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John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness.

Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(4), 371-403.Abstract John and Senbet (1998) have examined the corporate governance and board effectiveness. There were 3 variable used in this study which are Corporate governance; Corporate finance; and Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance. This dissertation surveys the pragmatic and conjectural literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. They have spotlight on the in-house mechanisms of corporate governance and their role in ameliorating a mixture of course of organization troubles arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors and other stakeholders to the corporate firm. They also look at the replacement effect between internal mechanisms of corporate governance and external mechanisms, particularly markets for corporate control.

Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of corporate finance, 9(3), 295-316. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) has examine Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee . . There were 3 variable used in this study which Board of directors , Earnings management and Audit committee. They have examined the function of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, they show that the work of art of a board in general and of an audit committee more exclusively, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. Their finding is that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.

Andres, P. D., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580. Andres & Vallelado (2008) has studied about Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. There were 4 variable used in this study which are Corporate governance , Board of directors , Commercial banks and System estimator.They have collected data by using a sample of large international commercial banks to test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors. They have a suitable econometric model (two step system estimator) to solve the well-known endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, and demonstrate the empirical and theoretical superiority of system estimator over OLS and within estimators. We find an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and board size, and between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. Our results show that bank board composition and size are related to directors ability to monitor and advise management, and that larger and not excessively independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and create more value. All of these relations hold after we control for the measure of performance, the weight of the banking industry in each country, bank ownership, and regulatory and institutional differences.

Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(4), 409-434. Abstract Gompers et al. [Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107155] created G-Index, a summary measure of corporate governance based on 24 firm-specific provisions, and showed that more democratic firms are more valuable. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., 2005. What matters in corporate governance? Working Paper, Harvard Law School] created an entrenchment index based on six provisions underlying G-Index, and found it to fully drive the Gompers et al. (2003) valuation results. Both G-Index and the entrenchment index are based on IRRC data that is comprised of anti-takeover measures, focusing on external governance [Cremers, K.J.M., Nair, V.B., 2005. Governance mechanisms and equity prices. Journal of Finance 60, 28592894]. We create Gov-Score, a summary governance measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and external governance, and we show that a parsimonious index based on seven provisions underlying Gov-Score fully drives the relation between Gov-Score and firm value. Our results support the Bebchuk et al. (2005) findings that only a small subset of provisions marketed by corporate governance data providers are related to firm valuation, and the Cremers and Nair (2005) evidence that both internal and external governance are linked to firm value. The 51 governance provisions we consider include five that are relevant to accounting and public policy: stock option expensing, and four that are audit-related. We find none of these five measures to be related to firm valuation. We document that only one of the seven governance provisions important for firm valuation was mandated by either the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 or the three major US stock exchanges. We provide researchers with an alternative measure of governance to G-Index with three distinct advantages: (1) broader in scope of governance, (2) covers more firms, and (3) more dynamic, reflecting recent changes in the corporate governance environment. Keywords

Corporate governance; Firm valuation; Anti-takeover; Internal and external governance

Solomon, J. F., Lin, S. W., Norton, S. D., & Solomon, A. (2003). Corporate governance in Taiwan: Empirical evidence from Taiwanese company directors.Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 235-248. Keywords:

Corporate governance; Taiwan; boards of directors; family control In this paper we present empirical evidence on the attitudes of Taiwanese company directors on the role and function of the board of directors in Taiwanese corporate governance. Our findings arise from a questionnaire survey distributed to the directors of a sample of companies listed on the Taiwanese Securities Exchange (TSE). Our findings provide a picture of the current state of corporate governance in Taiwan. The respondents indicate that the board of directors constitutes the most important instrument in Taiwanese corporate governance and our findings endorse the important role played by outside directors in the corporate governance system in Taiwan. Furthermore, the respondents endorsed the agency theory perspective on corporate governance as they considered the presence of outside directors improved corporate accountability to shareholders. There is, however, evidence that few companies have created remuneration and audit committees. We also found that Taiwanese directors are dissatisfied with the influence of families on the corporate governance of listed companies and do not consider that outside directors on boards should be related to founding families. Overall, the directors displayed an awareness of accountability issues and a desire to improve accountability and transparency. They clearly want international harmonisation of corporate governance standards and view corporate governance reform as a means of attracting foreign funds into Taiwan. This is an important finding as it endorses the work of the OECD and other international bodies in harmonising corporate governance at a global level.