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"There is a saying in Rwanda that Rwandans must swallow their tears. They do.

If they did not, they would surely drown." (Palmer, 1995, p. 459) Nearly fifty years after the Holocaust, and one hundred years after the first arrival of uropeans in their land, the people of !"anda suffered one of the most efficient episodes of mass #illin$ in modern times. %ecause of its scale and &rutality, the outlines of the !"andan $enocide are "ell #no"n. 'he facts of the matter are these( from early )pril to mid*+uly of 1994, some ,--,--- !"andans "ere #illed, a&out 1- percent of the pre*$enocide population. 'he victims "ere predominantly 'utsi. the perpetrators, predominantly Hutu. 'he slau$hter ended "hen the !"andan Patriotic /ront (!P/) $ained control of 0i$ali, the capital city, and the remnants of the Hutu $overnment fled to nei$h&orin$ countries. 1n the end, a plan aimed at solidifyin$ Hutu po"er and identity ended "ith thousands of !"andans displaced from their homes and thousands of corpses piled up on the floors of local churches. 'he $enocide in !"anda has deeply entan$led roots. 1n recent years, it has &een analy2ed from a num&er of an$les, and several rich narratives have emer$ed (0eane, 1995. 3ourevitch, 199,). 4ne of the dimensions of the $enocide "hich has &e$un to receive more attention is its impact on !"andan children. 1t is estimated that some 5--,--- youn$ people died durin$ the $enocide (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999). 'hose "ho survived carry &oth physical "ounds and the psycholo$ical scars of "itnessin$ the death of family mem&ers. 'his paper "ill &e$in "ith an analysis of the $enocide itself, then proceed to discuss its impact on children and the potential for healin$ and prevention. )s a frame"or# for the discussion, 1 rely primarily on the theoretical model developed &y :tau& (19,9) in his &oo#, The Roots of Evil. 6hereas most scholars of $enocide have applied political and sociolo$ical lenses to the

phenomenon, :tau& see#s to understand the psycholo$ical underpinnin$s of $enocide and mass #illin$. His model ta#es account of the preconditions leadin$ to $enocide in terms of social conditions, $roup identity, and cultural dispositions. 1t also e;plores the psycholo$y of perpetrators and the role of &ystanders in ena&lin$ or discoura$in$ mass #illin$. !ather than ela&oratin$ on these elements here, their meanin$ "ill &e developed throu$hout the paper in reference to the !"andan case.

Difficult Life Conditions 4f the insti$ators of $enocide, the most important overarchin$ factor is "hat :tau& calls "difficult life conditions" (19,9, p. 15). <urin$ periods of economic depravation and political insta&ility, &asic human needs can &e frustrated.1 People do not feel safe, and they may feel an;ious a&out the status and "elfare of their $roup. /eelin$ threatened, $roup mem&ers loo# for any means availa&le to understand and improve their situation. 'hus, difficult life conditions set the sta$e for scape$oatin$ and other destructive ideolo$ies. <ifficult life conditions "ere certainly present in !"anda &efore the $enocide. !"anda is one of the smallest and most densely populated states in )frica. 'here is a $reat amount of pressure on land since, as is often the case in post*colonial nations, lar$e tracts are o"ned &y relatively fe" people. 1n 1991, 1= percent of the people held 45 percent of all cultivated land (<es /or$es, 1999). 1n addition to a chronic shorta$e of land, !"anda suffered the crash of the coffee mar#et in 19,9 and a famine in 19,9 (:mith, 199,). 'he currency "as devalued &y 4- percent in 199- in response to demands for restructurin$ &y the 1nternational >onetary /und. )n$ry "ith

%asic human needs, accordin$ to :tau& (in press), include needs for positive identity, positive connection, effectiveness, and understandin$.

their $overnment, peasants or$ani2ed cooperatives and dissident pu&lications sprouted. 1n 1991, 5-,--- people rallied in 0i$ali to protest (:mith, 199,). '"o other events threatened national sta&ility and the he$emony of !"anda7s Hutu elite. /irst, in 4cto&er of 199-, troops of the 'utsi*led !P/ invaded from @$anda. )lthou$h halted &y $overnment forces and /rench military support, the !P/ continued e;ertin$ pressure throu$hout the early 199-s. 'he other source of political unrest "as the introduction of multi*party politics in 199-*91. ) concession to international demands to end sin$le*party rule, multi*party politics led to the rapid rise of several opposition parties. )mon$ insiders in the Ha&eryimana re$ime, there "as a sha#en confidence in their a&ility to maintain control. 'he state "as under$oin$ a "crisis of le$itimacy" (:mith, 199,). 'he )rusha accords, a compromise po"er*sharin$ a$reement "ith the !P/ reached in 1995, deeply alienated and an$ered Hutu e;tremists. %y 1994, these conditions had prepared the foundation upon "hich $roup violence mi$ht more easily &e &uilt.

Identity: Ideology and Devaluation Pla$ued &y difficult life conditions, $roups tend to devalue others and reify their o"n identity in an effort to satisfy their need for a positive self*concept (:tau&, 19,9). 1n !"anda, efforts to &olster Hutu identity led Hutu e;tremists to en$a$e in a pervasive campai$n of devaluation of the 'utsis. %efore discussin$ this effort, ho"ever, it is important to discuss ho" identity &ecame the fault line "hich split !"anda apart. 'he dynamics of identity in !"anda are comple;. 4n the surface, there is little to distin$uish 'utsi from Hutu. 6ith some 4-- years of co*e;istence in !"anda, they share a common lan$ua$e and cultural norms. 1ntermarria$e is not uncommon. 1n most cases, the only "ay to identify individuals is accordin$ to the la&el on their identity cards.

1n part, ethnic cate$ori2ation in !"anda is an artificial colonial le$acy. )fter $ainin$ control of the area from the 3ermans, the %el$ians preferred to rule at a distance throu$h the esta&lished po"er structure of the local 'utsi chiefs. 1nfluenced &y the "Hametic theory"**that 'utsi "ere the descendants of Noah7s son, Ham**the %el$ians tended to vie" the 'utsi as racially similar to themselves, as uropeans under a &lac# s#in (<este;he, 1995, p. 5,). 'he %el$ians supported the mytholo$y of 'utsi superiority and e;tended it into a policy of Hutu suppression. 1n 1955, the %el$ians instituted identity cards, solidifyin$ "hat, in the past, may have &een permea&le ethnic cate$ories. arlier, ethnicity had &een conflated "ith class( a Hutu could &ecome a 'utsi &y

virtue of o"nin$ a certain num&er of cattle (0eane, 1995). 4nce the ethnic cate$ories hardened, ho"ever, the 'utsi*controlled $overnment could use them to stren$then their hold on po"er. 'hey controlled access to education and employment opportunities. Hutus "ere la&eled as less intelli$ent and naturally su&servient (<es /or$es, 1995). 'hus, a sense of inferiority developed "hich Hutu e;tremists could use in incitin$ fear of the 'utsi. 'he identities carried &y the 'utsi and Hutu &ecame pervasive psycholo$ical elements of the $enocide. 'he rulin$ Hutu elite in !"anda felt threatened &y the social and political upheaval in the early 199-s. )s su$$ested a&ove, the colonial discourse of ethnicity had esta&lished the Hutu as uneAual to the 'utsi. 1n their o"n ideolo$ical discourse a&out the !P/ and 'utsi, Hutu e;tremists played upon past victimi2ation. 'hey revived old stereotypes of 'utsi identity( a cunnin$, repressive people alien to !"anda (<es /or$es, 1995). 'he identity used to Bustify 'utsi domination in the past "as used to Bustify the need for their elimination. 'he Hutu leaders portrayed the nation as vulnera&le to 'utsi a$$ression, even claimin$ that the !P/ intended to commit $enocide a$ainst the Hutu**unless the Hutu struc# first.

3enocide, as /ein (1999) has ar$ued, is a rational act, a calculated measure. 6hat did Hutu e;tremists &elieve they "ould $ain &y the #illin$sC Primarily, their motivation "as to consolidate political control in the face of $ro"in$ political fra$mentation (:mith, 199,. Demarchand, 1995. <es /or$es, 1999). )s 3ourevitch "ryly o&serves, "$enocide, after all, is an act of community &uildin$" (199,, p. 95). 'hreatened on several fronts**&y the !P/ militarily, &y opposition parties politically**they needed to unify Hutus a$ainst a common enemy. 'he Hutu e;tremists differentiated &et"een "us" and "them" &y dividin$ their "orld into faithful !"andans and "accomplices of the enemy" (<es /or$es, 1999, p. 5). 'he #ey to the $enocide "as la&elin$ the 'utsi population as accomplices of the !P/. thus, the entire 'utsi population &ecame that enemy. 'o $alvani2e ethnic division in the months leadin$ up the $enocide, a po"erful campai$n of devaluation "as launched. 'he campai$n emanated from the Akazu, the circle of elites surroundin$ the !"andan President. 'he primary vehicle of devaluation "as the radio, a hi$hly influential information source for most !"andans. 4nly days after the si$nin$ of the )rusha po"er*sharin$ accords, !adio >illes 8ollines &e$an &roadcastin$ (3ourevitch, 199,). /inanced &y $overnment insiders, the station "as po"ered &y electricity from the $enerators at the Presidential mansion in 0i$ali (8hal#, 1999). !adio >illes 8ollines fomented suspicion of the 'utsi and psycholo$ical devaluation. 'he primary messa$e "as simple( the 'utsis are villainous coloni2ers &ent on harmin$ Hutus. 'herefore, they must &e #illed. 1n order to dehumani2e the 'utsi, the messa$es replaced the "ord "'utsi" "ith "invenzi" (coc#roach). 'he devaluation "as codified in "hat "as #no"n as the "Hutu 'en 8ommandments." Pu&lished in <ecem&er of 199-, this document proclaimed that 'utsis "ere dishonest in &usiness and interested only in dominatin$ the Hutu, that 'utsi "omen "ere suspect, and that 'utsis should &e denied positions of influence. 'he document also called for the Hutu to unify a$ainst their

common enemy and stop havin$ mercy on the 'utsi (%erry and %erry, 1999, p. 114*15). :uch directives placed 'utsis outside the sphere of moral concern for the Hutu populace. 1t pushed to"ard "hat :tau& calls a "reversal of morality" (19,9, p. 1,) in "hich violence a$ainst a tar$et $roup is seen as virtuous service to the hi$her $oals of a dominant $roup.

Cultural Preconditions: Antagonism and authority orientation :tau& (19,9) identifies several cultural preconditions for $enocide. 'hey include authority orientation and an ideolo$y of anta$onism. 1n the case of !"anda, these factors played an important role in ena&lin$ the #illin$. 'he concept of "ideolo$y of anta$onism" hi$hli$hts the le$acy of past violence and devaluation, often unhealed "ounds "hich set the sta$e for further violence. Past e;periences of persecution support the &elief that another $roup is a security threat. <urin$ the years of 'utsi domination in !"anda, Hutus "ere lar$ely e;cluded from civil and political life. )ccess to Bo&s and economic resources "ere limited, and Hutus developed resentment a$ainst 'utsis. 1n 1959, "hen Hutus re&elled a$ain %el$ian colonial rule, thousands of 'utsi "ere #illed and an estimated 15-,--- 'utsis fled to %urundi. )s %el$ians &e$an to "ithdra" from !"anda, the nation &ecame independent. )ttac#s on 'utsis escalated. )n estimated 1- E ?-,--- 'utsi "ere #illed in the early 19=-7s and eventually half of the !"andan 'utsis "ere livin$ outside !"anda. /rom a psycholo$ical perspective, the authority orientation of the population su$$ests the de$ree to "hich people "ill follo" the dictates of those in po"er. 1n !"anda, there is ample evidence of a po"erful authority orientation. 1n his visits to prisons after the $enocide, Farem&o (1999) $ives several e;amples of deeply in$rained deference to authority. /or e;ample, "hen

$overnment officials visit, prisoners clap respectfully. Prisoners "or#in$ as coo#s are entrusted "ith machetes**the very instrument some of them may have used to murder their nei$h&ors. Farem&o even tells the story of a several suspected $enocidaires "ho "ere &ro#en out of their prison, only to return voluntarily. 'hey "anted to o&ey the la". 8ould such apparently conscientious people actually have &een ruthless #illers durin$ the $enocideC Farem&o (1999) ar$ues that the authority orientation in !"andan society is precisely "hat ena&led other"ise docile citi2ens to &ecome #illers. People "ere in the ha&it of doin$ "hat they "ere told. >orality "as understood as follo"in$ the commands of those in po"er. 'heir $overnment, in daily messa$es, "as tellin$ them that the 'utsis "ere a threat to the nation. )nd they did "hat the $overnment as#ed them to do( "#illin$ "as the la", and !"andans follo"ed it" (Farem&o, 1999, p. ,-).

Evolution of Violence <urin$ the three months of #illin$, an estimated 95 E 15-,--- people participated in the atrocities (+efremovas, 1995). 6hile historical anta$onism and authority orientation prepare the "ay for mass violence, they do not fully e;plain ho" people learn to #ill. 'o understand the violence in !"anda, it is essential to e;amine ho" mem&ers of the pu&lic "ere prepared to &ecome #illers. >ass #illin$s rarely happen "ithout precedent. 'ypically, less severe acts of violence pave the "ay for more e$re$ious crimes. )s :tau& (19,9) e;plains, people learn &y doin$( actions that harm others chan$e the actor, lo"erin$ the &arriers to further acts of a$$ression. 'hus, in $enocidal situations, lar$e*scale #illin$s are usually preceded &y other incidents, incidents "hich ultimately

&ecome part of a "continuum of destruction" (p. 19). 1n !"anda, there "ere several aspects to the continuum of destruction. 'he !P/ invasion in 199- provided a rationale for the $overnment to prepare the pu&lic for further violence. Hutu leaders called for the development of civil defense $roups. 'he prete;t of civil defense a$ainst the 'utsi invaders ena&led the spread of further messa$es of devaluation and $reater militari2ation of e;tremist sympathi2ers. 3roups "ere $athered and provided trainin$ in the s#ills "hich "ould &e later put to use in the #illin$ of 'utsis( the use of $renades, the construction of road&loc#s, the &urnin$ of houses. 4nly hours after the President7s plane "as shot do"n, road&loc#s "ere erected across 0i$ali and the previous trainin$ "as put into practice. 'he &rea#do"n of politics as usual "as another factor "hich led to pu&lic violence. /rom 19=? to 199-, !"anda "as ruled &y one party, the >ouvement !evolutionnaire National pour le <eveloppment (>!N<). 'he advent of multi*party politics led to a desta&ili2ed political landscape, "ith several upstart parties "restlin$ for po"er. )t a local level, this led to increased tensions and a$$ression. 4pposition parties attempted to "li&erate" mem&ers of other parties throu$h intimidation. )ttac#s &e$an sym&olically, and physical violence soon follo"ed (6a$ner, 199,). 1n the an$ry political atmosphere of the time, $enocide "as "&ut a short step from the mundane routini2ed violence that had already ta#en over everyday life" (6a$ner, 199,, p.5=). /or a $enocide to occur, there must &e #illers ready to do the Bo&. 1n the early 199-s, militias emer$ed in !"anda as the tensions &et"een parties escalated. 'he militia sponsored &y the >!N<, the interahamwe, &ecame the main perpetrator of violence a$ainst the 'utsis. Di#e other paramilitary $roups, the interahamwe "as attractive to Bo&less youn$ men loo#in$ for an affiliation that promised identity and po"er over others.

'he militias used sym&ols of "ealth and po"er to attract youth and initiate them into the practices of terror. 3ourevitch (199,) vividly captures the development of the militia( Hutu Po"er youth leaders, Bettin$ around on motor&i#es and sportin$ pop hairstyles, dar# $lasses, and flam&oyantly colored paBama suits and ro&es, preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense to increasin$ly pac#ed rallies, "here alcohol usually flo"ed freely, $iant &anners splashed "ith ha$io$raphic portraits of Ha&yarimana flapped in the &ree2e, and paramilitary drills "ere conducted li#e the latest hot dance moves. 'he President and his "ife often turned out to &e cheered at these spectacles, "hile in private the mem&ers of the interaham"e "ere or$ani2ed into small nei$h&orhood &ands, dre" up lists of 'utsis, and "ent on retreats to practice &urnin$ houses, tossin$ $renades, and hac#in$ dummies up "ith machetes (p. 95). 'he formation of the militias "as an instrumental preparation for the $enocide. 1nitiation ceremonies as descri&ed a&ove insured loyalty to the rulin$ party, developed positive connection "ithin the $roup, and &uilt confidence that ille$al actions "ere endorsed &y the state. 'o spread the violence &eyond trained troops and militias at the onset of the $enocide, it "as necessary to &rin$ civilians into the circle of #illers. Docal leaders offered incentives for those "ho "ould Boin the death sAuads( the promise of vacated fields, farm animals, &uildin$ materials, and cash (<es /or$es, 1999). Deaders also threatened people "ho "ould not colla&orate. 'he threats, material incentives, and e;perience of mem&ership in a $roup of #illers ena&led other"ise non*a$$ressive individuals to murder. )t an individual level, the evolution of violence is "ell illustrated in a case discussed &y Farem&o (1999). He intervie"ed a farmer named 1nnocent Nsen$iyumva imprisoned for #illin$ t"o children. His story indicates ho" simply murder can &ecome part of a day7s "or#( 0illin$ "as a Bo&. 'he local Hutu official had a list of victims, and each mornin$ the peasants $athered "ith their "eapons**machetes for most, a homemade "ooden clu& spi#ed "ith nails for 1nnocent. /or the first "ee# he only "atched, he says, 7li#e a child "atchin$ somethin$ his father is doin$.7 'he #illers dran# at the &ars they passed, "ent home for lunch, and resumed in the afternoons. His turn came "hen the cro"d spotted the t"o children. 'hey didn7t try to escape, he says,

and didn7t scream until he sun# the nails into the side of one of their heads (1999, p. 9-). Di#e so many perpetrators &efore him, 1nnocent claimed that he "as follo"in$ the dictates of the $overnment. He "as told &y local officials that he "as fi$htin$ for his country, and he &elieved them. )fter Farem&o as#ed "hat mi$ht have happened had 1nnocent refused to #ill, 1nnocent replied, "No&ody refused" (1999, p. 9-). :mall acts of violence can move individuals further alon$ the continuumGunless there are countervailin$ forces "hich pull them &ac# and force them to Auestion their actions. @nfortunately, !"andan society found nothin$ "ron$ "ith #illin$ 'utsis. Periodic massacres of 'utsis had $one unpunished in the recent past. 'he $overnment portrayed #illin$s as spontaneous to international a$encies, even thou$h the #illin$s usually follo"ed political meetin$s at "hich anti* 'utsi sentiment "as deli&erately fanned (3ourevitch, 199,). %ecause the $overnment did not treat such violence as a crime, !"anda developed a "culture of impunity" (%erry H %erry, 1999, p. ?). )s Demarchand (1995) points out, the $enocide "ould not have happened if the e;tremists did not &elieve they could $et a"ay "ith murder.

Social Organization 4ne of the facilitatin$ factors for efficient mass #illin$ not specifically addressed in :tau&7s model is that of social infrastructure. 6hen it came time for #illin$ to &e$in, the evolution of violence in !"anda "as supported &y a command*and*control mode of social or$ani2ation. 4ne of !"anda7s colonial le$acies "as its dense system of social or$ani2ation, a hierarchy "hich e;tended central po"er to the villa$e level (Farem&o, 1999). 'his system ena&led the efficient transfer of official instructions from 0i$ali to rural areas (<es /or$es, 1999). Docal administrators throu$hout

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the country helped mar# 'utsi for death and provided "eapons to the mo&s. 1n his &oo#, Season of Blood, 0eane (1995) recounts visitin$ a deserted $overnment office in "hich he found dra"ers full of identity cards, an inde; easily used to mar# for death. )nother matter of social structure "as the manipulation of "or#. /or years, the !"andan $overnment had issued calls for umuganda, t"o days per month of pu&lic service. 8iti2ens responded &y "or#in$ on appointed proBects. 'he practice of umuganda em&edded the ha&it of lendin$ a hand to service of the nation. )lthou$h the practice could serve positive social ends in other times, it could also &e manipulated to transform murder of other citi2ens as fulfillin$ the hi$her call of service to the nation. <urin$ the $enocide, huntin$ and murderin$ 'utsis "as referred to as ""or#," "or# done "ith the everyday "tools" of rural life (<es /or$es, 1999).

ystanders :tau&7s model is uniAue in identifyin$ &ystanders as #ey actors in the development of $enocide. )ctive &ystanders can retard the development of $enocide &y Auestionin$ the morality of the messa$es and actions "hich prepare people for #illin$. Passive &ystanders, on the other hand, convey a sense of acceptance, often interpreted &y #illers as approval for their actions. Passivity also leads to the devaluation of victims on the part of &ystanders (:tau&, 19,9). <urin$ the period of political insta&ility in the early 199-s, alle$iances &ecame clear. 6a$ner (199,) reports that the a$$ressive tactics of political parties revealed "ho mi$ht Boin them, "ho mi$ht oppose them, and "ho mi$ht simply "atch. :o Bust as some individuals "ere prepared for #illin$, others "ere prepared for roles as passive &ystanders. 1n this "ay, the $enocide itself &ecame a final act for roles that had &een "ell rehearsed.

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'he ideolo$ical $round"or# for the $enocide supported the passivity of Hutu &ystanders. )s noted a&ove, the Hutu commandments dictated that Hutus sho" no compassion for the 'utsi. 4ther pronouncements of !P/ villainy reinforced the messa$e that the #illin$ of 'utsis "as le$itimate. )t the same time, $enocide leaders tar$eted Hutus "ho resisted. 'he militias attac#ed politically*moderate Hutus, those #no"n to &e lu#e"arm to the ideolo$y of Hutu Po"er. 'hrou$h their ideolo$y and acts of intimidation, Hutu e;tremists "ere assured that there "ould &y no or$ani2ed Hutu resistance to mass violence. )t another level, the most visi&le &ystanders to the $enocide in !"anda "ere those nations "hich understood the events unfoldin$ &ut failed to respond effectively. 'he political dimensions of this issue are more comple; than can &e discussed here. %riefly, it is important to note that the commander of the @N peace#eepin$ force stationed in !"anda at the time, 3eneral <allaire, "arned @N officials a&out the impendin$ violence. )s violence erupted, %el$ian soldiers "ere intentionally tar$eted on the assumption that 6estern nations**already feelin$ vulnera&le from perceived failure in :omalia**"ould remove troops and avoid entan$lement. 'heir assumption proved correct. 'here "as fee&le response in the @N as the violence escalated. 6estern nationals "ere evacuated, and !"andans "ere left to die. )merican officials "ere instructed not to use the term "$enocide" in official discourse to avoid invocation of the 3enocide 8onvention. 'he /rench $overnment later responded &y creatin$ a 2one of protection "hich har&ored Hutu $enocidaires. 'heir actions supported the perpetuation of violence in refu$ee camps. Positive &ystanders could have had a po"erful impact on events in !"anda. )dditional troops may have allo"ed peace#eepers to effectively stop the militias. 4ne of the simplest actions the international community mi$ht have underta#en "as Bammin$ or destroyin$ the radio

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transmitters "hich spread the e;tremist messa$e across the country (8hal#, 1999). Dater $enocidairs continued to foment fear in refu$ee camps in Faire "ith a porta&le transmitter. 'he international protests that "ere voiced found listeners in !"anda. )ccordin$ to <es /or$es (1999), international protests "ere discussed at all civil levels, includin$ local meetin$s. Had the international community done more to discredit the $overnment durin$ the $enocide, <es /or$es ar$ues, the "ould*&e #illers may have had more reason to dou&t the inducements to #ill issued &y the $overnment. 6ithin !"anda, the church failed to act as a positive &ystander durin$ the $enocide. Historically, the 8hristian denominations "ere allied "ith the Hutu $overnment. 'hey did little to spea# out a$ainst the massacres of 'utsis. 'he church no" has an opportunity to model reconciliation efforts &y admittin$ its mista#es, denouncin$ all forms of violence, and supportin$ healin$ (:chonec#e, 1995).

!he Children of "#anda )t this point, 1 "ould li#e to shift attention to the e;perience of children in the $enocide. 'oo often, reports of $enocide $loss over the impact of the #illin$s on children. 1n !"anda, so many children died and so many others "itnessed violence that attention must &e $iven to their pli$ht for the sa#e of the nation7s future. 6ithout attention to healin$, "ithout support for positive self*valuation and connection to others, !"andan children mi$ht &e easily cau$ht up in destructive ideolo$ies and actions in the comin$ years. 'he Hutu militias did not spare children. 1n fact, eliminatin$ 'utsi children "as seen as a critical dimension of eliminatin$ the 'utsi presence in !"anda (<este;he, 1995). >ilitia mem&ers reminded each other( "6e "ill not repeat the mista#e of 1959. 'he children must &e #illed too" (<este;he, 1995, p. 5?). 'he mista#e of 1959, of course, "as the mista#e of allo"in$ 'utsi

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children to escape death "hen thousands of 'utsis "ere driven from !"anda. :ome of the youn$ &oys "ho left !"anda in 1959 returned in 199- as soldiers of the !P/. <urin$ the $enocide, 'utsi &oys "ere primary tar$ets &ecause they "ere seen as the ne;t $eneration of !P/ fi$hters. 'he $ender of infants "as carefully chec#ed, and infant &oys "ere immediately murdered. )lthou$h 'utsi $irls may not have &een #illed in the same num&ers, they "ere often raped and held captive in se;ual servitude. 'he ma$nitude of the violence children e;perienced is sta$$erin$. 1n 1995, @N18 / conducted a survey of 5,--- !"andan children? a$es , throu$h 19 to assess the level of trauma they had e;perienced (8hauvin, >u$aBu, H 8omlavi, 199,).? 'he findin$s indicate that, of those children surveyed( 95I had "itnessed violence ,-I had suffered a death in their immediate family =?I "ere threatened "ith death

!esearchers from )frica !i$hts $athered stories of children7s e;periences durin$ the $enocide (4mar H de 6aal, 1994). 1n their accounts, children are remar#a&ly clear a&out the events they e;perienced. 'ypically, children fled their homes "hen the militias came to attac#. >any "ere separated from their parents or si&lin$s. :ome survived &y hidin$ in s"amps or fields and scaven$in$ food. 4thers "ere hidden &y relatives. 4ne &oy "ho survived a massacre in a church "as hidden &y a Hutu uncle. 'he uncle du$ a hole &ehind his house, puttin$ a lar$e sieve over the hole to ena&le the &oy to &reathe. 'he militias returned to the house often, and the &oy remained in hidin$ for more than one month (4mar H de 6aal, 1994).

/rom the availa&le documentation, it is not clear if the sample population for the survey "as representative. 'he hi$h percenta$es su$$est that 'utsi children, or J$enocide survivors,K "ere the primary sample population.

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'here "ere also children "ho survived massacres in schools or churches after "itnessin$ the murder of their family mem&ers. 'hose fe" "ho did survive shared a common strate$y of hidin$ under the corpses around them and playin$ deadG"completely dead"Guntil the militias moved else"here (4mar H de 6aal, 1994, p. 49-).

Im$act of !rauma Liolent events do not have the same impact on all children. !esearchers point out that it is the child7s response to an event, not an event per se, that causes trauma. 'rauma occurs "hen the child "cannot $ive meanin$ to dan$erous e;periences in the presence of over"helmin$ arousal" (3ar&arino H 0ostenly, 199=, p. 59). 'he outcomes of traumatic e;perience are multiple. 1n addition to sufferin$ physiolo$ical dama$e, traumati2ed children are victims of their memories. >emories of traumatic episodes intrude into consciousness, and "ith them, feelin$s of fear and an;iety. 'raumati2ed children may &ecome hypervi$ilant, constantly surveyin$ the environment for possi&le dan$er. 'hey may &e fri$htened &y seemin$ly &eni$n o&Bects or noises that remind them of the violence they suffered or "itnessed. 4ther conseAuences of traumatic e;perience included difficulty "ith concentration, sleep distur&ances, and $eneral developmental re$ression (3eltman H :tover, 1999). /or many children, a "orld "hich caused such pain cannot &e trusted. )t root, trauma is an attac# on meanin$, on the &asic $oodness and trust"orthiness of the "orld. 'rauma can result in a sense of distrust and fearGthe "philosophical "ound" (3ar&arino H 0ostenly, 199=, p. 49) "hich needs as much attention as physical "ounds. %ecause trauma can also create self*devaluation, the traumati2ed child may feel less "orthy of livin$ a full life.

15

4ne of the most de&ilitatin$ effects of trauma is referred to as "diminished e;pectations". 1n other "ords, trauma can ro& children of their future. )ccordin$ to a @N18 / survey, =-I of children surveyed did not care if they $re" up (@N18 /, 1999). 6ithout their family mem&ers to support them and lead the "ay for"ard, they can no lon$er ima$ine themselves in the future. 'he e;perience of e;treme violence has ta#en a"ay the possi&ility of a future "orth livin$ into. 'raumati2ed adults may reinforce a &lea# outloo#. Palmer (1995) reports that !"andan parents seemed unmoved &y the death of their children. 4ne parent7s comment a&out a murdered child may &e typical( "6ell, "hat future "ould he have had any"ayC" /or many children, the trauma of $enocide has, literally, stolen their voices. :everal o&servers in !"anda tell of children "ho remain mute, una&le or un"illin$ to communicate. 'hey refuse to eat. they sit in silent isolation. 1n short, they are dyin$ of sorro" (0eane, 1995). 1n the years follo"in$ the $enocide, sadness has &ecome an esta&lished part of !"anda7s collective emotional life. ) $irl e;plains ho" she feels( "1 feel sad, &ut it7s normal, isn7t itC very&ody loses

some&ody" (>ay#uth, 199,, p. 9) Di#e so many other !"andans, she has learned to s"allo" her tears.

Or$hans and child%headed households 'he e;act num&er of children orphaned &y the $enocideGas is the case for any precise assessment a&out the $enocide7s conseAuences**is not #no"n. 1n 1994, it "as estimated &y the !"andan $overnment that 4--,--- children had &een separated or orphaned. )nother fi$ure from the !ed 8ross estimates 45,--- children orphaned or separated (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999). %y any count, there are thousands of children "ho have lost the care$ivin$ relationships that sustained their lives.

1=

) stron$ effort has &een made to re*unite children "ith immediate family mem&ers throu$h photo$raphs posted in refu$ee centers and other sites. 'hrou$h these efforts, thousands of children have &een reunited "ith their parents (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999). >any orphans have also &een placed in orphana$es. :ome ,,--- orphans are no" livin$ in 5- orphana$es across the country (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999). >any orphaned children have &een a&sor&ed &y !"andan families. 1n 1995, the avera$e num&er of children per family had increased from a pre*$enocide num&er of 5.5 to 9 (@N 8hronicle, 199=, p. 4). /or children "ho lost their parents, the $enocide has ripped a"ay the supportive layer &et"een them and the adult "orld. )ccordin$ to @N18 /, there are =5,--- families headed &y children 1? years of a$e and older (>ay#uth, 199,). 4ver 5--,--- children are $ro"in$ up in households "ithout adults**a total of nearly 1-I of all children under the a$e of 1,. )lthou$h the lon$*term conseAuences of so many children $ro"in$ up "ithout parents are un#no"n, it is clear that children on their o"n are more vulnera&le to life stresses than others. /arm "or# may preclude attendin$ school, and they may &e isolated from peers. Moun$ $irls "ithout adult protection may also &e vulnera&le to chronic se;ual a&use (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999). 1n !"anda, "omen

have no le$al ri$ht to o"n property. )s $irl survivors have returned to their family plots, they find themselves under pressure &y nei$h&ors and even male relatives. 'hey can &e easily e;ploited or dispossessed of property (>ay#uth, 199,).

Child Per$etrators 8hildren are suscepti&le to the same forces "hich drive adults to #ill. %ooth&y (1994) points out that child participation in violence is most common "hen social conditions are oppressive and economic resources are scarce. 8hildren can &e motivated to participate in violence

19

in order to o&tain food or assure their o"n security (6essels, 1999). )t an ideolo$ical level, children may &e attracted to contri&ute to a li&eration or nationalist stru$$le. 1n this "ay, the conditions for child participation in conflict mirror several of the $eneral preconditions for $roup violence. 'he role of child perpetrators in the !"anda $enocide is not fully #no"n. @N18 / estimates there "ere 4,,?- children involved in the armed forces on &oth sides of the conflict in !"anda. 6hile some children received militia trainin$, others &ecame involved "ith the violence spontaneously, encoura$ed to #ill &y family mem&ers and nei$h&ors (@N 8hronicle, 199=). <urin$ the $enocide period, child perpetrators committed arson, rape, theft, and murder (>atloff, 1999). Hutu children also acted as informants, disclosin$ the location of near&y 'utsis (6essels, 1999). !"anda has pursued punishment for child perpetrators. %y 1995, 1,911 children had &een imprisoned as suspected $enocidaires. 'hat num&er had increased to ?,159 &y 1999 (>atloff, 1999). 8hildren &et"een the a$es of 1- and 19 ma#e up appro;imately ?I of the prison population (@N 8hronicle, 199=). 1n prison, they face lon$ "aits for trials in a&usive conditions. 'here has &een no attempt to reinte$rate child perpetrators into their home communities. :uch an approach has a precedent. 1n >o2am&iAue, for$iveness has &een favored over punishment. %oys "ho had &een a&ducted &y the re&el $roup ! N)>4 and committed violence in its service "ere seen as victims. 'he state has felt that it is &etter to re*inte$rate perpetrators into communities than punish them (%ooth&y, 1994). :uch an approach can support healin$, individually and socially. Positive relationships "ith adults ena&le child perpetrators to feel remorse for their actions (%ooth&y, 1994).

1,

&ealing the 'uture 'he future of peace in !"anda is, in part, contin$ent upon the healin$ of the youn$est $eneration of $enocide survivors. )s a component of the overall healin$ effort, attention must &e $iven to children7s "elfare in "ays "hich inte$rate economic, social, and psycholo$ical needs. 1n this section, 1 "ill discuss approaches to healin$ $enerally and su$$estions for educational responses to the $enocide in !"anda. 'he "or# of %ooth&y (1994) and 6essels (1999) "ith child soldiers and child survivors of violence provides valua&le insi$ht into the dynamics of healin$. 'he overarchin$ imperative for healin$ is to "create a more positive social reality for the child" (%ooth&y, 1994, p. ?5-). Primarily, a positive social reality involves esta&lishin$ carin$ relationships "ith adults. Positive relationships "ith adults support children7s development( "child development is a partnership" (3ar&arino, 0ostenly, H <u&ro", 1991, p. 19). )n adult can help children process their e;perience and ma#e sense of a painful event. 'his is a critical process( recovery from trauma involves the re* inte$ration of over"helmin$ events into the child7s "orld. :afe, positive relationships provide the space for children to as# Auestions, communicate their feelin$s, and tell their stories (3eltman H :tover, 1999). /or all of these reasons, the first priority of supportin$ the recovery of traumati2ed children is &rin$in$ them &ac# into the care of an adult. 'he !"andan $overnment appears to &e movin$ in this direction. >ore than ?5,--- "social a$ents" have &een trained since 1995 in supportin$ the recovery of traumati2ed children (8huavin, >u$aBu, H 8omlavi, 199,). Met "ell* coordinated, lar$e*scale community efforts have not materiali2ed. 1nstitutionali2ed supportGorphana$es or other such facilitiesGare the least favora&le environment for children7s development. 8hild advocates su$$est that, "henever possi&le, orphana$es should &e converted into community facilities (6omen7s 8ommission, 1999. %ooth&y,

19

1994). >ore family*li#e care is essential. /acilities should &rin$ children to$ether "ith the community in a secure environment, and offer opportunities for recreation and employment trainin$. 1t is also important to note that efforts to support the recovery of children do not need to directly focus on children (Palmer, 1995). %ecause children7s "elfare is in many "ays dependent on the "elfare of families, support for vulnera&le families is support for vulnera&le children. fforts to help children can in many cases start "ith attention to the economic and psycholo$ical "elfare of "omen. 6estern models of individual therapy may not &e appropriate for adults or children healin$ from trauma in !"anda. 4ne of the first considerations in developin$ support pro$rams should &e ho" the local culture approaches matters of healin$. %ooth&y ma#es the point clearly( "1f culture is not ta#en into account, mental health responses "ill not focus on meanin$, and the essential therapeutic tas# of encoura$in$ the child to inte$rate "ar traumas into his or her "orldvie" "ill not &e accomplished" (1994, p. ?51). 1n "or# "ith refu$ees and child soldiers in )frica, %ooth&y (1994) and 6essels (1999) descri&e the po"er of indi$enous forms of healin$ to help children overcome trauma. !itual performed &y traditional healers can have po"erful effects. 3iven the hi$h profile of 8hristianity in !"anda, one cultural consideration mi$ht &e the role of the church. Ho" mi$ht church*related ritual &ecome an opportunity for psycholo$ical and spiritual cleansin$ amon$ youthC

(enocide and School 1n this section, 1 "ould li#e to discuss ho" schools in !"anda mi$ht ta#e a po"erful role in healin$ and reconciliation. :chools have the potential to &rin$ adults and children to$ether to tell stories a&out their e;perience and &uild positive connections &et"een $roups.

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'here are si$ns that an a$enda of reconciliation is &ein$ played out at the curricular level. :utcliffe (1995) reports that the 'utsi $overnment has suspended the teachin$ of history and civics. 'he minister of education &elieves that the lessons of the former te;t&oo#s had contri&uted to ethnic division. ) ne" curriculum, aimin$ at "&ias free" history and inclusion of human ri$hts perspectives, is under$oin$ implementation. 1t may also &e valua&le to teach a&out the $enocide itself, from perspectives that encoura$e empathy and understandin$, rather than &lame or victimi2ation. :tau& (in press) su$$ests that healin$ is aided &y co$nitive understandin$ of the ori$ins of violence. Met &efore curricular responses can ta#e hold, attention must &e $iven to the school as a livin$ community. %ecause of the $enocide, the continuity of relationships &et"een teachers and students has &een &ro#en. :ome teachers, active in local politics, &ecame perpetrators durin$ the $enocide (4mar H de 6aal, 1994). >any teachers "ere #illed, others fled. 1n 1995, only 5percent of the teachers "or#in$ &efore the $enocide remained in !"anda7s schools (:utcliffe, 1995). 'eachers are important fi$ures in children7s lives. 'hey need to &e trained in understandin$ the conseAuences of violence for children and in strate$ies for supportin$ children7s recovery. 1t is critical, for instance, that teachers appreciate that traumati2ed children "ill have difficulty focusin$ their attention. 8hildren may also &e especially sensitive to environmental stimuli "hich remind them of the circumstances surroundin$ traumatic events. %ecause traumatic e;perience involves a sense of helplessness, teachers should &e careful not to recreate conditions "hich lead to helplessness. 1n contrast to traditional modes of discipline and control*oriented teachin$, a more emotionally "arm environment "ould support children7s recovery. ) 8hilean priest descri&es the healin$ po"er of care( "for these #ids, the &est medicine is affection" (%roussard, 1999, p. 5=).

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1t is important for teachers to create a safe and carin$ community for learnin$. 'hey can do so &y modelin$ prosocial &ehavior, providin$ clear &oundaries, and ena&lin$ children to contri&ute to the school community ( li2, Finns, 6eiss&er$, et. al, 1999) 4ther techniAues include practice in self*re$ulation. /or e;ample, a classroom mi$ht contain an "an$er thermometer" "hich can help children descri&e their feelin$s and re$ulate intense emotions. 'eachers should also ma#e space for play. 1n play, children tend to re*enact traumatic events in an attempt to $ain mastery over the outcome. )nother important means of e;pression for children is dra"in$. 'he pictures and maps "hich children dra" of their "orld can help them process their e;perience (3ar&arino H 0ostenly, 199=). 6hat mi$ht &e done to heal the future in !"andaC /or adults and children, one of the most important strate$ies for lon$*term prevention may &e an e;panded sense of social efficacy. +ust as violence evolves, step &y step, so too does helpin$. !esearch on altruism in children su$$ests that children "ho help other children are more disposed to do so a$ain in the future (:tau&, 1999). 8hildren "ho help others develop a confidence in their a&ility to help and a valuin$ of the "elfare of others. 1n terms of schoolin$, policies should &e esta&lished "hich promote service learnin$ or other forms of community en$a$ement. )n emphasis on the needs of others can help "ounded children overcome a focus on the self and, thus, serve as part of a "positive evolution" (:tau&, in press, p. 55). 4ptimally, such activities "ould &e cross*$enerational, lin#in$ youth "ith elders to &roaden the ran$e of adult care$ivers.

!he #elfare of children and other considerations for a $ositive future 'he "elfare of children is insepara&le from a nation7s prospects for peace (6essels, 199,). 1n considerin$ options for healin$ and preventin$ future violence, it may &e helpful to frame the

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effort in terms of children7s "elfare. Ho" can the people of !"anda develop policies and practices "hich are accounta&le to their "ounded childrenC 1nvestment in the "elfare of children could

&ecome a common $round for dialo$ue and action amon$ all parties. :everal concrete measures could &e pursued. :upport for child*headed households and "omen is essential. 8ommunity centers "hich encoura$e the processin$ of traumatic e;perience, connection to others, and contri&ution to community should &e developed. :chools can also &e employed in the service of reconciliation "ith $reater attention to understandin$ trauma and creatin$ a carin$ environment for students. Providin$ children "ith security and opportunities to develop a positive identity and sense of connection "ill ma#e it less li#ely that they "ill &e attracted to participation in violence in the future. 1n the history of $enocide, !"anda is e;ceptional for havin$ the tar$et $roup ta#e control of the country follo"in$ the violence. 'heoretically, a 'utsi*led $overnment has a $reat potential for promotin$ reconciliation. 1t could help move the country &eyond past ideolo$ies of anta$onism and support the positive valuation of all $roups. 4fficially, the !P/*led $overnment has committed itself to pluralism and inclusion. 'he $overnment has pu&licly advocated a shift a"ay from the use of ethnic cate$ories for identifyin$ people. Nevertheless, an;ieties remain a&out the real commitment to democracy in !"anda. Hutus in the $overnment are fi$ureheads (Farem&o, 1999). 6idespread suspicion continues, as do listin$s of internal enemies (6a$ner, 199,). 1n the future, $reater efforts must &e made to develop a truly pluralistic political environment in !"anda, an environment in "hich violence is no lon$er tolerated as a tool of po"er. 'here are many important considerations for reconciliation in !"anda. 1n closin$, 1 "ill address only a fe". 'he politics of lan$ua$e "ill play an important role. 'he $enocide affected everyone. Met, as 6a$ner (199,) notes, typically only 'utsis are referred to as "survivors". 'he

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$overnment and international a$encies should ac#no"led$e that everyone in !"anda has suffered loss, rather than assumin$ that only 'utsis deserve attention. 'he $enocide and its aftermath** massive uprootin$, fear, continued #illin$s**affect the entire nation. <ialo$ue a&out these issues at the top levels of $overnment "ould &e helpful (:tau&, in press). )nother su$$estion involves the use of radio as a tool of peace (8hal#, 1999). 'he radio could promote the valuation of &oth Hutus and 'utsis and report actively on human ri$hts a&uses. 4verall, the ne" $overnment must ma#e every effort to create a civil society in "hich individuals can form positive connections across former anta$onisms and tal# openly a&out the conditions "hich led to the #illin$s. %y includin$ concern for the "elfare of children, such dialo$ue can help &uild hope in !"anda.

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!eferences %erry, +. ). H %erry, 8. P. (1999). 'he Hutu 'en 8ommandments. 1n +. ). %erry H 8. P. %erry ( ds). eno!ide in Rwanda" A !olle!tive memory. (pp. 115*115). 6ashin$ton, <8( Ho"ard @niversity Press. %erry, +. ). H %erry, 8. P. (1999). 1ntroduction( 8ollectin$ memory. 1n +. ). %erry H 8. P. %erry ( ds). eno!ide in Rwanda" A !olle!tive memory. (pp. ?*,). 6ashin$ton, <8( Ho"ard @niversity Press. %ooth&y, N. (1994). 'rauma and violence amon$ refu$ee children. 1n ). >arsella, '. %ornemann, :. #&lad, H +. 4rley, +. ( ds.) Amidst #eril and #ain" The mental health and well$%eing of the world&s refugees. (pp. ?59*?59). 6ashin$ton( )merican Psycholo$ical )ssociation. %roussard, P. (1999, )pril). 8asta"ays in 0i$ali. 'orld (ress Review, ))(4), 5=*5,. 8hal#, /. (1999). !adio &roadcastin$ in the incitement of interdiction of $ross violations of human ri$hts, includin$ $enocide. 1n !. :mith ( d.), eno!ide" Essays toward understanding, early$warning, and #revention (pp. 1,5*?-5). 6illiams&ur$, L)( )ssociation of 3enocide :cholars. 8hauvin, D., >u$aBu, +., H 8omlavi, +. (199,). valuation of the psychosocial trauma recovery pro$ramme in !"anda. Evaluation and (rogramming (lanning, *+, 5,,*59?. <es /or$es, ). (1995). 'he ideolo$y of $enocide, Issue, *,(?), 44*49. <es /or$es, ). (1999). -eave none to tell the story" eno!ide in Rwanda. Ne" Mor#( Human !i$hts 6atch. <este;he, ). (1995). Rwanda and geno!ide in the twentieth !entury. Ne" Mor#( Ne" Mor# @niversity Press. lias, >., Fins, +., 6eiss&er$, !., et al. (1999). (romoting so!ial and emotional learning" uidelines for edu!ators. )le;andria, L1( )ssociation for :upervision and 8urriculum <evelopment. /ein, H. (1999, Novem&er). So!iologi!al #ers#e!tives on geno!ide as state !rime. Paper presented at the 8onference on <ifferin$ )pproaches to )ssessin$ Potential 3enocides, Politicides and >ass 0illin$s. Lienna, L1. 3ar&arino, +. H 0ostelny, 0. (199=). 6hat do "e need to #no" to understand children in "ar and community violenceC 1n !. +. )pfel H %. :imon ( ds.), .inefields in their hearts" The

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mental health of !hildren in war and !ommunal violen!e (pp. 55*51). Ne" Haven( Male @niversity Press. 3ar&arino, +., 0ostelny, 0., H <u&ro", N. (1991). /o #la!e to %e a !hild" rowing u# in a war zone. De;in$ton, >)( De;in$ton %oo#s. 3eltman, P., H :tover, . (1999). 3enocide and the pli$ht of children in !"anda. 0ournal of the Ameri!an .edi!al Asso!iation, *11, ??*?9. 3ourivitch, P. (199,). 'e wish to inform you that tomorrow we will %e killed with our families. Ne" Mor#( /arrar, :traus H 3irou;. +efremovas, L. (1995). )cts of human #indness( 'utsi, Hutu, and the $enocide. Issue, *,(?), ?,* 51. 0eane, /. (1995). Season of %lood" A Rwandan 2ourney. Dondon( Li#in$. Demarchand, !. (1995). !"anda( 'he rationality of $enocide. Issue, *,(?), ,*11. >atloff, +. (1999, +anuary ?,). !"and7s &ind( 'ryin$ children for $enocide. 3hristian S!ien!e .onitor, ,9(45), 1 >ay#uth, ). (199,, :eptem&er ??). )ftermath of $enocide( 'oday 5--,--- children in !"anda are left to rear themselves. 4night$Ridder5Tri%une /ews Servi!e. 4mar, !., H de 6aal, ). (1994). Rwanda" 6eath, des#air, and defian!e. Dondon( )frican !i$hts. Palmer, 1. (1995). <ar#ness in the heart. British .edi!al 0ournal, ,++(9--?), 459. !"anda( ) case study. (199=). 7/ 3hroni!le, 55(4), 15*1=. :chonec#e, 6. (1995). 'he role of the church in !"anda. Ameri!a, +1*,?1, 9*1?. :mith, !. 6. (199,). 'he psychocultural roots of $enocide( De$itimacy and crisis in !"anda. Ameri!an (sy!hologist, 8,, 945*955. :tau&, . (19,9). The roots of evil" The origins of geno!ide and other grou# violen!e. Ne" Mor#( 8am&rid$e @niversity Press. :tau&, . (in press). 'he ori$ins and prevention of $enocide, mass #illin$, and other collective violence. (ea!e and 3onfli!t" 0ournal of (ea!e (s!yhology, 5, 5-5*55=. :tau&, . (1999). A %righter future" The develo#ment of !aring and nonviolent !hildren. >anuscript in preparation.

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:utcliffe, +. (1995, )u$ust 1,). 'ra$edy in the heart of dar#ness. Times Edu!ational Su##lement, 41?9, 9*9. @N18 /. (1999). Healin$ minds as "ell as &odies. )vaila&le( http(NN""".unicef.or$N$racaNpsychol.htm 6a$ner, >. <. (199,, +anuary*>arch). )ll the 7%our$mestre7s7 men( >a#in$ sense of $enocide in !"anda. Afri!a Today, )8,1, ?5*5=. 6essels, >. (1999). 8hild soldiers. Bulletin of the Atomi! S!ientists, 55(=), 5?*59. 6essles, >. (199,). 8hildren, armed conflict, and peace. 0ournal of (ea!e Resear!h, ,8(5), =55* =4=. 6omen7s 8ommission for !efu$ee 6omen and 8hildren. (1999). Rwanda&s women and !hildren" The long road to re!on!iliation. A field re#ort assessing the #rote!tion and assistan!e needs of Rwandan women and !hildren. Ne" Mor#( 6omen7s 8ommission for !efu$ee 6omen and 8hildren. Farem&o, ). (1999, )pril). +ud$ement day( in !"anda, 9?,59? $enocide suspects a"ait trial. 9ar#er&s .agazine, *:), 19=5, =,*,-.

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