;

;

;

2 2, 5; 13, 9, 14, 12; the rich should be encour to attend, even in demo aged used by the cracies, vi. 5, 5
;

demagogues
3,

to ruin the rich, v.

;

;

4; 5,
1

1-5!

vi

-

5.

3-

;

Law courts,
of, iv.

the possible varieties

6.

Legislator, the, to the country
ii.

;

6,

7;

7,

must have regard and the people, 14-17; must

may have

a party character, ib. 20; only exists 10, 5; II, for equals, ib. 13, 13, 14; must be supported J 6, 2, 3 by force in the ruler, ib. 15, is a mean, ib. 16, 14, 15
; ;

pay attention to the foreign

re lations of the state, ib. ; ib. ; vii. 2, 18; must secure leisure for his citizens, ii. 9, 2 ; ii,
10,
vii.

12;

vii.

9,

3,

12,

7);
ii.

must not

7 (cp. trust to
;

8

;

is

order,
of,

vii.

4,

8
15,

;

is

accidents,
J3>

without passion,
the rule
16,
5 (cp.
i.

iii.

5

;

the rule of
2,

God,

ib.
;

15, 16)

should the law or the monarch

vii. n, 15, 17 8-io; must regard the iii. 12 good, 13, ought not to want such a princi as ostracism, ib. 23 v. 3, ple

common

;

;

Index
3 ; possible 8 and state, iv. i , the causes of their preservation and destruction, v. 9, 9 vi. 5, 2 must be able to reform as well as to create a state, iv. i , should favour the middle 7 class, ib. 12, 4 ; must consider the deliberative, executive, and judicial elements in relation to the constitution of each state,

337
:

must know

all

forms of

;

of seven years, ib. 16, 17 ; 17, 15 simplicity of, at Sparta,
ii.

6,

17

;

iv. 9,

7.

;

Life, the

good, not desired by
in general,
;

;

i. 16 9, the object of the existence of the

mankind

;

state, ib. 2,
iv. 4,

8

;

iii.

9,
I
;

12
;

;

vii. I,

6-14; 2, 17;

1 1 4, 8, 4 ; is it the same for states and for individuals ?

vii. i

;

2

;

3,

10.

i ; ib. 14, his designs,

must be modest
ii.

in
4, 2

6,

7

;

viii.

2

;

should not

make conquest
state,
vii.
;

the
in

aim of his must give all the
;

Limit, a, necessary in the arts, i. 8, 21; 14; 9, 13; iii. 13, in population, ii. vii. 4, 10 10 6, 6, 7, 5; 9, 19;
;
;

citizens a share

vii.

4,

4-11;
4-7;
i.

5,
ii.

i;
6,

16,

the administration, ib. 14, 4 must have a care of edu
i,

15;
iii.

in the state,
vii.

7
S 1

;

3.

4.

5,

;

cation, ib.

8; 15,

8; viii.

in wealth,
ii.

8,

14; 9,

14;
vii. 5,

1,2; must not neglect i, i. physical education, vii. 16, Legislators, the best, belonged to the middle class, iv. u, 15. Leisure, the, of the citizens, the first object of the legislator, ii.
9,
2
;

6,
i.

8,

9;

7,
ii.

4-8;
7,

Locri (in Italy),

6; 12,

n,

10-12;

vii.

9,

3,4>

7 (cp.vii. 12,

7); the
viii.

citizen

must know the right uses
13-22
; ;

10. 6; v. 7, Lot, use of the, characteristic of democracy, ii. ii, 7; 12, 3 iv. 9, 45 J !9! vi. 2, 5, 8 modes in which it may be used in elections of magistrates,
;
5>

;

of, vii. 14,

3

;

5,

iv. 15,

16-22.
iii.

4; needed for virtue, vii. 9, 4. 6 Leontini, v. 10, 12, 13.

Lycophron, the Sophist,
8.

9,

Lesbos, Leucas,

iii.
ii.

13,
7, 7.

19.

Lyctus, in Crete,

ii.

10,

2.

Lycurgus,the author of the Lace

Liberty, supposed to be the characteristic feature of demo
cracy,
iii.

daemonian
2
;

constitution,
i
;

ii.

10,

12,

was
ib.
;

the guardian
2 his 10, his failure to
;

8,

7

;

iv. 4,

22,

of Charilaus,
bringthe
ib. 9,

6; 3; 8, 7; v. i, 14, 15 ; vi. 2, 1-4, 9; 9, 20; must not be confused 4, with licence, v. 9, 15 ; should be held out as a reward to slaves,

23;

8,

visit to Crete, ib.

women
1 1
,

under his laws,

vii. 10, 14. Life, action, not production, i. 4, is 5 ; pleasure of, iii. 6, 5
;

by some to have been a disciple of Thales, ib. 12, 7; belonged to the middle class, iv. n, 15.
12
;

said

the speculative or the practical, better? vii. 2, 5-18; 3: divided by the poets into periods

Lydian Harmony, the see Har mony. Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, v. 6,
:

i.

Lysander,

v. I,

10

;

7,

2.

338
Macedonia, v.
Magistrates,
10,

Index
8; vii.
2,

10.

power of

calling to

account

[see

Account, power of
;

calling magistrates to] division of law-suits among the Lace

daemonians and Carthaginian
ii. n, 7; iii. i, election 10 (cp. iv. 14, 3) of magistrates by merit charac teristic of aristocracy, ii. n, 10 for 7, 9! iv

magistrates,

;

8-11 lution, v. 3, 3; 4, great authority of the ancient i; v. i, magistrates, iii. 16, vi. 2, 8; 10, 10; 5, 5 8 the magistrates may pre vent revolutions by prudence, v. 8 manner in which they 8, should act in oligarchies, vi.
; ; ; ;

5,

10, ii

;

7,

54-7; enume

ration

-

I5>

!

wealth, of oligarchy, ii. 6, 19; iv. 15, 11, 10; choice by 9 lot, of democracy, ii. 6, 19 ;
;

of the different magis trates required by states, vi. 8 ; the magistrates must know the characters of their fellowcitizens, vii. 4,

13

;

must sup
:

12,
5,

3; 9
;

19; vi. 2, must be taken from
15,

iv.

those
in

iv. 13,

carry arms, ii. 8, 9; 9; are very numerous ii. ii, democracies, 14; ought to be only the guardians

who

10 press obscenity, ib. 17, Magistrates, certain, required law to take their meals to by
gether, vi. 2,
3, 3ii.

7

;

vii.

12,

2.

Magnesia (on the Maeander),
Magnesians, the,
9,
3.

iv.

and interpreters of the law, iii. iv. ii, 16, 5, 10-12 19 character and powers of 31 4,
;
; ;

the magistrates in aristocracies, 10 vi. 8, iv. 14, 15, 13 22 in constitutional govern in ments, iv. 14, 10, 16
;
; ;

Majority, the (in a state), diffi culties about the power which should be possessed by, iii. 10 ;
ii 13, 4-7; vi. 3. Male and female, reason
;

;

union
of,

of,

i.

2,

2

;

for the the relation

democracies,
-

ib.

1-7

;

15,
!

8 10-14; vi 2, 5-9 17, 24; in oligarchies, iv. 10-14; vi. 14, 8,9; 15, 8, 17, 24; the magistrates to each constitution, iv. peculiar 11-13; vi. 8, 17, 24; 15, definition of the term magis should he iv. 15, trate, 1-4; hold more than one office ? ii.
11,
8,
vi.

part of the household, ib. 3, i. 2; 12, Male, the, intended by nature to rule over the female, i. 5, 7 ;
12,
i.

Malians, the,

iv.

13,

9.

Man

a political animal, i. 2, iii. 6, has 9, 14, 15 3 a natural wish for posterity, i. 2 alone has the faculty of 2,
; ;

;

13;
2
;

iv.

15,
iv. 15,

5-10;

vi.

speech,

ib.

10;

the sense of
;

the various
11

modes of
14-21
;

appointment,
5,
;

popular election

10; 6, 6; dangerous, v. 5, the magistrates should not be allowed to make money, ib. 3,
i
;

12 the good and evil, ib. 12 ; power of reason, vii. 13, the worst of animals when not controlled by law and justice, T 16 imust allow 2,
5>

;

reason

to

direct

nature

and

8,

15;
;

vi. 7,

5

(cp. v.

undue power ac 12, 14) quired by them a cause of revo

habit, 11-13; should give the soul rule over the body,
vii. 13,
i-

5i

4~7;

the plants and

Index
animals created for his sake,
8,
ib.

339
;

12

:

Man, the
ib. 13,

virtue of

the, different

from that of the
3,

iii. 15 9 iv. 15, 9, 5; 5, 4, 9Messenian War, the (Second), v.

Megara,
v. 3,

;

woman,
4,
11.

9-11

;

iii.

7,

39, 3,

16:
7,

Men
8,

are
i.

unlimited
;

in their desires,

nature, ii. desirous of gain than of honour, 8 v. 8, iv. 13, 16; vi. 4, 3 ; are satisfied with a mode rate amount of virtue, vii. i, Men, the first, were or 5
;

16-18 19; are wicked by 12; are more 5,
9,

Messenians, the, ii. Metics see Aliens.
:

n.

Midas,
ii;

Middle

ii. 9, class, virtues of the, iv. the middle-class state 12;
i.

the best, ib.

n,
14
;

8-15;
9,

12,

4

;

v. 8,

6

;

smallin

:

ness of the middle ancient states, iv. 13,

class

n.
3
;

dinary,
21.

foolish

people,
of, v.
4,

ii.

8,

Might and
6; Miletus,
i.

right,
13. ii, 10,

i.

6,

vi. 3,

vii. 2,

Mantinea, battle
at, vi. 4,
4.

9

;

9
3;

;

v. 5,
vii.

8. 2,

government by representation
Marriage, regulations respecting, vii. 16 the marriage relation, i- 2, 2; 3, 1-3; 12; iii. 4,
;

Minos,
6.

ii.

10,

Mithridates (?Satrap of Pontus),
v. 10,

25.

6.

Mitylene, iii. 14, 6 ; 10, 19.

10; v-4,
the
:

5,

Massalia, v. 6,
4-

2,3;

vi.

7,

Mixo-Lydian Harmony,

see

Harmony.
in relation to the

Master, the,
slave,
i.

Mnaseas, a Phocian, v. 4,

7.

2,

2-5
7,

;

3,
;

12,
ib. 6,
;

i; 13,
iii.

12-14

1-3 has a
;

Mnason, a Phocian, v. 4, 7. Moderation in politics, necessary
for the salvation of the state, iv. 6 vi - 5. ii, 16-19; v
9>

common

interest with the slave,

6 ; vii. 14, 10; 6, 6 ought to train the slave in the science virtue, i. 13, 14;

;

2.

24 7, peculiar to, ib. 3, 14; the rule of, ib. 5 ; 13, 4 iii. 4, ii vii. 14, 6; 3, wrongly supposed [by Plato] to
;

Molossians, the, in Epirus, 2. 8; ii,

v. 10,

Monarchy,
against,
iii.
:

arguments for and
15-17see

;

;

Monarchy
Money,

King, Royalty,

be

different
ii
2
;

from
4.

political rule,

and Tyranny.
8 ; its origin of, i. 9, conventional nature, ib. ; not to be made from ought

3,
1 1

Mean,
states,

importance
iv.
;

of
9,

the,

in
in 15.
viii.

n

v.

6
;

;

education,

viii.
:

6,

7

7,

Mechanic, the see Artisan. Medes, the, iii. 13, 19
;

10, money, 5. Money-making, the

ib.

art of,
2

how
;

related to household

manage
i,

5,

5i.

ment,
9,

i.

3,

3

;

8,

9,

Medicine,
3,

45
v. 10,

8
>

13, 17; 10, 18. (See
19.

i,

12-18;
10,

10,
ib. 8,

natural kind,

1-4; the 3-15 9,
;

Physician.)

1-8;
2
;

1-4;

n,
i

i,

Megacles,

the unnatural,

ib. 9,

foil.;

Z 2

340
;

Index
Mytilene
:

10, ii, 3; the inter 4, 5 mediate, ib. ii, 4; the un natural pursues its end without limit, ib. 9, 13-15. Monopolies, a common method

see

Mitylene.

Nature, implants in of posterity, i. 2,
distinction

man a desire
2
;

makes a
6
;

between the ruler
;

of gaining wealth, i. ii, 8-13. Multitude, the, their claim to the

and the
6,

ruled, ib.

4,
;

5

;

8

;

12

;

13,

4

between

supreme power,
dividual, ib.

; 10, better collectively than the in

iii.

i

are

the female and the slave, ib. 2, 3 her designs must be sought
;

ii; 13, 4; 15; should have power only to elect and control the magistrates, ib.
11,
7-

in things
ib.

5,

5

which areuncorrupted, does nothing in a
;

niggardly fashion, ib. 2, creates nothing in vain, ib.
8,
;

3

;

10;

ii. Musaeus, quoted, viii. 5, Music, subject to a ruling princi 4; better judged of ple, i. 5, by the many than by the indi

vidual, iii. ii, 3; useful (i) in education, viii. 3; 5 ; 7, 3; (2) for the intellectual employ

12 ii. 8; gives toman 5, the social instinct, ib. 2, 1016; iii. 6, 3-5 not always able to accomplish her inten 10 ; 6, 8 sup tions, i. 5,
; ;

ment of
9
!
7>

leisure, ib.

3

(3)

w

i

5, 3 tn a v i
;

8,

W
;

9-12; plies food for all, ib. 8, 10, 3 ; has given all freemen a right to rule, ii. 2, 6; iii. 16,
2,

to

3

;

fits

purification, ib. 7,

3-6
i>

has

the old to

the young to obey, command, vii. 9, 6;

an

upon morals, ib. 5, 6; 7, !5- 2 5; 6 3-7 not taught at Lacedae7,
>

effect

;

ib. 5, 7 ; naturally plea sant to men, ib. 8, ii, 25; 6; produces enthusiasm, ib. 7, 16, 22 ; 7, 4; allays the 5,

mon,

permits proper relaxation, viii. 2 herself suggests the pro 3, per harmonies for each age, ib. forms one element in 13 7,
; ;

virtue,

vii.

13,

11-13;

I5i

7, 9 4-6 ; passions, ib. 6, a rattle for children of a larger
;

must be supplemented by and education, ib. 17, 15. Naval force, the, which should be possessed by the state, vii.
7 art
;

2 cannot be growth, ib. 6, judged except by a performer,
;

6,

6-9.
v. 6,
i.

Naxos,

7) 4 (but cp. c. 5, must not be pursued to the of professional excellence, point ib. 6,7, 15; includes a higher and a lower kind, ib. 8; 7, 6 is composed of melody
ib.
; ;

Nobility,

among Barbarians only
the state,

partially recognized by Hellenes, i. 6, 7; confers a claim to supe
riority in
iii.

9,

15

;

12,

may

2-5; iv. 8, 3 9; 13, be defined (i) as excellence
;

;

and rhythm,
7,
i.

ib. 5,

18

;

6,

5

;

of race, iii. 13, v. i, 7 3 (2) as ancient wealth and virtue,
;

Music, writers upon,
7,
2, 3, 8, ii,

viii. 5,

23

;

Musical
12.

Harmony

:

14. see

9 confused by mankind with wealth, ib. 4, 8; v. 7,
iv. 8,
;

Harmony.

i

;

like virtue,
v.
i,

is

not often

Myron, tyrant

at Sicyon, v. 12,

found,

14.

Nobles, quarrels among, a cause

Index
of revolutions,
6>

v. i,
;

16; 4,

i

;

9 form a demo cracy among themselves, ib. 8, 6 should be humane to the
5
;

8,

;

ing that an oligarchy can ever be called 3; oli good, iv. 2, garchy the perversion of aristo 12 ; iv. 5 cracy, iii. 7, 15,
;

subject classes,
5,
5-"-

iv.

13,

8;

vi.

2,
it,

2
ii.

;

how

distinguished from
;

Notium,

v. 3,

15.

Obedience, the necessary prelim
inary to command, iii. 4, 6. 6; 14, 14; vii. 9,
10,

i 5-10; iv. 5, 10; v. 7, 2-10; 14, 5~8; popularly supposed, like aristocracy, to be a govern

ii,

7; 8,

ment of the
i,

Odysseus,

viii. 3,

9.
of, v. 3, 5.

Oenophyta, battle
Oenotrians,

best, iv. 8, 4; v. 14; analogous to tyranny 11 ; in love of wealth, v. 10, has more forms than one, iv. I ,

the

(in

Southern

Italy), vii. 10,

3-5.

12

8; 4, 20-22; 12, 3; 13, the forms enumerated, ib. ;

Office, the indefinite, in all the citizens share,

which
iii.

5,

i-35

6,

7-n;

14,

i,

6-12;

2,

5.

Office, lust of

mankind for, iii.

6,

10; oligarchical tricks to keep

6; oligarchy less stable than democracy, iv. ii, 6; the 14; v. i, 15; 7, shortest lived of all forms of
vi.

8-n;

the poor from, iv. 13, 1-4; justice of the various claims to,
iii.

governments, excepting tyranny,
i 12, (cp. vi. 6, 4 ) the extreme form apt to pass into

v.

;

10-13
;

:

Offices, the, of the

state, posts of honour, ib.

4
vi.

8

10, their distribution, iv. 15 ; their organization deter ;

tyranny,
12,

iv.

ii,

ii

;

v. 10,
v.
;

5;
3,

13; the causes of revo
in

lutions
;

oligarchies,

mines
in

character of each 10 ; 3, constitution, iv. i, 5 ;

the

the 6; 12, 14 15-18 means of their preservation, ib.
6,

small states must be
ii,
2
;

com

95 8
5
;

.

5-21

5

9;

vi.

6,

bined, in large ones specialized,
ii.

8,

in

14; iv. 15, 5-7; vi. democracies restricted
6; 5)
i,
;

the Lacedaemonians the champions of oligarchy in
7
;

to six months tenure, v. 8,
(cp. vi. 2,

18; v. 7, Hellas, iv. ii, 14 the people to whom oligarchy
;

and rarely held
6
21
;

is suited, iv. 2,

more than once by the same
person,
iii.

vi.

2,

5

;

4; 12, 3 the military strength of oligarchy derived from cavalry and heavy
;

should be

divided
;

into

two

infantry, ib.
vi. 7,
I
;

classes, v. 8, Offices, sale of,

vi. 5,

n.
at

3, 3; 13, 10; oligarchical modes

and pluralism,

of appointing magistrates and
judges,
ii.

10, 13. Carthage, ii. ii, Oligarchy, the government of the few for their private interests, iii.
6,
2
;

6,
J
5>

19,

20;

iv.

14,
oli

8,

3;

or, more correctly,
ib.
7,

of the wealthy, 6, 7; iv. 4,
7 ; vi. 2,

5

;

8,
8,

i-6, 19;
i>

n,

16-19; v

3;

8; magistracies peculiar iv. 14, 11 garchy, 14; 15, vi. 8, 17, 24; luxury of the women in oligarchies, iv. I J3; bad education of the
16,

7-u;

i4-;

to

;

5>

7; Plato

wrong

in think

children,

ib.

ii,

6;

v.

9,

34*
:

Index
18. Parrhon, of Aenos, v. 10, Partheniae,the (atLacedaemon), 2. conspiracy of, v. 7, Passion, intended bynature to be

1 the oligarchs sometimes 3 forbidden to engage in trade, v.

12,

14;

their tricks to
in their
;

keep

the
iv.

power

own hands,

2 13, 1-4; 14, 9, 12; they ought rather to give the people a share in the go vernment, ib. 14, 14; vi. 5, ii 7, 4 they should not take oaths against the people, v. 9, 10, ii; they should not be allowed to make money
; ;

6 controlled by reason, i. 5, present in the human soul from 8 the first, iii. 15, 16, 5, vii. 15, 10 blinds men 5
; ; ; ;

by

office,
5-

ib.

3,

i

;

8,

15

;

34; u,3i; the multitude freer from passion than the individual, iii. 15, 8. Patrimony, laws forbidding the 6 ; 9, sale of a, ii. 7, 14
to danger, v. 10,
(cp. v. 8,

vi. 7.

20).

Olympic Games, the, viii. 4, Olympus, melodies of, viii.
16.

8.

5,

Pausanias, the assassin of Philip of Macedon, v. 10, 16. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus,
incorrectly

Onomacritus, the Locrian,
7-

ii.

12,

called
14,

king,
his
;

v.

i,

10;
v.

vii.

20;
10
7,

con
;

Onomarchus, a Phocian,
7-

4,
5.

spiracy, v. i, 20. 14,

4

vii.

Opici,the,orAusones,vii. 10,

Pauson,
21.

paintings

of,

viii.

5,

Opus
Oreus

(in Locris),
v. 5,
7.

iii.

16,

i.

Oratory,
:

see

Hestiaea.
v. 12,
i.
iii.

Payment of the democracy in troduced at Athens by Pericles
;

Orthagoras, Ostracism, how far justifiable, 13, 13-25; 17. 7; v
12. 3; 8, Oxylus, king of Elis,
vi. 4,

-

3,

12, 4; bad of the practice, ib. iv. 6, 6; 5; vi. 2, 19 how they may be counteracted,

and Ephialtes,
effects
;

ii.

7>

9.

vi. 5,

5-

Paches,

v. 4,

6.

Painters, combine their from scattered elements,

works
iii.

4
a

ii, like other artists, observe rule of proportion, ib. 13,
;
;

Peace, the true object of war, vii. i, 5; the 14, 13, 22; 15, 3. dangers of, ib. 15, men of the Pediaei, the (or
plain
2
>

),

at Athens, v. 5,
v.

9.

Peisistratus,

5,

9;

12,
the,

21

those who,

like

Polyv.

5!

Peisistratidae,
15,

gnotus, express moral ideas, to be preferred, viii. 5, 21. Paintings, obscene, not to be al

10,
5-

34; II,
ii.
;

9; 12,

lowed,

vii.

17,

9.

Panaetius, tyrant of Leontini, v. 6; 12, 10, 13. Parent, the, relation of, to the child, i. 2, 2; 12; 2; 3, provides food for the offspring, ib. 8, 10 ; 10, 3.

iii. 3, 3 10, Peloponnesus, 5 Peloponnesian War, the : see War, Peloponnesian. 22 9, 2. Penestae, the, ii. 5, in Pentacosio-medimni, the, Solon s constitution, ii. 12, 6.
;
;

Penthalidae, the, at Mitylene,
10,
19.

v.

Index
Penthilus
v.

343

(?

tyrant of Mitylene),

10,

19.

Periander, tyrant of Ambracia,
v. 4,

9; jo,

16.
iii.

Periander, tyrant of Corinth,
13, 12,

16;
3ii.

v.

10,

13; 11,
4.

4;

ii ; philo marriage, vii. 16, sophers who have treated of musical education, viii. 5, 23; 2, 3,8, 11,14. 7, Philosophy, especially necessary in the prosperous, vii. 15, 3,
4-

Pericles,

12,

Perioeci (in Argos), v. 3, 7 (in Crete), ii. 9, 3, 3; 10, 16 tohave 5, 8, advantageous of foreign race as cul perioeci 8 tivators, vii. 9, 13. 10,
:
:

10, ii. Philoxenus, viii. 7, Phocis, v. 4, 7. Phocylides, quoted, iv. ii, 9. Phoxus, tyrant of Chalcis, v. 4,
9-

;

Phreatto, court of, at Athens,
16,
3-

iv.

Perrhaebians, the,
Persia,
8,
iii.

ii.

9,

3.
v.
vii.

13, ii, 5.

24;

4,

19; 6;
:

ro,
2,

Phrygian harmony, the:

see

Har

mony.
6. Phrynichus, v. 6, Phylarchs, magistrates at Epi-

10; viii. 5, Persian War, Persian.
of government,
6,

the

see

War,

damnus,
iii.

v. i,

10.

Perversions, the, of the true forms

i,8-io;
i
;

ii

;

7 8,

;

17, i; all

iv.

2,

1-3;

governments

perversions of the perfect state, i iv. 8, 5). (cp. ii. ii, Phalaris, of Agrigentum, v. 10,
6.

Physician, the, must be judged by 10-12 the physician, iii. ii, is healed by the physician, ib. not expected to per 8 is 16, suade or coerce his patients, vii. must know both the 2, 13 end and the means of his art, 2 ib. 13, precepts of the
;

;

;

;

Phaleas of Chalcedon,
12,
7, 12.
v. 6,

ii.

7,

2

;

physicians about marriage, ib. ii law about physicians 16,
;

Pharsalus,
6.

10.
v. 10,

in

Egypt,

iii.

15,
;

4.

Pheidon, tyrant of Argos,

i Piraeus, ii. 8, Pittacus, ii. 12,

v. 3,

15.
iii.

13;

14,

Pheidon, of Corinth, ii. 6, Philip, King of Macedonia,
16.

13.
v. 10,

9, 10.

Plato, criticisms of;

forms of
i.

government
ii.

differ in kind,
7)
r
;

i

,

Philolaus,

12,

8, 10.

2

;

3,

4;

Philosopher, the,

may be allowed

of men and
i-

women

the virtue not the same,

to discuss practical questions, i. i; has no difficulty in ii,

J
3>

ways
14
ii.
;

9~n ; slaves not al to be harshly treated, ib.
disadvantages of
3-c. 5
;

8-10; acquiring wealth, ib. must go below the surface of i ; his life as iii. 8, things, distinguished from that of the 6: statesman, vii. 2, philo sophers, the, not agreed about 2 the opinions slavery, i. 6, of natural philosophers about
;

com

munity of wives and children,
i.

of

common pro

ib. 5; vii. 10, perty, 9; the unity of the state may be carried too far, ii. 2, 2-c. 3,

4

;

6
4>

;

5,

women ought

13 ; men and not to have the

344
same
pursuits, ib. 5,

Index
24
;

dan

ger from the rulers being always the same, ib. 25, 26; hap piness should not be confined Plato to one class, ib. 27 has neglected the foreign rela
;

how far right in wishing that his city should not be near tie
1-4 speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium criticism of quoted, ii. 4, 6 the Republic, ib. i, 3-c. 5; of the Laws, ib. 6.
sea, vii. 6,
:
:

tions of his state, ib. 6, 7 ; amount of property allowed by

him

insufficient,

ib.

9

;

he

should have limited population 10as well as property, ib. he has not said 4 14 7, how the rulers and subjects are
; ;

related, ib. 6, 14; not property in land

why
1

should
;

be increased
5
diffi

Pleasure, always sought by man 12 ; kind, i. 9, 16; ii. 7, denied by Plato to his guardians, ii. 5, 27; is regarded differ ently by different persons, viii. the pleasure of living, 3, 5 iii. 6, 4; relation of pleasure to happiness, vii. i,6; thenatural
;

to a certain extent ?

ib.

pleasure given by music,
ii,

viii. 5,

culty of living in two houses, ib. 16; the best state not made up of tyranny and demo 18 ; the state of cracy, ib.

8: 15, 17, 25; 6, Pleasures, the, which are unac companied by pain, ii. 7, 12.
Poetry, better judged by the many than the individual, iii. n, 3. Polity: see Government, the Con
stitutional.

the

Laws
;

really

a mixture of

oligarchy and democracy, ib. 18-22 Plato s distinctions between good and bad constitu
his account of the classes necessary to a state,
tions, iv. 2,
ib. 4,

Polycrates,
21.

v. ii,

9.
viii.

3

;

Polygnotus, the painter,
Poor,
iii.

5,

12-15

nized the

has not recog Polity in his enu
;

the,

8,

everywhere abound, 6 v. I, covet 14
;

;

meration of constitutions, ib. 7, i his theory of revolutions, v. 12, 7-18; his error in saying that the guardians should be fierce to those whom they do that not know, vii. 7, 5-8 a valiant city needs no walls, ib. 8 that the crying of ii, children should be checked, ib.
;
: :

the goods of the rich, iv. ii, their degraded state in 9
;

Hellenic

cities,

ib.

5-7;

willing to fight if they are sup ported by the state, ib. 13, 9; equal to the rich in democracies, vi. 2, 9 the surplus revenue distributed among them in the
;

extreme democracy,

17,

6;

his

inconsistency
:

in

may

cause a revolution

ib. 5, 7 ; if their

viii. 7,

retaining the Phrygian mode, the merits of 8-13
s

numbers increase, v. 3, 6-8; begrudge the extravagance of
courts, ib. II,

Plato

writings,

ii.

6,

6

;

he

19

;

should be

departs from ordinary practice more than other legislators, ib.
7,
i
;

humanely
iv.

treated,

13,

8

;

20; 7, should be helped
ii.

peculiarities suggested
12,

by him,ib.
his

censure

12: of the

justice of

Lacedae
34:

monian

constitution, ib. 9,

5-11. by the rich, vi. 5, Population, decline of, at Sparta, ii. 16; importance of regu 9, lating, ib. 6, 10-14; 7, 4-

Index
14-19; vii. 5, i; 16, changes of government brought about by the natural increase of population in Hellas, J 3; iv. 6, 5; 13, 15, 10 ; vi. 5, a limit of 5
; ;

6; 9, 15;

degree
7
;

among

friends, ib.
;

6,

10, 9 found to some extent at Sparta and Tarentum,
vii.
J 6; would 7! y idestroy the virtues of temper 8ance and liberality, ii. 5, i o would not produce the marvellous results which Plato
"
5> 5>

i".

population necessary to good 6, 10 7, government, ii. 6, 1 vii 4 4-" 55 9.
9>

;

5

expects,
of,

ib.

1 1

;

equalization
ib. 7
;

i; 16, 15. Poverty, not the cause of the worst crimes, ii. 7, 10; always antagonistic to riches, iv.4, 19 the parent of revolution and
5,
;

proposed by Phaleas,
12
;

12,

would not remedy

the deeper evils of human nature,
ib. 7, 8-13, 18. Property qualification, required in the holders of various offices,
iii.

1 3 (but cp. v. 1 2, of the essential characteristics of democracy, vi.

crime, 17);
2, 7-

ii.

6,

one

Priests, are not political officers,

4, 24; 5, 7; vi. 4, 5; not to be excessive, iv. ought in oligarchies should 13, 7

ii,

16;

iv.

i;

6,

3,

;

necessary to the state, vii. 8, 7,9; should be taken from the aged citizens who are past state service, ib.
iv.

15,

2

;

be fixed according to two stan 2 dards, vi. 6, changes in, a
;

189; their duties, vi. 8, 20 ; required to take their meals 6. at common tables, vii. 12, Property, a part of the household, i ; a condition i ; i. 8, 4,
9,

cause of revolutions, v. 3, 8, 10 the 16-18; 7, 6, 9 evil may be remedied by pe riodical revisions of the census,
; ;

ib. 8,

10, ii.
of,
iii.

Proportion, importance
13,
7

2i
vii.

;

iv.

12
10.

;

v.

i,

129,

but not a part of the state, vii. in the sense of food, 8, 4 provided by nature for all, i. 8, 9; 10, 3; the pleasure of Plato s 8 property, ii. 5, limit of property unsatisfactory, ib. 6, 9 ; the limit should be such as to enable a man to live both temperately and liberally, i ; ib. vii. 5, inequality of
; ;
;

15; 3,
;

6; 7,
4,

8;

8,i2;

Psammetichus, son of Gordius,
tyrant at Corinth,
9v. 12,

Pyramids, the, of Egypt,

3. v. ii,

14property at Sparta, ii. 9, 15; 3, 10; 12, 19; v. 7, a great cause of revolutions, ii.
2-6. 7, Property, community of cism of Plato s scheme,
;

Reason, an element of virtue, vii. 10-13; 15, i3 7; is the master artificer, i. 13, 8; di vided into two parts, the specu

criti
ii.

and the practical, vii. 14, 10 ; is the end towards which nature strives, ib. 15, 8; in tended by nature to control the
lative

5

(see

Plato)
to

;

opposed
4,

common property human nature, ib.

16;

exists in a modified

passionate or irrational element in the soul, i. 5, 6 6 13, vii. 8 is not 14, 9 15, found in the animals, i. 2, n;
; ; ; ;

34*
vii.

Index
12
;

13,

exists in slaves to

alimited extent, 1.5, 9; 13, 3; is not readily obeyed by those who have great advantages over others, iv. II, 5; may be

de jure and de facto, iii. 2, 34 should old debts be paid5
;

ib.

3,

i

;

democratic

mea

sures taken by Cleisthenes and others after a revolution, ib. 2,

overcome by passion,
33
;

v.

10,

3~5

;

vi. 4,

1

8

;

revolutions

ri
>

31

!

may make mis
7.

may happen
iv. 5,

without an
8.

imme

takes, vii. 15,

diate change in the constitution,

Religion, matters of, used to be entrusted to the kings, iii. 14, 3, 14 (cp. vi. 8, 20); the tyrant should have a care of 25; the ex religion, v. n, pense of public worship should be borne by the state, vii. 10, the officers of religion, 10:
vi.

35

v. i,
ii.

Rhegium,
13-

12,

14;
v. 3,

v.

12,

Rhodes,
5,
a-

ii.

10,

3;

4, 5

;

Rich, the, one of the elements of the state, iv. 4, 15; every where few compared to the poor,
iii.

8,
9-

18-21

;

vii.

8,

9

;

9,

Religious worship, one of the conditions of the state, vii. 8,
8.

Representation, principle of, once existed in the government of

8, 6; v. i, 14; often hindered by the cares of property from attending to public busi 6 (butcp. i. 7, 5); ness, iv. 6, possess the external advantages of which the want occasions

Mantinea, vi. 4, 4. Republic, the, of Plato
Plato.

crime, iv. 8, 4 (cp. ii. 7, 10); have too much power in so-called
aristocratical governments, iv. 6; v. 7, 12, 7; their en

:

see

Rest

see Leisure. Retail trade, not a natural mode of money-making, i. 9, 4, 1 2 arises out of the barter of
:

croachments more dangerous to
the state than those of the poor, 6 constantly in antago iv. i 2, nism to the poor, ib. n, 7 i
;

;

necessary articles, ib. 9-12. Revolutions, their objects, v. i their causes, ii. 7, 2, 5, 10; v. 2; 3; 4; 10, 13; 12, 14-18; their occasions, v. 1 1 the preventives of 4 7, 6 them, ii. n, 15 ; v. 7,
;
;

;

v. 9, 10 should be protected against the demagogues, v. 8, should be 20 vi. 5, 3 relieved from useless state ex 20 vi. 5, 9 ; penses, v. 8, should be generous to the poor,
; ;
;

;

;

iv.

5

;

6

;

ii; vi. 4, 16-20; 5 9 revolutions in democracies,
;
; ;

8 10 should vi. 5, 13, be public-spirited and munifi
;

;

cent, vi. 7,
1 1

6

;

are often spoilt

in oligarchies, ib. 6 ; v. 5 in constitutional governments,

by indulgence
,

ib.!7;
ib.

7,5J

in aristocracies,

childhood, iv. 13; can alone afford the expense of keeping
6
;

in

v. 9,

in monarchies, ib. 10; 7; in tyrannies, ib. ; 1 1 ; Plato s theory of revolutions, criticized, ib. 12, 7-18; questions raised after revolutions; citizens

horses, iv. 3,

2.

Riches and poverty, the opposing elements of the state, v. i, 14; 8, 14; riches more de sired by men than honour, iv.

Index
13,

347
and
the
ruled

8

;

v. 8,

16

;

vi.

4,

2

;

ruler

found

Solon wrong in thinking that no bound has been fixed to See Wealth. riches/ i. 8, 14. Royalty, the form of government in which one rules for the best,
iii7>

2 ; 5, throughout nature, i. 2, 2-7; the better the ruled,

the better the rule, ib. 5, 2, 7 5 v. n, 34; the rule of free men better than despotic au
thority, vii. 14, 19; rule over others, not the highest object of

3

!

v. 10,

3;

analogous
2,

to aristocracy, v. 10, opposed to tyranny, iii.
iv.

7,
;

7; 5
;

2,

2

;

v.

10,

2

is

it

the legislator, ib. 14, 14-22; rule must be learnt by obedience,
iii.

better than the rule of
iii.

thelaw?

4,

10,

14;

vii. 9,

6

;

16; arose (i) from the government of families by the

15

;

14.

6-

6 ; 7, i ; 12, eldest,!. 2, 3; (2) from services rendered by the
first chiefs, iii.

Ruler, the, ought to have moral virtue in perfection, i. 13, 8 the virtue peculiar to him, iii. 4,
;

14,

12
(3)

;

i5,n;
once 6 has
;

v.

10,

3,

weakness lower classes,
various forms
ship for
3>

from the of the middle and

8;

iv.

I3,n;
ii.

must learn to govern by 17 obedience, ii. 11, 14 iii. 4, 6 ; 14, 6 the 14 vii. 9, rulers ought to remain the same,
;

;

;

;

existed in Crete,
:

10,

(i) the
is

Lacedae
;

monian (which

only a general

2, 4-8 ; dangers arising arrangement, ii.
ii.

vii.

14,

2

;

5,

from this 24-27
;

life),ii. 9,
J
5>

33
;

iii.

H;

i, 2

16,

14, i;

vii.
if

3; the difficulty solved, 14, the elder rule, and the younger
vii. 9,

(2) the

despotic
iii.

(among Bar
6,

obey,

5;

14,

5.

14; iv. barians), 14, 2 ; (3) the ancient Dicta 10,
8, 14 ; iv. torships, iii. 14, 2 ; (4) the monarchies of 10, 11-14; theheroicage, iii. 14,

Salamis, victory

Samos,
"i

iii.

13,

of, v. 4, 19 ; v. 3,

8.

12

;

9-

(5) the absolute
;

15 royalty is suited, ib. c. 17; causes of revolutions in mon means of their archies, v. 10
;

monarchy, ib. the people to whom

22. Sardanapalus, v. 10, Science, the, of the statesman,
I,
2
;

i.
;

10,
3
;

i

;

iii.

12,

I

1-3; preservation, ib. n, royalty more often destroyed from within than from without, ib. 10, 36 ; true royalty un

known
vii.

in later Hellas, ib.
3.

37;

of the master, i. 3, of the slave, 2, 4 4 7, ib. 7, 2, 3; in all sciences the whole must be resolved into the 3 parts, ib. i, every science capable of improvement, ii. 8, 1 8 ; the philosophical student of science must not neglect any
iv. i,
;
;

;

14,
;

SeeKing, Monarchy.

Rule

the various kinds of rule

aim

i ; all sciences detail, iii. 8, at some good, ib. 12, i ;

essentially different 2 ; 3, other, i. i,
7,
i
;

from each

12; 13,
vii -

4; 4-8;
;

5,
iii.

6; 6,

5-7;
the

3,

2

6
i4>

;

the political science the highest of all sciences, iii. 1 2, I aims at the good of the state, vii. 2, the subjects which it in 4
;
;

distinction

between

the

cludes,

iv. i,

3-1

1.

34 8
Scylax,

Index
master have a
ib. 2,

vii. 14, 3. 3. Scylletic Gulf, the, vii. 10, Scythians, the, vii. 2, 10, II.
:

common interest,
6,

3

;

iii.

6

;

must not be addressed
language
of

the slave in the

Sedition

see

Revolution.

command

only

Self-sufficiency, the, of the state, 8 ; the end and the best, i. 2,
vii. 5,
i
;

8,

8
8.

;

would not
unifi

be promoted by extreme
cation,
:

[against Plato, Laws, vi. 777], i. I3, 14; place of the slave in the management of the family, ib. i the slave an 8, 4 5, 9
; ; ;

ii.

2,

Senate see Council of Elders. Senators see Councillors. Servant, the, a kind of instrument
:

instrument taking precedence of other instruments, ib. 4, 2 ;
like

in the arts,

i.

4,

2

;

many

ser

vants often less efficient than a the servants few, ii. 3, 4 who are employed in daily life, those with whom we most often children 4 disagree, ib. 5,
; ;

the animals, ministers to the needs of life, ib. 5, 9; the science proper to him, i. 7, his share in virtue, ib. 2, 3
;

13,
8,

2-14 9; I3

;

in reason, ib. 5, 3 ; has not the

not to be
vants,
vii.

left

too
7.

much

to ser
vii. 10,

17,

See Slave.

Sesostris, king of

Egypt,

deliberative faculty, ib. 13, 7; is nearer to his master than the mechanic, ib. 13 ought to be trained in virtue by him, ib. Slaves, how related to 14
; :

i,6. Seuthes, v. 10, 24. Shepherds, lead the laziest life i. 6 some 8, among men, times combine brigandage with 8 their other occupations, ib. form the second best material of a democracy, vi. 4, i, II
; ;

artisans,
iii.

i.

13,
;

13

;

ii.

7,

22;
ii.

4,

ia

5,

3; forbidden

gymnastic exercises in Crete,
5,
;
;

;

19 difficulty in managing 22 them, ib. 9, 2-4; vii. i o, 13; the different classes of
12 ; children of slaves, iii. 4, slaves only admitted to citizen

make excellent soldiers, ib.
Sicily,
ii.

II.
13.

10,

4

;

v. 12,

Sicyon,

v. 12,
(?),

i.

Simos

a

party
1

leader

at

Larissa, v. 6, Sirrhas, v. 10,

3.

ship in extreme democracies, ib. vi. 4, 16; slaves can 5, 7 not form a state, iii. 9, 6 can ii ; not be self-sufficient, iv. 4, licence allowed to them in
; ;

17. Slave, the, does he exist by nature ? i. 6-c. 6 different from the 4,
;

democracies and tyrannies, v. ii vi. 4, 20 some ii,
; ;

times

emancipated by tyrants
v. II,

female (except

among Barba

to serve as a guard,
;

2-4; rians), ib. 2, lated to his master, ib.

how
-

re

2-5 3, i-35 4, 5; vii 3, 55 not always distinguished by nature from the freeman, i. 5, 10 8 the relation be 6,
; ;

32; should be encouraged by the of freedom, vii. 10, hope 14; their company dangerous for
children, ib. 17,
7.

Slavery, is i. 5; 6.

it

according to nature

?

tween slave and master, when natural, does not exclude kind ib. slave and ness, 6, 9
;

Slavery
it

men should not think slavery to live according to the constitution, v. 9, 15.
;

Index
Slaves, the art of acquiring, a species of hunting or war, i. 7,
5
;

349

vii.

14,

21.
19.
i. i,

Smerdis,
all

v. 10,

Society, political, the highest of
i communities, exists, not for mere companionship, but for the sake of noble actions,
;

7 ; form (with cavalry) the natural military force of an oligarchy, vi. 7, 1,2 ; generally worsted by the light-armed in popular insurrec the principal tions, ib. 3 magistrates elected from those who are serving, or who have
at Athens, v. 3,
;

9, 12-14; man designed by nature to take part in society, 8-1 6 iii. 6, i. 2, bene 3 fit conferred on mankind by the
iii.
; ;

served, ii. 8, 9 ; iv. 13, 9. Soldiers, light-armed, always at tached to democracy, vi. 7, 2 ;

generally

master

the

heavy-

establishment of society, i. 2, 15 society cannot exist with out judicial decisions and punish
;

vii. 13, 6. ments, vi. 8, 9 Socrates see Plato. Soldiers, according to Plato, should be taught to use both
; :

in popular insurrections, ib. 3 ; the younger citizens in oligarchies should be trained in the exercises of light infantry,
ib.

armed

Solon,
15-

i.

8,

14
iii.

;

ii.

7,

6
;

;

12,

2-6 (cp.

ii,

8)

iv.

n,

hands alike,
herds
vi. 4,

ii.

12,

12; shep

make
1 1
;

excellent soldiers, relation of the dif

ferent kinds of soldiers to the
different
;

1-3 a good knowledge of the mili

constitutions, ib. 7, the soldier must have

n. Sophocles, quoted, i. 13, Soul, the, rules by nature over the body, i. 5, 4-6 ; poste rior to the body in order of
9; more generation, vii. 15, truly a part of an animal than the body, iv. 4, 14 ; the beauty of the soul less easily seen than that of the body, i. 5, ii ; the interests of soul and body the same, ib. 6, 10; the ir rational element in the soul subject to the rational, ib. 5,
6; 13, 6; vii. 14, 9; 15, 8 the divisions of the soul,
;

12; soldiers tary art, vii. 1 1 , as necessary to the state as artisans or husbandmen [against 10Plato, Rep. ii. 369], iv. 4,
17;
vii.
;

4,

4-7;

8,

7

;

9,

the soldiers should be 10 taken from the youth, the coun cillors from the old, vii. 9, 3-10 14, 5 should form
; ;

a separate caste, as
10
;

in

Egypt,

ib.

i.

5,

5-7;
vii.

i3,

6;

iii.

4,

10, ; 9, position of the soldiers in the constitution of Hippodamus, ii. 8, 2, 8i

9; the soul never wholly free from said to be passion, iii. 15, 5
6;
14,

9; 15,
;

12.

or to possess harmony,
25-

viii.

5,

Soldiers,heavy-armed,citizenship
in

constitutional governments 16 ; iii. confined to the, ii. 6,
7,

Lacedaemon. Speculation, life of, opposed to
Sparta
:

see

4; 17,

4;
their

iv.

13,

10;
;

that of contemplation,

vii.

2

;

growth of

Hellenic states, taken from the

importance in iv. 13, 9-12
roll of citizens

3!

H.

9-22.

State, the, is the highest of

com

munities,

i.

i
,

i

;

is

based upon

35*0

Index
12 ; must have the virtues of leisure, vii. 15, i can lead a life of virtuous activity isolated from others, ib. 2, 16 3, 810 is not made happier by
9,
; ; ;

the relations of husband and wife, father and child, master and
slave, ruler
13,

and subject, ib. 2 15; formed of a union
;

;

of villages, ib. 2, 8 exists for the sake of a good life, ib. iii.
;
,

6-14

;

iv. 4,

ii

;

vii. i,

3 conquest, ib. 2 14, 22 rests upon justice, i.
;

;

142,

;

16;

i; 8, 4, 8; sake of alliance and security,
9>

not for the
iii.

vii.

14,

3

;

must have a care
8
;

6-14; is distinguished from an alliance because it has
an ethical aim,
8
;

ii.

2,

3

;

iii.

9,

9, 13, 9 must be happy, 4) (cp. iv. 7, not in regard to a portion of the citizens, but to them all, ii.
;

of virtue,

iii.

vii.

from a nation, because it is made up of different elements, 2 is n t necessarily ii3 formed by a number of persons
3 ; 9, residing together, iii. 3, a) ; 9-12 ; (but cp. ii. i, is a work of nature, i. 2, 8, 9 ; prior to the family or the

5,

27

;

vii.

9,

7

;

is

united

by friendship among the citizens,
ii.

iv. n, 6; iii. 9, 13 5, 7; v. ii, 5 (cp.vi. 5, 7); must pay great regard to edu cation, i. 13, 8; 15; ii. 7,
;

v. 9,
left

1 1

;

viii. i

:

must not be
ii, 15,

to fortune,
vii.

ii.

individual,

12; 13, 15 composed of dissimilar parts or 2 ii. 2, iii. i, elements, 3
:

ib.

;

;

13, 9; is not the growth of a day, v. 3, 11 is the principle of preserved by

16;

;

3, 4, 7; 1-4; v. i, 12-15; 3, 6 ; vii. 8 the parts not to be identified with the conditions of i the state, vii. 8, the parts and conditions enumerated, iv.

4,

6-8

;

iv.

I

;

12,

;

2, compensation, 4-7; is sometimes left at the mercy of the army by the violence of
ii.

faction, v. 6,

13

;

its

perma

;

3,
7
;

i-6;

4,

7-20;
7-9
:

vii.

8,

nence can only be secured by the toleration of all elements, ii. 9, 22 ; iv. 9, 10 ; 12, i v.
;

compared

to the parts of

8,

5

;

9>

5

5

vi.

6,

2

;

any

animals, iv. 4,

the state

depends for its identity mainly on the sameness of the constitu must be able to de tion, iii. 3 fend itself, ii. 6, 7 147,
; ;

state, however ill-constituted, may last a few days, vi. 5, i :

the various claims to autho
rity in the state,
iii. 9,

14; 10
I
3>

;

12; 13;

iv. 8,

1-5, 9; vi.
in

17

;

1,
;

i>;

i-

13,

9
15,
i.

5

iv.

10 4, should be
ii. 2,

vii. 4,

6;
;

2;
8
;
;

state

~4; what share may be allowed
iii.

to

the the

self-sufficing,

2,

ordinary citizen?

ii,

65; j}

8

;

8; vii. 4, 11 5, i 8, should not exceed a certain
;

8;

iv. 13,

5-8;

vi. 4,

size,ii.6,6;iii.3,4-7;

i has the same 5, and therefore the same life and

vii-4; virtue,

5 (cp. ii. 12, 5). State, the ideal, of Aristotle, would require (i) a defensible
position, vii. 5, 3; (2) a rate naval force, ib.
(3)

mode

end, as the individual,
;

vii.

1-3

;

13-15 may, like an individual, be wanting in self-discipline, v.

6-9; courageous and intelligent
;

citizens, ib. 7

(4) the exclusion

Index
of mechanics and tradesmen from citizenship, ib. 9, 1-8 (5) slaves and Perioeci to till
;

the

soil,

ib.

8; 10,

9,

13,

; (6) common meals, ib. 10, 1-8, 10; (7) subdivision of the land into two parts, public

14

not despise small things, ib. 3, I 10 ; 4, II 2 7, 8, must he have virtue, or is skill alone sufficient ? ib. 9, 1-4; must know the real effect of
; ; ;

and
5>

the city ]

1 1 ; (8) private, ib. [for a. central situation, ib. 2 ; 3 J I] near, but not
>

political measures, ib. 9 ; will use tear as a means to bind the state together, ib. 8, 8 ;

upon, the sea, ib. 6, healthy site, ib. II, I water supply, ib. 3
fortifications

;
;

1-6; a a good

proper
ib.

and walls,
will

5,

will not suppose that the great ness of the state depends merely on size, vii. 4, 4 the life of the statesman contrasted with the life of the philosopher, ib. 2 , 6. Statesman, the, the rale of, dif
;

8-1

2

;

an arrangement of houses

ferent
i-

from other kinds of
*; 3.
vii.

rule,

combine the advantages of beauty and
streets

and

which

i,

45

i7>

Stentor,

6 ; an acropolis, security, ib. for the temples, and a freemen s
agora,

4, Sybaris, v. 3,

ii.

Symposium,
Plato.

ii, 12. the, of Plato
2
iii.

:

see

i-6; govern ment buildings and a trader s

ib. 12,

Syracuse,
v. 3,

i.

7,

;

15,

16;
5>

agora, ib. 7. State, the best [absolutely], the enquirer into, must examine the best ideal and actual forms of

5>

10; 6,

13; 4, 8; 10,
7,

I

-4,9;
12,

6, 23, 28,

30-2;
12.

n,

10

;

6,

government,

ii.

i,

i; differs from

the so-called aristocracies be cause the citizens are absolutely 2 12 iv. 7, good, iii. 13,
;

Syrtis (?), a district of Southern Italy, vii. 10, 5.

Tarentum,
7,

iv. 4,

21
10.

;

v. 3,

7
4.

;

(butcp. iii. 4, 5); presupposes the best life, vii. I in compari son with it, all existing govern
;

2

;

vi. 5,

Telecles, of Miletus,

iv. 14,

Tenedos,

iv. 4,

21.
:

ments maybe called perversions,
iv. 8,
i.

8 Thales, of Miletus, i. 1 1 , [probably the Cretan poet],
12,
5,
7-

ii.

State, the best [under ordinary

circumstances], iv.

i,

3;

n,2i
in

Theagenes, tyrant of Megara,
9-

v.

1 6). (cp. ii. 6, State, the best [for
;

mankind

i. 3 ii, general], iv. i, Statesman, the, is properly con cerned with the natural art of

Thebes; ii. 9, 10 iii. 5, 7
;
-

10,
;

16;
3,

12,
;

v.

5

6,

acquisition only,
;

i.

8,

15; 10,

15; vi 7, 4Theodectes, quoted, i. 6, 7. Theodorus, the actor, vii. 17,
13-

i ought also to be acquainted with the art of money-making, ib. ii, 13; must be able to re

Theopompus, king of Sparta,
II,
2.

v.

cognize

evil sat their

commence
9; must

Thera, one of the Sporades,
4>

iv.

ment,

v. 4,

3; 8,

5-

Index
Thessaly,
vii.
ii.

5,

22

;

9,

2

;

12,
ii.

3.

Thetes, the (in Solon s constitu
tion),

12,
vii.

6.

and oligarchy, v. is unendur able to freemen, iv. 10, 4; r. 11, 13 may arise either from

democracy
10,

ii, 30, 35

;

;

Thibron,
Thirty,

14,

17.
of,

extreme oligarchy or democracy,
at
iv.

the,

government

n,

ii

;

v. 8,

7; in Sicily,

6. Athens, v. 6, 10. Thracians, the, vii. 2, Thrasybulus (brother of Hiero), v. 10,

often arose out of oligarchy, v. 13, 13; was common in an cient times, owing to the great

31

;

12,

6.

Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, iii. 13, 16; v. 10, 13.
Thrasyllus,
Thurii,
12.
v. 3,
viii. 6,

12.
4.

powers of the magistrates, ib. 5, 8 10, always a short 5 lived government, ib. 12, i; rarely becomes hereditary, ib.
;

;

Thrasymachus,

v. 5,

Io
>

33

j

u,

12

;

7,

9, v.

in tyrannies, ib. 10 their preservation,

causes of revolution means of ; ii ; ib.

Timophanes of Corinth,
12.

6,

governments into which tyranny

Timophanes, of Mitylene,
6.

v.

4,

Trade

:

see

Commerce.

Traders, the employments of, de void of moral excellence, vi. 4,
12; vii. 9, 3 ; ought to be excluded from citizenship, vii. admitted to office at 3 9,
;

may change, ib. 12, ii. Tyrant, the, is the natural enemy of the freeman, iv. 10, 4 ; v. ii, 13 cuts off his rivals, iii. ii, 13 13, 16-19; v. 10, rules over involuntary sub 5 jects as the king over voluntary,
;

;

;

Thebes after they had retired from business ten years, iii. 5,
7
;

vi. 7,

4

.

Triopium, promontory Cnidus, ii. 10, 3.
;

near

II vii. 16, Troezen, v. 3, 7Tyrannicide, esteemed honour

aims at pleasure, 14, 7 10 ; the king at honour, v. 10, is guarded by mercenaries, iii. 10 sometimes v. 10, 14, 7 obliged to emancipate the slaves, v. n, 32 ; is much under the influence of flatterers, iv. 4, 1 2 28 v. 1 1, destroys the spirit and confidence of his
iii.
;
;

;

;

;

able in Hellas, v. 10,

26.

subjects, v.

Tyranny, the government of the

sends spies
incites

n, 4, 13, 15; among them, ib. 7

; ;

monarch who
interests,
iii.
;

rules for his
;

own

2 ; iv. 8, 5 7, akin to v. 10, 10, 3 9 27 ; v. 10, democracy, iv. 4, u, 30; n, 12; hardly to
;

them to quarrel, ib. 8 oppresses them by war and taxa
tion, ib.
ib.
;

distrusts his friends,

10

;

gives licence to slaves
1 1
;

and women, ib.
loves the bad,
fers
v.

vi. 4,

20
pre

;

be called a constitution,
i
;

iv. 8, iv.

n,

12

;

10,
iii.

i

;

the perversion of
i 5; 17, 2; 27; 5,
;

foreigners to citizens,
;

ib.

royalty,
2,
2
;

7,

14

is

capable of any wicked
;

4,

10,

ness, ib.

is

full

of self-indul

3
i

;

does not

rest

upon natural

justice
;

has

or expediency, iii. 17, all the vices both of

23; gence and sensuality, ib. may also preserve his tyranny by father of his playing the

Index
country, ib.

17-33; must be on his guard against assassins,

especially against those who think that they have been in

30 must conciliate the poor or the rich, whichever is the stronger, ib. 32. Tyrants, the, of Hellenic cities put down by the Lacedae
sulted, ib.
;

monians,
10,

iii.

2,

3

;

v. 10,

30

;

of the state, iii. 9, 6-8; vii. 13, 9 (cp. iv. 7, 4); gives a claim to superiority in the state, iii. i; has 9, 14, 15; 13, many kinds, ib. 7, 4 ; cannot ruin those who possess her, ib. 2 is a mean, iv. ii, 10, 3 how far required in the great officers of state, v. 9, 1-4; must be at least pretended by
;
;

of Sicily, by the Syracusans, v.
30.

the tyrant, ib. ii, 25, 34; is regarded as a secondary object

Tyrants,
;

originally 6 10,
10,
5.

most of the ancient, demagogues, v. 5, 4 sometimes great
;

can 5 by mankind, vii. i, not be separated from happiness,
:

vri.

i,

magistrates, or kings, ib. 5,

8

;

5;

9

Tyrrhenians, the, iii. 9, Tyrtaeus, v. 7, 4.

6.

ib. 13, is not a

from nature, habit, and reason, 7-io; 10-13;
*5>

2; 3, 3; 2, 3; 13; 5;

i

;

8,

results

matter of chance,
; ;

ib. 13,

9

;

how far consistent with the
3 should it the aim of education?
consists in hating and lov

Usury, the most unnatural mode of money-making, i. 10, 5 ;
11,
3-

political life, ib. 2

be made
viii. 2
;

Utility,

too much regarded by Hellenic legislators, vii. 14, 15; is not the sole aim of

ing and rejoicing aright, ib. 5, 1 should not (as is done by 7 the Lacedaemonians) be sup
:

education, viii. 2, 3; 3, 1 1 ; is not sought after by men of noble

mind,

ib. 3,

12.

posed inferior to external goods, 35 (cp. vii. i, 5) nor be 9. practised with a view to the
"

;

single object of success in war,

Village, the,acolonyofthe family, i. 2, 6; the state a union of
8. villages, ib. Virtue, the especial characteristic of aristocratical governments, ii.

ii,
7
;

5-10;

iv.

7;

v. 7,

5;

often allied to force, i. 6, 3 more a concern of household

management than wealth, ib. 1 i 3, depends upon the supre
;

of the rational principle in the soul, ib. 6; vii. 14, 9;

macy

5) 9i cannot be included under a general definition, i. 13, 10 must be taught to the
;

vii. 2, 9; 14, 16; the virtue proper to the slave, the woman, the child, ii~3 5 of the ruler and the subject different, ib. 4-6; iii. 4, 7-18; of the ruler, practical wisdom, of the subject, 18 ; of true opinion, iii. 4, men and women not the same, l6 iiii3 9-" 13. 4. less required in the artisan than the slave, i. 13, 12 (cp. vii. f the citizen relative to 7) 9 the constitution, iii. 4, 1-7 i y 7) i v. 9, of the good 3
"

9,

345
:

J

5)

6

I3>

:

>

>

>

;

-

!

;

slave

12; by his master, ib. ought to be the aim and care

man
a

vii. 13,

absolute, iii. 4, 1-7 7; of the good citizen:

;

A

Index
is it

identical with that of

the good

man

18; vii. 14, in the perfect state,

10 4 5, 8; of the citizen
?
iii.
;

;

iii.

4,

5

;

6 the Athens, ib. 13 6, 6. Thirty, ib. 6, War, the Persian, v. 3, 4, 7 4, 8 7, 4 effect of, upon
; ; ; ; ;

2. 12; iv. 7, 13, Virtue, military, is found in the iii. masses, 4 the social, 7,
;

Athens,
viii. 6,

ii.

12,
:

5

;

v. 4,

8

;

1 1

the Sacred, v. 4,

7-

is

justice,
3-

i.

2,

16;

iii.

13,

Virtues, the, of women and child ren important to the state, i. J5 5 of the state 13. 5 and the individual the same, vii. I, 12 of the military life,
9>

Wealth, always antagonistic to poverty, iv. 4, 19; forms an element of the state, ii. 7, 16
;

:

;

9.

">

34;

vii.

15,

3;

of leisure,

vii. 15,

I.

iv. 4, 15; vii. 8, 7, 9; in cludes many varieties, i. 8, 3 ; 2 i vJ [the true kind] has a limit, i. 8, 12 ; i, 14 9, popularly confused with coin, ib. 9, not so much a 10, 14 concern of household manage
3>

;

;

War, a
sition

part of the art of acqui when directed against wild beasts and against men who are intended by nature to be
; ; ;

ment

as virtue, ib. 13,
ii.

I

;

must
r.

be used with both temperance and
liberality,
6,

8;

vii. 5,

slaves, i. 7, 12; vii. 5 8, 21 exists for the 2, 15 14, sake of peace, vii. 14, 13,22 i; a school of virtue, ii. 15, 1 1 ; a 9, remedy against the dangers of prosperity, vii. 15, constant war a part of 3 10 ; tyrannical policy, v. n, success in war the sole object of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan
; ;

Wealth, too highly valued Sparta and Carthage, ii. 7, *3 ii, 8-12; iv.
J

at
9,
7,

4

;

the chief characteristic of
ii.

constitutions,
vii.

ii.

9,

34, 35;

2,

9; 14,

16; 15,
:

6;

progress in
tactics,
iv.

war
13,

invention of 10 of siege
; ;

n, 9 ; iii. 8, 7; ii vi. 3, 19 ; v. 10, confers a claim to supe 2, 7 J 4riority in the state, iii. 9, 6, 15; 12, 8, 9; 13, 1-5; associated with good popularly birth and education, iv. 8, 4, i. See Riches. 8; v. 7, Wealthy, the, have the external advantages of which the want
oligarchy,
iv. 4,
;

machines, vii. 1 1, 9 improve ment of fortifications, ib. 12. \Var, captives taken in, ought they to be made slaves ? i. 6,
1-8. War, the Peloponnesian ; losses of the Athenian nobility, v. 3,
7
;

tempts men to crime, ii. 7, 10; y ar e apt to be spoiled 3 by the luxury in which they are
i
8>

;

reared, iv. ii, to the state,
8,
iv.

6

;

v. 9,

13

;

form one of the classes necessary
14,

15;

vii.

7

9-

See Rich.

Whole,
its

the,
i.

must be resolved into
i,
i 3 ; 8, prior superior to the
;

battle of

Oenophyta,

ib.

parts,

5 capture of Mitylene, ib. 6 ; battle of Mantinea, ib. 4, 9 ; the Sicilian expedition. ib. the Four Hundred at
; ;

and
7
;

therefore
2,

parts, ib.

12-14;

"i-

J
7>

the part belongs entirely to the whole, i. 4, 5 ; every

Index
whole has a ruling element, the whole and the ib. 5, 3 part have the same interest, ib.
;

cracies

u
vii.

and tyrannies,
vi.

ib.

1 1

,

;

4,
5,

20

;

commonly
fifty,

cease to bear children after

10 ; the virtue of the parts 6, relative to the virtue of the

16; marry too young,
1

6,

should not ib. 6 j im

whole, ib. 13, 15 ; the happi ness of the whole dependent on the happiness of the parts, ii. 5, the sophism 27 ; vii. 9, 7
;

part their nature to their off
spring, ib.
14.

Women

and children, the com munity of, proposed by Plato,
;

that

if

the parts are
little,

little

the

whole

3; the care of the part and the care of the whole inseparable, viii. I,
is

v.

8,

3-

Woman,

the,

has

a
i.

different
13,

virtue to the

man,
;

3-

16 shares in the 12 ; iii. 4, deliberative faculty, i. 13, 7\Vomen, should be trained with a view to the state, i. 13, 15
(cp.
ii.

12 ; he has not ii. i, 12, 3 explained whether he would extend it to the dependent classes, ib. 5, 18-24; objec tions of Aristotle (i) unity would not be promoted, ib. 3, 2 ) there would be a general 2 ( neglect of the children, ib. 4 ;
: ;

(3) the parentage of the children could not be concealed, ib. 8;
(4) expiations would be impos i ; sible, ib. 4, (5) the conceal

9,

5)

;

cannot have

the same pursuits as men, ii. 5, 24; said to have been common

ment of relationship would lead
to unnatural crimes, ib.

1-3,

among
3,

certain
;

Libyan

tribes, ib.

among

have great influence warlike races, ib. 9, 7 caused great harm to Sparta by their disorder and licence, ib.
9
! !

5- 1 3 possessed two-fifths of the land in Laconia, ib. 15 ; too proud in oligarchies to be
controlled, iv. 15, 13; have often ruined tyrannies by their
v. ii, 23; are allowed great licence in demo

10; (6) affection would be weakened, ib. 4-9; (7) the transfer of children to another rank would be found impractic 10 (8) the household able, ib. would be neglected, ib. 5, 24.
;

Xerxes,
21.

King of

Persia, v.

10,

insolence,

Zaleucus, ii. 12, 12. Zancle, v. 3,

7.

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