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Construing Laws by the Language Used People vs. Abilong G.R. No 1960, November 26, 1948 Montemayor, J.

Facts: The appellant was sentenced with 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correctional, with the accessory penalty of law to pay the costs as he pleaded guilty for evading his initial penalty from criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery which is a 2 year, 4 month and 1 day of destierro within the radius of 100 kilometers of the City of Manila. He appeals to the Court that there is an error in the lower courts decision in applying Art. 157 of the Revised Penal Code which does not cover destierro. Appelle, through the Solicitor General, invoked the Statutory Construction aid of using the Spanish text of the Law to point out that destierro is part of the above-mentioned article because of the phrase sufriendo privacion de libertad. Issue: Whether or not the issued penalty for not evading the initial ruling of destierro is lawful Held: Yes. The English term imprisonment is erroneous because the above mentioned quote in Spanish translates to deprivation of his liberty where the penalty destierro is included. This ruling of the Spanish text prevailing over the English text had been applied to People vs. Manaba, 5 Phil. 665, 668, and the view on destierro was observed in People vs. Samonte, No. 36559. However, in the dissenting opinions of Justice Perfecto and Justice Briones, they state that it boils down to the perspective of which part of the Spanish text to translate. The two pointed out that the text fugndose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacin de libertad por sentencia firme correctly translates to by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

TAMAYO vs GSELL J. Trent 1916

FACTS:

Paciente Tamayo filed a claim for damages in behalf of his son, Braulio Tamayo, who is incidentally an employee of Carlos Gsell. Gsell is the owner of the factory where the minor Braulio is working. On March 13, 1914 the boy met and accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was severed. The boy was assigned by one Eugenio Murcia, one of the foreman in the factory to perform work that the petitioner was not accustomed to. The law being assailed here is the Employer's Liability Act (ACT 1874).

ISSUE: What is the intention of the legislature in measuring the damages? Should it be the same as that in the US as it is where ACT 1874 was copied from?

HELD: The court ruled that the intention of the legislature in measuring damages in personal injury cases brought under ACT 1874 shall be the same from which the Act was taken from. The result is that BarulioTamayo is entitled to recover, damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury.

NOTES: ACT 1868 - Creating Bureau of Labor. Originated from American Statutes.

ACT 2385 - amended subsection d of Section 2 and 3 of ACT 1868. Repeals ACT 2258 ACT 1874 - Employer's Liability Act copied from the State of Massachusetts 1902 ACT.

Principle of Stare Decisis J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano G.R. No. L-33140, October 23, 1978 Aquino, J. Facts: The case at bar is another litigation regarding the validity of OCT. No. 735, covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason Mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1625 hectares, respectively, as defined in Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888. Petitioner assails the decision of the public respondents on Civil Case No. 8943 to award to private respondents Manuela and Maria Aquial, as well as interveners Jose and Saturnina Cordova. In the said case, the private respondents filed a motion for damages because of the alleged illegal entry of the petitioners in the land and making them part-owners as stated in the OCT, as well as a question of the validity of OCT. No. 735 due to the irregularities in the Land Registration. When petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment, the judge of the lower court dismissed it on the reason that the petition is an affirmation of the respondents defense. In response, the petitioners filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. Issue: Whether or not the respondents can question the validity of OCT. No. 735 because of the irregularities in its entries Held: No. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases No. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, invalidating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court. On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled), it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no

longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the courts time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium. (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). [J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644(1978)]

Tan Chong vs Sec of Labor GR. No. L-47616 October 15, 1941 Laurel, J,: Facts: Jose Tan Chong was born in the Philippines on July 1915 at San Pablo, Laguna. Born from a Chinese father and a Filipina Mother and was legally married. Sometime on 1925 he was taken by his parents to China. On January 25 1940, Tan Chong arrived at a port in a manila seeking entrance as a native born citizen. He was denied by the board of Special Inquiry on the grounds that he was a Chinese citizen, and on appeal the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the board and ordered his deportation. Petitioner sued for writ of habeas corpus which was granted. Petitioner was born in the Philippines before the approval of our constitution

Issues:

If the petitioner is considered as a Filipino Citizen Held: Judgement of the lower court is AFFIRMED

Unconstitutionality of year 2000 GAA Accord vs Zamora GR No. 144256 June 8, 2005 Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to Article 7 Section 22 of the Constitution, for the fiscal year 2000 President Estrada submitted a IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) of P 121,778,000,000.00 to the congress Feb 16 2000 President Estrada Approved the House Bill no. 8374. Became RA No. 8760 An Act Appropriating "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" Otherwise known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for year 2000. The GAA provides under the heading of Allocations to Local Government units that the IRA for LGUs amount to P111,778,000,000.00. There was a special provision which removed the P 10,000,000,000.00 and classified as UNPROGRAMMED FUND. The PROGRAMMED FUND amounts to P 111,778,000,000.00. Petitioners argue that it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. By reason that: o It violates the local autonomy of the LGUs by unlawfully reducing the IRA by 10Billion pesos (withhold under UNPROGRAMMED FUND) o Placement of 10billion pesos was under the control of the central authority instead of the local authorities o It was an undue Delegation of the legislative power to the respondents. o Placement of the 10 billion under UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS constitutes to an amendment of the local government code of 1991 which cannot be done in an appropriations act and the purpose is not reflected in the title of the year 2000 GAA. o Reduction of the IRA undermines the foundation of our Local Governance System o Transgress the constitution and the local government codes prohibition on any invalid reduction and withholding of the local governments IRA. October 22, 2001 Motion for intervention was filed by Province of Batangas, and on Nov 6, 2001, Province of Nueva Ecija represented by Gov. Tomas N. Joson III also filed for Motion of Intervention. Both motions adopted the argument of the petitioners, and both were GRANTED.

Though effectivity of the GAA 2000 has passed court deemed it necessary because it is in the publics interest. GUYS IMPORTANT FACT relating to Statcon: o Wording of the constitutional injunction and how it was formulated: Article X Section 6 of the 1987 constitution. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Base on the conversation between (then) Comm. Davide and Comm. Noledo that the provision was specifically for the executive not the legislative, and the argument was for the inclusion or exclusion of the word PERIODICALLY, both parties agreeing on the word AUTOMATICALLY Used Websters dictionary on the meaning of automatic. Connotes something mechanic, spontaneous and perfunctory.

ISSUES: Whether the petition contains proper verifications and certifications Whether the petitioner has the requisite standing to file this suit Whether the questioned provisions violate the constitutional injunction that the just share of local governments in the national taxes or the IRA shall be automatically released

HELD Petition was GRANTED. Year 2000 GAA unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, amount of 10 Billion classified as Unprogrammed funds. Said provisions make the release of the fund NOT automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate of the just share of the LGUs which shall be automatically released to them

TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY AS WHAT IT SAYS (STATCON: INTRINSIC AIDS)

Ting vs Ting FACTS: Respondent, pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC, filed a petition for a declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner ab intio, on the grounds of the latter's psychological incapacity to contract marriage. Further claims of the respondent include the petitioner's alcoholism, excessive gambling, and incapacity to financially support his family. She presented a psychiatrist's opinion about the petitioner as evidence, alleging that petitioner has a personality disorder. In his defense, petitioner likewise presented an expert's opinion, which he claims to debunk the former psychiatrist's opinion. Petitioner's psychiatrist used a psychological evaluation report as well as his personal interview with petitioner's brothers to determine that there is nothing wrong with the petitioner's personality. The RTC found the petitioner to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of the marriage, and declared the marriage null and void ab initio based on the respondent's claims. Petitioner appealed to the CA. He was attesting that the RTC found no conclusive proof that he was indeed psychologically incapacitated at the time that he married the respondent, and that the RTC rendered judgment based only on theories. The CA used the guidelines set forth in the Molina case and reversed the RTC's decision. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the Molina case should not have been used as basis to reverse the RTC's decision because the decision in the Molina case was rendered five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. She claims that the guidelines from the Molina and Santos cases should not be applied retroactively. The CA reversed its first ruling and sustained the RTC's decision. The current petition was filed by the respondent for a petition for review of the CA's decision ISSUE: Whether or not the CA violated the rule of stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases. HELD: No. Respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted, and thus, the guidelines set forth in the Molina case should be applied retroactively. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith. The SC finds respondents testimony, as

well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36. Hence, the petition was granted, and the rulings of the RTC was reversed and set aside. (kasal pa rin yung dalawa)

Abad vs NLRC FACTS: The petitioners were employed by the private respondent (Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.), with the former treating the latter as project workers (mas ok pag non-project workers/employees). The petitioners who have been working under the private respondent for three to ten years were terminated on during the period 1973-1976. Two complaints were filed by the petitioner, praying for reinstatement. They are alleging that they are non-project employees who should have become regular employees after one year of employment, and thus, they should be entitled to benefits enjoyed by regular employees. They charged the private respondent with unfair labor practice, declaring that the services of some of them were terminated after the institution of their complaints. Both of the complaints of the petitioners were archived after they filed a motion to suspend the hearing of their cases to give way to the Abuan case, which they claim is essentially identical and analogous to their own cases. The Abuan case was elevated to the SC, but the decision was sustained in favor of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (herein private respondent). The petitioners in the Abuan case were found as project employees. Upon the revival of the cases of the petitioners (guys may issue pa dito, nawala kasi yung records nung una kaya nagkaroon ng delay sa revival nung cases. di ko na lang nilagay, hehe) , the Labor Arbitrer found that the petitioners continued working for the private respondent even when there were no projects to work on, and that their employments were not dependent on any particular project. The Labor Arbitrer rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, and ordered the private respondent to reinstate the petitioners and pay them backpay and privileges. On appeal by the private respodent, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbitrer's decision regarding the reinstatement of the petitioners, but ordered the private respondent to pay petitioners backwages. The NLRC used the Abuan case and the principle of stare decisis in formulating its decision, as the Abuan case and the case of the petitioners are substantially the same. The petitioners were found as project employees.

The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the NLRC ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it used stare decisis to formulate their decision. HELD:

No. Both of the cases are substantially the same. The NLRC even pointed out that petitioners themselves had admitted the similarity between their case and the Abuan case, and thus, pursuant to the principle of stare decisis, the decision in the Abuan case should be simulated in this case.

Furthermore, this petition for certiorari is without merit. The filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC is a prerequisite for availing of the remedy of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioners' failure to file such a motion is fatal to their petition. Hence, the petition was denied and the decision of the NLRC was affirmed.

Abad vs NLRC FACTS: The petitioners were employed by the private respondent (Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.), with the former treating the latter as project workers (mas ok pag non-project workers/employees). The petitioners who have been working under the private respondent for three to ten years were terminated on during the period 1973-1976. Two complaints were filed by the petitioner, praying for reinstatement. They are alleging that they are non-project employees who should have become regular employees after one year of employment, and thus, they should be entitled to benefits enjoyed by regular employees. They charged the private respondent with unfair labor practice, declaring that the services of some of them were terminated after the institution of their complaints. Both of the complaints of the petitioners were archived after they filed a motion to suspend the hearing of their cases to give way to the Abuan case, which they claim is essentially identical and analogous to their own cases. The Abuan case was elevated to the SC, but the decision was sustained in favor of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (herein private respondent). The petitioners in the Abuan case were found as project employees. Upon the revival of the cases of the petitioners (guys may issue pa dito, nawala kasi yung records nung una kaya nagkaroon ng delay sa revival nung cases. di ko na lang nilagay, hehe) , the Labor Arbitrer found that the petitioners continued working for the private respondent even when there were no projects to work on, and that their employments were not dependent on any particular project. The Labor Arbitrer rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, and ordered the private respondent to reinstate the petitioners and pay them backpay and privileges. On appeal by the private respodent, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbitrer's decision regarding the reinstatement of the petitioners, but ordered the private respondent to pay petitioners backwages. The NLRC used the Abuan case and the principle of stare decisis in formulating its decision, as the Abuan case and the case of the petitioners are substantially the same. The petitioners were found as project employees.

The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the NLRC ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it used stare decisis to formulate their decision. HELD:

No. Both of the cases are substantially the same. The NLRC even pointed out that petitioners themselves had admitted the similarity between their case and the Abuan case, and thus, pursuant to the principle of stare decisis, the decision in the Abuan case should be simulated in this case.

Furthermore, this petition for certiorari is without merit. The filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC is a prerequisite for availing of the remedy of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioners' failure to file such a motion is fatal to their petition. Hence, the petition was denied and the decision of the NLRC was affirmed.

Villanueva vs. CA FACTS: Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the NLRC. As an appeal bond, IBC 13 filed a surety bond. However, the document was subsequently found to be falsified. Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of public document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor's Office. The charges against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed by the City Prosecutor's Office which, however, found probable cause against the other respondents. Nonetheless, on a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), the latter affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in the two (2) criminal cases. Accordingly, the original information were amended to include respondent Villadores among those charged. Following the arraignment of respondent Villadores, the private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed anew a Motion to Admit Amended Information alleging damages sustained by private complainant, herein petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The incident was referred to the City Prosecutor's Office by the trial court. In compliance, the fiscal's office submitted a Motion to Admit Amended Information with the following amendment: "to the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed." The Motion was granted by the trial court and the amended information were admitted. Respondent Villadores subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Respondent Villadores filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA found that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended information and dismissed the petition of respondent Villadores. Respondent Villadores moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Villanueva, Jr. The pronouncement of the appellate court stated that Petitioner Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the ground that the abovequoted pronouncement of the appellate court is a mere obiter dictum. The trial court, recognizing the argument of Rico and Associates, denied the motion for disqualification. Reconsideration was sought by respondent Villadores but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated December 4, 1998 Respondent Villadores filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking the annulment of the trial court's Order denying the Motion for Disqualification as well as its subsequent Order denying reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the two Orders of the

trial court, and directed that the name of Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the offended party in Criminal Cases be stricken out from the records. The current petition was filed on the grounds that the CA committed error in failing to consider the pronouncement that "Petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party", as a mere obiter dictum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court to the effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases is obiter dictum. HELD: No. An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. Such are not binding as precedent. The pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the Amended Information. Where a case presents two points to consider, the point not taken into consideration is not an obiter dictum.

Hence, the petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.

People vs. Pinuila FACTS: Bonifacio del Cano and Buenaventura Dideroy as members of the crew of said barge, were sleeping inside its cabin. Dideroy was suddenly and violently attacked by men provided with stout wooden clubs, resulting in a fracture of his skull and other injuries to his body, which caused his death hours later. Del Cano went ashore and reported the tragic incident to the person in charge of the barge, who in turn notified the authorities. On the basis of said investigation, appellant was arrested together with Dioscoro Pinuila and Conrado Daiz, who were later charged with murder. At the trial, after the Government presented its evidence and rested its case, the counsel for the accused filed a motion for dismissal on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental had not been duly established. Although the information charged that the crime was committed inside the barge and within the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the evidence for the Government tended to show that at the time, the barge was not exactly docked at the bank of the Victorias River. On the basis of this finding, the trial court sustained the motion for dismissal claiming that its jurisdiction had not been duly established. It dismissed the case, but provided in its order that the three accused should not be released until the order shall have become final. The order of dismissal was appealed by the Government to this court over the objection of the defense which invoked the principle of double jeopardy, but the Court found that the jurisdiction of the trial court had been proven and that the appeal did not involve double jeopardy, and so remanded the case for further proceedings. (the issue involving double jeopardy was resolved) While the order of dismissal was pending in this Court, by virtue of an order of the trial court in a petition for habeas corpus, the three defendants were released. When criminal proceedings were resumed, the arrest of the three accused was sought, but only Bignay could be apprehended. His co-accused, Pinuila and Daiz, evaded arrest and until now are still at large. For this reason, the trial, was continued only against Bignay. During the trial, Del Cano readily identified not only Pinuila but also Bignay and Daiz as the assailants of Dideroy. There is, therefore, no room for doubt that said three men were responsible for the death of Dideroy, with Pinuila as the mastermind. The court inclined to be lenient with Bignay. In the course of the discussion of this case and before it was actually submitted to a vote, Chief Justice Paras raised the question of double jeopardy, and without questioning the guilt of the appellant on the basis of the evidence of record, claimed that said appellant has once been placed in jeopardy and therefore, he should now be acquitted. ISSUE:

Whether or not Bignay was put in double jeopardy. HELD: No. The doctrine of People v. Salico which held that an appeal by the government does not place accused in double jeopardy, though later abandoned, must be held applicable to accused. They cannot invoke the defense of double jeopardy. People v. Salico has long become final and conclusive and has become the law of the case. It may be erroneous as recently interpreted by the SC, but, even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. The SC's recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but not to an old one which was finally and conclusively determined. Hence, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation, petitioner vs NLRC and Imelda L. Salazar, respondents G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992 Romero, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, a general system analyst of GMRC, would seem to lose her job because of her close association with Delfin Saldivar, a manager for technical operations support, which was employed by the petitioner. In Maramaras investigation, it appears that private respondent Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the companys interest and that evidence showed that she signed as a witness between the partnership of Yamabao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the whereabouts of the missing air-conditioner but failed to inform her employer. October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984 giving her thirty (30) days to explain her side but three (3) days after the effectivity of the suspension, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension and amendment to illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, and 13th month pay damages after being notified by the petitioner that effective November 8, 1984 she is considered dismissed in view of her inability to refute and disprove the findings. After the hearing where the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits, petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. While on appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of the private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award of moral damages. But, the fault lay with private respondent when she had ignored petitioners memorandum of thirty (30) days ample of opportunity to present her side to the management. Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed a complaint against petitioner without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her controversy.

ISSUE: HELD:

Is the private respondent Imelda Salazar entitled to reinstatement?

Yes. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code: Sec. 2 Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorizes by existing laws. Sec. 3 Reinstatement An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages. In said report, it merely insituated that in view of Salazars special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivars questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records. But since the report came out after the resignation of Saldivar whom did not had the opportunity to refute the managements finding, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by the petitioner was principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, there was no ascertainment as to the existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well, thereby, justifying her dismissal. Finding none from the records, Salazar have been unlawfully dismissed, There being no evidence to show an authorize, much less a legal cause for the dismissal of private respondent, the assailed resolution of NLRC is hereby affirmed by the court.

COMENDADOR vs DE VILLA J. CRUZ

FACTS:

A consolidated case from practically the same parties and related issues where the petitioners are charged for the violation of Articles of War - Mutiny, Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman and Various Crimes in relation to ART 248 of RPC for Murder, this is in line with their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on Dec 1-9, 1989. PTI panel issued a subpoena dated Jan. 30,1990 addressed to each individual. Each being required to submit a counter affidavit. The petitioners are seeking remedy in the modified rule on peremptory challenges under PD 39.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 39 already cease to exist?

HELD: No, it is held by the supreme court that the right to peremptory challenge in PD 39 became ineffective during the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. Hence, the maxims Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Legis Est Anima. The reason of law is its soul.

NOTES: PD 39 - Governing the creation, composition, jurisdiction, procedure and other matters related to military tribunals. No peremptory challenges allowed. Peremptory Challenges - challenge for cause; a mulligan for jury or judge selection to remove bias

Chua v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

Legislative Purposes of a Statute De Guia vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992 Bellosillo, J. Facts: Petitioner, an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into district of 13 municipalities of the Metro Manila Area with only one district into two districts, does not specify the time of election of when this apportionment is applied. He leans on par. (d) of the aforementioned statute for the supplement of the information given. By this ambiguity and his own interpretation of the statute, he assails Resolution Nos. 2313 and 2379, and Resolution UND. 92-010, as grave abuses of discretion from COMELEC regarding R.A. 7166 entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Respondent, on the other hand, defends the position that they were lawful in promulgating said resolutions. The contested resolutions are issued in relation to the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166. These are actions of creating the election of members of Sangguniang Bayan of the above-mentioned municipalities, including Paraaque, by district, instead of election at large, shall be applied on the May 11, 1992 elections and not on the succeeding 1996 election as mentioned in par. (d) that the petitioner uses. Issue: Whether or not the Resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC are pursuant to the purpose of R.A. 7166 Held: Yes. Because the law in question generates confusion in the seeming abstruseness of its language, the Supreme Court resorts to the Legislative purpose of the law. As shown in the explanatory note of S.B. No 1861, R.A. 7166 is implemented to set the national and local elections for May11, 1992, with the inclusion of seeking to reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang bayan be elected by district. The provision of par. (d) in this Act is suppose to govern the provincial areas with one district, and they will only be apportioned for the 1995 Elections for the reason that by then, there will be enough time and resource to implement the proviso of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166.

TALA REALTY vs CA J. CARPIO-MORALES

FACTS: The majority of the stockholders of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank agreed to form a corporation known as the Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala) to which some of Banco Filipinos existing branch sites could be unloaded. The arrangement was that Banco Filipino would transfer some of its existing branch sites to Tala, and the latter would simultaneously lease them back to it.

Banco Filipino executed in favor of Tala a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring to it one of its branch sites located at Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union (the property) at the agreed purchase price.

On even date, Tala in turn leased the property to Banco Filipino for a period of 20-years, renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino, at a monthly rental rate. The contract further required Banco Filipino to pay Tala a certain amount as advance rentals for the 11th to the 20th years of the lease.

Tala claims that on that same day, the parties executed another lease contract which modified the previous lease contract. The second lease contract shortened the term of the lease to 11 years, renewable for 9 years at the option of Banco Filipino. The contract required Banco Filipino to pay a certain amount as security deposit to secure its faithful compliance with its obligations, to answer for any damage to the property, or for any damage that may be sustained by Tala on account of any breach or default on the part of Banco Filipino.

More than 11 years after the execution of the contract of lease, Talas director, Elizabeth H. Palma, sent Banco Filipino a letter informing it that the lease contract had expired as of August 1992, and that starting September 1992, the contract had been extended on a monthly basis under different terms and conditions including the monthly lease rental. Tala noted, however, that as Banco Filipino had failed to take any definite action towards the renewal of the contract, Tala was free to lease, dispose, sell and/or alienate the property. Tala subsequently notified Banco

Filipino that the lease contract would no longer be renewed, hence, it demanded that it vacate the property and pay the unpaid rentals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA decision be applied to the other petitions? HELD: YES. Upholding the principle and doctrine of stare decisis removes confusion. It stages a more direct approach in dealing with cases of similar concern being decided the same way. Thus the SC held that the other petitions be set aside as decided by the CA.

NOTES: N/A

Proviso of Labor Code Regarding Closure of Establishment National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000 De Leon, Jr., J. Facts: Petitioner, representing the number of their members, seeks for the annulment of 2 NLRC resolutions in denying the separation pay of these members who were employed by Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga City, Patalon Coconut Estate. When Congress passed and promulgated the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), an extension of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the Estate was forced to close, making the members of the petitioning conglomerate to be dispatched from their work. Upon the takeover of the effect of CARL, the private petitioners filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City, praying for their reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally dismissed, but their motion was denied because the cited Art. 283 of the Labor Code does not cover their case. Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to full backwages and the payment of their separation pay according to Art. 283 of the Labor Code Held: No. Even assuming, arguendo, that the situation in this case were a closure of the business establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the petitioners/employees are not entitled to separation pay. The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to . . . . The use of the word may, in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. The plain meaning ruie or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. [National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 327 SCRA 158(2000)]

Lopez and Sons vs Court of Tax Appeals GR No. L-9274 Feb.1 1957 Montemayor, J. Facts: Lopez and sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding custom duties and such duties were paid and shipments were released However, the freight of said wire netting as a result of the reassessment, additional custom duties in the amount of P 1966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure of reassessment, Lopez and Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the appeal on May 23, 1955 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction on the matter, upon a motion of dismissal by the Solicitor General that the Court of Tax appeals cannot review decisions from a Collector Customs of Manila as per Section 7 of Republic Act 1125. o Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided o (1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; o (2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and o (3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals in case involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto. Petitioner invoked Sec. 11 o SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association or corporation adversely by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling. o No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue or the Collector of the Customs shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided, however, that when in the opinion of the Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the

Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the interests of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court. (Emphasis supplied.) Issue: Whether there was a clerical error in section 11 mentioning Collector of Customs when it should be Commisioner of Customs. Held: Appealed order of DISMISSAL is AFFIRMED, with costs. Why? SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. The person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs in any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days after notification in writing by the collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the collector signifying his desire to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith transmit all the papers in the cause to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify, or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take such steps and make such order or orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision. This section indicates that Collector of Customs are under the Commissioner of Customs therefore all appeals on a decision of the former should first be filed to the Commissioner before appealing on the court of Tax Appeals. That is the intent of the law. Where the section 11 was a clear oversight when the legislature was meaning to say Commisioner of Customs instead of Collector of Customs.

People vs Yu Hai Gr. No. L-9598 August 15, 1956 Reyes, J. B.L., J.: Facts: Oct 22, 1954, Yu Hai alias Haya was accused in the Justice of Peace Court of Caloocan in violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the RPC. Respondent allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and acted as a mainter therof, in the municipality of Caloocan on or about 26th of January 1954. Accused moved to quash the information on the grounds that it charged more than just one offense and the criminal action or liability therefor had already been extinguished Justice of the Peace Court sustained the motion to quash it on December 24, 1954 on the grounds that the offense charged was a light offense. SolGen argues that since the fine charged may be punished by a maximum fine of 200, under article 26 is a correctional penalty, prescription thereof is 10 years pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 90. ART. 26. Fine, when afflictive, correctional, or light.A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it be less than 200 pesos." ART. 90 Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses prescribe is two years, The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months.

Issue: Is the offense a light felony? Held: Decision of the lower court appealed from is AFFIRMED. The crime was a light felony and was already prescribed. The question is the prescription of a crime not of a penalty so Article 9 would prevail over article 26. Criminal statutes are construed strictly against government and liberally in favour of the accused. It would be favourable for the accused if it was a light felony.

DI KO GETS YUNG CONNECTION NIYA SA STATCON DAHIL MUKHA SIYANG CRIMINAL CASE FOR ME SO NAG RESEARCH AKO AT ETO NAKITA KO Statutory Construction - Headnotes and Epigraphs - Construction to avoid Absurdity ISSUES OF THE CASE: Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a light felony? No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the offense committed as a correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses. Also, if the SolGens interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused, it should be the one to be adopted. HELD: THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein. Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result.