Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 1 for
Quality Investments
CE Services (Riga‐Zurich) is independent Corporate
Excellence research centre for systematic equity
investment analysis. CE Services focuses on the
following equity markets: USA, Western Europe,
Winners and Losers
Japan, Switzerland, and Eastern Europe.
Research findings are used in CE Asset Manage‐ under Credit Crunch
ment activities. The results of Excellence inves‐
tments covering the world’s major stock exchanges
are published on a monthly basis in the CE Corpo‐
rate Quality Index® and CE Corporate Excellence
Index®.
Our experience, enhanced by first‐hand research,
is consistently leveraged in a monthly publication
for clients called The Competitive Edge Perspecti‐
ve®.
CE Services
© 2009 CE Services SIA
Adrese: P.Brieža 15, Rīga, LV‐1010, Latvija. Tel: +371 67 808 974, +371 67 808 975
2
CE Services
Consumer staples
Only 4% of 977 European companies demonstrated an
discretionary
Consumer
Healthcare
Industrials
Financials
Materials
Telecom
increase in their share prices over July 2007 to end of
Utilites
Energy
IT
December 2009. Further 17% of companies lost less 0%
‐10%
than 30% in share prices. All the other companies ‐20%
‐30%
experienced a more than 30% decrease in stock re‐ ‐40%
‐50%
turns; some even experienced 95% loss in their market ‐60%
‐70%
values.
Figure 1: Average performance of the industry groups (July2007‐
December2009)
There appear to be large variances in the share price
reactions to the credit crunch depending on the geog‐
Size and Style Distribution
raphical region, size and financial performance of
companies, as demonstrated by the research project
Results of the study show that companies with low
in co‐operation of CE Services SIA and Tallinn School of
market capitalisation had demonstrated highest ave‐
Economics and Business Administration of the Tallinn
rage stock returns a year before the start of the credit
University of Technology. This project aims to identify
crunch (71% in average), whereas companies with
the typology of the winners and losers under the cre‐
highest market capitalisation exceeding 10 bn EUR lost
dit crunch by way of studying companies’ share price
relatively less in their share prices after the credit
performance and financial data as of December 2009
crunch started (‐17% in average).
in comparison to July 2007. The sample of 977 listed
companies from 32 European countries were resear‐
80%
ched. 31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007 71%
60% 31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008
20%
As a consequence of the credit crunch the companies
0%
headquartered in the EU 15 old member states and in
the EFTA countries lost overall less in share prices than ‐20%
large‐cap II quarter‐cap mid‐cap I quarter‐cap small‐cap
‐17% ‐23% ‐21%
companies registered in the CIS (Russia and Ukraine) ‐40%
‐21% ‐20%
and the EU 12 new member states. This is partly
Figure 2: Average performance of the size groups (July2006‐
explained by the previously high growth rates in the July2008)
latter regions as well as by higher political and financi‐
al instability and asset outflow from the emerging These results partly correspond to the performance of
markets during the credit crunch. The best performers investment styles. The companies classified as Growth
tend to be quoted in the developed Western Europe‐ companies, which are usually of a smaller size, showed
an countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Britain, better performance during the year before the finan‐
Denmark and Portugal as well as Slovakia. cial crisis emerged (61% in average). However, com‐
panies with lower valuation, which are considered to
Industry Distribution be of more conservative style during financial crises,
evidently were not able to outperform Growth style
As expected, in general the best performing compa‐ companies: performance of ‐19% of Growth style
nies were those in non‐cyclical businesses as well as companies versus performance of ‐21% of Value style
traditionally good dividend payers (with the exception companies.
of financial sector): healthcare, telecoms, utilities and
consumer staples. Among the best surviving industry 70.0%
61.3% 31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007
subgroups were food and staples retailing, healthcare 60.0%
31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008
50.0%
equipment, commercial and professional services. The 40.0%
39.3%
durables. However, considering the high intra‐industry 20.0%
10.0%
dispersion of these results, belonging to a certain 0.0%
industry does not seem to have been a fundamental ‐10.0%
driver of companies’ stock price reactions to the credit ‐20.0%
Growth Companies Value Companies
‐30.0% ‐19.1% ‐21.2%
crunch.
Figure 3: Average performance of the investment styles (July2006‐
July2008)
© 2009 CE Services SIA
Disclaimer: This document may contain confidential information that is not intended for third parties. If you are not the intended recipient of this document, you must not publish or pass on its content in
any way. This document is for information purposes only and constitutes neither an offer nor a recommendation to undertake any type of transaction or to buy or sell securities or financial products in
the broadest sense. CEAMS offers no guarantee of the completeness, correctness or security of this document. CEAMS accepts no liability claims that might arise from the use or non‐use of the content
of this document.
3
CE Services
Financials
Quality investors evidently were in the winning positi‐ Thus, systematic approach to creating stock portfolio
on as according to the investment style philosophy with the emphasis on Quality, including also defensive
they mostly consider enterprises with strong balance industry and size choice, could be able to beat the
sheet and solid financials. Study results proved that general market but most probably wouldhave lost in
the healthier were the financials of the company the absolute value during the global setback of major
better average performance during the period it could stock indices.
demonstrate. This is applicable to the major profit
ratios such as ROE as well as capital structure ratios CE Services Team in cooperation with Tallinn
such as debt/equity ratio (see figure 4) – companies University of Technology
with less risky capital structure outperformed compa‐
nies with more risky capital structure.
The research project “Survivors of the credit crunch”
60.0% 55.1% 53.6%
was carried out in co‐operation of CE Services SIA and
50.0% 47.5% 47.5% 31.07.2006 / 31.07.2007 a group of Master students at the Tallinn School of
40.0% 31.07.2007 / 31.07.2008 Economics and Business Administration of the Tallinn
30.0%
20.0%
University of Technology (TUT) from January to May
10.0% 2009. The Master students conducting the research
0.0% were Mari Männiste, Maksim Golovatjuk and Signe
‐10.0%
Uustal. They were supervised by Aaro Hazak, PhD,
‐20.0% D/E > 0,9 D/E 0,6‐0,9 D/E 0,3‐0,6 D/E < 0,3
‐30.0% ‐22.6% ‐19.1% ‐21.3%
‐16.7% Senior Researcher at TUT. Tallinn School of Economics
and Business Administration is the largest institution
Figure 4: Average performance of the companies according to
of research and higher education in economics and
Debt/Equity ratio (July2006‐July2008)
business administration in Estonia, offering
Interestingly, differences in companies’ working capi‐ internationally accredited study curricula at bachelor,
tal position do not appear to have been substantial master and doctoral level, including programs for fo‐
drivers of share price performance under the credit reign students.
crunch.
Typology of Winners
Most of the winners (positve share price performance)
tend to be large companies belonging to the EU 15 old
member states. The winners show a relatively low
average P/E ratio, high average profit margin and
relatively moderate return on assets. In contrast,
companies having experienced biggest losses in share
prices are the ones with highest P/E ratios and
relatively high return on assets. In this way the study
shows a clear contrast between the overly optimistic
expectations of shareholders and companies’ actual
ability to increase value.
There were only 38 winning companies (i.e. compa‐
nies with positive price performance) of the total
number of companies analyzed, which is not substan‐
tial to make logical conclusions and to find patterns in
order to set a strategy for winning equity portfolio.
Positive share price performance was caused by cor‐
porate events in the majority cases (e.g. Volkswagen).
© 2009 CE Services SIA
Disclaimer: This document may contain confidential information that is not intended for third parties. If you are not the intended recipient of this document, you must not publish or pass on its content in
any way. This document is for information purposes only and constitutes neither an offer nor a recommendation to undertake any type of transaction or to buy or sell securities or financial products in
the broadest sense. CEAMS offers no guarantee of the completeness, correctness or security of this document. CEAMS accepts no liability claims that might arise from the use or non‐use of the content
of this document.