Chapter 9

Topic 11 - Causation

IC = Insurance Contact, PP = Public Policy, HoL = House of Lords, CoA = Court of Appeal, SC = Supreme Court, PC = Proximate Cause Proximate Cause Rule  Insured must show that it is more probable than not that the loss was caused by a peril covered by IC (Clowrange v CGU Insurance Plc (2001) – Colman J)  Only causes which are proximate – not remote – are covered  Two Q’s to ask: 1. What peril have insurers agreed to cover? – contract  2. Was loss caused by that peril? Marsden v City and County Insurance Co (1865) o mob damaged window due to fire in a nearby building o riot = cause, not fire  not covered o same principle:  security reduced due to fire – thieves able to enter and steal goods or goods placed outside to save them and stolen – theft, not fire = proximate cause Winicofsky v Army and Navy General Assurance Assocn Ltd (1919) o theft policy excluded loss „occasioned by hostilities‟ – air raid burgled – claim upheld  cause = theft, air raid just made job easier Identify cause of loss: Lawrence v The Accidental Insurance Co Ltd (1881) – Watkin Williams J o impracticable to go back cause upon cause – would lead back to birth Dudgeon v Pembrok (1874) – Blackburn J o loss typically occurs as a result of a series of events o ship left London in bad condition  took on water in rolling seas  unmanageable = distress  thick weather + distress = going ashore Parties can agree the test for causation in contract – if they don‟t there are judicial principles  *Iondides v The universal Marine Ins Co Ltd (1863)–Willes J

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o look exclusively at the proximate and immediate cause of  the loss MIA s 55(1) – incorporates proximate cause – unless otherwise agreed by parties o liable for loss proximately caused by a peril insured against – not liable for loss not proximately caused by a peril insured against Lawrence v The Accidental Insurance Co Ltd (1881) o L had an epileptic seizure – fell on platform at waterloo = death by train  accident covered by personal accident policy Winspear v The Accident Insurance Co Ltd (1880) o insurer was liable when W had seizsure and drowned in river Rea Some US jurisdiction – last cause in time – not proximate cause o Continental Insurance Co v Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co (1996)  building damaged by 1992 NYC storms – flood damaged – caused electrical arcing – led to explosion which damaged circuit boards  looked at spatial and temporal remoteness – drew on Bird (1918) – flood to electrical damage – negligible distance insurer tried to avoid – flood covered, electrical damage Court approved trial judge ruling – flood was the cause, not the electrical arcing – looking at last in time – flood viewed as being within timeframe as it was rapid – not a drawn out timeframe  had it been months between flood and explosion conclusion may have been different  reasonable business person test Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] – Lord Shaw o wrong to treat proximate cause as proximate cause in time  look at proximate in efficiency o HoL: rejected Escher‟s distinction and approved Reischer o Pink v Fleming (1890) – Lord Escher MR

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not a scientist. would understand it to be o Tate Gallery (Trustees) v Duffy Construction Ltd [2007] – Jackson J  causation tends to coincide with common sense The Cendor Mopu [2011] – Lord Mance o Facts: offshore oil-drilling platform – tow from US–Malaysia – policy covered all risks except loss caused by inherent vice or nature of the subject matter insured o mid way through journey hit by wave – one leg broke – next day two others too – perils or inherent vice? o insurers knew of stress cracks in legs – required rig to be checked mid-voyage – weather = normal for voyage o SC: s55(1) – enquiry based on fact and common sense principles  reaffirmed proximate cause = proximate in efficiency o Insurer liable – proximate cause perils of sea – wave broke first leg. caused others to break  could only have avoided if it was caused solely by defect in insured object without any „fortuitous external accident or casualty‟   . distinguished marine (look at last cause) v non-  marine (prepared to look back further) o Reischer v Borwick (1894) – Lindley LJ  agreed with Escher in Pink but didn‟t apply distinction in practice o Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad v Global Process Systems Inc (The Cendor Mopu) [2011]  recent approval of Leyland Athel Line Ltd v Liverpool & London War Risks Insurance Association Ltd [1946] – Lord Greene MR o matter for the common sense and intelligence of the ordinary man Gray v Barr [1971] – Lord Denning o effective or dominant cause of the occurrence is to be determined by common sense – even if it is more remote in time o Yorkshire Dale SS Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] – Lord Wright  must look at what the common man.

even though sea was last in time *Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] o Facts: The Ikaria – insured against loss of perils from sea not war o hit by torpedo – blew hole in side – damaged bulkheads – toed to safe harbour – while anchored – gale blew up – bumped against harbour wall – harbour autborities ordered it into open sea (fear of sinking and blocking) o after two days of buffeting.o last cause in time could explain strict approach taken to warranties in Victorian times – previous breaches would have been irrelevant ∴ warranties needed to be strict  Reischer v Borwick (1894) o Facts:marine policy – covered collision – didn‟t cover perils of the sea – collision – hole – repaired – towed – motion of sea through towing caused hole to reopen  sank o CoA: proximate cause = collision. being grounded at low tide – bulkheads failed – it sank  probs safe in harbour o HoL: proximate cause of loss = torpedo – damage meant it was reasonably certain that sea-water would flow into ship – extent of damage may not have been expected Clarke (1981 article) o if peril covered = proximate cause of damage – liable for all consequences that flow naturally from it – even if these couldn‟t have been expected at the time of the loss Reischer (collision) and Leyland (torpedo) – influx of seawater = reasonably certain consequence – effect of events continued  not overshadowed by subsequent events o if Ikaria (Leyland) had sunk after hitting harbour wall while being towed out – torpedo overshadowed – negligence = proximate cause  doesn‟t matter that torpedo was reason she was in the harbour Burden of Proof  insured must establish on the balance of probabilities – loss proximately caused by an insured peril (Foreign Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Gaunt [1921]. The Popi M [1985])    .

arising from – not clear) Attempts to exclude liability where injury linked to another cause – not just accident  Lawrence v The Accidental Insurance Co Ltd (1881) o „direct and sole cause‟ – deemed restatement of PC test – even though policy excluded fits Fitton v Accidental Death Insurance Co [1864] – Williams J o injury must be direct and sole cause of death – excluded hernia or other disease within system before/ after accident which caused death o accidental fall  strangulated hernia o Held: insurer liable  policy exempted hernia within the system – not one caused by accident *Isitt v Railway Passengers Assurance Co (1889) – Willes J o Facts: policy covered effects from an accidental injury – accidental injury – confined to bed – so painful – no bed sheets – pneumonia – died o Q: were circumstances leading up to death reasonable and natural consequences of the injury and condition which insured had to live under as a result?  if what was reasonably to be expected under circumstances occurred = within policy   . burden switches to insurer – show another explanation more probable o Slattery v Mance [1962]  ship insured against fire – insured shows loss from fire – insurer must show on balance of probabilities fire not proximate cause or from excepted peril If insurer alleges loss deliberate – burden of proof commensurate with gravity of allegation – must prove that there is a substantial probability that the loss wasn‟t accidental  Agreements to alter the rule of Causation  proximate cause rule is a term implied into the contract – parties can alter it. but must be displaced using clear words (Coxe v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corpn Ltd [1916]) – words must give a clear indication of test to apply (attributable to.

arising from or traceable to war‟ – Captain Ewing – inspect sentries on railway line – poorly lit (air raids) – access forbidden to civilians – hit and killed by train o Scrutton J: train proximate cause – “indirectly” – determine if loss indirectly caused by excluded peril – war – reason on train track = excluded peril was indirect cause  claim refused o limit to this – cause may be indirect but must be cause  on platform waiting for troop train – died like Lawrence = diff decision – war part of background only – not part of danger *Jason v Batten [1969] (read)   . Insurers reworded policies: direct or proximate cause – not covered if disease or other intervening cause. or  b) construction principle – avoid literal meaning of   clause rendering cover illusory Smith v Accident Insurance Co (1870) o policy excluded death arising form erysipelas – before/ during/ after accident – S cut foot – erysipelas set in – died o Cleasby B: clause put in – don‟t have to determine if it arose due to injury or independent – Fitton distinguished by majority – diff wording o Kelly CB: dissenting – only exempted if it was independent  preferable – dissent appears to have been adopted – not referred to since *Coxe v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corpn Ltd [1916] o Facts: excluded death „indirectly caused. even if accident aggravated it = cause of death *Ethrington Arbitration [1909] o Facts: E fell during hunt – soaked – pneumonia – died o CoA: insurers hadn‟t avoided Isitt – would be difficult to establish a claim unless insured died at time of accident  limited utility o Vaughan Williams LJ: company must express intention plainly – where disease or other cause dependent on accident – covered by direct an PC  results of accident  two reasons for decision it was PC:  a) clause ambiguous.

attributable to pre-condition.o Facts: policy covered where injury resulted from accident – exclusive direct and immediate cause o motorist – narrowed coronary artery – severy coronary thrombosis – car accident – blood clotted – blocked artery o Held: narrowed artery led to thrombosis (pre-existing condition) – would have an attack within three years – accident advanced it – caused blood clot – not independent of all other causes the exclusive cause – not liable  If the accident had activated condition – but for accident would have remained latent = liable  *Blackburn Rovers Football & Athletic Club plc v Avon Insurance plc [2005] o footballer – spinal injury o CoA: exclusion for injury caused by degeneration – applied regardless of if the degeneration was part of normal aging process  if normal – good to exclude it o if not normal unlikely to conclude it was cause of injury induced by sports trauma o Can‟t recover if disablement. but for the hurricane and wider damage (don‟t get money for wider area damage) o Held: arbitrator didn‟t err in law in applying test – rule harsh. but no other test fairer or more reasonable – what parties had agreed  . even a small bit. doesn‟t matter if its normal or not o Dobbs J: degenerative condition caused the injury – couldn‟t recover Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni General SA [2010] – Hamblen J o terms of policy replace PC with „but for‟ test o Facts: OEH – hotel in New Orleans – hurricane Katrina – physical damage = closed – state of emergency = mandatory evacuation o policy covered business interruption from physical damage – could OEH recover for loss – claim arose due to physical damage and wider area disruption o clause – reduce amount payable which wouldn‟t have occurred.

2) not mentioned o CoA: insurers liable – no relevant exclusions or warranties – proof of peril which was within the policy was enough to entitle the plaintiffs to judgement – didn‟t matter that there was another PC – design fault on its own.Multiple causes  more than one PC = new concept – insurers are looking to find causation to include indirect coses of loss – court becoming more likely to find more than one cause Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corpn Ltd [1974] – Cairns LJ o judges shouldn‟t strain to find a dominant cause *Kuwait Airways Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1999] o number of perils covered – only show PC one o two separate PC – independent of each other – both would produce part of loss – no contribution other – only liable part covered *Ford Motor Co of Canada Ltd v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1959) – SC Canada o Facts: loss due to riot covered – cessation of work and change in temp not – riot  factory closed – damage from freezing o Held: only liable for part from riot *JJ Lloyd Instruments Ltd v Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd (The ‘Miss Jay Jay’) [1987] – Slade LJ o Facts: ship lost – 1) adverse condition of sea – 2) defects in boats design – insured unaware  1) covered. wouldn‟t be liable  *Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corpn Ltd [1974] o Facts: W installed equipment – store and convey liquid wax in a factory – factory burnt down  two negligent actions  1) supplied plastic pipe to convey hot wax + ineffective thermostat  2) switched on equipment and left unattended o Q: did public liability policy cover W‟s negligence?  covered damage as a result of accidents – exception – equipment sold or supplied by W     .

PC = defective pipe and thermostat – exclusion applied 2. California Courts – diff approach *State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co v Partridge 10 Cal3d 102 (1973) o Facts: insured accidently shot and injured friend – two acts negligence: 1) filed down trigger  „hair trigger‟ 2) drove with gun in hand – friend passenger seat o both actions required for injury – liable for negligence „hair trigger‟ not negligent driving o Held: two PC – one covered = liable. Roskill LJ: 1. clauses identifying coverage – broad interpretation  relatively easy to persuade ambiguity in exception clauses (Garvey v State Farm Fire and Casualty Co (1989)) Pro-Wayne o exclusion clauses determine premium – insurer shouldn‟t be liable where PC is excluded Pro-Partridge o application of exception unclear – construe against insurer Both Wayne and Partridge involved third party – what if first party? eg. even if two PC‟s  insurers not liable – only way to give effect to exception is to exempt altogether o Cairns LJ: preferred 2. Property insurance o indemnify insured if property covered suffers loss – defined by causation (loss caused by X peril) or loss caused by any risk (less exceptions)  pays irrespective of fault         . regardless if other excluded Keeton and Widiss (1988 Book) o where there are several factors – courts apply causation theory to allow cover to prevail – construe policies in light of reasonable insured‟s expectation  construe ambiguous policy provisions against insurer Not gained wide acceptance – reasonable expectation of insured only where ambiguity in contract (Montrose Chemical Cor v Admiral Ins Co (1995)) exclusionary clauses – narrow interpretation.o CoA: goods included pipe and Thermostat o Lord Denning MR.

usually maintined on a gradual basis – scale was more than usual – but not the event that triggered the action o CoA – Nourse LJ: FI was wrong – just because wear and tear didn‟t trigger the cover – the extent of it was so defective that ESR were triggered – created loss  similar to Leyland – track damage was same as torpedo. other expressly excluded o Property: not liable if one PC covered. at least partly by perils of the seas = no inherent vice  avoid causation issue inherent vice = not excepted peril – illustration of type of peril not = PC of loss o Lord Mance: distinguished where two risks combine to cause loss.o Liability – agrees to pay indemnify if insured liable to third  party  only pay if degree of fault = liable to third party Argue for differentiation o Liability: liable if one PC covered. wear and tear…” o denied policy for “wear and tear” o FI – Steel J: cause of loss = ESR – liable – cracks were part of normal features. one excepted v one risk specifically excepted     needs to hear more arguement Result: narrows circumstances court can find concurrent causes – little discussion one insured. even though it may not have been immediate cause it was underlying  . latent defect. gradual deterioration. other excluded The Cendor Mopu [2011] – SC (oil-rig case) o overruled The Miss Jay Jay – can‟t be loss by both perils of the sea and inherent vice of subject-matter o Lord Clarke: loss PC. short and easy to read if you want to get a better overview o Facts: Hatfield Rail disaster 2000 – four people killed – derailed – broken track – Emergency Speed Restrictions (ESR) across large parts of network similar to accident – disruption – rail businesses suffered losses o sought to recover from policies – excluded “inherent vice. one excepted *Midland Mainline v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2004] o Lowry and Rawlings article is basically this section of the book with the Midland case added.

as long as one proximate cause of the loss is an insured peril – insurer = liable o Wayne Tank – once one cause is excepted – not liable. criticised Steel J for only talking about one cause –  previous cases talked about multiple causes  Lowry and Rawlings – think criticism harsh  Probably multiple causes. but like in Wayne Tanks when one excluded – insurer not liable Lowry and Rawlings Article o distinction Miss Jay Jay and Wayne Tanks/ Midland Mainline (one cause exempted) o in light of s55(1) MIA Miss Jay Jay can be deemed to be incorrectly read – but it is sensible. courts will try take a narrow reading so that the insurer isn‟t excepted from the principal purpose of the insurance o US (California) – exclusionary clauses interpreted narrowly – clauses identifying coverage are broadly interpreted (Garvey [1989]) – contra preferendum rules apply o English – same contract principles for insurance and normal contracts o Reason for difference –  English same rules for contract  US treat contracts for insurance different treatment – industry of public interest – held to a broader legal responsibility than private contracts (Continental Life & Accident Co v Songer (Ariz 1979)  attempt to address imbalance of power between insurers (who generally write   contract) and insured contrast English – uphold freedom of contract Lowry and Rawlings – suggest welfare state in UK means less incentive for judges to protect individual insured – greater protection v US where welfare provision based more on private insurance o Reform  see Wayve v Partridge debate above Deliberate Actions by insured .

Gray and Co v London Assurance Corpn [1918] o voyage abandoned for fear of capthure o HoL: threat wasn‟t imminent – loss = captains voluntary decision o Lord Sumner: apprehension not good enough – mus be an actual or imminent threat *Joseph Watson and Son Ltd v Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co of San Fransico [1922] – Rowlatt J o Facts: captain thought he saw smoke from cargo hold – was steam – water sprayed – goods damaged     . Michael [1898] – Gorrell Barnes J o fire didn‟t break out – reasonably certain it would have – actual existing state of peril of fire. doused others in water – prevent spread of fire o Held: fire insurers liable – test when action is taken by insured to protect insured property from peril covered – Is it fear that something will happen in the future. or has the peril already happened or is it so imminent that I is immediately necessary to avert the danger by action? * The Knight of St.Actions to reduce Loss  insureds sometimes take actions to reduce a loss. not merely a fear of fire Becker. but actually cause more damage in the process – Q: did insurer contract for the event the caused the loss? *Canada Rice Mills Ltd v Union Marine and General Insurance Co [1941] (The Segundo) o Facts: rough weather – captain closed ventilators to stop seawater entering – rice cargo damaged o PC: loss covered – perils of the sea – even though water didn‟t touch cargo o Lord Wright: action by captain – “such a mere matter of routine seamanship necessitated by the peril that the damage can be regarded as the direct result of the peril” o perils of sea effect not broken by action – same as torpedo  in Leyland *Symington & Co v Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd (1928) – Scrutton LJ o Facts: fire near insured goods – port authorities threw some into sea.

harder if not quantified o Q: What had insurer agreed to cover? Australian line of cases:  *Guardian Assurance Co Ltd v Underwood Constructions Pty Ltd (1974) o HC: colud recover costs of repairing uninsured items outside and excavation – had been damaged – repair of items necessary to restore insured excavation to undamaged condition – viewed as loss or damage to excavation – not repairing office block would cause more damage to excavation *Re Mining Technologies Australia Pty Ltd [1999] – majority decision     .o Held: not liable – can‟t be liable for loss they didn‟t contract for – insured for fire – not for captain‟s error in judgement MIA – s78(4) – obligation to take actions to avert or minimise loss from an insured peril as an uninsured person would – no requirement for non-marine British Westinghouse Electric Co Ltd v Underground Electric Rys Co of London [1912] o unreasonable conduct is taken into consideration in mitigation – unable to claim addition damages if they wer PC caused by insureds failure  break chain of causation *Yorkshire Water Services Ltd v Sun Alliance & London Insurance plc [1997] o Facts: sewage leak – YWS carried out work £4m – aim: to reduce costs of claims likely to be brought by neighbouring properties – public liability policy – legal liability for damages and all other costs and expenses which may be subject of the claim o CoA: rejected YWS claim that insurer was liable for reasonable expenditure on work undertaken to alleviate loss – only had to indemnify for sums due as compensation to third parties – not work costs carried out on prpoerty – difficult to assess what is reasonable – £4m work for likely £300k claim  hard to assess.

Miller Smith & Partners (A Firm) Third Party [1967] – Diplock LJ    . prevent future outbreaks ∴ losses o FI: Davies JA in Re Mining Technologies Australia was minority view – related to property insurance – expense was incurred while loss was taking place – not the case in this case Negligent and Wilful Conduct of the Insured Negligence of insured  MIA s55(2)(a) – loss covers insured‟s negligence unless expressly excluded (AG v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1923])  *Harris v Poland [1941] o Facts: lit fire – forgot hidden jewellery there – loss or damage by fire policy o Held: insurers liable – actions probs negligent – not intentional  *JE Adams (1998 Article) – requirement to take reasonable care to avoid loss won‟t necessarily relieve insurer of loss.o Facts: mine collapse – insured equipment trapped underground – rescued – less than half value of equipment o Davies JA: policy clause – excluded liability for loss to property which could have been avoided by the insured exercising reasonable care – implied term allowing recovery of expenditure incurred exercising such care o McPherson JA: retrieving equipment amounted to repair – recover under that clause – don‟t need to imply in term *PMB Australia Ltd v MMI General Insurance Ltd [2001] – affirmed 2002 o Facts: policy – losses incurred through business interruption – outbreak of salmonella – stopped manufacture of peanut butter – didn‟t cover expenditure incurred to alter factory. even if insured acts negligently Tinline v White Cross Insurance Asssociation Ltd [1921] – Bailhache J o attempt to exclude negligence in liability insurance = nonsensical – liability to third party  requires negligence *Fraser v BN Furman (Production Ltd).

1999) –IOB website)  couldn‟t find online… *Cooke v Routledge [1998] o drove very drunk – car wrote off o Held: liable – required to take reasonable care to safeguard from loss – not a deliberate act – not inevitable or probable consequence of action – construed protect  from external theft – not his driving *Gunns v Par Insurance Brokers [1997] o Facts: jeweller left valuables in a safe – previously declared unsatisfactory – went away for weekend – didn‟t turn on alarm – shortly before theft reported that he thought he was being followed o Held: not liable – conduct = reckless * Hayward v Norwich Union Insurance Ltd [2001]     .o Held: insurer liable under employers‟ liability policy – negligence clause – unless conduct was reckless  acted with actual recognition that a danger exists – not caring if its averted or not – reckless clause there to ensure employer take precautions – prevent moral hazard – take risks just because they are covered * Paine v Catlins [2004] o Held: requirement that part of an extraction hood be cleaned at least monthly and ducting at least annually – fire – grease from hood/ ducting dripped onto fire – severe damage to hotel o Held: disputed section of equipment deemed to have been cleaned monthly in compliance with policy – as clean as it could be – would be dirtier at diff stages of cleaning regime – no negligence by insured Property Insurance  *Sofi v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd [1993] o Facts: Theft policy – take all reasonable steps to safeguard insured property – locked jewellery worth £42k in glove box in car – 15 mins – stolen o CoA: liable – insured not reckless – thought safer in car Pre Sofi IOB had taken a view that was more favourable to insurers (Digest of Annual Reports and Bulletins (London. IOB.

o Facts: Porsche – petrol station – left keys to pay – electronic locking device and immobiliser – prevent being driven. doesn‟t matter if it is close to home = left Claim dependent on illegal act of the insured  PP exclude claim dependent on criminal act – doesn‟t preclude claim by innocent person – insurer liable if act by third part not a party to insurance contract  Beresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1938] – Lord Atkin o not liable for intentional criminal or tortious act – insurers haven‟t agreed to this – not part of contract o insane committing suicide – once not excluded – might recover o Lord Wright MR: no distinction between criminal and estate as estate claiming is equivalent to criminal claiming – but innocent beneficiary not claiming through the estate can benefit – not tainted by criminality MIA s55(2) – not responsible for losses from insured‟s wilful misconduct – proximate from (1) replaced with attributable   . even with keys – thief targeted him – device to deactivate safety features – policy couldn‟t leave keys in or on car o FI: not left in or on if not unattended – not case – relatively close – had to be close enough so as to be likely able to prevent theft (left unattended)  Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd v Angel (1962) – Lod Denning  physical proximity to keep car under observation o CoA: reversed decision – policy didn‟t incorporate “left unattended” authorities – only q did he leave keys? – didn‟t matter only reason thief could take was due to device – rejected narrow interpretation of left – (tried to say car-jackings couldn‟t recover with broader one – held: they are involuntary – not left) o Ombudsman (March 2004): was insured in a position to intervene – not if they were successful in preventing theft  packing car – demisting – ran back inside  if on public highway.

but won‟t exclude alternative or independent rights – protect an innocent beneficiary o Lord Escher MR: has to be a causal connection between crime and loss – contract is made contrary to PP can‟t enforse in law or equity – where PP is being used to avoid when full consideration has been paid – rule should be narrow – shouldn‟t go any further than PP requires     . didn‟t know it was wrong – not insane – knew what he was doing and that it was wrong allowing a person to profit from crime would remove restrains in minds against committing crimes (Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liquidation v Moore Stephens (A Firm) [2009].even if misconduct not PC claim can be denied – against PP to  indemnify man against crime he knowingly commits Porter v Zurich Insurance Co [2009] o Facts: P had delusional disorder – set fire to home – suicide attempt – changed mind – escaped – house and contents damaged o Coulson J: well know PP prevents recovery from criminal act knowingly committed by insured o could recover if he‟d been insane – proof on the balance of probabilities under M‟Naghten Rules at time of fire  didn‟t know the nature and quality of the act he was doing. or if he did know. Hare and Koops Knight (1830)) *Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] – Diplock LJ o claim being denied unlikely to deter someone who isn‟t deterred by criminal sanctions – criminal law most appropriate for dealing with deterrent o must weigh up anti-social act v right being asserted (gravity of the two) – will enforcing it encourage the act? o legal fiction that criminal shouldn‟t benefit preventing valid recovery of claims by beneficiaries JG Shand (1972 Article) o contract never supposed to regulate conduct of community – admitted deterrent now used in application of PP *Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] o Fry LJ: courts won‟t support enforcing a claim based on a criminal act – excludes criminal and all those claiming under them. Bolland.

if legislature hadn‟t – but would have been based on facts. limited connection to claim or a lot of mitigating circumstances Australia haven‟t modified the PP rule        Suicide Cases:  Beresford v Royal Insurance Co [1938] o HoL: died by suicide – clause excluded paying if suicide committed in first year – death outside period – not liable . but  2) shouldn‟t refuse it automatically to enforce contract due to any little illegality regardless of how disproportionate it is to the loss *Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] – Diplock LJ o courts refusal to assert a right in favour of someone who has committed an anti-social act depends on nature of act and right court must draw a boundary between enforceable and unenforceable claim *Haseldine v Hosken [1933] o solicitor suffered loss entering champertous contract (no longer illegal – one side to litigation has costs paid by an outsider – gets share of profits) – couldn‟t claim on policy because it was criminal – didn‟t matter that he didn‟t know it was Forfeiture Act 1982 c34 s2(2) – courts can alter the PP rule based on offenders conduct and that of the deceased – based on circumstances of the case and those deemed necessary to do justice in the case Dunbar v Plant [1997] – Phillips LJ o judges would have modified rule. Deceased [1911] – Evans P o human mind revolts at thought of law being used to enforce a claim based on a criminal act *Saudners v Edwards [1987] – Bingham LJ o court won‟t refute claim merely because there‟s been an illegal act o Two issues with illegality  1) court shouldn‟t enforce or help a contract which is against the law. *Estate of Cunigunda Crippen.

 suicide = crime – PP wouldn‟t allow recovery . Hare and Koops Knight (1830) o henry Fauntleroy hanged 1824 – forged Bank of England note – estate unable to claim on life policy – crime led to death. but authorities no claim to insurance money – jewellery stole – theft policy o Talbot J: Insurance covers property law forbids them from having = contract connected to illegal act ∴ contract is  unenforceable *Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1987] o Facts: wholesaler of diamonds – exported diamonds to West Germany – misrepresented value to German customs    . pay after one year) no general prohibition – each state could legislate *Bolland. didn‟t matter that he didn‟t intend it to Charlton v Fischer [2001] o insurer can apply same defence against claims from a third party as the can against the insured where the claim is a derivative claim – accident not on a public road – it was a derivative claim o Rix J: distinction should be drawn loss caused by a deliberate criminal act – could recover V loss intentionally caused couldn‟t recover o Other judges: accident – included all acts  motor insurance peculiarities  *Bird v Appleton (1800) – Lord Kenyon CJ o insured can claim under theft policy even if goods bought with proceeds of sale from an illegal cargo – would have to examine all previous transactions to establish if insured had acquired funds illegally *Geismar v Sun Alliance and London Insurance Ltd [1978] o Facts: jewellery smuggled into UK – liable to confiscation.whole  contract not void ab initio – clause could be severed US SC diff direction – Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance CO v Johnson (1920) – imply term re: suicide only if mentioned (eg.

Germany – right to possess goods will be enforced even if owner acquires by illegal contract once they don‟t have to relyon that illegal contract to enforce claim ( Tinsley v Morgan [1994] Lord Browne-Wilkinson) o Kerr LJ: defined degree of connection by adopting and expanding *Thackwell v Barclays Bank plc [1986]  won‟t automatically deny a claim based on an illegal act – look at quality of act – consider if it would offend public conscience to allow remedy sought – is it encouraging criminal in act [or encouraging others to do the same *Saunders v Edwards [1987] Nicholls LJ] o issuing false invoice bad – didn‟t benefit insured – no bearing on loss – didn‟t deceive insurers  no direct connection between illegal act and contract V Geismar  insured better off with money – jewels could be confiscated – direct connection to illegal act  *Tinsley v Milligan [1994] o Facts: house acquired by two people – name of one – fraudulent social security claims o HoL: house acquired – trust – owner of legal title = trustee for other – who could claim under trust without having to rely on illegal contract – only claim against this by first person based on illegal contract – won‟t be considered o majority: disapproved of pubic conscience test – more flexibility than minority – not as much as public conscience test Cohen (1994 article) majority opinion inspired by Public conscience test o Lord Goff: minority – wanted to go back to rigid rule – property rights created by an illegal contract should be left as they were Stone & Rolls Ltd [2009]   .– help importer avoid tax – no misrepresentation to insurer – jewels stolen after arrival o CoA: claim allowed – transaction illegal in W.

” Oldfield v Transamerica Life Insurance Co of Canada (2002) o Canadian SC – McLaghlin CJ o P separated from wife – agreed he would maintain life insurance coverage in lieu of child and spousal support – wife would be beneficiary until kids 18 – P died – 30 cocaine filled condoms – on burst – heart attack o Wife wanted money – insurer refused – claim barred by PP – can‟t insure against own criminal act o FI and CoA: no PP or contract rule barred claim o SC: not against PP to allow innocent beneficiary to claim when insured dies through criminal act – criminal can‟t profit from crime – if claiming through his estate = no   . Cohen. “The Quiet Revolution in the Enforcement of Illegal Contracts” 1994 LMCLQ 163) *American Cases  Millen v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co (1938)  o can‟t find online… Weeks v New York Life Insurance Co (1924) o SC South Carolina o just because a contract to insure against death by legal execution would be against PP. speculative and theoretical. does not mean that an ordinary life policy that doesn‟t except against it will be declared unenforceable on PP grounds – there‟s no reason to presume insured intended to accelerate maturing of policy by committing a crime John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co v Tarrence (1957) o dismissed notion that allowing beneficiaries to collect insurance if criminal killed in the commission of a crime will increase crimes – remote. o Both the public and the insurer have “a guaranty against increasing the risk insured. by that love of life which nature has implanted in every creature.o HoL: affirmed Tinsley – won‟t allow claimant recover compensation for own illegal act – won‟t query transfer of property rights if claimant doesn‟t rely on contract (Article to read: N.

leaves it to legislature or another court based on facts to modify it  clear dislike of the rule as it stands (strict PP test) and attempting to assert pressure to bring about change of the rule o L‟Heureux‑ Dubé J : . but has a claim as beneficiary  not tainted with husbands illegality – shouldn‟t penalize innocent victim o PP doesn‟t make policy void – makes it unenforceable by the criminal – contract lawful on face but carried out unlawfully not void  contract to insure death by cocaine bursting unenforceable. but one to insure against death and death occurring through illegal act enforceable by innocent beneficiary o Major J: delivered majority decision   main reason to use PP is because the insurer hasn‟t provided for provision in policy Insurance Law in Canada (Brown) – denying recovery to an innocent beneficiary would be to penalise them for the insured‟s anti social behaviour  parties intention is important – of criminal act is incidental to the contract.claim. may even be enforceable by criminal insured differentiation between (backed up by MacGilivray and Chitty) 1) insured indemnified against type of loss suffered (death) but that loss arises through an unlawful act in that case  enforceable  2) contract of insurance is itself illegal  not PP rule change:  arbitrary to have distinction between refusing claim on PP grounds to criminal and beneficiaries through will v beneficiaries named   on policy looks at Diplock LJ in Hardy – doesn‟t modify   rule.

particularly where the beneficiary is innocent. but neither should insurance co get benefit of premium without risk alteration of PP rule should be done by legislature – must carefully balance competing rights if rule is bringing about harsh results should look at the rule itself and change it – rather than on a case by case basis should not relax PP rule to allow a criminal to benefit from his action. s 1(1) – PP rule – prevents a person who has killed another from benefiting from it o even if domestic abuse or suicide pact  s5 – unless convicted of murder the courts can modify rule if they see fit based on facts (s2(2))   *In the Estate of Cunigunda (otherwise Cora) Crippen. “While a crime may prevent a person from benefiting from that crime. Courts won’t enforce an illegal contract will enforce property rights acquired through illegal contract – once claim made without relying on contract or can only be defeated relying on contract Deliberate Killing and the forfeiture Rule  Forfeiture Act 1982. it cannot affect the rights of innocent third persons” forfeiture rule based on PP is there to manage the transfer of risk – criminal shouldn‟t benefit. but should relax the forfeiture rule to       balance competing interests. Deceased [1911] – Evans P o it is against what the public would want for the law to enforce a contract based on a criminal act o Dr Crippen hanged for murdering wife – estate not allowed to claim of policy on her life o valid contract – unenforceable by C or estate o legal fiction allowing insurer to keep premiums and not pay out – W not benefitting The Prince of Wales & Association v Palmer (1855)  .

diminished responsibility or provocation pleaded successfully – forfeiture still applies o court can consider provocation in deciding whether to alter rule or not if it isn‟t a murder conviction  Re K decd [1985] . but won‟t exclude alternative or independent rights – protect an innocent beneficiary o Lord Escher MR: has to be a causal connection between crime and loss – contract is made contrary to PP can‟t enforse in law or equity – where PP is being used to avoid when full consideration has been paid – rule should be narrow – shouldn‟t go any further than PP requires  Brown v American Internation Lif Co (1991) o if beneficiary didn‟t commit or scheme to commit criminal act leading to death  can recover o wife died setting fire to house – husband could collect Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] – Denning MR o an innocent beneficiary can collect even where another beneficiary is responsible for the death o approved by Oldfield – SC Canada Beresford [1938] – Lord Atkin o would have been decided differently if suicides will not claiming – no decision on third parties claiming – diff attitude to suicide – if parties agreed exclusion time then it would likely be followed o offender shouldn‟t benefit – shouldn‟t be able to dictate who will Davis v Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company 351 NE 2d 207    Rule applies in a lot of cases  *Re S decd [1996] – convicted of murder.o policy void as Palmer could benefit by killing insured Innocent beneficiaries:  *Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] o Facts: W (Florence Maybrick) killed H – she couldn‟t benefit – her claim ignored– policy terms – reverted to estate of H o Fry LJ: courts won‟t support enforcing a claim based on a criminal act – excludes criminal and all those claiming under them.

A. ―Liability Insurance—Manslaughter— Public Policy‖ [1970] CLJ 194 -J.o court consider moral culpability and financial position of    offender *Re Giles [1972] – confined under mental health act – not punished  rule still applies doubt if criminally insane *Dunbar v Plant [1998] – Mummery LJ – CoA o Elderly couple – incurable diseases – irrational desperation or depression – criminally complicit in suicide pact o crime must be deliberate and intentional resulting in death of insured – nature of crime will determine that forfeiture rule will apply o violence doesn‟t need to be used to kill the person – gas or poison.A. ―The Supreme Court of Canada and the Law of Insurance 1975‖ (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769 at 776–8   contrasted hunting accident – accidently shot person not animal = no intention = even if  gross negligence reduced it to manslaughter – covered by accident insurance as intended by policy no separation here – entered home with intention to shoot. if intention to kill – are sufficient to prevent claim o Philips LJ: forfeiture should apply – where DPP declined to prosecute due to suicide pact – court should follow lead o no benefit in applying forfeiture – should be leniency – if lead by one then would be diff *R v Chief National Insurance Commissioner [1981] – Lane CJ o doesn‟t need to be a criminal conviction – not label on crime = nature  *Gray v Barr [1971] o Facts: B thought W had affair with G – went to G house with gun – fired into ceiling – approached G – fight – shot fired – G killed – B cleared of manslaughter – G‟s wife sued B‟s liability insurance o CoA: policy designed to cover B‟s negligence o Denning MR: two possibilities Articles to be read on this case  1) shooting deliberate = no cover – a lot of discussion in book . even if result from second unintended shot = linked  deliberate act so closely linked  can‟t be seperated .J. ―Insurance for the Criminal‖ (1971) 34 MLR 176 -R.G. Fleming. Jolowicz. Hasson.

shouldn‟t be allowed to benefit from crime  higher court would need to rule before it would be allowable – battering with hammer. 2) civil court not bound by criminal court – Denning thought he should have been convicted o Philimore LJ: two shots can‟t be separated – second shot not unexpected given circumstances – reasonable objective person would expect it and wouldn‟t believe B‟s version of events o Salmon LJ: separated shots – but implied in term preventing recovery where accident happened while threatening with a loaded gun  would have denied on PP basis either – should discourage public using guns o Lane J: did person seeking indemnity use “deliberate. even if death unintended Academics dislike G v B but judges like it and follow it o followed and cited by Canadian SC No clear ratio from G v B – supports view court will look at insured‟s act – decide if there was a deliberate criminal intent towards victim – even if no criminal conviction what happens if third party is killed – Lane J test suggests violence must be towards person killed. even if diminished – shouldn‟t be able to benefit Motor Manslaughter  *Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Ltd [1921]    . but not definitively defined Modification  Re H (Deceased) [1990] – Peter Gibson J o suggested act could modify rule if the manslaughter didn‟t involve intentional deliberate threats or violence  *Dalton v Latham [2003] – Patten J o sceptical of Re H – parliament could have excluded rule for  diminished responsibility but didn‟t Jones v Roberts [1995] – Kolbert J o Re H not sited by CoA Royse v Royse [1984] – same facts . intentional and unlawful violence or threats of violence”?  yes = no indemnity. third party could claim.

but B entered G‟s house = intention o manslaughter requirement higher for motorist *Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] o CoA: act deliberate and criminal – insured driver already paid victims. if no insurance Motor Insurers‟ Bureau liable (Road Traffic Act 1988) *Gardner v Moore [1984] o HoL: convicted of inflicting grevious bodily harm o deliberate nature – already paid. can‟t recover o approved Diplock LJ statement in Hardy look at social harm of enforcement v not enforcing o Denning MR in Hardy: motorist can‟t recover sums paid – but the law by requiring motorist to be indemnified – policy must be read so wide that a third party won‟t be tainted by a motorists intent  can recover from insurer difficult to distinguish motor cases from G v B on PP grounds – both dangerous to a third party – victim suffers by not holding them liable Perpetrator not deterred by criminal sanction – lack of insurance not likely to work o not wanting to indemnify criminal v compensating malicious acts of motorist  motorists – compensation won o what‟s the diff between someone with a shogun and driving  licence when both act recklessly? Criminal courts should decide criminal matters – civil should focus on parties and compensation – like with motor insurance only looking at injuries no PP reason for indemnifying insured where not provided for in contract – leg is only thing helping motorists o must have certain level of liability – limits ability for insurers to restrict this      .o speeding – Shaftesbury avenue – killed one. even if negligence  liable o G v B: similar. driver couldn‟t recover indemnity from insurers – insurer only liable in driver can‟t pay. injured two pedestrians – convicted manslaughter  gross or reckless negligence o Ballihavhe J: generally negligence negates cover – motor policy must include cover.

o Charlton v Fisher [2002] CoA: driver deliberately steered into another car – didn‟t intend to injure  private land – RTA 1988 didn‟t apply – insurer not liable due to deliberate criminal act o shows leg is only thing differentiating motor from other liability insurance  .