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Philosophy Study, ISSN 2159-5313 January 2012, Vol. 2, No.

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Heraclitus as a Process Philosopher

Daniel W. Graham
Brigham Young University

At least since Hegel identified Heraclitus as a philosopher who dealt with becoming, it has seemed obvious to perhaps most scholars that he was in some way a philosopher of process rather than a philosopher of being. (For the views of Hegel and some early interpreters, see Graham 1997, 46-50.) Indeed, ancient sources say that for him all things are in flux, and one cannot step twice into the same stream. Yet for all that, many interpreters of Heraclitus perhaps unwittingly portray him in ways that are inconsistent with his being a process philosopher. And there are those who wish to downplay the role of flux in his system as well. In any case, to call him a process philosopher remains a vague claim until an interpreter specifies in what sense he is committed to process. Even more important, perhaps, is the question whether Heraclitus can maintain a coherent theory of process, given interpretations both ancient and modern that portray him as violating the principle of non-contradictionoften precisely because of his theory of flux. In this paper I shall attempt to argue that Heraclitus is indeed a process philosopher, and more importantly to spell out in what way he is, and to defend his theory as a consistent and indeed philosophically sound starting point for understanding the world as a process; I will end by pointing out some ways in which his theory accords with modern scientific explanations of the world. Keywords: Heraclitus, process philosophy, Presocratic philosophy, Greek science

1. Material Flux
I wish to begin by laying out what I think is at once a fairly traditional and a highly sophisticated view of Heraclitus, that of Jonathan Barnes. He identifies three main principles in Heraclitus philosophy, the doctrines he calls Flux, the Unity of Opposites, and Monism (1982, 75-76). He sees flux as the principle that everything is always flowing in some respects (69, original emphasis). According to the Unity of Opposites, every pair of contraries is somewhere coinstantiated; and every object coinstantiates at least one pair of contraries (70). The Monism in question is the material monism Barnes thinks Heraclitus inherits from his predecessors. According to material monism, there is only one kind of material constituent of everything in the world: according to Aristotles interpretation of his predecessors, either water, or air, or fire. If, for instance, water is the basic reality, then everything else (e.g., earth, air, fire) is an appearance of water under certain conditions.1 Barnes sees the Unity of Opposites as being entailed by Flux as well as supported by additional evidence (75-76), while Monism is a logically independent thesis. Barnes three principles are similar to those enunciated earlier by W. K. C. Guthrie (though there is one significant difference in Guthries formulation of three principles).2 I refer to Barnes account in part because few other interpreters provide a precise enough analysis of Heraclitus to even allow such a summation. It may be, of course, that Heraclitus is a fuzzy thinker who does not admit of precise formulations; on the other hand, it behooves us to try to go beyond fuzzy thinking in trying
Daniel W. Graham, Ph.D., professor of philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Brigham Young University; main research fields: Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ancient Greek Science.


to understand his theory, and Barnes has made a valiant effort to do so.3 When I say Barnes interpretation is traditional, I have in mind the fact that the roots of his interpretation go back to Aristotle. Aristotle attributed something like Flux (probably a stronger version than that of Barnes in fact) and also Monism to Heraclitus.4 And indeed, the flux theory interpretation comes also from Plato, and probably goes back at least to Hippias of Elis.5 Because of its Aristotelian origins, Barnes interpretation is liable to gain uncritical acceptance. But there is one striking fact about this kind of interpretation that is too often overlooked: Flux and Monism are fundamentally conflicting principles that tend to give different answers to the question of Heraclitus ontology. On the one hand, Flux says (in Barnes carefully limited version) that all things are changing in some respect, or (in an unrestricted version) that all things are changing in all respects. On the other hand, Monism, that is, material monism, says that ultimately all things are one stuff, namely, for Heraclitus, fire. But if all things are one stuff, and there is one subject for every change, then all changes are basically non-substantial changes. Remember that for Aristotle, there are four types of change: coming-to-be or perishing in the category of substance; increase or decrease in the category of quantity; alteration in the category of quality; and locomotion or change of place in the category of place.6 The last three types of change are kinds of accidental change. Hence they are, according to Aristotles ontology and typology of changes, instances of relatively insignificant change. According to Aristotle material monists did not allow substantial change,7 and Aristotle finally had to rescue this type of change from oblivion by developing his own more sophisticated and comprehensive theory of change (Physics I). Hence, if we follow the logic of this exposition, it turns out that, despite all the fuss, Heraclitus admits only accidental change. What is really real is not process, but substantiality, that of the underlying reality that is the subject of all change. Heraclitus is not a process philosopher but a substantial monist, who tricks us into thinking he is a process philosopher. He allows accidental change and makes a lot of commotion about it, but he blocks the most important kind of change, and indeed rules out a priori fundamental or radical change. One way out of this is to notice that fire is a queer kind of stuff that is perhaps more an ongoing process than a stable substantial reality. If we pursue that route, we have to take the apparent claim of Monism ironically. If we give Flux pride of place from the outset and say that this principle dictates the nature of reality for Heraclitus, then we end up at about the same place, overthrowing or somehow discounting Monism in the interests of Flux. For all these reasons, it seems to me that it does not make a lot of sense for Heraclitus to embrace both Flux and Monism. To the degree we take material monism seriously, we trivialize flux as a mere local variation of an all-pervasive static reality. To the extent that we take Flux seriously, we find ourselves compelled to sweep Monism under the rug. Flux and Monism are fundamentally incompatible principles. They can coexist in a system only if at least one is limited in its application. Or they can coexist if Heraclitus rejects (at least tacitly) the law of non-contradiction. In fact, this is just what Barnes says he does, in part on the basis of the Flux principle itself (79-81).8 Nevertheless, to reject the law of non-contradiction is to accept logical chaos, and it must disqualify any system from serious consideration. In fact, there is no reason to think that Heraclitus rejects the law of non-contradiction for all his paradoxical utterances (any more than to think that Socrates rejects it for all his paradoxical claims). Paradoxical sayings are provocative heuristic devices; they need not be taken at face value, and usually should not be. If any interpretation that does not commit Heraclitus to the denial of the law of non-contradiction can be found, it will be ipso facto superior to any that does so commit him. So let us press on.


I have not yet said what I mean by process philosophy. The real question at stake in an examination of Heraclitus principles is one of ontology: is the ultimate reality a substance (or a fact or a bundle of properties, etc.) or a process? If the former, Heraclitus is a substance theorist of the sort Aristotle considers the Milesians to be. If the latter, he is by definition a process philosopher who makes stable structures secondary to processes, and puts flux at the foundations of ontology. This will make him a philosopher of becoming rather than being, and to that extent, vindicate Plato and Hegel against Aristotle (or at least Aristotle when he is emphasizing material monism rather than flux). One indication that Heraclitus is a process philosopher would be his acceptance of some sort of change other than alteration. For according to Aristotle, material monists allow only alteration, or change of qualitynever generation or destruction, or change in the category of substance, since there is only one substance which is always present as a substratum to all changes.9 Let us then turn to Heraclitus account of change and see what he has to say about this. Heraclitus does address the question of basic changes in his system. According to him, The turnings [tropai] of fire: first sea, and of sea half is earth, half fireburst [prstr] (B31[a]). For souls it is death to become [genesthai] water, for water death to become earth, but from earth water is born [ginetai], and from water soul (B36). The first passage deals ostensibly with cosmology, the second with chemistry. But the general pattern is the same, allowing that soul is equivalent to fireburst, or some kind of fiery meteorological phenomenon. The crucial point is that there is a determinate series of stuffs such that one changes into another: earth turns into water and water turns into fire; fire turns back into water, and water into earth. What is most telling for the question of changes is that in the process change is likened to birth and death: the birth of one stuff is the death of another. While we can safely say that Heraclitus lays out no typology of changes like that of Aristotle, the language of birth and death is the language fitting for substantial change, which in Aristotles terminology is genesis and phthora, coming-to-be and perishing, or, more literally, birth and death. What the terminology implies is a radical change from stuff to stuff such that there is no transmission of identity from one elemental body to another. When one stuff is born, another dies. Heraclitus envisages then a radical change with accompanying loss of identity, not a mere alteration of an ongoing reality. There is a set sequence and order of changes, but no continuing substratum.10 One further fragment is well known as a statement or portrayal of flux: On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow (B12). There are several alleged river fragments, but I follow Geoffrey S. Kirk and Miroslav Marcovich in accepting only B12 as a genuine fragment.11 All the other statements can be satisfactorily accounted for as paraphrases (more or often less apt) of B12. This fragment (and its offspring) is often taken as evidence for radical flux. As Plato reads it, Heraclitus says you cannot step twice into the same river.12 If we stick to B12, we see that this is a misreading: the major contrast is between the different waters and the same rivers. Thus, the changing contents of the rivers are not evidence that the rivers have changed (hence that you cannot step twice into them). Indeed, the deeper point seems to be that the changing waters are a necessary condition for the existence of the rivers. If that is so, the changing waters actually constitute the rivers, and maintain them as the same rivers. This study in the physics of rivers suggests an object lesson in Heraclitean metaphysics: changing matter is consistent with, and perhaps constitutive of, stable structures of a higher level. There is also a second reading hidden in the fragment: the words are syntactically ambiguous, as are the words in a relatively large number of the fragments, and if we take the less obvious reading, we find that those who step into the water remain the same as the waters flow on.13 That is:


those who ford the different waters of the rivers remain the same in stark contrast to the claim that people as well as rivers change rapidly. The suggestion is that in a certain sense the travelers maintain their psychic and cognitive integrity precisely by confronting the changing waters, or more broadly, their changing surroundings. The general conclusion of both readings is that low-level changes somehow sustain high-level stability. Flux is a basic fact of nature, but it allows and perhaps sustains permanence.

2. Supervenient Stability
If there is flux at the level of the basic constituents of the world, it would seem that the world is chaotic, and so most commentators on Heraclitus from Plato on have thought. Yet this is not the picture we find in Heraclitusquite the opposite in fact. As we have already seen, in B31(a) and B36 Heraclitus identifies a set order of changes, from earth to water to fire. There is a determinate sequence of changes. Moreover, there is also a determinate order: A road up and down is one and the same (B60). Although the application of this observation is broad, commentators tend to agree that it should at least include elemental transformations.14 There is a road up, from earth to water to fire, and a road down, from fire to water to earth. In Heraclitus there is no cycle strictly speaking: no way of circling from fire to earth without going back through water (Kirk 1954, 114-15). Nevertheless, at each turning there is a two-way exchange, as B31(a) makes clear: half of water becomes earth while half becomes fire. There is also a set ratio of exchange in the transformations of elements: <Earth> is liquified as sea and measured into the same proportion [logos] it had before it became earth (B31[b]). That is, there is a fixed equivalence between earth and water such that n measures of earth equals m measures of water, and we get a chemical equivalence: a E b W. As Heraclitus puts it: All things are an exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods (B90). He does not say that fire is all things, but that it is a standard of value against which all things can be measured. So: a E = b W = c F.15 His world is not chaotic; rather, it is orderly and precise in its turnings or reversals or transformations. While there is no conservation of substance, there is a conservation of matter in general and presumably of energy. The result is a world in which stability is possible in spite of constant change. This fact can be seen most clearly in his description of the cosmos: This world-order [kosmos], the same of all, no god or man did create, but it ever was and is and will be: everliving fire, kindling in measures and being quenched in measures (B30). The world that we know is permanent, notwithstanding the fact that parts of it are turning into something else (fire) or reappearing from something else (fire). It is precisely the fact that measures are balanced against measures that maintain the world. There is an equilibrium state between transformations: water evaporates, condenses into cloud, rains down, and so water is lost and returned, ultimately in equal measures. Surprisingly, Heraclitus has the most permanent cosmos of any early philosopher: instead of a cosmogony, his world is everlasting, from past to present to future unchanged in its overall structure though constantly changing in its particular contents. If we use the river fragment as a guide, we may infer that what makes the cosmos the vibrant reality it is, is precisely the everliving alternation of elements that underlies it. Were there no exchanges, the world would be sterile and unproductivedead. Incidentally, this is the fragment that could provide the best textual support for material monism.16 Stripped of modifiers, the statement says the world is fire. If this is a statement of essential predication, then the world must be fire and nothing else. Nevertheless, the statement also says that fire is kindling and being


quenched. Taken together with the other passages that entail that fire perishes and is reborn, I think it is best to read the passage as a figurative connection between the world and fire. Fire is the most insubstantial of elements, and as such the claim that it is the fundamental element exposes the folly of making any element fundamental. One stuff turns into every other in turn, so none is prior, except insofar as one can reveal the impermanence of all. What emerges from this fragment is a claim that the world itself, despite the fact that its contents are continuously being transformed, or indeed because of this process, is stable, permanent, and everlasting. The ultimate outcome of elemental instability is cosmic stability. Not only does flux somehow produce order, it presupposes order. Heraclitus claims that all things happen according to his logos (B1). The logos exists forever and can be heard, but most people do not understand it when they hear it (B1). According to the logos, wisdom is knowing that all things are one (B50). Again we seem to be led back to material monism, in which all things are one. Yet if we study the way in which all things are one, we get a different picture: As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these (B88). The second sentence explains the first: the way things are the same is that there is a process by which one condition changes to another. And this change is not radical: Cold things warm up, hot things cool off, wet things become dry, dry things become moist (B126). If opposites were really identical there would be no change. But the sameness is explained as change. Hence the sameness is not identity, but connection through a continuous process. All things are one by being connected. The logos is both a message and a principle. The principle is the underlying order according to which all things happen. Presumably it is expressed in the sequence of changes among elements, in the fixed proportions of elements. Some sort of law of change is prior to the changes and processes manifest in natural events. So does that mean there is something prior to process in Heraclitus ontology? Not necessarily. For the law of change is manifest only in the processes themselves. It has no being apart from the processes that exemplify it. Heraclitus, for his part, does not present the logos as a transcendent principle, and indeed, there are those who, on both philosophical and philological grounds, deny that it means more than account or speech.17 If we return to the river fragment, we see that for Heraclitus stability may emerge from a process of constant exchange and replacement of material contents. To put it in a philosophical way, form supervenes on flux. As long as some sort of equilibrium state is achieved, we may find a long-lasting structure which is characterized by constant material changesuch as the river Cayster, which flowed through Ephesus in Heraclitus time two and a half millennia ago and still does, although Ephesus itself is long gone (there is an archaeological site at the place of the Roman-period city), the river has a new name in a different language, the river bed has shifted, and the harbor has silted up as the shoreline has receded.18 Similarly, human beings are stable entities constituted in part by their confrontation of the changing waters of rivers and their changing surroundings in general. Beyond the superstructures that Heraclitus recognizes as supervening on material process, there is the implication that the tension between low-level flux and high-level stability is all-important. Were it not for the replacement of matter in the river, there would be no river, only a stagnant marsh or a dry wadi. Were it not for ever-changing stimuli from their environment, humans would have no knowledge of the world. Were it not for the transformations of everliving fire, kindling in measures and being quenched in measures, our Earth would be dead and empty, as dead and empty as the moon that astronauts visited decades ago. The only stability that is valuable is that which arises from material interchanges, from the living and dying of the elements, and the


related cycles of cosmic masses, such as the water cycle. Without these processes the world would be without form and void. Process is basic, but it does not preclude order; rather, it provides the foundation for a creative order that depends ultimately on the lawlike behavior of matter.

3. The Scientific Heraclitean

Heraclitus advocacy of process is remarkable for both its boldness and its precociousness. But let us consider it also against the empirical evidence available today. In that connection, I would ask us to examine ourselves for just a moment, as Heraclitus says he examined himself (B101). (Although the chemistry is new, Heraclitus had a kind of chemical theory of his own, as we have seen, that did similar work for him.) Every minute of every day we are drawing in breath from the surrounding air. With each breath we draw in at least 500 ml of air. In our lungs, oxygen is exchanged for carbon dioxide: oxygen in, carbon dioxide out. In our blood stream hemoglobin in red blood cells bonds with individual molecules of oxygen and carries it to each of our cells, approximately 10,000 trillion of them. At rest the heart beats 70 times per minute. Each blood cell completes a circuit of the vascular system in about 60 seconds, from the lungs to the heart to the arteries to the arterioles, to the capillaries, to the venules, to the veins, and back to the heart and then the lungs. In the capillaries blood cells come into contact with stationary cells of the body. At each cell membrane oxygen is absorbed from red blood cells and carbon dioxide passed out. Meanwhile, our digestive system is breaking down food into glucose, amino acids, fatty acids, and glycerol, which pass into the blood stream. Each cell takes in the nutrients it needs. Glucose travels into the cytoplasm, where it is converted into pyruvic acid, which in turn is taken into the mitochondrion, where in the complex reaction known as the Krebs cycle and Oxydative Phosphorylation, one molecule of glucose is turned into 36 molecules of ATP (adenosine triphosphate), and water. ATP is the energy currency of the cell; whenever the cell needs energy, it pays in ATP: gold for goods and goods for gold. As ATP is expended carbon dioxide, water and other wastes are expelled. Each cell has about a billion molecules of ATP in it, all of which will be expended within two minutes time while another billion are generated. Inside us a river of blood flows down, then up, day in, day out, hour by hour, minute by minute. Our blood pumps about 300 liters of blood per hour. A massive network of vessels 100,000 km long carries blood to every individual cell in the body. As long as the river flows on, we live and flourish. If for a few seconds the constant chemical exchanges should stop, we would faint; if for a few minutes they should stop, we would die. Like a river that without circulation would perish, like a fire that without consuming fuel would flicker out, without the balanced processes of respiration and oxidation, we would die, become a corpse more fit to be cast out than dung. But even as we continue to live, our component cells are dying. Each minute 300 million cells die. But by the same token another 300 million cells come to birth. The death of some cells is the birth of othersand without that interchange we would cease to exist. The physiology I have shared is modern, but the insight is ancient. As the author of the Hippocratic treatise On Breaths put it: If the passages of the air into the body were cut off, in a small fraction of a day one would perish (4). The human body is a living manifestation of flux. Now, this example at the level of the physiology of the individual body is just one of many examples we might choose. We might begin at the cosmic level, where the universe is expanding via cosmic inflation, having started from a microscopic beginning. Evolving conditions in the early universe eventually allowed for the possibility of atoms and the production of hydrogen atoms in particular. Gravity brought these atoms together into masses large and dense enough to generate nuclear fusion, which produced atoms of helium and then


heavier elements, while supernova explosions produced still heavier elements, which were then dispersed to provide the seeds of rocky planets like Earth. One such planet condensed in the orbit of a yellow star at the edge of the Milky Way. It was large enough to hold on to an atmosphere and far enough from its star to allow for liquid water, but not so far that it would all freeze. Liquid water produced seas and a carbon-rich surface allowed for the beginnings of life. Cyanobacteria began to undergo photosynthesis, producing oxygen molecules as a waste product. The free oxygen molecules poisoned most bacteria, but allowed for a new kind of organism to used oxidation to run its cells. The presence of oxygen in the atmosphere also produced an ozone layer that blocked much ultraviolet light, allowing the possibility of living things on land. Evolution produced more complex life forms. Meanwhile the molten center of the planet produced tectonic action on the surface, along with volcanism. This action produced greenhouse gases and an uneven surface that kept the planet from being permanently covered by ice and snow during ice ages. The preceding is just a small sample of the conclusions of modern science. Their lesson is that, from the flux of subatomic particles to the motions of molecules to the physiology of complex organisms to the stability of species to climate change to the plate tectonics to the revolutions of galaxies to the life histories of stars and of the elements that make up the universe to the inflation of the universe itself, everything is in flux. And yet there is order. If the cosmos itself is more ephemeral than Heraclitus recognized, yet the order is more profound and pervasive. If we learn anything from modern science, it is that all things are in flux, while events and objects (which may be seen as stable or self-sustaining events) are orderly. After all the reconceptualizations of modern science, we find that Heraclitus theory captures the patterns of the world. Dynamic equilibrium is the manifestation of order, a kind of everliving process. Heraclitus is, I hope we can see, a philosopher of process, arguably the first,19 and one who still has something to teach us. And in his process theory, he may have advanced one of the rarest kinds of philosophical theses: one that is true.20

1. Aristotle Metaphysics, 983b6-21, 984a2-8. 2. Guthrie identifies three principles: the unity of opposites, constant flux, and the fact that the world is a living and everlasting fire (Guthrie 1962-81, Vol. I, 435, see 435-59). The last principle seems not to be consistent with material monism. 3. For further reflections on Barnes, see Graham, 1997; 2006, ch. 5. 4. Flux: Metaphysics, 1010a7-15; Topics, 104b21-22; On the Heavens, 298b29-33 (a commendably cautious statement); Monism: Metaphysics, 984a7-8. 5. Plato Theaetetus, 152d-153a; cf. Cratylus, 402a-c; Aristotle Metaphysics, 983b27-33 with Mansfeld 1990, 22-96; Patzer 1986, 49-55. 6. Categories, 14; Physics, V.1-2. 7. Metaphysics, 983b6-13. 8. Cf. Guthrie: He ignores the law of contradiction, he insists that opposites are identical (1962-81, Vol. I., 463). 9. Metaphysics, 983b8-13; On Generation and Corruption, 314a8-11, b26-315a3. 10. Cf. Osborne: For Heraclitus the things we meet with are not manifestations of a universal stuff (energy) which we encounter in its various guises and never gets destroyed but is always conserved. For Heraclitus the important point is that the elements do get destroyed (1997, 101). 11. Kirk 1951; Kirk 1954, 366-80; Marcovich 1967, 194-214. (Kirk accepts B91[b] as a fragment, but not the problematic B91[a].) 12. Cratylus, 402a8-10. 13. Kahn 1979, 167. I have tried to capture the ambiguity of the Greek in my translation above. The Greek of B12: Potamoisi toisin autoisin embainousin, hetera kai hetera hudata epirrei. The words toisin autoisin (the same) are sandwiched between


potamoisi rivers and embainousin those who enter, they agree morphologically with both the preceding and the succeeding terms, are adjacent to both, and can be construed with eithera rhetorical and semantic tour de force. This double entendre reiterates Heraclitus message in the river fragment: sameness and change are correlative and interdependent states. Plato, the spurious B49a, and the spurious B91 all get the point wrong. The rivers and the people fording them remain the same despite (because of) the changing contents of the rivers. 14. E.g., Diogenes Laertius 9.8-9; Kahn 1979, 240-41. Kirk identifies five ancient interpretations, of which the application to the elements is the commonest (1954, 105-12). 15. The point of providing equations is not to make Heraclitus look like a modern scientist, but to show that he admits a good deal of precision in his world of flux. 16. This seems to be Aristotles reading in Physics, 205a3-4; idem, On the Heavens, 279b12-17 and Simplicius On the Heavens, 294.4-7 seem to understand B30 as entailing a conflagration such as the Stoics envisage, in which the cosmos is periodically consumed by fire. 17. See now Gianvittorio 2010. 18. [S]hall we say that while the race of inhabitants remains the same, the city is also the same, although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and more coming? (Aristotle, Politics, 1276a34-39, revised Oxford trans.). 19. To establish his priority would take a longer argument than is justified on this occasion. Since I reject the common Aristotelian interpretation that makes the early Ionian philosophers material monists, I do not think the argument is a trivial one. Indeed, I see Heraclitus as arriving at his process philosophy by way of criticizing and clarifying the Generating Substance Theory of his predecessors (see Graham 1997; 2006). 20. I read a version of this paper at the Ancient Philosophy Society meetings in Sundance, Utah on April 15, 2011. Part of this paper is taken from a talk I gave at the Symposium Antiquae Philosophiae, Samos, Greece, and Ephesus, Turkey on July 25, 2005. I benefited from comments of my fellow symposiasts, and also from constructive criticism of an anonymous referee of this journal.

Works Cited
Barnes, Jonathan. 1979. The Presocratic Philosophers. 2 vols. Rev. ed. (1 vol.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Gianvittorio, Laura. Il discorso di Heraclito: Un modello semantico e cosmologico nel passagio dell oralit alla scrittura. Hildesheim: Olms, 2010. Graham, Daniel W. Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006. ---. Heraclitus Criticism of Ionian Philosophy. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15 (1997): 1-50. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1962-81. Kahn, Charles H. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979. Kirk, Geoffrey S. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1954. ---. Natural Change in Heraclitus. Mind 60.237 (1951): 35-42. Mansfeld, Jaap. Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990. Marcovich, Miroslav. Heraclitus. Mrida, Venezuela: U of the Andes P, 1967. 2nd ed. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2001. Osborne, Catherine. Heraclitus. From the Beginning to Plato. Ed. Christopher C. W. Taylor. Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. 1. London: Routledge, 1997. 88-127. Patzer, Andreas. Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1986.