Amita Chatterjee Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Coordinator at the Centre for Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University Smita Sirker Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy and Researcher at the Centre for Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University

It is platitudinous to say that whenever we try to read some ancient text or interpret some theory distant in space and/or time, we employ contemporary tools of analysis, contemporary techniques of modeling. Even while building theories, theoreticians (philosophers and scientists alike) are found to take help from the technology of the time. Aristotle, for example, had a wax-tablet view of memory. Leibniz used the model of a clock to explain the harmonious universe. Freud used a hydraulic model of the flow of libido, and the telephone switchboard model guided psychologists while they were theorizing on intelligence. Nearer to our time, we have seen physicists explaining the structure of an atom by the model of the solar system and cognitive scientists explaining the working of the human mind by the analogy of a computer. In this essay, we would like to borrow the tool of mental models from the famous cognitive psychologist P. N. Johnson-Laird and his team, to offer an alternative picture of the Buddhist ‘logical’ scenario, which we think will enable us to understand some perplexing issues in the given area and offer some solutions to them. I Theory of inference, which is the core of any logical theory, belongs to the pramāṇa theory in Indian philosophy. Stalwarts of Indian philosophy have attempted to glean logical insights from the pramāṇa theory by interpreting it in their own way. Consequently, we have come across all sorts of views regarding Indian logic. For example, (a) inferences are syllogistic in nature, hence Indian logic is deductive;1 (b) inference always depends on a vyāptivākya, a generalization based on observations, and therefore Indian logic is inductive;2 (c) inference is both deductive and inductive;3 (d) inference is neither inductive nor deductive;4 (e) Indian theory of inference can be reconstructed within the first-order logic,5 in spite of its explicit intentional language;6 and (f ) inferences cannot be understood at all within the framework of monotonic reasoning—these are instances of non-monotonic reasoning,7 especially of default reasoning.8 Indian theories of inference definitely form the core of Indian logic. But because of its epistemological origin and motivations, the contour of Indian logic does not nicely fit the outline of Western logic, which moves around the consequence relation and its formal properties. Though these theories of inference tell us how to

Philosophy East & West Volume 60, Number 3 July 2010 315–340 © 2010 by University of Hawai‘i Press


distinguish good arguments from bad arguments, people hesitate to admit it as logic wholeheartedly. Scholars are often found to be very apologetic in the face of comments such as that Indians did not have any sense of logic at all because they did not have the concepts of formal system, entailment, validity, or tautology. We grant that Indians did not develop any axiomatic/formal system, nor did they have the notion of tautology. However, we needn’t be unduly defensive because of that. For, (a) the approach of the Indian theorists was predominantly model-theoretic, and (b) they were interested in tracing the psycho-causal steps underlying the reasoning processes of ordinary people in their everyday life. Let us explain these points a bit. Modern logicians distinguish between proof theory and model theory. While proof theory follows a rule-based axiomatic approach, model theory proceeds by developing models or systems of interpretations. A model theory is supposed to tell us how values associated with constituents determine the values of the compound they make up and how values associated with premises lead to the value of the conclusion and the validity/invalidity of the argument. A model-theoretic approach does not necessarily presuppose a sterile, content-free environment and is often found to go beyond the formal properties of the entailment relation. Indian logicians, we have already mentioned, had no truck with pure formal logic. Besides, as epistemologists, the pramāṇavādins were interested to find out how inference results from a number of cognitive states and what conditions give rise to cognitive certainty. They were not primarily concerned with the question of how ideally rational human beings reason under ideal conditions. The last point leads us to the ‘rationality debate’—a debate that has drawn a lot of attention due to cognitive psychologists for the last forty years. Previously it was supposed that people reason by following the laws of the traditional Aristotelian logic or the rules of the first-order predicate calculus. But several experiments on human reasoning have revealed that a majority of us, most of the time, do not use the rules of classical logic while reasoning. Hence the question how do people actually reason or what is the nature of mental logic, if there is any, has become very significant. P. N. Johnson-Laird conjectures that human beings actually reason by constructing mental models and not by following rules admitted in the Natural Deduction system.9 The rules of the Natural Deduction system are such that it is quite unlikely that these are innate. People cannot grasp these rules without their being taught explicitly. If logical thinking depended on grasping these rules, then common people without logical training could never reach the right conclusion. But they do reason tolerably well, arrive at correct results, and by virtue of that survive in this world. The mental-model theory assumes that logically untrained reasoners are not equipped with formal rules of inference, but rather they rely on their ability to understand the premises. They build mental models of the relevant states of affairs based on this understanding and general knowledge. They can arrive at a conclusion that is true in these models and they can test the validity of an inference by establishing that no alternative models of the premises refute it. “In other words, a mental model is a representation of a possibility, which itself may occur in many ways, and so its structure and content capture what is common to these.”10


Philosophy East & West

which enables her to arrive at a conclusion that fits the happenings in the external world. Smita Sirker 317 . the primary emphasis has always been on the process of inferential representation and not on logical. Diṅnāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya re- Amita Chatterjee. To convince readers that our reading of the Buddhist inference is not anachronistic. a logician needs to interpret that symbol and determine the truth conditions of the premises of the argument.E. Mental models are iconic and can be construed with pictures. However. Formal logic—axiomatic or natural deductive—brackets the process of inference that goes on within us and focuses on a linguistically expressed product of that process. we would like them to look closely at the svārtha-parārtha distinction as expounded in Diṅnāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya11 and Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikka12 and Nyāyabindu. In Indian theories of inference and in Buddhist theory in particular. An argument or an argument form is always expressed through some symbol. et cetera. The former addresses a semantic issue while the latter forms part of the theory of mental representation. a theory of mental representation can also be viewed as a semantic theory. on the contrary. Since the reasoner reaches the conclusion through a causal chain of contentful beliefs/cognitions. These models are said to have a structural and a relational similarity to the external elements of which they are a representation.Before we proceed further we must point out that the model theorists and the mental model theorists use the word ‘model’ in different though related senses. Hence PAs are not to be viewed from the proof-theoretic perspective as formal rule-governed demonstrations but as models of reasoning that guide one to sound conclusions. While model theory tells us under what interpretations a given proposition turns out to be true and an inference sound. images. We would. Mental model theorists emphasize the semantic interpretation of a given issue/ problem/situation whose mental-model construction will vary accordingly. like to argue that svārthānumāna (SA) or inference-for-oneself of the Buddhists provides us with the mental representation in the form of mental models and that Parārthānumāna (PA) or inference-for-others is the externalization of mental models.) and was adopted by all later pramāṇa theorists. directed graphs. The mental-model theorists hypothesize that the world is represented to the reasoner through some mental models and not through explicit propositional representations of logical rules. therefore. rule-governed symbol manipulation. a mental-model theory deals with how the premises of a sound inference is mentally represented to a reasoner.13 II The distinction between SA and PA was first introduced by Diṅnāga (400–480 C. The mental model theorist. With these models. and when an argument is evaluated. depending on individual competence in handling them. it becomes imperative to all who deal with inferential process to conjecture how our beliefs get their content and in what mode such contents are represented. the reasoner may construe one or many different possibilities of any given problem before arriving at her conclusion. diagrams. is interested in unraveling the process of inference and hence in determining how the inferential situation is internally represented to a reasoner.

according to the Buddhists.17 Diṅnāga’s definition of PA had two additional clauses. All inferences. following Frauwallner. if one is interested in the logical form of an inference. causally connected cognitive states leading to one’s own inferential knowledge (jñānātmakam). is meant for public demonstration and hence must draw upon resources from a third person / public point of view. which leads us to think that there might have been some Vaiśeṣika thinkers of the ‘dark period’ who made this distinction but that it was unacceptable to Diṅnāga. The word ‘artha’ mentioned here has a special significance for our theory that we will discuss later. In spite of their different nature. to explain the nature of each one of them is to explain the nature of inference. must possess three terms: (a) a logical sign (hetu). PA. explained the nature of each kind of inference separately. PA essentially deals with the proper linguistic expression (śabdātmakam) of this inference with a view to convincing others. therefore. the hill as the subject-locus. Dharmakīrti did not always see eye to eye with Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti.15 Though this distinction has been admitted in almost all systems of classical Indian philosophy. here one’s private knowledge base enables one to infer. following Diṅnāga. according to many Buddhist scholars. and (c) the subject-locus (pakṣa). and.16 PA is defined as the expression or statement of the logical sign having three characteristics. namely that the logical sign must express reality and that it must be experienced by the person making an inference (parārthānumānaṁ svaḍṛstārthaprakāśanam). maintained that Diṅnāga probably borrowed this important distinction from the Sāṃkhya logicians. that is. The first clause is related to the soundness of inference and the second clause emphasizes the inadequacy of mere hearsay evidence. The Naiyāyikas (post-Diṅnāga). as SA contributes to one’s own knowledge.futed an earlier Vaiśeṣika view on this distinction. no one except Diṅnāga has attached so much significance to it.14 Richard P. however. Hayes. on the other hand. yet his exposition of this distinction in the Pramāṇavārttika and Nyāyabindu is in keeping with Diṅnāga’s understanding. They. both these means of knowledge are called anumāna because both SA and PA produce knowledge of objects that cannot be obtained perceptually (parokṣārtha-pratipatti). defines SA as knowledge of the signifier (sādhya) in the subject-locus (pakṣa) originating from a logical sign (hetu) having three characteristics. for example. The major difference between SA and PA lies in the fact that while SA deals with psychological conditions. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti desisted from giving a general definition of inference simply because they considered these two kinds of inference so different from each other that they could not bring them under the same defining characteristics. how can others be convinced? So. on the other hand. thus somewhat undermining the sharpness of the distinction. That is why we find that most Indian philosophers starting from the Naiyāyikas and almost all modern interpreters of Indian logic have concentrated on PA. When. one infers fire on a hill—seeing smoke coming out of the hilltop—smoke is generally taken as the logical sign. (b) the signified (sādhya-dharma). and fire as the signified. Before giving the standard definition of SA and PA we first need to describe the minimum structure of an inference and clarify some technical terms. one must concentrate on PA. 318 Philosophy East & West . first gave a definition of inference and then classified inference into SA and PA. Again. as there are only two kinds of inference. If the grounds of an inference are not expressed in language.

in this case. however. and example (dṛṣṭānta). In the example of SA. on the other hand. Wherever there is smoke. (ii) It should be known to occur in similar locations (sapakṣa) or homologues.According to Diṅnāga. it should rather be looked upon as a description or reporting of the steps usually followed by a competent reasoner. a homologue is any location other than sound where the property of being non-eternal is present—say. Another point that becomes evident from the examples above is that the Buddhist inferences are of the form ‘Q because P’ and not of the form ‘P therefore Q. An adequate sign. the intermediate steps have not been stated. So. Consider the condensed inference: sound is non-eternal because it is produced by human effort. the conclusion ‘Here is fire’ has not been mentioned. So the SA theory specifies conditions that yield certainty whenever one infers something (sādhya) on the basis of an adequate sign (hetu) in a particular subject-locus (pakṣa). therefore. (iii) It should not be known to occur in dissimilar locations (asapakṣa/vipakṣa) or heterologues. in PA the thesis need not be stated because having heard the premises the hearer can arrive at the conclusion without any difficulty. a pot. because here is smoke (hetu). and the property of being produced by human effort is the logical sign. Let us consider here one example of each type of inference. PA: Here is smoke (hetu-vacanam). reason (hetu). wherever there is no fire there is no smoke as in a lake (dṛṣṭānta-vacanam). following Dharmakīrti: SA: Here is fire (pakṣa). A Amita Chatterjee. though Diṅnāga has meticulously formulated the implicit intermediate steps in the Hetucakraḍamaru. A similar location or a homologue is similar to the subject-locus with respect to the presence of the signified.’19 One infers for oneself in order to have a certain awareness of some object. In PA. for example in a kitchen. as it is obvious. there is fire. Here we must enter a caveat: Diṅnāga’s specification of a sign leading to a sound inference should not be taken as a normative enterprise. which one cannot directly apprehend through sense perception. maintains that both SA and PA have two members. Dharmakīrti. Here sound is the subjectlocus. possesses the following three characteristics. A property P1 can be a sign for another property P2. SA comprises two members—thesis (pakṣa) and reason (hetu)—and PA consists of three members—thesis (pakṣa18). The significance of the theory of the sign with three characters will be clear if we apply it to the case of an actual inference. the property of being non-eternal is the signified. but is different from the subject-locus. provided (a) the first property P1 is observed at least once along with the second property P2 and (b) if no instance has been observed where P1 is present but P2 is absent. (i) The inferential sign must be known to be present in the subject-locus (pakṣa) where the signified would be inferred. says Diṅnāga. Smita Sirker 319 .

that does not amount to any logical difference between two kinds of inference. in Diṅnāga’s original formulation. but certainly not without involving any use of language. If someone comes across such an adequate sign. the speaker arrives at a sound inferential cognition through a causal sequence. On the other hand. and only if. The object of inferential theory in the primary sense is SA. therefore. at least. For. might be silently.20 and the absence of anything non-eternal is an eternal thing. Still. prooftheoretic standpoint. These statements cause an inferential cognition in a listener indirectly and hence are called an inference (anumāna). sapakṣa. A critique has pointed out that “in SA. Communicating such a triple-character sign to others in a structured way is called PA because a statement containing an adequate sign generates in the listener the inferential cognition of its conclusion. the three members of PA are properly represented to them. He was severely criticized by Uddyotakara for that. However. we do not get any hint regarding how to quantify pakṣa. as has been pointed out by Rajendra Prasad. from a logical. the whole process. She then expresses it in the standard form PA. an atom—because a dissimilar location has been defined as that in which the property to be proved is absent. There is a debate regarding the issue: which is to be called the genuine PA. In a discourse situation. Diṅnāga’s formulation of the three characters highlights not only the subjective nature of SA but also the psycho-cognitive steps that finally lead to a conclusion. thus making the structure of the inference perspicuous. mentioned above.dissimilar location or a heterologue here would be any eternal entity—for example. It is true that in the example of SA the sign with three characteristics has not been explicitly stated. or in the PA form is the same. II. and vipakṣa. in the example of PA. That is why Hayes sometimes describes SA theory as the general theory of inference. A sign must be known to be present in the whole of the subject-locus. or sub-vocally enacted. The way SA and PA have been described does not make the distinction between the two types of inference transparent—not. she can infer correctly. A sign must never be known to be present in any dissimilar location. A sign must be known to be present in at least one similar location. I. knowledge resulting from the ascertainment of the triple-character sign has been explicitly stated in the form of a positive or negative statement of universal concomitance. III. that is. whether it is in the SA form. presents the final formulation of the three characters of the inferential sign as follows. Dharmakīrti. but without ascertaining the three characters of the sign one cannot arrive at the conclusion. the linguistic statement of an adequate sign or the process that is generated in the mind of the listener? Diṅnaga as well as Dharmakīrti stated explicitly that the linguistic expression of the statement containing an adequate sign together with the example is called an anumāna only in a secondary sense (kāraṇe kāryopacārāt).”22 320 Philosophy East & West . which would generate an inference in others if.”21 Nor does a PA cease to be knowledge-producing simply because it has been expressed in language. “the set of conditions of the validity of inference. the entire drama.

They can represent discourse about real. or imaginary cases. claiming that these two and only these two represent the two basic and broadest types. hypothetical. conclude which is the best of them. The structure of a mental model corresponds to the structure of the real world. but. Johnson-Laird says that there are exceptions to this. mental models can represent three-dimensional entities. Since this is not true of SA and PA. processes. there is no logical reason for calling them two different types of inference. and if they retain the footnotes then they can construct explicit mental models. Craik (1943) wrote: If the organism carries a ‘small scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head. events. We hope to explain the distinction better by using the tool of mental model. and they reside in long-term memory as a representation of knowledge. react to future situations before they arise. in order to discover what kind of working hypothesis about mental models yields a descriptively adequate account of reasoning. safer. the connection obtaining between the premise(s) and the conclusion needs to be shown explicitly. by default. utilize the knowledge of past event[s] in dealing with the present and the future. spatial relations. However. not what is false. III Johnson-Laird developed Kenneth Craik’s intuitive idea of an inner mental replica that has the same ‘relation-structure’ with the phenomena that it represents. and in every way to react in a much fuller. it is able to try out various alternatives. in which Amita Chatterjee. Smita Sirker 321 .23 We think we can justify the proposed distinction between SA and PA by remembering that SA belongs to the realm of mental reasoning and PA to the realm that is accepted as logic proper. that does not make them sufficiently different: An inference can be called logically different from another only if the set of rules which legitimize drawing its conclusion from its premises is not wholly identical with the set of rules which legitimize drawing the latter’s conclusion from its premises. The first assumption is that a mental model represents a possibility. complex systems. of inference. There are five main assumptions of the mental-model theory. The second assumption is the principle of truth. A model captures what is common to the different ways in which the possibility might occur. In logic proper. that is.24 Johnson-Laird applies this idea to the rich and revealing test cases of mental inference.Only the order of the constituent propositions in two types of inference varies. mere seeing of the connection is not enough. temporal relations. logically speaking. Individuals make ‘mental footnotes’ about the falsity of clauses. and even abstract ideas. The the‑ ory of mental models postulates that human reasoning depends on understanding the meaning of the given premises and then uses this meaning and general knowledge to construct mental models of the possibilities under description. both formal and informal. and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it. In general. and these make it different from the other theories of human reasoning. or for dividing inference into SA and PA. or forms. mental models represent what is true.

He asks us to pretend that we have the power to conjure up individuals who fulfill one or more of the roles stated in the premises. given the premises. models can be used for reasoning according to the rational principle that a conclusion is valid if it holds in all the models of the premises. All we need to do is to construct adequate mental models.clauses are represented when they are false. The principle also postulates that people normally do not represent what is false. it has no counterexample. we need not know rules of syllogistic inference or a sophisticated system of notation. Some may even use some formal rules of inference. and comprehension of discourse delivers models of what is described. The account is also said to have empirical advantages. all sixty-four kinds of syllogism are variations of the following example: All artists are beekeepers All beekeepers are chemists He says that to arrive at a true conclusion from these two premises. this assumption says: models first. It dovetails with other parts of mental life—perception delivers models of the world. The fifth assumption holds that while reasoning using mental models one need not eschew all rules. This helps in reducing the volume of things that one has to keep in mind while working out a problem. So reasoners can use a model to draw a conclusion that does not correspond to any of the representations used to construct a model. According to his analysis. the principle of truth reduces the load on the working memory. and these individuals may be represented in the form of arrays in a mental model as: artist – beekeeper – chemist artist – beekeeper – chemist artist – beekeeper – chemist We are also aware of those persons who are beekeepers and chemists but not artists. Johnson-Laird and Ruth Byrne25 claim that this theory has theoretical advantages. rules afterward. Reasoners are faster and make fewer errors with deductions that require them to construct only one model than with deductions that require them to construct multiple models. The fourth assumption is that mental models are iconic. To understand the relevance of this theory in the context of the Buddhist theory of inference let us see how Johnson-Laird explains syllogistic reasoning. for whom the representing array is: beekeeper – chemist beekeeper – chemist beekeeper – chemist 322 Philosophy East & West . We can think of individuals who fulfill all the roles at one time. According to Johnson-Laird. However. The third assumption is that human reasoning depends on mental models. In other words. that is. and so it is necessary.

Since our search has failed to yield any permanent object produced by human effort—that Amita Chatterjee. if we want to answer the question whether all chemists are beekeepers. we can now read off from the arrays the correct conclusion. after all of the mental pictures have been constructed. The resulting array will be: impermanent object – produced by human effort – object pot impermanent object – produced by human effort – object cloth impermanent object – produced by human effort – object book impermanent object – produced by human effort – object pen impermanent object – [not produced by human effort] – object lightning impermanent object – [not produced by human effort] – object thunder permanent object – [not produced by human effort] – object ākāśa permanent object – [not produced by human effort] – object atom permanent object – produced by human effort – nil Once we have these arrays integrated in a mental frame we know what conclusion is to be drawn with respect to sound given that it is produced by human effort. Diṅnāga wants us to consider a few (at least one) object(s) possessing the property of being produced by human effort and being impermanent. An inference is sound if and only if there is no way of interpreting the premises that is consistent with a denial of the conclusion. On the other hand. we can simply look at the tableaux and reach a positive conclusion. we would answer in the negative. Consider the following inference: Sound is impermanent because it is produced by human effort. This integration enables the reasoner to look for both the confirming/positive cases as well as the disconfirming/negative cases. The benefit of this model-based approach lies in the prospect of creating an ‘integrated picture’ of the models built out of the given problem.We also know from common sense and careful consideration of the problem that there can be chemists who are not beekeepers. If we want to answer whether all artists are chemists. an integrated picture is submitted to a test: a search is undertaken for an interpretation of the premises that is inconsistent with the model. In Diṅnāga’s Hetucakraḍamaru we find different frames or tableaux for determining whether or not a conclusion is sound. Smita Sirker 323 . Finally. So we also have the following array at our disposal: chemists chemists chemists Once we have created a mental model that arrays all the information that can be taken directly from the given premises.

In this case. Sound is permanent because it is produced The mental model should make the following frame transparent thus: permanent object – produced object – nil permanent object – [but not produced] – object ākāśa permanent object – [but not produced] – object atom impermanent object – produced object – object pot impermanent object – produced object – object cloth impermanent object – produced object – object book impermanent object – [but not produced] – object lightning impermanent object – [but not produced] – object thunder 324 Philosophy East & West . 1. no conclusion is warranted. In case someone draws a conclusion in contravention of the third condition. sound may not be permanent because it is knowable. no counterexample of the thesis is known to be present—we can safely conclude that sound is impermanent. the inference is vitiated by the fallacy known as inconclusive (aniścita). which are knowable but impermanent.is. Diṅnāga has also specified different frames explaining what sort of errors ordinary people may commit if they create arrays without taking into consideration already established information. the third condition of the sign with three characters has been violated. the possibilities related to this inference may be tabulated as follows: permanent object – knowable object – object ākāśa permanent object – knowable object – object atom permanent object – [but not knowable] – nil impermanent object – knowable object – object pot impermanent object – knowable object – object cloth impermanent object – knowable object – object book impermanent object – knowable object – object pen impermanent object – [but not knowable] – nil Since there are objects. Let us analyze two such inferences mentioned in Diṅnāga’s table. Sound is permanent because it is knowable Following Diṅnāga. Whenever a given frame shows that the sign is present in the heterologue. 2.

but the soundness of a PA does not hinge on them. Of course. the conclusion does not follow from the explicitly stated premises merely by virtue of the form of the argument. wherever there is W there is X and vice versa. whether in a given inference a particular property P1 can be the sign of another property P2 is determined by constructing models of co-occurrence and non-occurrence of these properties in some locations on the basis of observation. Y W. that is.’ But she must remember that here. but because the background models provide warrant for them. as is evident from examples of arrays like pot-ākāśa. Besides. Following Diṅnāga.26 To explain the notion of pervasion. however. one is just taking stock of the information available from the data at hand. It may appear that while ascertaining the relation between the hetu and the sādhya one is actually following certain rules. we must point out. at the level of PA. Hayes wants us to imagine a small universe that is made up of four loci (a. one needs to make the connection explicit and express it in accordance with the accepted ‘logical structure. X. b. The rule of ascertainment of pervasion. it becomes transparent that W and X are in a reciprocal pervasion relation. is again established by constructing some mental models. one uses a PA. Let us also imagine that these four properties are distributed in the four loci as follows: a b c d W. One first constructs all possible alterative models depending on the information given. the number is finite. lightning-ākāśa-pot. while using the mental model. Y. X From the arrays above. integrates these models. whereas X and Amita Chatterjee. Without keeping these rules in mind one cannot possibly design suitable models corresponding to different inferences. too. in the Hetucakraḍamaru. X. c. X. When. and then formulates a rule. the rules that one is supposedly using are all related to the ascertainment of the relation of pervasion (vyāpti) between the sign and the signified. It is evident that in Diṅnaga’s frame. too. One is just supposed to use some model connecting the hetu with the sādhya. Z W. Z). It may be asked: how many models does an individual need to construct to arrive at the conclusion? Definitely. Y. Smita Sirker 325 . Z W. But that is not true. This frame is given the name ‘hostile’ (viruddha) because it warrants the contradictory of the thesis. One may anticipate an objection at this stage. So the inference is doubly erroneous. then one single model may suffice. Hayes also has explained pervasion with the help of models. d) and four properties (W.The sign ‘being produced’ is absent in the homologue (any permanent object) but present in the heterologues. But if there is essential identity between the sign and the signified. X. et cetera. it is possible to use some well-established logical rules. In fact. That is why we said earlier that what is known as an inference in the Indian parlance is always to be evaluated model-theoretically. one is not performing pure formal symbol manipulation. since. or a causal connection. namely that sound is impermanent because it is produced. one is not even employing any formal logical rule. .

have two different characters of the sign been mentioned? The answer is as follows. in the Nyāyabindutīkā: When it has already been said that the sign should be present only in homologues. when translated into language. hence his insistence on all three conditions. which is: models first.’ Whichever way the sign may be considered. we have seen. only one of them should actually be expressed. It therefore appears from the Hetucakraḍamaru and Hayes’ explanation that Diṅnāga’s system agrees with the fifth assumption of the mental model theory. the information content as well as the logical significance remains the same in a locuslocated frame. some. . then. both characters have been mentioned. or no similar locations and may be absent in all dissimilar locations. Adoption of the mental model theory enables us to answer another puzzle as well. then. So Dharmottara elucidates. or in none. (II) and (III) are equivalent and should have the same meaning. which will enable one to infer correctly even without the knowledge of any logical rule. But in neither an SA nor a PA does the location of occurrence of the sign in the premise(s) have any logical significance. Besides. Without considering all of the three arrays corresponding to the three characters of the hetu. what is the need to state that the sign must also be absent in heterologues? Isn’t the second implied by the first? Why. and (III) jointly? The mental model theory offers a plausible answer to this question. both must be without exception and not otherwise. has constructed all possible models that we need to consider in any inferential situation. Diṅnāga. one cannot really read off from the tableau a conclusion that will turn out to be sound. depending on the nature 326 Philosophy East & West . Why. Then (I) along with either (II) or (III) should suffice to make a sign adequate. And since they must not allow any exception. As a sign may be present in all. Dharmakīrti. not both of them together. Justifiably he has kept the parameter of a sign’s residing in the subject locus constant. For the basic unit here is of the form ‘a has f-ness’ or ‘f-ness-in-a. where the interpretation of negation is standard.28 In a syllogism the location of the middle term in the premises changes the form of the argument.29 Hence. rules later. In order to show this. X is erratic with respect to Y though Y uniformly co-occurs with X. . Diṅnāga was concerned with building a complete frame. Diṅnāga has specified nine possible models.Y are in a relation of non-reciprocal pervasion because though X pervades Y. in his Hetucakraḍamaru. does Diṅnāga insist on taking (I). [To legitimately arrive at the signified] either agreement in presence or agreement in absence should be used. A mental model. strictly from a logical standpoint. BARBARA and CESARE. Y does not pervade X. that is. thinks that either (I) and (II) or (I) and (III) should be sufficient for arriving at an acceptable conclusion. (II). The logical equivalence of (II) and (III) may follow from the available set of information but is not in any way operative in the actual process of reasoning. . on the contrary. some dissimilar locations. Diṅnāga thinks that the above-mentioned three conditions taken together constitute the necessary condition of a projectable sign. expresses a possibility.27 Dharmakīrti’s view accords well with the Nyāya position. sound inferences may take only two different logical forms.

the five-step inference pattern. Here one must bear in mind that Maharṣi Gautama and his commentator Vātsyāyana in the Nyāyasūtra and Nyāyabhāṣya (pre-Diṅnāga period) did not draw any distinction between SA and PA.30 They spoke of no such classification of inference. or episode). for example. following the Nyāyasūtra with Nyāyabhāṣya. IV So far we have shown the similarity between Diṅnāga’s Wheel of Reason and Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory. prototype. Thus SA needs to be translated linguistically into PA that may be interpreted according to more than one model. Ganeri contends that the logic of ancient India is an informal logic of case-based reasoning. the logic of ancient India tried to model informal patterns of case-based reasoning. sound argument in order to communicate and persuade her listener to believe in her piece of cognition. A case-based problem solver.32 He states that the early Nyāya model of argumentation. solves new problems by retrieving traces of relevant prior problems from Amita Chatterjee. patterns that are increasingly becoming recognised as widespread and representative of the way much actual reasoning takes place. exemplar. we are not claiming here that PA has an implicit form of modus ponens or of syllogism.33 can be interpreted in the line of CBR: “while the history of logic in India shows a strong tendency towards formalisations. I contend. And this in two inter-related respects: in the beginnings of a shift of interest away from the place of argumentation within dialectic and debate and towards a greater concern with the more formal properties of sound inference. the Modus Ponens. or there may be just one form. We wholeheartedly concur with Daye that meta-theories of PA and of propositional and predicate logic are neither fully isomorphic nor fully compatible.”34 CBR refers to a style of designing a system so that thought and action in a given situation are guided by a single distinctive prior case (precedent. Smita Sirker 327 . is an informal logic of case-based reasoning. human reasoning.31 He writes: I would like to argue that the Nyāya-sūtra presages a transformation in Indian thinking about logic. and learning are inextricably bound together. Jonardon Ganeri (2003). They had shown how good arguments must be presented in a structured five-step inference. When a cognizer wants to communicate her ‘cognition of X’ (‘there is fire on the hill’) to any listener. The logic of ancient India. has shown how a pañcāvayavi-nyāya (five-member syllogism) can be interpreted as an instance of case-based reasoning (henceforth CBR). memory. and in a parallel correlated shift from case-based to rule-governed accounts of logical reasoning.35 According to the CBR theorists.of the universal premise. In other words. But that does not in any way signify the poverty of logical sense of the Buddhist thinkers. The key assumption of CBR is that reasoning is primarily based on remembering a prior similar case and reapplying the lessons of prior episodes to the present new case. it refers to a process of solving a new problem by remembering a previous similar situation and by reusing information and knowledge of that situation. Moreover. then the cognizer has to prepare a good.

on the basis of perception of a plume of smoke. which is universally co-present with fire) – upanaya (application) (v) therefore. . Consider the same inference— ‘there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there. The citation of an example (either a similar instance—sādharmya dṛṣṭānta—or a dissimi- 328 Philosophy East & West . For instance. Let us understand Ganeri’s proposal with the help of an illustration. ‘F’ denotes the property that serves as the reason (hetu).”36 Ganeri states that in the ancient system of Nyāya argumentation. and ‘b’ is the cited example (udāharaṇa) Case:  An unseen fire is inferred to be present on the hill. that is. and adapting the prior solutions to fit the problem at hand. . one of the exemplars.37 In the following schematic representation of the five-step proof-inference. probandum (sādhya). ‘a’ is the new object about which we are trying to decide if it is G or not (pakṣa). observed one. one infers the existence of unseen fire (sādhya) on the mountain (pakṣa) by witnessing the presence of smoke (hetu) on the mountain. establishing correspondence between these problems and the new situation. by virtue of a similarity with an example (udāharaṇa).. probans (hetu) is that which proves what is to be proved. is of fundamental importance to draw an inference. one based on similar instance and the other on a dissimilar one. as does the kitchen stove – udāharaṇa (example) (iv) the hill is like that (i. and reasons that some new object belongs to the same category on the grounds that it resembles in some appropriate and context determined manner .memory. The citation of an example. possesses smoke.. Tables 1 and 2 show Ganeri’s representation and tabulation of the five-step proof-inference. the hill is like that (i. just as the two have been found associated in other places. as the two (fire and smoke) have been found to be associated in other places like the kitchen (udāharaṇa).e. CBR “begins with one or more prototypical exemplars of a category. In other words. a single case either similar or dissimilar to the present case at hand (application). possesses fire) – nigamana (conclusion) Ganeri gives a pair of schematic inferences.38 The schematic models in these tables present the general format in which parārthānumāna would be made following the typical five-step proof.’ The Nyāya five-step inference pattern will be: (i) The hill possesses fire – pratijñā (thesis) (ii) because it possesses smoke – hetu (reason) (iii) whatever possesses smoke possesses fire. Here an object is inferred to have an unobserved property on the grounds that it has another. ‘G’ is the property whose presence we are seeking to infer (sādhya).e. like the kitchen.

As in CBR. and events as referents to ascertain the current unproved case. because b is similar to a. like the lake a The hill is not like Ga \ The hill is fiery proves Ga. a = hill. episodes. Nyāya anumāna or the nyāya argumentation without convincing and relevant exemplars fails to clinch any ground in the dia- Amita Chatterjee. the nyāya form of argumentation (PA) also rests on either a similar or a dissimilar case/example or udāharaṇa either to prove the thesis or disprove the antithesis. [example] does not have the ‘character of a’ because it is dissimilar to a is not the same as b with respect to G [application] [conclusion] G = fiery. because b is dissimilar to a. b = lake lar instance—vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta) and its application in the case at hand helps not only in the process of drawing an inference but also in the establishment of the hypothesis. As stated earlier. like the kitchen stove a The hill is like that Ga \ The hill is fiery proves Ga. a case-based reasoning pattern typically involves the use of past cases. This process is particularly helpful in our drawing inference-for-others and convincing them as well. The recalled case lends an evidential support for any decision or action taken in the present case.e. b = kitchen stove Table 2 Five-step Proof Based on Dissimilarity [thesis] [reason] Ga The hill is fiery Fa Because the hill is not non-smoky (i. Smita Sirker 329 . has the ‘character of a’ because it is similar to a is the same as b with respect to G [application] [conclusion] G = fiery. a = hill. F = smoky. F = non-smoky.Table 1 Five-step Proof Based on Similarity [thesis] [reason] [example] Ga The hill is fiery Fa Because it is smoky b Whatever is smoky is fiery. smoky) b Whatever is not non-fiery is not non-smoky.

and given a new problem situation or prob- 330 Philosophy East & West . has the ‘character of a’ because it is similar to a G = fire. and ‘b’. can be expressed in more than one way. b = kitchen. c = lake Having discussed Ganeri’s proposal and demonstrated how Diṅnāga’s PA may also be interpreted in a CBR model. and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. PA 1. being an exercise of drawing an inference for others. Wherever there is smoke. for example in a kitchen. present unsolved cases will not be conclusive. as in a lake ‘F ’ = the property that serves as the reason (hetu). Here is fire 2. So let us first see how the two differ in their approaches. as in a lake does not have ‘character of a’ because it is dissimilar to a proves Ga. ‘c ’ = the cited example (udāharaṇa)39 Table 3 Ga = The Hill Has Fire  —Three-step Proof Sādhya Hetu Pakṣa:   sapakṣa   (an object other than a   that possesses G )   vipakṣa   (an object other than a   that does not possess G ) Ga Here is fire Fa Because here is smoke b Wherever there is smoke. a = hill. we assume that Diṅnāga’s three-member PA can also be presented in the CBR schema. because b is similar to a. The foundation of CBR is based on a collection of cases. It may appear that there is not much difference between the mental model theory and the CBR theory. shows the application of CBR on the Nyāya five-member syllogism. ‘a’ = the new object about which we are trying to decide if it is G or not (pakṣa). Though Ganeri. ‘G ’ = the property whose presence we are seeking to infer (sādhya). what is left to be addressed is why we think that the mental-model theory is better suited for interpreting Diṅnāga’s SA than CBR. Because here is smoke 3. which is like a CBR mechanism where.lectical debate. in his paper. for example. We have said that PA. there is fire. Let us show an example where one infers fire on a hill (see table 3). without past relevant cases. F = smoke. It constitutes a case base containing a collection of different individual cases. there is fire. in a kitchen c Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke.

In CBR. the main difference between the case-based reasoning approach and the mental model theory approach lies in the format of knowledge representation.lem case. Mental model reasoning involves constructing models on the basis of the given information. and a model is said to be foolproof when no counterexample is found to contradict the present model. but that only relates to domain-specific general knowledge. Generalized models may be constructed from the possibilities that are built in different cases. In mental-model Amita Chatterjee. which is śabdātmakam. Taking a clue from the recalled case provides the solution to the new one. This characteristic of CBR makes it a better model for PA. We do not play around with different alternatives or possibilities. A single matching case with respect to either the presence of a property (hetu) or the absence of a property (refer back to the previous example of proof by similarity and proof by dissimilarity) is good enough. In CBR. we have seen. yet the particular mechanisms and representations invoked by the two theories may be different. on the other hand. Generalizations lead to loss of details from cases. a single relevant similar or dissimilar exemplar is sufficient. and the closest relevant match is recalled. Johnson-Laird says that the two theories appear to be compatible in principle. we have seen. it is matched with each case available in the case base. the parts of the mental model correspond to the parts of what it represents. According to Johnson-Laird the advantage of such an iconic nature of the mental model is that one can build a model with some given assertions and then use the model to come to a conclusion that does not correspond to any of the given assertions. capturing what is common to the different ways in which the possibility could occur. Each model represents a possibility. An explicit mental model typically searches for the presence of counterexamples. Each case is stored individually. are said to be iconic. In mental models. It acts as background knowledge for constructing models. that is.42 The mental model theory postulates that knowledge is itself represented in the form of models of the world. which is jñānātmakam. In the mental-model approach. According to Johnson-Laird. have the same structure as that of their corresponding counterparts in the real world. a generalization of a case is usually not made unless it is a domain-specific generalization. CBR seems to invoke representations closer to language than to reality. Smita Sirker 331 . CBR talks about the usefulness of general knowledge.41 Iconic representations can vary from pictures to images to directed graphs. unlike in case-based reasoning. to prove a thesis (a case). The distinguishing feature of such a system is that the cases that are stored in the case base are not generalized versions of different cases. When presented with a new case. as it helps in finding the exact matching case with more accuracy. general knowledge plays a very important role. This background knowledge is not domain-specific. than for SA. These models. there is a relevant retrieval from the source case base. Among the possibilities both true (positive) and negative matching may be present. So CBR is usually seen as a postponement of induction. These models. Rather each individual case is stored with its distinctive features. et cetera. though not what is false. one builds different possibilities for a given problem or case. Case-based reasonings have been used for medical diagnostics and legal reasoning40 and also in artificialintelligence models.

to possess a concept is to be in a certain sort of epistemic state. even while inferring for oneself. mental models help the cognizer to construct the problem with possibilities. which is ideal for Diṅnāga’s SA. But even in this two-term argument form. and it does not require explicit means of linguistic expression. because here is smoke. one of the predictions is that inferences (cases/problems) that call for just one mental model should be easier than those that call for multiple models. They certainly influence the interpretation of premises as well as the process of reasoning. the easier it is to find the target case with greater efficiency. Now. drawing on similarities or dissimilarities between the case at hand and a past referent case will not work without an explicit argumentation form (a typical case shown by Ganeri with a fivemembered inference form). is epistemic in essence. the sign (hetu) leading to a sound inference is adequate only if it has the triple character that the cognizer must be aware of. The greater the number of models. But. like mental models. In CBR. sapakṣa. To avoid misconception. as shown.reasoning. having the potential for articulation. CBR works with a single exemplar. and vipakṣa. SA. And the greater the number of cases available under a single case-category. our beliefs and knowledge influence reasoning. The models will represent multiple possibilities like the following: • the positive instance of presence of hetu in the pakṣa where the sādhya is inferred (pakṣa). They should take less time and be less prone to error. The larger the case base. the presence of a greater number of cases marks the richness of the case base. These possibilities also help the cognizer to test n number of conclusions that can be generated or made available for this particular model. ��������������������������������������������������� The readers will recall that SA is a two-term argument. we must mention here that the lack of explicit linguistic representation of a particular type does not imply that the process of inference is a non-conceptual one. the greater the efficiency of the case-based reasoner. Second. Inference definitely involves concepts.’ One infers fire from the presence of smoke. On the other hand. A mental model would ideally help the cognizer to construct possibilities or models of pakṣa. being iconic in representation. CBR essentially invokes linguistic representation. ‘Here is fire. the cognizer must know the presence of the triple character of the hetu. the format of knowledge representation in both is similar. which need not always have explicit internal linguistic representation. work fine without explicit linguistic representation. but not a false information) in dissimilar locations (vipakṣa) 332 Philosophy East & West . involving the adequate sign (hetu) and the signified (sādhya)—for example. But in mental models. how is mental model theory better suited for Diṅnāga’s SA? First. the harder it is for the reasoner to reason. That is. Mental models. • the presence of hetu (positive information of presence of hetu in other instances) in similar locations (sapakṣa). which is ideal for generating and testing instances of sapakṣa and vipakṣa for SA. and finally • the absence of the hetu (negative information of hetu with respect to a particular location. In CBR.

but it does not correspond to any realities in the world as it stands independent of our awareness of it. impermanent?—a reasoner can construct an integrated picture where instances of both sapakṣa and vipakṣa are incorporated. Such integration benefits the reasoner as it contains both positive and negative instances in a single place or in a singular model. the conceptual constructs correspond to reali- Amita Chatterjee. the reasoner tries to construct alternative models from the given assertions that refute the putative conclusion. which is empirically real (saṁvṛti sat) and not ultimately real (pāramārthika sat). In the variation phase she constructs alternative models based on sapakṣa and vipakṣa cases�������������� wherever possible and thereafter integrates the models in a single frame. and in the inspection phase she inspects sapakṣa and vipakṣa cases. It is a fiction useful for analysis and understanding.’ The world that we are considering is the world of experience. the constructed model is inspected and the reasoner searches for new information that may not have been explicitly given. a product of human effort. The mental-model theorists distinguish among three different mental operations or phases: the construction phase. In the variation phase. Smita Sirker 333 . the inspection phase.Let the case be: is sound—a product of human effort—impermanent? A single mental-model representation of the hetu with three characters can be: [Model for pakṣa] sound – impermanent – produced by human effort [Model for sapakṣa]43 pot – impermanent – produced by human effort pen – impermanent – produced by human effort book – impermanent – produced by human effort statue – impermanent – produced by human effort [Model for vipakṣa] ākāśa – permanent – not produced by human effort atom – permanent – not produced by human effort Given this mental-model-based representation of the case—is sound. a product of human effort.44 In the construction phase. An integrated model consisting of both the sapakṣa model and the vipakṣa model give enough evidence to solve the case at hand—whether sound. a reasoner reflects on the given set of information and attempts to build the mental model accordingly.45 One must be cautious while reading the ‘realities of the world. In the inspection phase. and the variation phase. In Diṅnāga’s system a ‘property locus’ (dharmin) is a conceptual construct. the putative conclusion is considered to be true. In the construction phase of Diṅnāga’s model a reasoner attempts to build the model depending on prima facie information. When even one such alternative model cannot be constructed.46 However. is permanent or impermanent.

Svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna reflect two different domains of reasoning with different intentions. 334 Philosophy East & West . Inference-for-oneself falls within the domain of psychology of reasoning. The aim of this essay has been to show that the theory of inference pro‑ pounded by the Buddhist logicians should not be viewed in the light of formal logic. T.A. 252) wrote: “Hindu inference is . Seal (1985. as previously mentioned in the context of PA. svadṛṣṭārthaprākaśanam. M. The mental-model theory here seems more naturally extendable to Diṅnāga’s theory. S. Consciousness and Culture: East West Perspective. Roer 1850. representation of which within the cognizer can be of different types.R. Hence. So our SA involves nothing but mental.. We are grateful to Roy Perrett of the University of Hawai‘i for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.S.ties as experienced by the cognizer. .V. in 2004. Hiriyanna all endorsed this view). It has also been shown that there are interesting parallels between svārthānumāna as depicted in Diṅnāga’s Hetuchakraḍamaru and Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory on the one hand and parārthānumāna and case-based reasoning (CBR) on the other. Johnson-Laird himself has pointed out that the mental-model approach and the case-based approach are mutually compa‑ tible. 1 – H. and this leaves room for sufficient freedom and flexibility in how we go about accounting for our experiences. D. but he interpreted the Nyāya inference as a rule-based deductive inference. In spite of their differences. Language. conceptual constructs corresponding to the experienced world. these two processes cannot be incompatible with each other. a combined FormalMaterial Deductive-Inductive process” (S. whereas inference-for-others calls for more explicit logical structure. 3 – B. Chatterjee. Notes The first draft of this essay was presented as a paper at a conference organized to celebrate the birth centenary of T. and Stcherbatsky (1930) thought that the Nyāya and the Buddhist theory of inference is a version of Aristotelian syllogism. This lends plausibility to the suggested reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of inference. U. Murti in 2002. since it leaves open the possibility of having different forms of representation of the experienced external world. 2 – E. C. Radhakrishnan. C. . and M. Datta. the inferential content of SA and the corresponding PA being the same. N. p. 4 – J. Max Müller (1853) disagreed with them. R. as it is meant for convincing others. Ballantyne (1849) pointed out that the theory of inference is a theory of rhetorical exposition. organized by the Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion. Vidyabhusana (1921). means the expression of the reality cognized by that person himself. It was also presented at an international seminar. Colebrook (1824/1873).

Mohanty 1971.. K. 20 – In Pramāṇasamuccaya III. 117–131) has discussed this point. and also translation of fragments in Hayes 1988. 231–232. The arguments corresponding to the signs in this table are being mentioned here for the convenience of the reader. Prasad 2002. N. Sarkar 1997. pp.2). namely the statement of the thesis (Pramāṇasamuccaya III. Matilal 1968 and J. Daye (1986. 17 – trirūpa—liṅgākhyānaṁ parārtham anumānam (Nyāyabindu 3. Oetke 2003. K. p. 24 – Quoted in Johnson-Laird 2004. 9 – P. Girotto. Amita Chatterjee. Pramāṇasamuccaya (Tib. 27 – At II. 36. 6 – B. the subject locus where the signified would be inferred and is therefore called ‘sādhya-dharmī.). N. K. Ingalls (1951) and Bochenski (1961) also adopted this formal inter­ pretation. 8 – T. 5 – S. p. 15 – R. Schayer (1932–1933) used the tools of Natural Deduction to explain inference. 4–5. Diṅnāga defines asapakṣa as nothing but the ab sence of sapakṣa. 25 – Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1999. 31.1).3). 170. p. 7 – C.. in Diṅnāga 1961. 21 – R.20. pp. that is. 36–37. Johnson-Laird 1983. Previously we have seen that pakṣa also means one of the constituents of inference. 28 – See table 4. 14 – B.8 (Dharmakīrti 1955). pp. 16 – Svārthaṁ trirūpālliṅgād yad anumeye jñānaṁ tad anumānam (Nyāyabindu 2. p. 18 – Pakṣa in SA means that which the proponent intends to prove—pakṣo yaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭah—while in PA it means pakṣavacanam. 133. p. Hayes 1988. D. 22 – Ibid. Smita Sirker 335 . pp. 26 – R. Matilal 1977. and Legrenzi 1998. pp. 156–157. 12 – Dharmakīrti 1968. See also Hayes’ translation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya in Hayes 1988.’ 19 – D. 11 – Diṅnāga. Hayes 1988. 13 – Dharmakīrti 1955. 78. 23 – Ibid. 10 – Johnson-Laird. P. P.

the property of 1 2 being produced is the sign. and permanence is the signified. knowability is the sign. sound is the subjectlocus. D7:  Sound is non-produced by human effort. sound is the subject-locus. because it is produced by human effort. sound is the subject-locus. and permanence is the signified. and permanence is the signified. because it is impermanent. the sign is audibility. ākāśa) [Pseudo-sign: Inconclusive] D7 + = all. sound is the subject-locus. – lightning) + sapakṣa (pot) [Pseudo-sign: Inconclusive] D3 + vipakṣa (+ pot. Here. D6:  Sound is permanent. – atom) [Pseudo-sign: Inconclusive] D9   D :  Sound is permanent. sound is the subject-locus. + = some. – lightning) [Adequate sign] D8 + vipakṣa (+ ākāśa. because it is knowable. D3:  Sound is produced by human effort. impermanence is the sign. Here. sound is the subject-locus.                 336 Philosophy East & West . – = none – vipakṣa (ākāśa) + sapakṣa (pot) [Adequate sign] D2 – vipakṣa (pot) – sapakṣa (ākāśa) [Pseudo-sign: Inconclusive] D5 – vipakṣa (ākāśa) + sapakṣa (+ pot. Here. and being nonproduced by human effort is the signified. because it is produced. and permanence is the signified. and impermanence is the signified. K. Matilal 1998.   D :  Sound is impermanent. because it is not amenable to touch. because it is produced by human effort. Here the sign is impermanence. D4:  Sound is permanent. and permanence is the signified. D9:  Sound is permanent. Here. the sign is the prop‑ erty of being produced. and impermanence is the signified. because it is produced. the property of being not amenable to touch is the sign. and the property of being produced by human effort is the signified.Table 4 Diṅnāga’s Wheel of Reason: A Tabular Representation + vipakṣa (pot) + sapakṣa (ākāśa) [Pseudo-sign: Inconclusive] D1 + vipakṣa (pot) – sapakṣa (ākāśa) [Pseudo-sign : Hostile] D4 + vipakṣa (pot) + sapakṣa (+ lightning. – pot) + sapakṣa (+ ākāśa. – lightning) – sapakṣa (ākāśa) [Pseudo-sign: Hostile] D6 + vipakṣa (+ pleasure. D5:  Sound is permanent. Here. sound is the subject-locus. also B. sound is the subjectlocus. Here. D8:  Sound is impermanent. because it is audible. Here. the subject-locus is sound. because it is impermanent. Here the sign is the property of being produced by human effort. See the Sanskrit reconstruction of Diṅnāga’s Hetucakraḍamaru in Diṅnāga 1933. the property of being produced by human effort is the sign.

(3) mention of an example (udāharaṇa). In this context. 33. then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case” (quoted Ganeri 2003. b. 31 – J. 34 – J. later Naiyāyikas did make a distinction between svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. residing in a locus. This however. 9). 41 – Johnson-Laird 2004. 30 – However. G. has accepted this distinction. 32 – Ibid. So a surrogate proposition in Indian logic is of the locus-locatee model. p.. 38 – Ibid. (2) citation of a reason (hetu). 40 – Levi says “The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. 99. pp. does not affect the conclusion. p. 37 – Ibid. 43. 27. namely a has f-ness. 33 – The proper formulation of an argument is said to contain five limbs/avayavas: (1) tentative statement of the thesis to be proved (pratijñā). which can be either an abstract property or a concrete object. 44 – M. Amita Chatterjee. Knauff 2007. Ganeri 2003. 154.. 40. next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced.. Ganeri 2003. a Navya-Naiyāyika. 45 – R. and (5) final assertion of the thesis (nigamana/siddhānta). It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. p. 171. p. The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases. P. p. p. 43 – Diṅnāga mentions another alternative in the sapakṣa model (D8): lightning im permanent—not produced by human effort. c) used by Ganeri for readers’ con venience in understanding. a ‘property’ would signify any locatee. p.29 – Indian logic is said to be intentional (logic of properties). 43 n. Gaṅgeśa. 42 – We are grateful to Johnson-Laird for offering his opinion on the differences be tween the two theories in our correspondence with him in 2004. p. 36. 35–36. 35 – L. 36 – Ibid. p. 39 – We use the same set of symbols (F. Hayes 1988. (4) application of reason and example to the case at hand (upanaya). a. Smita Sirker 337 . It is reasoning from case to case. Ronald 1999..

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