Dharmakiirti's refutation of theism By Roger Jackson Philosophy East and West 36: !ct" #$%6 p" 3#&'3 % (" ()*R!D+,*(!) (ndian ci-ili.

ation/ no less than that of the West/ is haunted 0y the concept of 1od/ and (ndian philosophical 2riting/ no less than the 2orks of 34uinas/ Descartes/ 5ant/ or 6ume/ has as one of its important concerns the e7istence or none7istence of an omniscient/ eternal/ independent/ 0ene-olent 0eing 2ho creates and8or designs the cosmos" Despite 9in :utang's description of (ndia as a nation ;into7icated 2ith 1od/;<#= (ndian skepticism a0out such a 0eing goes 0ack -ery far indeed/<>= and e7plicit arguments against theism find an important place in the 2ritings of Buddhism/ Jainism/ and ?iimaa"msaa <as they must ha-e in the lost 2ritings of ,aar-aaka= / 2hile 1od's importance or e-en e7istence for early @aa"mkhya/ )yaaya/ and AaiBse"sika is at 0est moot"<3= (ndeed/ the only (ndian philosophical systems that are e7plicitly theistic are Aedaanta/ :oga/ and later/ )yaaya'AaiBse"sika" (t undou0tedly is due to the o-er2helming preference for Aedaanta among modern e7ponents of (ndian philosophy that (ndian tradition so often is presented through theistically'shaded lenses/ and it is not incorrect to assert that/ in general/ (ndian ci-ili.ation has 0ecome more theistic during the same period in 2hich the West has 0ecome less so" @till/ this should not 0lind us to the fact that as recently as fi-e hundred years ago thinkers like the Jaina 1u"naratna 2ere adducing sharp and original arguments against theistic assertions/ and that e-en today the unanimity of (ndian 0elief in 1od may not 0e as thoroughgoing as most s2amis and scholars 2ould ha-e us 0elie-e"< = 3s might 0e e7pected/ arguments for the e7istence or none7istence of the 0eing -ariously called puru"sa/ 0rahman/ paramaatman/ or iiBs-ara/ or 0y the name of one or another sectarian deity/ increased in sophistication as methods of philosophical discussion gre2 more comple7 and precise" @ometime around the middle of the first millennium 3"D" a philosophical 2atershed 2as reached 2herein the -arious (ndian schools arri-ed at least at a 0road consensus on the criteria for -alid and in-alid formal inferences/ anumaana/ and proper and improper argumentati-e modes/ tarka" (n principle/ at least/ this permitted

intersystemic de0ate on the 0asis of commonly accepted ;logical; canons/ and thus prompted the hope that arguments on fundamental philosophical issues might indeed 0e capa0le of resolution" (n general/ 0efore the de-elopment of these canons/ (ndian philosophical arguments that 2ere not simply dogmatic 2ere analogical or dialectical in formC arguments after the canons 2ere de-eloped still employed illustrati-e analogies and dialectical dilemmas/ 0ut 2ithin the much more carefully articulated frame2ork of 2hat is sometimes called the (ndian ;syllogism"; 3mong those contri0uting greatly to the de-elopment of generally accepta0le '''''''''''''''''''''''' Roger Jackson is an 3ssistant Professor of Religious @tudies at DairfieEd +ni-ersity/ ,onnecticut" *his paper 2as originally presented at the se-enth conference of the international 3ssociation of Buddhist @tudies/ Bologna/ (taly/ July/ #$%&" p" 3#6 logical canons 2as the se-enth'century Buddhist aacaarya Dharmakiirti/ 2ho de-eloped the seminal insights of his great predecessor/ Dignaaga/ into an epistemological and logical system that itself dre2 the attention of countless commentators <not to mention opponents<&== and has ser-ed as the 0asis of epistemology and logic in the *i0etan Buddhist tradition right up to the present" *he maFority of Dharmakiirti's 2ritings<6= are concerned 2ith epistemological and logical 4uestions/ 0ut he 2as not uninterested in matters of religious and metaphysical doctrine/ for the chapter titled ;Pramaa"nasiddhi/; or ;Esta0lishment of 3uthoritati-eness/ ; in his master2ork/ the Pramaa"na-aarttika/ <G= is de-oted almost entirely to a rational Fustification of Buddhist religious doctrines/ such as the authoritati-eness of the Buddha/ the reality of past and future li-es/ and the -alidity of the Dour )o0le *ruths" (n the course of demonstrating these doctrines/ Dharmakiirti attacks the positions of a -ariety of non'Buddhist opponents/ including the 9okaayatas<H,aar-aakas=/ @aa"mkhyas/ )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas/ ?iimaa"msakas/ and Jainas" 3lthough earlier Buddhist 2riters had critici.ed non'Buddhist systems/ and Bhaa-a-i-eka had su0Fected them to systematic scrutiny nearly a century earlier in his *arkaF-aalaa/ Dharmakiirti 2as the first Buddhist to

critici.e non'Buddhist doctrines 2ith fully de-eloped methods of inference and argumentation at his disposal" 3mong the non'Buddhist doctrines critici.ed 0y Dharmakiirti in the ;Pramaa"nasiddhi; chapter of the Pramaa"na-aarttika 2as the assertion that an omniscient/ permanent/ independent entity/ ((Bs-ara/ is the creator of the cosmos" 3lthough 1eorge ,hemparathy remarks that ;the systematic and thoroughgoing attack on the (Bs-ara doctrine 0y Dharmakiirti; ga-e a great impetus to the theist'atheist contro-ersy/ <%= and 1opimohan Bhattacharyya notes that the ;time'honored cosmological EsicI argument 2as for the first time su0Fected to scathing criticism 0y Dharmakiirti/ Bthe central figure around 2hom all the creati-e minds in (ndia re-ol-ed'/ ; <$= Dharmakiirti's arguments themsel-es/ pi-otal as they may ha-e 0een/ ha-e recei-ed surprisingly little attentionC most 2riters on Buddhist atheism ha-e focused either on the arguments of such earlier sources as the Paali )ikaayas/ )aagaarFuna/ 3Bs-aghosa/ and Aasu0andhu/ or the later/ e7tended discussions in B@aantarak"sita's *att-asa"mgraha and the PaJnFikaa upon it 0y 5amalaBsiila" *he earlier arguments are less systematic than Dharmakiirti's/ and the later ones are largely 0ased on the discussion of iiBs-ara in the Pramaa"na-aarttika/ so it seems desira0le to e7amine these crucial arguments/ for 2ithout an understanding of them/ our picture of the (ndian theist'atheist contro-ersy 2ill 0e incomplete" *his essay 2ill sketch the pre'Dharmakiirti de-elopment of theism/ outline earlier Buddhist refutations of it/ conte7tuali.e and analy.e Dharmakiirti's arguments in some detail/ note some of the directions taken in the theist'atheist de0ate after Dharmakiirti/ and conclude 0y e7amining pro0lems inherent in attempting to ;decide; the de0ate and compare it to similar de0ates in the Western tradition" p" 3#G ((" P6(9!@!P6(,39 *6E(@? BED!RE D63R?35((R*( (ndian speculation a0out the cosmos/ of course/ goes 0ack as far as the later sections of the"Rg-eda/ 2here the first cause is said to 0e/ for e7ample/ -iBs-akarman <;the all'maker;=/<#K= or puru"sa <;the person;= / <##= or praFaapati <;the lord of

creatures;=/ <#>= or tadekam <;the one;= "<#3= *he di-ine po2er/ or supreme puru"sa/ first is referred to as iiBs-ara <;the lord;= in the 3thar-a-eda/<# = 2hile the Braa"hma"nas and 33ra"nyakas continue Aedic speculations regarding praFaapati and -iBs-akarman and introduce the concepts of 0rahman and 0rahmaa"<#&= (n most of these accounts/ the discussion of the first cause is couched in mythological narrati-eC little real attempt is made to Fustify the concepts philosophically/ though lurking in the 0ackground are unstated assumptions a0out limiting principles and simplicity of e7planation" Discussions of the first cause in the -arious +pani"sads focus on the concept of 0rahman <also referred to as aatman or paramaatman=/ 2hose reality as the source and <most often= the su0stance of the cosmos is inferred usually through a reducti-e process that mo-es from change to permanence/ multiplicity to unity/ comple7ity to simplicity/ materiality to spirituality/ and grossness to su0tlety"<#6= *he earlier/ more ;monistic; +pani"sads tend to regard 0rahman as an impersonal principle that simply 0ecomes the cosmos <2hile at the same time remaining in some 2ay transcendent to it=C in later +pani"sads/ such as the B@-etaaBs-atara/ 0rahman is personali.ed''at least to the point 2here it has a creati-e aspect that is responsi0le for originating the cosmos and that can 0e addressed as ;lord; <iiBsa/ iiBs-ara=/ or ;deity; <de-a=/<#G= or e-en as Rudra" *he B@-etaaBs-atara actually lists non'Aedic e7planations of the cosmos/ such as s-a0haa-a <nature=/ kaala <time=/ niyata <fate=/ yad"rcchaa <chance=/ and so forth/ 0ut it reFects them out of hand/ simply asserting that 0rahman/ rather than any of these/ is the true e7planatory principle"<#%= *he Bhaga-adgiitaa further personali.es the first cause 0y identifying its ultimate nature 2ith the di-ine person of Ai"s"nu/<#$= 0ut/ again/ the fact is asserted rather than argued/ and the appeal is aimed more at the imagination and emotions than at rationality" (t is only 2ith the de-elopment of the classical darBsanas in the last centuries B"," or the first centuries 3"D" that theism/ 2idespread as it had 0ecome religiously/ 0egan to recei-e philosophical Fustification" (f 2e take the term ;theism; in the 0road sense in 2hich ( am using it''comprising any theory that attri0utes the creation and8or ordering of the cosmos to one source/ 2hether personal or impersonal''then there are three darBsanas that can

0e said to 0e ;theistic;: Aedaanta/ :oga/ and )yaaya" *he Brahmaasuutras of Baadaraaya"na did not recei-e their most important ad-aita commentaries until 1au"dapaada and B@aLnkara/ 0oth of 2hom pro0a0ly postdate Dharmakiirti/<>K= 0ut the suutras themsel-es ha-e as one of their central concerns to esta0lish that 0rahman is the source and su0stance of the cosmos"<>#= Brahman is asserted to 0e that on 2hich the 2orld is dependent/<>>= the material cause of all p" 3#% effects"<>3= Baadaraaya"na's arguments rest primarily on scriptural statements that 2ould not carry much force for a Buddhist/ since the latter admits neither the -alidity of the Aedas nor the e7istence of an independent Bsa0dapramaa"na" *his Aedaantin disinclination to proffer inferentially 0ased arguments for its theistic 0eliefs is seen clearly in later commentators such as B@aLnkara/ 2ho denies that 0rahman's origination of the cosmos e-er can 0e esta0lished inferentially/ since 0rahman is impercepti0le and inferences must 0e perceptually 0ased/ <> = and RaamaanuFa/ 2ho refutes -arious rational arguments for theism so as to pa-e the 2ay for kno2ledge of 1od through scripture and de-otion"<>&= *he :ogasuutra of PataJnFali 4uite specifically asserts the e7istence of a ;supreme puru"sa/ ; iiBs-ara/ 2ho is unaffected 0y affliction/ action/ or fruition/ is omniscient/ the eternal teacher/ and the o0Fect of the sylla0le o"m/ and de-otion to 2hom is one 2ay to achie-e samaadhi"<>6= *he :oga tradition generally is more concerned 2ith psychological than philosophical matters/ and its literature is far from 0eing replete 2ith rational discussions of the e7istence or none7istence of iiBs-ara/ 0ut PataJnFali's fourth'century commentator/ Ayaasa/ does interpret the assertion that in iiBs-ara ;the seed of the omniscient is not e7ceeded; as meaning that iis-ara's kno2ledge and preeminence are kno2ledge and preeminence other than 2hich none greater can 0e concei-ed"<>G= (f different degrees of kno2ledge or preeminence 0e admitted/ then a supreme instance of these is not inconcei-a0le'' and that supreme instance is iiBs-ara" (t ought to 0e noted that the iiBs-ara of :oga is not a creator'1od like that of Aedaanta" :oga arises 2ithin the conte7t of

@aa"mkhya/ according to 2hich the cosmos is simply a transformation of insentient nature/ prak"rti/ from 2hich indi-idual puru"sas''and the supreme puru"sa''e-er are utterly separate" 9ying mid2ay conceptually 0et2een the immanent 0rahman of Aedaanta and the detached/ inacti-e supreme puru"sa of :oga is the iiBs-ara of )yaaya/ 2ho is neither the material cause of the cosmos <like 0rahman=/ nor utterly noncausal <like the supreme puru"sa= / 0ut/ rather/ the 2orld's shaper and arranger''its efficient cause/ as it 2ere" (t is )yaaya <or/ later/ )yaaya'AaiBse"sika= alone among (ndian philosophical schools that seriously proposed to offer proof of the e7istence and creati-e acti-ity of iiBs-ara" (ronically/ the passage in 1autama's )yaayasuutra that 0ecame the 0asis of later theological ela0oration<>%= is not unam0iguously theistic''a num0er of scholars 0elie-e that/ 4uite to the contrary/ its discussion of the relation 0et2een iiBs-ara and the results of human action is intended as a criticism of theism/ that is/ that if iiBs-ara is posited/ then human action is pointless"<>$= Be that as it may/ 0y the time of Aaatsyaayana's )yaa-a0haa"sya <fifth century<3K==/ the moot passage in 1autama is interpreted as a demonstration that iiBs-ara is the cause of all effects/ and that human action could not ha-e results 2ithout the action of iiBs-ara" Aaatsyaayana goes on to define iiBs-ara as 0elonging in general to the category <padaartha= of su0stance <dra-ya= / and in particular to the su0stance that is self <aatman=/ of 2hich it is a special instance/ po2erful/ meritorious/ 0ene-olent/ and in control of 0oth karman and the material elements"<3#= p" 3#$ PraBsatapaada <si7th century= ad-anced the discussion still further in his Padaarthadharmasa"mgraha 0y arguing that iiBs-ara is necessary as the conscious impeller of the unseen <ad"r"s"ta= force that regulates karman/ and as that 2hich impels atoms to mo-ement and com0ination at the end of the uni-erse's dormancy <pralaya="<3>= *he last important pre'Dharmakiirti )aiyaayika <although 0y no2 it is possi0le to speak of )yaaya'AaiBse"sika= 2as +ddyotakara/ 2ho pro0a0ly flourished in the period 0et2een Dignaaga and .

creation/. undou0tedly can 0e t2isted in such a 2ay that certain aspects of ?ahaayaana theory and practice fall under the term/ 0ut it is e4ually clear that theism in the sense in 2hich ( am using it''as the assertion of an omniscient/ permanent/ independent/ uni4ue cause of the cosmos''is reFected throughout the length and 0readth of the (ndian Buddhist tradition" Dharmakiirti's antitheistic arguments may ha-e taken the Buddhist criti4ue to a ne2 le-el of sophistication/ 0ut he had 0ehind him a millennium of refutations/ 2ith many of 2hich he undou0tedly 2as familiar/ and 2hich ought to 0e 0orne in mind 2hen 2e consider his discussion" .material.theism.Dharmakiirti <late si7th or early se-enth century=" (n his )yaaya-aarttika/ he goes 0eyond arguing for iiBs-ara on grounds peculiar to )yaaya'AaiBse"sika and seeks to esta0lish his e7istence on more general grounds" ((Bs-ara/ +ddyotakara asserts/ is the instrumental cause <nimittakaara"na= of things/ 0ecause he assists 0eings in reaping the fruits of their actions" iiBs-ara further is necessary as an adFunct to material results/ 0ecause all results must 0e preceded 0y conscious action/ as a hatchet re4uires a 2ielder in order to function/ or the flo2 of milk to a calf re4uires the co2's intention" Durther/ although ((Bs-ara is a permanent/ unaltering entity/ he can cause impermanent entities/ 0ecause 2e see that/ for e7ample/ spun yarn/ though unmo-ing/ is the cause of a mo-a0le garment" ((Bs-ara is not the creator of the eternal atoms that comprise the material 2orldC his . into a cosmos in response to the necessary fruition of the dharma and adharma of 0eings" Dinally/ iiBs-ara's po2er and consciousness are eternal/ omnipresent/ and unlimited/ for e-ents throughout the entire e7tent of space and time re4uire a conscious agent as their instrumental causeC since that cause/ iiBs-ara/ can effect all results/ his po2er is unlimited/ and since he is conscious effector of all results/ he must/ 0y definition/ 0e omniscient"<33= (((" PRE'D63R?35((R*( B+DD6(@* 3**3.5@ !) *6E(@? Beginning 2ith the great ele-enth'century defender of theism/ +dayana/<3 = any num0er of 6indu 2riters ha-e attempted to argue that Buddhism/ 2ith its 2orship of an omniscient tathaagata/ actually is crypto'theism" *he 2ord . therefore/ is neither e7 nihilo nor out of himself" Rather/ he fashions the pree7istent .

ont le tort de se repeter".pro0lem of e-il/. 0rahmaa for his ignorance regarding the sphere 2herein all elements cease/<3G= and skepticism regarding the claims of some 0rahmins to ha-e seen 0rahmaa face'to'face"<3%= Dor the later Buddhist philosophical tradition/ ho2e-er/ the most important early arguments are perhaps the implicit ones: those many passages in the )ikaayas 2here the concept of a permanent attaa or aatman is reFected/ principally on the grounds that no permanent entity is or can 0e encountered in e7perience or Fustified 0y reason" (t really is Buddhism's emphasis on uni-ersal impermanence that is at the root of its a-ersion to the concept of 1od/ as 0ecame e-ident in the sorts of refutations offered in the post'nikaaya period <2hen the attri0utes of the creator/ identified 0y the Buddhists as iiBs-ara/ perhaps had 0ecome more clearly defined=" Poussin remarks that Buddhist refutations of iiBs-ara .omnisicient. occurs at a num0er of places in the )ikaayas/<36= 2here it is claimed that the postulation of a 1od as creator of the cosmos and the regulator of karman undermines human moral responsi0ility/ 2hile at the same time -itiating claims that the 1od can 0e 0ene-olent/ since e-ils are his creation/ too" !ther e7plicit criti4ues include mockery of the .*he Paali )ikaayas contain a num0er of e7plicit reFections of theism/ and some important implicit ones/ as 2ell" (n the BrahmaFaalasutta/ one of the si7ty't2o -ie2s discussed 0y the Buddha is the claim that 0rahmaa is the creator of the p" 3>K cosmosC this claim is reFected on the grounds that it is 0ased on a mistaken inference: at the 0eginning of a 2orld cycle/ 0rahmaa' is the first 0eing to arise" 9onely/ he 2ishes for other 0eings as companions/ and they appear" 6e concludes that he has created them/ 0ut is mistaken/ for 0y the Buddhist e7planation the 0eings simply are arising due to their o2n karman''karman/ rather than the 2ill of a deity/ 0eing the true creati-e force in the cosmos"<3&= 3 second e7plicit reFection/ made on the grounds of theodicy/ or the .<3$= (t is true that certain points are stressed again and again/ 0ut the arguments do -aryC indeed/ their uniformity is more in style than su0stance: -irtually all are couched in .

atu"hsta-a argues that iiBs-ara must either originate from another p" 3># entity/ in 2hich case his uncreatedness is -iolated/ or 0e self'originated/ 2hich is impossi0le/ since an entity cannot at the same time 0e 0oth the agent and o0Fect of an action"< 3= *he Bodhicitta-i-ara"na notes that <a= if iiBs-ara is alleged to 0e permanent/ then he cannot create/ either simultaneously or gradually <since results are impermanent/ and so cannot ha-e a permanent cause=C <0= if he is said to 0e efficient/ then he must create the uni-erse unaided all at once <since efficiency re4uires the immediate generation of a result=C <c= if he re4uires assistance in creation/ then he is not truly eternal or efficientC and <d= if he is alleged to 0e an entity <0haa-a=/ then he cannot 0e permanent/ since entities are o0ser-ed to 0e impermanent"< = Dinally/ the Ai"s"norekakart"rt-a' niraakara"nam/ < &= 2hich is entirely de-oted to a . 2ithout 0eing specifically inferential" !ne of the earliest post'nikaaya reFections of iiBs' -ara is found in the Buddhacaarita of 3Bs-agho"sa <first'second century 3"D"=/ 2here at one place the rhetorical 4uestion is posed: (f iiBs-ara is the creator/ then 2hat point is there in human effortM< K= (n a second passage/ the Buddha is 4uoted as pointing out that if iiBs-ara/ the cause/ is perfect and unchanging/ then the cosmos that is his effect must 0e perfect and unchanging/ 2hich it manifestly is not" Durther/ if it 0e argued that iiBs-ara creates 2ith a purpose in mind/ then he has not achie-ed all purposes/ and his perfection is limitedC 2hereas if he creates 2ithout a purpose/ then he must 0e regarded as no more sensi0le than a madman or a child"< #= 3 num0er of 2orks attri0uted to )aagaarFuna''generally 0elie-ed to 0elong to the same period as 3Bs-agho"sa''reFect the concept of iiBs-ara" *he @uh"rllekha mentions in passing that iiBs-ara is nor to 0e accepted as the cause of the aggregates"< >= *he .logical/.the form of logical dilemmas/ in 2hich the predication of this or that attri0ute of iiBs-ara is sho2n to lead to unaccepta0le conclusions/ no matter ho2 it is 4ualified" Post'nikaaya/ pre'Dharmakiirti arguments are thus 0roadly .

than space"< G= Aasu0andhu's 30hidharmakoBsa and 30hidharmakoBsa' 0haa"sya reFect iiBs-ara at a num0er of places/ most e7tensi-ely in the Bha"sya to ((// 6 d/ 2hich asserts that the -arious dharmas do not arise from a uni4ue cause like iiBs-ara/ 0ecause dharmas are successi-e and iiBs-ara is not" 3mong the points made 0y Aasu0andhu in his dialogue 2ith a theist are that <a= if iiBs-ara is said to 2ill the successi-e generation of dharmas/ then he must ha-e multiple desiresC if he is single/ he must ha-e a single desire/ hence create dharmas all at onceC <0= if iiBs-ara re4uires assistance/ then he is not the uni4ue cause/ and his assistant causes 2ould re4uire further assistant causes/ in infinite regressC <c= if iiBs-ara 2ills the creation of some dharmas in the present and some later/ then he must 0e incapa0le of creating the later dharmas no2/ and if he cannot create them no2/ he cannot in the future/ since his nature does not changeC and <d= if the o0ser-ed causes of -arious effects are said to 0e au7iliaries to iiBs-ara's causation/ then it must 0e asked 2hether iiBs-ara can pre-ent the effects from arising''he cannot/ and therefore is 0oth impotent and irrele-ant/ for the o0ser-ed impermanent causes are perfectly ade4uate e7planations for effects"< %= Aasu0andhu also argues that since karmic results are multiple/ their cause cannot 0e single/< $= and that/ similarly/ suffering cannot 0e originated 0y a cause that is single/ .e7istence.refutation of iiBs-ara/ argues that <a= he cannot create the e7istent/ since it already e7ists/ nor the none7istent/ since it cannot come to 0eC and <0= he cannot 0e self'originated/ as that is a contradictory conceptC or other'originated/ for that 2ould entail an infinite regress of creators/ e-en one of 2hom e7ist 0efore iiBs-ara/ there0y -itiating his status as creator"< 6= 3rguments against the concept of iiBs-ara also are found in the 330hidharmika literature of succeeding centuries" *he great compendium of @ar-aasti-aadin thought/ the ?ahaa-i0haa"sa/ notes that <a= if iiBs-ara is the cause of e-erything/ then he must create e-erything at once <since efficiency implies immediate causation=C <0= if he re4uires help/ then he is not the sole causeC <c= if he is undifferentiated and eternal/ so must his effects 0e <since effect must resem0le cause=C and <d= since effects are kno2n to 0e impermanent/ their alleged permanent cause/ iiBs-ara/ has no more .

is reFected as unpro-ed <asiddha= 0ecause of the a0sence of any corro0orati-e e7ample of such an entity" Dinally/ the syllogism/ .<*he eye and so forth ha-e= iiBs-ara <as a maker preceding .nonsuccessi-e/ or guided 0y intelligence"<&K= 3mong ?ahaayaana 330hidharmika te7ts that include refutations of iiBs-ara/ 2e p" 3>> 2ill mention only the :ogaacaara0huumi of 3saLnga/ 2hich argues that <a= if iiBs-ara has a reason for creation/ then that reason is the real cause/ 2hereas if he has none/ then he cannot 0e moti-ated to 0ecome a causeC <0= if iiBs-ara is immanent in the cosmos/ then he cannot stand outside as its creator/ 2hereas if he is not immanent in it/ then he has no relation to it/ and so cannot create itC <c= if iiBs-ara creates intending some purpose/ then it must 0e admitted that there is a purpose he has not yet fulfilledC and <d= if creation depends on iiBs-ara's 2ill alone/ then e-erything must arise simultaneously/ 2hile if it depends on an iiBs-ara 2ho is assisted/ then he is not the uni4ue cause"<&#= !ne final pre'Dharmakiirti te7t 2orthy of 0rief mention is the *arkaF-aalaa of Bhaa-a-i-eka/ or Bha-ya <si7th century= / 2hose discussion of iiBs-ara<&>= sho2s at least a rudimentary a2areness of attempts to pro-e iiBs-ara inferentially and of the pitfalls entailed 0y those attempts" Bhaa-a-i-eka recites a num0er of the standard refutations/ noting that the multiple e-ents 2e o0ser-e in the 2orld cannot 0e asserted to arise from a uni4ue cause/ 0ut rather must 0e e7plained as proceeding from a multiplicity of karmic conditions/ and that iiBs-ara cannot 0e held to 0e any more real than a sky'flo2er or a 0arren 2oman's son" 6e does note that one possi0le argument for iiBs-ara is the syllogism/ .*he eye and so forth e7ist as accompanied <that is/ caused= 0y a maker/ 0ecause they are arranged like a pot". *o this Bhaa-a-i-eka's response is that the syllogism is in-alid 0ecause it pro-es 2hat is already pro-en for the Buddhist/ namely/ that e-ents ha-e causes''for the Buddhist/ ho2e-er/ the causes are multiple <karman/ the elements/ parents/ and so forth=/ not a single arranger" 3 second syllogism/ namely/ .((Bs-ara is the maker of the eye and so forth 0ecause he is permanent/ uni4ue and unproduced/ .

is reFected on the grounds that a potter is <a= em0odied and <0= impermanent/ neither of 2hich is applica0le to iiBs-ara"<&3= (A" D63R?35((R*('@ .them= 0ecause <they are shaped=/ Fust as a pot has a potter as its maker/.!)*EO* 3s noted in the introduction/ Dharmakiirti's refutation of theism is found in the Pramaa"nasiddhi chapter of his Pramaa"na-aarttika" *he Pramaa"na-aarttika is loosely constructed as a commentary on Dignaaga's Pramaa"nasamuccaya/ and the Pramaa"nasiddhi chapter'' regarded as the first 0y modern editors and the second 0y the *i0etan tradition<& =''is itself an ela0orate gloss on Fust one -erse of the Pramaa"nasamuccaya/ the first/ 2herein Dignaaga salutes the Buddha as !ne Who 6as Become 3uthoritati-e <pramaa"na0huuta=/ !ne Who Desires to Benefit the World <Fagaddhitai"sin=/ the *eacher <Bsaast"r=/ the @ugata/ and the @a-ior <taayin=" *he 0asic purpose of the Pramaa"nasiddhi chapter is to demonstrate the Buddha's authoritati-eness for those 2ho desire spiritual li0eration/ through demonstrating that it is reasona0le to regard him as the Bene-olent !ne/ the *eacher/ the @ugata/ and the @a-ior"<&&= *hese/ in turn/ are pro-en through a series of e7tended philosophical p" 3>3 arguments/ the most important of 2hich re-ol-e around <a= defining authoritati-eness and gi-ing negati-e and positi-e e7amples of 0eings 2ho em0ody it/ <0= pro-ing that positi-e mental 4ualities such as 0ene-olence can 0e de-eloped infinitely/ through demonstrating that the mind'0ody relation is an interactionist dualism that permits the e7istence of past and future li-es/ and <c= sho2ing that the Dour )o0le *ruths taught 0y the Buddha are in fact true/ and/ especially/ that acceptance or reFection of a self <aatman= is the key to sa"msaara and nir-aa"na" 3s the nineteenth'century *i0etan commentator ?i pham notes/ the proof of past and future li-es pa-es the 2ay for pro-ing that the Buddha has the causes for 0eing regarded as authoritati-e/ 2hile the proof that the Dour )o0le *ruths are true sho2s us the reason 2hy he is authoritati-e"<&6= (t is in the first general di-ision of the chapter/ that 2hich defines and e7emplifies authoritati-eness/ .R(*(N+E !D *6E(@?: .

annot 0e accepted as generated from a permanent <cause=C <3nd 0ecause= it is unsuita0le that <a permanent cause= depend on conditions"<6K= p" 3> .an one then posit the authoritati-eness of a 0eing 2hose nature is permanent <nitya=M <%'$a:= *here is no permanent authoritati-e <0eing=/ Because authoritati-eness cogni.es <functioning= entitiesC Because/ since o0Fects of kno2ledge are impermanent/ *hat <2hich cogni.*(!) !D (B@A3R3'@ 3+*6!R(*3*(AE)E@@ Dharmakiirti already has esta0lished <in -erses 30' 0= that authoritati-eness is cogniti-e <dhii=/ an act of consciousness" . for his definition of authoritati-eness" *his/ of course/ is iiBs-ara/ 2hose authoritati-eness/ creatorship/ and e7istence are reFected in -erses %'>%" *he argument can 0e 0roken do2n into three general sections: <#= -erses %'$ reFect iiBs-ara's authoritati-enessC <>= -erses #K'>K are a refutation of a theistic syllogism purporting to pro-e that 2orldly effects must ha-e a conscious cause/ and that cause is iiBs-araC and <3= -erses >#'>% 4uestion the possi0ility that iiBs-ara could 0e a causal agent/ through a comparison 0et2een the characteristics attri0uted to iiBs-ara and the reality of the causal process" We 2ill consider each of these arguments in turn/ relying primarily upon Dharmakiirti's o2n 2ords" Where necessary/ 2e 2ill turn for interpreti-e help to one of the greatest of *i0etan Pramaa"na-aarttika commentators/ r1yal tsha0 dar ma rin chen <#36 '# 3>=/ <&%= and/ on occasion/ to Dharmakiirti's o2n disciple/ De-endra0uddhi <or 'mati="<&$= A" D63R?35((R*('@ REJE.that the reFection of iiBs-ara is to 0e found" 3fter defining pramaa"na <authoritati-eness= in the first si7 -erses<&G= as uncontradicted/ fresh cognition/ Dharmakiirti asserts in -erse G that the Buddha fulfills this definition" Before demonstrating generally <as he 2ill in -erses >$'33= that the Buddha is authoritati-e 0ecause he kno2s 2hat is to 0e reFected and 2hat accepted <heyopadeya= 0y those intent on li0eration/ Dharmakiirti pro-ides a .es them= is unsta0leC Because that 2hich is generated consecuti-ely .nonaccordant e7ample.

only is predicated of efficient <arthakriya= entities/ and efficiency only can 0e .es are the functioning entities <-astu= that are 2hat is .e all entities only could cogni.)ote that the e7plicit o0Fect of refutation here is simply a permanent authoritati-e cognition/ 2hich could define not only iiBs-ara/ 0ut such other non'Buddhist concepts as aatman/ puru"sa/ and so forth" (n fact/ the term iiBs-ara does not appear until -erse >%" @till/ iiBs-ara is pro0a0ly the primary o0Fect of refutation throughout this discussion/ for <a= iiBs-ara is the only .permanent authority. in the 2orld" Dunctioning entities are kno2n to 0e impermanent/ that is/ to e7ist only momentarily" 3ny entity/ therefore/ actually is a succession of momentary e-ents/ each follo2ing the other 2ith inconcei-a0le rapidity/ and constituting a .real. only insofar as there is a certain similarity from one moment to the ne7t" @ince it is o0Fects that <con-entionally/ at least= generate cognitions/ a cognition of an o0Fect only can arise 2here an o0Fect e7ists" (f an o0Fect e7ists only for a moment/ its cognition must 0e similarly momentary/ generated successi-ely" (ndeed/ a permanent authority said to cogni.e them simultaneously/ for it does not change from one moment to the ne7t" *his 2ould mean that all o0Fects in fact e7ist simultaneously/ 2hich manifestly is not so" (f it is maintained that iiBs-ara himself remains permanent/ 0ut that his cognitions are impermanent in accordance 2ith the succession of o0Fects/ then at least t2o conse4uences ensue: <a= iiBs-ara is 0eing 4ualified 2ith contradictory properties <permanence and impermanence= and <0= he is 0eing accepted as dependent on conditions <the succession of o0Fects=/ 2hich a permanent 0eing cannot 0e"<6#= (t ought to 0e noted/ 0efore 2e continue/ that Dha' makiirti's argument here presupposes the -alidity of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness/ 2here0y .thing. mentioned any2here in the -erses/ <0= iiBs-ara is clearly indicated as the o0Fect of refutation 0y Dharmakiirti's commentators/ and <c= iiBs-ara had 0een singled out 0y pre'Dharmakiirti )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas as a permanent 0eing 2ho 2as the creator of all effects/ hence/ 0y definition/ authoritati-e regarding all effects <omnisicient=" *aking iiBs-ara as the permanent authoritati-e 0eing 2ho is 0eing reFected/ then/ 2e see that Dharmakiirti's argument is as follo2s" *hat 2hich any authoritati-e cognition cogni.e7istence.

er= has not 0een helped in any 2ay.ers must 0e impermanent=/ for iiBs-ara is said to 0e self'sufficient and eternally li0erated/ 2hile 2hat is impermanent may or may not e7ist/ may suffer or 0e li0erated/ in accordance 2ith helping or hindering conditions" *hus/ e-en if iiBs-ara is defined as impermanent/ other characteristics attri0uted to him -itiate that definition"<66= 3s r1yal tsha0 rightly notes/ De-endra0uddhi takes the line in 4uestion as further proof that a permanent authoritati-e cognition is impossi0leC indeed/ he takes it as the reason 2hy a permanent cogni. is intended as a proof that iiBs-ara cannot 0e impermanent <hence a cogni.Because <a permanent cogni.er is a contradictory concept/ Dharmakiirti goes on to reFect the notion that iiBs-ara could 0e regarded as impermanent: <$0:= Because <a permanent cogni.er/ since cogni.er cannot depend on conditions/ that is/ 0ecause he cannot 0e helped in any 2ay <0eing/ 0y definition/ .er=has not 0een helped in any 2ay/ *here cannot 0e an impermanent authoritati-e <0eing=" <6 = 3ccording to r1yal tsha0/ 2ho follo2s PraFJnaakaragupta here/ <6&= .predicated of momentary entities''since an entity that is not inherently and instantly destructi0le cannot 0e destroyed/ hence is immuta0le/ and 2hat is immuta0le cannot interact 2ith 2hat is successi-e/ as entities manifestly are" Buddhist arguments for momentariness 2ere highly contro-ersial/<6>= 0eing open to criticism for <a= -itiating causality 0y denying continuity and <0= 0egging the 4uestion 0y defining e7istence in such a 2ay <as a particular type of efficacity= that only momentary entities could fulfill the definition" (t is not my intention to enter into these fundamental arguments here/ 0ut simply to point out that the de0ate 0et2een Dharmakiirti and his opponents is not necessarily self'contained/ 0ut constantly opens out onto the 0roader metaphysical issues di-iding them <and these issues/ in turn/ are ine7trica0ly intert2ined 2ith 4uestions of the religious psychologies of different traditions<63= =" p" 3>& *o continue/ ha-ing sho2n that a permanent authori' tati-e cogni.

stands alone/ as a simple assertion that a 0eing defined as permanent simply cannot 0e impermanent''although impermanence is the nature of o0Fects/ and so of cognitions/ too" A(" D63R?35((R*('@ RED+*3*(!) !D 3 *6E(@*(.ommentarial glosses on Dharmakiirti's presentation of the theistic syllogism make it clear that/ in fact/ three different reasons are 0eing offered as pro0ati-e of p" 3>6 a creator" r1yal tsha0/ thus/ restates the syllogism more fully as follo2s: .permanent and self'sufficient="<6G= (f iiBs-ara's not 0eing helped is taken in this 2ay/ as further proof that he cannot 0e a permanent cogni.er/ then the line/ . @:99!1(@? Dharmakiirti ne7t addresses himself to a specific formal inference that is alleged to pro-e the e7istence of a creator" Dirst/ he sets out the syllogism: <#Ka:= <Because of= intermittence/ particular shape/ Efficiency/ etc"/ <a creator e7ists="<6%= *he unnamed opponent here may 0e the )yaaya'AaiBse"sika/ for/ to our kno2ledge/ of all the 6indu theistic schools/ only the )yaaya'AaiBse"sika had/ 0y Dharmakiirti's time/ sought to Fustify the creatorship of iiBs-ara through formal inference" Durthermore/ the syllogism here phrased in rather skeletal form 0y Dharmakiirti 0ears a close similarity to the arguments proffered 0y +ddyotakara/ 2ho insisted that 2orldly results re4uired a conscious moti-ator/ like a hatchet/ 2hose fashioning and use 0oth point to the inter-ention of a conscious agent"<6$= *he syllogism also recalls Bhaa-a-i-eka's unnamed opponent/ 2ho argued that all results re4uire a creator 0ecause they ha-e a specific arrangement/ like a pot/ 2hose arrangement informs us of the e7istence of a potter"<GK= .Worldly en-irons/ 0odies and enFoyments are preceded 0y the mind of a maker/ <a= 0ecause they act intermittently/ like a hatchet/ <0= 0ecause they ha-e a particular shape/ like a pot and <c= 0ecause they .*here cannot 0e an impermanent authoritati-e <0eing=/.

and this general concomitance 2ill 0e accepted 0y the Buddhist/ too/ since/ according to the Buddhist/ en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments are preceded 0y mental karman/ hence 0y .en-irons/ 0odies and enFoyments are preceded 0y the mind of a maker/.the mind of a maker". Drom these and other such statements/ it is pro-en that <a0odes/ 0odies and possessions= ha-e a maker 2hose mind has preceded them/ and also that that <maker= is iiBs-ara"<G#= *he argument from intermittence makes the claim that 0ecause entities sometimes function and sometimes do not/ their e7istence must 0e due to action 0y a conscious agent" *he argument from particular shape makes the claim that/ 4uite simply/ design implies a designer/ and there is a design to entities/ so there must 0e a designer" *he argument from efficiency makes the claim that the o0ser-ed efficiency of entities re4uires that they 0e preceded 0y an efficient maker 2ho foresa2 the purposes they could fulfill" Dharmakiirti does not turn to the arguments from intermittence and efficiency until later in his discussion/ 2here he 2ill reFect them as part of his refutation of the causal agency attri0uted to iiBs-ara" 6e 2ill address himself first and in most detail to the argument from particular shape" Dharmakiirti's first mo-e in refuting the syllogism/ ho2e-er/ is to state generally the pro0lems it entails: <#K0:= <6ere/= either <a= the assertion is already pro-en/ or <0= the e7ample is uncertain/ !r <c= the statement issues in dou0t"<G>= 3ccording to r1yal tsha0/ <a= the assertion is already pro-en 0ecause the syllogism simply states that . !ne of the re4uisites for posing a formal inference is that it seek to pro-e something not pro-en 0efore/ so the theistic syllogism is/ in its general form/ redundant" Durthermore/ if iiBs-ara in particular is posited as the conscious creator/ then <0= the e7ample is uncertain/ 0ecause all three e7amples''the hatchet/ the pot/ and the 0attle'a7e''are impermanent entities/ 2hich must/ therefore/ 0e made or employed 0y impermanent 0eings/ 2hereas the entity to 2hose e7istence they are supposed to point/ iiBs-ara/ is permanent" *he e7amples/ thus/ may 0e pro0ati-e of impermanent causes/ 0ut not of a permanent one" .are efficient <in fulfilling 0eings' aims=/ like a 0attle'a7e".

@haped as a pot is.= " Dirst of all/ it is perfectly self'e-ident that en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments do not ha-e the same shape as a pot <or a mansion=/ and so 2e cannot necessarily infer that they ha-e a maker in the same 2ay that a pot does/ for it is entirely possi0le that different particular types of shapes may ha-e different particular types of causes generating them" (ndeed/ a Buddhist 2ill argue that such things as en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments actually ha-e preceding them a multiplicity of mental karmans/ not a single creator'designer" @econdly/ the mere fact that a particular shape/ a pot/ arises from a single conscious designer does not mean that different shapes or different types of shapes need .Dinally/ <c= the statement issues in dou0t/ 0ecause e-en if en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments are preceded 0y a maker/ there is no guarantee that that maker is iiBs-ara/ for iiBs-ara is simply one possi0le e7planation for the 2ay things are''and not a -ery promising one/ gi-en that/ for e7ample/ the entities 2hose e7planation is sought are impermanent and intermittent/ 2hile iiBs-ara is permanent/ and so cannot 0e intermittent"<G3= Dharmakiirti no2 turns to an analysis of the argument from particular shape/ p" 3>G that is/ that en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments ha-e preceding them the mind of a maker<iiBs-ara=/ 0ecause they ha-e particular shape/ like a pot/ or a mansion: <##:= <(f= shape/ etc"/ are pro-ed such as to 0e Positi-ely and negati-ely related to a designer/ 3n inference from that <shape to that designer= (s reasona0le"<G = ?uch of the force of this statement is deri-ed 0y implication" 3ccording to r1yal tsha0/ the main point is this: if/ and only if/ en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments are shaped Fust as a pot is/ can 2e infer that they are preceded 0y a single conscious designer/ as a pot is" .en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments. can ha-e t2o different meanings here: the arrangement of the material of the pot/ and the process 2here0y that arrangement 2as achie-ed" By either interpretation/ .particular shape is found to 0e a reason that is unpro-en in the su0Fect <.

in general <rather than the particular shape of/ for e7ample/ a pot= as pro0ati-e/ he has pro-ided a reason that is too general/ and thus unpro-en in the su0Fect" 1ranted/ 2e legitimately apply the term .grey su0stance. alone is too general to 0e the 0asis of .part' icular shape. <of 2hich smoke is only one type= is too general to 0e the 0asis of a legitimate inference of the presence of fire in a particular place/ so the term .shaped. applies necessarily must ha-e a similar designer/ for the sources of the shapes of differing shaped o0Fects may -ery 2ell differ" *hus/ Fust as the term .shape in general/.necessarily arise in the same 2ayC again/ the Buddhist 2ill posit mental karmans as the cause and 2ill claim that/ although consciousness may 0e in-ol-ed in producing karmic effects/ conscious design is not" *hus/ unless the theist 2ants to claim/ a0surdly/ that all entities are shaped Fust as a pot is/ he cannot make inferences a0out them that are 0ased on the particular circumstances of the pot"<G&= Dharmakiirti turns no2 from an e7amination of .shape. to en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments/ 0ut 2hereas 2e are a0le to infer that a pot or a mansion has preceding it the mind of some person/ 0ecause 2e ha-e o0ser-ed positi-e and negati-e concomitance p" 3>% 0et2een these o0Fects and a maker/ 2e ha-e not o0ser-ed such concomitance in the case of/ for e7ample/ the particular realms into 2hich 2e are 0orn/ the 0odies 2e ha-e/ and the en-ironment that 2e share/ 2ith its mountains/ seas/ and forests" *hus/ a particular designer is pro-en in the cases of some particular shapes/ 0ut one cannot generali. to .e from this that any o0Fect to 2hich the 2ord .shape.shaped.annot reasona0ly 0e inferredC <*hat 2ould 0e= like <inferring= fire from a grey su0stance"<G6= 6ere/ the theist's pro0lem is that if he tries to claim the term . to see 2hether it may 0e pro0ati-e: <#>:= <3 4uality= is pro-en in an entity 0y a particular <reason=/ <But that= a term similar <to the reason is pro0ati-e= 0ecause of its <alleged= nondifference <from the reason= .

shape/.e4ual results. has no pro0ati-e -alue for the theistic syllogism" (ndeed/ if anything/ the anthill is a counter'e7ample to the pot/ since it is an instance of a shaped o0Fect/ yet it is one that 2e kno2 0y o0ser-ation to 0e positi-ely and negati-ely concomitant 2ith causes that are <a= multiple rather than single and <0= -ery possi0ly unconscious rather than conscious"<G$= (n short/ then/ the term . the particular aspects of shape analy.shape.shape. cannot 0e pro0ati-e/ 0ecause specific in4uiries into its meaning and rele-ance sho2 that a particular shape <for e7ample/ a pot= cannot 0e pro0ati-e 0ecause not all o0Fects ha-e that particular shape/ 2hile shape in general cannot 0e pro0ati-e 0ecause different shapes may arise under different circumstances/ as an anthill arises in a different manner from a pot" (n the ne7t si7 -erses <num0ers # '>K= Dharmakiirti digresses in a direction that is more of logical than theological interest/ and ( 2ill pass o-er this discussion relati-ely 4uickly" 3gainst an opponent's suggestion that the analysis to 2hich he has su0Fected the reason in the theistic syllogism is an instance of kaaryasama/ an o-erly specific refutation that can re0ound upon or ha-e .ed in the t2o preceding -erses" Dirst/ an anthill''at least of the (ndian -ariety''has the same shape as a pot" We ought/ therefore/ to conclude on the 0asis of this similarity that it 2as made 0y a potter/ 2hereas 2e kno2 4uite 2ell that it 2as made 0y ants" *hus/ a similarity in shape does not imply a necessary similarity in origin" @econd/ e-en if an anthill 2ere nor shaped like a pot/ the general fact that it is . 0y pointing out that: <#3:= (f that is not the case/ then a potter ?ay 0e pro-en to ha-e made an ant'hill/ Because it has some <similarity= to the shape !f clay in a pot/ etc"<G%= *he e7ample is an interesting one/ 0ecause it can 0e read as refuting the pro0ati-e -alue of either a particular shape or the general term . for the .shaped.a legitimate inference that all shaped o0Fects must arise in the same 2ay that some shaped o0Fects do"<GG= Dharmakiirti dra2s out the e7treme conse4uences entailed 0y the pro0ati-e -alue of .

.Buddhi is nonsentient/ 0ecause it is impermanent/.shape".refuter/ Dharmakiirti points out that kaaryasama occurs only 2hen a legitimate general reason is illegitimately undermined 0y an o-erly specific p" 3>$ analysis of its details/<%K= as 2hen the generally -alid inference .<%3= Dharmakiirti dri-es home the conse4uences of the theistic syllogism 0y pointing out that if 2ords alone 2ere pro0ati-e/ then simply 0y uttering a 2ord one ought to attain its o0Fect/ and all goals 2ould 0e achie-ed/ and all syllogisms pro-ed/ simply through the manipulation of 2ords''2hich/ in fact/ arise not from the e7istence of their referents/ 0ut simply from a speaker's or 2riter's desire to e7press them"<% = *his same type of refutation/ Dharmakiirti adds/ can 0e applied to the syllogisms of other schools" Dor instance/ the @aa"mkhya assertion/ .= are used improperly/ and so the syllogism is -itiated" (n the ne7t three -erses <and a supplemental -erse . is refuted on the grounds that the @aa"mkhya is using a reason/ impermanence/ that he himself cannot really accept/ since impermanence only is admitted of momentary entities/ 2hich 0uddhi and the other e-olutes of prak"rti are not" *he Jaina assertion/ . is undermined 0y posing a sophistic dilemma 2here0y a sound cannot arise 0efore the effort or as a result of a ne2/ unprecedented effort"<%#= *he refutation of the theistic reason/ on the other hand/ has rested on the principle that a reason may 0e pro0ati-e of a predicate for a particular class of o0Fects/ 0ut that a term le7ically similar 0ut semantically different from that reason cannot thus 0e pro0ati-eC one cannot/ for instance/ maintain that 2ords ha-e horns simply 0ecause there e7ists a term/ got-a/ that denotes 0oth . is refuted on the grounds that the definition of death 0eing applied 0y the Jaina is too 0road to 0e admissi0le 0y his opponents/ and thus cannot 0e adduced"<%&= (n 0oth cases/ 2ords <.death.2ordness.<%>=''any more than one can maintain that en-irons/ 0odies/ and enFoyments are preceded 0y the mind of a creator/ iiBs-ara/ simply 0ecause they ha-e . and .impermanence/.co2ness.3 conch'sound is a result/ 0ecause it arises from effort.3 tree is sentient/ 0ecause it dies 2hen its 0ark is stripped/.

or <0= .3toms are impermanent 0ecause they ha-e aspects <muurti=. 0ut can supply from his o2n system a term 2ith e4ui-alent meaning/ . that are not elephants"<%$= By the same token/ there are shapes that presuppose a single/ conscious shaper/ 0ut there are shapes that may not" 6ence/ the theistic syllogism is in-alid" A((" D63R?35((R*('@ REJE.on-ersely/ e-en if a 2ord is unmistaken/ if the meaning is inappropriate/ then the term cannot 0e pro0ati-e/ for entities are pro-en from other entities/ not from Words"<%%= *he *i0etan -ersion here adds an e7ample illustrating this last point: one cannot argue that either <a= . for in each instance the reason is merely an e7pression used collo4uially to refer to the predicate/ a co2 or an elephantC in fact/ there are .ha-e aspects/.sound is impermanent 0ecause it is a product. 2ill 0e accepted for discussion 0y a AaiBse"sika/ 2ho does not admit the 2ording of the reason .3 0a0y elephant is an elephant 0ecause it is an Bhand'possessor' <hastin='/.*(!) !D ((B@A3R3 3@ . that are not co2s and .3 colored co2 is a co2 0ecause it is a Bgoer p" 33K <Fagat='/.goers. cannot 0e refuted 0y attempting to sho2 that sound's relationship to space is unaccounted for"<%6= Durther/ e-en if a particular term is unpro-en/ if the meaning of the term is pro-en then the syllogism is -alid/ as/ for instance/ the Buddhist syllogism .is tangi0le".found in *i0etan 0ut not @anskrit=/ Dharmakiirti goes on to dra2 from these considerations some general conclusions a0out logical reasons" (n the first place/ the -alidity of a reason depends on 2hether it is generally rele-ant to the su0Fect and positi-ely and negati-ely concomitant 2ith the predicate" (f the reason is generally correct/ then it cannot 0e undermined 0y o-erly specific criti4ues/ as/ for instance/ the fact that .3+@39 31E)* (n the final eight -erses of his discussion/ Dharmakiirti directly attacks the idea that iiBs-ara can 0e considered a causal entity/ e7posing the logical difficulties in-ol-ed in the theistic 0elief in a permanent creator'1od" (n the course of his analysis/ he refutes the t2o other reasons that formed part of the theistic syllogism/ that is/ the argument from intermittence and the argument from efficiency" 6e does not refute them in as much detail .hand'possessors.<%G= .

as he did the argument from specific shape/ 0ut they are central to his concerns" We 2ill signal those passages in 2hich they are addressed/ since the refutation of the arguments from intermittence and efficiency 2ill complete the refutation of the theistic syllogism posed in -erse #K" Dharmakiirti first attempts to sho2 that the argument from intermittence entails a logical contradiction: <>#:= 6o2/ if an entity is a cause/ <But is said= sometimes to 0e 3 non'cause/ can one assert in any 2ay *hat a cause is a non'causeM !ne cannot so assert"<$K= *he argument from intermittence states that the fact that entities sometimes arise and sometimes do not/ that is/ are occasional or intermittent in nature/ re4uires the postulation of a conscious 0eing that ser-es as their cause at those times 2hen they arise/ and that that 0eing is iiBs-ara" Dharmakiirti points out/ ho2e-er/ that a 0eing that ser-es as the cause of intermittent entities must/ 0y definition/ 0e a noncause/ too/ since <a= an intermittent entity has times of nonproduction/ 2hen its e-entual cause is actually its noncause/ and <0= at the time 2hen the cause is generating the intermittent entity/ there still are other intermittent entities that it is not generating/ so it ser-es as the noncause of some entities at the same time as it ser-es as the cause of others" <a= @uccessi-e causality and noncausality poses a pro0lem 0ecause the causal entity posited 0y the theist/ iiBs-ara/ is permanent" 6e cannot/ therefore/ change from moment to moment/ and if he is asserted to 0e causal/ then he must al2ays 0e causal/ and can ne-er 0ecome noncausal/ for that 2ould entail a change in nature/ an impossi0ility for a permanent entity" <0= @imultaneous causality and noncausality poses a pro0lem/ 0ecause iiBs-ara is a single entity/ yet is 0eing furnished 2ith contradictory 4ualities at one and the same time" .ontradictory properties cannot 0e predicated of a single/ partless p" 33# entity at one and the same time/ and if these properties are reaffirmed/ then iiBs-ara cannot 0e single/ 0ut must 0e multiple"<$#= ((Bs-ara cannot/ thus/ 0e a creator of intermittent entities"<$>= .

homeopathic magic".Dharmakiirti ne7t turns to a series of pro0lems that re-ol-e around the theistic contention that iiBs-ara is the actual empo2ering cause that gi-es to the causes 2e o0ser-e the a0ility''or efficiency''2here0y they yield their results" *he first dilemma entailed 0y this is that: <>>:= <(f iiBs-ara is an unseen cause/ then= 2hen .<$ = (f 2e are to posit a further unseen cause 0ehind the o0ser-ed causes/ then 2hy not claim that an unseen/ irrele-ant post 0e in-ol-ed in the processM<$&= !ne in-isi0le entity/ Dharmakiirti implies/ is really no more a0surd than another/ and the postulation of any such entity tends to make a mockery of our attempts to understand causality/ for the implication is that anything may 0e posited as the cause of any result" Dharmakiirti presses the attack/ pointing out further pro0lems in the concept of iiBs-ara: <>3:= !ne 2hose nature does not -ary (s unsuita0le as a creatorC @ince a permanent <entity= ne-er is a0sent/ E-en if it has the a0ility <to 0e a cause=/ it is difficult to see"<$6= *he first half of the -erse is/ in a sense/ a reiteration of a fundamental and recurring argument/ namely/ that a permanent entity cannot 0e posited as the cause of impermanent entities/ since <a= the entity is asserted sometimes to 0e a noncause/ and its nature cannot change/ so it cannot 0ecome a causeC<$G=<0= causality is a process that in-ol-es intermittence/ and a permanent entity cannot 0e intermittent/ since intermittence in-ol-es a change in natureC and <c= if a permanent cause is posited/ .ed/ 0e the cause <of healing=M<$3= Dharmakiirti's attack here is directed at the postulation of an e7tra causal entity in situations 2here 2e already can pro-ide an ade4uate account of the causal process" Dor instance/ it is to Dharmakiirti a 2ell'attested fact that a knife 2ound can 0e healed 0y medicine or 0y the knife itself/ the latter 0eing an instance of 2hat )agatomi calls .aitra is healed By connection 2ith a 2eapon or medicine/ Why could not an unconnected post/ 3lthough not cogni.

cause <2hether principal or assistant= must 0e either redundant or impotent"<$%= *here is a further conse4uence of the postulation of an in-isi0le cause'0ehind'the'scenes/ namely: <> := When some <cause= e7ists/ some <result= comes to 0eC (f some cause other than that (s supposed/ then there 2ill 0e no end *o the causes of any result"<$$= r1yal tsha0 sums up this point succinctly 0y remarking that: *here 2ould follo2 an infinite regress of causes for e-ery result/ 0ecause then it 2ould 0e accepta0le to think that 2hen some cause assists a result/ the cause of the result is something else/ 2hich 2e do not see as 0eing a0le to generate some result"<#KK= !nce again/ then/ the postulation of an unseen cause desta0ili.0ehind'the'scenes.then causality cannot 0e an intermittent process/ 0ut must occur all at once/ since a permanent cause could not alter so as to produce entities in a second moment" *he second half of the -erse raises still another 0asic o0Fection/ namely/ that if iiBs-ara is the unseen cause of e-ery result/ then he must 0e u0i4uitous and can ne-er 0e a0sent" 3 cause/ ho2e-er/ is defined as that in the a0sence of 2hich a result does not arise/ so an entity that ne-er is a0sent cannot meaningfully 0e descri0ed as a cause" (ndeed/ 2hether iiBs-ara is only intermit' p" 33> tently present <as argued earlier= or u0i4uitous <as his nature 2ould seem to dictate= seems to ha-e little actual 0earing on our analyses of causality/ 2hich/ in fact/ turn on the presence or a0sence of certain o0ser-a0le factors" !ne may/ if one 2ishes/ posit an e7tra entity such as iiBs-ara as the cause 0ehind o0ser-a0le causes/ 0ut positi-e and negati-e concomitance can only 0e o0ser-ed 2ith regard to the o0ser-ed causes" @ince o0ser-ed positi-e and negati-e concomitance is an ade4uate 0asis for the e7plication of any causal situation/ the e7tra .es our notion of causality/ for the admission of unseen and unseea0le causes opens the door to an infinity of such causes/ 2hich is .

1od of the gaps. <#K#= (n other 2ords/ if entities cannot change their nature from that of noncause to cause/ then soil/ moisture/ sunlight/ and the seed itself/ 2hich are p" 333 not at this moment generating a sprout/ 2ill ne-er 0e a0le to" Dharmakiirti's response is that: <>&:= (n the generation of a sprout/ the soil and other <conditions= Do change their nature 3nd 0ecome causes/ for 2hen 2e see that <culti-ation= (s done 2ell/ <the har-est= is e7cellent"<#K>= *he implicit point here is that it is only a permanent entity/ such as iiBs-ara/ that cannot 0ecome a cause once it has 0een a noncauseC such causal conditions as soil/ moisture/ sunlight/ and the seed are all impermanent/ momentary entities/ so there is no contradiction in asserting that at one moment they are noncauses and at another moment they .tantamount to causal chaos" 6ere/ it ought perhaps to 0e added in all fairness that the Buddhist notion of karman can 0e su0Fected to the same general criti4ue as iiBs-ara" 5arman is certainly neither permanent nor u0i4uitous in the 2ay that iiBs-ara is/ 0ut it is an unseen causal factor that is operati-e in -irtually e-ery situation in 2hich sentient 0eings are in-ol-ed" (n those instances 2here other causes can 0e adduced/ karman is superfluous/ unless 2e insist that there 0e a moral e7planation for e-erythingC 2hile in those instances 2here 2e do not ha-e ade4uate e7planations/ karman ser-es some2hat the 2ay the .""" according to you/ 2hen soil/ etc"/ do not generate a sprout/ they cannot change their nature/ so there 2ill 0e no generation of a sprout". does in Western theology/ that is/ as a stop'gap e7planation 2here o0ser-a0le concomitances ha-e not yet 0een esta0lished" 5arman/ like iiBs-ara/ e7plains so much that it threatens to e7plain nothing at all" (n the final four -erses of the section/ Dharmakiirti responds to some possi0le o0Fections to his arguments/ there0y clarifying his notion of the causal process and iiBs-ara's unsuita0ility for participation in it" *he first o0Fection/ as supplied 0y r1yal tsha0/ claims that/ .

are causes" (ndeed/ such must 0e the case/ for 2e o0ser-e that soil and the other conditions do ser-e as noncauses at one time <early in the season= and as causes at another/ later time <har-est="<#K3=. it is not so" Because there is alteration <of organ and o0Fect= from 2hen <they ha-e not met="<#K = *he o0Fector here e-idently is a )yaaya'AaiBse"sika/ for the account of cognition 0eing offered deri-es from the )yaa-asuutra/<#K&= 2here it is said that cognition results from the contact 0et2een an organ and an o0Fect" *he claim is made that Fust as organ and o0Fect do not percepti0ly change from one moment to the ne7t/ and yet in the first moment there is no cognition 2hile in the second there is/ so iiBs-ara/ although he does not change/ can 0e a noncause one moment and''our nonperception not2ithstanding''a cause the ne7t" *he Buddhist has t2o possi0le responses/ one doctrinal/ the other logical" *he doctrinal is that the )yaaya'AaiBse"sika account of the cogniti-e process is incorrect/ and that there is a third factor that determines a cognition/ namely/ a pre-ious cognition/ 2hose presence or a0sence and particular 4ualities must 0e posited to e7plain the e-ident fact that''e-en if organ and o0Fect are admitted not to -ary''cognitions do -ary"<#K6= 3lternati-ely/ if the opponent 0e taken as accepting the Buddhist postulation of three conditions for cognition/ then the logical o0Fection can 0e made that/ at the -ery least/ the organ must -ary/ for other2ise 2e could not e7plain the relati-e clarity or dullness of cognitions"<#KG= 3 further logical o0Fection/ of course/ is simply that the postulation of an entity's noncausality at one time and causality at another re4uires that there 0e .Just as o0Fect and organ/ ?eeting 2ithout alteration/ cause cognition/ @o/ too/ <iiBs-ara is a cause 2ithout alteration/=.on-ersely/ it might 0e added/ the fact that it clearly is the case that entities can change from noncauses into causes is a further demonstration of their necessary impermanence/ since a permanent entity could not thus change" Dharmakiirti ne7t entertains and ans2ers a related o0Fection: <>6:= (f you say/ .

p" 33 an alteration/ 0ecause 0et2een a cause and a noncause there is a difference/ a difference that can only 0e e7plained 0y positing an alteration in nature" *hus/ Dharmakiirti adds: <>G:= <Dactors= that are indi-idually po2erless <as causes=/ (f they do not change their nature/ Will 0e po2erless e-en 2hen they meet" *hus/ alteration is pro-ed"<#K%= (n the instance of the organ/ o0Fect/ and cognition/ the three factors are considered indi-idually una0le 0ut collecti-ely a0le to generate a cognition" Dharmakiirti's point/ ho2e-er/ is that regardless of 2hether they are functioning indi-idually or collecti-ely/ the three factors cannot 0e causally potent if it is not admitted that their nature changes''for the simple reason that pre-iously they ha-e 0een a noncause/ and in order to 0e efficacious/ they must change in nature so as to 0ecome a cause" *hus/ according to r1yal tsha0: """it is pro-en that the three conditions ha-e different natures 2hen they ha-e met and 2hen they ha-e not met/ 0ecause 2e see the difference that they generate or do not generate sense'cognition 2hen they ha-e met or ha-e not met"<#K$= Dharmakiirti concludes his refutation 2ith a final o0ser-ation of the incompati0ility 0et2een the concept of cause and the concept of iiBs-ara''here named for the first time as the o0Fect of refutation: <>%:= *hus/ those <factors= that are indi-idually po2erless <But 0ring a0out= the e7istence of the 4uality <of the result= 2hen they ha-e met 3re causesC iiBs-ara/ etc"/ 3re not <causes=/ 0ecause they do not alter"<##K= .ausality/ then/ is a process entailing not only the presence or a0sence of certain factors <2here0y/ as 2e sa2/ iiBs-ara could not 0e considered a cause=/ 0ut also the alteration of those factors in such a 2ay that they change from 0eing noncauses to 0eing causes" *hus/ the generation of a sprout re4uires <a= the presence of certain factors that might not 0e .

<##3= *he latter sort of 0eing .authoritati-e. 0eings: .present/ that is/ the seeds/ soil/ moisture/ sunlight/ and so forth/ and<0= the alteration of the nature of each of these so that their indi-idual causal nonefficacity 0ecomes their collecti-e efficacity" @imilarly/ a sense'cognition re4uires <a= the o0Fect/ organ/ and preceding cognition and <0= an alteration of each of these such that indi-idual nonefficacity can 0ecome collecti-e efficacity" )o2/ this alteration is not some superadded process 0eyond the meeting of the conditions/ 0ut it must 0e specified as part of the causal process/ for 2ithout such specification/ one might o-erlook the ontological difference that is entailed 0y causality" Difference/ in turn/ re4uires impermanence/ for entities are kno2n sometimes to 0e causes and sometimes to 0e noncauses of particular e-ents/ 0ut it is contradictory that they 0e 0oth at the p" 33& same time/ 2hile a permanent entity/ like iiBs-ara/ cannot alter its nature/ and so it must al2ays 0e a noncause or al2ays a cause" (f it is al2ays a noncause/ then the discussion is academicC if it is al2ays a cause/ then it must 0e u0i4uitous/ and it cannot 0e accepted as a cause/ 0ecause its presence or a0sence cannot 0e o0ser-ed to make a difference in the generation of a result" Before lea-ing Dharmakiirti/ 2e ought to note that he adduces one additional argument against iiBs-ara/ later in the Pramaa"nasiddhi chapter/ 2hen he insists <follo2ing the line of reasoning of such predecessors as Aasu0andhu<###= = that the cause of the -arious sufferings e7perienced 0y 0eings cannot 0e a uni4ue cause/ 0ecause the -ariety among results permits us only to infer a -ariety of causes/ and 0ecause/ as has 0een demonstrated/ a permanent cause cannot 0e pro-en to e7ist"<##>= r1yal tsha0/ finally/ adds his o2n -ersion of the argument from e-il/ at the end of his discussion of the -ital and tri-ial characteristics of omniscience that may 0e attri0uted to .(f someone 2ho can make anything 0ecause of his kno2ledge of the sciences is omniscient/ then he also has made the sufferings of the lo2er realms"""".someone 2ho/ ha-ing accomplished the elimination of e-ery last fetter/ is omniscient regarding ho2 all o0Fects really e7ist". With this in mind/ r1yal tsha0 concludes/ 2e should turn not to such a 0eing/ 0ut to .

is one 2ho truly is authoritati-e for those intent on li0eration/ and is/ of course/ e7emplified 0y the Buddha/ 2ho has not made the 2orld/ 0ut kno2s it/ and kno2s the 2ay out of it" A(((" *6E *6E(@*'3*6E(@* DEB3*E 3D*ER D63R?35((R*( Dharmakiirti's attack on theism 2as a stinging one/ 0ut it did not end the de0ate 0et2een theists and atheists any more than did 6ume's criti4ue in the West" (ndeed/ as noted earlier/ Dharmakiirti's discussions had the salutary effect of raising the discussion to a ne2 le-el of sophistication/ and in the centuries follo2ing him the issue 2as Foined not only 0y )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas responding to his attacks/ 0ut 0y still other Buddhists/ as 2ell as 0y ?iimaa"msakas and Jainas" *hese de0ates ha-e 0een co-ered 2ell else2here/<## = and 2e ha-e neither the need nor the space to outline them in detail" We 2ill/ ho2e-er/ sur-ey them 0riefly" *he )yaaya'AaiBse"sika response to Dharmakiirti's criti4ue 2as far from immediate" (ndeed/ it 2as nearly three centuries after Dharmakiirti/ in the )yaayamaJn' Farii of Jayanta Bha"t"ta/ that a counterattack finally 2as mounted" (n the meantime/ further criti4ues of theism had 0een forthcoming/ not only from Buddhists/ 0ut from ?iimaa"msakas and Jainas/ as 2ell" *he first important post'Dharmakiirti Buddhist attack on theism is that of B@aantide-a <eighth century= / 2ho critici.es a num0er of non'Buddhist -ie2s of causality in the ninth chapter of his Bodhicaryaa-ataara" 3mong these is the )aiyaayika claim that iiBs-ara/ a di-ine/ pure/ permanent/ single creator/ is the source of e-erything" But/ notes B@aantide-a/ if iiBs-ara is identified 2ith the elements that are accepted as the material causes of material things/ there is a contradiction/ 0ecause these elements are neither pure nor permanent nor single" !n the other hand/ if he is said p" 336 to 0e the creator of the permanent padaarthas that constitute the 2orld according to )yaaya'AaiBse"sika/ then there is a pro0lem/ 0ecause permanent entities cannot ha-e an origin/ 2hile if 2orldly phenomena are granted impermanence/ then they cannot 0e accounted for 0y a permanent/ single entity"<##&= *he remainder of B@aantide-a's argument recapitulates earlier .

then he is 0oth cruel and dependent on the instrument of amusement/ namely/ the cosmos=<#>K= and <0= potency <if he is a0le to create all things/ he must do so immediately/ for potency entails immediate generation="<#>#= 3ttacks on theism also 2ere launched 0y the t2o great theoreticians of ?iimaa"msa/ Pra0haakara and 5umaarila <se-enth'eighth centuries=" ?oti-ated in part 0y their idiosyncratic concern to sho2 that the Aedas are 2ithout an author <2hich iiBs-ara sometimes 2as said to 0e= / the ?iinaa"msakas adduced some refutations that o-erlapped those of the Buddhists/ and others that 2ere uni4ue" !f note among the latter 2ere arguments that raised 4uestions of 2hether iiBs-ara can 0e said to ha-e a 0ody or not: 2e kno2 that creati-e agency 2ithin the 2orld re4uires a 0ody" (f iiBs-ara is to 0e pro-ed 0y analogy to .conFunction.Buddhist analyses of the pro0lems entailed 0y iiBs-ara's permanence/ his need for assistants/ and his creation 2ith or 2ithout a desire to do so"<l#6= 3 century later/ in the *att-asa"mgraha/ B@aantarak"sita critici.amusement/.ed creation theories centering on 0oth iiBs-ara and puru"sa<##G=''though the characteristics of puru"sa are not those of the @aa"mkhya puru"sa/ 0ut of the Aedaantin 0rahman" *ogether 2ith 5amalaBsiila's PaJnFikaa/ the *att-asa"mgraha pro0a0ly is the most detailed e7tant Buddhist criti4ue of theism" ?uch of the section on iiBs-ara recapitulates and e7pands upon Dharmakiirti's refutation of the theistic syllogism/ although B@aantarak"sita does add points of his o2n" Dor e7ample/ to 3-iddhakara"na's claim that the simultaneous functioning of t2o senses must 0e e7plained 0y recourse to a conFuncti-e su0stratum and that/ 0y analogy/ so must the com0inations of the 2orld 0e e7plained 0y the concept of iiBs-ara/ he replies that it is unpro-en either that there can 0e t2o simultaneously functioning senses/ or that the category of . <sa"myoga= is admissi0le"<##%= B@aantarak"sita also points out that iiBs-ara cannot 0e the source of a -er0al re-elation/ for the simple reason that he has no 0ody/ hence no mouth/ and -er0al communication is dependent on the e7istence of a mouth"<##$= *he criti4ue of puru"sa centers on the dilemma posed 0y puru"sa's <a= moti-es <if he is moti-ated 0y another/ he is not self'sufficientC if he is moti-ated 0y compassion/ he must create a perfect 2orld/ 2hile if he cannot create a perfect 2orld/ he is not po2erfulC and if he is moti-ated 0y .

2orldly creati-ity/ he must ha-e a 0ody/ yet he is claimed 0y )yaaya'AaiBse"sika tradition to 0e 0odiless'' although 2e kno2 that 2ill alone cannot generate results: some physical agency is re4uired" (f iiBs-ara is admitted to ha-e a 0ody/ then -arious conse4uences ensue: for instance/ if iiBs-ara has a 0ody/ 2hence has that 0ody comeM (f it is from another creator/ then that creator's 0ody must ha-e a creator/ and so on/ in infinite regressC if from himself/ then he must ha-e had a 0ody 2ith 2hich to create that 0ody/ 2hich must ha-e had a preceding 0ody''again/ there is an infinite regress" p" 33G Durther/ of 2hat could iiBs-ara's 0ody 0e madeM (t cannot 0e made of material elements/ 0ecause they ha-e not 0een created yet/ 2hile it cannot 0e immaterial/ 0ecause the immaterial cannot 0e the cause of the material"<#>>= Jaina criti4ues of theism/ as in the eighth'century "@a"ddarBsanasamuccaya of 6ari0hadra/ the thirteenth'century @yaad-aadamaJnFarii of ?allisena and the fifteenth'century *arkarahasyadii' pikaa of 1u"naratna/ are easily as sophisticated as those of the Buddhists and ?iimaa"msakas/ and open some interesting areas of discussion/ 0ut cannot detain us here"<#>3= 3s noted a0o-e/ the first concerted )yaaya'AaiBse"sika counterattack is contained in the tenth'century )yaa-amaJnFarii of Jayanta Bha"t"ta/ 2ho states the theistic syllogism in the follo2ing form: iiBs-ara e7ists 0ecause he produces a result <the cosmos= of a type that presupposes a maker 2ho kno2s the process and moti-e of production/ like a potter" Jayanta considers at least t2el-e different arguments against the e7istence of iiBs-ara/ most of them familiar/ such as the inade4uacy of the potter analogy/ the pro0lems entailed 0y iiBs-a-a's em0odiment or 0odilessness/ 4uestions of moti-e/ and the superiority of .impersonal. e7planations/ such as karman" Jayanta sets out to demonstrate that his -arious opponents' disproofs are themsel-es riddled 2ith logical fla2s" *he assertion/ for instance/ that natural o0Fects do not necessarily ha-e a conscious designer is itself uncertain/ and thus cannot 0e adduced as a good logical reason refuting the theistic reason/ 2hile the theistic argument 0y analogy is -alid 0ecause in those instances 2here 2e ha-e o0ser-ed an o0Fect's source of design/ that .

source has 0een a conscious designer" *hus/ all effects can 0e deduced to arise from a conscious designer/ including the 2orld itself" Jayanta reasserts iiBs-ara's noncorporeality/ maintaining that his 2ill can acti-ate physical results in the same 2ay that the human 2ill can acti-ate the 0odyC in either case/ an immaterial agency does ha-e material effects" ((Bs-ara's compassion is Fustified 0y e7plaining that he creates/ for e7ample/ hell only as a sort of .holding'cell. for 0eings until their karman permits their sal-ation" Dinally/ the -ie2/ for e7ample/ that .hemopathy<#>%= as the most thorough since Dharmakiirti/ that the last great )yaaya' AaiBse"sika defense of theism/ +dayana's )yaayakusu' maaJnFali/ 2as composed" +dayana's 2ork is comple7 and sophisticated enough to ha-e 0een the su0Fect of a num0er of scholarly monographs/<#>$= and ( 2ill not discuss it here/ pausing only to note that it includes detailed attempts to refute other schools' attacks on iiBs-ara/ and sets out t2o series of .<#> = !ther )yaaya'AaiBse"sika defenses of theism included those of AyomaBsi-a's tenth'century Ayoma-atii/ 2hich reiterates the point that an effect presupposes an intelligent designer/ and reaffirms that the cosmos presupposes a po2erful and omniscient designer/<#>&= and AaacaspatimiBsra's tenth'century )yaaya-aarttika' taatparya"tiikaa/ 2here it is argued that the la2 of parsimony <laagha-a= re4uires that the creation of the -arious entities of nature 0e attri0uted to one/ rather than a multiplicity of/ di-inities/ and that such a di-inity must 0e inconcei-a0ly po2erful and kno2ledgea0le to 0e a0le to effect such a creation"<#>6= *he Buddhist position 2as reaffirmed in the ele-enth century 0y JJnaanaBsriimitra/ 2hose ((Bs-ara-aada is in part an e7panded commentary on some of p" 33% Dharmakiirti's discussion/ and 0y JJnaanaBsrii's disciple/ Ratnakiirti/ in his ((Bs-arasaadhanaduu"sa"na" <#>G= (t 2as in response to JJnaanaBsriimitra's attack/ descri0ed 0y .cooperation". karman rather than a single designer is the cause of the natural en-ironmt is reFected on the grounds that human responses to the en-ironment are too -aried <some people lo-e the mountains/ others do not= to ena0le us to posit such karmic .collecti-e.

9+D()1 RE?3R5@ By 2ay of conclusion/ ( 2ant to address myself 0riefly to t2o some2hat 0roader 4uestions that naturally emerge from our considerations of the theological disputes engaged in 0y Dharmakiirti and other (ndian philosophers" *he first 4uestion is: *o 2hat degree are the arguments of Dharmakiirti <or/ for that matter/ any of his supporters or antagonists= philosophically conclusi-e 2ithin an (ndian frame of referenceM *he second 4uestion is: *o 2hat degree can these (ndian theological discussions 0e transposed onto the atheist'antitheist de0ate as it has unfolded in the WestM (n principle/ the -arious (ndian philosophers 2ho argued 0ack and forth a0out the e7istence of iiBs-ara accepted a common set of rules for their discussions/ and so deciding 2ho 2as right and 2ho 2as 2rong ought to 0e a simple matter of seeing 2ho 0egs the fe2est 4uestions and 2ho constructs syllogisms 2ith the most care" @uch decisions only can 0e simple/ ho2e-er/ if <a= the rational structures de-ised for discussion are themsel-es foolproof and <0= the disputants do not import any idiosyncratic doctrinal notions into intersystemic discussions" (n point of fact/ ho2e-er/ <a= the relia0ility of formal inference''either in principle or/ at least/ for deciding metaphysical 4uestions''2as attacked e-en from 2ithin the (ndian tradition/ 0y such thinkers as )aagaarFuna/ B@aLnkara/ JayaraaBsi and Purandara/ 2ho claimed either that the positing and structuring of pramaa"nas could not themsel-es 0e supported 0y any pramaa"na 2ithout 0egging the 4uestion/ or that inference/ e-en if accepted as pro-isionally -alid/ could not inform us on matters fore-er 0eyond .positi-e proofs/ the first <consisting of nine proofs= demonstrating iiBs-ara's e7istence/ and the second <also nine proofs= demonstrating his authorship of the Aedas" *he first series of arguments/ though a 0rilliant synthesis/ does not add a great deal to earlier )yaaya'AaiBse"sika discussionsC the second series is 4uite original/ 0ut is directed primarily at the ?iimaa"msakas/ and 2ould 0e considered irrele-ant 0y a naastika such as a Buddhist or Jaina" *he )yaayakusumaaJnFali itself stimulated counterattacks/ from the Aedaanta school of RaamaanuFa and/ e-entually/ in the last great classical 2ork of the theist'atheist de0ate/ 1u"naratna's *arkarahasyadiipikaa"<#3K= (O" .!).

of p" 33$ arguments" (ndeed/ ( think that discussions of the e7istence or none7istence of iiBs-ara ser-e as a good e7ample of the ine-ita0ility of such coloration" (f 2e strip a2ay the almost 0e2ildering -ariety of arguments 2e ha-e re-ie2ed/ 2e find at 0ottom t2o 0asic issues on 2hich''to take our t2o main antagonists''the )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas and Buddhists ha-e disagreed: <#= the e7istence of a permanent entity and its relation to the impermanent and <>= the re4uirement that causal action entail a conscious agent" ?any comple7 philosophical discussions turn on these t2o issues/ yet it might 0e argued that the attitudes to2ard each entertained 0y each of the schools is/ in fact/ prephilosophical/ and thus not essentia(ly amena0le to re-ision on the 0asis of rational considerations" <#= *he permanence'impermanence issue is one that goes -ery far 0ack and -ery deep in the (ndian tradition" ?uch of the religious and philosophical search that produced 0oth the +pani"sads and Buddhism 2as geared to2ard the disco-ery of an immuta0le state that 2as free from the -icissitudes of sa"msaara/ yet in searching for and e7plicating this state/ 6indu and Buddhist schools arri-ed at -ery different conclusions" 6indu schools/ of 2hich )yaaya'AaiBse"sika is one/ concluded on the 0asis of religious e7perience and logic that the impermanent entities 2e see around us must in some 2ay 0e su0sumed or limited 0y an eternal su0stance that pro-ides their continuity/ the continuity that 2e kno2 to 0e the 0asis of order in the cosmos" Buddhists/ on the other hand/ concluded on the 0asis of their empirical and logical e7plorations that there is not/ nor could there possi0ly 0e/ a permanent su0stance/ for such a su0stance can neither change itself nor interact 2ith the impermanent" *hus/ the )yaaya'AaiBse"sika <or Aedaantin= insistence on the necessity of permanence to e7plain continuity/ and the Buddhist insistence on the necessity of impermanence to e7plain change are deep'seated and seemingly irreconcila0le positions/ .ed.perceptual ken" Durther/ <0= -ery real differences in the 2ays in 2hich different schools approached philosophical pro0lems tended in-aria0ly to color e-en the most carefully .depersonali.

ed/ that is/ to deconstruct personal notions into impersonal processes much like those 2e o0ser-e among nonsentient entities" *hus/ causality is not e-en a .atomism.personal. not2ithstanding''tend to dra2 their model of causality from human p" 3 K acti-ities: mo-ement of the 0ody is preceded <usually= 0y a conscious intention/ a pot 0y a potter/ a house 0y an architect and 0uilders" By analogy/ then/ 2e conclude that other o0Fects in nature''2hose sources 2e do not kno2''must also arise through personal agency/ and so/ 0y e7tension/ must the o-erall arrangement of the 2orldC an agent responsi0le for the o-erall arrangement of the 2orld must 0e a -astly po2erful and kno2ledgea0le 0eing/ such as iiBs-ara" !nce again/ the antagonists seem to ha-e arri-ed at completely antithetical positions 0y 0eginning from different places/ and it is difficult to see 2here a common ground could 0e found" *hus/ (ndian arguments o-er the e7istence or none7istence of iiBs-ara ha-e their inherent fascinations/ and yet 2e must remain a2are that they may not 0e finally solu0le/ for the simple reason that/ despite their agreement on the meanings of many terms/ the disputants ha-e -astly different approaches to some 0asic pro0lems/ and this disparity . process on the le-el of the sentient indi-idual/ 2ho actually is a ne7us of impersonal forces/ some material and some mentalC and/ needless to say/ nonsentient entities do not re4uire a personal agent/ either" *he )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas/ on the other hand''their .and/ much like a 5antian antinomy/ each seems logically to e7clude the other and yet/ 2hen taken alone/ to lead to insupera0le difficulties" *o the degree that the dispute o-er permanence and impermanence is one of the core issues in discussions of iiBs-ara/ those discussions may 0e impossi0le to resol-e" <>= *he 4uestion 2hether cause'and'effect re4uires a conscious agent also seems rooted in prephilosophical decisions that commit the )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas and Buddhists to irreconcila0le positions" 6ere/ ( think the pro0lem may 0e the source for the model of causality that each school constructs" Buddhist meditation and Buddhist logic tend to 0e radically depersonali.

hristian 1odM 3 closer e7amination/ ho2e-er/ re-eals that there are considera0le differences 0et2een the .hristian 1od does all three" *he iiBs-ara of )yaaya'AaiBse"sika does not create the eternal padaarthas that constitute the 2orld/ although he does arrange them into the cosmos that 2e kno2/ 2hereas the .hristian 1od does not 0ecome the 2orld/ 0ut/ rather/ creates it e7 nihilo/ and remains fore-er transcendent to it" *he paramapuru"sa that is iiBs-ara in the :oga system does not create the 2orld/ or arrange it/ or relate to it in any 2ay/ 2hereas the . 2hile the 1od asserted 0y/ for e7ample/ 34uinas and )e2ton and reFected 0y/ for e7ample/ 6ume are/ in fact/ -ery differentC furthermore/ the arguments arise in different conte7ts and are conducted in different philosophical languages" p" 3 # 3ll these points are 2ell taken/ 0ut they do not .hristian 1od and most of the (ndian models" *he 0rahman of most Aedaantin schools/ for instance/ transforms itself into the 2orld/ is the 2orld's material cause/ 2hereas the .argument from design.hristian 1od creates 0oth the .ra2 material. <or teleological argument= for 1od's e7istence"<#3#= *he )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas/ after all/ 2ere talking a0out one type of . and the arrangement of the cosmos" *hese considerations/in turn/ must 0e 2eighed 2hen 2e decide 2hether or not to descri0e the )yaaya' AaiBse"sika syllogism reFected 0y Dharmakiirti as simply an (ndian -ersion of the .1od.ertainly/ the fre4uent translation of iiBs-ara as . seems at first 0lush to 0e legitimate/ for are not the 0asic characteristics of iiBs-ara''permanence/ omniscience/ independence/ creatorship/ compassion''-ery much like the attri0utes of the .1od/.of approaches threatens to render the arguments on 2hich they are 0ased fore-er inconclusi-e" 9et us turn/ then/ to the second general 4uestion 2ith 2hich 2e 0egan this section/ that of the applica0ility of the (ndian discussion to the Western de0ate o-er the e7istence of 1od" !ne must/ needless to say/ 0e -ery cautious in entertaining such comparisons/ for concepts that seem identical in t2o different cultural'philosophical traditions more often than not are re-ealed on closer e7amination to 0e 4uite different/ 0oth in denotation and connotation" .

akis <in his *he @a-iors of 1od=/ that do not re4uire the omnipotence of 1od/ and admit his dependence on his creatures for the fulfillment of his ends" *hese 2ould escape the o0Fections raised against a permanent/ independent 1od/ though 2hether they could e-ade criticisms aimed at the concept of di-ine teleology <especially those .hristianity/ represented 0y/ for e7ample/ 6artshorne/ or 5a. of (ndian and Western philosophy are different/ 0ut that does not mean that there is not a fair degree of translata0ility across traditions: the inducti-e and deducti-e processes generally accepted to 0e the 0asis of sound reasoning are found in 0oth/ as are many of the same notions of the types of fla2s that may -itiate arguments" @econdly/ e-en if there are differences 0et2een iiBs-ara and 1od/ they are not so great as to o0-iate all comparison 0et2een their roles and the arguments for their e7istence" *he argument from design/ after all/ simply attempts to sho2 generally that the order 2e percei-e in the cosmos presupposes a single conscious designer and8or sustainer of that order" (t really is a secondary matter <pace 5ant= 2hether the 0eing responsi0le for the cosmic order creates e7 nihilo or arranges pree7istent ra2 materialC in either case/ it is not mode of ordering that is at issue/ 0ut the e7istence of a single eternal 0eing 2ho is the conscious agent of that ordering" *hus/ ( think it is fair to call the )yaaya'AaiBse"' sika syllogism reFected 0y Dharmakiirti an .(ndian argument from design/ .ant. *herefore/ * think that the sorts of arguments proffered 0y Dharmakiirti and his opponents can 0e of interest to Western theologians" *he precise 2ays in 2hich the (ndian arguments o-erlap or de-iate from the Western ones must 0e the topic of another study/ as must detailed considerations of 2hether the (ndian tradition has arguments that could ser-e either theists or antitheists in the West"<#3>= 6ume/ 5ant/ and others ha-e gi-en fairly thorough treatment to the pro0lem of conscious agency/ and it is my suspicion that it is on the permanence'impermanence issue that the (ndian tradition may ha-e the most to contri0ute" *he Buddhist criti4ue of a 1od 0elie-ed to 0e immuta0le seems to me an acute one/ and the price of accepting 1od's muta0ility a high one/ that is/ his suscepti0ility to conditions/ hence loss of omnipotence" *here are: of course/ currents in modern .1od".languages. Fust as ( think it is relari-ely fair to call iiBs-ara .totally undermine the comparison" *o 0egin 2ith/ the .

What you say is -ery fine/ 3dso/ and ( thank you" *he order that our mind imagines is like a net/ or like a ladder/ 0uilt to attain something" But after2ard you must thro2 the ladder a2ay/ 0ecause you disco-er that/ e-en if it 2as useful/ it 2as meaningless"""".But in imagining an erroneous order you still found something"""".solution.( arri-ed at <the killer= pursuing the plan of a per-erse and rational mind/ and there 2as no plan/ or/ rather/ there 0egan a se4uence of causes/ and concauses/ and causes contradicting one another/ 2hich proceeded on their o2n/ creating relations that did not stem from any plan" Where is all my 2isdom/ thenM ( 0eha-ed stu00ornly/ pursuing a sem0lance of order/ 2hen ( should ha-e kno2n 2ell that there is no order in the uni-erse".regarding the admissi0ility of e7traneous causes=/ ( am not so certain" (t also is my suspicion/ alas/ that cross'cultural de0ates may in the end 0e no more conclusi-e than intra'cultural ones ha-e 0een/ and that the arguments/ if e7amined carefully enough/ 2ill 0e seen to rest on prephilosophical choices and assumptions that cannot really 0e 4uestioned/ and yet 2hich -itiate the certainty to 2hich philosophers fore-er aspire" *his final note of uncertainty can/ if 2e permit it/ gro2 into a more general uncertainty a0out the . of a series of crimes has 0een purely accidental/ and implies there0y a sort of . 2e percei-e and disco-er in the cosmos/ an order/ incidentally/ that 2as assumed 0y 0oth theists and atheists in (ndia/ their only disagreement 0eing o-er ho2 to account for it" (s it not/ in fact/ possi0le that this order simply is not there/ that it actually is concei-ed and in-ented rather than p" 3 > percei-ed and disco-eredM *his is the possi0ility entertained in a modern master2ork from Bologna/ +m0erto Eco's *he )ame of the Rose" 3t the end/ the monk'detecti-e protagonist/ William of Basker-ille/ 0emoans to the 0ook's young narrator/ 3dso/ that his .: .order. . . .argument from no'design.

William looked at me 2ithout 0etraying any feeling in his features/ and he said/ .alcutta: ?anisha/ #$6$=/ pp" 3>' 3" . ( dared/ for the first and last time in my life/ to e7press a theological conclusion: .riticism of Dharmakiirti's Philosophy: 3 @tudy/ 9" D" @eries no" ## <3hmeda0ad: 9" D" (nstitute of (ndology/ #$6G=C and D" )" @hastri/ .ompare such .ompare .But ho2 can a necessary 0eing e7ist totally polluted 2ith the possi0leM What difference is there/ then/ 0et2een 1od and primogenial chaosM (sn't affirming 1od's a0solute omnipotence and 6is a0solute freedom 2ith regard to 6is o2n choices tantamount to demonstrating that 1od does not e7istM.hina and (ndia <)e2 :ork: ?odern 9i0rary/ #$ >=/ p" ##" >" .hattopadhyaya's 0ook/ 2hile occasionally straining for e-idence that one or another am0iguous passage is atheistic/ presents o-erall a compelling picture of the per-asi-eness of atheism in (ndian philosophical <if not religious= 3" .:ou ha-e no reason to reproach yourself: you did your 0est".. Aedic passages as" Rg <"Rg-eda= ((/ #>/ &C (A/ #%/ #>C and A(((/ #KK/ 3C and their discussion in Depi0rasad .ompare/ for e7ample/ i0id"/ chap" # C and )arendranath Bhattacharyya/ Jain Philosophy: 6istorical !utline <)e2 Delhi: ?unshiram ?anoharlal/ #$G6=/ pp" $3'#K%" &" .3 human 0est/ 2hich is -ery little" (t's hard to accept the idea that there cannot 0e an order in the uni-erse 0ecause it 2ould offend the free 2ill of 1od and 6is omnipotence" @o the freedom of 1od is our condemnation/ or at least the condemnation of our pride".<#33= )!*E@ #" 9in :utang/ ed"/ *he Wisdom of .hattopadhyaya/ (ndian 3theism <.ompare/ for e7ample/ )agin J" @hah/ 3kalaLnka's .6o2 could a learned man go on communicating his learning if he ans2ered yes to your 4uestionM.hattopadhyaya/ (ndian 3theism/ chaps" $ and #6" " .skeptical.riti4ue of (ndian Realism: 3 @tudy of the .onflict Bet2een the )yaya'Aaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga @chool <3gra: 3gra +ni-ersity/ #$6 =" 6" *he *i0etans attri0ute se-en 2orks to him: . .

ollege Research @eries/ no" # <.ollege/ #$6#=/ p" " #K" "Rg-eda/ O/ %>/ trans"/ for e7ample/ 0y .hemparathy/ 3n (ndian Rational *heology: 3n (ntroduction to +dayana's )yaayakusumaaJnFali/ Pu0lications of the De)o0ili Research 9i0rary/ -ol" # <Aienna/ #$G>=/ p" >%" $" 1opimohan Bhattacharyya/ @tudies in )yaaya'AaiBse"sika *heism/ .hapter of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa"na-aarttika <+npu0lished diss"/ +ni-ersity of Wisconsin/ #$%3=" *his annotated translation/ re-ised/ 2ill 0e issued in #$%6 as ?ind/ Body/ @elflessness/ Dreedom: Dharmakiirti's Defense of the Buddhist World'Aie2 as E7pounded in r1yal tsha0's . of 3charya ?anorathaanandin <Aaranasi: Bauddha Bharati/ #$6%= C and :" ?iyasaka/ ed"/ Pramaa"na-aarttika'5aarikaa <@anskrit and *i0etan= / in 3cta (ndologica > <#$G#'#$G>=/ 3 <#$G3'#$G&=/ and <#$GG=" Aarious parts of the @-aarthaanumaana chapter ha-e 0een translatedC compare Warder/ (ndian Buddhism/ and 9eonard P2illing/ Dharmakiirti on 3poha <+npu0lished diss"/ +ni-ersity of Wisconsin/ #$G6= " *he Pramaa"nasiddhi chapter <P@= 2as translated 0y ?asatoshi )agatomi in 3 @tudy of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa"na-aarttika: 3n English *ranslation and 3nnotation of the Pramaa"na-aarttika/ Book ( <+npu0lished diss"/ 6ar-ard +ni-ersity/ #$&G=" ( translated r1yal tsha0 dar ma rin chen's ti0etan commentary on the P@ chapter as part (( of my dissertation/ (s Enlightenment Possi0leM 3n 3nalysis of @ome 3rguments in the Buddhist Philosophical *radition/ With @pecial 3ttention to the Pramaa"nasiddhi .alcutta: @anskrit .Elucidating the Path to Enlightenment 3ccording to the BPramaa"na-aarttika' .ommentary .alcutta @anskrit .omplete editions include: D2arikas @hastri/ ed"/ Pramaa"na-aarttika of 3charya Dharmakiirti/ 2ith the .Pramaa"na-aarttika <hereafter cited as PA= / Pramaa"na-iniBscaya/ )yaaya0indu/ 6etu0indu/ @am0andhapariiki"saa/ @amtaanaantarasiddhi and Aadanyaaya" !nly the PA and )yaaya0indu are completely e7tant in @anskritC the others e7ist in *i0etan translation" Dor a list of editions and translations/ compare 3" 5" Warder/ (ndian Buddhism/ >d ed" <Delhi: ?otilal Banarsidass/ #$%K= /pp" &3$'& K" p" 3 3 G" .Aritti. <9ondon: Wisdom Pu0lications=" %" 1eorge .

6istory of the Word ((Bs-ara and (ts (dea/.onference A(( <Baroda=/ pp" $> ff: #&" .ausality: *he .ompare/ B@-etaaBs-atara (((/ G'#KC *A/ #/ #/ and so forth/ in @ource Book/ pp" $K'$#" #%"B@-etaaBs-atara (/ >/ in @ource Book/ p" %$" #$"Bhaga-adgiitaa O/ >#C O(/ $'3&/ in @ource Book/ p" #36/ #3%'# #" >K"(0id"/ p" &K6C @urendranath Dasgupta/ 3 6istory of (ndian Philosophy <Reprint/ Delhi: ?otilal Banarsidass/ #$G&=/ -ol" #/ p" #%" Dasgupta notes <pp" >K' >#= that most of the early commentators on the Brahmasuutras 2ere 4uasidualistic Aai"s"na-as" .ompare ?argaret and James @tutley/ 6arper's Dictionary of 6induism <@an Drancisco/ .entral Philosophy of Buddhism <6onolulu/ 6a2aii: +ni-ersity Press of 6a2aii/ #$G&=/ pp" #G'#%" 5alupahana's summary of pre'Buddhist causation theories is a good one" #6" .@ar-epalli Radhakrishnan and .f"/ e"g"/ )inian @mart/ Doctrine and 3rgument in (ndian Philosophy <9ondon: 1eorge 3llen and +n2in/ #$6 =/ pp" #&6'#&%" >6":ogasuutra <hereafter cited as :@= >3'>%/ in @ource Book/ pp" &%' &$" .f" Da-id 5alupahana/ .harles 3" ?oore/ in Radhakrishnan and ?oore/ eds"/ 3 @ource Book in (ndian Philosophy <Princeton/ )e2 Jersey: Princeton +ni-ersity Press/ #$&G=/ p" #%" ##" "Rg-eda/ O/ $K/ in @ource Book/ p" #$" #>" "Rg-eda/ O/ #>#/ in @ource Book/ pp" > '>&" #3" "Rg-eda/ O/ #>$/ in @ource Book/ pp" >3'> " # " 3thar-a-eda A((/ #K>/ # and O(O/ 6/ " .alifornia: 6arper Q Ro2/ #$GG=/ p" #>KC and ?" D" @astri/ . 3ll (ndia !riental .ompare/ for e7ample/ B"rhadaaraa"nyaka ((/ #/ >'#3/ and >KC (((/ 6/ in @ource Book/ pp" G$/ %&'%6" #G" .ommentary to B@ (/ i-/ >3/ in @ource Book" >&".ompare also 6aFime )akamura/ 3 6istory of Early Aedaanta Philosophy/ trans" *re-or 9eggett and others/ Religions of 3sia @eries/ no" # <Delhi: ?otilal Banarsidass/ #$%3=/ section (A" >#"Brahmasuutras <hereafter cited as B@= (/ i/ >/ in @ource Book/ p" &##" >>"B@ (/ i-/ 3/ in @ource Book/ p" &#&" B@aLnkara's comments here/ and at ((/ i/ 6 <i0id"/ p" &>>= indicate that this may 0e a -ariant of the cosmological argument/ 2ith the e7istence of the cosmos as a 2hole pointing to the e7istence of a cause on 2hich it is contingent" >3"B@ (/ i-/ >3/ in @ource Book/ p" &>#" > ".

iller/ #$66=/ pp" K' #/ # " 36"Dor e7ample/ ?aFFhimanikaaya ((/ >>>C 3Lnguttara (/ #G3C Jaataka A/ >3%/ and so forthC compare/ for e7ample/ 5alupahana/ .>G":@ >& and Bhaa"sya/ in @ource Book/ p" &%C @mart<p" #&G= argues that this is a modified form of the ontological argument" >%")yaayasuutra <hereafter cited as )@= (A/ #/ #$'>#/ trans"/ eg"/ 0y ?rinalkanti 1angopadhyaya/ )yaaya Philosophy <.hattopadhyaya/ chap" #6C and 5arl 6" Potter/ ed"/ Encyclopedia of p" 3 (ndian Philosophies: (ndian ?etaphysics and Epistemology: *he *radition of )yaaya'AaiBse"sika up to 1aLngeBsa <Princeton/ )e2 Fersey: Princeton +ni-ersity Press/ #$GG=/ p" #KK" 3K".hattopadhyaya/ (ndian 3theism p" >#C Potter/ Encyclopedia/ p" &&%" 3&"Diighanikaaya <hereafter cited as D= (/ #GC compare/ for e7ample/ 5alupahana/ .oncept of 1od <.ed 0y Potter/ Encyclopedia/ pp" 33#'333" 3 ")yaayakusumaaJnFali/ (/ 3C compare/ for e7ample/ .ompare/ for e7ample/ .ausality/ p" >>C 1lasenapp/ Buddhism/ pp" 3$' K" 3G"D ((/ ##/ %#'%3C compare 1lasenapp/ Buddhism/ p" # 6" 3%"D ((/ #3/ # '>KC compare 1lasenapp/ Buddhism/ pp" # 6'# %" !n )ikaaya discussions of 1od/ compare also 1unapala Dharmasiri/ 3 Buddhist .hristian .olom0o: 9ake 6ouse (n-estments/ #$G =/ passim" 3$"9ouis de la Aallee Poussin/ AiFJnaptimaatrataasiddhi: 9a @iddhi de 6iuan'*sang <Paris: Paul 1euthner/ #$>%=/ (/ p" 3K" K"Buddhacarita (O/ 63C compare E" 6" Johnston/ *he Buddhacarita or 3cts of the Buddha <Reprint/ Delhi: ?otilal Banarsidass/ #$G>=/ ((/ p" #36" #"Buddhacarita OA(/ #% ff"C compare/ for e7ample/ .ompare Potter/ Encyclopedia/ p" >3$" 3#".ausality/ pp" >K'>#C and 6elmuth -on 1lasenapp/ Buddhism''3 )on'*heistic Religion/ trans" (rmgard @chloegl <)e2 :ork: 1eorge Bra.riti4ue of the .ompare 1angopadhyaya/ )yaa-a Philosophy/ and Potter/ Encyclopedia/ p" >63" 3>"Padaarthadharmasa"mgraha KC compare Potter/ Encyclopedia/ p" >%&" 33")yaaya-aarttika (A/ #/ #$'>#/summari.alcutta: (ndian @tudies Past and Present/ #$G3=/ (A/ pp" >#'>6" >$".

alcutta: (ndian @tudies Past and Present/ #$6$=/ pp" #'#6" G"?ahaa-i0haa"sa/ **OOA((/ $$30/ summari.most pro0a0ly.hattopadhyaya/ (ndian 3theism/ p" #K3" >"@uh"rillekha &KC compare/ for e7ample/ 1eshe 9o0sang *harchin and 3rtemus B" Engle/ )agarFuna's 9etter <Dharamasala: 9i0rary of *i0etan Works and 3rchi-es/ #$G$=/ pp" % '%6" 3".*2o Early Buddhist Refutations of ((Bs-ara as the . Wiener Peitschrift fur 5unst und !rientalische @tudien/ >>'>3/ pp" %$'$ / $G'$$C and *h" @tcher0atsky/ Papers of *h" @tcher0atsky/ trans" 6" .ompare 1eorge .atu"hsta-a ((/ 33'3 C compare .ed in )akamura/ 6istory/ pp" # G'#&#" %"30hidharmakoBsa <hereafter cited as 35 = and '0haasya ((/ 6 dC compare 9ouis de la Aallee Poussin/ 9'30hidharmakoBsa de Aasu0andhu <hereafter cited as 3A = <Paris: Paul 1euthner/ #$>3'#$3#=/ (/ pp" 3#3'3#&" $" 35 (A/ #" &K"35 A((/ #3aC 3A A((/ pp" 3%'3$" *hese characteristics are the last three of the four aspects of the truth of origination/ namely/ samudaya/ pra0ha-a and pratyaya" &#":ogaacaara0huumi/ pp" # '&C compare . pp" %6'%$/$ '$6" &>"Bha-ya/ ?adhyamaka'h"rdaya'-"ritti'tarkaF-ala/ (((/ $/ in Daiset." 1upta/ ed" De0iprasad .reator of the +ni-erse/ .hemparathy/ .hemparathy/ . Journal of the 3merican !riental @ociety G$ <#$&$=: >63/ note #" &&"Dor a discussion of the 2ay in 2hich these epithets structure the chapter/ compare )agatomi/ .*he Drame2ork of the Pramana-arttika/ Book (/.. *" @u.hattopadhyaya/ @o-iet (ndology @eries no" > <.openhagen: 3kademisk Dorlag/ #$%>=/ pp" #&K'#&#" "Bodhicitta-i-ara"na G'$C compare 9indtner/ pp" #%6'#%$" &"9indtner/ in )agarFuniana <p" #6=/ maintains that its attri0ution to )aagaarFuna is . false" 6".*he Drame2ork/ . and compare also Ernst .hr" 9indtner/ )agarFuniana/ (ndiske @tudier <.uki/ ed"/ *he *i0etan *ripi"taka/ Peking Edition <hereafter cited as P** = <*okyo/ 5yoto: *i0etan *ripitaka Research (nstitute/ #$&G= / no" &>&6/ -ol" $6/ pp" $8386'&K8>8>8" &3"(0id"/ pp" $8&8>'G" & "Dor a discussion of this much mooted point/ compare *h" @tcher0atsky/ Buddhist 9ogic <Reprint/ )e2 :ork: Do-er/ #$6>= / #/ pp" 3%'3$C and ?asatoshi )agatomi/ .*2o Early Buddhist Refutations/.

)anto Bukkyo $ <#$%>=: #'#%" &6"?i pham/ *shad ma rnam Bgrel gyi g.*he spiritual Place of the Epistemological *radition in Buddhism/ .ompare pre-ious note G/ for references" &%" r1yal tsha0 rFe/ Rnam'3grel'*har'9am'1sal'Byed <hereafter cited as 1*= <@arnath: *i0etan ?onastery/ #$G =/ -ol" i/ pp" >3%'> %" *he section on iiBs-ara is/ according to r1yal tsha0 <p" >3$=/ part of Dharmakiirti's attempt to sho2 the meaning of the 2ord .hin skye 0a can dag ni 88 rtag las skye 0a mi Bthad phyir 8 ltos pa mi rung pa yi phyir 8=" 6#"1*/ pp" >3$'> KC Jackson/ (s Enlightenment Possi0leM pp" &6 '&66" 6>" .0ecame.@teinkellner/ .alifornia: Dharma Press/ #$%#=/ -ol" $ / fols" G3>'G 6/ pp" #% '#%%" *he section on iiBs-ara is at the end of chapter ## and the 0eginning of chap" #>" 6K"nitya"m pramaa"na"m nai-aasti pramaa"nyaad -astusaLngate"h 8 FJneyaanityatayaa tasyaa adhrau-yat kramaFanmana"h 88 nityaad utpatti-iBsle"saad apek"saya ayogata"h 8 <tshad ma rtag pa nyid yod min 8 dngos yod rtogs pa tshad phyiir dang 8 shes 0ya mi rtag pa nyid kyis 8 de ni mi 0rtan nyid phyir ro 8 rim 0.hung gsal por 0shad pa legs 0shad snang 0a'i gter <Blockprint/ Dehradun: )yingma ?onastery/ n"d"=/ p" >&G" &G"( am follo2ing ?iyasaka's num0ering here" @hastri num0ers t2o introductory -erses that p" 3 & ?iyasaka does not/ so the @hastri num0er is found 0y adding > to the ?iyasaka num0er" .0ecome.ompare/ for e7ample/ @hah/ chap" >C and D" )" @hastri/ passim" 63". <0huuta= authoritati-e: a permanent entity like iiBs-ara al2ays has 0een authoritati-e/ and so cannot .ompare the concluding section for remarks on this issue" 6 "kathaJncin nopakaaryat-aad anitye'py apramaa"nata' 88 <rnam 'gas phan gdags 0ya min phyir 8 mi rtag na yang tshad med nyid 88=" 6&" PraFJnaakaragupta/ Pramaa"na-aarttika'0haa"sya or AaarttikaalaLnkaara of PraFJnaakaragupta/ ed" . so" &$" *he PA paJnFikaa/ or '-"rtti <hereafter cited as PAA= is e7tant only in *i0etan: P** no" &G#G<0=/ -ol" #3KC and sDe dge no" >#G" found at/ for e7ample/ *he )yingma Edition of the sDe'dge 0ka '' 'gyur and 0s*an''gyur <!akland/ .

not a pot/ 0ut a mansion/ PAA/ fol" G3 / p" #%&" G>"i"s"tasiddhir asiddhir -aa d"r"s"taante sa"mBsayo 'tha-aa 88 <'dod pa gru0 pa 'am dpe ma gru0 8 yang na the tshom .f *att-asa"mgraha <*@= 6 <for full references/ compare note ##G follo2ing=" 6$" Preceding/ p" 6" Prof" 5arl Potter has disagreed 2ith me that the syllogism 0eing refuted is )yaaya'AaiBse"sika/ noting <a= that no such e7act syllogism is found in )yaaya'AaiBse"sika 2orks and <0= that no later )yaaya'AaiBse"sika 2orks specifically defended the tradition against Dharmakiirti's attacks" Prof" Potter has suggested that Dharmakiirti's opponent may/ in fact/ 0e a lost @aa"mkhya 2ork" *his may 2ell 0e/ 0ut it must 0e argued from silence/ and it seems to me that <a= 2hile the syllogism refuted 0y Dharmakiirti is not precisely like those found in )yaaya'AaiBse"sika 2orks/ there is a significant o-erlap and <0= later )yaaya'AaiBse"sika 2orks may not ha-e specifically addressed Dharmakiirti's o0Fections 0ecause 0y the time they 2ere 2ritten/ Dharmakiirti's arguments perhaps had 0een o-ershado2ed 0y those of @aantarak"sita/ 5amalaBsiila and JJnaamaBsrii" Prof" Potter also has pointed out''and in this ( 4uite agree 2ith him''that Dharmakiirti's opponent may 0e unidentifia0le for the simple reason that Dharmakiirti has distorted the theistic position in recasting it for discussion" *hus/ the )yaaya'AaiBse"sikas may ha-e 0een the intended target/ 0ut not recogni.particular shape.ed for their o2n position as restated 0y Dharmakiirti" 3lternati-ely/ Dharmakiirti may 0e com0ining the ideas of more than one theistic school into the syllogism" GK"Preceding/ p" #K" G#"1*/ p" > #C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &6G" *his does not depart su0stantially from the interpretation of De-endra0uddhi/ 2ho differs only in descri0ing that 2hich must 0e created as 0odies/ en-irons/ and products/ and cites as an e7ample of .Rahula @ankrityayana <Patna: 5ashi Prasad Jayas2al Research (nstitute/ #$&3=/ p" 3 " 66" 1*/ p" > KC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &66" 6G" PAA/ )yingma sDe'd1e/ -ol" $ / fols" G33'G3 / p" #%&" 6%" sthit-aa pra-"rttisa"msthaana-iBse"saarthakriyaadisu 8 sdod 'Fug d0yi0s kyi khyad par dang 8 don 0yed pa la sogs pa dag 8=" .a 0a yin 88=" G3"1*/ p" > #C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &6G'&6%" G "siddha"m yaad"rg adhi"s"thaat"r0haa-aa0haa-aanu-"rttimat8 .

<3lthough= one pro-es <a thesis= in regard to a particular class/ 8 (t is not reasona0le to pro-e <a similar thesis= Fust from seeing 8 *hat there is a general term <that is similar to the reason=C as if 8 Words could 0e horned 0ecause <there is a term/ = got-a".hin 88= <-erse #&=" %3" 1*/ p" > C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &G3" .hin no 88=" GG" 1*/ p" > >C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &GK" p" 3 6 G%" anyathaa kum0hakaare"na m"rd-ikaarasya kasyacit 8 gha"taade"h kara"naat sidhyed -almiikasyapi tatk"rti"h 88 <de lta min na rd.hig 0yed pa'i phyir 8 grog mkhar yang des 0yas gru0 'gyur 88=" G$" 1*/ p" > >C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &GKC compare *@ 6&" %K" . saadhyenaanugamaat kaarye saamaanyenaapi saadhane8sam0andhi0hedaad 0hedoktido"sa"h kaaryasamo mata"h 88 <0sgru0 0ya'i rFes 'gro phyir '0ras 0u 8 spyis kyang sgru0 par 0yed pa la 8 '0ral 0a can nyid the dad phyir 8 tha dad skyon 0rFod '0ras mtshungs 'dod 88= <-erse # =" %#" 1*/ pp" > >'> 3C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &GK'&G3" %>" . Faatyantare prasiddhasya Bsa0dasaamaanyadarBsanaat8 na yukta"m saadhana"m got-aac cchaBsaadiinaa"m -i"saa"ni-at88 <rigs kyi khyad par la gru0 pa 8 sgra yi spyi ni mthong pa las 8 sgru0 0yed mi rigs ngag la sogs 8 go nyid phyir na r-a can 0.sa"mni-eBsaadi tad yukta"m tasmaad yad anumiiyate 88 <0yin rla0s yod med rFes 'Fug can 8 d0yi0s sogs ci 'dra ra0 gru0 pa 8 de las rFes su dpog gang yin 8 de ni rigs pa nyid yin no 88=" G&"1*/ pp" > #'> >C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &6$C compare *@ 63" G6"-astu0hede prasiddhasya Bsa0dasaamaanyaad a0hedina"h8 no yuktaanumiti"h paa"n"dudra-yaJdi-ad dhutaaBsane 88 <tha dad ngos la ra0 gru0 pa 8 sgra mtshungs tha dad med pa'i phyir 8 rFes dpog rigs pa ma yin te 8 skye 0o'i rd.When a general result is pro0ati-e 8 Because it is concomitant 2ith the predicate/ 8<*hen/= 2hen one <o-er'=differentiates the relator/ 8 *hat differentiation is asserted to 0e the fla2 called kaaryasama".a mkhan gyis 8 0um pa la sogs 'Fim pa yi 8 rnam 'gyur 'ga' .as las me 0.

depends on space.-astus-aruupe 'siddhe 'yam nyaaya"h siddhe -iBse"sa"na"m 8a0aadhakam asiddhaa.% " .Because<2ords= are controlled 0y a desire to e7press/ 8 *here is nothing for 2hich there is not a 2ordC 8 (f one attained <o0Fects= through the e7istence <or 2ords for them=/ 8 3ll people should attain all o0Fects". <does not affect the permanence or impermanence of sound= " .apy aakaaBsaaBsraya-ad dh-ane"h 88 dngos po 'i ngo 0o ma gru0 na 8 tshul 'di gru0 na ma gru0 kyang 8 khyad par gnod 0yed ma yin te 8 sgra yi nam kha' la 0rten 0.(f a general entitati-e <reason= is unpro-en/ <then the syllogism is in-alid/= 8 Whereas if the <general reason= is pro-en/ then e-en if particular <details= 8 3re unpro-en/ <the syllogism= is not in-alidated/ 8 3s <2hether or not= sound .han d0ang phyir 8 sgra rnams gang la 'ang med ma min 8 de yod pas ni don gru0 na 8 thams cad kyis ni thams cad gru0 88= <-erse #6=" @ee 1*/ p" > C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &G3'&G " %&" .api Bsa0dasya siddhe -astuni sidhyati 8 auluukyasya yathaa 0auddhenokta"m muurtyaadisaadhana"m 88 <sgra ma gru0 kyang dngos po ni 8 gru0 na gru0 par 'gyur te dper 8 'ug pa da la sangs rgy as pas 8 lus sogs sgru0 0yed 0shad pa 0. -i-ak"saaparatantrat-aan na Bsa0daa"h santi kutra -aa 8 tad0haa-aad arthasiddhau tu sar-a"m sar-asya sidhyati 88 <0rFod par 'dod pa'i g. asiddhaa.<3toms are impermanent/ 0ecause= they are physical".hin 88= <-erse #%=" 1*/ pp" > '> &C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &G '&G&" %G" .*hrough this <approach= one can also in-estigate <and refute= such @aa"mkhya <and Jaina syllogisms as/ respecti-ely/= 8 BBuddhi is non'sentient/ 0ecause it is impermanent/' 8 3nd '<3 tree= is sentient/ 0ecause it dies8 When its 0ark is stripped".hin 88= <-erse #$=" 1*/ pp" > &'> GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &G&'&GG" %%" .' etena kaapilaadiinaam acaitenyaadi cintita"m 8 anityaadeBs ca caitanya"m mara"naat t-agapohata"h 88 <'dis ni ser skya la sogs kyi 8 mi rtag sogs phyir yang sems med 8 sogs dang shung pa 0shus na ni 8 'chi phyir sems ldan dpyad pa yin 88= <-erse #G=" 1*/ p" > C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &G " %6" .if the <entity= is mistaken/ 8 *hen e-en if the 2ord is unmistaken/ 8 *he proof must 0e kno2n as .E-en if a 2ord is unpro-en/ if the entity8 (s pro-en/ then <the reason= 2ill 0e pro-en/ as 8 *he Buddhists e7plain to the 3ulukyas 8 .

cited 0y Dharmakiirti/ and glosses the -erse as ha-ing the 2eapon inflict the 2ound and the medicine heal it" De-endra0uddhi <fol" G >/ lines 6'G= supports the reading 2e ha-e gi-en" (ncidentally/ an instance of homeopathic magic is cited in Dante's (nferno .realism.fla2ed/ 8 Because an entity is <only= pro-en from an entity".' and '0ecause it is . .' 8<3s reasons= pro-ing <a colored co2= is a co2 and <an elephant calf= is an elephant 8 3re not <-alidly= asserted/ for these are -er0al e7pressions 8 *hat are merely common <sayings=".homeopathic magic.ompare preceding/ p" #6/ alternati-e <c=" $3" Bsaastrau"sadhaa0hisa"m0andhaac caitrasya -ra"naroha"ne 8 asa"m0addhasya ki"m sthaano"h kaara"nat-a"m na kalpyate 88 <mtshon dang sman sogs '0rel 0a las 8 nag pa 'i rma dang 'dru0s yin na 8 '0rel med sdong dum ci yi phyir 8 rgyu nyid du ni rtog mi 0yed 88=" $ " )agatomi/ 3 @tudy of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa"na-aar' ttika/ p" 33" $&" 1*/ p" > GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &G$" r1yal tsha0 pro0a0ly 2as unfamiliar 2ith the instance of. tasyai-a -ya0hicaaraadau Bsa0de'py a-ya0hicaari"ni 8 do"sa-at saadhana"m FJneya"m -astuno -astusiddhita"h 88 <de nyid 'krul la sogs yin na 8 sgra ni 'khrul pa med na yang 8 sgru0 0yed skyon (dan shes 0ya ste 8 dngos las dngos po gru0 phyir ro 88 <-erse >K=" 1*/ p" > GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &GG" )ote the strong element of.'gro 0a 'i phyir dang lag (dan phyir 8 r-a can glang po . here: though the connection 0et2een 2ords and entities may 0e tenuous/ it still is assumed 0y Dharmakiirti that there is a definite and discerni0le nature to entities/ 2hich may ser-e as the foundation for -alid reasoning" %$" .goer.hand'possessing.'Because it is a .hes sgru0 0yed 8 'di yi sgra yi 0rFod 0ya ni 8 grags pa yin gyis 0rFod 'dod min 88 <-erse >Ka=" 1 */ p" > GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &GG'&G%" $K" yathaa tat kaara"na"m -astu tathai-a tadakaara"na"m 8 yadaa tat kaara"na"m kena mata"m ne"s"tam p" 3 G akaara"nam 88 <Fi ltar dngos de rhyu yin pa 8 de lta de nyid gang gi tshe 8 rgyu min gang gis de ni rgyur 8 'dod la rgyu ma yin mi 'dod 88=" $#" 1*/ p" > GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &G%'&G$" $>" .

hin yongs su gyur nas ni 8 rgyu yin de legs 0yas pa na 8 de yi khyad par mthong phyir ro 88=" #K3"1*/ p" > %C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &%K" #K "yathaa -iBse"sena -inaa -i"sayendriyasa"mhati"h 80uddher hetus tatheda"m cen na tatraapi -iBse"sata"h <gal te Fi ltar yul d0ang po 8tshogs pa khyad med 0#o rgyu yin8 de ltar 'di yin .han de yi rgyu 8 rtog pa yin na thams cad la 8 rgyu rnams thug pa med par 'gyur 88=" #KK"1*/ pp" > G'> %C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &G$'&%K" #K#"1*/ p" > %C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &%K" #K>"s-a0haa-apari"naamena hetur aLnkuraFanmani 8 0huumyaadis tasya sa"mskaare tad-iBse"sasya darBsanaat 88 <myu gu skyed la sa la sogs 8 rang 0.ompare preceding/ p" $" ##>"Aerse #%3C 1*/ p" >#$C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" G#3'G# " *he -erse is found in the discussion .he na min8 de las khyad par yod phyir ro88=" #K&")@/ (/ #/ " #K6"*his is the import of De-endra0uddhi's reading at PAA/ fol" G &/ line >/ p" #%%" #KG"1*/ p" > %C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &%K" #K%"p"rtak p"rtag aBsaktaanaa"m s-a0haa-aatiBsaye 'sati 8 sa"mhataa.hin khyad par med par ni80yed par yang ni mi rung ngo8rtag la ldog pa med pa'i phyir8 nus pa nyid kyang rtog par dka' 88=" $G" 1*/ p" > GC Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &G$" $%" (0id" $$" ye"su satsu 0ha-aty e-a yat te0hyo 'nyasya kalpane 8 taddhetut-ena sar-atra hetuunaam ana-asthiti"h 88 <gang dag yod no gang 'gyur nyid 8 de dag las g.apy asaamarthya"m syaat siddho 'tiBsayas tata"h 88 <so so so sor nus med rnams 8 rang 0.<OOO(/ '6=/ 2here the poet recalls the lance of 3chilles and his father/ 2hich could 0oth 2ound and heal" $6" s-a0haa-a0hedana -inaa -yaapaaro 'pi na yuFyate 8 nityasyaa-yatirekit-aat saamarthyan ca duran' -oya"m88<rang 0.hin khyad par med pas na 8 tshogs kyang nus pa med 'gyur 0as 8 de phyir khyad par gru0 pa yin 88=" #K$"1*/ p" > %C Jackson/ Enlightenment/ pp" &%K'&%#" Emphasis mine" ##K"tasmaat p"rtag aBsakte"su ye"su sa"m0haa-yate gu"na"h 8 sa"mhatau hetutaa tesaa"m neBs-araader a0hedata"h 88 <de phyir so sor gang nus med 8 tshogs na yon tan srid 'gyur 0a 8 de dag rgyu yin d0ang phyug sogs 8 ma yin khyad par med phyir ro 88=" ###".

ompare preceding/ notes % and $" #3K".ed in Potter/ Encyclopedia/ pp" 3&' 36" #>6")yaaya-aarttikataatparya"tiikaa (A/ #/ >#C summari.ompare 1anganatha Jha/ trans"/ *he *att-asamgraha of B@aantarak"sita 2ith the .hattopadhyaya/ )" Bhattacharyya/ and Potter mentioned in this article <preceding/ notes >/ / and >$=" ##&"Bodhicaryaa-ataara (O/ ##%'#>3" (t ought to 0e noted that B@aantide-a is misrepresenting the )yaaya'AaiBse"sika -ie2/ 2here0y ((Bs-ara is not the creator of the padaarthas/ 0ut their arranger" ##6"(0id"/ (O/ #> '#>&" ##G"((Bs-ara is reFected at *@ 6'$3/ puru"sa at *@ #&3'#GK" .ompare . 2hile Potter <p" #K>= .cosmological argument/.ommentary of 5amalaBsiila <Baroda: !riental (nstitute/ #$3G=/ -ol" #/ pp" 6%'#K#/ #3>'#3$" ##%"*@ G' % and &6'6KC Jha/ *att-asamgraha/ pp" 6$'G# and G&'G$" ##$"*@ %&C Jha/ *att-asamgraha/ p" $> p" 3 % #>K"*@ #&&'#6#/ Jha/ *att-asamgraha/ pp" #33'#3&" #>#"*@ #6>'#6GC Jha/ *att-asamgraha/ pp" #3&'#3G" #>>".of the aspect of origination <samudaya= of the truth of origination" ##3"1*/ p" >&#/ Jackson/ Enlightenment/ p" &%6" ## ".ed in Potter/ Encyclopedia/ pp" %#' %>" #>G"*he 2orks of 0oth JJnaanaBsriimitra and Ratnakiirti ha-e 0een edited 0y 3nantalal *hakur in the *i0etan @anskrit Works @eries <Patna: 5ashi Prasad Jayas2al Research (nstitute/ #$&$ and #$&G/ respecti-ely=" #>%".ompare/ for e7ample/ the 2ritings of .ed in Potter/ pp" 3G#'3G3" #>&"Ayoma-atii KC summari.hattopadhyaya/ (ndian 3theism/ chap" #&/ for a good summary of ?iimaa"msaka arguments" #>3"Dor references/ compare preceding/ note " #> ")yaayamaJnFarii #>&'#33C summari.hemparathy/ 3n (ndian Rational *heology/ p" >%" ( ha-e not as yet studied JJnaanaBsriimitra's or Ratnakiirti's arguments" #>$".ompare preceding/ note " #3#"(ndeed/ there is not e-en agreement on 2hether the syllogism corresponds to the argument from design: 1" Bhattacharyya <p" = calls it the .

cosmological.es modern Western arguments directly/ interspersing his discussion 2ith passages from and reflections upon the *hera-aadin tradition" *hera-aada does not de-elop a rational a'theology to any2here near the degree that the @anskritic .''although the focus there still is on the analogical appeal to design" #3>"*he most concerted attack on Western theism 0y a Buddhist is that of Dharmasiri <preceding/ note 3%=/ 2ho does not/ ho2e-er/ often directly relate Buddhist arguments to Western ones/ 0ut/ rather/ critici.Pramaa"na.cosmoteleological". (n fact/ the syllogism refuted 0y Dharmakiirti''2hich seeks to pro-e that entities are preceded 0y a conscious designer 0ecause of intermittence/ particular shape/ and efficiency''seems most like the argument from design/ 2hile the later syllogism proposed 0y Jayanta''in 2hich the e7istence of iiBs-ara follo2s from the 2orld's 0eing an effect''seems a 0it more . tradition does" #33"+m0erto Eco/ *he )ame of the Rose/ trans" William Wea-er <)e2 :ork: 6arcourt Brace Jo-ano-ich/ #$%3=/ pp" $>' $3" .considers it .