Mega LD Backfile Part 1

Julian Switala Mega LD Backfile Part I
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* * * * * MEGA LD BACKFILE * * * * *
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* * * * * Written by Julian Switala * * * * *
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* * * * * Instructions * * * * *
1 !!!"SE #$E %D&C"ME'# MA() *IEW F"'C#I&'!!!
+ !!!MI'IMI,E E*E-.#$I'G I' #$E D&C"ME'# MA( FI-S#!!!
/ #0is 1ile 0as internal lin23 i45act3 an6 1ra4ewor2 car6s a55licable to nearly all 5ossible LD
resolutions
7 I su88est rea6in8 an6 cuttin8 articles s5eci1ic to t0e to5ic 1or lin2s an6 uni9ueness
: A L&# o1 t0e car6s o;erla5 an6 can be reasonably 5lace6 in 6i11erent cate8ories $owe;er3
t0ere are ;ery 1ew 6u5licate car6s <car6s t0at coul6 be in 4ulti5le cate8ories only a55ear
once in t0e 1ile= #0us3 i1 you>re loo2in8 1or a 5articular car6 in w0at see4s li2e its 4ost
li2ely cate8ori?ation3 you 4ay not 1in6 it t0ere an6 will 0a;e to searc0 elsew0ere in t0e 1ile I
8uarantee t0at you@ll 1in6 w0at you@re loo2in8 1or i1 you searc0 0ar6 enou80 <So4e 6e1ense
car6s 4i80t be in t0e o11ensi;e sections etc=
A As suc03 I woul6 a6;ise a8ainst usin8 t0is 1ile inBroun6 since t0e car6s aren@t 5artitione6
enou80 an6 4any 6i11erent car6s are lu45e6 to8et0er un6er a ;ery broa6 0ea6in8 I woul6
reco44en6 writin8 bloc2s 5reBroun6 wit0 t0is 1ile $owe;er3 i1 you nee6 car6e6 answers to
ar8u4ents you 0a;en@t 0ear6 be1ore or i1 you 2now t0e 1ile eCtre4ely well3 t0en 8o 1or it
D An6 8i;en 0ow LD wor2s3 you@ll 5robably be success1ul Eust by rea6in8 t0e ta8lines o1 t0ese
car6s an6 t0en 4a2in8 s0ort eCtra5olations an6 analytics on t0e 1lyF
G $a;e 1un!
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* * * * * #ABLE &F C&'#E'#S * * * * *
* * * * * MEGA LD BACKFILE * * * * *...........................................................1
* * * * * Written by u!ian "#ita!a * * * * *.......................................................$
* * * * * Instructions * * * * *............................................................................%
* * * * * TABLE &F C&'TE'T" * * * * *........................................................(
*****LIBE)T******.......................................................................................++
**Autono,y Goo- . Coercion Ba-**............................................................+$
/u,an -i0nity is the hi0hest stan-ar-....................................................................................................... +1
Mora! ob!i0ation to 2rotect !iberty.............................................................................................................. +%
Free-o, co,es be3ore a!! other i,2acts ................................................................................................. +4
Coercion out#ei0hs5 con-itions !i6e 2o7erty are ine7itab!e5 its 3uti!e to try to so!7e...................................+(
Co,2u!sory 7io!ate ri0hts...................................................................................................................... +8
Coercion is i,,ora! 9 -enies in-i7i-ua!s the ca2acity -e7e!o2 as ,ora! a0ents.......................................+:
E7a!uate 3ree-o, 3irst 9 it is critica! to both 2ros2erity an- 3airness .........................................................$;
Free-o, out#ei0hs 9 #ithout 3ree-o,5 #e are a!! re-uce- to the !e7e! o3 ani,a!s an- s!a7es 9 on!y
3ree-o, 3ro, 0o7ern,ent o22ression so!7es............................................................................................ $1
Coercion restricts ri0hts an- -estroys in-i7i-ua! a0ency...........................................................................$+
Coercion sno#ba!!s<E7ery increase in the states 2o#er brin0s us c!oser to tyranny..............................$$
There is no 7a!ue to !i3e in their 3ra,e#or6 9 coercion ,a6es us into ,ere too!s o3 the state....................$1
=ti!itarianis, -oesnt tru,2 the i,2act o3 coercion<in-i7i-ua!s cant be re-uce- to units o3 7a!ue..........$%
E7ery in7asion o3 !iberty ,ust be re>ecte- 9 3ai!ure to -o so !ea-s to ,assi7e atrocities...........................$4
Go7ern,ent coercion is i,,ora! because it 6i!!s 3ree-o, an- 7irtue by ero-in0 the basis o3 3ree ,ar6et
ca2ita!is,.................................................................................................................................................. $(
Coercion creates a s!i22ery s!o2e to ,ore coercion..................................................................................$8
?io!ations o3 !iberty create a s!i22ery s!o2e to ,ore 0o7ern,enta! constraints. ........................................$:
Go7ern,ent coercion causes ,ore 7io!ations o3 !iberty............................................................................1;
Go7ern,ent coercion -estroys the 7a!ue to !i3e an- cannot be ,ora!!y >usti3ie-........................................11
Coercion -estroys 7a!ue to !i3e.................................................................................................................. 1+
Coercion ensures e@tinction. .................................................................................................................... 1$
Coercion is the root cause o3 ,i!itary con3!ict ........................................................................................... 11
G!oba! -e,ocratic conso!i-ation is necessary to 2re7ent ,any scenarios 3or #ar an- e@tinction..............14
Each use o3 coerci7e 3orce 2a7es the roa- 3or ,assi7e atrocities.............................................................1(
Go7ern,ent coercion creates e7i!............................................................................................................. 18
Go7ern,ent coercion ,ust be ,ora!!y re>ecte-........................................................................................ 1:
Coercion ,ust be re>ecte- in e7ery instance............................................................................................. %;
Coercion 7io!ates 3un-a,ent hu,an ri0hts............................................................................................... %1
**Aro2erty )i0hts Goo-**............................................................................%+
Aro2erty ri0hts are 6ey to a!! ri0hts............................................................................................................ %$
Aro2erty ri0hts critica! to ,ora! a0ency...................................................................................................... %1
Aro2erty ri0hts are 6ey to 2re7ent 'aBis,................................................................................................. %%
**)i0hts Co,e First**..................................................................................%(
A!acin0 sur7i7a! o7er in-i7i-ua! autono,y re2!icates authoritarian re0i,es o3 contro!5 sub>u0atin0
in-i7i-ua! ri0hts to the 7a!ues he!- by those in 2o#er ...............................................................................%8
?io!ation o3 3ree-o, ne0ates the 7a!ue o3 hu,an e@istence an- re2resents the 0reatest threat to hu,an
sur7i7a!...................................................................................................................................................... %:
?io!atin0 ri0hts in the na,e o3 sur7i7a! causes socia! 2ara!ysis an- -estroys the 7a!ue to !i3e...................4;
It is i,2ossib!e 3or 2o!icy,a6ers to 6no# 3uture conseCuences 9 a!!o#in0 ,ore ri0hts 7io!ations #i!! >usti3y
#orse conseCuences in the 3uture............................................................................................................. 41
)i0hts out#ei0h a!! 9 critica! to hu,an -i0nitye 3uture...............................................................................4+
Ao!icy,a6ers ,ust 2rotect in-i7i-ua! ri0hts............................................................................................... 4$
The ca!cu!ation o3 uti!itarianis, is the 3oun-ation o3 tota!itarianis,............................................................41
E7ery a!ternati7e to ri0hts !ea-s to tyranny................................................................................................ 4%
Co!!ecti7e sa3ety is no >usti3ication 3or ri0hts 7io!ations<!ea-s to s!a7ery5 0enoci-e5 an- #ars..................44
"acri3icin0 ri0hts to 2reser7e !i3e 2ro-uces tota!itarianis,. .......................................................................4(
Err on the si-e o3 ri0hts 9 its the bi00est conseCuence in the !on0 ter,...................................................48
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)i0hts abso!ute 9 cant in3rin0e on one 2ersons ri0hts to increase #e!!Dbein0 o3 others...........................4:
)i0hts an- basic !iberties are a 2rereCuisite o3 rationa! -ecision,a6in0....................................................(;
)i0ht to hea!th out#ei0hs 9 7io!ation o3 ri0ht to !i3e....................................................................................(1
**ATE Aositi7e )i0hts Goo-**......................................................................(+
Go7ern,ent 2rotection o3 2ositi7e ri0hts >usti3ies #ar................................................................................($
Li,itin0 0o7ern,ent 2rotection to 2ro2erty ri0hts is 6ey to 2re7ent atrocities............................................(1
**ATE =ti! Arotects )i0hts**.........................................................................(4
Current 2riceDta0 thin6in0 is insu33icientD #e ha7e to ,a6e the tou0h -ecisions that incor2orate in-i7i-ua!
ri0hts instea- o3 tryin0 to s2are !ay2eo2!e 3ro, -i33icu!t -ecision,a6in0....................................................((
=ti!itarianis, -oesnt tru,2 the i,2act o3 coercion<in-i7i-ua!s cant be re-uce- to units o3 7a!ue..........(8
The sacri3ice o3 innocence -e0ra-es hu,anityDD it is an abso!ute #ron0...................................................(:
=ti! 3ai!s to 2rotect ,ora! ri0hts 9 it si!ences ri0hts c!ai,s #hen not 0roun-e- in !a#.................................8;
=ti!itarianis, 3un-a,enta!!y 3ai!s to 2rotect in-i7i-ua! ri0hts 9 F0reatest 0oo-G c!ai,s si,2!y con3!ict........81
=ti!itarianis, re-uces in-i7i-ua!s to their ,ere uti!ity 7a!ue5 ,a6in0 the, e@2en-ab!e.............................8+
Ca!cu!ation o3 hu,an !i3e !ea-s to no 7a!ue to !i3e an- the Bero 2oint o3 the ho!ocaust..............................8$
**ATE )i,a!**...............................................................................................81
Mutua! coercion #ont so!7e D they !ac6 the 6no#!e-0e an- incenti7e to 2rotect the en7iron,ent an- #i!!
2er2etuate tyrannica! coercion.................................................................................................................. 8%
An authoritarian 0o7ern,ent #ou!- 3ai! to conser7e resources.................................................................84
Their authors contra-ict the,se!7es.......................................................................................................... 8(
**ATE Coercion Ba-**..................................................................................88
I!!e0iti,ate resource acCuisition >usti3ies re-istribution..............................................................................8:
Libertarians conce-e that e@tinction out#ei0hs......................................................................................... :;
)e-istribution is not an inherent a33ront to hu,an -i0nity. As !on0 as you be!ie7e he!2in0 others is 0oo-5
re-istribution -oesnt threaten -i0nity........................................................................................................ :1
The on!y #ay their a!ternati7e can ca2ture this is i3 their a!ternati7e is a!!o#e- to i,a0ine a #or!- in #hich
in-i7i-ua!s a!! beco,e charitab!e 0i7ers. This is abusi7e 2ri7ate actor 3iat. I3 the ne0 can i,a0ine this they
can >ust i,a0ine #or!- 2eace an- so!7e a!! o3 our case i,2acts................................................................:+
'oBic6Hs conce2t o3 -i0nity reCuires access to resources..........................................................................:$
"ince initia! acCuisition #as un>ust5 there are no !e0iti,ate entit!e,ents ..................................................:1
Ta@ation re-istributes 3ree-o, rather than !i,itin0 it.................................................................................:%
Ta@es -onHt 7io!ate ri0hts........................................................................................................................... :4
?io!ations o3 !iberty -ont >usti3y re>ectin0 #e!3are.......................................................................................:(
We!3are enhances se!3 -eter,ination........................................................................................................ :8
)e-istribution is >usti3ie- on uti!itarian 0roun-s.......................................................................................... ::
=ti!itarianis, >usti3ies the #e!3are state.................................................................................................... 1;;
E@tinction out#ei0hs................................................................................................................................ 1;1
E@cess !iberty creates a ,ora! 7acuu,................................................................................................... 1;+
Libertarianis, #ou!- un-er,ine the ,ora! basis o3 the !ibera! state........................................................1;$
B!an6et state,ents about coercion are 3a!se5 ,ust e7a!uate coercion on a case by case basis..............1;1
TurnE Autono,y ba-................................................................................................................................ 1;%
**ATE I "o!7e Future Coercion**................................................................1;4
Coercion sno#ba!!s 9 Each increase beco,es easier to >usti3y. The on!y reason #hy #e -o not rea!iBe it is
because the 0o7ern,ent uses the 2!oy o3 FA!truis,G to ta6e it ste2 by ste2. As each 2ro0ra, 3ai!s5 it
beco,es FnecessaryG to ,o7e another ste2 c!oser to ,ore coercion. We are on a roa- to o22ression. 1;(
Linear< e7ery increase in coerci7e 2o#er -ecreases hu,an -i0nity. ...................................................1;8
"te2s to#ar- state 2o#er are ste2s to#ar- tyranny ...............................................................................1;:
Coercion isnt >usti3ie- to 2re7ent coercion 9 this ,in-set !ea-s to #ar...................................................11;
/u,an -i0nity out#ei0hs 9 =ti!itarianis, 3ai!s to 2rotect ri0hts...............................................................111
'onDabso!ute ri0hts 3ai!s to 2rotect 3ree-o,............................................................................................ 11+
**ATE I, not e@cessi7e!y coerci7e**.........................................................11$
E7ery >usti3ication 3or coercion5 no ,atter ho# !e0iti,ate5 con-itions us to acce2t 3urther !i,itations on our
!iberty...................................................................................................................................................... 111
Coerci7e e33orts 3ai! an- sno#ba!! into ,assi7e atrocities 9 e7ery in7asion o3 !iberty ,ust be 3orce3u!!y
re>ecte-................................................................................................................................................... 11%
=nco,2ro,isin0 stance on !ibertarian 2rinci2!es is 6ey..........................................................................114
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A!!o#in0 any rea!, o3 0o7ern,ent contro! Cuic6!y sno#ba!!s to tota!itarian co!!ecti7is,..........................118
**ATE )a#!s**............................................................................................11:
)a#!s conce2tion o3 ri0hts 3!a#e- 9 3ai!s to e@2!ain #hy s,a!! incursions on !iberty #ou!- threaten
citiBenshi2............................................................................................................................................... 1+;
)a#!s 3ai!s to 2ro7i-e #arrants 3or the abso!ute 2reser7ation o3 basic !iberties o7er other en-s..............1+1
)a#!s conce2tion o3 2ersona! 3ree-o, cannot reso!7e uti!itarian -e,ocratic i-ea!s...............................1++
**ATE E0a!itarianis, . ECua!ity . Distribution Goo-**................................1+$
1. Distributi7e >ustice !ea-s to 0!oba! 2o7erty........................................................................................... 1+1
+. Focusin0 e@c!usi7e!y on the 2oor sti0,atiBes the issue<no so!7ency................................................1+%
$. E0a!itarianis, -oes not eCuate society .............................................................................................. 1+4
1. FArinci2!es o3 >usticeG ce,ent the 2o!itica! s2here<ero-e the 2ossibi!ity 3or rea! chan0e ...................1+(
%. IneCua!ity ine7itab!e<ca2ita!is, ........................................................................................................ 1+8
/ierarchies are ine7itab!e e7en a3ter the re-istribution o3 #ea!th............................................................1+:
ECua!ity is i,2ossib!e<en7y .................................................................................................................. 1$;
Distribution o3 bene3its to eCua!iBe the i,2o7erishe- is in-e3ensib!e 9 encoura0es en7y an- ,ora!
-isorientation........................................................................................................................................... 1$1
E0a!itarian an- Arioritarian thin6in0 3!a#e- 9 no stan-ar- base!ine 3or eCua!ity 0uarantees ne7erDen-in0
re-istribution. .......................................................................................................................................... 1$+
Acce2tance o3 e0a!itarianis, -o,inates the 2o!itica! s2here an- ,a6es us 2o#er!ess to the abuses o3
e!ites ....................................................................................................................................................... 1$$
Mora! ca!!s 3or e0a!itarianis, are se!3 -e3eatin0 ...................................................................................... 1$1
Err on the si-e o3 co,binin0 2o!itica! conseCuences #ith hu,anitarianis, ............................................1$%
Mora! 7ie#s o3 e0a!itarianis, are se!3 ser7in0 ........................................................................................ 1$4
E0a!itarianis, isnt -e,ocratic<ine7itab!e -i!e,,a ..............................................................................1$(
Force- atte,2ts at eCua!ity 2er2etuate ineCua!ity ................................................................................1$8
E0a!itarianis, hurts the 2oor ................................................................................................................. 1$:
'o such thin0 as a uti!itarian -e3ense o3 e0a!itarianis, ..........................................................................11;
=ti!itarian ca!cu!us not e0a!itarian 9 -oesnt act on the 2rinci2!e o3 intrinsic eCua!ity................................111
InDe0a!itarianis, so!7es9 bene3its tric6!e -o#n........................................................................................ 11+
The 0oa! o3 the >u-0e shou!- not be to ,a6e sure each 2erson is eCua!<rather ensure each 2erson is
su33icient.................................................................................................................................................. 11$
E7erythin0 is re!ati7e<the 0oa! shou!- not be to car7e e7eryone into the sa,e statue<rather ensure
each 2erson is su33icient<this is -istinct 3ro, econo,ic e0a!itarianis,..................................................111
E0a!itarianis, 3osters ne7erDen-in0 co,2arison an- ob!i0ation 9 a su33icientarian 3ra,e#or6 shou!- ta6e
2rece-ence............................................................................................................................................. 11%
Mo-erate su33icentarianis, o33ers a 2!ura!ist a22roach to >ustice #hich ,a@i,iBes conte@tua! eCua!ity. .114
*****A)I?ATIIATI&'*****.........................................................................11:
**Ari7atiBation Goo- . Go7ern,ent Ba-**.................................................1%;
"oDca!!e- #e!3are Fri0htsG restrict 3ree-o,5 rationa!iBe the coerci7e trans3er o3 #ea!th5 an- -estroy
charitab!e 3ee!in0s5 turnin0 the case........................................................................................................ 1%1
/ea!th care 2o!icies are coerci7e............................................................................................................. 1%+
Free hea!th care ,eans s!a7ery.............................................................................................................. 1%$
The state is -ehu,aniBin0 because o3 bureaucracy an- the abi!ity to ,a6e #ar....................................1%1
The 0o7ern,ent is inherent!y -ehu,aniBin0 because it see6s to contro! 2eo2!e....................................1%%
Go7ern,ent is stri22in0 -octors ri0hts throu0h coerci7e action..............................................................1%4
The #e!3are state is 3!a#e- 9 it !oo6s on!y at the outco,es rather than the 2rocess #hich is i,,ora!
because !oo6in0 at outco,es on!y assu,es that the 2oor ha7e been cheate- not that they ha7e trie- an-
3ai!e-....................................................................................................................................................... 1%(
Ca2ita!is, is the best syste, to 3oster 3ree-o,5 #hich is a ,ora! necessity...........................................1%:
Li,ite- 0o7ern,ent is 6ey to 2re7ent tyranny5 #hich 6i!!e- ,ore 2eo2!e than both Wor!- Wars co,bine- 9
the 2!an 2ro7i-es 2ositi7e ri0hts5 or entit!e,ents that causa!!y 3ai! to 2rotect the ri0ht to !i3e....................14;
Free ,ar6ets are inherent!y nonD7io!ent because they re!y on 7o!untary associations #hereas
0o7ern,ents 3orce an- co,2e!5 !ea-in0 to 7io!ence. ..............................................................................141
Turn 9 a33.ne0 creates -e2en-ence #hich -ecreases incenti7es to #or6 9 tan6s the econo,y..............14+
Ta6in0 #ea!th 3orce3u!!y 6i!!s charitab!e -esires....................................................................................... 14$
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The a!ternati7e resu!ts in bene3icia! 3or,s o3 ca2ita!is,. &n!y a!truis, resu!ts in the -an0erous 3or,s o3
ca2ita!is, that their authors assu,e....................................................................................................... 141
Ca2ita!is, so!7es #ar 9 econo,ic inter-e2en-encies............................................................................14%
Econo,ica!!y 3ree countries are !ess !i6e!y to 0o to #ar 9 2ut a#ay your -e,ocracy a--Dons because the
a!t. so!7es better...................................................................................................................................... 144
The 3ree ,ar6et is a ,ora! necessity....................................................................................................... 14(
Go7ern,ent coercion -estroys 3ree-o, 9 the 3ree ,ar6et syste, is the hi0hest ,ora! 0roun- an- #i!!
so!7e a!! other 2rob!e,s ......................................................................................................................... 148
Go7ern,ent 2o#er ine7itab!y !ea-s to #ar an- ,ass 0enoci-e 9 !i,itin0 the 2o#er o3 the 0o7ern,ent an-
3osterin0 in-i7i-ua! 3ree-o, so!7es......................................................................................................... 1(;
Go7ern,ent 2ro7ision is ine33icient an- ine33ecti7e < three reasons.......................................................1(1
E!i,inatin0 !icensin0 reCuire,ents 3or ,e-ica! estab!ish,ents an- restrictions on ,e-ica! su22!ies5
-ere0u!atin0 hea!th insurance5 an- e!i,inatin0 subsi-ies such as Me-icai- 6ey to 0reater e33ecti7eness
an- a7ai!abi!ity o3 hea!th care.................................................................................................................. 1(+
Abo!ishin0 3e-era! 2ro0ra,s is the 3irst ste2 to so!7in0 2o7erty 9 a!!o#s 2ri7ate sector to 0ro#...............1($
Lo#er ta@ rates in-uce charitab!e 0i7in0 9 stu-ies 2ro7e.........................................................................1(1
Fai!ure to 2ri7atiBe co!!a2ses the econo,y.............................................................................................. 1(%
**A!ternati7e to Go7ern,ent Aro7ision**...................................................1(4
The a!ternati7e is to re>ect the coerci7e 2o!icies o3 the a33ir,ati7e. By e,bracin0 ne0ati7e 3ree-o,s5 the
3ree ,ar6et #i!! a!!e7iate socia! i!!s5 turnin0 the case................................................................................1((
We shou!- re>ect coercion 3or -e!iberati7e -e,ocracy............................................................................1(8
)e>ect coercion in 3a7or o3 ca2ita!is, an- in-i7i-ua! ri0hts......................................................................1(:
)e>ection o3 the co!!ecti7ist #e!3are 2o!icies o3 the a33 is critica! to i,a0inin0 a better #or!-. &n!y throu0h
this can #e estab!ish concrete 3oun-ations 3or reasonab!e chan0e.........................................................18;
A!t 9 7ie# the in7isib!e 7icti,s ................................................................................................................ 181
A,ericans #ant s,a!!er 0o7ern,ent #hen ta@es ,atter.........................................................................18+
ATE Cant i,a0ine. Con3ine,ent to the F2o!itica!!y 2ossib!eG ,a6es chan0e i,2ossib!e. Are3er the re3or,ist
2o!icies ................................................................................................................................................... 18$
**Ari7ate Charities CA**............................................................................18%
Ari7ate charities are ,ore success3u! than the 0o7ern,ent at 2ro7i-in0 ai-...........................................184
Go7ern,ent e!i0ibi!ity reCuire,ents s6e# ai- -istribution.......................................................................18(
Go7ern,enta! 2ro0ra,s are ine33icientJ Ari7ate charities arent..............................................................188
A 0reater -i7ersity o3 so!utions ,a6es 2ri7ate charities ,ore e33ecti7e....................................................18:
Ari7ate Charity causes an attitu-ina! shi3t encoura0in0 reci2ients to esca2e 2o7erty..............................1:;
Ari7ate Charity 2ro,otes 2artici2atory -e,ocracy..................................................................................1:1
&n!y the counter2!an so!7es 9 in3or,a! 2ri7ate net#or6s are not on!y so!7e 2o7erty but 2rotect 6ey 7a!ues
................................................................................................................................................................ 1:+
Ari7atiBation 2ro,otes choice an- increases Cua!ity o3 ser7ices to a!! 2eo2!e.........................................1:$
Aro-uct choice because o3 2ri7atiBation #i!! reso!7e the ine33iciency 2re7entin0 hi0h Cua!ity 0oo-s an-
ser7ices................................................................................................................................................... 1:1
Ari7atiBin0 is a 2rereCuisite to e!i,inatin0 2o7erty...................................................................................1:%
Ari7ate charities so!7e 2o7erty................................................................................................................. 1:4
Go7ern,ent 2ro0ra,s are ine33ecti7e an- tra-eDo33 #ith 2ri7ate e33orts..................................................1:(
Ari7ate charities so!7e coercion............................................................................................................... 1:8
Ari7ate charity best 9 tar0ets causes5 not sy,2to,s. .............................................................................1::
Ta@es tra-e o33 #ith charity...................................................................................................................... +;;
*****=TILITA)IA'I"M G&&D . DE&' BAD*****......................................+;$
**=ti! Goo- For )i0hts**............................................................................+;1
=ti!itarianis, u2ho!-s se!3Do#nershi2 an- thus !iberty.............................................................................+;%
=ti!itarianis, is best 9 it 2rotects ri0hts #hi!e not tota!!y re>ectin0 a!! 2o!icies that ,i0ht in3rin0e.............+;4
=ti! 2rotects ri0hts in socia! an- constitutiona! hierarchies.......................................................................+;(
=ti!itarian ca!cu!us is the on!y #ay to -eter,ine ri0hts re!ati7e i,2ortance.............................................+;8
**=ti! Goo-E Generics**.............................................................................+;:
Their ,ora! i,2erati7es re7o!7e aroun- a 3!a#e- !ibertarian ,etho-D conseCuences ,ust be e7a!uate-
3irst to esca2e the cyc!e........................................................................................................................... +1;
Page 10 of 609
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Ao!icy ,ust be 7ie#e- throu0h a conseCuentia!ist 3ra,e#or6D s!i22in0 into the !ibertarian ,in-set on!y
recreates the root cause o3 the a33ir,ati7e har,s....................................................................................+11
Go7ern,ents ,ust #ei0h conseCuences................................................................................................ +1+
Mora! abso!utis, su33ers 3ro, tunne! 7ision that 0enerates e7i! an- 2o!itica! irre!e7ance.........................+1$
=ti!itarianis, 6ey to 2o!icy ,a6in0........................................................................................................... +11
Ao!icy,a6ers shou!- a-a2t uti!itarian ca!cu!us 9 a22!icab!e throu0hout society.......................................+1%
In a nuc!ear #or!-5 you ha7e to #ei0h conseCuences.............................................................................+14
=ti!itarianis, necessitates 2ub!ic 2o!icy that reCuires that !ea-ers ta6e the action #hich is in the best
interest o3 2eo2!e..................................................................................................................................... +1(
ConseCuences ,atter 9 the tunne! 7ision o3 ,ora! abso!utis, 0enerates e7i! an- 2o!itica! irre!e7ance...+1:
Deonto!o0y is ba- in the conte@t o3 2ub!ic 2o!icy 9 3i7e reasons .............................................................++;
At the sa,e ti,e5 -eonto!o0ica!!y base- ethica! syste,s ha7e se7ere 2ractica! !i,itations as a basis 3or
2ub!ic 2o!icy. At best5 a 2riori ,ora! 2rinci2!es 2ro7i-e on!y 0enera! 0ui-ance to ethica! -i!e,,as in 2ub!ic
a33airs an- -o not the,se!7es su00est a22ro2riate 2ub!ic 2o!icies5 anat #orst5 they create a re0i,en o3
re0u!atory unreasonab!eness #hi!e 3ai!in0 to a-eCuate!y a--ress the 2rob!e, or actua!!y ,a6in0 it #orse.
For e@a,2!e5 a ,ora! ob!i0ation to 2reser7e the en7iron,ent by no ,eans i,2!ies the best #ay5 or any
#ay 3or that ,atter5 to -o so5 >ust as there is no a 2riori reason to be!ie7e that any 2o!icy that c!ai,s to
2reser7e the en7iron,ent #i!! actua!!y -o so. Any nu,ber o3 2o!icies ,i0ht #or65 an- others5 a!thou0h
see,in0!y consistent #ith the ,ora! 2rinci2!e5 #i!! 3ai! utter!y. That -eonto!o0ica! 2rinci2!es are an
ina-eCuate basis 3or en7iron,enta! 2o!icy is e7i-ent in the rather si0ni3icant irony that ,ost 3or,s o3
-eonto!o0ica!!y base- en7iron,enta! !a#s an- re0u!ations ten- to be i,2!e,ente- in a 7ery uti!itarian
,anner by streetD!e7e! en3orce,ent o33icia!s. Moreo7er5 i0norin0 the re!e7ant costs an- bene3its o3
en7iron,enta! 2o!icy an- their atten-ant incenti7e structures can5 as a!!u-e- to abo7e5 actua!!y #or6 at
cross 2ur2oses to en7iron,enta! 2reser7ation. KThere e@ists an e@tensi7e !iterature on this as2ect o3
re0u!atory en3orce,ent an- the o3ten 2er7erse outco,es o3 re0u!atory 2o!icy. "ee5 3or e@a,2!e5
Ac6er,an5 1:81J Bartri2 an- Fenn5 1:8$J /a#6ins5 1:8$5 1:81J /a#6ins an- Tho,as5 1:81.L E7en the
,ost -ieDhar- 2reser7ationist.-eonto!o0ist #ou!-5 I be!ie7e5 be troub!e- by this outco,e. The abo7e 2oints
are 2erha2s best e@2resse- by )ichar- F!ath,an5 The nu,ber o3 7a!ues ty2ica!!y in7o!7e- in 2ub!ic 2o!icy
-ecisions5 the broa- cate0ories #hich ,ust be e,2!oye- an- abo7e a!!5 the sco2e an- co,2!e@ity o3 the
conseCuences to be antici2ate- ,i!itate a0ainst reasonin0 so conc!usi7e!y that they 0enerate an
i,2erati7e to institute a s2eci3ic 2o!icy. It is se!-o, the case that on!y one 2o!icy #i!! ,eet the criteria o3
the 2ub!ic interest K1:%85 2. 1+L. It there3ore 3o!!o#s that in a -e,ocracy5 2o!icy,a6ers ha7e an ethica!
-uty to estab!ish a 2!ausib!e !in6 bet#een 2o!icy a!ternati7es an- the 2rob!e,s they a--ress5 an- the
2ub!ic ,ust be reasonab!y assure- that a 2o!icy #i!! actua!!y -o so,ethin0 about an e@istin0 2rob!e,J this
reCuires the ,eansDen- !an0ua0e an- ,etho-o!o0y o3 uti!itarian ethics. Goo- intentions5 !o3ty rhetoric5
an- ,ora! 2iety are an insu33icient5 thou0h 2erha2s at ti,es a necessary5 basis 3or 2ub!ic 2o!icy in a
-e,ocracy............................................................................................................................................... ++1
Ma@i,iBin0 a!! !i7es is the on!y #ay to a33ir, eCua! an- uncon-itiona! hu,an -i0nity..............................++$
We ,ust not obscure the issue by characteriBin0 this ty2e o3 case as the sacri3ice o3 in-i7i-ua!s 3or so,e
abstract Fsocia! entity.G It is not a Cuestion o3 so,e 2ersons ha7in0 to bear the cost 3or so,e e!usi7e
Fo7era!! socia! 0oo-.G Instea-5 the Cuestion is #hether so,e 2ersons ,ust bear the inesca2ab!e cost 3or
the sa6e o3 other 2ersons. )obert 'oBic65 3or e@a,2!e5 ar0ues that Fto use a 2erson in this #ay -oes not
su33icient!y res2ect an- ta6e account o3 the 3act that he is a se2arate 2erson5 that his is the on!y !i3e he
has.G But #hy is this not eCua!!y true o3 a!! those #ho, #e -o not sa7e throu0h our 3ai!ure to actM By
e,2hasiBin0 so!e!y the one #ho ,ust bear the cost i3 #e act5 #e 3ai! to su33icient!y res2ect an- ta6e
account o3 the ,any other se2arate 2ersons5 each #ith on!y one !i3e5 #ho #i!! bear the cost o3 our
inaction. In such a situation5 #hat #ou!- a conscientious Kantian a0ent5 an a0ent ,oti7ate- by the
uncon-itiona! 7a!ue o3 rationa! bein0s5 chooseM A ,ora!!y 0oo- a0ent reco0niBes that the basis o3 a!!
2articu!ar -uties is the 2rinci2!e that Frationa! nature e@ists as an enin itse!3G KGMM 1+:L. )ationa! nature
as such is the su2re,e ob>ecti7e en- o3 a!! con-uct. I3 one tru!y be!ie7es that a!! rationa! bein0s ha7e an
eCua! 7a!ue5 then the rationa! so!ution to such a -i!e,,a in7o!7es ,a@i,a!!y 2ro,otin0 the !i7es an-
!iberties o3 as ,any rationa! bein0s as 2ossib!e Kcha2ter %L. In or-er to a7oi- this conc!usion5 the nonD
conseCuentia!ist Kantian nee-s to >usti3y a0entDcentere- constraints. As #e sa# in cha2ter 15 ho#e7er5
e7en ,ost Kantian -eonto!o0ists reco0niBe that a0entDcentere- constraints reCuire a nonD 7a!ueDbase-
Page 11 of 609
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rationa!e. But #e ha7e seen that Kants nor,ati7e theory is base- on an uncon-itiona!!y 7a!uab!e en-.
/o# can a concern 3or the 7a!ue o3 rationa! bein0s !ea- to a re3usa! to sacri3ice rationa! bein0s e7en #hen
this #ou!- 2re7ent other ,ore e@tensi7e !osses o3 rationa! bein0sM I3 the ,ora! !a# is base- on the 7a!ue
o3 rationa! bein0s an- their en-s5 then #hat is the rationa!e 3or 2rohibitin0 a ,ora! a0ent 3ro, ,a@i,a!!y
2ro,otin0 these t#o tiers o3 7a!ueM I3 I sacri3ice so,e 3or the sa6e o3 others5 I -o not use the, arbitrari!y5
an- I -o not -eny the uncon-itiona! 7a!ue o3 rationa! bein0s. Aersons ,ay ha7e F-i0nity5 that is5 an
uncon-itiona! an- inco,2arab!e #orthG that transcen-s any ,ar6et 7a!ue KGMM 1$4L5 but 2ersons a!so
ha7e a 3un-a,enta! eCua!ity that -ictates that so,e ,ust so,eti,es 0i7e #ay 3or the sa6e o3 others
Kcha2ters % an- (L. The conce2t o3 the en-DinDitse!3 -oes not su22ort the 7ie# that #e ,ay ne7er 3orce
another to bear so,e cost in or-er to bene3it others. I3 one 3ocuses on the eCua! 7a!ue o3 a!! rationa!
bein0s5 then eCua! consi-eration su00ests that one ,ay ha7e to sacri3ice so,e to sa7e ,any..............++1
=ti!itarianis, is the ,ost ,ora! out!oo62ro7i-es the ,ost bene3its 3or the ,ost nu,ber o3 2eo2!e......++4
Ethics are accesse- throu0h the e7a!uation o3 conseCuences throu0h an i,2artia! out!oo6...................++(
Turn 9 ca!cu!ation is ine7itab!e an- >usti3ie- 9 e7ery action reCuires ca!cu!ation5 an- re3usin0 to en0a0e in
ca!cu!ation ,eans a!!o#in0 the #orst atrocities to occur..........................................................................++8
)e>ection o3 2re-iction is an i,2!icit 2re-iction #hich un-ercuts 0oo- 2re-ictions..................................++:
Are-ictions are 6ey to chec6 -isasters ................................................................................................... +$1
Des2ite stu-ies 2re-ictions e@2erts are sti!! trust#orthy..........................................................................+$+
ConseCuentia!is, accesses their interna! !in6#e ,a6e the best -ecisions base- on ,ora! A'D
uti!itarian conseCuences.......................................................................................................................... +$1
Concrete -ecision ,a6in0 D &n!y =ti!itarianis, ,a6es >usti3ications base- on the en- resu!t rather then
a,bi0uous !an0ua0e............................................................................................................................... +$4
=ti!itarianis, 2re7ents nuc!ear #ar.......................................................................................................... +$(
=ti!itarianis, ine7itab!e............................................................................................................................ +$8
=ti!itarianis, is ine7itab!e D 2eo2!e are inherent!y uti!itarians...................................................................+$:
ConseCuentia!is, is best5 short ter, i,2acts are 6ey e7en #hen the !on0Dter, i,2acts are uncertain..+1;
Conce2t o3 ,ora!s not ,utua!!y e@c!usi7e #ith uti!itarianis,...................................................................+11
"uccess3u! inte0ration o3 ,ora!ity into uti!itarian ca!cu!us 2ossib!e..........................................................+1+
=ti!itarianis, is ine7itab!e it #i!! in-e3inite!y 2er,eate hu,an thou0ht.....................................................+1$
Because o3 the a-7ent o3 nuc!ear o,nici-e5 ethics shou!- not be he!- abso!ute ....................................+11
&nce an action enters the 2o!icy rea!, #e ,ust use a ConseCuentia!ist a22roach5 this is necessary to
,ini,iBe su33erin0 an- con3!ict. .............................................................................................................. +1%
=ti!itarianis, another 3or,s o3 ca!cu!ation are ine7itab!e......................................................................+14
In-i7i-ua! an- 0o7ern,ent choices on ,ora!ity are -i33erent5 once #e 2!ay the ro!e o3 2o!icy ,a6ers #e
,ust 3o!!o# a uti!itarian ca!cu!us ............................................................................................................. +1(
ConseCuences co,e 3irst 3or 0o7ern,ents D on!y our e7i-ence -ra#s the -istinction bet#een ,ora!
theories 3or in-i7i-ua!s an- 0o7ern,ents................................................................................................ +18
Mora! ri0hts an- #ron0s are base- on conseCuences 9 2ro7es ConseCuentia!is, is best.....................+1:
I0norin0 conseCuences is i,,ora! D they sacri3ice others to 2reser7e ,ora! 2urity. It is ,ost ,ora! to act
to 2ro-uce the best en- re0ar-!ess o3 the ,ora! c!ean!iness o3 the ,eans.............................................+%;
ustice 9 ,ust sa7e hu,anity an- #ei0h................................................................................................ +%1
=ti!itarian actions on!y act as a !ast resort. Lac6 o3 a!ternati7es ,eans the on!y inhu,an action is to not act
at a!!. ...................................................................................................................................................... +%+
&7erri-in0 ri0hts is >usti3ie- #hen ,ore ri0hts o3 others an- !i7es are at sta6e. ......................................+%$
We ,ust choose the !esser e7i!. /ar- an- 3ast ru!es about #hat is ri0ht ,ust be ,a-e to !i,it 3urther
atrocities a0ainst ci7i!iBation.................................................................................................................... +%1
Mora! 2o!icy on!y b!oc6s -ecision ,a6in0 necessary to !i,it 3urther -a,a0e. In>ustice can on!y be
-estroye- by inaction to ,a6e sacri3ices................................................................................................. +%%
=ti!itarianis, is the on!y ,ora! 3ra,e#or6 an- a!ternati7es are ine7itabi!ity se!3Dcontra-ictory.................+%4
Ao!itics can on!y be one o3 res2onsibi!ity. )ationa! 2o!icy ,a6ers ,ust consi-er 3irst #hether to 2ut ri0hts
be3ore a!! e!se. ........................................................................................................................................ +%(
&n!y conseCuentia!is, can reso!7e con3!ictin0 ,ora! 7a!ues an- 2ro,ote hea!thy society......................+%8
Mora!s an- Cuestions o3 hu,an -i0nity #i!! constant!y con3!ict ,a6in0 -eonto!o0ica! 2o!icy ,a6in0
i,2ossib!e............................................................................................................................................... +%:
Page 12 of 609
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/u,an 7a!ue an- -i0nity is i,2ossib!e to -eter,ine e@terna!!y5 uti!itarianis, is on!y a!ternati7e. ...........+4;
The i,2ossibi!ity to attain 6no#!e-0e o3 e7ery outco,e or abuse !ea7es uti!itarianis, as the on!y o2tion
3or ,ost rationa! -ecisionD,a6in0............................................................................................................ +41
'ot 6no#in0 con-itions 3or each in-i7i-ua! or ra,i3ications 3orces us to a-o2t uti!itarianis,. Ao!icy ,a6ers
,ust use in their -ecision ,a6in0........................................................................................................... +4+
True eCua!ity is on!y attainab!e un-er uti!itarian 3ra,e#or6. ...................................................................+4$
**ATE )i0hts . Liberty Co,e First**...........................................................+4%
=2ho!-in0 !i3e is the u!ti,ate ,ora! stan-ar-........................................................................................... +44
Li3e is the en- to#ar- #hich a!! 2ur2ose3u! action is -irecte-..................................................................+4(
Li3e is the 2rereCuisite to a!! other 7a!ue.................................................................................................. +48
=ti!itarianis, 2rec!u-es any c!ai, o3 ,ora! ri0hts 9 ri0hts not Cuanti3iab!e..............................................+4:
'o !e0iti,ate reason to inc!u-e ri0hts -iscussion un-er uti! 3.#...............................................................+(;
=ti!itarianis, is the on!y ca!cu!us that ta6es into account hu,an res2onse.............................................+(1
)i0hts -ont co,e 3irst 9 con3!ictin0 7a!ues an- i-eo!o0ies......................................................................+(+
)i0hts not abso!ute 9 -oesnt ta6e into account inten-e- 0oo-...............................................................+($
'o a22ro2riate -uty to satis3y ri0hts o3 conscience. ...............................................................................+(1
'o abso!ute ri0hts 9 co,2etin0 7a!ues an- ri0hts o3 -i33erent 0rou2s......................................................+(%
Ariority o3 !iberty not 7iab!e as basis o3 0o7ern,ent 9 at best it #ou!- be a co,2etin0 theory a,on0 other
!ibera! conce2tions o3 >ustice.................................................................................................................... +(4
'o >usti3ication 3or 7io!ation o3 ri0hts to 2re7ent e@terna! !oss D 2rinci2!e o3 inter7enin0 actions ,eans that
0o7ern,ent is not he!- res2onsib!e 3or -eath o3 others. .........................................................................+((
Go7ern,ent cannot act to u2ho!- the ri0hts o3 the sub>ect on the basis o3 ,ora! 2rinci2!e......................+(8
**ATE =ti! 'o )i0hts**...........................................................................+8;
=ti!ity cant be ,a@i,iBe- in the !on0 ter, by 7io!atin0 ri0hts..................................................................+81
=ti!itarianis, Arotects Fairness............................................................................................................... +8+
**ATE Free-o, . Liberty &ut#ei0hs Li3e.=ti!**..........................................+81
Libertarianis, -enies e,otiona! satis3action outsi-e that o3 3ree-o,......................................................+8%
=ti!itarian 2o!icyD,a6in0 ensures there #i!! be no unnecessary constrains on !iberty because each
scenario is #ei0he-. ............................................................................................................................... +84
**ATE Ca!cu!ations Ba-**...........................................................................+8(
Turn 9 ca!cu!ation is ine7itab!e an- >usti3ie- 9 e7ery action reCuires ca!cu!ation5 an- re3usin0 to en0a0e in
ca!cu!ation ,eans a!!o#in0 the #orst atrocities to occur..........................................................................+88
Mu!ti2!yin0 2robabi!ity by ,a0nitu-e is the on!y ,ora! o2tion 9 har- ,ora! ru!es resu!t in circu!ar
2re3erences an- horrib!e conseCuences.................................................................................................. +8:
**ATE Catastro2hes 9 Lo# Arobabi!ity**....................................................+:1
Ao!icyD,a6in0 reCuires assess,ent o3 a!! ris6s -es2ite 2robabi!ity..........................................................+:+
Ao!icy ,a6ers ris6 2o!itica! bac6!ash #hen 2ro2er action isnt ta6en to 2re7ent catastro2he...................+:$
**A+E "tri7e 3or Aer3ection KI,a0inationL**................................................+:4
I,a0ination 3ai!s 9 cant chan0e rea!ity.................................................................................................... +:(
**Deonto!o0y Ba-**...................................................................................+:8
Deonto!o0y is ba- #hen 2eo2!e -isa0ree about #hat is ri0ht or #ron0...................................................+::
Whi!e the ethica! choice is nor,a!!y a 0oo- i-ea5 a thresho!- shou!- be use- in the 3ace o3 a catastro2he.
................................................................................................................................................................ $;;
Mora!ity coDo2ts ethica! beha7ior because the 3ocus 3a!!s on i-eo!o0y5 not action ..................................$;1
Deonto!o0y is unab!e to -istin0uish bet#een FbetterG ethics5 but is !o0ica!!y no !on0er ethica! #hen
2eo2!es !i7es are at ris6.......................................................................................................................... $;+
/atre- bet#een 0rou2s o3 2eo2!e ,a6e hu,an ri0hts 7io!ations ine7itab!e.............................................$;$
Deonto!o0y -oes not ho!- u2 a0ainst the threat o3 nuc!ear #ar...............................................................$;1
Deonto!o0y is a terrib!e syste, 3or 2o!icyD 2o!icies ,ust use ,eans to an en- 3ra,e#or6 an- are >u-0e-
by their e33ecti7eness .............................................................................................................................. $;%
Deonto!o0y is irre!e7ant in 2o!icy ,a6in0 D intentions are i,2ossib!e to 6no#5 on!y the outco,e ,atters
................................................................................................................................................................ $;4
Deonto!o0y in 2o!icy ,a6in0 3ai!s to u2ho!- -e,ocracy an- !e0iti,iBes o22ression................................$;(
Deonto!o0y 3ai!sDD no #ay o3 e7a!uatin0 con3!ictin0 ob!i0ations ...............................................................$;8
The nee- 3or e@ce2tions ,eans -eonto!o0y 3ai!s as a theory..................................................................$;:
The sub>ecti7ity o3 #hat ri0hts are i,2ortant ,eans -eonto!o0y 3ai!s. ....................................................$1;
Page 13 of 609
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Deonto!o0ys abso!utis, 2rioritiBes ,ora!ity as a conce2t o7er ,ora! resu!ts. ........................................$11
Deonto!o0ys abso!utis, ,eans it #i!! ine7itab!y 3ai!. ..............................................................................$1+
=ti!itarianis, is the on!y #ay to access ,ora!ity. "acri3ice in the na,e o3 2reser7in0 ri0hts -estroys any
ho2e o3 3uture 0enerations attainin0 other 7a!ues. ..................................................................................$1$
Destruction o3 socia! institutions that !i,it ri0hts !itera!!y cause socia! chaos an- ,a6e it i,2ossib!e to
2ro>ect ri0htDbase- econo,ies e!se#here. ............................................................................................. $11
There is no =to2ia in #hich #e can 0et ri- o3 -i33icu!t ,ora! -ecisions. Ao!itica! inaction in ti,es o3 ris6s
can on!y be 3or the #orst......................................................................................................................... $1%
Ao!itica! inaction to 2re7ent 3urther -eath is the 0reatest inhu,anity one can co,,it. ...........................$14
Atte,2ts to tota!iBe syste,s o3 ,ora!s is i,2ossib!e...............................................................................$1(
Construction o3 ,ora! !ines is counterD2ro-ucti7e to -ecision ,a6in0. ....................................................$18
E@ce2tions to a!! concrete !ines o3 ,ora!s 2ro7e there e@ists no true -eonto!o0ica! 3ra,e#or6. .............$1:
A!ternati7es to costDbene3it ana!yses #ou!- resu!t in 2o!itica! 2ara!yses an- crush -ecisionD,a6in0 ......$+;
*****=TIL BAD . DE&' G&&D*****..........................................................$+$
**=ti! Ba-**................................................................................................$+1
Aeo2!e are not a ,eans to a resu!t5 the resu!ts o3 an action are ne7er as i,2ortant as the action itse!3.. $+%
'or,a!ity bias causes us to un-eresti,ate the i,2act o3 -iscri,inatory outco,es. This >usti3ies a
3ee-bac6 !oo2 #here #e acce2t the estab!ishe- or-er an- treat -isa-7anta0e- 2o2u!ations as suitab!e
7icti,s necessary 3or our sa3ety.............................................................................................................. $+4
)is6 assess,ent is -istorte- by 2o7erty 9 tra-in0 on ca2ita! reser7es e@c!u-e the 2oor.........................$$;
u-0e ,ust reco0niBe their co,2!icity in rein3orcin0 be!ie3s #hich >usti3y a continuation o3 racis,..........$$1
A2oca!y2tic 2re-ictions are constructe- by a!ar,ists to a-7ance 2ersona! interests...............................$$+
Are-ictions out o3 -ebate ,ay be 0oo-5 but in -ebate they shou!- be he!- to a 7ery !o# stan-ar-. The
2robabi!ity o3 one s,a!! 2o!itica! chan0e 3ro, the status Cuo causin0 nuc!ear #ar or e@tinction is not on!y
in3initesi,a!5 its a!so ri-icu!ous................................................................................................................ $$$
Mora! conscience 2rece-es rationa! -ecision ,a6in0 9 -ecisions are base- o33 a ,ora! bac6-ro2.........$$1
The Cuest 3or sur7i7a! -estroys a!! hu,an 7a!ues....................................................................................$$4
=ti!itarianis, inherent!y on!y 3a7ors a 2ri7i!e0e- 3e#...............................................................................$$(
Ca!cu!ation re-uces !i3e to Bero............................................................................................................... $$8
=ti!itarianis, causes s2ecies e@tinction.................................................................................................. $$:
=ti!itarianis, is unsustainab!ea-7ocates u!ti,ate!y re7ert bac6 to ,ora!s to ,a6e -ecisions .............$1;
Are-iction -estroys hu,an a0ency......................................................................................................... $11
=ti!itarianis, N Ki!!in0.............................................................................................................................. $1+
The ca!cu!ation o3 uti!itarianis, is the 3oun-ation o3 tota!itarianis,..........................................................$11
E7ery a!ternati7e to ri0hts !ea-s to tyranny.............................................................................................. $1%
Go7ern,ent coercion ,ust be ,ora!!y re>ecte-...................................................................................... $14
ConseCuentia!is,5 by 7ery nature5 #i!! 3ai! in 2ub!ic 2o!icy to i,2ro7e the #e!!Dbein0 o3 others................$1(
ConseCuentia!is, is base- on the 0reater 0oo-5 not on se!3Dinterests.....................................................$18
There is a !i,it to #hat ,ora!ity can reCuire 3or us5 #hich conseCuentia!is, 3ai!s to incor2orate.............$1:
ConseCuentia!is, can resu!t in sacri3ices on so,e 3or the sa6e o3 others...............................................$%;
=ti!itarianis, cant a--ress the issues o3 eCuity an- -istributi7e >ustice ..................................................$%1
=ti!itarianis, 2o!icies resu!t in ineCua!ity ................................................................................................ $%+
=ti!itarian thin6in0 resu!ts in ,ass ,ur-er............................................................................................... $%$
=ti!itarianis, is use- to >usti3y ,ass ,ur-er by 0o7ern,ents.................................................................$%1
Me-ica! uti!itarian ca!cu!us ensures hu,an -ehu,aniBation an- annihi!ation.........................................$%%
=ti!itarianis, ta6es a#ay a!! 7a!ue to !i7e................................................................................................. $%4
)i0hts inco,2atib!e #ith uti!itarianis,..................................................................................................... $%(
=ti! i0nores 3un-a,enta! ri0hts an- creates a s!i22ery s!o2e unti! ri0hts !ose a!! si0ni3icance..................$%8
Mora!ity is co,2!e@ 9 B!an6et c!ai,s that #e nee- to sa7e 2eo2!e in 2o7erty 2re7ent us 3ro, ,a6in0
rationa! choices....................................................................................................................................... $%:
The uti!itarian 7ie#2oint is 3!a#e-. It is i,2ossib!e 3or society to be 7ie#e- as a sin0!e...........................$41
=ti!itarians 7ie# society as a sin0!e entity5 #hich -e7a!ues the ri0hts an- hu,an -i0nity o3....................$4+
=ti!itarianis, 7ie#s 2eo2!e as !ocations o3 uti!ities5 #hose 2ur2ose is to brin0 0oo- to the.....................$4$
A-a2tin0 the conseCuentia!ist 7ie#2oint >usti3ies the -eaths o3 ,i!!ions o3 innocents in...........................$41
=ti!itarianis, ta6en a!one a!!o#s un>usti3ie- #arJ 3u!! #ei0ht ,ust be 0i7en to.........................................$4%
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Ao!icy -ecisions -irecte- at ,aintainin0 hu,an sur7i7a! throu0h #hate7er ,eans #i!! encoura0e
0enoci-e5 #ar5 an- the -estruction o3 ,ora! 7a!ues.................................................................................$44
=ti!itarianis, -isre0ar-s res2ect 3or the in-i7i-ua! an- 2er2etuates societa! ineCua!ity by e7a!uatin0 uti!ity
as a #ho!e............................................................................................................................................... $4(
A!thou0h uti!itarianis, c!ai,s to resu!t in eCua!ity5 its nature to on!y re0ar- 2eo2!e as one entity rather
than a 0rou2 o3 in-i7i-ua!s inherent!y contra-icts the 2rinci2!e o3 eCua!ity...............................................$4:
&#nin0 onese!3 is a ,ora! i,2erati7e 9 uti!itarianis, i,2oses inter2ersona! ob!i0ations to society5 #hich
-estroys ,ora!ity..................................................................................................................................... $(;
Ai,s to ,a@i,iBe o7era!! uti!ity -es2ite co,2etin0 interests in the 2ub!ic is uti!itarianis, 9 -estroys
in-i7i-ua!is,............................................................................................................................................ $(1
=ti!ity ,a@i,iBation -estroys in-i7i-ua!is,.............................................................................................. $(+
=ti!itarianis, 3orces in-i7i-ua!s to sacri3ice their o#n 0oa!s in or-er to increase uti!ity ...........................$($
)is6s ta6en by the 0o7ern,ent to increase o7era!! uti!ity #i!! se7ere!y co,2ro,ise the in-i7i-ua! #hich #i!!
resu!t in 3ata!ity........................................................................................................................................ $(1
Go7ern,ent coercion threatens in-i7i-ua! 3ree-o, an- ren-ers ,ora!ity ,eanin0!ess..........................$(%
=ti!itarianis, 2ro,otes ineCuity an- inherent!y -iscri,inates a0ainst ,inority !i6e s!a7ery ....................$(4
=ti!itarianis, -estroys 7a!ue to !i3e by 3orcin0 the in-i7i-ua! to ta6e ris6s on a costDbene3it basis in an e33ort
to increase o7era!! uti!ity o3 an entity5 #hi!e -e,ora!iBin0 the in-i7i-ua!s o#n syste, o3 7a!ues.............$((
The on!y #ay to 2reser7e in-i7i-ua!is, is to a!!o# a!! 2ersons to ha7e the ri0ht to o#n the,se!7es
re0ar-!ess o3 any ne0ati7e conseCuentia!ist i,2acts...............................................................................$(8
=ti!itarianis, a!!o#s !ar0er 2o#ers !i6e the 0o7ern,ent to contro! the in-i7i-ua! as !on0 a 0reater uti!ity is
achie7e-. It is i,,ora! to 7io!ate the sanctity o3 hu,an !i3e.....................................................................$(:
=ti!itarianis, su22resses in-i7i-ua! choiceD,a6in0 9 3ree-o, 0i7es 7a!ue to !i3e....................................$8;
Go7ern,ents ha7e a res2onsibi!ity to ,aintain hu,an ri0hts an- in-i7i-ua!is, 9 uti!itarianis, un-er,ines
hu,an ri0hts .......................................................................................................................................... $81
Theories o3 ri0ht 2reser7e 7a!ue to !i3e 9 0o7ern,ent 2o!itics #ith the intention o3 increasin0 o7era!! uti!ity
throu0h en7iron,enta!is, -estroy ,ora!ity an- -ecei7es the in-i7i-ua!.................................................$8+
=ti!itarianis, ine7itab!e e7en in -eonto!o0ica! 3ra,e#or6s......................................................................$8$
Co,2ro,isin0 ,ora! 7a!ues an- tra-in0 o33 3or other in>ustices 2ro7es -eonto!o0y is i,2ossib!e...........$81
A0e o3 nuc!ear -eterrence ,a6es 2re7entati7e ,easures necessary. Its too !ate to consi-er other#ise.
................................................................................................................................................................ $8%
**Deon Goo-**..........................................................................................$84
ConseCuences can on!y be e7a!uate- AFTE) ,ora!s )i0hts co,e 3irst............................................$8(
Deonto!o0y Ine7itab!eIt is 0roun-e- in hu,an beha7ior.......................................................................$88
Deonto!o0y 2rec!u-es uti!D the 7a!ues o3 -eonto!o0y co,e 3irst...............................................................$8:
Deonto!o0y co,es 3irst5 the ,eans ,ust >usti3y the,se!7es 9 uti!itarianis, >usti3ies the /o!ocaust. .....$:;
Deonto!o0y 2rec!u-es uti!D the 7a!ues o3 -eonto!o0y co,e 3irst...............................................................$:1
Deonto!o0y co,es be3ore uti!D uti!itarianis, can be a !ast resort to 2reser7e 3un-a,enta! ri0hts............$:+
Deonto!o0y 2reser7es 3un-a,enta! ri0hts an- sti!! accesses the u!ti,ate 0oo-5 accessin0 the sa,e thin0s
as uti!....................................................................................................................................................... $:$
E7a!uatin0 the -eonto!o0ica! as2ects o3 a 2o!icy is critica! to 2o!icy ,a6in0............................................$:1
Deonto!o0y 6ey to 0i7in0 hu,an !i3e 7a!ue.............................................................................................. $:%
Deonto!o0y -oes not -is,iss conseCuences5 cate0orica! i,2erati7e ,eans -eont sti!! ,a@i,iBes
ha22iness................................................................................................................................................ $:4
Ca!!ahan e,braces reason an- says it ,ust be use- in co,bination #ith a ,ora! ob!i0ation to ,a6e
-ecisions................................................................................................................................................. $:(
Ao!icy ,a6ers cannot -e2en- so!e!y on econo,ics5 but nee- to a22!y ethics to ,a6e e33icient 2o!icies. $::
Deonto!o0y is essentia! 3or the ,aintenance o3 internationa! hu,an ri0hts because it restricts the 2ractice
o3 >usti3yin0 the actions o3 the 0o7ern,ent by the en-s achie7e-5 creatin0 #hat is essentia!!y a hu,ane
internationa! or-er................................................................................................................................... 1;;
Certain 2re,ises ha7e an intrinsic ,ora! 7a!ue that co,es be3ore conseCuences o3 actions. E7a!uatin0
conseCuences 3irst 2uts our 3ate an- the 3ate o3 the ,asses in the han-s o3...........................................1;1
)eco0niBin0 ri0hts an- 2uttin0 the, be3ore a uti!itarian ca!cu!us is the on!y rationa! an-........................1;+
Page 15 of 609
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Deonto!o0ica! 2rinci2!es o3 ri0hts shou!- be consi-ere- 3irst 9 other inter2retations are assi0ne- no ,ora!
7a!ue i3 con3!ictin0 #ith the 2rinci2!es o3 ri0hts because 7ie#in0 the -ebate 3ro, a -eonto!o0ica!
2ers2ecti7e is the on!y #ay to 0uarantee 3ree-o,...................................................................................1;1
By 0ui-in0 socia! choice5 -eonto!o0y u!ti,ate!y achie7es the sa,e resu!t as uti!itarianis, #ithout
co,2ro,isin0 the in-i7i-ua!.................................................................................................................... 1;%
An action ta6en to ,a@i,iBe uti!ity by a 2o#er3u! entity !i6e the 0o7ern,ent is i!!e0iti,ate an- i,,ora!.
Deonto!o0ica! ,ora! !a# 0ui-es the in-i7i-ua! to rea!iBe ob!i0ations he has to society an- #i!! u!ti,ate!y
so!7e 3or societys 2rob!e,s.................................................................................................................... 1;4
The uti!ity o3 a society on!y has 7a!ue #hen its in-i7i-ua!s are treate- #ith -i0nity. A 3ree society that
sacri3ices so,e o3 its o#n in-i7i-ua!s to 2re7ent hu,an e@tinction is ,ora!!y corru2t.............................1;(
Maintainin0 2ro2er ,ora! 7a!ues is the on!y #ay to obtain a 3ree society5 #hich out#ei0hs nuc!ear
e@tinction................................................................................................................................................. 1;8
Li7in0 #ithout 3ree-o, transcen-s nuc!ear #ar ...................................................................................... 1;:
A -eonto!o0ica! 3ra,in0 ,a@i,iBes the 0oo- by e,2hasiBin0 ri0hts an- actin0 on an in-i7i-ua!ist basis
................................................................................................................................................................ 11;
Both uti!itarians an- nonDuti!itarians res2ect the ,ora! 2rinci2!e o3 eCua!ity an- 3ree-o,. /o#e7er5 on!y
-eonto!o0y can ,eet this 2rinci2!e because it a!!o#s 3or in-i7i-ua! -ecisions..........................................111
Deonto!o0y ,ora!ity ,a@i,iBes 0oo- to its 3u!!est e@tent #hi!e uti!itarianis, is in-i33erent to -istribution o3
0oo- ....................................................................................................................................................... 11+
E7a!uatin0 ,ora!ity throu0h ri0hts an- >ustice is intrinsica!!y 0oo- #hi!e uti!itarianis, -enies hu,ans o3
their basic ri0hts...................................................................................................................................... 11$
Deonto!o0ica! ,ora!ity 2ro,otes in-i7i-ua!is,5 2rotectin0 hu,ans 3ro, uti!itarian ob!i0ations to society111
/u,ans shou!- ,ora!!y ha7e a ri0ht to the,se!7es an- the ri0ht to their 2ro2erty 9 the 0o7ern,ent is
i,,ora! to -eny 2ro2erty ri0hts re0ar-!ess o3 their uti!itarian intentions..................................................11%
*****M&)ALIT* G&&D . BAD*****...........................................................11(
**Mora!ity Goo-E &b!i0ations5 Mora! La#s5 etc**.......................................118
Mora! >ustice 7ita! 9 sets us a2art 3ro, ani,a!istic ten-encies.................................................................11:
Mora! !a# out#ei0hs other consi-erations 9 inte0ra! to hu,an nature....................................................1+;
Mora! rationa!ity 6ey to sustainab!e -ecision,a6in0 9 a7oi-s ani,a!istic ten-encies..............................1+1
=ti!itarianis, 3ai!s to ta6e into account 2ri,a 3acie ri0hts9 ,ora! reso!ution o3 con3!icts necessary.........1++
Fai!ure to satis3y ,ora! ob!i0ations !ea-s to 7io!ent bac6!ash...................................................................1+$
**Mora!ity Ba-**.........................................................................................1+1
Ethics is structura!!y 3!a#e-5 in that it i,2!ies a trans0ression..................................................................1+%
The i-eo!o0y o3 O0oo- an- e7i! is inherent!y 3!a#e-.................................................................................1+4
The rea! -ri7e behin- ethics is -esire5 not the O#i!! to -o 0oo-................................................................1+(
Mora!ity is a -e,an- 3or the i,2ossib!e as it is base- on our -esires.....................................................1+8
Ethics is ,ere!y a too! by #hich 2ersona! ,ora!s are i,2ose- on others5 #hich is the root o3 -iscontent in
society..................................................................................................................................................... 1+:
It is i,2ossib!e to -eter,ine #hether an action is tru!y ethica! or not......................................................1$;
Ethics in ter,s o3 atte,2ts to -o so,ethin0 O0oo- on!y reDentrenches the 2resence o3 the o,ni2resent
e7i!........................................................................................................................................................... 1$1
Aeo2!e a!rea-y rea!iBe they ha7e a ,ora! ob!i0ation but -ont actua!!y 3o!!o# the, or treat the, as
anythin0 but another ob!i0ation............................................................................................................... 1$+
Ethics 3ai!s to ta6e into account hu,an nature an- there3ore -oes not a!!o# the in-i7i-ua! to e,brace
onese!3. Instea-5 it 3orces a ,o-e! that is not 0roun-e- in hu,anity an- actua!!y a!ienates hu,an !i3e...1$$
Ahi!oso2hers 2ro7i-e- ethics as a rationa! 3oun-ation 3or thou0ht an- ,ora! res2onsibi!ity but ne7er rea!!y
Cueste- or co,2are- the,5 on!y #hen Cuestione- can they actua!!y be consi-ere-...............................1$1
Ethics is a 3aPa-e5 a bac6 bone by #hich #estern 2hi!oso2hers cou!- bounce contri7e- i-eas5 ethics as a
#ho!e ,ust be Cuestione- to critiCue the cu!ture that creates it instea- o3 the inconseCuentia!
rationa!iBations........................................................................................................................................ 1$%
Mora!ity is co,2!e@ 9 B!an6et c!ai,s that #e nee- to sa7e 2eo2!e in 2o7erty 2re7ent us 3ro, ,a6in0
rationa! choices....................................................................................................................................... 1$4
**Ethica! Action Q Le0a!ity Mutua!!y E@c!usi7e**.......................................1$(
Ethica! action cant be base- on the !e0a! an- i!!e0a!..............................................................................1$8
Ethica! action an- !e0a!ity cannot be re!ate-........................................................................................... 1$:
**"tate Ethics Ba-**..................................................................................11;
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A Go7ern,ent that -ro2s 2o!itica! ob!i0ation in or-er to obtain correct F,ora!G or Fethica!G res2onsibi!ity has
the abi!ity to Ftota!iBeG into a -estructi7e re0i,e that stri2s hu,an -i0nity KturnL......................................111
EthicoD2o!itics 0i7es 0o7ern,ents the !o0ocentric nature that !ea-s to the #orst atrocities in hu,anity such
as the /o!ocaust KturnL............................................................................................................................ 11+
Whene7er ethics is rein3orce- throu0h i-ea!s an- nor,s chosen by the state it resu!ts in a #or!- #here
2eo2!e are -esensitiBe-. Any uni7ersa!!y i,2ose- ethics #i!! resu!t in the -estruction o3 ,an as 2eo2!e
0ain the conscience o3 a ,achine. KturnL................................................................................................. 11$
The a33ir,ati7e cant reach out to the other #hen ,an-ate- by the state to -o so5 your e7i-ence is
2er7erte- on this5 usin0 the state a!!o#s authoritati7e action a0ainst the other.......................................111
The 0oa! o3 ethics to the other an- the ethics o3 the re3u0ee actua!!y 3urthers state contro!. &n!y by
cha!!en0in0 so7erei0nty can #e ha7e in-e2en-ent ethics.......................................................................11%
Deconstructin0 uni7ersa! conce2tions o3 ri0ht an- ethics actua!!y o2ens u2 the 2ossibi!ity 3or res2onsibi!ity
to the other. Wor6in0 #ithin the state reDentrenches current o22ressi7e -ua!is,s..................................114
Go7ern,ent en3orce,ent o3 res2onsibi!ity ta6es a#ay 3ro, the in-i7i-ua!s abi!ity to thin6 an- act on an
in-i7i-ua! !e7e! o3 ,ora!ity5 #hich is 6ey to re0ainin0 !ost sense o3 ,ora!ity in 2o!itics.............................11(
Go7ern,ent estab!ishe- nor,s o3 ethica! an- ,ora! ri0ht an- #ron0s !ea- to the -u!!in0 conscience o3 the
in-i7i-ua! ta6in0 out a!! so!7ency. It a!so !ea-s to acce2tin0 the shi3t to tota!itarian re0i,es in the na,e o3
crises....................................................................................................................................................... 118
Forcin0 ethica! 7ie#s u2on 2eo2!e throu0h 2o!itics resu!ts in the ethics bein0 short !i7e- as in-i7i-ua!s are
unab!e to 3ee! in7este- in these ne# i-ea!s............................................................................................. 1%;
"tate ethics 7io!ate the 7ery i-ea o3 -e,ocratic ethics Kno so!7encyL......................................................1%1
**=ni7ersa! . Abso!utist Ethics Ba-**.........................................................1%+
=ni7ersa! ,ora!ity is i,2ossib!e because e7eryone has in-i7i-ua! 2assions an- 7ie#s..........................1%$
Institutiona! ethics resu!ts in a ho,o0enous ,in-!ess unconscious. &n!y by a-7ocatin0 in-i7i-ua! ethics
can hu,ans 0ain 7a!ue 3or the,se!7es................................................................................................... 1%1
Any 2ro>ect that -e3ines a uni7ersa! ethica! c!ai, 3osters in-i33erence. &n!y by 3in-in0 ethics in the
absence o3 uni7ersa! nor,s can ethica! action ta6e 2!ace.......................................................................1%4
Their 3or, o3 ,ora! abso!utis, 2rioritiBes c!ean ,ora! han-s o7er ,ora! resu!tsE they are ,ore concerne-
#ith not actin0 -irect!y i,,ora! than 2re7entin0 ,uch !ar0er i,,ora! conseCuences.............................1%(
I0norin0 conseCuences is i,,ora! D they sacri3ice others to 2reser7e ,ora! 2urity. It is ,ost ,ora! to act
to 2ro-uce the best en- re0ar-!ess o3 the ,ora! c!ean!iness o3 the ,eans.............................................1%8
**Aesthetic Ethics Goo-**.........................................................................1%:
Foucau!t 2ro2ose- an aesthetica! ethics in #hich in-i7i-ua!s choose their ethics base- on an aesthetic
e@istence.
Aoster ;(................................................................................................................................................. 14;
'arcissis, #ere the &ther is su22ose- to -isco7er the,se!7es is o22ose- by Foucau!t5 in-icatin0 that #e
shou!- !i7e aesthetica!!y instea- an- -ra#s a !ine bet#een this narcissistic en!i0hten,ent an- aesthetic
7a!ues
Aoster ;(................................................................................................................................................. 141
Aesthetic >u-0,ents5 or >u-0,ents 3ree o3 bias an- societa! o2inion5 are the best a!ternati7es to >u-0in0
,ora!s an- ethics #ithout 2!acin0 our o#n 7anity an- e0os as the hi--en 2riority..................................14+
By 2!acin0 our o#n in-i7i-ua! art an- >u-0,ent be3ore the #or!-s ethics #e ha7e the abi!ity to Cuestion
the institutiona!iBe- ethics that !ea-s our !i7es an- 3or, our o#n i-ea o3 FethicsG by the su2erior
i,2erati7es.............................................................................................................................................. 141
**ATE Kants Cate0orica! I,2erati7e**.......................................................144
Institutiona!iBe- ethics5 such as the Kants Cate0orica! I,2erati7e5 2!aces re0u!ations o3 #hat is Fri0htG an-
#hat is thou0ht to be F#ron0G #ithout e@2!anation or 3ree-o, to assu,e an a!ternati7e 2ath#ay by the
in-i7i-ua!................................................................................................................................................. 14(
Kants cate0orica! i,2erati7e resu!ts in -uty bein0 i,2ersona!. This resu!ts in a society #here #e #or6
si,2!y out o3 necessity an- no 2erson choice resu!tin0 in the -estruction o3 ourse!7es !i6e the Ger,an
#riter /einreich 7on K!eis........................................................................................................................ 14:
Kants cate0orica! i,2erati7e creates a #or!- #here 2eo2!e are i,2ersona! to the notion o3 -uty. A nation
3o!!o#in0 this cate0orica! i,2erati7e o3 i,2ersona! -uty #i!! assure its -estruction as it ,a6es a nation o3
conscience !ac6in0 ,achines.................................................................................................................. 1(;
Page 1 of 609
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The cate0orica! i,2erati7e -estroys any in-i7i-ua!is, an- 2ro,ote so7erei0nty by c!ai,in0 in the na,e o3
se!3D2reser7ation #e ,ust e,brace a uni7ersa! ethics............................................................................1(1
*****BI&A&WE)*****................................................................................1($
**Lin6E "tate Ethics**.................................................................................1(1
The a33ir,ati7es atte,2t to Fsecure societyG a!!o#s 3or the 0o7ern,ent to ru!e a state o3 e@ce2tion on
beha!3 o3 /u,anitarian I,2erati7es. It a!!o#s the so7erei0ns bio2o#er to 0o 0!oba!...............................1(%
The ,o-ern hu,anitarian ,o7e,ent is ren-erein bio2o!itica! ter,s an- actua!!y #or6s to e@ten- the
states bio2o!itica! contro! to a 0!oba! sca!e.............................................................................................. 1((
The "tates atte,2t to be ethica! is >ust a co7er to increase bio2o!itica! contro! o7er the 2o2u!ation.
/u,anitarian inter7ention is ,eant to >usti3y state s2onsore- security an- contro! o7er !i3e....................1(8
The i-ea o3 hu,an ri0hts an- a states ob!i0ation to 2rotect thin0s !i6e hun0er is >ust the ,o7in0 o3
security -iscourse into the 2ri7ate !i3e. This i-ea o3 an ethica! res2onsibi!ity is >ust the states e@cuse 3or
3urther bio2o!itica! contro! o3 e7ery-ay !i3e................................................................................................ 18;
The "tate e@2!oits an- -estroys the &ther in the na,e o3 hu,anitarian inter7ention an- 3or the sa6e o3
hu,anity as a #ho!e................................................................................................................................ 181
The abi!ity o3 the state to a22!y 0oo- or ba- ethica! c!ai,s is the root o3 security -iscourse. In the na,e o3
ethics the a33ir,ati7e 0i7es the state increase- bio2o!itica! contro!..........................................................18+
In the na,e o3 hu,anitarian an- ethica! concerns the 0o7ern,ent inter7enes e7en ,ore into the 2erson
!i3e o3 the 2eo2!e. The bio2o!itica! or-er is rein3orce- by the i-ea that the state has a res2onsibi!ity to its
2eo2!e an- there3ore has a ri0ht to contro! it........................................................................................... 181
**Lin6E Ethics**..........................................................................................184
Foun-ationa!is, is a ,ora! stance that !ea-s to#ar-s a ho,o0enous bio2o!itica! structure...................18(
Atte,2ts to coerci7e!y 0enera!iBe ethica! stances resu!ts in rein3orcin0 the a!rea-y hierarcha! an-
-o,inatin0 syste, o3 the state5 this coerci7e!y brin0s 2eo2!e into the states contro! anis bio2o!itica!..188
*****G&?E)'ME'T A)&?I"I&'*****.....................................................1:1
**)i,a!**....................................................................................................1:+
Authoritarianis, an- constraints are 6ey to a7oi- o7er2o2u!ation an- resource crunch that #i!! en- !i3e 1:$
Constitutiona! !iberties encoura0e an unsustainab!e re!ationshi2 #ith natura! resources.........................1:1
Ari7ate 2ro2erty an- !iberty encoura0es unsustainab!e resource consu,2tion.......................................1:%
We!3are is 6ey to a7oi- the resource crunch that #i!! en- a!! !i3e..............................................................1:4
Tyranny is ine7itab!e 9 its on!y a Cuestion o3 ho# Cuic6!y #e a!!o# it to 3or,...........................................1:(
Front!ineE Mutua! coercion a0ree- u2on by the ,a>ority #i!! chec6 ba- instances o3 coercion.................1:8
=niCuenessE A 0!oba! authoritarian re7o!ution is co,in0 9 there is a !ac6 o3 2o!itica! interest in the
2ro,otion o3 -e,ocratic 3ree-o,s.......................................................................................................... 1::
=niCuenessE Authoritarianis, is s2rea-in0 0!oba!!y 9 its a!rea-y en,eshe- in 0!oba! 2o!itica! an-
econo,ic institutions............................................................................................................................... %;;
**ATE Ari7atiBation**..................................................................................%;+
Ari7atiBation Fai!s More Than "uccee-s................................................................................................. %;$
'o ,ora! co,,on 0oo- e@ists 9 ar0u,ents that the 3ree ,ar6et #i!! 2ro7i-e 3or those in 2o7erty are !oose
2re-ictions an- are nto ,ora!!y ,oti7ate-............................................................................................... %;1
Ari7atiBation )aises Death )ate.............................................................................................................. %;%
In-i7i-ua! in7estors #i!! be !ess 2ro3itab!e than the 0o7ern,ent ensurin0 the 3ai!ure o3 2ri7atiBation.......%;4
Ari7atiBation 'ot E33icient........................................................................................................................ %;(
Ari7atiBation Creates Disaster................................................................................................................. %;8
Cor2orations runnin0 the 2ri7atiBe- econo,y are ana!o0ous to bi0 0o7ern,ents...................................%;:
*****T/E ="FG*****..................................................................................%1+
*****Courts*****..........................................................................................%1$
**"ocia! )e3or, . Mo7e,ents**................................................................%11
u-icia! ru!in0s 3ai! to s2ur socia! ,o7e,ents on their o#n......................................................................%1%
Courts cant 2ro-uce socia! re3or, 9 $ reasons...................................................................................... %14
**Courts Goo-E Generic**.........................................................................%1(
u-icia! su2re,acy 6ey to ,aintainin0 constitutiona! unity an- ri0hts o3 ,inorities.................................%18
'ot a-herin0 to 2rece-ent 6i!!s Court !e0iti,acy......................................................................................%1:
=n-er,inin0 the Constitution causes e@tinction .....................................................................................%+;
**/o!!o# /o2e . Courts Ba-**...................................................................%+1
The "u2re,e Court Are7ents -e,ocracy............................................................................................... %++
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Lin6D En7iron,ent. The Courts #ere on!y ab!e to he!2 the en7iron,ent once the other branches ha-
acte-....................................................................................................................................................... %+$
Contro7ersia! "u2re,e Court -ecisions s2ur con3usion5 acco,2!ishin0 nothin0.....................................%+1
The "u2re,e Court un-er,ines ,inority ri0hts ,o7e,ents causin0 tension in A,erican co,,unities an-
-e2en-ence on 3!a#e- !e0is!ation........................................................................................................... %+%
Liti0ation -istracts ti,e an- ,oney 3ro, success3u! 0rassroots ,o7e,ents...........................................%+4
Courts ,ere!y >oin ,o7e,entsD they -ont 2ro-uce socia! chan0e..........................................................%+(
Court rhetoric 2re7ents the ,obi!iBation o3 the 2ub!ic5 short circuitin0 2ersona! autono,y. ....................%+8
Ci7ic En0a0e,ent is 6ey to -e,ocracy................................................................................................... %+:
**ATE /o!!o# /o2e . Courts Goo-**..........................................................%$;
Ci7i! obe-ience 3o!!o#s !e0is!ationD socia! chan0e is a 2ro-uct o3 con0ressiona! !a#...............................%$1
La#suits can 3aci!itate socia! ,o7e,ents................................................................................................ %$+
Court -ecision can be trans3or,ati7e<its 2ro7en by the 3act that Bro#n a33ecte- 3ar ,ore than >ust 2ub!ic
schoo!s.................................................................................................................................................... %$$
Court -ecisions are insu33icient in chan0in0 2ub!ic o2inion......................................................................%$1
u-icia! 7ictories -o not ha7e a cata!ytic e33ect........................................................................................ %$%
Courts ,obi!iBe socia! chan0e 9 #a0e -iscri,ination ru!in0s 2ro7e........................................................%$4
"y,bo!ic !e0a! su22ort to ri0hts c!ai,s a-7ance socia! ,o7e,ent..........................................................%$(
E7en !osses in the Courts !ay the 0roun-#or6 3or 2o!itica! success.........................................................%$8
"ocia! success reCuires a shi3t in i-eo!o0y that the Courts an- in-i7i-ua!s ,ust achie7e to0ether..........%$:
)osenber0s ho!!o# ho2e ana!ysis is 3!a#e-5 court -ecisions 2o!ariBe citiBenry in e@ce2tiona! #ays. .....%1;
u-0es are seen by the 2ub!ic as essentia! to socia! chan0e..................................................................%11
Courts cant so!7e broa-er #o,ens ri0hts 9 e7en 2rece-ent settin0 -ecisions 3ai! because courts !ac6 the
essentia! too!s to so!7e 3or a!t. causa!ities ............................................................................................... %1+
)osenber0 is #ron0 9 ba- theory an- no reason #hy con0ress an- the e@ecuti7e -o 2ro7i-e chan0e . %1$
Aer, on the counter2!an so!7es the DA 9 to be e33ecti7e5 the court ,ust #or6 #ith other branches o3
0o7ern,ent ............................................................................................................................................ %11
Courts so!7e socia! chan0e 9 ,assi7e s#in0s in 2ub!ic o2inion -ont ,atter5 ,inor chan0es in
assu,2tions o7erti,e bui!- u2 an- in3!uence actors...............................................................................%1%
"ocia! chan0e -oesnt nee- to be seen5 court -ecisions si,2!y nee- to cha!!en0e current assu,2tions to
2ro7i-e 3or chan0e e!se#here................................................................................................................. %14
The /o!!o# /o2e theory is #ron0 9 )osenber0 ,isre2resents the e33icacy o3 the !o#er courts in court
-ecision en3orce,ent.............................................................................................................................. %1(
)osenber0 3ai!s to ta6e into account 2rob!e,s #ith i,2!e,entation at the Con0ressiona! !e7e!..............%18
Courts are i,2ortant 9 the /o!!o# /o2e 3ai!s to ta6e into account that the >u-iciary #or6s #ith an- resu!ts
in the action o3 other branches o3 0o7ern,ent to en3orce -ecisions........................................................%1:
)osenber0 as6s too ,uch o3 court -ecisions 9 he i,2!ies there is intent #here there isnt 9 >ustices re!y
on en3orce,ent at the !oca! !e7e!............................................................................................................. %%;
In cases o3 !ost ho2e5 the court -i-nt actua!!y act on the socia! chan0eD ho!!o# ho2e is a ,yth..............%%+
)osenber0 an- 3o!!o#ers e@a00erate the 2o#er the court has to !ose ho2e............................................%%$
TurnE Court action encoura0es 3urther !iti0ation an- strate0yD Bro#n 2ro7es..........................................%%1
"ocia! ,o7e,ents #i!! continue e7en i3 they -ont #inD resources5 nee- to 3i0ht o22osition ...................%%%
*****Con0ress*****.....................................................................................%%(
**"ocia! )e3or, . Mo7e,ents**................................................................%%8
Con0ress is the ,ost e33ecti7e a0ent 3or so!7in0 societa! 2rob!e,s.........................................................%%:
**Centra!iBation . Go7ern,ent Ba-**........................................................%4;
The a33ir,ati7es acce2tance o3 centra!iBation 2re7ents socia! ,o7e,ents by -iscoura0in0 in-i7i-ua! action
<the resu!t is e@tinction
Aa2#orth ;1 Kohn5 "enior E-itor R Eco!o0ist S Foun-er o3 Fourth Wor!- )e7ie#5 Aeace Throu0h "ocia!
E,2o#er,ent5 TAri,ary Causes5T htt2E..###.#i!!ia,3ran6!in.co,.1th#or!-.aca-e,icinn.>211.ht,!L .....%41
?otin0 ne0ati7e cha!!en0es the ine7itabi!ity o3 centra!iBation an- o2ens u2 !oca! co,,unities 3or action %4+
Decentra!iBation "o!7ency D "ee6in0 institutiona! so!utions #hi!e 3ai!in0 to Cuestion the assu,2tions that
un-er!ie such institutions #i!! ine7itab!y 3ai! ............................................................................................. %4$
'o net bene3it<there is on!y a ris6 the CA a!one so!7es best.
................................................................................................................................................................ %41
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Centra!iBation an- in-i7i-ua!is, are BeroDsu,<the 0ro#in0 2o#er o3 centra!iBe- 2o#er necessari!y
-ecreases the si0ni3icance o3 in-i7i-ua!s ................................................................................................ %4%
The centra!iBation o3 2o#er in the center o3 an or0aniBation ine7itab!y tra-es o33 #ith the in-i7i-ua!.......%44
Aer, 3ai!sD 2o#er cannot resi-e in t#o 2!aces at once............................................................................%4(
The 2er, cannot so!7e. The en-orse,ent o3 a ,ass ,o7e,ent5 no ,atter ho# #e!! ,eant5 #i!! ine7itab!y
!ea- to a !oss o3 in-i7i-ua! 2o#er............................................................................................................. %48
Centra!iBe- 2o#er ine7itab!y tra-es o33 #ith the !oca!..............................................................................%4:
Centra! 0o7ern,ent action -iscoura0es in-i7i-ua! ,o7e,ents to so!7e the 2rob!e, because they 2osit
2rob!e,s as Fout o3 our contro!G............................................................................................................... %(;
The 0o7ern,ent is the root cause o3 2rob!e,s........................................................................................ %(1
Decentra!iBation so!7es -e,ocracy an- 2o7erty......................................................................................%(+
The 0o7ern,ent is the root cause o3 en7iron,enta! -estruction5 #ars5 an- econo,ic u2hea7a!s...........%($
The centra!iBation o3 2o#er ine7itab!y !ea-s to 0!oba! -estruction...........................................................%(1
In-i7i-ua! en0a0e,ent in -e,ocracy is 6ey to 2re7entin0 a co!!a2se......................................................%(%
Decentra!iBe- 0o7ern,ent is 6ey to -e7e!o2,ent o3 -e,ocracy.............................................................%((
Loca!iBation is a 2reDreCuisite to so!7in0 -e,ocracy ...............................................................................%(8
Loca!iBe- e33orts are 6ey to so!7e #ar an- -e,ocracy ...........................................................................%(:
Decentra!iBation 2ro,otes -e,ocracy ................................................................................................... %81
Decentra!iBation 2ro,otes -e,ocracy ................................................................................................... %8+
Ine33iciencies o3 the 3e-era! 0o7ern,ent are ine7itab!e this is an inherent characteristic in 3e-era!
enter2rise tra-ition resu!tin0 in corru2tion an- ,isa!!ocation ..................................................................%81
/ea!thcare is the e2ito,e o3 o7ercentra!iBation. ItHs current 2ractice -enies the 2o#er o3 !oca!
co,,unities5 #hi!st sacri3icin0 Cua!ity hea!thcare 3or 2ro3its. ..................................................................%8%
The concentration o3 2o#er ,a6es 2o2u!is, ine7itab!e<a!! socia! ,o7e,ents #i!! re0ress to
ine33ecti7eness because o3 their -e,an-s 3or uni7ersa!ity ......................................................................%8(
Decentra!iBation o3 2o#er is 6ey to so!7in0 the 2o2u!ation crisis. ............................................................%88
We canHt 2ro7i-e a b!ue2rint 3or the #or!- o3 the a!ternati7e. Doin0 so #ou!- on!y 3urther the -o,ination o3
centra!iBe- 2o#er. .................................................................................................................................. %8:
Their e7i-ence is biase-D the ,e-ia #i!! use itHs contro! o3 in3or,ation to ,aintain its ho!- on 2o#er .....%:;
Centra!iBation is bein0 bro6en -o#n in the status CuoDtechno!o0y a!!o#s in-i7i-ua!s to reach !ar0e
au-iences .............................................................................................................................................. %:1
**Centra!iBation Goo- . "tates Ba-**........................................................%:+
Furtherin0 the neo!ibera! a0en-a >usti3ies 0enoci-e an- e@tinction..........................................................%:$
Fe-era! -e7o!ution to the states e@acerbates neo!ibera!is,....................................................................%:1
De7o!utionary 2o!icies can !ea- to a 3u!! b!o#n neo!ibera! shi3t................................................................%:%
Ao!icies 2asse- to the state rein3orce neo!ibera! i-eo!o0ies.....................................................................%:4
De7o!ution to the states rein3orces !o#Dinco,e -is2arities .....................................................................%:(
De7o!ution to the states -estroys 2o!itica! in3!uence 3or the !o#Dinco,e..................................................%:8
Aassin0 >uris-iction to the states increases 0o7ern,enta! contro! o7er in-i7i-ua!s.................................%::
De7o!utionary 2o!icies increase the sti0,atiBation 2!ace- on the 2oor....................................................4;;
De7o!utionary 2o!icies inherent!y brin0 -estabi!iBation an- 6i!!s so!7ency................................................4;1
"tate 2o!icies are ine33icient 9 i,2!e,entation -i33erences......................................................................4;+
De7o!ution inherent!y ,a6es 2o!icies !ess eCua! .....................................................................................4;$
En3orcin0 neo!ibera!is, causes en-!ess #ars......................................................................................... 4;1
'eo!ibera!is, ,a6es 2o7erty ine7itab!e.................................................................................................. 4;%
E7en sin0!e 2o!icies ris6 a hu0e i-eo!o0ica! shi3t 9 e,2irica!!y 2ro7en.....................................................4;4
**"e2aration o3 Ao#ers**..........................................................................4;(
Co!!a2se o3 constitutiona! ba!ance o3 2o#er ris6s tyranny an- rec6!ess #ar,on0erin0...........................4;8
Lac6 o3 se2aration o3 2o#ers causes nuc!ear #ar...................................................................................4;:
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*****LIBE-#.*****
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**Autono4y Goo6 H Coercion Ba6**
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$u4an 6i8nity is t0e 0i80est stan6ar6
Geor8e Kateb3 (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 (rinceton3 #$E I''E- &CEA'3 1II+3 5 I
In sum, there seems to be no generally credible foundation for a critique of rights. Rights emerge as the only or best
way of protecting human dignity, and human dignity remains the highest standard. This is not to deny that there
will be strenuous differences of interpretation of various rights and quarrels over the comparative importance of
various rights. But by now even some anti-individualists, whether secular or religious, accept the idea of rights as
useful or even as an indispensable ingredient in their own thinking about politics and society.
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Moral obli8ation to 5rotect liberty
dward Crane, !resident of the "ato Institute, #IT$% &!"'& () T' *$+, &eptember ,--,., ,/IA, p. -/.
Those are words that we need to hear more of. It0s true, freedom and morality do, ultimately, depend on each other
for their e1istence. But as government grows year in and year out, under *emocratic and Republican
administrations, as regulations multiply, politically correct public education e1pands, and our ta1 burden gets ever
greater, I can0t help but think the reservoir of morality in $merica is much deeper than our reservoir of political
liberty. The crisis we confront is a political crisis - one that merits our immediate attention. 2e have, it seems to
me, a moral imperative to challenge the political status quo and to roll back the 34th century0s legacy of statism. It
is our heritage as $mericans to live in a civil society - not a society that is increasingly politici5ed. If we want a
more moral society, then, as Barry 6oldwater said, liberty must be our main interest. Thank you.
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Free6o4 co4es be1ore all ot0er i45acts
&ylvester (etro, professor of law at 2ake )orest, &pring 1ID7, Toledo %aw Review, p784
'owever, one may still insist on echoing rnest 'emingway 9 :I believe in only one thing; liberty.< $nd it is always well to bear
in mind *avid 'ume=s observation; :It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.< Thus, it is unacceptable to say that
the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads
to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. $sk &ol5henstyn, $sk >ilovan *?ilas. In sum, if one believes
in freedom as a supreme value and proper ordering principle for any society aiming to ma1imi5e spiritual and material welfare,
then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.
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Coercion outwei80s3 con6itions li2e 5o;erty are ine;itable3 it@s 1utile to try to sol;e
@elley3 1oun6er an6 senior 1ellow o1 t0e Atlas Society3 /8
A*avid @elley, founder and senior fellow of the $tlas &ociety, ,//8, :$ life of one0s own,< pB8-B/C
To be sure, there is not always a hard and fast distinction between the number of alternatives one has and the
degree of one=s freedom to choose among them. Theoretically, any obstacle, restraint, or limitation may be
looked at in either of two ways; we may view it A,C as something that eliminates one or more alternatives a
person would otherwise have available or A3C something that prevents the person from choosing one or more
alternatives. The difference lies in whether we consider the limitation as affecting the range of alternatives he has or
the process of choosing among them. $dvocates of positive freedom have e1ploited this fact, insisting that lack of
a certain opportunity because of poverty, illness, or disability deprives a person of the freedom to choose that
opportunity. "onversely, we could in principle view overt coercion, physical force, or violence, not as something
that prevents a person from choosing an alternative but as something that removes alternatives he would
otherwise have. There are real differences between A,C and A3C. (ne difference is whether the obstacle or
limitation is imposed by reality or by other people. 2hen some fact of reality affects the range of alternatives
we face, it is wishful thinking to regard it as an obstacle to what we would otherwise be free to do. )acts are
facts. The world operates a certain way, according to causal laws, and the constraints imposed by nature are
the foundation for human choice, not a barrier to it. $ farmer plants a field and tends it over the growing season,
but a hailstorm destroys the crop before he can harvest it. It would be bi5arre to say that the hailstorm abridged his
freedom to reap what he has sown. $s a natural event, the hailstorm is a misfortune that eliminates the possibility of a
harvest. By contrast, if a government price-support regulation forbids the farmer to harvest the crop, the restraint arises
from human action and does abridge his freedom to what he otherwise could.
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Co45ulsory ;iolate ri80ts
$yn -an6, 1IA73 Russian-$merican novelist, philosopher, playwright, and screenwriter, author of numerous books including $tlas
&hrugged and The )ountainhead. The #irtue of &elfishness pg ,3/ -D>a1 RispoliD-
$ single question added to each of the above eight clauses would make the issue clear; $t whose e1penseE Fobs, food, clothing, recreation AIC,
homes, medical care, education, etc., do not grow in nature. These are man-made valuesGgoods and services produced by men. 2ho is to provide
themE If some men are entitled by right to the products of the work of others, it means that those others are deprived of rights
and condemned to slave labor. $ny alleged HrightH of one man, which necessitates the violation of the rights of another, is
not and cannot be a right. Io man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unrewarded duty or an involuntary
servitude on another man. There can be no such thing as Hthe right to enslave.< $ right does not include the material
implementation of that right by other menJ it includes only the freedom to earn that implementation by one0s own effort.
(bserve, in this conte1t, the intellectual precision of the )ounding )athers; they spoke of the right to the !ursuit of
happinessGnot of the right to happiness. It means that a man has the right to take the actions he deems necessary to achieve
his happinessJ it does not mean that others must make him happy.
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Coercion is i44oral J 6enies in6i;i6uals t0e ca5acity 6e;elo5 as 4oral a8ents
dward Feser3 philosophy professor, %oyola, (I I(KI"@, 34K7, p. L.-8
>ore hopeful is the strategy, pursued by a large number of libertarian philosophers, of appealing to a broadly
$ristotelian account of morality A>ack ,/8,J >achan ,/8/J Rasmussen and *en Myl ,//,J &mith ,//-C.
(n $ristotle=s view, the fundamental moral question is not :2hat is the right thing to doE< but rather :2hat traits of character should I
developE< (nly when one has determined what traits these are -- that is, what habitual patterns of action count as virtues can one go on to answer
the subordinate question of how one ought to act in a particular case Athe answer being that one should act the way someone possessing the virtue
relevant to that situation would actC. 2hat count as the virtues, in turn, are ?ust those qualities most conducive to enabling human
beings to fulfill the potentials which distinguish them as the unique sorts of beings they are G those qualities, that is, which
best allow human beings to flourish given their distinctive human nature. 6iven that human beings are by nature rational
animals, we can flourish only if we practice those virtues governing practical and theoretical reason. It follows that we have
reason to acquire intellectual virtues like truthfulness and practical virtues such as temperance and courage, and to avoid such corresponding vices as
licentiousness and cowardice. 6iven that human beings are also by nature social animals, we can only flourish if we practice also those virtues
governing interaction with other human beings, so that we have reason to acquire such social virtues as honesty and loyalty. Though the moral
life will involve decision-making about what to do in a particular concrete situation, then, it involves more basically the
gradual development of a good character by the taking on of the virtues and the weeding out of vices G it essentially
involves, that is, a process of self-perfection. (nly a person who voluntarily decides to do so can carry out this process,
however virtue must be freely chosen if it is truly to count as virtue. >oreover, the specific requirements of virtuous behavior depend to a
considerable e1tent on the unique circumstances of the situation and the individual person involved, circumstances knowable only to that person
himself in the concrete conte1ts of moral decision- making. The moral life, then, is only fully possible under conditions wherein the
individual is capable of self-direction Ain Rasmussen and *en Myl=s termsC, the absence of coercion and interference from outside forces.
$llowing others such self-direction is necessary too if the individual is to allow those others also to develop the virtuesJ and in general, respecting
others= autonomy is essential if one is successfully to cooperate with them as fellow citi5ens, and thus fulfill one=s own nature as a social being.
6iven the centrality of self-direction to self- perfection, then, respect for the rights of self-ownership turns out to be required
for the successful pursuit of the moral life.
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Evaluate freedom first it is critical to both prosperity and fairness
-ic0ar6 L. Strou5 Aprofessor of economics at >ontana &tate MniversityC 1IGDL R)%"TI(I& (I )R*(>, )$IRI&&, $I*
T' "(I&TITMTI(I
)reedom Awith accountabilityC is the key to both prosperity and to any reasonable and realistic conception of fairness. (nly with
entrepreneurial freedom will the innovation required to increase prosperity occur. $nd only through freedom and prosperity can
fairnessG in the sense of benefits accruing to those with low incomes, as well as fair treatment under the lawGbe maintained. Both
freedom and prosperity are incompatible with e1tensive regulatory or ta1Ntransfer powers in the hands of government . This paper
argues that freedom, fairness, and prosperity are unalterably linked and require strong constitutional constraints on government . $
powerful case can be made for small, secure, but constrained and competing governments ofthe sort a federal system suggests. $s
Fames Buchanan=s work indicates, in today=s world 'obbesian anarchy is not likely to yield freedom, economic growth and prosperity,
or fairness. In this world, I believe we do need government. Restraints on government, however, are the key to freedom and fairness.
)ew would dispute the need for restraints to maintain freedom, but the restraints on government are necessary for fairness as well.
2hyE Individuals are not equally endowed with effectiveness in market earnings, nor in the market for political influence. There will
be elites in any system, and those who are not members of the elite are far better offwhen the influence of elites is diffused, as in a free
society with constrained governmentGwith freedom of entry and e1it, operating under the rule ofwilling consent. Thus a government
with the power to prevent arbitrary abuse of some people by others, but with sharply limited power to coerce others directly and in
detail, is likely to provide ma1imum freedom,and hence ma1imum prosperity and fairness as well.
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Free6o4 outwei80s J wit0out 1ree6o43 we are all re6uce6 to t0e le;el o1 ani4als an6 sla;es J only 1ree6o4 1ro4
8o;ern4ent o55ression sol;es
%udwig von Mises A$ustrian conomist and !hilosopherC 1IAK; The conomic )oundations of )reedom.
http;NNmises.orgNefandiNch,.asp
$nimals are driven by instinctive urges. They yield to the impulse which prevails at the moment and peremptorily asks for satisfaction.
They are the puppets of their appetites. >an0s eminence is to be seen in the fact that he chooses between alternatives. 'e regulates his
behavior deliberatively. 'e can master his impulses and desiresJ he has the power to suppress wishes the satisfaction of which would
force him to renounce the attainment of more important goals. In short; man actsJ he purposively aims at ends chosen. This is what we
have in mind in stating that man is a moral person, responsible for his conduct. Free6o4 as a (ostulate o1 Morality
$ll the teachings and precepts of ethics, whether based upon a religious creed or whether based upon a secular doctrine like that of the
&toic philosophers, presuppose this moral autonomy of the individual and therefore appeal to the individual0s conscience. They
presuppose that the individual is free to choose among various modes of conduct and require him to behave in compliance with definite
rules, the rules of morality. *o the right things, shun the bad things. It is obvious that the e1hortations and admonishments of morality
make sense only when addressing individuals who are free agents. They are vain when directed to slaves. It is useless to tell a
bondsman what is morally good and what is morally bad. 'e is not free to determine his comportmentJ he is forced to obey the orders
of his master. It is difficult to blame him if he prefers yielding to the commands of his master to the most cruel punishment threatening
not only him but also the members of his family. This is why freedom is not only a political postulate, but no less a postulate of every
religious or secular morality. #0e Stru88le 1or Free6o4 +et for thousands of years a considerable part of mankind was either entirely or at least in many regards deprived of
the faculty to choose between what is right and what is wrong. In the status society of days gone by the freedom to act according to their own choice was, for the lower strata of society,
the great ma?ority of the population, seriously restricted by a rigid system of controls. $n outspoken formulation of this principle was the statute of the 'oly Roman mpire that
conferred upon the princes and counts of the Reich AmpireC the power and the right to determine the religious allegiance of their sub?ects. The (rientals meekly acquiesced in this state
of affairs. But the "hristian peoples of urope and their scions that settled in overseas territories never tired in their struggle for liberty. &tep by step they abolished all status and caste
privileges and disabilities until they finally succeeded in establishing the system that the harbingers of totalitarianism try to smear by calling it the bourgeois system. #0e Su5re4acy o1
t0e Consu4ers The economic foundation of this bourgeois system is the market economy in which the consumer is sovereign. The consumer, i.e., everybody, determines by his buying
or abstention from buying what should be produced, in what quantity and of what quality. The businessmen are forced by the instrumentality of profit and loss to obey the orders of the
consumers, (nly those enterprises can flourish that supply in the best possible and cheapest way those commodities and services which the buyers are most an1ious to acquire. Those
who fail to satisfy the public suffer losses and are finally forced to go out of business. In the precapitalistic ages the rich were the owners of large landed estates. They or their ancestors
had acquired their property as giftsEfeuds or fiefsEfrom the sovereign whoEwith their aidEhad conquered the country and sub?ugated its inhabitants. These aristocratic landowners were
real lords as they did not depend on the patronage of buyers. But the rich of a capitalistic industrial society are sub?ect to the supremacy of the market. They acquire their wealth by
serving the consumers better than other people do and they forfeit their wealth when other people satisfy the wishes of the consumers better or cheaper than they do. In the free market
economy the owners of capital are forced to invest it in those lines in which it best serves the public. Thus ownership of capital goods is continually shifted into the hands of those who
have best succeeded in serving the consumers. In the market economy private property is in this sense a public service imposing upon the owners the responsibility of employing it in the
best interests of the sovereign consumers. This is what economists mean when they call the market economy a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote. #0e (olitical
As5ects o1 Free6o4 Representative government is the political corollary of the market economy. The same spiritual movement that created modern capitalism substituted elected
officeholders for the authoritarian rule of absolute kings and hereditary aristocracies. It was this much-decried bourgeois liberalism that brought freedom of conscience, of thought, of
speech, and of the press and put an end to the intolerant persecution of dissenters. $ free country is one in which every citi5en is free to fashion his life
according to his own plans. 'e is free to compete on the market for the most desirable ?obs and on the political scene for the highest
offices. 'e does not depend more on other people0s favor than these others depend on his favor. If he wants to succeed on the market,
he has to satisfy the consumersJ if he wants to succeed in public affairs he has to satisfy the voters. This system has brought to the capitalistic
countries of 2estern urope, $merica, and $ustralia an unprecedented increase in population figures and the highest standard of living ever known in history. The much talked-about
common man has at his disposal amenities of which the richest men in precapitalistic ages did not even dream. 'e is in a position to en?oy the spiritual and intellectual achievements of
science, poetry, and art that in earlier days were accessible only to a small elite of well-to-do people. $nd he is free to worship as his conscience tells him.
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Coercion restricts ri80ts an6 6estroys in6i;i6ual a8ency
Bla2e, $ssociate !rofessor of !hilosophy at the Mniversity of 2ashington, K1
A>ichael Blake, $ssociate !rofessor of !hilosophy at the Mniversity of 2ashington, &ummer 344,, *istributive Fustice, &tate
"oercion, and $utonomy, !hilosophy and !ublic $ffairs, #ol. L4, Io. L A&ummer, 344,C, pp. 3-.-3/B, F&T(RC
There is much more to be said in the above conte1t, but I want now to turn to the issue of coercion. !eople can be denied their
autonomy by being starved, deeply impoverished, or sub?ected to oppressive and marginali5ing norms, but they can also
face a denial of autonomy that results from outright coercion. I will refrain from offering a complete theory of coercion in the
present conte1tJ07 I will only note that, as I have insisted upon throughout this e1ercise, whether an individual faces a denial of
autonomy resulting from coercion cannot be read off simply from the number of options open to her. "oercion is not simply
a matter of what options are availableJ it has to do with the reasons the set of options is as constrained as it is. "oercion is an
intentional action, designed to replace the chosen option with the choice of another. "oercion, we might therefore say,
e1presses a relationship of domination, violating the autonomy of the individual by replacing that indi- vidual0s chosen
plans and pursuits with those of another. %et us say, therefore, that coercive proposals violate the autonomy of those against
whom they are employedJ they act so as to replace our own agency with the agency of another.
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Coercion snowballsME;ery increase in t0e state@s 5ower brin8s us closer to tyranny
Browne3 For4er Libertarian (arty can6i6ate 1or (resi6ent an6 Director o1 (ublic (olicy 1or t0e
Downsi?eDCor83 I:
<$arry Browne3 For4er Libertarian (arty can6i6ate 1or (resi6ent an6 Director o1 (ublic (olicy 1or
t0e Downsi?eDCor83 1II:3 W0y Go;ern4ent Doesn>t Wor23 5A:BAA=
ach increase in coercion is easier to ?ustify. If it=s right to force banks to report your finances to the
government, then it=s right to force you to ?ustify the cash in your pocket at the airport. If it=s right to take property from
the rich and give it to the poor, then it=s right to take your property for the salt marsh harvest mouse. $s each
government program fails, it becomes :necessary< to move another step closer to complete control
over our lives. $s one thing leads to another 9 as coercion leads to more coercion 9 what can we look forward
toE 9 2ill it become necessary to force you to ?ustify everything you do to any government agent who thinks you might
be a threat to societyE 9 2ill it become necessary to force your children to report your personal habits to their teachers
or the policeE 9 2ill it become necessary to force your neighbors to monitor your activitiesE 9 2ill it become necessary
to force you to attend a reeducation program to learn how to be more sensitive, or how not to discriminate, or how to
avoid being lured into taking drugs, or how to recogni5e suspicious behaviorE 9 2ill it become necessary to prohibit
some of your favorite foods and ban other pleasures, so you don=t fall ill or have an accident 9 putting a burden on
$merica=s health-care systemE &ome of these things 9 such as getting children to snitch on their parents or ordering
people into reeducation programs 9 are already happening in $merica. The others have been proposed and are being
considered seriously. 'istory has shown that each was an important step in the evolution of the world=s worst tyrannies.
2e move step by step further along the road to oppression because each step seems like such a
small one. $nd because we=re told that each step will give us something alluring in return 9 less
crime, cheaper health care, safety from terrorists, an end to discrimination 9 even if none of the previous steps
delivered on its promise. $nd because the people who promote these steps are well-meaning
reformers who would use force only to build a better world.
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#0ere is no ;alue to li1e in t0eir 1ra4ewor2 J coercion 4a2es us into 4ere tools o1 t0e state
$aye23 'obel (ri?e winner 1or Econo4ics3 AK
A).$. 'ayek, Iobel !ri5e winner for conomics, ,/B4, The "onstitution of %iberty, p.34C
By :coercion< we mean such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another
that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to
serve the ends of another. 1cept in the sense of choosing the lesser evil in a situation forced on him by another,
he is unable either to use his own intelligence or knowledge or to follow his own aims and beliefs.
"oercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking and valuing person
and makes him a bare tool in the achievement of the ends of another. )ree action, in which a person
pursues his own aims by the means indicated by his own knowledge, must be based on data which cannot be shaped at
will by another. It presupposes the e1istence of a known sphere in which the circumstances cannot be so shaped by
another person as to leave one only that choice prescribed by the other.
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"tilitarianis4 6oesn@t tru45 t0e i45act o1 coercionMin6i;i6uals can@t be re6uce6 to units o1 ;alue
>achan, /- !rofessor of philosophy, $uburn Mniversity, ,//- ATibor, !RI#$T RI6'T& $I* !MB%I"
I%%M&I(I&, ,//-, p. ,3/C
The essential point to note at this ?uncture is how the idea of the worth and rights of the individual simply cannot find a
place in the standard utilitarian cost-benefit analysis favored by many economists. Benefits, according to this approach,
are to be measured by what people prefer Aor would prefer, if properly informedC, while costs are reducible to what
people would prefer to do without or avoid if they were properly informed. The kind of value Aor worthC individuals
have, however, is not ?ust one benefit competing among other benefits..."onsider the case where some people are
in?ured or harmed by others. H&ince the costs of in?ury are borne by its victims,H @elman contends, Hwhile its benefits
are escaped by its perpetrators, simple cost-benefit calculations may be less important than more abstract conceptions
of ?ustice, fairness, and human dignity. *eveloping this theme more fully, @elman writes as follows; 2e would not
condone a rape even if it could be demonstrated that the rapist derived enormous pleasure from his actions, while the
victim suffered in only small ways. Behind the conception of HrightsH is the notion that some concept of ?ustice,
fairness or human dignity demands that individuals ought to be able to perform certain acts, despite the harm of others,
and ought to be protected against certain acts, despite the loss this causes to the would-be perpetrator. Thus we
undertake no cost-benefit analysis of the effects of freedom of speech or trial by ?ury before allowing them to continue.
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E;ery in;asion o1 liberty 4ust be reEecte6 J 1ailure to 6o so lea6s to 4assi;e atrocities
'arry Browne, former %ibertarian presidential candidate, e1ecutive director of public policy at $merican %iberty
)oundation, editor of %iberty >aga5ine, financial advisor and economist, ,/I:, 2hy 6overnment *oesn=t 2orkC

The reformers of the "ambodian revolution claimed to be building a better world. They forced people
into reeducation programs to make them better citi5ens. Then they used force to regulate every aspect of
commercial life. Then they forced office workers and intellectuals to give up their ?obs and harvest rice, to round out
their education. 2hen people resisted having their lives turned upside down, the reformers had to use
more and more force.
By the time they were done, they had killed a third of the country=s population, destroyed the lives
of almost everyone still alive, and devastated a nation. It all be8an wit0 usin8 1orce 1or t0e best o1
intentions G to create a better worl6.
The &oviet leaders used coercion to provide economic security and to build a :Iew >an< G a human
being who would put his fellow man ahead of himself. $t least ,4 million people died to help build the Iew
>an and the 2orkers= !aradise.L. But human nature never changed G and the workers= lives were always 'ell,
not !aradise.
In the ,/L4s many 6ermans gladly traded civil liberties for the economic revival and national pride
$dolf 'itler promised them. But like every other grand dream to improve society by force, it ended
in a nightmare of devastation and death.
!rofessor R. F. Rummel has calculated that ,,/ million people have been killed by their own governments in this
century.L8 2ere these people criminalsE Io, they were people who simply didn=t fit into the Iew (rder G people who
preferred their own dreams to those of the reformers. E;ery ti4e you allow 8o;ern4ent to use 1orce to
4a2e society better3 you 4o;e anot0er ste5 closer to t0e ni80t4ares o1 Ca4bo6ia3 t0e So;iet
"nion3 an6 'a?i Ger4any.
2e=ve already moved so far that our own government can perform with impunity the outrages described in the
preceding chapters. These e1amples aren=t cases of government gone wrongJ they are e1amples of government G
period. They are what governments do G ?ust as chasing cats is what dogs do. They are the natural consequence
of letting government use force to bring about a drug-free nation, to ta1 someone else to better your life,
to guarantee your economic security, to assure that no one can mistreat you or hurt your feelings, and to cover
up the damage of all the failed government programs that came before.
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Go;ern4ent coercion is i44oral because it 2ills 1ree6o4 an6 ;irtue by ero6in8 t0e basis o1 1ree
4ar2et ca5italis4
Dou8 Ban6ow <Senior Fellow at t0e Cato Institute an6 a 1or4er S5ecial Assistant to (resi6ent -onal6
-ea8an= Marc0 D3 1IIDL Free6o4 an6 *irtue are Inse5arable 0tt5LHHwwwcatoor8H5ubN6is5lay505O
5ubNi6PA1GA
)or years the %eft promised that socialism would eventually out-produce the market. That claim died with the &oviet
Mnion. 2hat remained of the %eft then began to complain that capitalism generated too many material goods. Iow
similar attacks on capitalism are coming from the Right. The market, it is said, threatens family, human relationships,
values and virtue. 'owever, it is a mistake to treat freedom, which is the essence of capitalism, and virtue as mutually
antagonistic. In fact liberty-- the right to e1ercise choice, free from coercive state regulation-- is a necessary
precondition for virtue. $nd virtue is ultimately necessary for liberty to flourish. #irtue cannot e1ist without the
freedom to make moral choices. "oerced acts of conformity with some moral norm, however good, do not represent
virtueJ rather, compliance with that moral norm must be voluntary. #irtue re?ects a standard of intra-personal morality.
$s such it is an area that lies largely beyond the reach of state power. (f course societies can be more or less virtuous.
But blaming moral shifts on legal changes mistakes correlation for causation. $merica0s one-time cultural consensus
eroded during an era of strict laws. (nly cracks in this consensus, which provided the moral foundation of the laws, led
to statutory changes. 6overnment has proved that it is not a good teacher of virtue. The state tends to be effective at
simple tasks, like ?ailing people. It is far less successful in shaping individual consciences. Iew laws would not make
$merica a more virtuous nation. ven if there were fewer overt acts of immorality, there would be no change in peoples
hearts and thus in society0s moral core. Indeed attempting to forcibly make people virtuous would make society it self
less virtuous; )irst individuals would lose the opportunity to e1ercise virtue. They would not face the same set of
temptations and be forced to choose between good and evil. This approach might make their lives a bit simpler. But
they would not be more virtuous. In this dilemma we see the parado1 of "hristianity; $ 6od of love creates man and
provides a means of redemption, but allows him to choose evil. &econd, to vest government with primary responsibility
for promoting virtue shortchanges other institutions like the family and church, sapping their vitality. !rivate social
institutions find it easier to lean on the power of coercion than to lead by e1ample, attempt to persuade and solve
problems. Third making government a moral enforcer encourages abuse by whatever interest groups gain power. If one
thing is certain, it is that man is sinful. That sin is magnified by coercive power. Those who possess power can of
course, do good, but history suggests that they are far more likely to do harm. Indeed, as $mericas traditional Fudeo-
"hristian consensus crumbles we a more likely to see government promoting alternative moral views. This is possible
only if the state is given the authority to coercively mold souls in the name of the community or family. *espite the best
intentions of advocates of statecraft as soulcraft, government grows ever more likely to enshrine something other than
traditional morality. The fact that government can do little to help does not mean that there is nothing it should do.
!ublic officials should adopt as their ma1im H)irst, do no harm.H $lthough $merica0s moral breakdown, most evident in
the inner-city, has many causes, the welfare state has e1acerbated the problem at every level, punishing marriage, work
and thrift. 6overnment has spent years attempting to e1punge religious values from the public squareJ the public school
monopoly discourages both good education and values instruction.
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Coercion creates a sli55ery slo5e to 4ore coercion
'arry Browne3 )ormer %ibertarian !arty candidate for !resident, *irector of !ublic !olicy for the *ownsi5e*".org,
T' 6R$T %IBRT$RI$I ())R, +KKK3 p. ,8
6overnment grows, too, because the subsidy given to one group inspires others to demand the same benefits. $nd
when government protects one company or industry from competition, others wonder why they shouldn0t demand
the same protection. That0s why no government program ever stands still. Io matter what the stated purpose or
limit when implemented, it inevitably e1pands to cover more and more peopleGand wider and wider areas.
veryone who comes to the government asking for favors has a plausible request. (nce it0s considered proper to
use government force to solve one person0s problem, force can be ?ustified to solve anyone0s problem. (ver time,
fewer and fewer requests seem out of bounds. $nd the grounds for saying HnoH become more and more eroded. The
pressure on politicians to use coercion to grant favors becomes overwhelming. The >otives of !ublic &ervants But,
in truth, very little pressure is needed. %awmakers, bureaucrats, and ?udges all re?oice in a government that grows
and grows and grows. Big government gives lawmakers the power to make or break companies and individuals.
!eople must bow and scrape to obtain favorsGor ?ust to keep government from destroying them.
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*iolations o1 liberty create a sli55ery slo5e to 4ore
8o;ern4ental constraints
Tibor R. Mac0an, Research )ellow O 'oover Institution, !rofessor meritus in the *epartment of !hilosophy at
$uburn Mniversity, 34K+, %iberty and 'ard "ases, p. P1vii 9 1i1Q
2e are not unfamiliar with the ha5ards of the slippery slope in our own personal lives. If a man hits his child in some
alleged emergency, the very act of doing so may render him more amenable to smacking the kid under more typical
circumstances. &lapping someone who is hysterical may make it easier to slap someone who is only very upset or
recalcitrant or annoying or ?ust too slow fetching the beer from the refrigerator. &imilarly, a :minor< breach of trust
can beget more of the same, a little white lie here and there can beget lying as a routine, and so forth. >oral habits
promote a principled course of action even in cases where bending or breaking the principle might not seem too
harmful to other parties or to our own integrity. (n the other hand, granting ourselves :reasonable< e1ceptions tends to
weaken our moral habitsJ as we seek to rationali5e past action, differences of kind tend to devolve into differences of
degree. ach new e1ception provides the precedent for the ne1t, until we lose our principles altogether and doing what
is right becomes a matter of happenstance and mood rather than of loyalty to enduring values. The same is true of
public action. 2hen citi5ens of a country delegate to government, by means of democratic and ?udicial processes, the
power to forge paternalistic public policies such as banning drug abuse, imposing censorship, restraining undesirable
trade, and supporting desirable trade, the bureaucratic and police actions increasingly rely on the kind of violence and
intrusiveness that no free citi5enry ought to e1perience or foster. $nd the bureaucrats and the police tell themselves, no
doubt, that what they=re doing is perfectly ?ust and right. "onsider, for starters, that when no one complains about a
crimeGbecause it is not perpetrated against someone but rather involves breaking a paternalistic lawGto even detect
the :crime< requires methods that are usually invasive. Instead of charges being brought by wronged parties, phone
tapping, snooping, anonymous reporting, and undercover work are among the dubious means that lead to prosecution.
Thus the role of the police shifts from protection and peacekeeping to supervision, regimentation, and reprimand. Io
wonder, then, that officers of the law are often caught brutali5ing suspects instead of merely apprehending them.
Mnder a paternalistic regime, their goals have multiplied, and thus the means they see as necessary to achieving those
goals multiply too. The same general danger of corrupting a free society=s system of laws may arise when government
is called on to deal with calamities. There is the perception, of course, that in such circumstances the superior powers
of government are indispensable, given the immediateness of the danger. The immediate benefitsGa life saved by a
marineGare evident. +et the dangers of e1tensive involvement by legal authorities in the handling of non?udicial
problems are no less evident, if less immediate in impact.
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Go;ern4ent coercion causes 4ore ;iolations o1 liberty
$a?litt, founding board member of the >ises Institute and Fournalist for The 2all &treet Fournal, KD
A'enry, "an the &tate Reduce !overtyE http;NNwww.mises.orgNstoryN3-3BC
)rom the beginning of history, sincere reformers as well as demagogues have sought to abolish or at least to
alleviate poverty through state action. In most cases their proposed remedies have only served to make the problem
worse. The most frequent and popular of these proposed remedies has been the simple one of sei5ing from the rich
to give to the poor. This remedy has taken a thousand different forms, but they all come down to this. The wealth is
to be Hshared,H to be Hredistributed,H to be Hequali5ed.H In fact, in the minds of many reformers it is not poverty that
is the chief evil but inequality. $ll schemes for redistributing or equali5ing incomes or wealth must undermine or
destroy incentives at both ends of the economic scale. They must reduce or abolish the incentives of the unskilled
or shiftless to improve their condition by their own effortsJ and even the able and industrious will see little point in
earning anything beyond what they are allowed to keep. These redistribution schemes must inevitably reduce the
si5e of the pie to be redistributed. They can only level down. Their long-run effect must be to reduce production
and lead toward national impoverishment. The problem we face is that the false remedies for poverty are almost
infinite in number. $n attempt at a thorough refutation of any single one of them would run to disproportionate
length. But some of these false remedies are so widely regarded as real cures or mitigations of poverty that if I do
not refer to them I may be accused of having undertaken a book on the remedies for poverty while ignoring some of
the most obvious.
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Go;ern4ent coercion 6estroys t0e ;alue to li1e an6
cannot be 4orally Eusti1ie6
#ibor Mac0an3 (-I*A#E -IG$#S Q ("BLIC ILL"SI&'S3 1II:3 5 AGBI
$ll governmental action that does not serve to repel or retaliate against coercion is antithetical to any respect for
human dignity. 2hile it is true that some people should give to others to assist them in reaching their goals, forcing
individuals to do so plainly robs them of their dignity. There is nothing morally worthwhile in forced giving.
6enerally, for a society to respect human dignity, the special moral relations between people should be left
undisturbed. 6overnment should confine itself to making sure that this voluntarism is not abridged, no matter how
tempting it might be to use its coercive powers to attain some worthy goal.
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Coercion 6estroys ;alue to li1e
Foseph -a?, philosopher, T' >(R$%IT+ () )R*(>, ,/GA, p. L4.
(ne way to test the thesis of the primacy of action reasons is to think of a person who is entirely passive and is
continuously led, cleaned, and pumped full with hash, so that he is perpetually content, and wants nothing but to stay
in the same condition. It=s a familiar imaginary horror. 'ow do we rank the success of such a lifeE It is not the worst
life one can have. It is simply not a life at all. It lacks activity, it lacks goals. To the e1tent that one is tempted to ?udge
it more harshly than that and to regard it as a Rnegative life= this is because of the wasted potentiality. It is a life which
could have been and was not. 2e can isolate this feature by imagining that the human being concerned is mentally and
physically effected in a way which rules out the possibility of a life with any kind of meaningful pursuit in it. Iow it is
?ust not really a life at all. This does not preclude one from saying that it is better than human life. It is simply
sufficiently unlike human life in the respects that matter that we regard it as only a degenerate case of human life. But
clearly not being alive can be better than that life.
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Coercion ensures eCtinction
%ouis Rene Beres, !rofessor of International %aw, !urdue Mniversity, &pring, ,/I7, $RIK(I$ F(MRI$% ()
IITRI$TI(I$% $I* "(>!$R$TI# %$2, p. 3L-7
This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue humankind by freeing individuals from fear of death, this perspective recommends educating people to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and
geopolitics. By surrendering ourselves to &tates and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable
e1tinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. $lthough the corrosive calculus of geopolitics has now
made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to &tates for security. It is
the dreadful ingenuity of &tates that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the
threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold ar, the citi5ens of conflicting &tates reaffirm their segmented loyalties,
moved by the persistent unreason that is, after all, the most indelible badge of modern humankind.
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Coercion is t0e root cause o1 4ilitary con1lict
*r. >ary F. -uwart3 !h*, former pharmaceutical research scientist, former $ssistant !rofessor of &urgery,
'$%II6 (MR 2(R%*; T' (T'R !I" () T' !MKK%, ,/I/, p.
http;NNwww.ruwart.comN'ealingNruwartSall.html.
'umankind is poised on the brink of an evolutionary leap. In the last few decades, we have become increasingly aware
of the source of our inner peace and enrichment. *epending on our personal background, we e1press this great
discovery differently. The practical, down-to-earth individuals among us Htake responsibility for our livesH as
described in 2ayne 2. *yer0s +our rroneous Kones. Those of us with a metaphysical outlook Hcreate our own
realityH as &hirley >ac%aine did in (ut on a %imb. The spiritual among us know that Hthe kingdom of 6od is withinH
and follow The Road %ess Traveled A>. &cott !eckC. &ometimes we simply Hfind ourselvesH through the power of love
as Richard Bach did in The Bridge $cross )orever. Mltimately, our inner harmony and abundance depend on how we
react to our outer world. The creation of peace and plenty in our outer world, however, frequently seems hopelessly
beyond our control. In the past century, we0ve supported widespread social reform. Ievertheless, people are still
starving in a world capable of feeding all. In our own country, homelessness and poverty are on the rise. #iolence is no
longer limited to overseas wars; our streets, even our schools, are no longer safe. The environment that nurtures us is
ravaged and raped. 2hen we acknowledge how our reactions contribute to our inner state, we gain control. (ur
helplessness dissolves when we stop blaming others for feelings we create. In our outer world, the same rules apply.
Today, as a society, as a nation, as a collective consciousness, HweH once again feel helpless, blaming selfish others for
the world0s woes. (ur nation0s laws, reflecting a composite of our individual beliefs, attempt to control selfish others at
gunpoint, if necessary. &triving for a better world by focusing on others instead of ourselves totally misses the mark.
2hen others resist the choices we have made for them, conflicts escalate and voraciously consume resources. $
warring world is a poor one. $ttempting to control others, even for their own good, has other undesirable effects.
!eople who are able to create intimacy in their personal relationships know that you can0t hurry love. Trying to control
or manipulate those close to us creates resentment and anger. $ttempting to control others in our city, state, nation, and
world is ?ust as destructive to the universal love we want the world to manifest. )orcing people to be more HunselfishH
creates animosity instead of good will. Trying to control selfish others is a cure worse than the disease. 2e reap as we
sow. In trying to control others, we find ourselves controlled. 2e point fingers at the dictators, the "ommunists, the
politicians, and the international cartels. 2e are blithely unaware that our desire to control selfish others creates and
sustains them. %ike a stone thrown in a quiet pond, our desire to control our neighbors ripples outward, affecting the
political course of our community, state, nation, and world. +et we know not what we do. 2e attempt to bend our
neighbors to our will, sincere in our belief that we are benevolently protecting the world from their folly and short-
sightedness. 2e seek control to create peace and prosperity, not reali5ing that this is the very means by which war and
poverty are propagated. In fighting for our dream without awareness, we become the instruments of its destruction. If
we could only see the patternT In seeking to control others, we behave as we once did as children, e1changing our dime
for five pennies, all the while believing that we were enriching ourselves. 2hen a concerned adult tried to enlighten us,
we first refused to believe the truth. (nce awareness dawned, we could no longer be fooled, nor was laborious
deliberation necessary for every transaction. (nce we understood how to count money, we automatically knew if we
benefited from such a trade. &imilarly, when the fact and folly of controlling others first come to our attention, we0re
surprised and full of denial. I certainly wasT 2hen we care about the state of our world, however, we don0t stop there. I
trust you are concerned enough to persevere and to consider seriously the shift in consciousness this book proposes.
(nce we have the courage to accept responsibility for our part of the problem, we automatically become part of the
solution, independent of what others do. 2e honor their non-aggressive choices Aeven if they are self-ishC and stop
trying to control them. In doing so, we dismantle their most effective means of controlling us . (thers only ignite the
flames of war and poverty. 2e feed the flames or starve them. Iot understanding their nature, we0ve fanned the sparks
instead of smothering them. Iot understanding our contribution to the raging inferno, we despair that a world full of
selfish others could ever e1perience universal har-mony and abundance. Iothing could be further from the truthT
2idespread peace and plenty can be created within our lifetime. 2hen we understand how to stop fueling the flames
of war and poverty, we can manifest our dream.
Coercion causes tyranny.
Tibor Mac0an, philosophy professor, $uburn, !RI#$T RI6'T& $I* !MB%I" I%%M&I(I&, ,/I:, p. 8B-.
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$s Bondy notes, in totalitarian states, where the government controls the printing presses and publishing
organi5ations, anyone wishing to state a personal opinion must gain official sanction. Aven under >ikhail
6orbachev0s glasnost and perestroika reformsGbegun in ,/8., prior to the breakup of the &oviet stateGthe
openness and restructuring involved were permitted or instituted by government, rather than being understood as a
basic human right that limits the scope and power of the government. "onsider also that 6eneral $ugusto
!inochet0s "hile had had a relatively HfreeH marketGthat is, a government policy of abstention from heavy-handed
economic regulation. +et its critics will quite rightly refuse to regard it as having been a free country. >oreover in
countries where broadcasting is government administered, there is no right to telecast one0s views or ideas on the
airways, only a permission to do so if it suits the state authorities. In contrast, if the right to property is respected,
individuals do not have to seek political permission to act, even if they still must earn the opportunity to do so via
the free marketplace and in face of natural obstacles. The right to property is the right to work for, acquire, and hold
goods and valuablesJ it includes the rights of production, trade, and bequest, as well as the right to undertake
innumerable actions vis-a-vis the world of ownable items not even conceived of yet. The right to pursue happiness
or individual e1cellence in life, then, requires full support of the right to property. !rivate property rights are neither
favored nor legally protected in our era and have not been for a long time. Both cultural and legal developments in
the last one hundred years have undermined the protection of property rights The state often acts in a paternalistic
fashion toward the citi5en0s ownership and management of property. It is increasingly willing to usurp mutually
agreed-upon contracts. Ievertheless, broadly speaking, the history of the Mnited &tates demonstrates that the
significant protection of private property rights, despite much compromise and confusion, has a propensity to
increase the productivity as well as the self-responsibility of the members of a human community. It contributes to
their self-perception as moral agents who cannot e1pect others to live for them and it fosters their concern for and
development toward doing reasonably well in their lives. In short, the right to private property is a required feature
of a human community that enhances human flourishing.
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Global 6e4ocratic consoli6ation is necessary to 5re;ent
4any scenarios 1or war an6 eCtinction
%arry *iamond, 'oover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Fournal of *emocracy, *ecember ,//-, $
Report to the "arnegie "ommission on !reventing *eadly "onflict, :!romoting *emocracy in the ,//4s; $ctors and
Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,< http;NNwwics.si.eduNsubsitesNccpdcNpubsNdiN,.htm
(T'R T'R$T& This hardly e1hausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former +ugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of urope and could easily spread. The
flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Iuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on arth, the global ecosystem,
appears increasingly endangered. >ost of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty, and openness. %&&(I& () T' T2ITIT' "ITMR+ The e1perience of this century offers
important lessons. "ountries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.
They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandi5e themselves or glorify their leaders. *emocratic governments
do not ethnically HcleanseH their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
*emocracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or
to threaten one another. *emocratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citi5ens, who organi5e to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets
to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more
difficult to breach agreements in secret. !recisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order
of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Eac0 use o1 coerci;e 1orce 5a;es t0e roa6 1or 4assi;e
atrocities
)oundation, editor of %iberty >aga5ine, financial advisor and economist, 2'+ 6(#RI>IT *(&I=T 2(R@,
,/I:, p. BB-..
The reformers of the "ambodian revolution claimed to be building a better world. They forced people into reeducation
programs to make them better citi5ens. Then they used force to regulate every aspect of commercial life. Then they
forced office workers and intellectuals to give up their ?obs and harvest rice, to round out their education. 2hen people
resisted having their lives turned upside down, the reformers had to use more and more force. By the time they were
done, they had killed a third of the countrys population , destroyed the lives of almost everyone still alive , and
devastated a nation. It all began with using force for the best of intentionsGto create a better world. The &oviet leaders
used coercion to provide economic security and to build a :Iew >an<Ga human being who would put his fellow man
ahead of himself. $t least ,4 million people died to help build the Iew >an and the 2orkers= !aradise. But human
nature never changedGand the workers= lives were always 'ell, not !aradise. In the ,/L4s many 6ermans gladly
traded civil liberties for the economic revival and national pride $dolf 'itler promised them. But like every other
grand dream to improve society by force, it ended in a nightmare of devastation and death. !rofessor R.F. Rummel has
calculated that ,,/ million people have been killed by their own governments in this century. 2ere these people
criminalsE Io, they were people who simply didn=t fit into the Iew (rderGpeople who preferred their own dreams to
those of the reformers. very time you allow government to use force to make society better, you move another step
closer to the nightmares of "ambodia, the &oviet Mnion, and Ia5i 6ermany. 2e=ve already moved so far that our own
government can perform with impunity the outrages described in the preceding chapters. These e1amples aren=t cases
of government gone wrongJ they are e1amples of governmentGperiod. They are what governments doG?ust as
chasing cats is what dogs do.
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Go;ern4ent coercion creates e;il
Mann @K/. )rederick >ann, entrepreneur, author of The conomic Rape of $merica, and founder of the )ree 2orld
(rder. :2hy you must recogni5e and understand "oercion,< p,. 344L.
http;NNwww.buildfreedom.comNpowerNpower1N,.html
H%ao T5u believed that when people do not have a sense of power they become resentful and uncooperative.
Individuals who do not feel personal power feel fear. They fear the unknown because they do not identify with the
world outside of themselvesJ thus their psychic integration is severely damaged and they are a danger to their society.
Tyrants do not feel power, they feel frustration and impotency. They wield force, but it is a form of aggression, not
authority. (n closer inspection, it becomes apparent that individuals who dominate others are, in fact, enslaved by
insecurity and are slowly and mysteriously hurt by their own actions. %ao T5u attributed most of the world0s ills to the
fact that people do not feel powerful and independent.H )riedrich Iiet5sche, the famous 6erman philosopher, wrote
that Hwill to powerH is the essence of human nature. In a book compiled from his notes after his death, 0The 2ill To
!ower,0 is written; H>y idea is that every specific body strives to be master over all space and to e1tend its force Aits
will to powerC and to thrust back all that resists its e1tension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of
other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement AHunionHC with those of them that are sufficiently related to it; Thus
they conspire together for power.H .. To feel that we are worthwhile individuals, to know that we e1ist, we have to
e1press our power - feel that we are in control. This imperative to e1press our power and e1perience control is central
to human behavior. very human does something to e1press his or her power in the world. This power can be
e1pressed creatively or destructively. 'umans first attempt to e1press their power creatively. If such attempts fail
repeatedly, they e1perience themselves as powerless. They may feel helpless and hopeless, and become depressed.
2hat they e1perience is that they cannot make a positive difference in their own lives or in the world. $ cognitive
breakdown occurs between their actions and the results they produce. >entally and intellectually they cease to
understand the connections between their behavior and the consequences of their behavior. Then they e1press their
power destructively.
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Go;ern4ent coercion 4ust be 4orally reEecte6
*r. dward .oun2ins, business professor, 2heeling Fesuit, "I#I% &("IT+; T' R$%> () )R*(>,< Fune
,4, +KKK, p. http;NNwww.quebecoislibre.orgN444B,4-,,.htm
Recently Aand ironicallyC, government pro?ects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state
subsidi5ation or coercive mandates. &uch coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. &tatists who support
such pro?ects believe only in the power of political society 9 they don0t reali5e that the subsidi5ed or mandated
activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don0t
understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity , but simply its
coercion. If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace
mandates with the rule of law. $ccording to the "ato 'andbook for "ongress, "ongress should; before trying to
institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program
that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate itJ ask by what legal
authority in the "onstitution "ongress undertakes an action ...J recogni5e that when government undertakes a
program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear
redundant, with significant negative effectsJ and begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government
programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recogni5ing that
accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates
more efficient outcomes. very time ta1es are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program
is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral
imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians U
solve V our problems and run our lives.
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Coercion 4ust be reEecte6 in e;ery instance
)rederick Mann, :2hy +(M >M&T R"(6IIK $I* MI*R&T$I* "(R"I(I, +KKK, p.
http;NNquebecoislibre.orgN444B,4-,,.htm
In &i1 >yths $bout %ibertarianism, >urray I. Rothbard writes; HIf a person is forced by violence or the threat
thereof to perform a certain action, then it can no longer be a moral choice on his part. The morality of an action
can stem only from its being freely adoptedJ an action can scarcely be called moral if someone is compelled to
perform it at gunpoint. "ompelling moral actions or outlawing immoral actions, therefore, cannot be said to foster
the spread of morality or virtue. (n the contrary, coercion atrophies morality for it takes away from the individual
the freedom to be either moral or immoral, and therefore forcibly deprives people of the chance to be moral.
!arado1ically, then, a compulsory morality robs us of the very opportunity to be moral.
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Coercion ;iolates 1un6a4ent 0u4an ri80ts
Ridgway Foley, &&$+ (I "$RII6, $pril ,/G:, p. www.libertyhaven.comNpoliticsandcurrente
ventsNpoliticalpartiesoractivismNessayoncaring.html
The *ividing %ine $ remarkable duality pervades the concept of caring and its current implementation. )orce
represents the dividing line. $pplication or refrain from coercion separates the wrongful intrusion into the sanctity
of the life of another from the permissible compassionate endeavor. The law ought not impede attempts to aid
others or to solve problems where those enterprises occur without compulsion. This should be true where the
ma?ority decries the problem as ridiculous or the solution as ill-advisedJ after all, the crowd often proves ineluctably
wrong and, in any event, no human being possesses either the ability or the moral privilege to substitute his
?udgment for that of another choosing sentient being. "onversely, no one should employ the legal monopoly of
force to compel adherence to, participation in, or compliance with an artifice designed to better another, no matter
how well intentioned or meritorious the plan. Io individual should be permitted to thrust a decision or shunt
responsibility for the consequences of his choice upon another, unwilling human being. *isregard of this salient
principle necessarily denies the dignity of that other individual, since moral choice and accountability constitute an
essential element in the human condition. Those who purport to care, then, must submit to a test of means and
motive. The law Arules and orders created and enforced by mankindC should not address the means employed by
those who promote compassion as a political or economic discipline e1cept to assure that no individual or entity
compels a dissenter to assent to, support or participate in a proposal disagreeable to the latter for any reason.$ll too
often, those who preach caring, compassion and concern rest their case upon the root of envy; %oathe the rich and
trust the poorJ take from the evil producer and give to the high-principled but helpless victim of circumstance and
oppression. &uch caring persons really do not care at all about others; The creators must be plundered, the users
must be pandered, by force and violence, by false premises and promises, in order to salve the promoter0s inordinate
ego and to effect his flawed view of mankind and the world. In these, the vast ma?ority of instances, one can always
count upon the concerned to care - -for themselves T
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**(ro5erty -i80ts Goo6**
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(ro5erty ri80ts are 2ey to all ri80ts
Fohn $os5ers, !rofessor of !hilosophy, Mniversity of &outhern "alifornia, T' %IBRT$RI$I $%TRI$TI#,
Tibor >achan, ed., ,/D7, p. 8.
*epriving people of property is depriving them of the means by which they live-the freedom of the individual
citi5en to do what he wishes with his own life and to plan for the future. Indeed, only if property rights are
respected is there any point to planning for the future and working to achieve one0s goals. !roperty rights are what
makes long-range planning possible - the kind of planning which is a distinctively human endeavor, as opposed to
the day-by-day activity of the lion who hunts, who depends on the supply of game tomorrow but has no real
insurance against starvation in a day or a week. 2ithout the right to property, the right to life itself amounts to
little; how can you sustain your life if you cannot plan aheadE and how can you plan ahead if the fruits of your
labor can at any moment be confiscated by governmentE
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(ro5erty ri80ts critical to 4oral a8ency
Tibor Mac0an, philosophy professor, $uburn, !RI#$T RI6'T& $I* !MB%I" I%%M&I(I&, ,/I:, p. /-,4
If one is on a desert island all by oneself, the issue of property rights is of no significance, because there is no one
else who could threaten one0s authority over what one is going to do and how one will set out to manage the natural
world that surrounds one. But if there is somebody elseGif, for e1ample Robinson "rusoe is met by )ridayGboth
now have the choice to do good, bad, or mediocre deeds, and either may have an impact on the other. They are
moral agents who may get in each other0s way with their morally wrong choices and actions. In his choice of ac-
tions, for instance, )riday might help himself in a morally significant fashion from which "rusoe ought not to
benefit without )riday0s permission. There should be some way to tell what Robinson "rusoe does and what )riday
does and to let both of them have a say whether and when they want to cooperate. This, in brief, spells out one of
the moral functions of private property rights; &uch rights identify what Robert Io5ick called Hmoral spaceH around
personsGwithin which, if ad equately protected, they can be sovereign agents 2e can appreciate, then, that from
the point of view of morality ev eryone needs to know his or her proper scope of personal authority and
responsibility. (ne needs to know that some valued item, skill, or liquid asset is in one0s own ?urisdiction to use
before one can be prudent, creative, courageous, charitable, or generous. If one does not know that some particular
area of human concern is under one0s own or other people0s proper authority, then one cannot know if it would be
coura geous , foolhardy, or silly to protect it, whether it would be generous or reckless to share it, and so on. It
follows that private property rights are, in the first place, a social precondition to the possibility of an e1tensive,
personally guided, and morally significant life. If one is to be generous to the starving human beings in &omalia but
has nothing of one0s own from which to be generous, generosity will not be possible &o there is, in effect, a
necessary connection between a practical moral code or set of guiding moral prin ciples and the institution of private
property rights.3B
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(ro5erty ri80ts are 2ey to 5re;ent 'a?is4
*r. Iathanial Bran6en, psychotherapist and author, II*I#I*M$%I&> $I* )R &("IT+3 Fanuary ,/I:, p.
http;NNwww.fff.orgNfreedomN4,/-d.asp
The policy of seeking values from human beings by means of force, when practiced by an individual, is called
crime. 2hen practiced by a government, it is called statism G or totalitarianism or collectivism or communism or
socialism or na5ism or fascism or the welfare state. )orce, governmental coercion, is the instrument by which the
ethics of altruism G the belief that the individual e1ists to serve others G is translated into political reality. $lthough
this issue has not been traditionally discussed in the terms in which I am discussing it here, the moral-political concept that forbids the initiation of force, and
stands as the guardian and protector of the individual0s life, freedom, and property, is the concept of rights. If life on earth is the standard, an
individual has a right to live and pursue values as survival requiresJ a right to think and act on his or her ?udgment
G the right of libertyJ a right to work for the achievement of his or her values and to keep the results G the right of
propertyJ a right to live for his or her sake, to choose and work for personal goals G the right to the pursuit of
happiness. 2ithout property rights, no other rights are possible. 2e must be free to use that which we have
produced, or we do not possess the right of liberty. 2e must be free to make the products of our work serve our
chosen goals, or we do not possess the right to the pursuit of happiness. $nd G since we are not ghosts who e1ist
in some nonmaterial manner G we must be free to keep and consume the products of our work or we do not
possess the right of life. In a society where human beings are not free to own privately the material means of
production, their position is that of slaves whose lives are at the absolute mercy of their rulers. It is relevant here to
remember the statement of Trotsky; H2ho does not obey shall not eat.H
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**-i80ts Co4e First**
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(lacin8 sur;i;al o;er in6i;i6ual autono4y re5licates aut0oritarian re8i4es o1 control3 subEu8atin8
in6i;i6ual ri80ts to t0e ;alues 0el6 by t0ose in 5ower
Sc0roe6er3 (ro1 Law3 Du2e3 GA
<C0risto50er $ Sc0roe6er3 (ro1 Law3 Du2e31IGA3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3) GA Colu4 L -e; 7I:=
$ctually, e1panding the idea of preservation to include bodily integrity on the basis of quality of life
considerations has already pointed the way to a more realistic statement of those individual characteristics worth
protecting. The same considerations of quality of life counsel recogni5ing some freedom of action and initiative within
the definition of the morally relevant aspects of the individual. *oing so is consistent with a long political and
philosophical heritage. /4 *eeply ingrained in practically all theories of the rights tradition is the vision of a person
as capable of forming and entitled to pursue some individual life plan. /, 6iven this vision, placing survival or
bodily integrity absolutely above all other ends would be tantamount to saying that the life plan that
one ought to adopt is that of prolonging life at all costs. That idea is unacceptably authoritarian and
regimented. It would be e1tremely anomalous for a theory supposedly centered on the autonomy of the
individual to result in a conception of ?ustice that constrained all individuals to a monolithic result.
Individual human beings want more from their lives than simple PW-34Q bodily integrity, and the
conception of an individual, of what defines and constitutes a person, as so limited is peculiarly impoverished.
Individuals are capable of formulating and pursuing life plans, of forming bonds of love, commitment, and friendship
on which they subsequently act, of conceiving images of self- and community-improvement. &ome of these may
directly advance interests in human survival, as when dedicated doctors and scientists pursue solutions to cancer or
develop chemical pesticides with a view to assisting agricultural self-sufficiency in developing countries. &ome may
dramatically advance the Hquality of life,H rather than survival itself, as when 6uttenberg0s press made literature more
widely available or when 'enry )ord pioneered the mass production of the automobile. 'owever,
even individual initiatives of much less demonstrable impact on the lives of others constitute a vital
element that makes human life distinctively human. $ ?ust society ought to understand and value this element
both in the concrete results it sometimes produces and in the freedom and integrity that are acknowledged when
individual liberty to conceive and act upon initiative is respected.
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*iolation o1 1ree6o4 ne8ates t0e ;alue o1 0u4an eCistence an6 re5resents t0e 8reatest t0reat to 0u4an
sur;i;al
-an63 (0iloso50er3 GI
<Ayn -an63 &bEecti;ist (0iloso50er3 KDB1IGI3 The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, 5
17:=
$ society that robs an individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the
freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational ?udgment, a society that sets up a conflict
between it=s ethics and the requirements of man=s nature 9 is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held
together by institutionali5ed gang-rule. &uch a society destroys all values of human coe1istence, has
no possible ?ustification, and represents, not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to man=s
survival. %ife on desert island is safer than and incomparably preferable than e1istence in &oviet
Russia or Ia5i 6ermany.
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*iolatin8 ri80ts in t0e na4e o1 sur;i;al causes social 5aralysis an6 6estroys t0e ;alue to li1e
Calla0an3 institute o1 Society an6 Et0ics3 D/
<Daniel Calla0an3 institute o1 Society an6 Et0ics3 1ID/3 The Tyranny of Survival, 55 I1BI/=
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the
name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of
individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of "ommunist domination has for over two decades
fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. *uring
2orld 2ar II, native Fapanese-$mericans were herded, without due process of law, to detention
camps. This policy was later upheld by the &upreme "ourt in @orematsu v. United States A,/77C in the
general conte1t that a threat to national security can ?ustify acts otherwise blatantly un?ustifiable. The survival of the
$ryan race was one of the official legitimations of Ia5ism. Mnder the banner of survival, the
government of &outh $frica imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human
rights. The #ietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of
survival; the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been
evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. ). &kinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned
society is the need for survival. )or Facques >onod, in Chance and ecessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious,
ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient
grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing
children. &ome have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those
suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of
population and environment, one can do no better than to cite !aul hrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy
name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted
population-control policies. )or all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a Htyranny of survival.H There
seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of
survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to
recogni5e the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. *ictators never talk about their
aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands
of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that
concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and
values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other
values. &urvival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness
that will stop at nothing. 2e come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for
survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the
premise of a right to lifeGthen how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in
human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation,
then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the
!yrrhic victory to end all !yrrhic victories.
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It is i45ossible 1or 5olicy4a2ers to 2now 1uture conse9uences J allowin8 4ore ri80ts ;iolations will
Eusti1y worse conse9uences in t0e 1uture
Journal o1 Conte45orary $ealt0 Law Q (olicy3 K1
<Journal o1 Conte45orary $ealt0 Law Q (olicy3 Winter +KK13 1G J. Contemp. ealth !. " #ol$y I:3 5
11D=
The utilitarian principle ?ustifies intentional, harmful acts against other humans to achieve a hoped-
for benefit to a greater number of people. It is the wrong approach to public policy decisions. Its most
notable proponents have been responsible for much of the misery and strife of the last century. 1perience has
taught us time and again that public servants, even when crafting policies that appear wholly
beneficent, can cause great harm Athe so-called Hlaw of unintended consequencesHC. 'umans lack the
wisdom and foresight to completely understand the future ramifications of many actions. $ father, for
e1ample, may believe that it is an entirely good thing to help his daughter with homework every day because they are
spending time together and he is showing sincere interest in her life and schooling. By HhelpingH with homework,
however, his daughter may be denied the mental struggle of searching for solutions on her own. &he may not develop
the mental skills to solve tough math problems, for e1ample, or to quickly find key concepts in reading selections. If
even HgoodH actions can produce undesirable results, how much worse is the case when evil is
tolerated in the name of some con?ectural, future outcomeE
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-i80ts outwei80 all J critical to 0u4an 6i8nitye 1uture
Geor8e Kateb3 (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 (rinceton3 #$E I''E- &CEA'3 1II+3 5 7K:
2hy make so much of individual personal and political rightsE The answer, as I have said, is that respect for rights
is the best way of honoring human dignity. 2hy make so much of human dignityE I do not find much to say. I am
not even sure that much should be said. &uppose we carry on at length about why governments should treat people
in certain ways Aby actions and abstentionsC, and in these ways unconditionally and as a matter of course, and
should do so because people deserve and are entitled to such treatment, rather than because governments may find
it prudent to treat people in these ways in the spirit of e1tending revocable privileges. I am afraid that we may
?eopardi5e human dignity by laboring to defend it. 2hat sort of attack would merit an answerE Is a long and
elaborate theory needed to establish the point that people should not be treated by the state as if they were masses,
or obstacles or instruments to higher purposes, or sub?ects for e1periments, or pieces in a game, or wayward
children in need of protection against themselves, or patients in need of perpetual care, or beasts in need of the
stickE 2ith what right does anyone maintain that people may be regarded or used in these nonhuman or subhuman
waysE 2ith what truthE Mnabused and undegraded, people have always shown that they deserve better. They
deserve guaranteed rights. 2hen their rights are respected, all that their dignity, their human status, requires is
achieved. !eople are enabled to lead lives that are free, modest, and decentGprovided, of course, socioeconomic
circumstances are not hopeless. To tie dignity to rights is therefore to say that governments have the absolute duty
to treat people Aby actions and abstentionsC in certain ways, and in certain ways only. The state0s characteristic
domination and insolence are to be curbed for the sake of rights. !ublic and formal respect for rights registers and
strengthens awareness of three constitutive facts of being human; every person is a creature capable of feeling pain,
and is a free agent capable of having a free being, of living a life that is one0s own and not somebody else0s idea of
how a life should be lived, and is a moral agent capable of acknowledging that what one claims for oneself as a
right one can claim only as an equal to everyone else Aand relatedly that what one wants done to oneself one should
do to othersC. Respect for rights recogni5es these capacities and thus honors human dignity.
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(olicy4a2ers 4ust 5rotect in6i;i6ual ri80ts
Geor8e Kateb3 (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 (rinceton3 #$E I''E- &CEA'3 1II+3 5 +
The background assumption is that most people in a society of rights are disposed to be law-abiding and that
government0s mere e1istence sustains their disposition. But because some persons inevitably transgress against their
fellow citi5ens, government can never lose the status of protectorJ in particular, protector of life and property, the
usual ob?ects of transgression. If, then, rights are rights against the state, the theory of rights does not ignore the
obvious fact that the state e1ists to prevent, deter, or punish crime or mayhem. AI prefer to see crime not as a denial
of the victim0s rights but, instead, as legally culpable immoralityJ nevertheXless, it is sometimes sensible to speak of
individuals violating one anXother0s rights.C 6overnment e1ists to preserve individuals. The point is that it must do
this work, and its other work, in a way that does not violate rights, including the rights of transgressors and those
accused of transgression. If the Bill of Rights is the core, its silences and deliberate omissions required that it be
supplemented over time. )reedom of speech, press, religion, and associationJ due-process rights for suspects,
defendants, and the legally guiltyJ and respect for a person0s freedom from arbitrary invasions of security and
privacyGall go far in protecting the dignity Aor integrityC of individuals. But their dignity needs moreGabove all,
three further rights; first, the right to vote and take part in politicsJ second, the right to be spared from utter
degradation or to be saved from material miseryJ and third, the right to equal protection of the laws Ain the language
of the )ourteenth $mendmentC. The two last-named rights do not call for mere governmental abstention, as do the
rights of speech, press, religion, association, security, and privacy. Ior do they call for only procedural ?ustice, as
do some other main rights in the Bill of Rights. Rather, the right to be free of degradation and misery $nswers To a
minimal samaritanism as morally obligatory on society and looks to government to carry it out. It is a right to be
given something, to be enabled to begin to live a life. &amaritanism is obligatory on society, and obligatory
samaritanism would be the foundation of a right to life which was e1panded beyond its present constitutional
interpretation in the Mnited &tates. I believe that this right, more than any other, stands in need of e1pansion
through positive governmental action, despite all the serious risks involved in charging governments with the task
of fostering life. $nd the equal protection of the laws may necessitate governmental action against, say, official or
social racial discrimination. Iaturally, in saying that the state, which must always be kept under suspicion, must
also be entrusted not only with the fundamental task of preserving individuals against transgressors but also with
the positive function of promoting some of the rights that are indispensable to human dignity, one admits that there
will be an inevitable ambivalence toward the state. It is an enemy, the worst enemy, but it is not the only enemy and
it is not only an enemy. >y emphasis, however, is on the antagonism that government shows to rights by its
initiatives rather than by its neglect. Throughout this book I rarely refer to rights that need government0s positive
contribution. The latter rights, no matter how fundamental, cannot be the norm in a society devoted to individual
rights. *ifferent individuals may use or need the several rights variably, but when government refuses to respect
rights, it not only makes people suffer, it in?ures everyone0s human dignity.
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#0e calculation o1 utilitarianis4 is t0e 1oun6ation o1 totalitarianis4
Geor8e Kateb3 (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 (rinceton3 #$E I''E- &CEA'3 1II+3 5 11
I do not mean to take seriously the idea that utilitarianism is a satisfactory replacement for the theory of rights. The
well-being Aor mere preferencesC of the ma?ority cannot override the rightful claims of individuals. In a time when
the theory of rights is global it is noteworthy that some moral philosophers disparage the theory of rights. The
political e1perience of this century should be enough to make them hesitate; it is not clear that, say, some version of
utilitarianism could not ?ustify totalitarian evil. It also could be fairly easy for some utilitarians to ?ustify any war
and any dictatorship, and very easy to ?ustify any kind of ruthless-ness even in societies that pay some attention to
rights. There is no end to the immoral permissions that one or another type of utilitarianism grants. verything is
permitted, if the calculation is right. Io, an advocate of rights cannot take utilitarianism seriously as a competing
general theory of political morality, nor any other competing general theory. Rather, particular principles or
considerations must be given a place. $ theory of rights may simply leave many decisions undetermined or have to
admit that rights may have to be overridden Abut never for the sake of &ocial well-being or mere policy preferenceC.
$lso, kinds of rights may sometimes conflict, and it is not always possible to end that conflict either by an
elaboration of the theory of rights or by an appeal to some other
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E;ery alternati;e to ri80ts lea6s to tyranny
6eorge Kateb, !rofessor of !olitics, !rinceton, T' IIIR ("$I, ,/I+, p. -
$t the same time, there are other theories that seem to affirm human dignity yet give rights only a lesser or
probationary or instrumental role. 1amples are utilitarianism, recent communitarianism, recent republicanism, and
radical egalitarianism. The first and last , will return to shortlyJ my response to the others appears here and there in
this volume. A$ll I wish to say now is that unless rights come first they are not rights. They will tend to be sacrificed to
some purpose deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. There will be little if any concept of the
integrity or inviolability of each individual. The group or the ma?ority or the good or the sacred or the vague future will
be preferred. The beneficiaries will be victimi5ed along with the victims because no one is being treated as a person
who is irreplaceable and beyond value. To make rights anything but primary, even though in the name of human
dignity, is to in?ure human dignity.
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Collecti;e sa1ety is no Eusti1ication 1or ri80ts ;iolationsMlea6s to sla;ery3 8enoci6e3 an6 wars
-an6 R7K3 &bEecti;ist (0iloso50er3
<Ayn -an63 &bEecti;ist (0iloso50er3 1I7K3 %#o All Innocent Colu4nists3) The Journals of Ayn %an&, 5
/:1=
They preach H*emocracyH and then make a little additionGH!conomic *emocracyH or a HBroader *emocracyH
or a H"rue *emocracy,H and demand that we turn all property over to the 6overnmentJ Hall propertyH means
also Hall rightsHJ let everybody hold all rights togetherGand nobody have any right of any kind individually. Is
that *emocracy or is it TotalitarianismE +ou know of a prominent woman commentator who wants us all to die for
*emocracyGand then defines HtrueH *emocracy as &tate &ocialism Pprobably a reference to Dorothy "hompsonQ. +ou have
heard &ecretary P'aroldQ Ickes define a HtrueH freedom of the press as the freedom to e1press the views of the ma?ority. +ou
have read in a highly respectable national monthly the claim that the Bill of Rights, as taught in our schools, is HselfishHJ that
a HtrueH Bill of Rights means not demanding any rights for yourself, but your giving these rights to Hothers.H 6od help us,
fellow-$mericans, are we blindE *o you see what this meansE *o you see the implicationsE $nd this is the picture
wherever you look. They HopposeH Totalitarianism and they HdefendH *emocracyGby preaching their
own version of Totalitarianism, some form of Hcollective good,H Hcollective rights,H Hcollective will,H
etc. $nd the one thing which is never said, never preached, never upheld in our public life, the one thing all these
Hdefenders of *emocracyH hate, denounce and tear down subtly, gradually, systematicallyGis the
principle of Individual Rights, Individual )reedom, Individual #alue. "hat is the principle against which the
present great world conspiracy is directed. "hat is the heart of the whole world question. That is the only opposite of
Totalitarianism and our only defense against it. *rop thatGand what difference will it make what name
you give to the resulting societyE It will be TotalitarianismGand all Totalitarianisms are alike, all come
to the same methods, the same slavery, the same bloodshed, the same horrors, no matter what noble
slogan they start under, as witness &oviet Russia and Ia5i 6ermany.
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Sacri1icin8 ri80ts to 5reser;e li1e 5ro6uces
totalitarianis4
"hristopher '. Sc0roe6er, !rofessor of %aw, *uke MniversityJ #isiting !rofessor of %aw, M"%$ ,/8--8B, 1IGA,
"olumbia %aw Review, #ights $gainst #isks, 8B "olum. %. Rev. 7/-
$ctually, e1panding the idea of preservation to include bodily integrity on the basis of quality of life considerations
has already pointed the way to a more realistic statement of those individual characteristics worth protecting. The same
considerations of quality of life counsel recogni5ing some freedom of action and initiative within the definition of the
morally relevant aspects of the individual. *oing so is consistent with a long political and philosophical heritage. /4
*eeply ingrained in practically all theories of the rights tradition is the vision of a person as capable of forming and
entitled to pursue some individual life plan. /, 6iven this vision, placing survival or bodily integrity absolutely above
all other ends would be tantamount to saying that the life plan that one ought to adopt is that of prolonging life at all
costs. That idea is unacceptably authoritarian and regimented . It would be e1tremely anomalous for a theory
supposedly centered on the autonomy of the individual to result in a conception of ?ustice that constrained all
individuals to a monolithic result. Individual human beings want more from their lives than simple PW-34Q bodily
integrity, and the conception of an individual, of what defines and constitutes a person, as so limited is peculiarly
impoverished. Individuals are capable of formulating and pursuing life plans, of forming bonds of love, commitment,
and friendship on which they subsequently act, of conceiving images of self- and community-improvement. &ome of
these may directly advance interests in human survival, as when dedicated doctors and scientists pursue solutions to
cancer or develop chemical pesticides with a view to assisting agricultural self-sufficiency in developing countries.
&ome may dramatically advance the Hquality of life,H rather than survival itself, as when 6uttenberg0s press made
literature more widely available or when 'enry )ord pioneered the mass production of the automobile. 'owever, even
individual initiatives of much less demonstrable impact on the lives of others constitute a vital element that makes
human life distinctively human. $ ?ust society ought to understand and value this element both in the concrete results it
sometimes produces and in the freedom and integrity that are acknowledged when individual liberty to conceive and
act upon initiative is respected.
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Err on t0e si6e o1 ri80ts J it@s t0e bi88est conse9uence in t0e lon8 ter4
Mac0an3 (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y3 K/
#ibor Mac0an3 5ro1 e4eritus o1 50iloso50y at Auburn "ni;ersity3 +KK/ %(assion 1or Liberty)
$ll in all, then, I support the principled or rights-based approach. In normal conte1ts, honesty is the best policy, even if at times it does not
achieve the desired good resultsJ so is respect for every individual0s rights to life, liberty, and property. $ll
in all, this is what will ensure the best consequencesGin the long run and as a rule . Therefore, one need not be
very concerned about the most recent estimate of the consequences of banning or not banning guns,
breaking up or not breaking up >icrosoft, or any other public policy, for that matter. It is enough to
know that violating the rights of individuals to bear arms is a bad idea, and that history and analysis
support our understanding of principle. To violate rights has always produced greater damage than good, so
let0s not do it, even when we are terri bly tempted to do so, %et0s not do it precisely because to do so would
violate the fundamental requirements of human na ture. It is those requirements that should be our guide, not some recent empirical data that have no
staying power Aaccording to their very own theoretical termsC. )inally, you will ask, isn0t this being dogmaticE 'aven0t we learned not to bank too much on what we0ve learned so far, when we also know that
learning can always be improved, modified, even revisedE Isn0t progress in the sciences and technology proof that past knowledge always gets overthrown a bit laterE $s in science and engineering, so in
morality and politics; 2e must go with what we know but be open to changeG provided that the change is
warranted. &imply because some additional gun controls or regulations might save lives Asome lives,
perhaps at the e1pense of other livesC and simply because breaking up >icrosoft might improve the
satisfaction of con sumers Asome consumers, perhaps at the e1pense of the satis faction of other
consumersC are no reasons to violate basic rights. (nly if and when there are solid, demonstrable reasons to do so should we throw out the old principles and
bring on the new principles. $ny such reasons would have to speak to the same level of fundamentally and relevance as that
incor porated by the theory of individual rights itself . Those defending consequentialism, like Fustice (liver 2endell 'olmes, have argued the opposite thesis;
Mnless one can prove, beyond a doubt, that violating rights in a particular instance is necessarily wrong in the eyes of a Hrational and fair man,H the state may go ahead and Haccept the natural outcome of
dominant opinionH and violate those rights., &uch is now the leading ?urisprudence
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Rights absolute 9 can=t infringe on one person=s rights to increase well-being of others.
Gewirt03 5ro1 o1 50iloso50y S " C0ica8o 1II7
$lan. :$re There $ny $bsolute RightsE< $bsolutism and its "onsequentialist "ritics. Foram 6raf 'aber. !gs ,L.-,L8
(ught $brams to torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastropheE >ight he not merely
pretend to torture his mother, so that she could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang members continuedE
ntirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily pierce this deception, the main ob?ection to the very raising of
such question s is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participating in an
unspeakably evil pro?ect. To inflict such e1treme harm on one0 s mother would be an ultimate act of betrayalJ in
performing or even contemplating the performance of such an action the son would lose all self-respect and would
regard his life as no longer worth living.0 $ mother0 s right not to be tortured to death by her own son is beyond any
compromise. It is absolute . This absoluteness may be analy5ed in several different interrelated dimensions. all
stemming from the supreme principle of morality. The principle requires respect for the rights of all persons to the
necessary conditions of human action, and this includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational
capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their behaviour in the light of such reflection. The principle hence
prohibits using any person merely as a means to the well-being of other persons. )or a son to torture his mother to death
even ,4 protect the lives of others would be an e1treme violation of this principle and hence of these rights, as would
any attempt by others to force such an action . )or this reason , the concept appropriate to it is not merely 0wrong0 but
such others as 0despicable0, 0dishonorableH, 0base0, 0monstrous0. In the scale of moral modalities , such concepts function
as the contrary e1tremes of concepts like the supererogatory , 2hat is supererogatory is not merely good or right but
goes beyond these in various waysJ it includes saintly and heroic actions whose moral merit surpasses what is strictly
required of agents, In parallel fashion, what is base, dishonourabte. or despicable is not merely bad or wrong but goes
beyond these in moral demerit since it subverts even the minimal worth or dignity both of its agent and of its recipient
and hence, the basic presupposition s of morality itself, Fust as the supererogatory is superlatively good, so the
despicable is superlatively evil and diabolic, and its moral wrongness is so rotten that a morally decent person will not
even consider doing it. This is but another way of saying that the rights it would violate must remain absolute.
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-i80ts an6 basic liberties are a 5rere9uisite o1 rational 6ecision4a2in8
#aylor3 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y S (rinceton +KK/
-obert %-awl@s De1ense o1 t0e (riority o1 LibertyL A Kantian -econstruction) (rinceton "ni;ersity
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 1A (roEect M"SE
In order to advance the reconstruction of the 'ierarchy $rgument, we must now answer the following question; 'ow
does this highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions ?ustify the le1ical priority of the basic liberties over
other primary goods, as called for by the !riority of %ibertyE In short, it ?ustifies such priority because t0e basic
liberties are necessary con6itions 1or t0e eCercise o1 rationality 3 which is why parties in the (riginal !osition :give
first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters< App. ,L,9L3C. If the parties were to sacrifice the basic liberties
for the sake of other primary goods Athe :means that enable them to advance their other desires and ends< Pp. 7.BQC, they
would be sacrificing their highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions, and thereby failing to e1press their
nature as autonomous beings Ap. 7/LC. $ brief e1amination of the basic liberties enumerated by Rawls will indicate why
they are necessary conditions for the e1ercise of rationality Ap. -LC. The freedoms of speech and assembly, liberty of
conscience, and freedom of thought are essential to the creation and revision of plans of life; without secure rights to
e1plore ideas and beliefs with others Awhether in person or through various mediaC and consider these at our leisure, we
would be unable to make informed decisions about our conception of the good. )reedom of the person Aincluding
psychological and bodily integrityC, as well as the right to personal property and immunity from arbitrary arrest and
sei5ure, are necessary to create a stable and safe personal space for purposes of reflection and communication, without
which rationality would be compromised if not crippled. E;en s4all restrictions on t0ese basic liberties woul6
t0reaten our 0i80est or6er interest , however slightly, and such a threat is disallowed given the absolute priority of
this interest over other concerns. Iote also that le1ical priority can be ?ustified here for all of the basic liberties, not
merely a subset of them Aas was the case with the strains-of-commitment interpretation of the qual %iberty of
"onscience $rgumentC.,
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-i80t to 0ealt0 outwei80s J ;iolation o1 ri80t to li1e
McClos2ey3 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y3 1IG7
$J %"tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts) - G Frey "tility an6 -i80ts (8s 1+DB
1+G
The right to health, like the right to bodily integrity, is related to but not whol,y based on the right to life. Ill health and
mutilation of the body need not threaten life. *eliberately to harm the health of persons is to violate their personhood,
impairing capacities, causing needless suffering, overriding wills. &o too with violation of bodily integrity, as with
compulsory sterili5ation, barbarous forms of punishment such as chopping off hands, blinding, removing the tongue. In
a real sense, although not in the sense suggested in %ocke0s labor argument for private property nor in the sense claimed
by many feminists in their defense of abortion from a woman0s right to control Aand mutilateEC her body, our body is
ours to care for and maintain as the vehicle of our personhood. $lthough it is true that we can lose an organ, a leg, an
eye, and still be the same person, our body appertains to us as persons. The negative aspect of the case for the rights to
health and bodily integrity is evidently strong. 'ow can another have the right to in?ure, infect, disease a personE &o to
act is to violate a right. $ very powerful moral ?ustification would be necessary for such an act not to constitute a grave
end illegitimate violation of a right.
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**A#L (ositi;e -i80ts Goo6**
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Go;ern4ent 5rotection o1 5ositi;e ri80ts Eusti1ies war
)rank ;an Dun, &enior %ecturer of !hilosophy of %aw at the Mniversity of >aastricht,
F(MRI$% () %IBRT$RI$I &TM*I&, )all 34K1, p. http;NNwww.mises.orgN?ournalsN?lsN,-S7N,-S7S,.pdf.
ven in the richest states, budgetary limitations often lead to sharp confrontations between pressure groups and vested
interests in various social, economic, and cultural domains. Msing the term : human rights< to describe one=s interests
does not change this fact of real-world limits. Rather, it creates the risk of inflating political rhetoric and passion, now
that the flag of human rights flies over almost the whole arena of government policy. ach policy option can be
interpreted at one and the same time as both a measure to further some human right and as an indication of the neglect
or even violation of any number of other human rights. Therefore, there is at all times unlimited room for weighing
various :rights< and for setting and revising priorities. The political and administrative bodies to which this weighing
of rights has been entrusted or that have succeeded in monopolising it have ample opportunities for e1panding their
power and influence. Iothing remains of the old idea that a right is worthy of respect in all circumstances e1cept,
perhaps, the most e1treme emergency. The human rights of the M* are not and cannot be absolute, even in the most
normal of circumstancesGunless anything short of Mtopia should count as an emergency.

By their very nature, they
are susceptible to continuous weighing, negotiation, and qualification. They are a politician=s delight, for every human
right translates into :a right to more government intervention on its behalf.< This is no less true for the ghosts of
natural rights that linger in the first half of the M* than for the economic, social, and cultural :rights< in the rest of it.
(f course, we should not confuse the ghost and the real thing. )or e1ample , $rticle 3 of the )rench *eclaration of the
Rights of >an and "iti5en clearly states what a person=s natural rights are; liberty, property, freedom from arbitrary
arrest, and resistance to oppression.

In the M*, on the other hand, a person is not informed that his life, liberty, security
of person, and property are his fundamental rights. 'e is told only that he has the right to life, liberty, and security of
person A$rt. LC and property A$rt. ,.C.

'e should not e1pect more. )or it is obviously inconsistent to claim that
everyone is entitled to the full realisation of the economic, social, and cultural :rights< and at the same time to claim
that any person=s fundamental rights are his life, liberty, and property. The administration of the former requires the
concentration of massive coercive powers of ta1ation and regulation in the hands of the state, and so must presuppose
that a person=s life, liberty, and property are not his rights . 'owever, this inconsistency evaporates once we realise that
the M*=s :rights to life, liberty, property< do not specify to whose life, liberty, or property a person has a right. It rules
out the possibility that he has an e1clusive right to his own life, liberty, or property, but it does not rule out that some
or all others have an equal, or perhaps more pressing, claim on those things in order to enable them, say, to en?oy the
arts or a paid holiday. Thus, a person=s life, liberty, and property are thrown upon the enormous heap of desirable
scarce resources to which all people are said to have a right. $s such, they, too, end up in the scales with which
political authorities, administrators, and e1perts are supposed to weigh the ingredients for their favoured policy-mi1.
'ere we catch our first glimpse of the shadow of 'obbes behind the contemporary notion of human rights; the person
who believes he has :a right to everything< is likely to find out that there is no thing that is his right. $ 'obbesian
!redicament The following thought e1periment will bring out the 'obbesian character of the M*=s conception of
human rights. Imagine two people, the only survivors of a shipwreck, who find refuge on a small deserted island. They
have with them nothing but their human rights, in particular their :right to work< and all that it entails according to
$rticles 3L, 37, and 3- of the M*. (ne can imagine what will happen if they sit there insisting on their :right< of being
employed by the other at a ?ust and favourable wage, or to receive an unemployment compensation high enough to
allow them an e1istence worthy of their dignity. (ne can also imagine what will happen if, instead of ?ust sitting there,
they attempt to enforce their human rights against one another; their own version of 'obbes=s war of all against all.
)inally, one can easily imagine what would happen if one of them won that war; 'obbes=s solution for the
incompatibility of their :rights< would emerge. The winner could then arrange for himself a nice unemployment
compensation Ae.g., a ta1 on an-other=s labourC to match his new-found dignity as a ruler, and keep the other man quiet
by leaving him as much as is consistent with :the organisation and the resources of their state .< Indeed, starvation,
universal war, and the %eviathan &tate are the only possible outcomes under a regime of human rightsGand only the
latter outcome is compatible with survival. Imagining a two-person situation makes this conclusion clear, but its
validity does not depend on the numbers. %arge numbers only serve to obscure the logic of the situation. the burden of
ta1ation and regulation ?ust below the threshold of revolt.
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Li4itin8 8o;ern4ent 5rotection to 5ro5erty ri80ts is
2ey to 5re;ent atrocities
E6war6 Feser3 50iloso50y 5ro1essor3 Loyola3 &' '&,ICK3 +KK73 5 GIBIK
That last line of the last chapter no doubt scandali5es many readers, as does the conception of politics it evinces.
:&urely there is more to morality than property rights, and more to social life than e1changing propertyT< they
might be tempted to respondJ :$nd surely there is more to community than the collective safeguarding of that
propertyT 2hat a cold and heartless G indeed, positively counter- utopian Gconception of human life is embodied
by such a viewT< They would, of course, be absolutely right to think this. 2here they go wrong is in assuming that
Io5ick would think, or is required by his position to think, any differently in assuming that Io5ick=s political
philosophy is intended to be a complete social philosophy. They go wrong also in assimilating :morality< to ?ustice,
:social life< to politics, and :community< to government. )or ?ustice is not the whole of moralityJ not all of social
life is politicsJ and genuine human community definitely is not the same thing as government action. Fustice the
securing of which is the chief end of political action G is, however important, but one virtue among others.
&ometimes what is called :?ustice< is not ?ustice at all, but a mask for something decidedly unvirtuous, such as
envy. (ne suspects that the demand for equality is a case in pointJ certainly one suspects this when one considers
that equality as an ideal is rarely argued for by it proponents, and is almost never argued for very well AIo5ick
,/.7. chapter 8C. There are, in any case, virtues that are as important as ?ustice, and some that are more important.
Temperance, prudence. fortitude, faith, hope, and love are cases in point, and only a fool could believe that the
practice of these virtues will be guaranteed if only we hit upon the right government program. 6overnment itself,
however high-flown the rhetoric often spouted in its defense, is, it must always be remembered, nothing more than
brute force, the getting of people to do things or to refrain from doing things by the threat of violence. &ometimes,
as when the defense of individual rights is involved, such force is necessaryJ it remains force nonetheless. $nd
when it involves the imposition of redistributive ta1ation or paternalistic regulation, it involves nothing more than
some people forcing other people G innocent people who have violated no one else=s rights G to do things against
their will, to submit to the will of those doing the forcing. 2hether or not one thinks such arm-twisting is morally
?ustified, it is dishonest, indeed perverse, to talk smugly as if it is the quintessence of :community.< Ior can
politics G which in a non-libertarian society amounts to little more than the struggle to be the ones who get to force
the others, even if :for their own good< G plausibly be regarded as a paradigmatically social activity, at least not if
:social< is meant to connote an ideal of high-minded cooperation. $ conception of human life that sees all
questions of morality, and indeed everything of value, as necessarily entailing a political program backed by the
police power of the state and the threat of litigation, is one that can only be described, charitably, as deficientJ less
charitably, as warped. 2e need, in Io5ick=s view, to learn :to see through the political realm< A,/.7, 1C. 2e need
to get beyond the tendency G a very modern tendency that would have surprised earlier generations G refle1ively
to think of all problems as having a political solution, of all progress as dependent on government action. 2e need
in particular to stop thinking in utopian termsGor rather, to stop thinking of utopia in political terms. The utopias
of the past have usually been implemented in a political fashion, and they have universally failed, often
catastrophically G think the )rench Revolution, $uschwit5, the 6ulag $rchipelago. They have also involved the
imposition of one group=s vision of utopia on everyone Aindeed, this is part of the reason why they have failedC. If
utopian thinking is to be realistic and to have a future, it must avoid these errors.
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**A#L "til (rotects -i80ts**
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Current 5riceBta8 t0in2in8 is insu11icientB we 0a;e to 4a2e t0e tou80 6ecisions t0at incor5orate
in6i;i6ual ri80ts instea6 o1 tryin8 to s5are lay5eo5le 1ro4 6i11icult 6ecision4a2in8
'YlZne 'ermansson R4., *ivision of !hilosophy, *epartment of !hilosophy and the 'istory of Technology Royal
Institute of Technology A@T'C, :Rights at Risk; thical Issues in Risk >anagement< &tockholm 344. p --.
$s choices like these seem to become more common, i.e., choices between risk alternatives presented in terms of probability
estimates, it is not surprising if people in general feel more and more insecure despite the fact that we lead longer and
healthier lives now than we did a couple of centuries ago. The solution, however, is not to spare lay people from making
risk decisions or letting e1perts make the decisions for them. In this thesis it is argued that the risk-e1posed should be
included in the decision procedure. >oreover, this procedure should be open to other aspects than those that a narrow technical
framing allows for. Respecting a variety of aspects may not make risk decisions easier to make, but as these decisions
are in fact seldom easily made, being honest about that may relieve some of the feelings of an1iety and distrust
among the general public. Background and aim of thesis Risk management is frequently described as a practice in
crisis. "ritics point to investigations analysing several countries= risk e1penditures which have shown large
variations in the cost per statistical life saved in different social sectors. The differences are said to be the result of
arbitrary decisions. )urthermore, it is argued that if societal resources were used in a more effective and rational
way, these differences could be levelled out and more lives be saved for the same amount of money. Therefore,
demands for a consistent risk management have repeatedly been called for in the risk literature A&ee e.g. >orone [
2oodhouse, ,/8BJ >orrall, ,/8BJ #iscousi, ,//BJ Breyer, ,///J &?\berg ,///J &unstein, 3443C. In technical
discussions about risk it has been maintained that risks should be managed in accordance with scientific data in order to avoid
the irrational fears of the public, whose focus is on sensational risks, while the real, but more ordinary risks, go unnoticed.
Risk management should be a rational, neutral, and scientific area beyond the influence of emotions, ideologies and
values. (ne such approach is the &tandard >odel that is discussed in this thesis Asee especially articles I and IIC.
$ccording to this model a risk is defined as the probability of a negative event multiplied by the damage resulting
from it, for instance e1pected fatalities. The number representing the risk is weighed against the possible benefit
that could be gained from accepting it. If total benefit e1ceeds total cost AriskC, then the risk can be accepted. In this
thesis I argue that scientific and technological reasoning is not enough for analysing or managing risks. ven though the
&tandard >odel contributes to a systematic way to make risk decisions, it is too narrow a perspective on risk
management. &uch a narrow perspective may allow for risk e1posure that violates the rights of the individual. 2hile I
agree that consistency in risk decisions is valuable and worth striving for, I question the standard approach to how
this should be done and maintain that a new and wider perspective on how to understand consistency in risk
management needs to be developed. $bove all, it is argued that the current :price-tag thinking< Ai.e., that consistency
in risk management is e1clusively about costs for different kinds of risk reductionsC is insufficient.
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"tilitarianis4 6oesn@t tru45 t0e i45act o1 coercionMin6i;i6uals can@t be re6uce6 to units o1 ;alue
>achan, /- !rofessor of philosophy, $uburn Mniversity, ,//- ATibor, !RI#$T RI6'T& $I* !MB%I"
I%%M&I(I&, ,//-, p. ,3/C
The essential point to note at this ?uncture is how the idea of the worth and rights of the individual simply cannot find a
place in the standard utilitarian cost-benefit analysis favored by many economists. Benefits, according to this
approach, are to be measured by what people prefer Aor would prefer, if properly informedC, while costs are reducible
to what people would prefer to do without or avoid if they were properly informed. The kind of value Aor worthC
individuals have, however, is not ?ust one benefit competing among other benefits..."onsider the case where some
people are in?ured or harmed by others. H&ince the costs of in?ury are borne by its victims,H @elman contends, Hwhile
its benefits are escaped by its perpetrators, simple cost-benefit calculations may be less important than more abstract
conceptions of ?ustice, fairness, and human dignity. *eveloping this theme more fully, @elman writes as follows; %e
would not condone a rape even if it could be demonstrated that the rapist derived enormous pleasure from his actions&
while the victim suffered in only small ways. Behind the conception of HrightsH is the notion that some concept of
?ustice, fairness or human dignity demands that individuals ought to be able to perform certain acts, despite the harm of
others, and ought to be protected against certain acts, despite the loss this causes to the would-be perpetrator. Thus we
undertake no cost-benefit analysis of the effects of freedom of speech or trial by ?ury before allowing them to continue.
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#0e sacri1ice o1 innocence 6e8ra6es 0u4anityBB it is an absolute wron8
$nscombe, /L !rofessor of !hilosophy, "ambridge Mniversity, $bsolutism and Its "onsequentialist "ritics, edited by
Foram 6raf 'aber, p. -,--3.
"ommon morality is outraged by the consequentialist position that, as long as human beings can remain alive, the
lesser of two evils is always to be chosen. Its defenders maintain, on the contrary, that there are minimum conditions
for a life worthy of a human being, and that nobody may purchase anything- not even the lives of a whole community-
by sacrificing those conditions. $ community that surrenders its members at the whims of tyrants ceases to be anything
properly called by that nameJ and individuals willing to accept benefits at the price of crimes committed upon other
individuals degrade their humanity. "ommon morality allows a certain room for compliance with tyrannical e1ternal
force, when resistance has become impossibleJ but there is a line that must be drawn beyond which compliance is
e1cluded, and the e1ample of rabbinic teaching is a guide drawing it.
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"til 1ails to 5rotect 4oral ri80ts J it silences ri80ts clai4s w0en not 8roun6e6 in law
rin Byrnes, F* M $ri5ona, ,///, :Therapeutic Furisprudence; Mnmasking 2hite !rivelege to 1pose the )allacy
of 2hite Innocense,< 7, $ri'. (. #ev. -L-
Mtilitarianism conceives of rights as being cogni5able only when they are legally recogni5ed . 3LB To the utilitarian,
there is no such thing as a moral right because it is not socially recogni5ed . 3L. The utilitarian re?ection of moral rights
can be fatal to affirmative action. Rights in utilitarian rhetoric are synonymous with the idea of a valid claim to act. 3L8 !ut differently, one can be said to hold a valid
claim when, and only when, that claim is grounded in a legally or socially recogni5ed right. This normative theory of
rights further posits that the e1ercise of rights is not dependent upon a duty incumbent upon others to acknowledge or respect that right. 3L/ This is clearly problematic when applied to calls for affirmative
action. Instead of conceiving of rights as corresponding with a duty, the utilitarian thinks of rights in terms of
Himmunity rights ,H which have a corresponding concept of a H disability .H 374 This too is a foreboding concept because affirmative action programs often
involve affirmative guarantees, versus a simple right to be free from discrimination. $n e1ample of an immunity right is the right to free speech. The right to free speech e1ists independently of an obligation
upon others not to interfere with an individual0s right to e1ercise free speech. 37, The corresponding disability operates upon "ongress. The disability prohibits "ongress from enacting certain laws abridging
the individual0s right to free speech, but does not e1tend so far as to require the passage of legislation which would affirmatively protect or guarantee the immunity right. 373 The immunity right, then, is one
that merely involves a freedom from outside interference, a sort of negative right, as opposed to being a right that is affirmatively protected through the imposition of an obligation upon others to honor the
right. The distinction made between moral and legal rights, encompassing the distinction between a disability and a duty, is central to the utilitarian argument. Mtilitarianism squarely re?ects
the recognition of moral rights because moral rights must be understood in terms of a corresponding beneficial obligation .
37L $ moral conception of rights dictates that a right is held by an individual Hif and only if one is
supposed to benefit from another person0s compliance with a coercive...rule.H 377 Mtilitarianism must
necessarily re?ect a conception of rights grounded in morality because the utilitarian doctrine is diametrically opposed to the
notion that rights correspond with duties . PW-BLQ )urthermore, utilitarianism renounces moral rights precisely because they
e1ist independent of social recognition or enforcement . 37- >oral rights Hare independent of particular circumstances and do not depend on any special conditions,H
37B like legal affirmation. Thus, moral rights cannot be accepted by the utilitarian because they lack the normative grounding fundamental
to utilitarian theory. Mtilitarians, therefore, assume that there is a clear delineation between moral rights and the pursuit for
overall human welfare , the central tenet of utilitarian doctrine.
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"tilitarianis4 1un6a4entally 1ails to 5rotect in6i;i6ual ri80ts J %8reatest 8oo6) clai4s si45ly con1lict
rin Byrnes, F* M $ri5ona, ,///, :Therapeutic Furisprudence; Mnmasking 2hite !rivelege to 1pose the )allacy of 2hite
Innocense,< 7, $ri'. (. #ev. -L-
>oral rights are ob?ectionable not only because they lack social recognition but also because they necessarily imply a correlation between rights and duties. $gain, utilitarianism0s
specific re?ection of the tie between rights and duties renders recognition of white privilege nearly
impossible. 2ithout this recognition, there can be no meaningful solution. 37. If accepted, moral rights would provide the grounds for
the appraisal of law and other social institutions, a system of appraisal antithetical to utilitarianism0s rubric of assessment. >oral rights carry with them the e1pectation that institutions will be erected with an
eye towards respect and furtherance of such rights. 378 &uch a proposition would certainly require more than ?ust striving towards color-blindness were it applied to affirmative action.
Mtilitarianism, however, requires that institutions and rights be evaluated solely with respect to the
promotion of human welfare, welfare being the satisfaction of overall citi5en desires. 37/ The assumption, implicit in the
foregoing argument, is that moral rights neither fit perfectly nor converge with legal rights. 3-4 This may not necessarily be the case. *avid %yons0 Htheory of moral rights e1clusionH discusses the way in which
utilitarians conceive of moral rights working at odds with the utilitarian goal. 3-, %yons0 theory describes the way in which a moral right, at some point, gains enough currency to warrant individual e1ercise of
that right. $ccording to %yons, when a moral right has reached this point, it has achieved the Hargumentative thresholdH and gains normative force. 3-3 The potential for this occurrence is precisely what leads
to the utilitarian re?ection of moral rights. Re?ection is predicated on the fact that once the argumentative threshold is reached, a presumption is created against interference upon the individual e1ercise PW-B7Q of
the right. 3-L Mnder a system which recogni5ed moral rights, but still organi5ed itself according to the
utilitarian goal of achieving human welfare Awhich is happinessC, individual rights would purportedly run
headlong into the pursuit of welfare. 3-7 Though the pursuit of welfare would be deemed morally relevant and would ?ustify a course of action on welfare0s behalf, in a
scenario where that course of action constituted a mere Hminimal increment of utility,H it would be
incapable of overcoming the argumentative threshold of rights. 3-- Thus, the argument is that the recognition of moral
rights is diametrically opposed to utilitarianism because in a moral rights regime, rights act as a
limitation upon the utilitarian goal of fulfilling as many individual desires as possible.
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"tilitarianis4 re6uces in6i;i6uals to t0eir 4ere utility ;alue3 4a2in8 t0e4 eC5en6able
"hristopher '. &chroeder, !rof. %aw, *uke,,/8B, :Rights $gainst Risks,< 8B "olum. %. Rev. 7/-
The an1iety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun by larger social considerations
underlies what '.%.$. 'art has aptly termed the Hdistinctively modern criticism of utilitarianism,H -8 the criticism that,
despite its famous slogan, Heveryone PisQ to count for one,H -/ utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary place
in its system of values. #arious versions of utilitarianism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to ma1imi5e
happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires. B4 2hatever the specific formulation, the goal of
ma1imi5ing some measure of utility obscures and diminishes the status of each individual . It reduces the individual to a
conduit, a reference point that registers the appropriate Hutiles,H but does not count for anything
independent of his monitoring function. B, It also produces moral requirements that can trample an individual, if
necessary, to ma1imi5e utility, since once the net effects of a proposal on the ma1imand have been taken into account, the
individual is e1pendable. "ounting pleasure and pain equally across individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only
pleasure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals and the PW-4/Q trampling of the few in furtherance of
the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any individual radically contingent. The individual0s
status will be preserved only so long as that status contributes to increasing total utility. (therwise , the
individual can be discarded.
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Calculation o1 0u4an li1e lea6s to no ;alue to li1e an6 t0e ?ero 5oint o1 t0e 0olocaust
>ichael *illon, !rof. !olitics M-%ancaster, 47-,///, )olitical "heory& vol. 3., no. 3, p. ,B-
conomies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration
without inde1ation. (nce rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but
also, of course, to devaluation. *evaluation, logically, can e1tend to the point of counting as nothing. 'ence, no mensuration
without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this; the declension of economies of value leads to the 5ero
point of holocaust. 'owever liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for e1ample, they run the
risk of counting out the invaluable. "ounted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. 'erewith, then, the
necessity of championing the invaluable itself. )or we must never forget that, Hwe are dealing always with whatever e1ceeds
measure.H But how does that necessity present itselfE $nother Fustice answers; as the surplus of the duty to answer to the
claim of Fustice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Fustice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human
way of being.
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**A#L -i4al**
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Mutual coercion won@t sol;e B t0ey lac2 t0e 2nowle68e an6 incenti;e to 5rotect t0e en;iron4ent an6
will 5er5etuate tyrannical coercion
%eeson ./ $d?unct !rofessor at the Mniversity of (regon &chool of %aw, )ormer !rofessor of !olitical &cience at 2illamette
Mniversity, )ormer Fudicial )ellow for the M.&. &upreme "ourt and Fustice for the (regon &tate &upreme "ourt P&usan,
:!hilosophical Implications of the cological "risis; The $uthoritarian "hallenge to %iberalism< !olity #ol. ,,, Io. L, pg.
L4L-L,8, ?storQ
'ardin0s solution would be reasonable if it could be assumed that the ma?ority is aware of threats to the commons and knows
the measures needed to prevent its destruction. But this is the very knowledge which 'ardin asserts individuals lack.
Individual Hrationality,H or self-interest, 'ardin says, is what leads to the destruction of the commons. 'ow self- interested
individuals are to be transformed into a public-spirited, wise ma?ority is a problem 'ardin does not address. The knowledge
required to use the commons wisely will not result automatically from the ma?ority0s power to impose its will on the minority.
'ardin also ignores the possibility that the ma?ority might act un- ?ustlyJ that is, coerce the minority for its own immediate
pleasure rather than for the preservation of the commons and the well-being of future generations. That mutual coercion
might degenerate into ma?ority tyranny is a possibility that 'ardin does not acknowledge, nor does his prescription provide a
solution.7B
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An aut0oritarian 8o;ern4ent woul6 1ail to conser;e resources
L4L-L,8, ?storQ
'eilbroner0s argument leads to a similar predicament. $s pessimistic as he is in Inquiry Into the 'uman !rospect, he
does see hope that the psychological need for authority-the Htrait of obedienceH-will be powerful enough to force men
to acquiesce to authoritarian controls before it is too late.7. 'eilbroner doubts that men will consent to the authority of
reason or engage in discussion about the need for government. 'e predicates his only hope for survival on a
government which presupposes the unwillingness if not the incapacity of men to e1ercise reason. )or 'eilbroner the
'obbesian fear of violent death at the hands of one0s fellow man is the fear of e1tinction from environmental de-
struction. In both cases salvation is sought in the coercive power of the %eviathan. Ironically, it was the unleashing of
the passion for material abundance, legitimi5ed by 'obbesian natural right, amplified by %ocke, combined with the
re?ection of the classical commitment to reason and proper limits that caused the ecological crisis. (ne is left wondering
what endowed the authoritarian power with the wisdom to rule which everyone else lacks. Indeed, none of the prescriptions for
%eviathan includes measures to insure its wisdom or political skill. &urely, it takes more than brute force to make wise use of
scarce resources, balance population with resources, and decide on appropriate levels and uses of technology. It will require skill to
persuade modern men that the industrial capacities of the society ought not be developed without regard to the supply of natural
resources, and to persuade them to e1ercise restraint when no immediately apparent reasons e1ist.
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#0eir aut0ors contra6ict t0e4sel;es
L4L-L,8, ?storQ
(phuls0 new position still traps him between competing political traditions. 'e wishes to affirm the basic materialism of
nlightenment thought, which attempts to e1plain the human situation in terms of biological survival and man0s relationship
to physical nature. $t the same time he hopes for the revival of classical politics while yet refusing to affirm the classical
faith in an ob?ective good that can guide man in the selection of appropriate ends for his life.-, %ike Rousseau and many
contemporary thinkers, (phuls wants the best of the classical and modern worlds, irrespective of the wide epistemological
gulf separating classical 6reek thought from the nlightenment.
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**A#L Coercion Ba6**
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Ille8iti4ate resource ac9uisition Eusti1ies re6istribution
Will Ky4lic2a3 (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y3 "ni;ersity o1 #oronto3 C&'#EM(&-A-. (&LI#ICAL
($IL&S&($.3 1IIK3 5 1KI
Because 4ost initial ac9uisition was in 1act ille8iti4ate3 'o?ic2>s t0eory cannot 5rotect eCistin8
0ol6in8s 1ro4 re6istribution But we still need to know how acquisition could have arisen legiamately. If we
cannot answer that question, then we should not only postpone the implementation of Io5ick0s principle of transfer
until historical titles are ascertained or rectified, we should re?ect it entirely. I1 t0ere is no way t0at 5eo5le can
a55ro5riate unowne6 resources 1or t0e4sel;es wit0out 6enyin8 ot0er 5eo5le>s clai4 to e9ual consi6eration3
t0en 'o?ic2>s ri80t o1 trans1er ne;er starts
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Libertarians conce6e t0at eCtinction outwei80s
>urray -ot0bar63 libertarian, *ean of $ustrian &chool, 'ead of >ises Institute, )(R $ I2 %IBRT+; T'
%IBRT$RI$I >$II)&T(, ,/D/, p. http;NNwww.mises.orgNrothbardNnewlibertywhole.asp]p3BL. accessed 7N34N4B.
>any libertarians are uncomfortable with foreign policy matters and prefer to spend their energies either on
fundamental questions of libertarian theory or on such HdomesticH concerns as the free market or privati5ing postal
service or garbage disposal. +et an attack on war or a warlike foreign policy is of crucial importance to libertarians.
There are two important reasons. (ne has become a cliche, but is all too true nevertheless; t0e o;erri6in8
i45ortance o1 5re;entin8 a nuclear 0olocaust #o all t0e lon8Bstan6in8 reasons3 4oral an6 econo4ic3 a8ainst
an inter;entionist 1orei8n 5olicy 0as now been a66e6 t0e i44inent3 e;erB5resent t0reat o1 worl6 6estruction
I1 t0e worl6 s0oul6 be 6estroye63 all t0e ot0er 5roble4s an6 all t0e ot0er is4sMsocialis43 ca5italis43
liberalis43 or libertarianis4Mwoul6 be o1 no i45ortance w0atsoe;er.
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-e6istribution is not an in0erent a11ront to 0u4an
6i8nity As lon8 as you belie;e 0el5in8 ot0ers is
8oo63 re6istribution 6oesn@t t0reaten 6i8nity
2ill @ymlicka, !rofessor of !hilosophy, Mniversity of Toronto "(IT>!(R$R+ !(%ITI"$% !'I%(&(!'+,
,//4, p. ,33-L.
)inally, 'o?ic2 4i80t ar8ue t0at wel1are re6istribution 6enies 5eo5le>s 6i8nity, and this dignity is crucial to
treating people as equals Ae.g. Io5ick ,/.7; LL7C. Indeed Io5ick often writes as if the idea that other people
have claims on the fruits of my talents is an assault on my dignity. But this is implausible. &ne 5roble4 is t0at3
'o?ic2 o1ten ties 6i8nity to sel1B6eter4ination, so that it will be liberal regimes, not libertarian ones, which
best promote each person0s dignity. In any e;ent3 6i8nity is 5re6icate6 on3 or a by5ro6uct o13 ot0er 4oral
belie1s We only 1eel so4et0in8 to be an attac2 on our 6i8nity i1 we are alrea6y con;ince6 t0at it is wron8
-e6istribution will 1eel li2e an assault on 6i8nity only i1 we belie;e it is 4orally wron8 I1 we belie;e
instea6 t0at re6istribution is a re9uire6 5art o1 treatin8 5eo5le as e9uals3 t0en it will ser;e to 5ro4ote3
rat0er t0an attac23 5eo5le>s sense o1 e9ual 6i8nity.
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#0e only way t0eir alternati;e can ca5ture t0is is i1
t0eir alternati;e is allowe6 to i4a8ine a worl6 in
w0ic0 in6i;i6uals all beco4e c0aritable 8i;ers #0is
is abusi;e 5ri;ate actor 1iat I1 t0e ne8 can i4a8ine
t0is t0ey can Eust i4a8ine worl6 5eace an6 sol;e all
o1 our case i45acts
$I$R"'(-"$!IT$%I&> 2(M%* 6I# RI& T( R6I>& () *(>II$TI(I $I* (!!R&&I(I, T'I&
!(&& T' &II6% 6R$T&T T'R$T T( 'M>$I Î&TI"
Ioam C0o4s2y, philosopher, "'(>&@+ (I $I$R"'(-"$!IT$%I&>,3447, p. !.
http;NNflag.blackened.netNlibertyNchomsky-on-ac.t1t.
$narcho-capitalism, in my opinion, is a doctrinal system which, if ever implemented, would lead to forms of
tyranny and oppression that have few counterparts in human history. There isn0t the slightest possibility that its
Ain my view, horrendousC ideas would be implemented, because they would quickly destroy any society that
made this colossal error. The idea of Hfree contractH between the potentate and his starving sub?ect is a sick ?oke,
perhaps worth some moments in an academic seminar e1ploring the consequences of Ain my view, absurdC ideas,
but nowhere else.
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'o?ic2>s conce5t o1 6i8nity re9uires access to resources
2ill @ymlicka, !rofessor of !hilosophy, Mniversity of Toronto, "(IT>!(R$R+ !(%ITI"$% !'I%(&(!'+,
,//4, p. ,-4.
But, we have seen, the notion of dignity and agency that Io5ick relies on, based on the idea of acting on one0s
conception of oneself, requires rights over resources as well as one0s person. 'aving independent access to
resources is important for our purposes, and hence our purposive freedom, but that argues for liberal equality not
libertarianism.
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Since initial ac9uisition was unEust3 t0ere are no le8iti4ate entitle4ents
Jonat0an Wol113 50iloso50er3 -&BE-# '&,ICK3 1II13 5 171
&econd, initial appropriation remains undefended by Io5ick, and this may well be because it is indefensible on
libertarian grounds $llowing people virtually unlimited appropriation of the world will importantly restrict what
others can do, thus undermining their liberty and self-ownership. Thus Io5ick0s concept of ownership itself
generates conflicts, and so The pro?ect of allowing no restrictions upon ownership itself falls into incoherence.
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#aCation re6istributes 1ree6o4 rat0er t0an li4itin8 it
2ill @ymlicka, !rofessor of !hilosophy, Mniversity of Toronto, "(IT>!(R$R+ !(%ITI"$% !'I%(&(!'+,
,//4, p, ,7..
$s soon as we ask that question, )lew0s equation of capitalism with freedom is undermined. )or it is the owners of
the resource who are made free to dispose of it, while non-owners are deprived of that freedom. &uppose that a
large estate you would have inherited Ain the absence of an inheritance ta1C now becomes a public park, or a low-
income housing pro?ect Aas a result of the ta1C. The inheritance ta1 does not eliminate the freedom to use the
property, rather it redistributes that freedom. If you inherit the estate, then you are free to dispose of it as you see
fit, but if I use your backyard for my picnic or garden without your permission, then I am breaking the law, and the
government will intervene and coercively deprive me of the freedom to continue. (n the other hand, my freedom to
use and en?oy the property is increased when the welfare state ta1es your inheritance to provide me with affordable
housing, or a public park. &o the free market legally restrains my freedom, while the welfare state increases it.
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Ta'es &on(t violate rights
Fohn "hristman, !rofessor of !hilosophy at #irginia !olytechnic Institute, !'I%(&(!'+ $I* !MB%I" $))$IR&,
&pring ,/8B, p.,B-.
$lso, as @earl has pointed out, persons who gain entitlements through embedded labor may enter into a market, the
function of which serves to reduce inefficiencies, reduce e1ternalities, and lower negotiation costs which all
increase the net social product produced from those entitlements without demanding e1tra labor from individual
traders Thus, ta1ation which redistributes that e1tra product would amount to a limitation of the ownership rights of
the traders over the commodities in question but not constitute an encroachment on the rights anyone has to her or
his labor Asince the product redistributed is from the increased efficiencies of the market mechanism, not increased
labor.
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*iolations o1 liberty 6on@t Eusti1y reEectin8 wel1are
Thomas 'a8el3 !rofessor of !hilosophy, Iew +ork Mniversity, R$*II6 I(KI"@, Feffrey !aul, ed., ,/G1, p. ,/L.
Iaturally any opposition to the power of governments will meet with a certain sympathy from observers of the
contemporary scene, and Io5ick emphasi5es the connection between his view and the fight against legal regulation of
se1ual behavior, drug use, and individual life styles. It is easy to develop an aversion to state power by looking at how
actual states wield it. Their activities often include murder, torture, political imprisonment, censorship, conscription for
aggressive war, and overthrowing the governments of other countries-not to mention tapping the phones, reading the
mail, or regulating the se1ual behavior of their own citi5ens. The ob?ection to these abuses, however, is not that state
power e1ists, but that it is used to do evil rather than good. (pposition to these evils cannot be translated into an ot
?ection to welfare, public education, or the graduated income ta1.
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Wel1are en0ances sel1 6eter4ination
2ill Ky4lic2a3 !rofessor of !hilosophy, Mniversity of Toronto, "(IT>!(R$R+ !(%ITI"$% !'I%(&(!'+,
,/IK, p ,33.
%ibertarians claim that liberal welfare programmes, by limiting property-rights, unduly limit people0s self-
determination. 'ence the removal of welfare redistribution programmes AIo5ickC, or their limitation to an absolute
minimum A)riedC, would be an improvement in terms of self-determination. But that is a weak ob?ection.
Redistributive programmes do restrict the self-determination of the well off to a limited degree. But they also give
real control over their lives to people who previously lacked it. %iberal redistribution does not sacrifice self-
determination for some other goal. Rather, it aims at a fairer distribution of the means required for self-
determination. %ibertarianism, by contrast, allows undeserved inequalities in that distribution-its concern with self-
determination does not e1tend to a concern for ensuring the fair distribution of the conditions required for self-
determination. In fact, it harms those who most need help in securing those conditions. If each person is to be
treated as an end in herself, as Io5ick says repeatedly, then I see no reason for preferring Ja libertarian regime to a
liberal redistributive one.
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-e6istribution is Eusti1ie6 on utilitarian 8roun6s
!eter Sin8er, !rofessor of !hilosophy, >onash Mniversity, R$*II6 I(KI"@, Feffrey !aul, ed., ,/G1, p. -4.
Mtilitarianism has no problem in ?ustifying a substantial amount of compulsory redistribution from the rich to the
poor. 2e all recogni5e that _,,444 means far less to people earning _,44,44 than it does to people trying to support
a family on _B,444. Therefore in normal circumstances we increase the total happiness when we take from those
with a lot and give to those with little. Therefore that is what we ought to do. )or the utilitarian it is as simple as
that. The result will not absolute equality of wealth. There may be some who need relatively little to be happier, and
others whose e1pensive tastes require more to achieve the same level of happiness. If resources are adequate the
utilitarian will give each enough to make him happy, and that will mean giving some more than others.
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"tilitarianis4 Eusti1ies t0e wel1are state
!eter Sin8er3 !rofessor of !hilosophy, >onash Mniversity, R$*II6 I(KI"@, Feffrey !aul, ed., ,/G1, p. -4-,.
Ione of the arguments Io5ick uses against Rawls is decisive when invoked against a utilitarian position.
Mtilitarianism gives a clear and plausible defense not merely of progressive ta1ation, welfare payments, and other
methods of redistribution, but also of the general right of the state to perform useful functions beyond the protection of
its citi5ens from force and fraud. Mtilitarianism also provides an argument in defense of the claim behind 2illiams0s
argument for equality-that society should, so far as its resources allow, provide for the most important needs of its
members.
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ECtinction outwei80s
>urray -ot0bar63 libertarian, *ean of $ustrian &chool, 'ead of >ises Institute, )(R $ I2 %IBRT+; T'
%IBRT$RI$I >$II)&T(, ,/D/, p. http;NNwww.mises.orgNrothbardNnewlibertywhole.asp]p3BL. accessed 7N34N4B.
>any libertarians are uncomfortable with foreign policy matters and prefer to spend their energies either on
fundamental questions of libertarian theory or on such HdomesticH concerns as the free market or privati5ing postal
service or garbage disposal. +et an attack on war or a warlike foreign policy is of crucial importance to libertarians.
There are two important reasons. (ne has become a cliche, but is all too true nevertheless; the overriding
importance of preventing a nuclear holocaust. To all the long-standing reasons, moral and economic, against an
interventionist foreign policy has now been added the imminent, ever-present threat of world destruction. If the
world should be destroyed, all the other problems and all the other ismsGsocialism, capitalism, liberalism, or
libertarianismGwould be of no importance whatsoever.
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ECcess liberty creates a 4oral ;acuu4
Robert 'isbet, !rofessor of &ociology, "olumbia, )R*(> $I* #IRTM, 6eorge "arey, ed., ,/G7, p. 34.
)or the conservative, individual freedom lies in the interstices of social and moral authority. (nly because of the
restraining and guiding effects of such authority does it become possible for human beings to sustain so liberal a
political government as that which the )ounding )athers designed in this country and which flourished in ngland
from the late seventeenth century on. Remove the social bonds, as the more 5ealous and uncompromising of libertarian
individualists have proposed ever since 2illiam 6odwin, and you emerge with, not a free but a chaotic people, not
creative but impotent individuals. 'uman nature, Bal5ac correctly wrote, cannot endure a moral vacuum.
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Libertarianis4 woul6 un6er4ine t0e 4oral basis o1 t0e
liberal state
2alter Berns, !rofessor of 6overnment, 6eorgetown, )R*(> $I* #IRTM, 6eorge "arey, ed., ,/G7, p. L3-L.
I think what I have said above is sufficient to illustrate my point; we were founded on liberal principles, but we
used the public authority in nonliberal ways. 2e did so partly out of habit, I suppose, and partly because there were
men--'orace >ann, the central figure in $merican public schooling, is a good e1ample-who reflected on our
situation and who knew that a liberal state could not be perpetuated with simply self-interested citi5ens. >en had to
be taught to be public-spirited, to care for others, to be at least somewhat altruistic. In the course of time, and partly
as the result of &upreme "ourt decisions affecting public education, public support of private education, and, of
course, the censorship of obscenity, we have ceased to use the public authority in these ways. 2e can now be said
to be living off the fat we built up in the past. I shudder to think of what would happen if we moved all the way
from liberalism to libertarianism.
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Blan2et state4ents about coercion are 1alse3 4ust
e;aluate coercion on a case by case basis
Stein IG P'erbert, senior fellow at the $merican nterprise Institute and was on the board of contributors of The 2all
&treet Fournal. 'e was chairman of the "ouncil of conomic $dvisers under !resident Ii1on and !resident )ord. In
the ,/.4s, he was a professor of economics at the Mniversity of #irginia, :2hat I think; ssays on conomics,
!olitics, and %ife<. ,//8 !. .Q
Today0s concern is mainly about coercion by the state. 2e have many government regulations today, mainly related to
health and the environment, that we did not have fifty years ago. 2e have fewer regulations about international trade,
agriculture, transportation, and banking than we did then. I don0t know whether there is more regulation now than there
was. >ore important, it is essential to have some feeling about the coerciveness of government coercion. It is one thing
to be prevented from producing an automobile that emits more than a specified amount of carbon dio1ide by a
regulation enacted pursuant to a democratic legislative process, applied ob?ectively and sub?ect to ?udicial review. It is
quite a different thing to be thrown into the %ubyanka prison and shot for malting a critical remark about the dictator. I
agree that much of current government regulation is unnecessary and inefficient. I admire the people who diligently
analy5e all regulation and point out the follies that they find. They are engaged in the constant tidying up needed for a
good society, but they are not carrying on a revolution
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#urnL Autono4y ba6
Gaylin an6 Jennin8s3 1IIA3 Willia43 5syc0oanalytic 4e6icine 5ro1essor at Colu4bia3 5resi6ent o1
$astin8s Center an6 Bruce3 6irector o1 Center 1or $u4ans an6 'ature3 #0e (er;ersion o1 Autono4yL
t0e 5ro5er uses o1 coercion an6 constraints in a liberal society (a8es :BA 'ew .or23 '.3 #0e Free
(ress3 1IIA=
The dark side of the culture of autonomy is becoming increasingly apparent; something akin to decadence is setting in.
Individualism, privacy, and rights claims are sometimes so o;erblown that they become caricatures of themselves. The
individualistic philosophy that has been the backbone of political liberalism and that protects the person from the power of the
state has become hypere1tended into a kind of social liberalism that sees power, and nothing but power, everywhere, and that
casts the same acids of suspicion J mistrust on the family and civil associations that political liberals have traditionally reserved
for the government. 1tending the claims of autonomy as $merica has been doing recently is dangerous for two reasons. )irst, it
invites a politicallyJ socially reactionary backlash that could threaten civil liberties across the board, and not ?ust the e1aggerated
ones. qually dangerous, more subtle and insidious, is the possibility that it will come to unXdermine the very social and psychic
infrastructure upon which social order, and hence the conditions for autonomy itself, rests. The social infrastructure to which we
refer consists primarily of the family and the various civic institutions through which individuals live as parXents, friends, and
neighborsJ as church, synagogue, or mosque memXbersJ as volunteers, professionals, and citi5ens. The psychic infrastrucXture
endangered by the culture of autonomy is those processes of childrearing, sociali5ation, and moral development that create the
motivational basis for responsible conduct in the social emotions of shame, guilt, pride, and conscience. >aintaining these
foundations of social order requires respect for authority as well as respect for freedomJ it requires institutional power and
restraint as well as self-e1pression and independence.
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**A#L I Sol;e Future Coercion**
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Coercion snowballs J Eac0 increase beco4es easier to Eusti1y #0e only reason w0y we 6o not reali?e it
is because t0e 8o;ern4ent uses t0e 5loy o1 %Altruis4) to ta2e it ste5 by ste5 As eac0 5ro8ra4 1ails3 it
beco4es %necessary) to 4o;e anot0er ste5 closer to 4ore coercion We are on a roa6 to o55ression
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LinearM e;ery increase in coerci;e 5ower 6ecreases 0u4an 6i8nity
-ot0bar63 DK
TMurray3 aca6e4ic ;ice 5resi6ent o1 t0e Lu6wi8 ;on Mises Institute an6 6istin8uis0e6 5ro1essor at
"'L*3 Free6o43 Ine9uality3 (ri4iti;is4 an6 t0e Di;ision o1 Labor3
0tt5LHHwww4isesor8H1i5an6olH1i5sec1as5U
Individual human beings are not born or fashioned with fully formed knowledge, values, goals, or personalitiesJ they must
each form their own values and goals, develop their personalities, and learn about themselves and the world around them.
very man must have freedom, must have the scope to form, test, and act upon his own choices, for any sort of
development of his own personality to take place. 'e must, in short, be free in order that he may be fully human. In a sense,
even the most fro5en and totalitarian civili5ations and societies have allowed at least a modicum of scope for individual
choice and development. ven the most monolithic of despotisms have had to allow at least a bit of HspaceH for freedom of
choice, if only within the interstices of societal rules. The freer the society, of course, the less has been the
interference with individual actions, and the greater the scope for the development of each individual.
The freer the society, then, the greater will be the variety and the diversity among men, for the more fully developed
will be every man0s uniquely individual personality. (n the other hand, the more despotic the society, the
more restrictions on the freedom of the individual, the more uniformity there will be among men and the less the
diversity, and the less developed will be the unique personality of each and every man. In a profound sense,
then, a despotic society prevents its members from being fully human.
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Ste5s towar6 state 5ower are ste5s towar6 tyranny
Browne RI:3 For4er Libertarian (arty can6i6ate 1or (resi6ent an6 Director o1 (ublic (olicy 1or t0e
Downsi?eDCor83 I:
<$arry Browne3 For4er Libertarian (arty can6i6ate 1or (resi6ent an6 Director o1 (ublic (olicy 1or
t0e Downsi?eDCor83 1II:3 W0y Go;ern4ent Doesn>t Wor23 5A:BAA=
ach increase in coercion is easier to ?ustify. If it=s right to force banks to report your finances to the government,
then it=s right to force you to ?ustify the cash in your pocket at the airport. If it=s right to take property from the rich and give
it to the poor, then it=s right to take your property for the salt marsh harvest mouse. $s each government program fails,
it becomes :necessary< to move another step closer to complete control over our lives. $s one thing leads to
another 9 as coercion leads to more coercion 9 what can we look forward toE 9 2ill it become necessary to force you
to ?ustify everything you do to any government agent who thinks you might be a threat to societyE 9 2ill it become necessary
to force your children to report your personal habits to their teachers or the policeE 9 2ill it become necessary to force your
neighbors to monitor your activitiesE 9 2ill it become necessary to force you to attend a reeducation program to learn how to
be more sensitive, or how not to discriminate, or how to avoid being lured into taking drugs, or how to recogni5e suspicious
behaviorE 9 2ill it become necessary to prohibit some of your favorite foods and ban other pleasures, so you don=t fall ill or
have an accident 9 putting a burden on $merica=s health-care systemE &ome of these things 9 such as getting children to
snitch on their parents or ordering people into reeducation programs 9 are already happening in $merica. The others have
been proposed and are being considered seriously. 'istory has shown that each was an important step in the evolution of the
world=s worst tyrannies. 2e move step by step further along the road to oppression because each step seems
like such a small one. $nd because we=re told that each step will give us something alluring in return 9
less crime, cheaper health care, safety from terrorists, an end to discrimination 9 even if none of the previous steps
delivered on its promise. $nd because the people who promote these steps are well-meaning reformers
who would use force only to build a better world.
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Coercion isn@t Eusti1ie6 to 5re;ent coercion J t0is
4in6set lea6s to war
>urray -ot0bar6, $cademic #ice !resident of the %udwig >ises Institute and the "enter for %ibertarian &tudies, T' T'I"& () %IBRT+, ,/G+, p.
http;NNwww.mises.orgNrothbardNethicsNfifteen.asp *($ -N34N4B.
$"' &T$T '$& $I assumed monopoly of force over a given territorial area, the areas varying in si5e in accordance with different historical conditions.
Foreign policy& or foreign relations, may be defined as the relationship between any particular &tate, $, and other &tates, B, ", *, and the inhabitants living under
those &tates. In the ideal moral world, no &tates would e1ist, and hence, of course, no foreign policy could e1ist. 6iven the e1istence of &tates, however, are
there, any moral principles that libertarianism can direct as criteria for foreign policyE The answer is broadly the same
as in the libertarian moral criteria directed toward the :domestic policy< of &tates, namely to reduce the degree of
coercion e1ercised by &tates over individual persons as much as possible. Before considering inter-&tate actions, let us return for a
moment to the pure libertarian stateless world where individuals and their hired private protection agencies strictly confine their use of violence to the defense of
person and property against violence. &uppose that, in this world, Fones finds that he or his property is being aggressed against
by &mith. It is legitimate, as we have seen, for Fones to repel this invasion by the use of defensive violence. But, now we must ask; is it within the right
of Fones to commit aggressive violence against innocent third parties in the course of his legitimate defense against
&mithE "learly the answer must be :Io.< )or the rule prohibiting violence against the persons or property of innocent
men is absoluteJ it holds regardless of the sub?ective motives for the aggression. It is wrong, and criminal, to violate
the property or person of another, even if one is a Robin 'ood, or is starving, or is defending oneself against a third
man=s attack. 2e may understand and sympathi5e with the motives in many of these cases and e1treme situations. 2e Aor, rather, the victim or his heirsC may
later mitigate the guilt if the criminal comes to trial for punishment, but we cannot evade the ?udgment that this aggression is still a
criminal act, and one which the victim has every right to repel, by violence if necessary. In short, $ aggresses against B because " is threatening, or aggressing
against, $. 2e may understand "=s :higher< culpability in this whole procedure, but we still label this aggression by $ as a criminal act which B has every right to
repel by violence. To be more concrete, if Fones finds that his property is being stolen by &mith, Fones has the right to repel him
and try to catch him, but Fones has no right to repel him by bombing a building and murdering innocent people or to
catch him by spraying machine gun fire into an innocent crowd. If he does this, he is as much Aor moreC a criminal
aggressor as &mith is. The same criteria hold if &mith and Fones each have men on his side, i.e., if :war< breaks out between &mith and his henchmen and
Fones and his bodyguards. If &mith and a group of henchmen aggress against Fones, and Fones and his bodyguards pursue the &mith gang to their lair, we may cheer
Fones on in his endeavorJ and we, and others in society interested in repelling aggression, may contribute financially or personally to Fones=s cause. But Fones and
his men have no right, any more than does &mith, to aggress against anyone else in the course of their :?ust war<; to steal others= property in order to finance their
pursuit, to conscript others into their posse by use of violence, or to kill others in the course of their struggle to capture the &mith forces. If Fones and his men
should do any of these things, they become criminals as fully as &mith, and they too become sub?ect to whatever sanctions are meted out against criminality. In fact
if &mith=s crime was theft, and Fones should use conscription to catch him, or should kill innocent people in the pursuit, then Fones becomes more of a criminal
than &mith, for such crimes against another person as enslavement and murder are surely far worse than theft. &uppose that Fones, in the course of his H?ust warH
against the ravages of &mith, should kill some innocent peopleJ and suppose that he should declaim, in defense of this murder, that he was simply acting on the
slogan, :give me liberty or give me death.< The absurdity of this :defense< should be evident at once, for the issue is not whether Fones was willing
to risk death personally in his defensive struggle against &mithJ the issue is whether he was willing to kill other
innocent people in pursuit of his legitimate end. )or Fones was in truth acting on the completely indefensible slogan;
:6ive me liberty or give them death<Gsurely a far less noble battle cry . 2ar, then, even a ?ust defensive war, is only
proper when the e1ercise of violence is rigorously limited to the individual criminals themselves. 2e may ?udge for
ourselves how many wars or conflicts in history have met this criterion. It has often been maintained, and especially by
conservatives, that the development of the horrendous modern weapons of mass murder Anuclear weapons, rockets,
germ warfare, etc.C is only a difference of degree rather than kind from the simpler weapons of an earlier era . (f
course, one answer to this is that when the degree is the number of human lives, the difference is a very big one. But a
particularly libertarian reply is that while the bow and arrow, and even the rifle, can be pinpointed, if the will be there, against actual criminals, modern nuclear
weapons cannot. 'ere is a crucial difference in kind. (f course, the bow and arrow could be used for aggressive purposes, but it could also be pinpointed to use
only against aggressors. Iuclear weapons, even :conventional< aerial bombs, cannot be. These weapons are ipso facto engines of indiscriminate mass destruction.
AThe only e1ception would be the e1tremely rare case where a mass of people who were all criminals inhabited a vast geographical area.C 2e must, therefore,
conclude that the use of nuclear or similar weapons, or the threat thereof, is a crime against humanity for which there can be no ?ustification. This is why the old
cliche no longer holds that it is not the arms but the will to use them that is significant in ?udging matters of war and peace. )or it is precisely the characteristic of
modern weapons that they cannot be used selectively, cannot be used in a libertarian manner. Therefore, their very e1istence must be condemned, and nuclear
disarmament becomes a good to be pursued for its own sake. Indeed, of all the aspects of liberty, such disarmament becomes the highest political good that can be
pursued in the modern world. )or ?ust as murder is a more heinous crime against another man than larceny so mass murderG
indeed murder so widespread as to threaten human civili5ation and human survival itselfGis the worst crime that any
man could possibly commit. $nd that crime is now all too possible.
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$u4an 6i8nity outwei80s J "tilitarianis4 1ails to
5rotect ri80ts
%oren Lo4as2y, philosophy professor, Mniversity of >innesota, !R&(I&, RI6'T&, $I* T' >(R$%
"(>>MIIT+, ,/GD, p. ,8.
It might prove to be the case that by violating the rights of one person, five equally grave rights violations
will be averted. If so, then a :utilitarianism of rights< will endorse the one rights-violation act while a side
constraint account will re?ect it. But how can this re?ection be presented as anything other than a single-
minded fanaticism that devours its indebted beneficiary in the case of preserving itE :+ou maintain that the
protection of rights is of great, even transcendent value. #ery well then more upholding of rights is better
then less. If one violation is necessary to prevent many others your own principles ought to lead you to prefer
the former. +et you obstinately resist.< 'ow is this criticism to be counteredE The problem that has been
identified is that rights may prove to be inconvient. They set up barriers which neither private individuals
nor governmental bodies may breach at their pleasure. To be sure, that may often be advantageous in a
morally unproblematic way. 'uman beings are notoriously susceptible to temptations to pursue their narrow
self-interest at the e1pense of the well-being others. 2ere sympathy and beneficences the strongest and most
universally shared emotions, it might be feasible to do without barriers of any kind 9moral rules, rights,
legally enforceable obligationsGand rely instead on the promptings of individuals= hearts to secure a
decently livable life for all. Mnfortunately, the animal we are is much more recogni5able in the 'obbesian
caricatures than in this idyllic alternative. &o incursions must be prevented if we are to attain a tolerably
decent measure of sociability. By recogni5ing each individual as a bearer of rights all are afforded some
protection against the predations that would otherwise ensue. ven when arguments for overriding rights are
couched in the most high-minded terms, faced with referenced to the general welfare or the need for mental
sacrifice in a ?ust cause one may suspect that the rhetoric is meant to yield the most for power or personal
attainment 'istory is a te1tbook for cynics. 'aving read from it, we may be prompted to insist on
undeviating respect for rights, no matter how beckoning are inducements to the contrary, because we have no
confidence in people=s ability to discriminate accurately and dispassionately between incursions that will
ma1imi5e public good and those that will debase it. If we are to err either on the side of too much fle1ibility
or e1cess dignity, betterGfar better the later.
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'onBabsolute ri80ts 1ails to 5rotect 1ree6o4
Tibor Mac0an, !hilosophy !rofessor, $uburn,II*I#I*M$%& $I* T'IR RI6'T&, ,/GI, pp. ,,/-3,.
By not treating basic human rights as basic, all 6ewirth and others do is invite some other set of principles we
will have to turn to when we need to make principled decisions about what people are free or not free to do.
(r, more likely, they leave the matter to the discretion of those who sit as ?udges in the courts. Indeed, the current
legal climate, in which any strong political interest group can secure the protection of some alleged right to well-
being G to be provided with medical care, child-care facilities, a museum, the preservation of an historical
building, a subsidy, or the imposition of a tariff upon a foreign import business G suggests what can be e1pected of
a welfare state, a system that embraces both the limited right to liberty and the limited right to welfare. The
resulting situation is a kind of 'obbesian war of special interests against all other special interests, each demanding
the protection of its alleged liberty or welfare rights. 6ewirth, like 6regory #iastos before him, seems to forget
that rights are basic principles of political life and that making them inherently unstable deprives them of their
essential character. To make rights nonabsolute within the legal conte1t is to open a !andora=s bo1 of bureaucratic
arbitrariness producing the very situation that the moral-political principles we know as human rights were
e1plicitly designed to render impermissible. Instead of treating human rights as conte1tually deontological, as
principles rather than piecemeal rules of thumb, 6ewirth and *workin are inviting the elitism that utilitarianism
requires G that is, certain leaders whose value-?udgments must be imposed on the rest whenever they find it
intuitively certain or in some other fashion warranted to override basic human, individual rights. There is a
snowballing effect arising from this kind of utilitarian thinking. &uch thinking ought to be avoided and alternatives
to solving the problems for which the violations of rights seemed to be ?ustified should be sought.
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** A#L I@4 not eCcessi;ely coerci;e**
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E;ery Eusti1ication 1or coercion3 no 4atter 0ow le8iti4ate3 con6itions us to acce5t 1urt0er li4itations
on our liberty
Mac0an RK+3 -esearc0 Fellow S $oo;er Institution3 (ro1 E4eritus De5 (0iloso50y at Auburn "3
<#Ibor - Mac0an3 -esearc0 Fellow S $oo;er Institution3 (ro1 E4eritus De5 (0iloso50y at Auburn "3
+KK+3 !i)erty an& ar& Cases, 55 C;iiBCiC=
2e are not unfamiliar with the ha5ards of the slippery slope in our own personal lives. If a man hits his child in some
alleged emergency, the very act of doing so may render him more amenable to smacking the kid under more
typical circumstances. &lapping someone who is hysterical may make it easier to slap someone who is only very upset or
recalcitrant or annoying or ?ust too slow fetching the beer from the refrigerator. &imilarly, a :minor< breach of trust can beget
more of the same, a little white lie here and there can beget lying as a routine, and so forth. >oral habits promote a
principled course of action even in cases where bending or breaking the principle might not seem too
harmful to other parties or to our own integrity. (n the other hand, granting ourselves :reasonable< e1ceptions tends
to weaken our moral habitsJ as we seek to rationali5e past action, differences of kind tend to devolve into differences
of degree. ach new e1ception provides the precedent for the ne1t, until we lose our principles altogether and doing
what is right becomes a matter of happenstance and mood rather than of loyalty to enduring values. The
same is true of public action . 2hen citi5ens of a country delegate to government , by means of democratic and
?udicial processes, the power to forge paternalistic public policies such as banning drug abuse, imposing censorship,
restraining undesirable trade, and supporting desirable trade, the bureaucratic and police actions increasingly rely on the kind
of violence and intrusiveness that no free citi5enry ought to e1perience or foster . $nd the bureaucrats and the police tell
themselves, no doubt, that what they=re doing is perfectly ?ust and right . "onsider, for starters, that when no one complains
about a crimeGbecause it is not perpetrated against someone but rather involves breaking a paternalistic lawGto even detect
the :crime< requires methods that are usually invasive. Instead of charges being brought by wronged parties, phone tapping,
snooping, anonymous reporting, and undercover work are among the dubious means that lead to prosecution. Thus the role
of the police shifts from protection and peacekeeping to supervision, regimentation, and reprimand. Io wonder, then, that
officers of the law are often caught brutali5ing suspects instead of merely apprehending them. Mnder a paternalistic regime,
their goals have multiplied, and thus the means they see as necessary to achieving those goals multiply too. The same
general danger of corrupting a free society=s system of laws may arise when government is called on to
deal with calamities. There is the perception, of course, that in such circumstances the superior powers of
government are indispensable, given the immediateness of the danger.
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Coerci;e e11orts 1ail an6 snowball into 4assi;e atrocities J e;ery in;asion o1 liberty 4ust be 1orce1ully
reEecte6
)oundation, editor of %iberty >aga5ine, financial advisor and economist, ,/I:, 2hy 6overnment *oesn=t 2ork, p.
BB-.
#0eir better worl6 ne;er 4ateriali?es because it 6e5en6s u5on coercion to succee6. $nd coercion
ne;er i45ro;es society. &o government is always promising to do something that=s impossible G such as
coercing people to stop taking drugs or abandon their pre?udices. 2hen the coercion doesn=t work, the politicians
must impose harsher and harsher measures in order to show they=re :serious< about the problem and,
inevitably, we come to the abuses we saw in the preceding chapter G such as property sei5ures and :no-
knock< invasions of your home. These arent legal mistakes in need of reform. "hey are the inevitable result of
asking government to use coercion to create a better world. ach increase in coercion is easier to ?ustify.
If it=s right to force banks to report your finances to the government, then it=s right to force you to ?ustify the cash in your
pocket at the airport. If it=s right to take property from the rich to give to the poor, then it=s right to take your property for the
salt marsh harvest mouse. $s each government program fails, it becomes :necessary< to move another step
closer to complete control over our lives. $s one thing leads to another G as coercion leads to more coercion G what
can 2ill it become necessary to force you to ?ustify`àwe look forward toE everything you do to any government agent who
thinks you might be a threat to 2ill it become necessary to force your children to report your`àsocietyE 2ill it become
necessary to`àpersonal habits to their teachers or the policeE 2ill it become necessary to`àforce your neighbors to monitor
your activitiesE force you to attend a reeducation program to learn how to be more sensitive, or how not to discriminate, or
how to avoid being lured into taking drugs, or how 2ill it become necessary to prohibit some`àto recogni5e suspicious
behaviorE of your favorite foods and ban other pleasures, so you don=t fall ill or have an accident putting a burden on
$merica=s health-care systemE &ome of these things G such as getting children to snitch on their parents or ordering people
into reeducation programs G already are happening in $merica. The others have been proposed and are being considered
seriously. 'istory has shown that each was an important step in the evolution of the world=s worst
tyrannies.
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"nco45ro4isin8 stance on libertarian 5rinci5les is 2ey
dward -o4ar, %ecturer in >anagement 9 M. >ass. Boston "ollege of >anagement, Fournal of Business thics,
:Ioble >arkets; The IobleN&lave thic in 'ayek=s )ree >arket "apitalism<, 8-;-.-BB, 34KI, &pringer
%ike Iiet5sche, 'ayek, though acutely aware of the importance of ethics in a world based upon ma1imum freedom,
did not develop a complete ethical theory to support the functioning of free market capitalism. %ike Iiet5sche,
'ayek does not claim to know the meaning of morality or, in Iiet5sche=s case, good and evil.L
Beyond support for the principles needed to anchor the functioning of free markets and the
institutions needed to support them, 'ayek left it to individual actors to develop their own
moral principles, so long as these did not contradict those needed to support free markets. It was not his
intention to prescribe a detailed ethical system to support free market capitalism because to
do so would violate his principle of freedom and curtail the creativity of markets. +et, the
world described by 'ayek is one where individuals have substantial power to control their
destiny and seek their own level, a world where talent and risk dominate, a world governed by
self interest, a world where individuals have few responsibilities to others, and a world driven by competition where
reward goes to the successful. 'e described a world open to Iiet5schean ethics. In The Road to &erfdom A,//7C and
The )atal "onceit A,/88C 'ayek presents a powerful and eloquent attack on twentieth century
totalitarianism In The Road to &erfdom he argues that the socialist e1periment must inevitably
lead to totalitarianism and the complete elimination of individual liberty and freedom. In the
name of principles of social ?ustice, society installs a system of centrali5ed social and
economic planning, substitutes collective decisions for individual ones, and requires each
person to adopt an identical and complete set of social values )urthermore3 to achieve its
ob?ectives, the socialist state must determine in great detail the allocation of resources and
insure that each individual performs precisely hisNher assigned role. !lanned economies
must substitute collectivist thought, values and behavior and eliminate any room for
individualism. 'ayek labels this weltanschauung the RRfatal conceit.== It is fatal because it
cannot achieve its ob?ectives and it is conceit because it overestimates the role of human
rationality and man=s ability to control social and economic processes. 'e sees constructivist continental
uropean philosophic thought, primarily "artesian rationalism, as the source of this error A'ayek, ,/78, pp. /9,4J ,/.L, pp. /9,3C. This
philosophic tradition argues that man can understand the world completely and , therefore, social and
economic processes can be understood completely and molded to fit human will. 'ayek
considers this a foolish, self-serving and arrogant position 7 "ertainly, humans have a powerful intellect and
reasoning skills. 'uman reason, though powerful, has its limitations and cannot completely understand with any certainty how human institutions and social
processes evolved and how they operate. 'e views the evolution and development of human institutions, be they money, markets, or ethics as spontaneous, self-
generating orders. &ystems, if you will, evolving gradually, accidentally, on the basis of incremental changeJ not as a result of human design. 'e labels this
RRbetween instinct and reason.== 'umans can understand to some e1tent how human society evolved from clan based societies into modern, comple1 ones based
upon individualism and abstract rules, but we cannot know the processes or mechanisms of this evolution in sufficient detail to bend them to our will. 2e
can tweak the social and moral systems but cannot engineer them. >an can modify social
processes and their underlying ethical foundationsJ but, in the final analysis, we must accept
them as is.- &ince social process and institutions obey their own set of evolutionary
principles which man cannot know completely, it is best for these to evolve on their own,
without much human interference. In The "onstitution of %iberty A,/B4C and %aw, %egislation and %iberty
AL vols., ,/.L, ,/.B, ,/./C 'ayek develops his ideas about the proper principles of economic and political
organi5ations and their underlying ethical foundations. The fundamental principle of social organi5ation
must be based upon the principle of liberty, which may be defined as RRthat condition of
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men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society==B A'ayek,
,/B4, p. ,,C. 'ayek=s conception of the free, ?ust and moral society is not one where there is a complete absence of coercion but where coercion is limited to
those situations where it is required to prevent a reduction in the liberty of others. &ociety may use coercion to protect private property and to secure individual
rights and conditions which allow each person the ma1imum amount of personal freedom to make choices of their own. This is accomplished through a limited
set of abstract rules RRthat apply equally to all== which protect private or several property, enforce contracts, and prevent fraud and deception== A'ayek, ,/B4, pp.
,74, ,7,, ,7L, ,--C. 2hile 'ayek is concerned with ?ust and moral principles of economic, political and social organi5ation, he views attempts to
achieve RRdistributive ?ustice== as the root cause of the immorality brought about by planned
economies. In order to achieve the desired goals, human behavior must be planned in
minute detail, thereby eliminating freedom of choice. $chieving collectivist goals mean that
there can be no individual ones. (rgani5ing to control every outcome means there cannot be
individual choice. &ocial control means there will be little individual control and it is all doomed because humans cannot understand completely the
mechanisms needed to reach their ob?ectives. The only solution must be the free market and the minimal
organi5ational principles required for it to operate efficiently. &ince these are few and well
known, it will be easier to succeed and create a ?ust and moral society. $llow the market
free reign and the ?ust and moral society will follow according to its own principles
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Allowin8 any real4 o1 8o;ern4ent control 9uic2ly
snowballs to totalitarian collecti;is4
Fack Dou8las, !rof. meritus &oc. 9 M" &an *iego, :The >yth of the 2elfare &tate<, ,/I1, p. 74, 6oogle !rint
The logic of totalitarian collectivism is simple3 brutal, and entirely consistent. (nce a people has
decided--whether actively or, more commonly, by default, by not actively stopping them--to allow politicians
to decide by legislation, and without severe constraints of custom, moral principle and constitutional law, what is
right and wrong in such basic realms of life as economic property rights, then there is no
longer any logical constraint upon their e1ercise of power in all other realms of life. $s classical
liberals saw, even in the vastly more simple and self-contained society of the eighteenth century, without inviolate
property rights no other rights can long be sustained. The government that controls our
property rights must ultimately control our right to the pursuit of happiness3 our right to free
speech and to the publication of that speech, our right to take a spouse or have children, our right to work and choose
an occupation, our right to life itself--for all things of life are ultimately dependent upon material
goods and, thus, upon the controls of those goods we call property rights. The government that has the right
to legislate gas prices in Te1as, or income redistribution nationwide, has every logical right
to dictate research standards in physics, hiring standards in sociology, wage rates for black teenagers in Iew
+ork, parental care standards for all parents, the right to bear children, the right to redefine life, and--
the right to everything 2hen the $merican people, tempted by the ancient enabling myth of the welfare state,
used the power of their votes to give the politicians and, by inaction, the courts the power to legislate away and rule
away our ancient economic rights--our freedoms from unconstrained government control of our property for the
common welfare--they unknowingly gave them power to legislate away and rule away all our ancient rights. $lmost a
hundred years ago, Theodore Roosevelt, one of the first heroes of the rationalistic state planning of $merican
progressivism proclaimed, Hvery man holds his property sub?ect to the general right of the community to regulate its
use to whatever degree the public welfare may require it.H The insidious implications of that Hto whatever degreeH for
the counterrevolution against the &ystem of Iatural %iberty became clear only slowly, but for almost a century
now the $merican state has been pursuing that relentless logic of totalitarian collectivism at
an accelerating rate .
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**A#L -awls**
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-awls@ conce5tion o1 ri80ts 1lawe6 J 1ails to eC5lain w0y s4all incursions on liberty woul6 t0reaten
citi?ens0i5
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 : (roEect M"SE
Mp to this point, Rawls has said nothing about the priority of the basic libertiesJ rather, he has focused e1clusively on
their equal provision. (nly at the end of his main presentation of the &elf-Respect $rgument does he briefly discuss the
!riority of %iberty; 2hen it is the position of equal citi5enship that answers to the need for status, the precedence of the
equal liberties becomes all the more necessary. 'aving chosen a conception of ?ustice that seeks to eliminate the
significance of relative economic and social advantages as supports for men=s self-confidence, it is essential that the
priority of liberty be firmly maintained Ap. 7.8C.These two sentences provide a good illustration of what I earlier called
the Inference )allacy; Rawls tries to derive the le1ical priority of the basic liberties from the central importance of an
interest they supportGin this case, an interest in securing self-respect for all citi5ens. 2ithout question, the &elf-
Respect $rgument makes a strong case for assigning the basic liberties a high priority; otherwise, economic and social
inequalities might reemerge as the primary determinants of status and therefore of self-respect. It does not e1plain,
however, why le*ical priority is needed. 2hy, for e1ample, would very small restrictions on the basic liberties threaten
the social basis of self-respect, so long as they were equally applied to all citi5ensE &uch restrictions would involve no
subordination and, being very small, would be unlikely to ?eopardi5e the central importance of equal citi5enship as a
determinant of status.
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-awls 1ails to 5ro;i6e warrants 1or t0e absolute 5reser;ation o1 basic liberties o;er ot0er en6s
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8s +KB+1 (roEect M"SE
$lthough Rawls briefly discusses and defends the !riority of %iberty early in )olitical (iberalism A!%, pp. 7,, .7, .BC,
his most sustained arguments for it are to be found late in the book, in the lecture entitled :The Basic %iberties and
Their !riority.< $ll of these arguments are framed in terms of Fustice as )airness rather than liberal political conceptions
of ?ustice more generally, a point to which we will return below. The three arguments for the !riority of %iberty that we
identified in "heory can also be found in )olitical (iberalism, and both their strengths and weaknesses carry over into
the new conte1t.,8 $t least two new arguments can be found, however, arguments that I will refer to as the &tability
$rgument and the 2ell-(rdered &ociety $rgument, respectively. $s I will now show, both of these arguments are
further illustrations of the Inference )allacy. The &tability $rgument has a structure similar to that of the &elf- Respect
$rgument. In it, Rawls notes the :great advantage to everyone=s conception of the good of a . . . stable scheme of
cooperation,< and he goes on to assert that Fustice as )airness is :the most stable conception of ?ustice . . . and this is the
case importantly because of the basic liberties and the priority assigned to them.<Taking the second point first, Rawls
never makes clear why the !riority of %iberty is necessary for stability, as opposed to strongly contributory to it. *ery
s4all restrictions on t0e basic liberties woul6 see4 unli2ely to t0reaten it3 and some types of restrictions Ae.g.,
imposing fines for the advocacy of violent revolution or race hatredC might actually enhance it. ven if we assume,
however, that the !riority of %iberty is necessary for stability, this fact is not enough to ?ustify it; as highly valued as
stability is, sacrificing the basic liberties that make it possible may be worthwhile if such a sacrifice is necessary to
advance other highly valued ends. !ointing out the high priority of stability, in other words, is insufficient to ?ustify the
le1ical priority of the basic liberties that support itGonly the le*ical priority of stability would do so, yet Rawls
provides no argument for why stability should be so highly valued.
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-awls@ conce5tion o1 5ersonal 1ree6o4 cannot resol;e utilitarian 6e4ocratic i6eals
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8s ++B+/ (roEect M"SE
Rawls speculates that :the narrower the differences between the liberal conceptions when correctly based on
fundamental ideas in a democratic public culture . . . the narrower the range of liberal conceptions defining the focus of
the consensus.<3- By :correctly based,< Rawls appears to mean at least two things; first, that the conceptions should be
built on the :more central< of these fundamental ideasJ second, that these ideas should be interpreted in the right way
A!%, pp. ,B.9B8C. )or e1ample, Rawls asserts that his :conception of the person as free and equal< is :central to the
democratic ideal< A!%, p. ,B.C. This idea is in competition with other democratic ideas, however Ae.g., the idea of the
:common good< as it is understood by classical republicansC, as well as with other interpretations of the same idea Ae.g.,
the utilitarian understanding of :equality< as the equal consideration of each person=s welfareC. $ necessary condition,
then, for Fustice as )airness to be the focus of an overlapping consensus would be for adherents of all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines to endorse this idea, along with the interpretation Rawls gives it, as more :central to the
democratic ideal< than other fundamental ideas. If they were to accept not only this idea but also its companion idea of
society as :a fair system of cooperation,< then the procedures of political constructivism Aincluding the (riginal
!ositionC would presumably lead them to select Fustice as )airness as their political conception of ?ustice.
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**A#L E8alitarianis4 H E9uality H Distribution Goo6**
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1 Distributi;e Eustice lea6s to 8lobal 5o;erty
"arl Kni80t 9 !.h.d International &tudies 34KG, L7, .,L9.LL, British International &tudies $ssociation :$ pluralistic
approach to global poverty<
But Rawls= masterpiece also presents some obvious obstacles to global poverty alleviation. $ Theory of Fustice
e1plicitly states that the theory is only to be applied within a society. )urthermore, in those few places where the book oers
some tangential discussion of transdomestic ?ustice, it is characterised as a question of Rthe ?ustice of the law of nations and of relations between
states=.,B 'ence, in a discussion occasioned by his analysis of conscription and conscientious refusal, Rawls suggests that Rone may e1tend the
interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of dierent nations who must choose together the fundamental
principles to ad?udicate conbicting claims among states=.,. 'e com- ments that this procedure is Rfair among nations=, and that there would be Rno
surprises= in the outcome, Rsince the principles chosen would . . . be familiar ones= ensuring treaty compliance, describing the conditions for ?ust wars,
and granting rights of self-defence and self-determination 9 the latter being Ra right of a people to settle its own a airs without
the intervention of foreign powers=.,8 This is, then, a thoroughly nationalist conception of ?ustice; social ?ustice
applies only within a state or nation . Rawls=s radical principles of distributive ?ustice, such as the dierence principle, would only hold
transdomestically where, improbably, states had signed treaties to this eect. 6iven that such wide ranging internationally
redistributive treaties have never been signed, $ Theory of Fustice provided a rationale for the 2estern
general public=s impression that their duties to the global poor are, at most, those of charity . Rawls= full e1pression of
his views in this area came nearly three decades later in The %aw of !eoples.,/ 'ere Rawls again uses the notion of a transdomestic original
position, arguing that it is an appropriate instrument for selecting laws to govern relations between both liberal societies
and Rdecent non-liberal societies=, especially those which are Rdecent hierarchical societies=, being non-aggressive, recognising their citi5ens= human
rights, assigning widely acknowledged additional rights and duties, and being backed by genuine and not unreasonable beliefs among ?udges and other
ocials that the law embodies a Rcommon good idea of ?ustice=.34 This &ociety of !eoples would agree to be guided by eight principles constituting Rthe
basic charter of the %aw of !eoples=.3,
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+ Focusin8 eCclusi;ely on t0e 5oor sti84ati?es t0e issueMno sol;ency
!atrick Boleyn-Fit?8eral6 9 $ssistant !rofessor of !hilosophy O %ouisiana &tate, Fanuary ,/II :>isfortune,
welfare reform, and right-wing egalitarianism<
+et nobody in the welfare debate, as far as I know, invoked the "harles >urray of "he Bell Curve rather than the >urray of (osing +round. >oreover,
while many right-wing arguments are neutral about questions of class distinctions, others actually seem to be grounded in a kind of relational
egalitarianism. )or e1ample, conservatives sometimes argue that welfare stigmati5es recipients. $s we have already heard 6ingrich A,//-, .,C say, HThe
welfare state reduces the poor from citi5ens to clients.H This argument raises a serious issue for relational
egalitarians ; $ow can t0e 5oor be 8i;en 4aterial ai6 wit0B out ot0ers t0in2in8 less o1 t0e4O The stigma of being on the receiving
end of welfare may create the very divisions in society that the relational egalitarian seeks to avoid. If
government programs designed to help the poor stand in the way of citi5ens relating to each other non-
hierarchically, maybe we should abolish such programs in the interest of a society in which citi5ens stand as
equals.
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/ E8alitarianis4 6oes not e9uate society
Jan 'ar;eson J (0D S $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity 1IID %E8alitarianis4L (artial3 Counter5ro6ucti;e an6
Baseless) Blac2well
galitarianism forces persons who e1ceed the average, in the respect deemed by the theorist to be relevant, to
surrender, insofar as possible, the amount by which they e1ceed that average to persons below it. (n the face of
it, therefore, egalitarianism is incompatible with common good, in empowering some people over others;
roughly, the unproductive over the productive. The former=s interests are held to merit the imposition of force
over others, whereas the interests of the productive do not. +et producers, as such, merely produceJ they don=t
use force against others. Thus egalitarianism denies the central rule of rational human association. 2hat could
be thought to ?ustify this apparent bias in favour of the unproductive, the needy, the sick, against the productive
9 the healthy, the ingenious, the energeticE 2hat are the latter supposed to have done to the former to have
merited the egalitarian=s impositionsE The answer can=t be, R(h, nothing 9 they=re ?ust unluckyT= or R2e don=t
like people like thatT= $ rational social theory must appeal to commonvalues. By definition, those have not been
respected when a measure is forced upon certain people against their own values.
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7 %(rinci5les o1 Eustice) ce4ent t0e 5olitical s50ereMero6e t0e 5ossibility 1or real c0an8e
Willia4 W So2olo11 BB (0D Can6i6ate S A40erst +KK: %Between Justice an6 Le8alityL Derri6a on
Decision)3 #olitical %esearch *uarterly3 0tt5LHH5r9sa8e5ubco4Hc8iHcontentHabstractH:GH+H/71
In Rawls=s A,//L; ,-.C universe, consensus is cemented into the political founding and overrides all other
issues. 3B $nything that triggers political conflict is e1cluded from the public sphere; :$ liberal view removes
from the political agenda the most divisive issues, serious contention about which must undermine the bases of
social cooperation.< *ifficult issues may be interesting but, for Rawls, they are not the stuff of politics. They
threaten consensus and must be e1cluded or contained in the private sphere. !olitics is about tinkering, not
controversy. The only truly political moment in Rawls=s work, then, is laying the ground for ?ustice as fairness
in the original position. (nce the principles of ?ustice as fairness are established, however, the political sphere
is essentially closed. fforts to re-open the foundation are a threat to political stability. The range of acceptable
political issues is framed by principles that are not up for debate. 'ence, citi5ens are prevented from pursuing
those modes of civic involvement that would open the political sphere to real contestation. 6iven the imperative
of consensus, the regime must protect its political founding from interrogation. Iarrowing the range of
acceptable political issues e1acts a high cost from citi5ens. &pace for dissent is eliminated. The range of political
possibilities is restricted to one Aand only oneC that will be fi1ed :once and for all< ARawls ,//L; ,B,C. (nce the
principles of ?ustice are instituted, only the support of the status quo is possible A$le?andro ,//8; ,77C. )or
Rawls, all citi5ens affirm the same public conception of ?ustice A,//L; L/C. !ublic discussion about alternative
political possibilities is not necessary.L, &ince a critical disposition toward the founding moment of ?ustice as
fairness would risk destroying consensus, it is better to treat it as a monument before which one genuflects.
Rawls, however, does not purge all conflict from his model of politics in the name of consensus. &ome level of
reasonable disagreement is permitted in his liberal utopia. It arises from the :burdens of ?udgment.< The causes
of these burdens are formidable;
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: Ine9uality ine;itableMca5italis4
Stuart W0ite +23 %-e;iewArticleL Social -i80ts an6 t0e Social Contract J (olitical #0eory an6 t0e 'ew
Wel1are (olitics) Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress3 BJ(olS /K3 :KDJ:/
,ow -uch !.uality of /pportunity Does Fair #eciprocity #e.uire0 I have presented only a very intuitive
account of the conditions of fair reciprocityJ I have not formally presented a full conception of distributive
?ustice and demonstrated how each condition follows from this conception, something one might attempt in a
lengthier analysis. 'owever, I do wish to e1amine one general philosophical issue that arises when we come to
think about the conditions of fair reciprocity. $ssume that distributive ?ustice is centrally about some form of
equal opportunity. The notion of equality of opportunity can, of course, be understood in a number of different
ways. But assume, for the moment, that we understand it in the radical form defended in contemporary
egalitarian theories of distributive ?ustice.74 qual opportunity in this sense requires, inter alia, that we seek to
prevent or correct for inequalities in income attributable to differences in natural ability and for inequalities in
capability due to handicaps that people suffer through no fault of their own. The question I wish to consider can
then be put like this; 'ow far must society satisfy the demands of equal opportunity before we can plausibly say
that all of its members have obligations under the reciprocity principleE (ne view, which I shall call the full
compliance view, is that the demands of equal opportunity must be satisced in full for it to be true that all
citi5ens have obligations to make productive contributions to the community under the reciprocity principle.
The intuition is that people can have no obligation to contribute in a signiccant way to a community that is not
Ain all other relevant respectsC fully ?ust 9 at least if they are amongst those who are disadvantaged by their
society=s residual in?ustices. Reciprocity kicks in, as it were, only when the terms of social co-operation are fair,
where Rfairness= requires Ainter aliaC full satisfaction of the demands of equal opportunity. If equal opportunity
is understood in our assumed sense, however, then this full compliance view effectively removes the ideal of
fair reciprocity from the domain of real-world politics. )or there is no chance that any advanced capitalist Aor,
for that matter, post-capitalistC society will in the near future satisfy equal opportunity, in our assumed sense, in
full. $nd so, following the full compliance view, we should, if we are egalitarians in the assumed sense, simply
abandon the idea that there can be anything like a universal civic obligation to make a productive contribution to
the community.
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$ierarc0ies@ are ine;itable e;en a1ter t0e re6istribution o1 wealt0
Baseless) Blac2well
galitarians can only defend their view by reference to values that many or most people do not have. !eople
below the mid-point of the proposed redistributional scale will, of course, have some reason to re?oice at their
unearned egalitarian windfalls 9 temporarily. >eanwhile, people from whom they are wrested have the opposite
motivation, so common good is out the window from the start. Ior can equality relevantly be held to be an
Rob?ective= or an Rabsolute= value 9 a value in itself, that doesn=t need to be held byanybody Ae1cept the theorist
himself, of courseC. That is intuitional talk, which has already been dismissed. *o real people Aas opposed to
theoristsC care about equality as suchE Io. They want better and more reliable food on the table, nicer tables to
put it on, T#=s, theatres, motorcars, books, medical services, churches, courses in "hinese history, and so on,
indefinitely. quality is irrelevant to these values; how much of any or all of them anyone has is logically
independent of how much anyone else has. !eople are rarely free of envy, to be sure. >ost people would like to
be better than others in some way 9 and some will pay others to let them look down on them. But few will make
themselves worse off in order to make some other people equally badly off. #alues that can be improved by
human activity are not independent in any other way, though, for production is cooperative, requiring
arrangements agreed to by a great many people 9 workers, financiers, engineers, customers. Iobody can attain
to wealth, insofar as the free market obtains, without others likewise benefiting. These are truisms, though I am
aware that they will be seen by many readers as Rideological= 9 even at the present time, when the absurdities of
alternative views of economics have been so completely e1posed.,L
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E9uality is i45ossibleMen;y
Jon Man6le +2 %-e;iwe6L Liberalis43 Justice3 an6 Mar2etsL A Criti9ue o1 Liberal E9uality by Colin M
Macleo6) #0e (0iloso50ical -e;iew3 *ol 1KI3 'o 7 <&ct3 +KKK=3 55 AK1BAK7 Du2e "ni;ersity (ress
Jstor
'ere, I can only illustrate one of >acleod0s many distinct criticisms of *workin0s use of ideali5ed markets.
*workin argues that the initial division of resources Aprior to ad?ustments made in light of differences in
individual ambitionC should satisfy an Henvy testH; HIo division of resources is an equal division if, once the
division is complete, any PpersonQ would prefer someone else0s bundle of resources to his own bundleH
A*workin ,/8,b, 38-C. $nd the mechanism he proposes to satisfy this test is a hypothetical auction in which
individuals bid on resources using some counter Aitself without value and equally distributedC. This market-
based solution values resources entirely in terms of the preferences that individuals e1press in the auction.
>acleod recogni5es that a great strength of *workin0s auction is that it is sensitive to the opportunity costs to
others of giving some resource to a particular individual. $s >acleod helpfully points out, HThe resources a
person can acquire are a function not only of the importance she attaches to them but also of the importance
attached by others to them .... !hrased in the language of opportunity costs, the auction ensures that aggregate
opportunity costs are equalH A3BC.
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Distribution o1 bene1its to e9uali?e t0e i45o;eris0e6 is in6e1ensible J encoura8es en;y an6 4oral
6isorientation
(a8e +KKD
E6war6 %Justice Between GenerationsL In;esti8atin8 a Su11icientarian A55roac0) Journal o1
Global Et0ics *ol /3 'o 13 A5ril +KKD3 58s /B+K
&uppose, again, that the sufficiency level for all was -4. 2hereas intrinsic egalitarianism seems, other things
being equal, to favour outcome ALC and prioritarianism would favour allocation A,C, sufficientarianism would
favour outcome A3C since this would be the only outcome in which at least some people had enough. )or the
sufficientarian, the distribution of benefits and burdens to achieve equality or priority in such circumstances is
indefensible. It would be analogous to the tragedy involved in a famine situation of giving food to those who
cannot possibly survive at the cost of those that could survive if they received e1tra rations. In this sense, the
ideal of sufficiency is related to the medical concept of Rtriage= according to which, when faced with more
people requiring care than can be treated, resources are rationed so that the most needy receive attention first.
'owever, because the category of Rmost needy= is defined in terms of the overarching aim that as many people
as possible should survive a given emergency, triage protocols often lead to the very worst off being denied
treatment for the sake of benefitting those who can be helped to survive. )rankfurt=s view is that all distributive
claims arise in some way from an analysis of where people stand relative to the threshold of sufficiency, or as he
puts it the Rthreshold that separates lives that are good from lives that are not good= A)rankfurt ,//., p. BC.
galitarianism, by contrast, posits a relationship between the urgency of a person=s claims and their comparative
well-being without reference to the level at which they would have enough. &ince allocating people enough to
lead decent lives e1hausts our duties of distribution, sufficientarians argue that egalitarianism recogni5es duties
that do not e1ist. In fact, in linking ethical duties to the comparative fortunes of people, egalitarianism
encourages envy and thereby contributes Rto the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time= A)rankfurt
,/8., pp. 3393LJ $nderson ,///, pp. 38.ff.C.
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E8alitarian an6 (rioritarian t0in2in8 1lawe6 J no stan6ar6 baseline 1or e9uality 8uarantees ne;erB
en6in8 re6istribution
(a8e +KKD
$lthough )rankfurt focuses his critique of rival distributive views on intrinsic egalitarianism, it can be readily e1tended
to cover prioritarianism. 2hile the priority view is grounded in the badness of absolute rather than comparative
disadvantage, it is also inclined to divert resources to the worst off even if this would mean sacrificing substantial
benefits to other, slightly better off, persons who could be helped to lead a decent life. )rankfurt argues that ; It is true
that people in the lowest strata of society generally live in horrible conditions, but this association of low social position and
dreadful quality of life is entirely contingent. There is no necessary connection between being at the bottom of society and
being poor in the sense in which poverty is a serious and morally ob?ectionable barrier to life. A)rankfurt ,//., p. 3C The
problem with prioritarianism, then, is not that it fetishi5es comparative wellbeing but rather that it fetishi5es absolute
well-being with the result that it mandates constant interference in people=s lives to benefit the worst off. By doing so,
prioritarianism is inclined to generate ?ust as much envy and pity as its egalitarian rival and to mandate a range of
redistributions that do not help their recipients to lead decent lives. "onsider the following e1ample. There are two
groups in society, where one en?oys a considerably lower level of well-being than the other, where both groups en?oy a
far better than decent life, and where the inequalities are undeserved. 2e can call these groups the Rvery happy= and the
Re1tremely happy=. galitarians claim that, if we could do something about it, the very happy group should be
compensated for their relative well-being deficit. This is because this theory regards undeserved inequality as bad even
if everyone is at least very happyJ that is, it makes no ethical difference that the inequality is between groups, or
persons, who are very well off. !rioritarians, by contrast, regard the very happy in isolation of their relative happiness as
they are only interested in absolute levels of well-being. Ionetheless, the very happy, as the worst off, deserve our
attention even if their lives are so good they want for nothing. Accor6in8 to su11icientarians3 0owe;er3 t0e e8alitarian
an6 5rioritarian clai4s are absur6 $ow can t0ere be a 6uty to 0el5 t0e worst o113 t0ey as23 w0en t0ey alrea6y
lea6 li;es o1 suc0 a 0i80 stan6ar6O
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Acce5tance o1 e8alitarianis4 6o4inates t0e 5olitical s50ere an6 4a2es us 5owerless to t0e abuses o1
elites
Willia4 W So2olo11 BB (0D Can6i6ate S A40erst +KK: %Between Justice an6 Le8alityL Derri6a on
Decision)3 #olitical %esearch *uarterly3 0tt5LHH5r9sa8e5ubco4Hc8iHcontentHabstractH:GH+H/71
If Rawls=s appeal to the burdens of ?udgment seems disingenuous insofar as the founding moment of ?ustice as
fairness is somehow protected from them, his underlying notion of citi5enship also leaves much to be desired.
ven though he claims :citi5ens learn and profit from conflict and argument< ARawls ,//L; lviiC, he
methodically closes spaces for the types of dissent, conflict and argument that nurture democratic citi5enship. If
citi5ens with competing comprehensive doctrines happen to meet on the street in Rawls=s liberal utopia, they
nervously grimace at each other and then retreat to the private sphere, simply shrugging shoulders in silence
during encounters. Both the immediate impact and the intergenerational effect of Rawls=s neutrali5ation of
public dialogue will produce a society of inarticulate shoppers on !ro5ac; :By taking !ro5ac, they may be able
to alleviate their angst, which might be a disruptive force to the liberal order< A$le?andro ,//8; ,LC. "iti5ens
will not only be unable to contest abuses of power but they will be incapable of negotiating encounters with
others in substantive ways. Rawls=s allergy to even mild modes of political conflict results in a de-politici5ation
of politics under the banner of neutrality.L- 'e evacuates all political content from public discussion; :2e try to
bypass religion and philosophy=s pro- foundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncover- ing a basis of
a stable overlapping consensus< ARawls ,//L; ,-3C.LB>uch to his credit, Rawls acknowledges the great deal of
indeterminacy of decision in the burdens of ?udgment but this indeterminacy is somehow absent from his image
of political society. The indeterminacy of decision in Rawls is mitigated by his de-politici5ation of political
foundations. The indeterminacy of politics is precisely what Rawls seeks to e1pel from the political hori5on.
!olitical liberalism purges politics from politics and encloses the political field under the terror of
uniformity.L.The value Rawls ascribes to pluralism is disingenuous. It is incompatible with the imperative of
unanimity on basic principles.
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Moral calls 1or e8alitarianis4 are sel1 6e1eatin8
(atric2 BoleynBFit?8eral6 J Assistant (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y S Louisiana State3 January 1III
%Mis1ortune3 wel1are re1or43 an6 ri80tBwin8 e8alitarianis4)
'ow will democratic decision makers choose which welfare policy to endorseE They will speculate. The
average voter, for e1ample, will have no option other than guessing which policy has the best long- term
consequences, and the average elected representative is probably in no better position. In speculating about
long-term consequences they may be inordinately swayed by any number of pre?udices or pre- conceived ideas.
2hen the truth does not present itself clearly, it is easy to sei5e on the evidence that supports one0s ideological
presuppositions. The consequence of applying equality of fortune to the welfare debate is not usefully neutral in
the sense that it avoids blind ideological presuppositions or commitments. It is tragically neutral in the sense that
it provides democratic voters and their representatives with no reason to challenge their blind ideological
commitments. )or equality of fortune would focus the debate on the empirical question that did, in fact,
command the lion0s share of attention; 2hich policy is best for the poorE $nswers to this question will be
determined by pre?udice and mood more than reasoned deliberation or real debate. If this consequence is
inevitable, then the implications for the ideal of equality are dismal; it would appear impotent as a political
ideal, for it requires democratic bodies to make decisions based on speculation about economic effects over the
course of decades or even generations.
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Err on t0e si6e o1 co4binin8 5olitical conse9uences wit0 0u4anitarianis4
#0o4as Weiss RII3 (resi6ential (ro1essor o1 (olitical Science S C"'. Gra6uate Center3 V5rinci5les3
5olitics3 an6 0u4anitarian actionV
!olitical actors have a newfound interest in principles, while humanitarians of all stripes are increasingly
aware of the importance of politics. +et, there remain two distinct approachesGpolitics and humanitarianism as
self-contained and antithetical realities or alternatively as overlapping spheres. Iostalgia for aspects of the "old
2ar or other bygone eras is perhaps understandable, but there never was a :golden age< when
humanitarianism was insulated from politics. >uch aid was an e1tension of the foreign policies of ma?or
donors, especially the superpowers. Ionetheless, it was easieq conceptually and practically, to
compartmentali5e humanitarianism and politics before the present decade. Then, a better guide to action was
provided by an unflinching respect for traditional principles, although they never were absolute ends but only
intermediate means. In today=s world, humanitarians must ask themselves how to weigh the political
consequences of their action or inactionJ and politicians must ask themselves how to gauge the humanitarian
costs of their action or inaction. The calculations are tortuous, and the mathematics far from e1act. 'owever,
there is no longer any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersect. The real question is how
this intersection can be managed to ensure more humani5ed politics and more effective humanitarian action. To
this end, humanitarians should be neither blindly principled nor blindly pragmatic.
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Moral ;iews o1 e8alitarianis4 are sel1 ser;in8
Baseless) Blac2well
3. (ur sub?ect concerns normative political theory, which I take to be part of morality. The sub?ect is not
depiction of a Rway of life,= a formula for individual happiness, or a view of the meaning of life, but rather,
rules for the AlargeC community, or better Aas assumed henceforthC, everybody. In the words of $quinas, a moral
theory imposes a uniformity. It proposes a set 9 a single set, however complicated 9 of rules, declaring that all
should adhere to it. But this uniformity need not be egalitarian in the sense defined above. The one basic set of
directives to which everyone ought to adhere, and by reference to which the conduct of anyone may be called to
account, could be wildly inegalitarian Aas with slave moralities.C Mniversality 9 sameness of rules for all 9 is a
defining feature of moralsJ egalitarianism is not.
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E8alitarianis4 isn@t 6e4ocraticMine;itable 6ile44a
Fabienne (eter J (0D in Econo4ics J 1/ 'o;e4ber +KKA %#0e (olitical E8alitarian@s Dile44a)
S5rin8er Lin2
The dilemma is the following. If, on the one hand, the substantive constraints on the deliberative process are
kept to a minimum, only a weak criterion of political equality can be imposed on the deliberative process. This
criterion may fail to ensure the effective equality of participants in the deliberative process, which undermines
the legitimacy of the outcomes of such a process. If, on the other hand, political equality is interpreted
comprehensively, many substantive ?udgments will be packed into the conditions imposed on the deliberative
process. They will be treated as e1empt from deliberative evaluation. The stronger the criterion of political
equality, the more emphasis is placed not ?ust on general political resources, but on people=s abilities to make
effective use of these resources, the narrower the scope for democratic scrutiny. This, again, ?eopardi5es
democratic legitimacy. Thus, a strong criterion of political equality, which focuses on people=s possibilities to
participate in the deliberative process as effectively equals, will fail to ensure democratic legitimacy because it
will e1empt too many value ?udgments from deliberative democratic scrutiny. $ weak criterion of political
equality will fail to ensure democratic legitimacy because many will not have been able to participate in the
deliberative process as effectively equals. In other words, the political egalitarian=s dilemma reveals a clash
between the attempt to ensure equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of
sub?ecting substantive ?udgments to deliberative evaluation.
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Force6 atte45ts at e9uality 5er5etuate ine9uality
Baseless) Blac2well
The conclusion stands, then, that egalitarians propose measures incompatible with "ommon 6ood, conceived in
liberal terms. $ppeals to Requity= that are not simply question-begging failJ appeals to moral intuitions are
uselessJ appeal to the arbitrariness of nature is irrelevantJ appeals to marginal utility are of questionable basic
relevance, and e1actly wrong insofar as they are relevant. &ociety, I conclude, should make no interference in
the free actions of individuals in using their resources as they see best, by their own lights, within the constraints
of a no-harm-to-others rule. There is no socially acceptable case for forced equality.
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E8alitarianis4 0urts t0e 5oor
Baseless) Blac2well
)urther reflection on this leads to an important further point against egalitarianism; that it is essentially certain to
be counterproductive as well 9 to defeat the very values whose equali5ation is required by the theory. )orced
transfers from rich to poor, from capitalists to proletarians, will worsen the lot of the poor even as it decreases
the wealth of the rich. Iot only is egalitarianism biased, but the particular people against whom it is biased are
the productive9 the source of what the people it is biased in favour of hope to receive in consequence. It is not
too much to say, even, that egalitarianism is a conspiracy against those it claims to be trying to help. There is a
reason for this, whose incomprehension by philosophers even to this day should be a matter of astonishment. $
free economy is one in which no one forcibly intervenes against the property rights of any other 9 all are free to
use their resources as they ?udge best, including engaging in commercial e1changes. In such a system, the only
ways to achieve wealth are by means which improve the situations of others. &uccessful businesspeople become
so by organi5ing or financially supporting the production of things that other people want, and want more than
the e1isting alternatives 9 since those people, having no obligation to buy, would not otherwise buy them. The
only other possibilities are fairly uninteresting; gift, and the discovery or Roriginal acquisition= of valuable
things. But gift, as such, is pure transfer and does not create wealth, e1cept in the form of good will. 2e may
praise occasional acts of charity, but if everyone were only charitable and unproductive, all, including the poor
and sick, would quickly die. $nd as to acquisition, if we would attain to wealth, those items must be harnessed
to human use 9 nature does not afford a free lunch any more than our fellows. ven someone who acquired a
natural beauty spot, say, and keeps it natural, will be able to make a decent living thereby only if he is able to
charge others for the right to en?oy that spot. $nd so on.
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'o suc0 t0in8 as a utilitarian 6e1ense o1 e8alitarianis4
Baseless) Blac2well
$n immensely popular argument, thought to provide a clear utilitarian defense for egalitarianism, appeals to a
principle of Rdiminishing marginal utility.= The idea is that the marginal return from possession of some
measurable good decreases as a function of the amount one already has 9 money being the most familiar and
obvious case in point. )rom this it is inferred that general utility will be promoted by transferring such goods
from those above the midpoint to those below, where the marginal utility of unit increments is much greater.
Two ma?or flaws destroy this argument. The first is fundamental;general AaggregateC utility simply isn=t a
common value, and therefore cannot be appealed to. Individuals are not necessarily concerned to promote the
aggregate sum of good. They are mostly concerned to promote the goods of certain particular persons 9
themselves, friends, countrymen, whatever 9 and not the sum of utility, even if that sum could be ob?ectively
determined. It is therefore inadmissible to appeal to it. (nly if the particular individual addressed can be shown
that what matters to himwill be forwarded if the aggregate of utility grows 9 sometimes plausible, to be sure 9
is he rationally interested in its growth. That special case apart, utilitarian arguments are dismissed. &econd, and
more important for present purposes, the argument suffers from myopia; it focuses only on the
consumptionutil- ity of money. But all good things come from somewhere; namely, human effort and know-
how. $llocation of those requires investment. But the poor, obviously, do not invest 9 the better-off do that. $
well-invested dollar yields goods and services in the future greatly e1ceeding the stock of consumption goods
one could buy with the same money. The marginal utility of dollars in the upper incomes is therefore greater,
not less, than the marginal utility of dollars for the poor.
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"tilitarian calculus not e8alitarian J 6oesn@t act on t0e 5rinci5le o1 intrinsic e9uality
(a8e +KKD
!erhaps the simplest theory of the pattern of ?ustice is that benefits and burdens should be distributed across some
population so that inequality is minimi5ed. 2e might call this view Rintrinsic egalitarianism= as it holds that inequality is
bad or un?ust AI use these terms interchangeablyC in itself and not because of its consequences. $s Temkin has put it, the
essence of intrinsic equality is that Rit is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own= ATemkin
344L, p. B3C. It is worth contrasting intrinsic equality with some closely associated views. Mtilitarians hold that acts and
social policies should be evaluated only in terms of their consequences and that these consequences ought to promote
the ma1imum amount of welfare possible. *epending on the circumstances the utilitarian may prefer an equal
distribution of well-being because this coincides with the desire to ma1imi5e welfare. The reason for this is that it is
generally easier to help the worse off than othersGone only has to give them a little for their welfare level to improve a
lot. In this sense, utilitarians are Racci6ental@3 rat0er t0an intrinsic3 e8alitarians
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InBe8alitarianis4 sol;esJ bene1its tric2le 6own
Baseless) Blac2well
In short, successful investment enhances the lot of others in society. 2hen people are employed, this enhances
their real incomes, more than any other opportunities they may have had. $nd when they spend their money, it
is because they ?udge that e1penditure to contribute ma1imally to their well-being. Thus, if we wrest the gains
from investment or well-paid work from the investors and workers in question, we take from the productive and
transfer to the unproductive. This takes money that would have produced more and ensures that it will be used
in less productive ways. $ large society that undertakes this kind of activity e1tensively decrees poverty for
itself, in comparison with what it could have done instead in a freed-up market. $nd it is the poor, above all,
who benefit, relatively speaking, from commercial activity 9 activity that, if unimpeded, continually drives
down prices, continually finds new employment for available labour, and continually real- locates resources in
the way that does most good for most people, as indicated by the actual choices and preferences of those
people.,,
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#0e 8oal o1 t0e Eu68e s0oul6 not be to 4a2e sure eac0 5erson is e9ualMrat0er ensure eac0 5erson is
su11icient
+uko $as0i4oto --ph.d. Fapanese. $ssociate !rofessor of conomics. Fune 34K: :2hat >atters is $bsolute !overty,
Iot Relative !overty< http;NNwww.cdams.kobe-u.ac.?pNarchiveNdp4--,4.pdf
Therefore, sufficientarianism is an alternative to economic egalitarianism. &ufficientarianism presents the idea
of sufficiency as an alternative to the idea of economic equality. The essence of sufficientarianism is to show
that the idea of economic equality has no intrinsic value. $ccording to sufficientarianism, when people consider
what is important for their own lives, the amount of goods owned by other people becomes irrelevant. Instead,
comparison with the amount of goods owned by others prevents people from seeking what they consider
valuable for themselves. It is unnecessary to attach moral significance to economic egalitarianism. 2hile
)rankfurt enumerates some reasons for the failure of economic egalitarianism, he indicates that egalitarians do
not actually defend the idea of equality, as indicated by the priority view. In other words, egalitarians=
ob?ections are not based on their moral aversion to a person holding a smaller amount of goods as compared to
other people. In reality, their ob?ection is to the fact that the person owns only a remarkably small amount of
goods. This naturally gives rise to the following questions. 2hat does sufficiency implyE 2hat is the
standard of sufficiencyE $lthough )rankfurt does not define the meaning of sufficiency in concrete terms, it
does not imply that sufficientarianism is pointless. Indeed, the meaning of sufficiency can be defined in various
ways. 'owever, the essence of sufficientarianism is to seek what one finds valuable in hisNher life and not
compare the amount of goods one owns with that of othersJ this is crucial to ?udge sufficiency.
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E;eryt0in8 is relati;eMt0e 8oal s0oul6 not be to car;e e;eryone into t0e sa4e statueMrat0er ensure
eac0 5erson is su11icientMt0is is 6istinct 1ro4 econo4ic e8alitarianis4
+uko $as0i4oto --ph.d. Fapanese. $ssociate !rofessor of conomics. Fune 34K: :2hat >atters is $bsolute
!overty, Iot Relative !overty< http;NNwww.cdams.kobe-u.ac.?pNarchiveNdp4--,4.pdf
Irrespective of the definition of sufficiency selected, sufficientarianism cannot ?ustify distribution to those
whose circumstances are above the standard of sufficiency. Therefore, it does not lead to the implausible
conclusion that goods should be distributed to millionaires in a society that comprises only billionaires and
millionaires. &ufficientarianism, which re?ects economic egalitarianism and simultaneously requires distribution
to those below the standard of sufficiency, is consistent with moderate libertarianism or classical liberalism,
which re?ects distribution aimed at reducing income disparity and admits the necessity of distribution that
guarantees a minimum standard of living. Indeed, the interpretation of sufficientarianism that I present in this
paper might conflict with the original intention of sufficientarians. $s we have seen, I support
sufficientarianism. *espite differences between
sufficientarianism and the priority view, I re-emphasi5e the fact that they have a common crucial viewpoint
regarding egalitarianism. They share the belief that being worse off than others does not have moral
significance in terms of the ethics of distribution. 2hile the idea of equality that emphasi5es relativity with
others is set as a default position in the argument on distribution, both theories demand criticism of the above
assumption. galitarians often confuse equality with priority or sufficiencyJ however, it is important to bear in
mind that the apparent plausibility of egalitarianism is derived from its humanitarian appeal. The point I wish to
emphasi5e is that absolute poverty, and not relative poverty, is important. Ie1t, before turning to an
e1amination of the connection between sufficientarianism and libertarianism, I shall consider the necessity of
highlighting the abuse of egalitarianism.
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E8alitarianis4 1osters ne;erBen6in8 co45arison an6 obli8ation J a su11icientarian 1ra4ewor2 s0oul6
ta2e 5rece6ence
(a8e +KKD E6war6 %Justice Between GenerationsL In;esti8atin8 a Su11icientarian A55roac0)
Journal o1 Global Et0ics *ol /3 'o 13 A5ril +KKD3 58s /B+K
In contrast to egalitarians and prioritarians, some theorists, such as 'arry )rankfurt, hold that benefits and burdens
should be distributed in line with the Rdoctrine of sufficiency=. This states that as many people as possible should have
enough Aof the currency of ?ustice adoptedC to pursue the aims and aspirations they care about over a whole lifeJ and that
t0is ai4 0as leCical 5riority o;er ot0er i6eals o1 Eustice A)rankfurt ,/8., pp. 3,97LJ ,//., pp. L9,7C. $ttaining what
we really care about, for )rankfurt, requires a certain level of well-being, but once this level is reached there is no
further relationship between how well-off a person is and whether they discover and fulfil what it is that they really care
about. )rankfurt holds that, above the level of sufficiency, it is neither reasonable to seek a higher standard of living nor
e1pect, as amatter of ?ustice, any additional allocation of some currency of ?ustice to further improve their prospects . It
is important to add that Rhaving enough= is not the same as living a Rtolerable= life in the sense that one does not regret
one=s e1istence. Rather it means a person leads a life that contains no substantial dissatisfaction. $ccording to
)rankfurt, t0e 1law in intrinsic e8alitarianis4 Rlies in su55osin8 t0at it is 4orally i45ortant w0et0er one 5erson
0as less t0an anot0er re8ar6less o1 0ow 4uc0 eit0er o1 t0e4 0as@ <)rankfurt ,/8., p. L7C. 2hat matters, )rankfurt
argues, Ris not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough it would
be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others= A)rankfurt ,/8., p. 3,J original emphasisC. This does
not mean, however, that egalitarian and prioritarian concerns will always frustrate sufficiency since each and every
person should be helped to the threshold of sufficiency if possible, and those who can be helped to lead a decent life are
often among the worst off in a population. But the aim of reducing inequality, or of improving the position of the worst
off, has no intrinsic value for sufficientarians.
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Mo6erate su11icentarianis4 o11ers a 5luralist a55roac0 to Eustice w0ic0 4aCi4i?es conteCtual e9uality
(a8e +KKD
(ne way of responding to the problems raised by these two e1amples would be to construct a Rpluralist= approach to
distributive ?ustice. !luralism, in this conte1t, means that we would appeal to contrasting ideals in different conte1ts
A*aniels ,//B, p. 348C. There are three possibilities, which I can only sketch here. )irst, the ideals could apply in
different distributive circumstances. )or e1ample, we might give le1ical priority to sufficiency when at least some can
be brought up to the threshold, but appeal to equality or priority when all are above, or all below, the threshold A"risp
344L, pp. .-8ff.C. &econd, sufficiency might be allocated non-le1ical priority over other values so that large gains in
these values will sometimes outweigh lesser gains in sufficiency. $rneson has usefully labeled this Rmoderate
sufficientarianism= A$rneson 344B, p. 38C. The strength of this view is that it can e1plain why we should opt for A3C over
A,C since it o11ers tre4en6ous 8ains in bot0 e9uality an6 5riority wit0 no a6;erse i45act on su11iciency &imilarly,
though more controversially, moderate sufficientarians have at least some reason to opt for A7C over ALC since great
benefits arise, in terms of equality and priority, if we ignore the sufficiency of the few for the pri5e of giving ma?or
benefits to the many. Third, we might subsume one ideal under another while attributing some degree of intrinsic value
to the subsumed ideal. &ufficientarians generally view inequality as regrettable because of its consequences, such as the
way in which it inhibits economic growth, undermines political processes, or is a malign influence on cultural life. +et,
there is a more subtle way that inequality matters. This is that some people might fail to reach the standards of a decent
life if they are continually faced with the discomfiture that many others are far better off. &imilarly, some people might
fall below the threshold of sufficiency if they begin to en?oy life less as a result of identifying with the resentment of
others who are worse off A>armor 344L, pp. ,3.ffC.
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*****(-I*A#I,A#I&'*****
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**(ri;ati?ation Goo6 H Go;ern4ent Ba6**
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SoBcalle6 wel1are %ri80ts) restrict 1ree6o43 rationali?e t0e coerci;e trans1er o1 wealt03 an6 6estroy
c0aritable 1eelin8s3 turnin8 t0e case
@elley, !h.*., !rinceton Mniversity, /8
A*avid @elley, !h.*, !rinceton Mniversity, philosopher, author, founder and senior fellow of the $tlas &ociety, /8, $
%ife of (ne=s (wn; Individual Rights and the 2elfare &tate, p ,-,C
2e have e1amined the nature of welfare rights, their history, and the philosophical case for them. 2e have e1amined the
arguments for believing in such rights and seen how the many issues they raise play out in the concrete reality of welfare
programs. The conclusion can no longer be resisted; the concept of welfare rights is invalid. There is no warrant 1or
clai4in8 ri80ts to 1oo63 s0elter3 an6 4e6ical care3 to inco4e 4aintenance3 c0il6 su55ort3 an6
retire4ent 5ensions3 at taC5ayer eC5ense . &uch rights cannot be ?ustified by appeal to freedom, to benevolence, or to
community. They do not e1pand but curtail freedomGthat of program clients as well as of ta1payers. They
make charity compulsory, undermining any genuine benevolence donors might have toward the poor. They
replace the voluntary bonds of a society of contract with the coercive power of the state, undermining
genuine community. The concept does not provide a valid rationale for the welfare stateJ it provides a mere
rationali5ation for the coercive transfer of wealth. If we want a system based on genuine rights, one that promotes
genuine human welfare, we should privati5e or simply terminate the government programs. In place of Hsocial
insurance,H the market can provide real and affordable insurance to protect against the risk of illness,
accidents, disability, and unemployment. $nd for retirement, as we saw in the last chapter, private savings
instruments provide a much better return than most people can e1pect from &ocial &ecurity. $t the very least,
people should be allowed to opt out of the social insurance programs, forgoing the benefits to which they would otherwise be
entitled in e1change for e1emption from payroll ta1es. $ number of plans have been put forward to allow opting out without
harming the interests of current retirees.
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$ealt0 care 5olicies are coerci;e
Bissell, The (b?ectivist "enter, 'o Date
A$ndrew Bissell, The (b?ectivist "enter, Io *ate, :'ealth "are - Is it a rightE< http;NNwww.ob?ectivistcenter.orgNct-
,3/.-RightSToS'ealthS"are.asp1C
)irst, it is very important not to conflate the right to life with a right to health care. The right to life is central to
the (b?ectivist ethics and politics, and health care is certainly essential to maintaining one=s life. 'owever, as Rand
puts it; :$ right does not include the material implementation of that right by other menJ it includes only the
freedom to earn that implementation by one=s own effort.< AH>an=s RightsH, The #irtue of &elfishness, pp. ,,L-
,,7C In this sense, an apt comparison can be drawn to the right of free speechJ your right to speak your mind does not
create some obligation on the part of others to support that e1pression, financially or otherwise. $yn Rand unmasks
the fallacy at the root of the :right to health care< and all other such economic rights; :$ single question d would
make the issue clear; $t whose e1penseE< AH>an=s RightsH, The #irtue of &elfishness, p. ,,LC 'ealth care doesn=t
simply grow on treesJ if it is to be made a right for some, the means to provide that right must be confiscated
from others. 'ealth care e1ists because of the efforts of doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and even the
engineers who design and build lifesaving machines. There are really only a few ways, then, that it can be
provided. These medical personnel can offer their services as part of a mutual e1change of benefit for benefit, in a
system of free, market e1change. (r, they can be forced to provide these services at the point of a gun, as in the movie
Fohn e. (r, the government can arrogate to itself the title of the sole health care provider, funding its
operations through forced ta1ation. The problems with forcing doctors to treat patients are obviousGfirst,
of course, it requires wanton violation of their rights, and represents government enforcement of the
principle that a doctor=s life is not his own, but instead belongs to the state or the community. $nd no one
will want to enter the medical profession when the reward for years of careful schooling and study is not fair
remuneration, but rather, patients who feel entitled to one=s efforts, and a government that enslaves the very minds
upon which patients= lives depend.
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Free 0ealt0 care 4eans sla;ery
Brown, &taff 2riter, 47
AFohn Brown, &taff 2riter, The *aily Beacon, &enior in !olitical &cience, /N38N47,
http;NNwww.freerepublic.comNfocusNf-newsN,33/-B.NpostsC
$ HrightH is the ability and autonomy to perform a sovereign action. In a free society founded on the ideal of
liberty, an individual has an absolute ability to perform such an action - so long as it does not infringe upon
the rights of another individual. 'ealth care is not speech; In order for you to e1ercise a theoretical HrightH to
health care, you must infringe on someone else0s rights. If you have a HrightH to health care, then it means you
must also have the right to coerce doctors into treating you, to coerce drug companies into producing
medicine and to coerce other citi5ens into footing your medical bill. This is (rwellian. H)reedomH for you
cannot result in slavery for others. Thus the concept of a HrightH to health care is an o1ymoron; It involves takPesQ
away the rights of other individuals.
&urely, though, we can agree that doctors, the pharmaceutical industry and insurance companies earn e1cessive profits, you say.
2ell, that depends on what your definition of He1cessiveH is. *octors literally hold the lives of their patients in their hands. 'ow
much is someone who saves lives everyday worthE The same is true of pharmaceutical companies. 2hile it has become
fashionable to condemn their profits, the fact is that these profits fund medical research, which leads to more medicines being
produced, and, consequently, more lives saved. Insurance companies spread the cost of health care among many
people who might not otherwise be able to afford it, and thus make health care readily available for many.
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#0e state is 6e0u4ani?in8 because o1 bureaucracy an6 t0e ability to 4a2e war
Ste50ens3 so1tware en8ineer3 K7
<-obert L Ste50ens3 so1tware en8ineer3 AH+HK73 0tt5LHHrobertlste50ensco4HessaysHessayN1ra4e505O
essayrootPste50ensBrobertBlHQessay1ilePKK+Ba6In1luence0t4l=
*ehumani5ation, of a sort, is yet one more inevitable consequence of the sheer si5e and structure of the
modern state. There is simply no way for the agents of an organi5ation claiming to HserveH hundreds of thousands Aor
hundreds of millionsTC of people to know anything about the vast ma?ority of those individuals beyond some
disembodied entries on a ta1 return, or an arbitrary accounting convenience like a &ocial &ecurity number. To borrow a
phrase often used by critics of large private enterprises, the modern state is Hbeyond human scale.H
$nother, more insidious, form of dehumani5ation is inseparable from the political process that is the
very essence of the state. To see this, let0s first consider the most e1treme act of the state; war. In order to
break down people0s natural resistance to the killing of other human beings, states have historically made
dehumani5ation of the enemy one of the ma?or components of their war propaganda. 2ith the enemy
reduced to less-than-human status, it0s easier to ?ustify the use of lethal force against him.
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#0e 8o;ern4ent is in0erently 6e0u4ani?in8 because it see2s to control 5eo5le
Morrison3 JD3 Boston Colle8e Law Sc0ool3 KA
A&teven R. >orrison, F.*., Boston "ollege %aw &chool, "riminal %aw, )all 4B, *artmouth %aw Fournal,
:*ehumani5ation and Recreation; $ %acanian Interpretation of the )ederal &entencing 6uidelines, pp. ,34-,3,,
http;NNworks.bepress.comNcgiNviewcontent.cgiEarticleD,443[conte1tDstevenSmorrisonC
$t this point, we have discussed how the law denies a person=s humanity. 'owever, it creates something new in
its place, since HPaQt each instant of its intervention, this law creates something new. very situation is transformed by
its intervention.H The re-creation of an individual depends on what will best eliminate discordant ideas, since HPaQ
discordant statement PisQ unknown in law.H This may be seen as %acan=s way of saying fthat the law as a master
will do what it must to preserve its power, that is, to preserve Hthe e1isting relations of production
and the moral and social order.H Therefore, if society views minorities as criminal, then the !&6 will shape itself
to fulfill that prophesy. If ?udges are seen as abusive of their discretion in ?udging, then the )&6 will create ?udges that
are Hmere automatons, permitted only to apply a mathematical formula.H lf the &entencing "ommission becomes
sympathetic toward the idea of downward departures and the rigid strictures of !R(T"T, then "ongress will create a
"ommission that becomes a mere tool for a tough-on-crime policy of sentence increases. The master wants
uniformity, predictability, and severity, and will censor and recreate others in its drive to achieve
these goals.
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Go;ern4ent is stri55in8 6octor@s ri80ts t0rou80 coerci;e action
Jonat0an3 MD -os4an, +KK+ 5syc0iatrist in 5ri;ate 5ractice in (asa6ena3 is a senior writer 1or t0e
Ayn -an6 Institute3 It>s My Li1e! A Doctor $as a -i80t to $is &wn Li1e3 February +K
t0
+KK+
0tt5LHHwwwaynran6or8HsiteH'ews+O5a8eP'ewsArticleQi6P:/1AQnewsNi;NctrlP1K+1U BPMaC -is5oliPB
very doctor, like individuals in other ?obs, has a right to work for himself and for his own en?oyment, and
to make a ton of money at it if he can. $s individuals, doctors have a right to offer their patients treatment
according to their best ?udgment, and to charge such fees as they ?udge their e1pertise to be worth.
"onversely, patients have the right to accept or re?ect our advice and services, and to shop around for the
best deals they can get. 'aving the right to your life does not guarantee health or medical treatment at the
doctors0 e1pense, but it does guarantee that every individual has the freedom to seek whatever treatment he
wishes, according to his own ?udgment and his own means. Individual rights means the freedom to act
within one0s meansJ it does not mean an entitlement to the goods and services provided by others. 'owever,
not only have $merican doctors been stripped of their professional freedom by all the various oversight agencies Awhich include
licensing boards, the 'ealth "are )inancing $dministration, managed care companies, peer review committees and moreC, but--
more important--they have also been morally disarmed. (ur intellectuals have taught doctors that need comes before ability, and
that healthy and rich doctors have a duty to support sick and poor patients. They have taught doctors that the consumers of
medical services ApatientsC are morally superior to the providers of medical services AdoctorsC, ?ust because the consumers are in
need. Bureaucrats have eagerly latched on to this altruistic idea, and have erected a ma5e of welfare laws and regulations to
satisfy the needs of the poor and the sick, and to HprotectH them from HgreedyH doctors. Thanks to these controls, it has become
very difficult for doctors to think or to act freely on their own ?udgment. $nd it is the best doctors, the most dedicated and those
least ready to relinquish their independent ?udgment, who have been the first to leave the practice of medicine when doctors0
rights were trampled on. 2ho will ultimately be left if this trend continuesE To quote *r. 'endricks in $yn Rand0s novel $tlas
&hrugged, H%et them discover, in their operating rooms and hospital wards, that it is not safe to place their lives in the hands of a
man whose life they have throttled. It is not safe, if he is the sort of man who resents it--and still less safe, if he is the sort who
doesn0t.H To save $merican medicine, $merican doctors need to be saved from altruism. To accomplish this, doctors must
vigorously challenge the invalid notion of a HrightH to health care. Iobody has a right to an antibiotic made by someone else, ?ust
as he does not have a right to someone else0s car. Iobody has a right to have his gallbladder removed, ?ust as he does not have a
right to have his toilet fi1ed by a plumber. Io one has a right to demand that a doctor treat him, but doctors do
have rights, ?ust as do auto workers and plumbers, to practice their profession Aor tradeC free from coercion.
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#0e wel1are state is 1lawe6 J it loo2s only at t0e outco4es rat0er t0an t0e 5rocess w0ic0 is i44oral
because loo2in8 at outco4es only assu4es t0at t0e 5oor 0a;e been c0eate6 not t0at t0ey 0a;e trie6
an6 1aile6
2alter . Willia4s AFohn >. (lin *istinguished !rofessor of conomics and "hairman of the conomics
*epartment at 6eorge >ason MniversityC Fanuary ,-, ,/IA. T' $R6M>IT )(R )R >$R@T&;
>(R$%IT+ #&. ))I"II"+. http;NNwww.cato.orgNpubsN?ournalNc?,-n3-L-L.html
Fustice; !rocess vs. Results
$t the heart of most interventionist policy is a vision of ?ustice. >ost often this vision evaluates the presence of ?ustice
by looking at results. &ocial ?ustice has considerable appeal and as such is used as ?ustification for interventionist
statism. There are several criticisms of the concept of social ?ustice that 'ayek has answered well, but defenders of
personal liberty must make a greater effort to demystify the term and show that ?ustice or fairness cannot be
determined by e1amining results. The results people often turn to in order to determine the presence or absence of
?ustice are educational and occupational status, income, life e1pectancy, and other socioeconomic factors. But ?ustice
or fairness cannot be determined by results. It is a process question. "onsider, for e1ample, that three individuals play
a regular game of poker. The typical game outcome is; individual $ wins .- percent of the time, while individuals B
and " win ,- percent and ,4 percent of the time, respectively. By knowing the game0s result, nothing unambiguous
can be said about whether there has been Hpoker ?ustice.00 Individual $0s disproportionate winnings are consistent with
his being an astute player, clever cheater, or ?ust plain lucky. The only way one can determine whether there has been
poker ?ustice is to e1amine the game0s process. !rocess questions would include; *id the players play voluntarilyE
2ere the poker rules neutral and unbiasedly appliedE 2as the game played without cheatingE If the process were ?ust,
affirmative answers would be given to those three questions and there would be poker ?ustice irrespective of the
outcome. Thus, ?ustice is really a process issue. The most popular ?ustification for the interventionist state is to create
or ensure fairness and ?ustice in the distribution of income. "onsiderable confusion, obfuscation, and demagoguery
regarding the sources of income provide statists with copious quantities of ammunition to ?ustify their redistributionist
agenda. Income is not distributed. In a free society, income is earned. !eople serving one another through the
provision of goods and services generate income. 2e serve our fellow man in myriad ways. 2e bag his groceries,
teach his children, entertain him, and heal his wounds. By doing so, we receive Hcertificates of performance.00 In the
Mnited &tates, we call these certificates dollars. lsewhere they are called pesos, francs, marks, yen, and pounds.
Those certificates stand as evidence AproofC of our service. The more valuable our service to our fellow man Aas he
determinesC, the greater the number of certificates of performance we receive and hence the greater our claim on
goods and services. That free-market process promotes a moral discipline that says; Mnless we are able and willing to
serve our fellow man, we shall have no claim on what he produces. "ontrast that moral discipline to the immorality of
the welfare state. In effect the welfare state says; +ou do not have to serve your fellow manJ through intimidation,
threats, and coercion, we will take what he produces and give it to you. The vision that sees income as being
Hdistributed00 implies a different scenario for the sources of income never made e1plicit. The vision that sees income
as being distributed differs little from asserting that out there is a dealer of dollars. It naturally leads to the conclusion
that if some people have fewer dollars than others, the dollar dealer is unfairJ he is a racist, se1ist, or a multi-
nationalist. Therefore, ?ustice and fairness require a re-dealing Aincome redistributionC of dollars. That way the ill-
gotten gains of the few are returned to their Hrightful00 owners. That vision is the essence of the results-oriented view
of ?ustice underpinning the welfare state. !eople who critici5e the e1isting distribution of income as being unfair and
demand government redistribution are really critici5ing the process whereby income is earned. Their bottom line is
that millions of individual decision makers did not do the right thing. "onsider the wealth of billionaire Bill 6ates, the
founder of >icro&oft. 6ates earned billions because millions of individuals voluntarily spent their money on what
they wanted--his products. )or someone to say that 6ates0s income is unfair is the same as saying that the decisions of
millions of consumers are wrong. To argue that 6ates0s income should be forcibly taken and given to others is to say
that somehow third parties have a right to preempt voluntary decisions made by millions of traders. 2hen sources of
income are viewed more realistically, we reach the conclusion that low income, for the most part, is a result of people
not having sufficient capacity to serve their fellow man well rather than being victims of an unfair process. %ow-
income people simply do not have the skills to produce and do things their fellow man highly values. &eldom do we
find poor highly productive individuals or nations. Those who have low incomes tend to have low skills and education
and hence low productive capacity. (ur challenge is to make those people AnationsC more productive. $nother
e1planation of low income is that the rules of the game have been rigged. That is, people do have an ability to provide
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goods and services valued by their fellow man but are restricted from doing so. $mong those rules are minimum wage
laws, occupational and business licensure laws and regulations, and government-sponsored monopolies. 'ence,
another argument for free-market capitalism is that it is good for low-income, low-skilled people.
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Ca5italis4 is t0e best syste4 to 1oster 1ree6o43 w0ic0 is a 4oral necessity
*avid Boa? Ae1ecutive vice president to the "ato InstituteC 1IID; ditorial; !ro-"hoice.
http;NNwww.cato.orgNpubsNpolicySreportNcpr-,/n7-3.html
@ristol and 2olfson are struggling, not ?ust against the principles on which $merica was founded, but against the
modern world. It is capitalism that has given us moderns so many choices. "apitalism is the economic system of free
peopleJ it is what happens when you let people alone. The virtues that capitalism rewards--prudence, discipline,
initiative, self-reliance, new ideas--and the affluence it creates tend to push people in the direction of confidence in
their own abilities, skepticism about organi5ed authority, and a desire to manage their own affairs in all realms of life.
That0s why capitalism is not in the long run compatible with political repression or governmental restrictions on
freedom.
)reedom is also necessary for the development of strong moral character. &urely @ristol and 2olfson don0t want to
undermine the bourgeois virtues, but the effect of restricting choice is to eliminate the incentive and the opportunity
for people to make good choices and develop good habits. !eople do not develop prudence, self-reliance, thrift, and
temperance when their choices are imposed by force. 2elfare-state liberals undermine moral character when they
subsidi5e indulgence in destructive choices. Big-government conservatives undermine character when they deny
people the right to shape their own characters through their choices.
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Li4ite6 8o;ern4ent is 2ey to 5re;ent tyranny3 w0ic0 2ille6 4ore 5eo5le t0an bot0 Worl6 Wars
co4bine6 J t0e 5lan 5ro;i6es 5ositi;e ri80ts3 or entitle4ents t0at causally 1ail to 5rotect t0e ri80t to
li1e
rich Wee6e A!rofessor of &ociology at the Mniversity of BonnC 2inter +KKG; 'uman Rights, %imited 6overnment,
and "apitalism. http;NNwww.cato.orgNpubsN?ournalNc?38n,Nc?38n,-L.pdf
Iegative rights serve to protect the individual, his liberty, and his property from coercion and violence. Iegative
rights prevent others from undertaking some types of actions, but they do not oblige others to help one. In order to
safeguard negative rights government has to be limited. The link between negative rights and limited government was
already well understood long before the term :human rights< gained currency. In the late ,.th century, %ocke AP,B/4Q
344L; ,B,, ,8/C wrote; The supreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his own consent;
for the preservation of property being the end of government . . . wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the
government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to
impoverish, harass, or subdue them into arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have itJ there it presently
becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many.
The right to life certainly is a fundamental human right. It is a negative right since it only requires that others do not
kill one. In this conte1t, one should recall that about ,B/ million people have been killed by states or their
governments in the 34th century ARummel ,//7C. "ommunists and Iational &ocialists established the most
murderous regimes. $mong the victims of communism, there are tens of millions of deaths from starvation after the
coerced collectivi5ation of agriculture in &talin=s &oviet Mnion or >ao=s "hina. $lthough the 34th century suffered
two world wars and other bloody wars, fewer people died on the battlefield or because of bombing campaigns than
have been murdered or starved to death by their own governments. 2hoever wants to protect human rights should
therefore first of all focus on the necessity of protecting people from the state and its abuses of power.
)ositive #ights
!ositive rights or entitlements commit the state and its officials to undertake certain types of actionGfor e1ample, to
guarantee certain minimal standards of material well-being. The $merican Bill of Rights A,.8/C is limited to negative
or protective rights, while the Mnited Iations 6eneral *eclaration of 'uman Rights A,/78C and the uropean Mnion
"harter of )undamental Rights A3444C encompass both protective rights and entitlements., The trend from short lists
of negative rights to long lists of negative and positive rights has been accompanied by a rapid and sustained increase
in public spending in the 2est ATan5i and &chuknecht 3444C.
"lassical liberals, in contrast to people called :liberals< in 34th century $merica and :social democrats< in urope,
demanded the primacy of individual liberty and thereby of protective rights and limited government . !roviding people
with entitlements forces the state to curtail the negative rights and liberties of individuals. In order to fund
entitlements the state has to ta1 Ai.e., to take coercively fromC some people in order to provide for others. ntitlements
have to rest on coercion and redistributionGthat is, on a greater restriction of negative rights or individual liberty than
would otherwise be necessary. $s the balance of achievements and victims of communism demonstrates, the attempt
to provide entitlements did not prevent tens of millions of deaths from starvation. $ctually, the attempt to provide
more than negative rights resulted in something less; the lack of respect of negative and positive rights. $s I shall
argue, this association between the attempt to guarantee entitlements by a monopoly of coercion and central planning
is causally related to the repeated failure to protect even the right to life.
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Free 4ar2ets are in0erently nonB;iolent because t0ey rely on ;oluntary associations w0ereas
8o;ern4ents 1orce an6 co45el3 lea6in8 to ;iolence
Bran6en3 5syc0ot0era5ist3 aut0or3 teac0er3 I:
<'at0aniel3 5syc0ot0era5ist3 aut0or3 teac0er3 January 1II:3 %In6i;i6ualis4 an6 t0e Free Society3 (art
+)3 0tt5LHHwww111or8H1ree6o4HK1I:6as5=
2hatever the differences in their specific programs, all the enemies of the free market economy-communists,
socialists, fascists, welfare statists-are unanimous in their belief that they have a right to dispose of the lives,
property, and future of others, that private ownership of the means of production is a selfish evil, that the more a person
has achieved, the greater is his or her debt to those who have not achieved it, that men and women can be compelled to go on producing under any terms or conditions their rulers decree, that freedom is a lu1ury that
may have been permissible in a primitive economy, but for the running of giant industries, electronic factories, and comple1 sciences, nothing less than slave labor will do. 2hether they propose to take over the
economy outright, in the manner of communists and socialists, or to maintain the pretense of private property while dictating prices, wages, production, and distribution, in the manner of fascists and welfare statists, it
is the gun, it is the rule of physical force that they consider Hkind,H they who consider the free market Hcruel.H &ince the moral ?ustification offered for the rule of
force is humankind0s need of the things that persons of ability produce, it follows Ain the collectivist0s system
of thoughtC that the greater an individual0s productive ability, the greater are the penalties he or she must
endure, in the form of controls, regulations, e1propriations. "onsider, for e1ample, the principle of the progressive income ta1; those who produce the most
are penali5ed accordinglyJ those who produce nothing receive a subsidy, in the form of relief payments. (r consider the enthusiastic advocacy of sociali5ed medicine. 2hat is the ?ustification offered for placing the
practice of medicine under government controlE The importance of the services that physicians perform-the urgency of their patients0 need. !hysicians are to be penali5ed precisely because they have so great a
contribution to make to human welfareJ thus is virtue turned into a liability. In denying human beings freedom of thought and action, statists and collectivist systems are anti-self-esteem by their very nature. &elf-
confident, self-respecting men and women are unlikely to accept the premise that they e1ist for the sake of others . $ free society cannot be maintained without an
ethics of rational self-interest. Ieither can it be maintained e1cept by men and women who have achieved a healthy level of self-esteem. $nd a healthy level of self-esteem cannot be
maintained without a willingness to assert-and, if necessary, fight for-our right to e1ist. It is on this point that issues of psychology, ethics, and politics converge. If I may allow myself a brief aside, one might imagine
that psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers who speak enthusiastically and reverently about freedom, self-responsibility, autonomy, the beauty of self-regulating systems, and the power of synergy Athe
behavior of whole systems unpredicted by the behavior of the parts taken separatelyC would naturally be champions of noncoercion. >ore often than not, as I have already indicated, ?ust the opposite is true. They tend
to be among the most vociferous in crying for the coercive apparatus of government to further their particular ideals. To quote 2aterman once again; It should be recogni5ed that a defining feature
of a synergistic society is that participation in it is voluntary. If people do not choose to engage in a given
cooperative activity, the implication is that they do not perceive that activity to be helpful, either for
themselves or for others. fforts to promote social cooperation within a synergistic society may appropriately include
such techniques as education, persuasion, and negotiation. 'owever, the use of political force to compel
cooperation represents the abandonment of the synergistic ideal. $ free society cannot automatically guarantee
the mental or emotional well-being of all its members. )reedom from e1ternal coercion is not a sufficient
condition of our optimal fulfillment, but it is a necessary one. The great virtue of capitalism-laisse5-faire
capitalism, as contrasted not only with the more e1treme forms of statism but also with the mi1ed economy
we have today-is that it is the one system whose defining principle is precisely this barring of physical
coercion from human relationships. Io other political system pays even lip service to this principle
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#urn J a11Hne8 creates 6e5en6ence w0ic0 6ecreases incenti;es to wor2 J tan2s t0e econo4y
F\rg 6uido $Wls4ann Aprofessor of economics at the Mniversity of $ngers in )ranceC +KKG; The !olitical conomy
of >oral 'a5ard
$ central occupation of economists is to analy5e the nature, causes, and effects of incentives G the circumstances that
are held to motivate human action. conomists agree on the positive role that HgoodH incentives play to increase
production. They also agree that HperverseH incentives have an opposite impact. (ne of these perverse incentives is
called moral ha5ard, the sub?ect of our present essay. >oral ha5ard is the incentive of a person $ to use more
resources than he otherwise would have used, because he knows, or believes he knows, that someone else B will
provide some or all of these resources. The important point is that this occurs again"t B#" will and that B is unable
to sanction this e1propriation immediately. The mere incentive to rely on resources provided by others is not $er "e
problematic. )or e1ample, the announcement of a future inheritance might prompt the prospective heir to spend more
in the present than he would otherwise have spent. In such cases we would not speak of moral ha5ard. $ genuine
moral-ha5ard problem appears however if $ has the possibility to use B0s resources against B0s will and if he knows
this. %aymen would call $0s incentives a Htemptation to stealH or a Htemptation to act irresponsibly.H conomists, ever
weary of morali5ing, have espoused the technocratic e1pression Hmoral ha5ard.H Thus the essential feature of moral
ha5ard is that it incites some people $ to e1propriate other people B. The B-people in turn, if they reali5e the presence
of such a moral ha5ard, have an incentive to react against this possible e1propriation. They make other choices than
those that they would consider to be best if there were no moral ha5ard. >any economists have therefore concluded
that 4oral 0a?ar6 entails 4ar2et 1ailures J it brings about a different allocation of resources than the one that would
e1ist in the absence of moral ha5ard. "onventional economic theory e1plains moral ha5ard as a consequence of the
fact that market participants are unequally well informed about economic reality. In other words, moral ha5ard results
from Hasymmetries of informationH and the theory of moral ha5ard is therefore considered to be a part of the
economics of information.
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#a2in8 wealt0 1orce1ully 2ills c0aritable 6esires
-ot0bar63 econo4ist3 Austrian Sc0ool3 K7
<Murray -ot0bar63 econo4ist3 Austrian Sc0ool3 K73 Wel1are an6 t0e I4a8es o1 C0arity3 5 7A:=
The mistake, they say, is to convert moral pressure into compulsion G to force people to do what everyone agrees it
would be morally desirable for them to do. >urray Rothbard=s view is typical. 'e recogni5es that charity is a good
thing, but writes, :PIQt makes all the difference in the world whether the aid is given voluntarily or is stolen by force.<
PIQt is hardly charity to take wealth by force and hand it over to someone else. Indeed this is the direct opposite of
charity, which can only be an unbought, voluntary act of grace. "ompulsory confiscation can only deaden charitable
desires completely, as the wealthier grumble that there is no point in giving to charity when the state has already taken
on the task. This is another illustration of the truth that men can become more moral only through rational persuasion,
not through violence, which will, in fact, have the opposite effectg
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#0e alternati;e results in bene1icial 1or4s o1 ca5italis4 &nly altruis4 results in t0e 6an8erous 1or4s
o1 ca5italis4 t0at t0eir aut0ors assu4e
More, founder of 1tropy Institute, GA
A>a1 >ore, founder of 1tropy Institute, ,/8B, :T' I>!(RT$I" () &%)I&'I&&, T' *$I6R& ()
$%TRMI&>,< http;NNwww.thedegree.orgNphiln447.pdfC
)inally, it would be fitting to consider the matter of competition in the conte1t of the pursuit of rational self-interest.
>any people say that capitalism is an entirely competitive economic system. They say that competition,
while it serves a number of useful purposes, breeds hostility, violence, and unhappiness. The first assertion is
false and the second may or may not be true depending on how it is interpreted. (b?ectivists are principled
moral agents, not Rmaterialists= and can therefore happily ?oin in by condemning the :rat race<. The first point to note
is that capitalism is both cooperative and competitive. )irms compete within a market but firms also
cooperate every time they buy and sell raw materials, semi-finished goods, etc., from each other. Individuals
within a firm must cooperate to get their ?obs done. very time anyone buys anything on the free market,
cooperation is occurringJ both parties get together to make a mutually beneficial e1change. (n the other hand, in a
socialist economy you are told what to produce and have little or no choice as to what you consume. 2here
competition e1ists in a free market it promotes progress and benefits everyone. In a socialist system, competition is
for positions of coercive power. 2ithin a free market G or mi1ed economy such as ours G more than one type
of competition is possible. (ne can compete in a friendly, rela1ed way, always bearing in mind one=s values and
rational self-interest. (r one can madly, obsessively, irrationally compete for ends set by other people G whether
Rsociety=, the company, the government, or parents. This second type of competition is truly a :rat race<, a scrambling
for advancement where one=s self-interest and values are lost sight of. It is not competition between those pursuing
their rational self-interest that is bad. It is competition between those trying to fulfill their irrational whims
Aperhaps for wealth or fameC, or to conform to standards set by others. It is common for people to wear themselves
down developing heart disease, ulcers, and hypertension, to become heavy drinkers, insomniacs, or pillpoppers, with
no regard for their happiness. "apitalism does not demand this, and though it does not prevent it Aonly force, with
all its consequences, can do thatC, it does function better without it. &tudies have shown that most successful
managers in business are generally pleasant, non-compulsive individuals who are a pleasure to work for. It is
altruis4 which 5ro4otes o;erly strenuous Aand misguidedC e11ort since t0e in6i;i6ual 6oes not 4atter M
only t0e 8oo6 o1 t0e co45anyH8o;ern4entH societyHone@s 5arents 4atters. The rationally self-interested
person has a great deal of self-esteem. The altruist lacks self-esteem. $nd it is lack of self-esteem that leads to
neurotic, inappropriately competitive behaviour since the esteem of other people must be earned at all cost to
fill the gap. A&ee Branden=s The !sychology of &elf-steem for the importance of this factor.C If one has no self-worth
one must compete hard to prove oneself to others. Rational people do not need to win, since that implies that you can=t
be happy without defeating someone. There is no need to win. To play the game of life according to one=s values, in
pursuit of one=s happiness, one=s self-interest, is all that matters.
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Ca5italis4 sol;es war J econo4ic inter6e5en6encies
rich Wee6e A!rofessor of &ociology at the Mniversity of BonnC 2inter +KKG; 'uman Rights, %imited 6overnment,
and "apitalism. http;NNwww.cato.orgNpubsN?ournalNc?38n,Nc?38n,-L.pdf
"apitalist development contributes not only to prosperity but also to reducing the risk of war . )rom a human rights
perspective, the avoidance of war is a paramount concern because the fog of war has frequently been used as a cover
for human rights abuses and war crimes A$podaca 344,J 'arrelson-&tephens and "allaway 344,J Richards, 6elleny,
and &acko 344,C.8 conometric studies A6art5ke 344-, 344.J Russett and (neal 344,J 2eede 344-C are compatible
with the following causal relationships between economic freedom, prosperity, and peace; 2hether assessed by
financial market openness, trade, or property rights, economic freedom contributes to peace. The more trade there is
between two states or the more they are economically interdependent, the less likely military conflict between them
becomes.
In addition to this direct effect of economic freedom on the avoidance of war, there is an indirect effect via prosperity
and democracy that is well documented A%ipset ,//7J Russett and (neal 344,J 2eede 344-C. The freer an economy is,
the more prosperous it is likely to be. The more prosperous a country is, the more likely it is to be a democracy. /
>ilitary conflict between democracies is e1tremely unlikely. conomic freedom and free tradeGthat is, the global
e1pansion of capitalism and the corresponding catch-up opportunities for poor countriesGconstitute the beginning of
the causal chain leading to democracy and peace, at least to peace among prosperous or capitalist democracies.
conomic freedom and free trade also e1ert a direct pacifying impact. Therefore, it is preferable to call this set of
pacifying conditions the :capitalist Aor market-liberalC peace< rather than the :democratic peace.<
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Econo4ically 1ree countries are less li2ely to 8o to war J 5ut away your 6e4ocracy a66Bons because
t0e alt sol;es better
rik Gart?2e A$ssociate !rofessor of !olitical &cience !h*, Mniversity of IowaC +KK:; )uture *epends on
"apitali5ing on "apitalist !eace
2ith terrorism achieving Hglobal reachH and conflict raging in $frica and the >iddle ast, you may have missed a
startling fact - we are living in remarkably peaceable times.
)or si1 decades, developed nations have not fought each other. )rance and the Mnited &tates may chafe, but the
resulting conflict pitted french fries against Hfreedom fries,H rather than )rench soldiers against M.&. Hfreedom
fighters.H Tony Blair and Facques "hirac had a nasty spat over the M, but the nglish aren0t going to storm "alais any
time soon.
The present peace is unusual. 'istorically, powerful nations are the most war prone. The conventional wisdom is that
democracy fosters peace but this claim fails scrutiny. It is based on statistical studies that show democracies typically
don0t fight other democracies.
+et, the same studies show that democratic nations go to war about as much as other nations overall. $nd more recent
research makes clear that only the affluent democracies are less likely to fight each other. !oor democracies behave
much like non-democracies when it comes to war and lesser forms of conflict.
$ more powerful e1planation is emerging from newer, and older, empirical research - the Hcapitalist peace.H $s
predicted by >ontesquieu, $dam &mith, Iorman $ngell and others, nations with high levels of economic freedom not
only fight each other less, they go to war less often, period. conomic freedom is a measure of the depth of free market
institutions or, put another way, of capitalism.
The Hdemocratic peaceH is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom. *emocracy and
economic freedom typically co-e1ist. Thus, if economic freedom causes peace, then statistically democracy will also
appear to cause peace.
2hen democracy and economic freedom are both included in a statistical model, the results reveal that economic
freedom is considerably more potent in encouraging peace than democracy, -4 times more potent, in fact, according to
my own research. conomic freedom is highly statistically significant Aat the one-per-cent levelC. *emocracy does not
have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are ,7 times more prone to conflict
than those with very high levels.
But, why would free markets cause peaceE "apitalism is not only an immense generator of prosperityJ it is also a
revolutionary source of economic, social and political change. 2ealth no longer arises primarily through land or
control of natural resources.
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#0e 1ree 4ar2et is a 4oral necessity
"onclusion
The struggle to e1tend and preserve free markets must have as its primary focus the moral argument. &tate
interventionists stand naked before well-thought-out moral arguments for private ownership of property, voluntary
e1change, and the parity of markets. !eople readily understand moral arguments on a private basis--for e1ample, one
person does not have the right to use force against another to serve his own purposes. 'owever, people often see
government redistribution as an acceptable use of force. In a democratic welfare state that coercion is given an aura of
legitimacy. The challenge is to convince people that a ma?ority vote does not establish morality and that free markets
are morally superior to other forms of human organi5ation.
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Go;ern4ent coercion 6estroys 1ree6o4 J t0e 1ree 4ar2et syste4 is t0e 0i80est 4oral 8roun6 an6 will
sol;e all ot0er 5roble4s
Ja4es A Dorn <;ice 5resi6ent 1or aca6e4ic a11airs at t0e Cato Institute an6 5ro1essor o1 econo4ics at #owson
"ni;ersity in
Marylan6= +KK:L W0y Free6o4 Matters 0tt5LHHwwwcatoor8H5ubsHwt5a5ersH6ornBKGK1K:561
The future of civili5ation depends on preserving and spreading freedom. $s a moral principle, freedom means we
ought to respect private property rights, broadly understood as the rights to life, liberty, and property. $s a practical
matter, when private property rights are protected by law, individuals will be free to trade for mutual gain and be held
responsible for their behavior. &ocial and economic coordinationGor what ). $. 'ayek called :spontaneous order<G
emerges from the voluntary decisions of millions of free people under limited government and the rule of law. Those
nations that have failed to adopt freedom as a first principle have also failed to reali5e the benefits of freedom. They
have ignored the great liberal idea, as articulated in "he (aw by )rYdYric Bastiat in the mid-nineteenth century, that
:the solution of the social problem lies in liberty.< By :social problem< Bastiat meant the problem of coordination that
confronts every societyGthat is, the problem of satisfying people=s wants for goods and services without central
planning. The beauty of the market system, based on private property rights and freedom of contract, is that it allows
individuals to continuously ad?ust to new information about wants, resources, and technology, and to engage in
mutually beneficial e1changes. conomic freedom increases the range of choices and thus the wealth of nations. Those
countries with greater economic freedom have higher standards of living than those with less freedom Afigure ,C.
>oreover, countries that have liberali5ed more quicklyGas measured by the inde1 of economic freedomGhave tended
to grow faster than countries that have failed to liberali5e or that have liberali5ed more slowly Afigure 3C. conomists
Fames 6wartney and Robert %awson, the authors of the )raser Institute=s annual !conomic Freedom of the %orld, find
that :long term differences in economic freedom e1plain appro1imately two-thirds of the variation in cross-country per
capita 6*!.< It is no secret that countries that have opened to the forces of international trade and have restrained the
growth of government have prospered, while those countries that have limited the scope of the market have stagnated.
'ong @ong=s consistent adherence to market-liberal principles has resulted in long-run prosperity and the world=s
freest economy since ,/.4. In its 1223 4nde* of !conomic Freedom, the 'eritage )oundation and the %all Street
5ournal once again ranked 'ong @ong number one. (n hearing the good news, )inancial &ecretary 'enry Tang
remarked,:I am pleased virtues we have been upholding to keep 'ong @ong flourishing as a free market economy
have once again been reaffirmed by the international community.< Those virtues include credibility and reliability,
prudence and thrift, entrepreneurial alertness, personal responsibility, respect for others, and tolerance. They are
fostered by private property rights, the rule of law, freedom of contract, open trade, low ta1 rates, and limited
government. Iations that have not followed the virtues of 'ong @ong have not reaped the long-run benefits of
economic freedom. Iorth @orea, "uba, &udan, Iraq, and 'aiti are but a few e1amples. The lesson is that the virtues of
the market require constant practice if they are to survive and flourish. 6overnment policy must be market-friendly and
transparentJ it cannot be muddled. >arkets discount future effects of current policy changes. If those changes are in the
direction of greater economic freedom, they will be immediately rewarded and wealth created. Illiberal trade policies,
higher ta1 rates, increased government spending, erratic monetary policy, and wage-price controls undermine private
property rights, send negative signals to the global capital markets, and destroy the wealth of nations. The failure of
central planning in the &oviet Mnion and "hina has moved those countries in the direction of greater economic
freedom, but the ghost of communism still haunts Russia, while the "hinese "ommunist !arty has yet to abandon its
monopoly on power. %eaders of emerging market economies need to recogni5e that economic freedom is an important
component of personal freedom, that free-market prices and profits provide useful information and incentives to
allocate resources to where consumers Anot politicians or plannersC deem them most valuable, and that markets e1tend
the range of choice and increase human welfare. >ost important, leaders must understand that ultimately economic
liberali5ation requires limited government and constitutionally protected rights. merging market economies,
especially in $sia, have discovered the magic of the marketJ they have also found that chaos emerges when the
institutional infrastructure necessary for free markets is weakened by e1cessive government. 2hen politics trumps
markets, coercion and corruption follow. #0e Et0ical Basis the ethical basis of the market system is often overlooked,
but not by those like Khang &huguang, an economist at the Mnirule Institute in Bei?ing, who were deprived of their
economic liberties under central planning. 'e compares the coercive nature of planning with the voluntary nature of
the market and concludes; :In the market system . . . the fundamental logic is free choice and equal status of
individuals. The corresponding ethics . . . is mutual respect, mutual benefit, and mutual credit.<, The moral
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?ustification for individual freedom is selfevident. In !thics for the ew -illennium, the *alai %ama wrote;:2e all
desire happiness and wish to avoid suffering. . . . thical conduct is not something we engage in because it is somehow
right in itself but because, like ourselves, all others desire to be happy and to avoid suffering. 6iven that this is a
natural disposition, shared by all, it follows that each individual has a right to pursue this goal.< )reedom without rules
is an illusion. The famous Ken master &hunryu &u5uki wrote in his classic te1t, 6en -ind& Beginners -ind; :!eople,
especially young people, think that freedom is to do ?ust what they want. . . . But it is absolutely necessary . . . to have
some rules. . . . $s long as you have rules, you have a chance for freedom.< The rules necessary for a market-liberal
order are rules to protect the private sphere so individuals can pursue their self-interest while respecting the equal
rights of others. 2ithout clear rules to limit the use of force to the protection of persons and property, freedom and
?ustice will sufferGand economic development, properly understood, will cease. In ,.74 the great liberal *avid
'ume wrote that :the peace and security of human society entirely depend Pon adherence toQ the three fundamental
laws of nature, that of the stability of possession& of its transference by consent& and of the performance of promises<
A$ "reatise of ,uman atureC. 'is legacy of liberty should not be forgotten. De;elo54ent an6 Free6o4 in !conomic
$nalysis and )olicy in Underdeveloped Countries, the late !eter A%ordC Bauer argued that economic development and
freedom are inseparable; :I regard the e1tension of the range of choice, that is, an increase in the range of effective
alternatives open to people, as the principal ob?ective and criterion of economic development.< conomists have found
that countries with secure private property rights create more wealth Aas measured by real 6*! per capitaC than
countries in which property is not protected by law. Trade liberali5ation is vital to the process of development.
#oluntary international e1change widens consumers= range of effective choices and lowers the risk of conflict . There
is a saying in "hina; :%u wei 'e wu shu bu wei<G:If no unnatural control, then there is nothing you cannot do.< In the
"ao "e Ching, %ao T5u advocates the principle of nonintervention Awu weiC as the ideal way of ruling. The wise ruler
says,:I take no action and the people of themselves are transformed. I engage in no activity and the people of
themselves become prosperous.< 3 To take no action does not mean to do nothing, but rather , as "hinese scholar *erk
Bodde has noted, to refrain from those actions that are :forced, artificial, and unspontaneous.<L $ natural order is one
consistent with free markets and free peopleJ it is $dam &mith=s :simple system of natural liberty.<$s former "5ech
!resident #hclav 'avel so elegantly stated after the collapse of the &oviet Mnion, the free-market economy is :the only
natural economy, the only kind that makes sense, the only one that can lead to prosperity, because it is the only one
that reflects the nature of life itself.<7 %eaders in the 2est as well as the ast should keep the following five lessons in
the forefront of their minds as they contemplate future policy decisions; A,C private property, freedom, and ?ustice are
inseparableJ A3C ?ustice requires limiting government to the protection of persons and propertyJ ALC minimi5ing the use
of force to defend life, liberty, and property will ma1imi5e freedom and create a spontaneous market-liberal order J A7C
private free markets are not only moral, they create wealth by providing incentives to discover new ways of doing
things and increase the range of alternativesJ and A-C governments rule best when they follow the rule of law and the
principle of noninterference.
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Go;ern4ent 5ower ine;itably lea6s to war an6 4ass 8enoci6e J li4itin8 t0e 5ower o1 t0e 8o;ern4ent
an6 1osterin8 in6i;i6ual 1ree6o4 sol;es
-u6ol50 Jose50 -u44el <5ro1essor e4eritus o1 5olitical science at t0e "ni;ersity o1 $awaii= 1II7L
%(ower3 Genoci6e3 an6 Mass Mur6er) Journalo1 (eace -esearc0 /1 <1=L 1J1K
Iow for the overview. The principle conclusion emerging from previous work on the causes of war and this pro?ect is that
power kills, absolute power kills absolutely. The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to
the whims and desires of the elite, the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic sub?ects. The
more constrained the power of governments, the more it is diffused, checked and balanced, the less it will aggress on others
and commit democide.
8
$t the e1tremes of power, totalitarian communist governments murder their people by the tens of
millions, while many democracies can barely bring themselves to e1ecute even serial murderers. $s listed in Table , , this
century0s megamurderers --those states killing in cold blood , aside from warfare, ,,444,444 or more men, women, and
children--have murdered over ,-,,444,444 people, almost four times the almost L8,-44,444 battle-dead for all this century0s
international and civil wars up to ,/8.. The most absolute !ower, that is the communist M.&.&.R., "hina and preceding >ao
guerrillas, @hmer Rouge "ambodia, #ietnam, and +ugoslavia, as well as Ia5i 6ermany, account for near ,38,444,444 of
them, or 87 percent. Io one of the remaining megamurderers, which include the regimes of !akistan,
/
wartime Fapan, Iationalist "hina, "ambodia,
communist #ietnam, post-2ar II !oland,
,4
and communist +ugoslavia, were democratic when it committed its democide. Then there are the kilomurderers,
or those states that have killed innocents by the tens or hundreds of thousands, the top five of which were the "hina 2arlords A,/,.-,/7/C, $tatirk0s Turkey
A,/,/-,/3LC, the Mnited @ingdom Aprimarily due to the ,/,7-,/,/ food blockade of the "entral !owers and %evant in and after 2orld 2ar I, and the ,/74-
7- indiscriminate bombing of 6erman citiesC, !ortugal A,/3B-,/83C, and Indonesia A,/B--8.C. These are shown in Table ,. &ome lesser kilomurderers were
communist $fghanistan, $ngola, $lbania, Rumania, and thiopia, as well as authoritarian 'ungary, Burundi, "roatia A,/7,-77C, "5echoslovakia A,/7--7BC,
Indonesia, Iraq, the "5ar0s Russia, and Mganda. )or its indiscriminate bombing of 6erman and Fapanese civilians, the Mnited &tates must also be included on
this list. These and other kilomurderers add almost ,-,444,444 people killed to the democide for this century. $s listed in Table 3, the most lethal
regime in this century was that of the communist @hmer Rouge in "ambodia during ,/.- through ,/.8. In less than four
years of governing they e1terminated over L, percent of their men, women, and childrenJ the odds of any "ambodian
surviving these four long years was only about 3.3 to ,. $s mentioned, the $ppendi1 e1emplifies some of the estimates of
this killing. The ma?or and better known episodes and institutions for which these and other regimes were responsible are
listed in Table L. )ar above all is gulag--the &oviet slave-labor system created by %enin and built up under &talin. In some .4
years it likely chewed up almost 74,444,444 lives, over twice as many as probably died in some 744 years of the $frican
slave trade, from capture to sale in an $rab, (riental, or Iew 2orld market. In total, during the first eighty-eight years of
this century, almost ,.4,444,444 men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, fro5en,
crushed, or worked to deathJ or buried alive, drowned, hanged, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways
governments have inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citi5ens or foreigners. The dead even could conceivable be near a
high of LB4,444,444 people. This is as though our species has been devastated by a modern Black !lague. $nd indeed it has,
but a plague of absolute power and not germs. $dding the human cost of war to this democide total, governments have
violently killed over 34L,444,444 people in this century. Table 7 breaks down this toll by type of regime. )igure , graphs the
regime comparisons. Iow, democracies themselves are responsible for some of the democide. $lmost all of this is foreign
democide during war, and mainly those enemy civilians killed in indiscriminate urban bombing, as of 6ermany and Fapan in
2orld 2ar II. It also includes the large scale massacres of )ilipinos during the bloody $merican coloni5ation of the
!hilippines at the beginning of this century, deaths in British concentration camps in &outh $frica during the Boar 2ar, civilian deaths due to starvation
during the aforementioned British blockade, the rape and murder of helpless "hinese in and around !eking in ,/44, the atrocities committed by $mericans
in #ietnam, the murder of helpless $lgerians during the $lgerian 2ar by the )rench, and the unnatural deaths of 6erman prisoners of war in )rench and
$merican !(2 camps after 2orld 2ar II. $ll this killing of foreigners by democracies may seem to violate the principle that power
kills, absolute power kills absolutely, but really underlines it. )or in each case, the killing was carried out in secret, behind a
conscious cover of lies and deceit by those agencies and power-holders involved. $ll were shielded by tight censorship of the
press and control of ?ournalists. ven the indiscriminate bombing of 6erman cities by the British was disguised before the 'ouse of "ommons and
in press releases as attacks on 6erman military targets. That the general strategic bombing policy was to attack working men0s homes was kept secret still
long after the war. $nd finally, )igure 3 Aone of the most important comparisons on democide and power produced by this pro?ectC displays the range of
democide estimates for each regime, that is, level of power. $s mentioned over 8,,44 estimates of democide from over a thousand sources were collected to
arrive at a most likely low and high for democide committed by 3,/ regimes or groups. The totals that have been displayed in previous figures have been the
sum of conservatively determined mid-totals in this range. )igure 3 then presents for each type of regime, such as the authoritarian, this range resulting from
the sum of all the lows and highs for all the democide of all regimes of that type. The difference between the three resulting ranges drawn in the figure can
only be understood in terms of power.
,,
$s the arbitrary power of regimes increase left to right in the figure, the range of their democide ?umps accordingly
and to such a great e1tent that the low democide for the authoritarian regime is above the democratic high, and the authoritarian high is below the totalitarian
low. The empirical and theoretical conclusion from these and other results is clear. The way to virtually eliminate genocide
and mass murder appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom . This is the
ultimate conclusion of this pro?ect.
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Go;ern4ent 5ro;ision is ine11icient an6 ine11ecti;e M t0ree reasons
Blan23 "Mic03 +2
<-ebecca M Blan23 "Mic03 K/B+23 %W0en Can (ublic (olicy Ma2ers -ely on (ri;ate Mar2etsO #0e
E11ecti;e (ro;ision o1 Social Ser;ices3) Economic Journal *ol 11K Issue 7A+3 5C/7BC7I=
)irst, government inefficiencies might become large enough that even with somewhat higher
quality, the cost of allowing government management offsets the benefits. $s &tiglit5 A,/8/C has noted,
fpublic management0 is itself a public good, and one that is often hard for voters to observe easily. 2olf A,/88C
reviews a large number of studies on the comparative efficiency of the public and private sector,
noting that most -- but by no means all -- of them conclude the private sector is able to operate at lower Ain
some cases very much lowerC costs.PBQ )ew of these studies focus on social service areas, however. !oterba A,//BC
notes that it is not clear that the government is markedly less efficient in comparison to the non-profit sector, which
provides the primary private-sector alternative to the public sector in many areas of social services in the Mnited &tates.
&econd, the more that government is plagued by patronage and corruption problems, the less
attractive is the government management of services. &uch problems may be one particular reason why the
government is less efficient, but they are likely to also affect the quality of services provided, as well as the e1tent to
which the government meets public goals about access and equity in the provision of services. (f course, it is worth
noting that corruption in the public sector in many countries often mirrors corruption in the private sector. In this
situation, it is unclear which sector is the preferred provider of services.
Third, the government may be ineffective in providing higher quality services. !oor management
and inefficiencies in the public sector may be causally related to low quality services, in which case the
priceNquality tradeoff posited above is an inaccurate characterisationJ lower prices and higher quality may be
complements rather than substitutes. Indeed, in cases where the public sector underpays workers relative to the market,
or provides particularly bad managerial oversight, the quality of government-provided services may be very low. AThere
are plenty of e1amples of this in my current hometown of 2ashington, *.".C The lower the quality of publicly-provided
services, the less apparent force there is to the argument that the private sector will provide services at too low a quality
level. $s 2olf A,/88C has noted, there is e1tensive fnonmarket failure0 in government, ?ust as there may
be market failure in the private sector.
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Eli4inatin8 licensin8 re9uire4ents 1or 4e6ical establis04ents an6 restrictions on 4e6ical su55lies3
6ere8ulatin8 0ealt0 insurance3 an6 eli4inatin8 subsi6ies suc0 as Me6icai6 2ey to 8reater e11ecti;eness
an6 a;ailability o1 0ealt0 care
$o55e3 (ro1 E4eritus o1 Econ3 "ni;ersity o1 'e;a6a3 I/
<$ansB$er4ann $o55e3 (ro1 E4eritus o1 Econ3 "ni;ersity o1 'e;a6a3 K7H1II/3 %A FourBSte5 $ealt0B
Care Solution3) +ises ,nstitute, 0tt5LHH4isesor8H1ree4ar2etN6etailas5COcontrolP+DI=
It0s true that the M.&. health care system is a mess, but this demonstrates not market but government
failure. To cure the problem requires not different or more government regulations and bureaucracies, as self-
serving politicians want us to believe, but the elimination of all e1isting government controls. It0s time to get
serious about health care reform. Ta1 credits, vouchers, and privati5ation will go a long way toward decentrali5ing the
system and removmg unnecessary burdens from business. But four additional steps must also be taken; ,.
liminate all licensing requirements for medical schools, hospitals, pharmacies, and medical
doctors and other health care personnel. Their supply would almost instantly increase, prices would
fall, and a greater variety of health care services would appear on the market. "ompeting voluntary
accreditation agencies would take the place of compulsory government licensing--if health care
providers believe that such accreditation would enhance their own reputation, and that their consumers care about
reputation, and are willing to pay for it. Because consumers would no longer be duped into believing that there is such
a thing as a Hnational standardH of health care, they will increase their search costs and make more
discriminating health care choices. 3. liminate all government restrictions on the production and
sale of pharmaceutical products and medical devices. This means no more )ood and *rug $dministration,
which presently hinders innovation and increases costs. "osts and prices would fall, and a wider variety of better
products would reach the market sooner. The market would force consumers to act in accordance with their
own--rather than the government0s--risk assessment. $nd competing drug and device manufacturers and sellers, to
safeguard against product liability suits as much as to attract customers, would provide increasingly better product
descriptions and guarantees. L. *eregulate the health insurance industry. !rivate enterprise can offer
insurance against events over whose outcome the insured possesses no control. (ne cannot insure
oneself against suicide or bankruptcy, for e1ample, because it is in one0s own hands to bring these events about. Because a
person0s health, or lack of it, lies increasingly within his own control, many, if not most health risks, are actually uninsurable. HInsuranceH against risks
whose likelihood an individual can systematically influence falls within that person0s own responsibility. $ll insurance, moreover, involves the
pooling of individual risks. It implies that insurers pay more to some and less to others. But no one knows in advance, and with certainty, who the
HwinnersH and HlosersH will be. H2innersH and HlosersH are distributed randomly, and the resulting income redistribution is unsystematic. If HwinnersH
or HlosersH could be systematically predicted, HlosersH would not want to pool their risk with Hwinners,H but with other Hlosers,H because this would
lower their insurance costs. I would not want to pool my personal accident risks with those of professional football players, for instance, but
e1clusively with those of people in circumstances similar to my own, at lower costs. Because of legal restrictions on the health insurers0 right of
refusal--to e1clude any individual risk as uninsurable--the present health-insurance system is only partly concerned with insurance. The industry
cannot discriminate freely among different groups0 risks. $s a result, health insurers cover a multitude of uninnsurable risks, alongside, and pooled
with, genuine insurance risks. They do not discriminate among various groups of people which pose significantly different insurance risks. The
industry thus runs a system of income redistribution--benefiting irresponsible actors and high-risk groups at the e1pense of responsible individuals
and low risk groups. $ccordingly the industry0s prices are high and ballooning. To deregulate the industry means to restore it to unrestricted freedom
of contract; to allow a health insurer to offer any contract whatsoever, to include or e1clude any risk, and to discriminate among any groups of
individuals. Mninsurable risks would lose coverage, the variety of insurance policies for the remaining coverage would increase, and price
differentials would reflect genuine insurance risks. (n average, prices would drastically fall. $nd the reform would restore individual responsibility in
health care. 7. liminate all subsidies to the sick or unhealthy. &ubsidies create more of whatever is
being subsidi5ed. &ubsidies for the ill and diseased breed illness and disease, and promote
carelessness, indigence, and dependency. If we eliminate them, we would strengthen the will to live
healthy lives and to work for a living. In the first instance, that means abolishing >edicare and
>edicaid. (nly these four steps, although drastic, will restore a fully free market in medical
provision. Mntil they are adopted, the industry will have serious problems, and so will we, its
consumers.
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Abolis0in8 1e6eral 5ro8ra4s is t0e 1irst ste5 to sol;in8 5o;erty J allows 5ri;ate sector to 8row
Blanc0ette3 -esearc0 Fellow3 KD
<Ju6e Blanc0ette3 $enry $a?litt -esearc0 Fellow at t0e Foun6ation 1or Econo4ics E6ucation3 %#0e
S0ortco4in8s o1 Go;ern4ent C0arity) May +KKD3 #0e Free4an *olu4eL :D X IssueL 7
0tt5LHHwwwt0e1ree4anonlineor8H1eature6Ht0eBs0ortco4in8sBo1B8o;ern4entBc0arityH= HAC
'istory shows that it is only through private voluntary solutions that we see true human
compassion. (rgani5ations and individuals, in the spirit of compassion, provided poverty relief that
embraced generosity, but recogni5ed the dire consequences of hapha5ardly given aid. >ost social
workers of a century ago understood that good character, self-reliance, and strong social ties were virtues that must be
instilled in the poor if there were to be any gains made in alleviating poverty. Before the *epression private solutions
played an important moral and material role for the poor. 2hereas government relies on coercion, charities
and fraternal societies embody the qualities that make volunteerism socially advantageous.
"onversely, the past .4 years have shown that government has not prudently handled, and cannot
prudently handle, the plight of the poor. Rather than help those in need of assistance during times of trouble,
the federal government has imprisoned them in a political power game, resulting in increased dependence.
&nly abolition o1 t0e 8o;ern4ent 6ole will allow t0e 5ri;ate sector to once a8ain ac0ie;e t0e
le;els o1 social wel1are seen in t0e 5ast.
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Lower taC rates in6uce c0aritable 8i;in8 J stu6ies 5ro;e
Ben?in8, economics professor, K7
A"ynthia Ben5ing, !h.* *re1el Mniversity, $ssociate *ean of the "ollege of Business and !ublic $ffairs, "hairperson
and !rofessor of conomics and )inance, Thomas $ndrews :The effect of ta1 rates and uncertainty on contributory
crowding out<, &eptember 3447, $tlantic conomic Fournal
http;NNfindarticles.comNpNarticlesNmiShbB7,LNisSLSL3NaiSn3/,3-774NpgS,,NEtagDcontentJcol,C N$.".
$ccording to the results of this e1periment, uncertainty and ta1 rates significantly influence both the rate of
voluntary contributions and the crowding out effect. SubEects ;oluntarily contribute6 a 0i80er
5ercenta8e o1 inco4e w0en t0e taC rate was low and sub?ects were uncertain as to whether they would be
disadvantaged. This leads one to con?ecture that low income individuals with less education and skills may be more
inclined to voluntarily contribute to income support and social programs because their probability of needing such
support is higher. 'igh income, two wage earning families are less likely to ever need welfare, food stamps, etc. and,
consequently, are less inclined to voluntarily contribute to such programs. If this is the case, then ta1ation to compel the
contribution of higher income individuals may well increase the supply of income support and social programs. This
study points to progressive ta1ation as a means of maintaining or increasing the supply of social programs. 2ith respect
to crowding out, ID 5ercent o1 contributions were crow6e6 out w0en taC rates were increase6
1ro4 K to lK 5ercent.
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Failure to 5ri;ati?e colla5ses t0e econo4y
Bresi8er3 business writer Q e6itor3 KG
6regory Bresiger, business writer [ managing editor of %ra&er" Maga'ine, :The Ion-Issue that &hould be an issue<,
.NLN3448, #on >ises http;NNmises.orgNstoryNL434C N$.".
But they do matter, according to one of the great economic historians, Foseph &chumpeter. Indeed, history has
endless episodes of nations that e1perienced incredible economic and social problems owing to the
government, which took over bigger and bigger pieces of the economy.
If the will of the people demands higher and higher public e1penditures, if more and more means
are used for purposes for which private individuals have not produced them, if more and more
power stands behind this will, and if finally all parts of the people are gripped by entirely new ideas
about private property and the forms of life G then the ta1 state will have run its course and society
will have to depend on other motive forces for its economy than self-interest. This limit d can
certainly be reached. 2ithout doubt, the ta1 state can collapse.
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**Alternati;e to Go;ern4ent (ro;ision**
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#0e alternati;e is to reEect t0e coerci;e 5olicies o1 t0e a11ir4ati;e By e4bracin8 ne8ati;e 1ree6o4s3
t0e 1ree 4ar2et will alle;iate social ills3 turnin8 t0e case
-ot0sc0il6, Mniversity of %in5, #ienna, $ustria, K/
A@urt Rothschild, Mniversity of %in5, #ienna, $ustria, 344L, Reflections on an anniversary; )riedman0s "apitalism and
)reedom, Fournal of conomic &tudies, #olume L4, Iumber -, pp. -78---.A,4C, Ingenta"onnectC ?5
The usual distinction between :negative< and :positive< freedom is that the first demands that individuals
should not be interfered with when carrying out their desired actions Awhich in turn must not interfere with the
plans of other peopleC, while :positive< freedom is concerned with the question to what degree individuals are
given the opportunity to choose between different actions. Iothing speaks against adopting one0s personal
preference as a concept of :)reedom< which includes both aspects, the positive and the negative one. $martya &en or
Fohn Rawls are the outstanding e1amples of social scientists adopting such a view. But this wider perspective leads to
a more complicated situation when it comes to practical applications of one0s :philosophy<. 2hile policies and
institutions 9 in both politics and economics 9 may very well foster at the same time both positive and negative
freedoms, there are also frequent cases where the two come into conflict. Then, difficult problems of trade-offs can
ariseP3Q; 'ow much can be taken away from some people Ae.g. through ta1esC reducing the degree of their AnegativeC
freedom, in order to increase the degree of ApositiveC freedom of some other people Ae.g. through subsidiesC.
)riedman gets rid of such difficult choices in his abstract and practical deliberations by making negative
freedom a dominant and sole target. 'e draws a sharp division :between equality of rights and equality of
opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality or equality of outcome on the other< Ap. ,/-C. 2hile he
accepts the first target, he re?ects the second because it might come into conflict with the first. This
confrontation of the two supposedly contradictory alternatives has two decisive flaws. )irst, equality need not Aand
cannot in practiceC be a question of complete equality, but only of degrees of equality which makes it unnecessary to
draw a sharp either-or line, and second, the two alternatives are not completely independent of each other. In
particular, equality of opportunity is not independent of the degree of equality or inequality of material means.
)riedman, however, insists that the first alternative has to be the dominant principle of a :free< society. This
does not mean that he does not care about social and other societal problems. 'e does. But in his view t0ey
s0oul6 as 1ar as 5ossible be le1t to ;oluntary 5ri;ate acti;ities wit0 state inter1erence 2e5t at a
4ini4u43 because coercion is ab0orre6 . :I find it hard, as a liberal, to see any ?ustification for graduated
ta1ation solely to redistribute income. This seems a clear case of using coercion to take from some in order
to give to others and thus to conflict head-on with individual freedom< Ap. ,.7C. A66e6 to t0is reEection o1
coercion is Frie64an>s belie1 t0at t0e un6isturbe6 1ree 4ar2et wit0 its e11iciency can contribute to an
alle;iation o1 social 5roble4s Go;ern4ent 4oti;es an6 actions are re8ar6e6 wit0 6oubt an6 6istrust.
This brings problems connected with )riedman0s approaches to capitalism and government. )reedom 9 both in its
wider and narrower A)riedman-typeC sense 9 can be divided into political and economic freedom. In both cases, the
problem is 9 for )riedman the only one 9 that power-based coercion can force people to act differently from what they
really want to do. In the political field, this raises the question; how far the state should be allowed to interfere into
private decisions. This will be dealt with later. But political freedom is also connected with economic freedom, which
deals with freedom for transactions in the economic sphere. )or )riedman, with his stress on negative freedom and his
scepticism about government power, which would be enhanced by controlling economic affairs, economic freedom
achieves priority. :)reedom in economic arrangements d is an end in itself d and is also an indispensable
means toward the achievement of political freedom< Ap. 8, italics addedC.
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We s0oul6 reEect coercion 1or 6eliberati;e 6e4ocracy
Me6earis, *epartment of !olitical &cience, Mniversity of "alifornia, Riverside, K:
AFohn >edearis, *epartment of !olitical &cience, Mniversity of "alifornia, Riverside, 344-, &ocial >ovements and
*eliberative *emocratic Theory, British Fournal of !olitical &cience, L- ; -L-.- "ambridge Mniversity !ressC
I adopt a view of coercion rooted in the current conceptuali5ation of deliberation itself. Indeed, before offering
a definition, it is worth e1ploring the close connection between non-coercion and deliberation. (ne of the deliberative
theorists= basic premises is that only those decisions are legitimate that are 9 or could be 9 supported by citi5ens for
reasons they have reflected upon and think are good ones. "oercion, simply as it is conventionally understood 9 as
compelling through force or threats 9 stands in obvious contrast to such a notion of deliberation. )or coercion, in
this quite ordinary sense, would bypass the attempt to gain reasoned support. This is surely why *ry5ek contrasts
Rcoercion= with Rpersuasion= and contends that deliberative democratic theory in general Anot ?ust his varietyC
re?ects Rcoercion=.,, $ principled re?ection of coercion runs deep in the writings of 'abermas and Rawls,
who have not only endorsed deliberative democracy, but, more importantly, provided much of its intellectual
apparatus. In a frequently-cited formulation, 'abermas writes that Rparticipants in argumentation cannot avoid the
presupposition that dthe structure of their communication rules out all e1ternal or internal coercion other than the
force of the better argument and thereby also neutrali5es all motives other than that of the cooperative search for
truth.=,3 &uch a co-operative search for truth, or Raction oriented to reaching understanding=, is the principled
heart of at least one ma?or strand of deliberation.,L $ similar understanding of coercion is clearly also
embedded in Rawls=s central insistence that parties to deliberation offer each other reasons and forms of co-
operation that they can accept, as he puts it, Rfor the right reasons= 9 and not merely because of a Rbalance of
political and social forces= or Rsanctions=.,7 %ikewise, a number of central features of 6utmann and
Thompson=s influential deliberative writings would seem to rule out coercion; their Rawlsian commitment to
Rreciprocity=, one of three putative deliberative values, which involves a sole reliance on Rreasons that are shared or
could come to be shared=J their stringent demand that people who disagree Rcontinue to reason together to reach
mutually acceptable decisions=J and their disapproval of outcomes that turn, strategically, on actors= self-interests.,-
Bohman, similarly, makes the e1posing of coercion one of the three conditions of deliberative legitimacy in
pluralistic societies.,B (f course, deliberative democrats do not claim that politics can be entirely non-coercive, any
more than they claim politics can be entirely deliberative. But they do claim that decisions are democratically
legitimate only in so far as they are deliberative. $nd thus from their perspective, decisions are democratically
legitimate only in so far as the processes from which they result are non-coercive.
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-eEect coercion in 1a;or o1 ca5italis4 an6 in6i;i6ual ri80ts
Bi66le, editor and publisher of The (b?ective &tandard, KA
A"raig Biddle, editor and publisher of The (b?ective &tandard, The (b?ectivist &tandard, &pring 344B, #ol. ,, Io. ,,
:Introducing The (b?ective &tandard,< http;NNtheob?ectivestandard.comNissuesN344B-springNintroducing-the-ob?ective-
standard.aspC
In the realm of politics, we recogni5e that in order to take life-promoting action, a person must be free to do
soJ he must be free to act on the ?udgment of his mind, his basic means of living. The only thing that can stop
him from doing so is other people, and the only way they can stop him is by means of physical force. Thus, in order
to live peacefully together in a societyGin order to live together as civili5ed beings, rather than as barbariansG
people must refrain from using physical force against one another. This fact gives rise to the principle of
individual rights, which is the principle of egoism applied to politics. The principle of individual rights is the
recognition of the fact that each person is morally an end in himself, not a means to the ends of othersJ
therefore, he morally must be left free to act on his own ?udgment for his own sake, so long as he does not violate that
same right of others. This principle is not a matter of personal opinion or social convention or :divine
revelation<J it is a 4atter o1 t0e 1actual re9uire4ents o1 0u4an li1e in a social conteCt . $ moral society G
a civili5ed societyGis one in which the initiation of physical force against human beings is prohibited by law.
$nd the only social system in which such force is so prohibitedGconsistently and on principleGis pure, laisse5-
faire capitalism. "apitalismGwhich, contrary to widespread mis-education, is not merely an economic systemG
is the social system of individual rights, including property rights, protected by a strictly limited government.
In a laisse5-faire society, if people want to deal with one another, they may do so only on voluntary terms, by
uncoerce6 a8ree4ent. If they want to receive goods or services from others, they may offer to e1change value for
value to mutual benefitJ however, they may not seek to gain any value from others by means of physical force. !eople
are fully free to act on their own ?udgment and thus to produce, keep, use, and dispose of their own property
as they see fitJ the only thing they are not :free< to do is to violate the rights of others. In a capitalist society,
individual rights cannot legally be violated by anyoneGincluding the government.
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-eEection o1 t0e collecti;ist wel1are 5olicies o1 t0e a11 is critical to i4a8inin8 a better worl6 &nly
t0rou80 t0is can we establis0 concrete 1oun6ations 1or reasonable c0an8e
Ebelin8, president of )oundation for conomic )reedom, KA
ARichard beling, president of )oundation for conomic )reedom, (ctober 344B, :!rinciples >ust "ome Before
!olitics,< http;NNwww.nassauinstitute.orgNarticlesNarticleBLB.phpEviewDprintC
The real political task, however, is not to try to attract votes or nudge policy in the conte1t of the e1isting bell curve
of voter preferences. Rather, it is to move the curve in the direction of individual freedom, limited
constitutional government, and a truly free market. In other words, the task is to shift the curve0s dome over to
where its individualist tail end is today, so that someday the middle mass of voters will more or less hold views
generally consistent with classical-liberal ideas. But this requires looking beyond what is politically e1pedient
today. Indeed, it re9uires i8norin8 w0at see4 to be t0e boun6aries o1 t0e 5olitically 5ossible an6 instea6
t0in2in8 in ter4s o1 t0e 5olitically 6esirable . If policies really consistent with individual freedom are ever
to be implemented, we must first e1plain to our fellow citi5ens what such a society of freedom would look
like, how it would work, and why it is desirable. They must slowly but surely come to see the vision of
liberty. >aybe part of the reason so many people seem unable or unwilling to think beyond five minutes is that they
are so infrequently challenged to do. >aybe our fellow citi5ens find it 0ar6 to brea2 out o1 t0e current
4in6set o1 t0e eCistin8 inter;entionist wel1are state because t0ey are too rarely o11ere6 a clear an6
consistent case for the classical-liberal ideal and why it would be good for them and others they care about .
>aybe people are often trapped in the policies of the short run precisely because they almost never are presented with
a political and economic philosophy of freedom for the long run. !olitics will always only reflect the e1isting
distribution of people0s political views. !olitical campaigns, therefore, will never be the primary method for
transforming society from less free to more free. This will only happen outside of the narrow political
process-through a change in the climate of ideas. Though most people don0t know it, they are guided by an
implicit set of political and economic principles when they think about and decide on what they want
government to do. These principles are the ideological residues of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
collectivism. #0ey nee6 to be re5lace6 wit0 a new set o1 5olitical an6 econo4ic 5rinci5les3 t0ose o1
classical liberalis4 W0en a su11icient nu4ber o1 our 1ellow citi?ens acce5t classical liberalis43 5olitics
will 1ollow 5rinci5le an6 t0e inter;entionist wel1are state will be o55ose6 an6 1inally abolis0e6 This is
why a radical change in principles must come before any successful change in politics.
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Alt J ;iew t0e in;isible ;icti4s
*emystification of the &tate
$. #. *icey A,/,7; 3-.C wrote;
The beneficial effect of &tate intervention, especially in the form of legislation, is direct, immediate, and so to speak
visible, whilst its evil effects are gradual and indirect, and lie outside our sight.... 'ence the ma?ority of mankind must
almost of necessity look with undue favour upon government intervention. This natural bias can be counteracted only
by the e1istence, in a given society, ... of a presumption or pre?udice in favour of individual liberty, that is of laisse5-
faire.
(ne can hardly determine the casualties of war simply by looking at survivors. 2e must ask what happened to those
whom we do not see. &imilarly, when evaluating interventionist public policy we cannot evaluate it simply by looking
at its beneficiaries. 2e must discover its victims. >ost often the victims of public policy are invisible. To garner
greater public support against government command and control, we must somehow find a way to make those victims
visible.
In all interventionist policy there are those who are beneficiaries and those who are victims. In most cases the
beneficiaries are highly visible and the victims are invisible. $ good e1ample is the minimum wage law. $fter
enactment of an increase in the minimum wage law, politicians accompanied by television crews readily point to
people who have benefitted from the legislation. The beneficiaries are those with a fatter paycheck. Thus, the politician
can lay claim to the wisdom of his legislation that increased minimum wages. >oreover, the politician is also a
beneficiary since those now earning higher wages will remember him when election time comes around. By parading
minimum wage beneficiaries across the stage, those who oppose minimum wage increases can be readily portrayed as
having a callous, mean-spirited disregard for interests of low-wage workers.
$ political strategy of those who support liberty should be that of e1posing the invisible victims of minimum wage
laws. 2e need to show those who have lost their ?obs, or do not become employed in the first place, because their
productivity did not warrant being employed at the minimum wage. 2e should find a way to demonstrate ?obs
destroyed by minimum wages such as busboys, gasoline station attendants, and movie ushers. 2e must show how
marginally profitable firms have been forced out of business, though surviving firms may have the same number of
employees. 2e should show how capital was artificially substituted for labor as a result of higher mandated wages and
how firms have ad?usted their production techniques in order to economi5e on labor. The particular ad?ustments firms
make in response to higher mandated wages are less important than the fact that ad?ustments will be made.
$ more dramatic e1ample of the invisible victims of interventionist state policy can be found in the regulation of
medicines and medical devices, as in the case of the )ood and *rug $dministration A)*$C in the Mnited &tates.
ssentially, )*$ officials can make two types of errors. They can err on the side of undercaution and approve a drug
with dangerous unanticipated side effects. (r they can err on the side of overcaution, not approving a useful and safe
drug, or creating costly and lengthy drug approval procedures.
rrors on the side of undercaution lead to embarrassment and possibly loss of bureaucratic careers and promotions
because the victims of unsafe drugs will be visible through news stories of sick people, congressional investigations,
and hearings. 'owever, errors on the side of overcaution, through e1tensive delay in the approval of drugs--as in the
cases of propranolol, &eptra, and other drugs--impose virtually no costs on the )*$. #ictims of )*$ errors on the side
of overcaution are mostly invisible to the press, the public, and politicians.
Those victims should be made visible. (nce the )*$ Aor some other approving agencyC approves a drug widely used
elsewhere with no untoward effects, we should find people who died or needlessly suffered as a result of the )*$0s
delay. )or political efficiency we cannot simply offer intellectual arguments. 2e must get pictures and stories of )*$
victims in an effort to appeal to a sense of fair play, decency, and common sense among the citi5enry. But there is also
a role for intellectual arguments in the sense of teaching people that any meaningful use of Hsafe00 must see safety as a
set of tradeoffs rather than a category. The attempt to get a Hsafe00 drug means that people will die or needlessly suffer
during the time it takes to achieve greater safety. That toll must be weighted against the number of people who might
die or become ill because of the drug0s earlier availability and attendant unanticipated harmful side effects. !eople
should also be taught to understand that if a ,44 percent safe drug is ever achieved, it will be the only thing in this
world that is ,44 percent safe.
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A4ericans want s4aller 8o;ern4ent w0en taCes 4atter
Boa?, "ato0s e1ecutive vice president, KI
A*avid Boa5, "ato0s e1ecutive vice president, BN3LN4/, "$T( Institute, http;NNwww.cato-at-
liberty.orgN344/N4BN3LNamericans-want-smaller-governmentNC
$ new 2ashington !ost-$B" Iews poll again shows that voters prefer :smaller government with
fewer services< to :larger government with more services<;(bama has used the power and financial
resources of the federal government repeatedly as he has dealt with the country=s problems this year, to the
consternation of his Republican critics. The poll found little change in underlying public attitudes toward
government since the inauguration, with slightly more than half saying they prefer a smaller
government with fewer services to a larger government with more services. Independents, however,
now split B, to L- percent in favor of a smaller governmentJ they were more narrowly divided on
this question a year ago A-3 to 77 percentC, before the financial crisis hit.The !ost calls a -7 to 7, lead for
smaller government :barely more than half,< which is fair enough, though it=s twice as large as (bama=s margin over
>c"ain. It=s also twice as large as the margin the !ost found in the same poll in Iovember 344..I=ve always thought
the :smaller government< question is incomplete. It offers respondents a benefit of larger government9<more services<9
but it doesn=t mention that the cost of :larger government with more services< is higher ta1es. The question ought
to give both the cost and the benefit for each option. $ few years ago a Rasmussen poll did ask the
question that way. The results were that B7 percent of voters said that they prefer smaller
government with fewer services and lower ta1es, while only 33 percent would rather see a more
active government with more services and higher ta1es. $ similar poll around the same time,
without the information on ta1es, found a margin of -/ to 3B percent. &o it=s reasonable to conclude
that if you remind respondents that :more services< means higher ta1es, the margin by which
people prefer smaller government rises by about / points. &o maybe the margin in this poll would have been
something like -/ to L. if both sides of the question had been presented.
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A#L Can@t i4a8ine Con1ine4ent to t0e %5olitically 5ossible) 4a2es c0an8e i45ossible (re1er t0e
re1or4ist 5olicies
Ebelin8, president of )oundation for conomic )reedom, KA
ARichard beling, president of )oundation for conomic )reedom, (ctober 344B, :!rinciples >ust "ome Before
!olitics,< http;NNwww.nassauinstitute.orgNarticlesNarticleBLB.phpEviewDprintC
$t the same time, there are many people who talk about dealing with the dangers of bigger and bigger
government and the budgetary burdens it imposes on all of us. But, again, rather than focusing on
fundamentals, theirs is often only an attempt to find s0ortBter4 8i44ic2s to deal with the problems. This,
too, is the result o1 1ocusin8 on 5olitics . It0s often pointed out that the political preferences of voters are
distributed in the shape of a bell curve. $t the ends are the political He1tremists,H collectivists and individualists
respectively. In between, under the dome, are the vast ma?ority of voters who are somewhere Hin the middle.H If a
politician is to be elected, it is e1plained, he Por sheQ must appeal to a significant number in that middle, since
there are ?ust not enough votes at either end of the curve to win an election. Thus he Por sheQ must weave together a
patchwork of inconsistent and often contradictory positions that will reflect the diverse political views of his
potential constituents. This also limits what market-oriented think tanks in either 2ashington or in the various
state capitals can offer as policy options in the debates about the role of government. ven while seeming to
be nudging the debate more in a free-market, smaller government direction, th e boun6aries in w0ic0 t0ey
can 1ra4e t0eir 5ro5osals are constricte6 by w0at t0e 5oliticians consi6er V5olitically 5ossible .H
Beyond those boundaries the policy advocate becomes a Hkook,H a pie-in-the-sky Hnut,H an e1tremist who does
not reali5e that HnobodyH is going to take those views seriously. The policy advocate risks losing political
legitimacy and a hearing in the halls of power-which is why his organi5ation is located in that center of political
decision-making. #0is o1ten 4eans t0at 5olicy 5ro5osals are Vwatere6 6ownV to be 5olitically
acce5table. ven the defense of a policy is often couched in terms designed to avoid the impression that its advocates
support anything as radical as, well, laisse5 faire and the end to the interventionist welfare state. $ny detailed and
fundamental discussion of government policy is therefore implicitly ruled out of court. &nce attention is 1ocuse6
on in1luencin8 w0at 8o;ern4ent is 6oin8 ri80t now3 t0e 6ebate is 6e1ine6 by w0at is 5olitically
5racticable to6ay.
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**(ri;ate C0arities C(**
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(ri;ate c0arities are 4ore success1ul t0an t0e 8o;ern4ent at 5ro;i6in8 ai6
#anner3 6irector o1 0ealt0 an6 wel1are stu6ies at t0e Cato Institute3 IA
<Mic0ael #anner3 6irector o1 0ealt0 an6 wel1are stu6ies at t0e Cato Institute3 Dece4ber IA3 Cato
(olicy -e5ort3 %-e5lacin8 Wel1are)3 0tt5LHHwwwcatoor8H5ubsH5olicyNre5ortHc5rB1GnAB10t4l=
!rivate efforts have been much more successful than the federal government0s failed attempt at
charity. $merica is the most generous nation on earth. $mericans already contribute more than
_,3- billion annually to charity. In fact, more than 8- percent of all adult $mericans make some
charitable contribution each year. In addition, about half of all $merican adults perform volunteer
workJ more than 34 billion hours were worked in ,//,. The dollar value of that volunteer work was
more than _,.B billion. #olunteer work and cash donations combined bring $merican charitable
contributions to more than _L44 billion per year, not counting the countless dollars and time given informally
to family members, neighbors, and others outside the formal charity system. !rivate charities have been more
successful than government welfare for several reasons. )irst, private charities are able to
individuali5e their approach to the circumstances of poor people in ways that governments can
never do. 6overnment regulations must be designed to treat all similarly situated recipients alike.
6lenn ". %oury of Boston Mniversity e1plains the difference between welfare and private charities on that point.
HBecause citi5ens have due process rights which cannot be fully abrogated . . . public ?udgments
must be made in a manner that can be defended after the fact, sometimes even in court.H The result
is that most government programs rely on the simple provision of cash or other goods and services
without any attempt to differentiate between the needs of recipients.
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Go;ern4ent eli8ibility re9uire4ents s2ew ai6 6istribution
In addition to being better able to target individual needs, private charities are much better able to
target assistance to those who really need help. Because eligibility requirements for government
welfare programs are arbitrary and cannot be changed to fit individual circumstances, many people
in genuine need do not receive assistance, while benefits often go to people who do not really need
them. >ore than 74 percent of all families living below the poverty level receive no government
assistance. +et more than half of the families receiving means-tested benefits are not poor. Thus, a
student may receive food stamps, while a homeless man with no mailing address goes without.
!rivate charities are not bound by such bureaucratic restrictions.
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Go;ern4ental 5ro8ra4s are ine11icientY (ri;ate c0arities aren@t
!rivate charity also has a better record of actually delivering aid to recipients. &urprisingly little of
the money being spent on federal and state social welfare programs actually reaches recipients. In
,/B-, .4 cents of every dollar spent by the government to fight poverty went directly to poor people. Today, .4 cents
of every dollar goes, not to poor people, but to government bureaucrats and others who serve the
poor. )ew private charities have the bureaucratic overhead and inefficiency of government
programs.
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A 8reater 6i;ersity o1 solutions 4a2es 5ri;ate c0arities 4ore e11ecti;e
&econd, in general, private charity is much more likely to be targeted to short-term emergency
assistance than to long-term dependence. Thus, private charity provides a safety net, not a way of
life. >oreover, private charities may demand that the poor change their behavior in e1change for
assistance. )or e1ample, a private charity may reduce or withhold benefits if a recipient does not
stop using alcohol or drugs, look for a ?ob, or avoid pregnancy. !rivate charities are much more
likely than government programs to offer counseling and one-on-one follow-up rather than simply
provide a check. By the same token, because of the separation of church and state, the government cannot
support programs that promote religious values as a way out of poverty. +et church and other
religious charities have a history of success in dealing with the problems that often lead to poverty.
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(ri;ate C0arity causes an attitu6inal s0i1t encoura8in8 reci5ients to esca5e 5o;erty
)inally, and perhaps most important, private charity requires a different attitude on the part of both
recipients and donors. )or recipients, private charity is not an entitlement but a gift carrying
reciprocal obligations. $s )ather Robert &irico of the $cton Institute describes it, H$n impersonal check given
without any e1pectations for responsible behavior leads to a damaged sense of self-worth. The
beauty of local Pprivate charitableQ efforts to help the needy is that . . . they make the individual
receiving the aid reali5e that he must work to live up to the e1pectations of those helping him out.H
!rivate charity demands that donors become directly involved. )ormer +ale political science
professor Fames !ayne notes how little citi5en involvement there is in government charity;
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(ri;ate C0arity 5ro4otes 5artici5atory 6e4ocracy
!rivate charity demands that donors become directly involved. )ormer +ale political science
professor Fames !ayne notes how little citi5en involvement there is in government charity; 2e
know now that in most cases of government policy making, decisions are not made according to the
democratic ideal of control by ordinary citi5ens. !olicy is made by elites, through special interest
politics, bureaucratic pressures, and legislative manipulations. Insiders decide what happens, shaping the
outcome according to their own preferences and their political pull. The citi5ens are simply bystanders.
!rivate charity, in contrast, is based on Hhaving individuals vote with their own time, money, and
energy.H
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&nly t0e counter5lan sol;es J in1or4al 5ri;ate networ2s are not only sol;e 5o;erty but 5rotect 2ey
;alues
Mltimately, the struggle to achieve and preserve freedom must take place in the habits and minds of individuals. $nd, as
admonished by the "onstitution of the &tate of Iorth "arolina A$rt. I, &ec. L-C, HThe frequent reference to fundamental
principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.00 It is those fundamental principles that deliver
economic efficiency and wealth, not the other way around. )undamental moral principles or values are determined in
the arena of civil society. #alues such as thrift, hard work, honesty, trust and cooperative behavior, based on shared
norms, are the keys to improving the human condition and provide the undergirding for a free-market economy. Fust as
important are such social institutions as respect for private property, sanctity of contracts, educational institutions, clubs,
charities, churches, and families. $ll those institutions provide the glue to hold society together in terms of common
values and provide for the transmission of those values to successive generations. Too often informal institutions and
local networks are triviali5ed and greater favor is given to the intellectual0s narrow conception of what constitutes
knowledge and wisdom. The importance of informal networks such as friends, church members, neighbors, and families
cannot be underestimated--as demonstrated in the following e1ample of small proprietorships.P,Q The critical
determinants of a proprietor0s success are perseverance, character, ability, and other personal characteristics. Banks
seldom finance the establishment of such business. >ost small businesses are financed through friends and family. The
reason is that those are the people who have the lowest cost in acquiring the necessary information about the proprietor0s
characteristics deemed critical for success. $lso, friends and family, who lend the proprietor money, have a personal
stake in the business and have an incentive to moderate their likely bias in favor of the borrower. "learly, a formal
lending institution could query friends and relatives. 'owever, the information obtained would have greater bias
because friends and relatives would not have sufficient stake in the business to offset any personal bias they had in favor
of the borrower.
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(ri;ati?ation 5ro4otes c0oice an6 increases 9uality o1 ser;ices to all 5eo5le
The case for privati5ation includes other claims besides improved efficiency, budget savings, and increased economic growth. The
key word is choice. $dvocates claim that privati5ation will enlarge the range of choice for
individuals while serving the same essential functions as do traditional programs. Thus, if &ocial
&ecurity were privati5ed, the )ederal government would still require people to put aside funds for
retirement but would allow them to choose their own retirement invest ments. ducational vouchers would
not abolish laws requiring children to go to school but would allow families to choose which one. $sset sales and shifts of services
from public agencies to private contractors might permit greater choice among suppliers. !roponents of privati5ation
maintain that greater choice would serve the in terests of equity. The rich have always been able to
afford private schoolsJ educa tional vouchers would give the middle classes and the poor that ability.
&ocial &ecurity, they say, favors whites, whose longer life e1pectancy enables them to receive
greater retirement benefits than do blacksJ privati5ation would allegedly correct that bias. $ccording
to the privati5ers, greater freedom of choice will gener ally lead to a more ?ust distribution of
benefits.
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(ro6uct c0oice because o1 5ri;ati?ation will resol;e t0e ine11iciency 5re;entin8 0i80 9uality 8oo6s an6
ser;ices
"hoice is unquestionably the single strongest point in the case for privati5a tion. The uniformity of
public programs and services is often a grave limitation. ven where it is not logically required, the
demands of equal treatment are often interpreted to prohibit heterogeneity in public services. Rules
requiring uniform pricing also impede the production of varied services, especially those of high
quality. These barriers to heterogeneity have long been a weakness of public ser vices, but the
problem grows more serious as personal income increases with eco nomic growth. %arger numbers of
consumers demand the more varied, specially designed services available previously only to those with the highest incomes. This
demand for qualityGor rather for different qualities G constitutes a source of dissatisfaction with the public sector that may be
e1pected to grow.
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(ri;ati?in8 is a 5rere9uisite to eli4inatin8 5o;erty
Blanc0ette3 -esearc0 Fellow3 KD
<Ju6e Blanc0ette3 $enry $a?litt -esearc0 Fellow at t0e Foun6ation 1or Econo4ics E6ucation3 %#0e
S0ortco4in8s o1 Go;ern4ent C0arity) May +KKD3 #0e Free4an *olu4eL :D X IssueL 7
0tt5LHHwwwt0e1ree4anonlineor8H1eature6Ht0eBs0ortco4in8sBo1B8o;ern4entBc0arityH= HAC
)or large charities such as the &alvation $rmy and smaller local charities run by churches and other
private organi5ations, the fight against poverty has been going on for the past ,-4 years. Tragically,
stan6in8 in t0eir way 0as been t0e 1e6eral 8o;ern4ent. Besides an effort to wage :war< on
poverty beginning in the ,/B4s, the federal government has attempted to intercede and dole out aid since
the beginning of )ranklin Roosevelt=s Iew *eal. These interventions have proven costly and yielded
disastrous results. By continually si50onin8 1un6s away 1ro4 t0e 5ri;ate sector, law4a2ers and
bureaucrats further 6i4inis0 t0e ability o1 ci;il society to 6eal wit0 t0e 5roble4 o1 5o;erty A$s
"harles >urray shows in Lo"ing (roun&, poverty was declining steadily through the ,/-4s and ,/B4s up until the
6reat &ociety programs kicked in during the early ,/.4s.C
If the plight of the poor is to be truly addressed, $mericans should study the lessons of the past. arlier in the
twentieth century, private charities offered a more effective cure for chronic indigence, and it was
through mutually beneficial activities and voluntary funding that the spirit of $merican compassion was
unleashed. In t0e best interests o1 t0e 5oor, t0e 8o;ern4ent s0oul6 wit06raw itsel1 co45letely
1ro4 all acti;ities 6esi8ne6 to 0el5 t0e4 an6 allow ci;il society its 1ull ran8e o1 4otion.
Mnfortunately, most social commentators see increased state action as the best Aindeed, the onlyC way to fight poverty.
2ith apologies to Ian >cwan, the welfare state has become :the repository of collective fantasy.< !rivate charities,
they often argue, financed by volunteers and private donations, cannot meet the immense burden of welfare provision.
$dvocates of public assistance see :private enterprise< as an economic system that functions on 'obbesian self-interest
and that would leave the poor to suffer if profit could not be squee5ed from their labor.
>any proponents of laisse5 faire recogni5e these common protestations, but are unable to provide cogent rebuttal. (n
the surface it would seem that only government, with its vast infrastructure and immense financial
resources, can improve the plight of the poor. !rivate charities, sub?ect to the vagaries of voluntary donations,
are a far less reliable source of income.
+et if this were the case, how is it that after more than 74 years since the 6reat &ociety and more
than _8 trillion spent Ain 3444 dollarsC so little headway has been made by the government in
alleviating povertyE This is not to say that poverty has not diminished in $merica. Indeed , the market
economy has virtually eliminated e1treme poverty in the Mnited &tates. The average poor $merican lives
a lifestyle that would be envied by most of the world=s citi5ens. But this is a product of the market economy not
government handouts. It is only through wealth creation, not wealth distribution, that we see the
wellspring of human progress.
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(ri;ate c0arities sol;e 5o;erty
Awenius, retired attorney, G7
ARobert $wenius, retired attorney, :2hy Iot !rivate "harity<, Iovember ,/87 The )reeman #olume; L7 Issue; ,,
http;NNwww.thefreemanonline.orgNcolumnsNwhy-not-private-charityNC N$.".
)or some period of time there has been considerable evidence that private charity is superior to
government welfare as a means of overcoming poverty in $merica. mpirical data suggests that
private charity indeed would do more for the poverty-level families of this nation than is being
achieved under the present welfare system. 'owever, we must not conclude that this seemingly radical plan is
anything new in the annals of mankind. In the nineteenth century one of ngland=s most powerful voices for social
reform, "harles *ickens, professed a belief in private charity as opposed to public charity. 'e opposed government
charity because of its ineffectiveness. 'e was convinced that the polestar of charity was the human being=s innate
concern for another creature. 'e felt that the aid and assistance e1tended by private persons was more
powerful, useful, and kind than the charity of government. Fust to cite his views is to affirm the favored
position of private charity, as in the following statement; )ollowing the Iapoleonic 2ars much discontent and unrest
prevailed in ngland, but instead of revolution the #ictorian $ge brought relative peace, manifested by great reforms
such as the Reform $cts of ,8L3, the )actory Reform of ,8LL, and the !oor %aws of ,8L7. 2ith these reforms passed,
the general bent of the programs was to treat the symptoms of poverty, not the causes. $s a result, there was a great
alienation of the working masses and only partial satisfaction within the commercial and industrial strata of society.
That is the very same complaint we hear today concerning our welfare laws; alienation of welfare clients and complaint
of the ta1payers who are shouldering the burden of the necessary ta1ation to support the system. Today in the
Mnited &tates the bulk of the donating public make their contributions to philanthropy by ta1es
through their government or privately to organi5ed charities. There is negligible warmth of heart
between the public donors Ata1payersC and the recipientsGalbeit, there is slight concern by those giving
funds as to direct knowledge of the state of affairs or indigency of the beneficiaries. There is undoubtedly more concern
in this regard in the case of private charities. $lso, there is some little suspicion on the part of many
contributors that a considerable number of those who ask for charity are undeserving. This same
attitude was true during *ickens= time when, beginning about ,8,8, the upper classes made attempts to protect
themselves by forming a >endicity &ociety, where subscribers contributed funds to the &ociety rather than give directly
to beggars. The &ociety investigated each case to see if each had merit.
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6overnment programs are ineffective and trade-off with private efforts.
Awenius, retired attorney, G7
ARobert $wenius, retired attorney, :2hy Iot !rivate "harity<, Iovember ,/87 The )reeman #olume; L7 Issue; ,,
http;NNwww.thefreemanonline.orgNcolumnsNwhy-not-private-charityNC N$.".
The adoption of welfare state procedures and plans tends to encourage the destructive activity of the
modern state in the mass liquidation and redistribution of wealth. The normal and hitherto accepted
role of government has been to maintain law, ?ustice, and order, defend the nation abroad, and to
permit every man the ownership of his property. In general, the government=s business in the past was to
protect the common welfare of its citi5ens.
The destructive effect of the welfare state is manifested in its e1propriation, ta1ation, or arbitrary
creation of money and creditGall done in the name of the poor. The effect of this damaging
tendency is to abolish the independent citi5en and foster the idea that all the people should look to
2ashington for subsistenceGi.e., to become parasites, wholly dependent on government for all their
needs and wants. 2ith this tendency, the politicians follow a short-term e1pediency of approving sophisticated theft
Ain redistributing the wealthC without regard to ultimately damaging long-term results.
The very people who have done so much and will do so much in aiding private charityGthe great
middle classGare economically squee5ed by the welfare state and find its capacity to support
private charity greatly diminished.
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(ri;ate c0arities sol;e coercion
-ee63 a6Eunct sc0olar3 K1
A%awrence 2. Reed, an ad?unct scholar of the >ises Institute, president of the >ackinac "enter for !ublic !olicy in
>idland, >ichigan, :"harity and )ree 2ill<, 8N/N344, http;NNmises.orgNstoryN.-,CN$.".
)rom start to finish, what private charities do is a manifestation of free will. Io one is compelled to
provide assistance. Io one is coerced to pay for it. Io one is required to accept it. $ll parties come
together of their own, individual volition. $nd that=s the magic of it. The link between the giver, the
provider, and the receiver is strong precisely because each knows he can walk away from it at the
slightest hint of insincerity, broken promises, or poor performance. Because each party is giving of his own time
or resources voluntarily, he tends to focus on the mission at hand and doesn=t get bogged down or
diverted by distant or secondary agendas, like filling out the proper paperwork or currying favor with the
political powers-that-be.
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(ri;ate c0arity best J tar8ets causes3 not sy45to4s
Jo0nston3 economist, IG
Fim Fohnston, economist and a member of the board of directors of the 'eartland Institute3RWel1are an6 C0arityL
.es3 #0ere Is a Di11erence)3 JunyHJuly 1IIG http;NNwww.newcoalition.orgN$rticle.cfmEartIdD.B8
There are probably more solutions than there are causes for poverty. The reason is that many HsolutionsH
are not well considered, and sometimes they actually worsen the condition of the poor. "learly, effective help for the
poor takes more than ?ust good intentions. 2ealth and poverty have been important topics in economics for more than
344 years since $dam &mith, a professor of moral philosophy, published The 2ealth of Iations in ,..B. (ne of the
most important contributions made recently to the literature is by Fennifer Roback >orse, a fellow
economist who is a person of deep religious conviction. >orse has compared government welfare and
private charity in a way that helps to understand the issue in a new light. &he points out that 5ri;ate
c0arity o5erates to treat 5articular causes o1 5o;erty. The help is tailored to the individual
person. By contrast, government welfare does not, and should not, discriminate among recipients. The
discretion of social workers must be circumscribed in order to reduce corruption in the system.
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#aCes tra6e o11 wit0 c0arity
Garret an6 -0ine, economic researchers, KI
Thomas $. 6arrett and Russell >. Rhine, economic researchers at the )ederal Reserve,:6overnment 6rowth and
!rivate "ontributions to "harity<, Fuly 344/ http;NNresearch.stlouisfed.orgNwpN344.N344.-4,3.pdfCN$.".
2e obtained the interesting result that a decrease in state and local government spending on education increases private
giving to education, and that increased education giving then leads to a reduction in federal government spending on
education. 2e argued that this one-way relationship is a result of changing fundraising efforts and the nature of state
and local government versus federal government education e1penditures Ageneral appropriations versus grants,
respectivelyC and the relative si5e of each toward total education e1penditures. In addition to a reduction in
private charitable contributions resulting from government spending on charitable organi5ations,
government growth itself, ignoring the destination of government spending, may reduce private charitable
contributions. !rivate contributions may decrease because of reduced disposable income that results
from higher ta1es used to fuel future government growth.
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*****"#ILI#A-IA'ISM G&&D H DE&' BAD*****
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**"til Goo6 For -i80ts**
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"tilitarianis4 u50ol6s sel1Bowners0i5 an6 t0us liberty
Bailey3 lecturer (olitics at (rinceton3 ID
<Ja4es Bailey3 lecturer (olitics at (rinceton3 1IID3 -tilitarianism, ,nstitutions, an& Justice3 &C1or6
"ni;ersity (ress3 5 1AK=
I have also tried to show that attempts to subvert utilitarianism through appeals to formal properties
about theories of ?usticeGsuch as finality and publicityGdo not work either. The finality of utilitarianism is
unlikely to be in ?eopardy in a world in which people cannot suffer horrible acts as patients or alienating acts as agents.
The rules protecting self-ownership, which are necessary to prevent e1ploitation, also forbid the
horrible acts and allow individuals the liberty to do much of what they see as with their lives. The
question of utilitarianism0s subversion in its finality by grossly, unfair distributive arrangements is
answered by a set of institutions in which no deep suffering is allowed and a generous provision is made
for educational opportunities for all.
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"tilitarianis4 is best J it 5rotects ri80ts w0ile not totally reEectin8 all 5olicies t0at 4i80t in1rin8e
$ar;ey3 JD .ale3 K+
<(0ili5 $ar;ey3 JD .ale3 S5rin8 +KK+3 %$u4an -i80ts an6 Econo4ic (olicy DiscourseL #a2in8
Econo4ic an6 Social -i80ts Seriously3) // Colum. uman %ights !. %ev. /:/=
!erhaps the clearest illustration of this compromise or balancing principle is the distinction drawn in constitutional ?urisprudence between the standard of review applied by courts in deciding whether
legislative enactments comply with the qual !rotection "lause of the )ourteenth $mendment. %aws that do not infringe on certain constitutionally
protected rights will pass muster if there is a mere rational basis for their enactment, whereas laws
that do infringe on such rights require more compelling ?ustification, with the level of ?ustification varying
depending on the right at issue. ,/B 'uman rights claims have bite precisely because they declare that
certain actions may be improper, even if those actions are supported by a ma?ority of the population,
indeed, even if the actions in question would increase the total utility of the population as a whole.
But it is not necessary to take the position that rights-based claims should always trump conflicting
utility-ma1imi5ing purposes. ,/. It should be possible to honor multiple goals in public policy
decision-making.
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"til 5rotects ri80ts in social an6 constitutional 0ierarc0ies
Bailey3 lecturer (olitics at (rinceton3 ID
AFames Bailey, lecturer !olitics at !rinceton, ,//., Utilitarianism& 4nstitutions& and 5ustice, (1ford Mniversity !ress, p.
,-L-,-7C
ven in a world full of rules and institutionsGlike that of ImperfectiaGthere is still normative work for
utilitarianism to do. The foundation for this work stems from an argument in chapter , that the work of
utilitarianism is more likely a form of local rather than global ma1imi5ing, of making the best use of
new information and opportunities on the margin rather than a complete revolution of social
relations. In imperfect worlds, this work thus includes local ma1imi5ation, constitutional change,
and e1ceptional case guidance. In addition there is a kind of distinctive normative work specifically for utilitarians
in venal oligarchies. To provide anything like a full theory of any of these things here would require an entire new book.
2hat I do provide is merely a series of thumbnail sketches of the problems. The aim is to show that there is still
plenty of value in a consciously held global theory of utilitarianism, and therefore we should not fall hack
only on common sense and whatever reasonable institutions are lying about.
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"tilitarian calculus is t0e only way to 6eter4ine ri80ts@ relati;e i45ortance
Bran6t3 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y S " Mic0 1II+
-ic0ar6 Morality3 "tilitarianis43 an6 -i80ts Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress (8 1II
Before turning to possible H deeperH difficulties, let me make ?ust one point favorable to the utilitarian view, that it tells
us, in principle, how to find out what are a person0s rights, and how stringent they are, relative to each other, which is
much more than can be said of most other theories, unless reliance on intuitions is supposed to be a definite way of
telling what a person0s rights are. 'ow does one do this, on the utilitarian theoryE The idea, of course, is that we have to
determine whether it would ma1imi5e long-range e1pectable utility to include recognition of certain rights in the moral
code of a society, or to include a certain right with a certain degree of stringency as compared with other rights. A)or
instance, it might be optimistic to include a right to life with more stringency than a right to liberty and this with more
stringency than the right to pursue happiness.C &uppose, for instance, one wants to know what should be the scope of the
H right to life.H Then it would be proper to inquire whether the utility-ma1imi5ing moral system would require people to
retrain from taking the life of other adults, more positively to support life by providing adequate medical care, to abstain
from life-termination for seriously defective infants or to refrain from abortion, to require abstaining from assisting a
person with terminal illness in ending his own life if he requests it, to refrain from assisting in the discharge of a
sentence of capital punishment, or to refrain from killing combatants in war time and so on. If one wants to know
whether the right to life is stronger than the right of free speech on political sub?ects, it is proper to inquire whether the
utility ma1imi5ing moral code would prefer free speech to the cost of lives Aand in what circumstancesC.
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**"til Goo6L Generics**
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#0eir 4oral i45erati;es re;ol;e aroun6 a 1lawe6 libertarian 4et0o6B conse9uences 4ust be e;aluate6
1irst to esca5e t0e cycle
Frie64an3 (olitical Science at Bernar6 "ni;ersity3 ID
<Je11erey Frie64an3 (oliSci Bernar6 "3 1IID3 VW0at>s Wron8 wit0 Libertarianis43V Critical %eview3
*olu4eL /3 55 7/:B7/A=
The effect of libertarian straddling on libertarian scholarship is suggested by a passage in the scholarly appendi1 to
Boa5=s collection of libertarian essays, The %ibertarian Reader. There, Tom 6. !almer Aalso of the "ato InstituteC writes
that in libertarian scholarship, :the moral imperatives of peace and voluntary cooperation are brought together with a
rich understanding of the spontaneous order made possible by such voluntary cooperation, and of the ways in which
coercive intervention can disorder the world and set in motion comple1 trains of unintended consequences< ABoa5
r//.b, 7,B, emphasis addedC. !almer=s ambiguous :brought together< suggests Awithout coming right out and sayingC
that even if there were no rich understanding of spontaneous order, libertarianism would be
sustained by :moral imperativesE= But in that case, why develop the rich understanding of
spontaneous order in the first place, and why emphasi5e its importance now that it has been
developedE &pontaneous order is, on !almer=s own terms, irrelevant, since even if a rich understanding of it yielded
the conclusion that markets are less orderly or less spontaneous than states, or that the quality of the order they produce
is inferior to that produced by states, we would still be compelled to be libertarians by moral imperatives. The premise
of the philosophical approach is that nothing can possibly trump freedom-cum-private property. But if libertarian
freedom is an end in itself and is the greatest of all values, one=s endorsement of it should not be
affected in the slightest by such empirical questions as whether libertarianism would spell starvation
or warfare. The premise of the empirical approach is, conversely, that such consequences do matter.
2hy investigate the effects of libertarianism if they could not conceivably outweigh the putative
intrinsic value of private propertyE If a priori reasoning tells us that laisse5-faire capitalism is ?ust,
come what may, then why should we care to find out what may, in fact, comeE
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(olicy 4ust be ;iewe6 t0rou80 a conse9uentialist 1ra4ewor2B sli55in8 into t0e libertarian 4in6set
only recreates t0e root cause o1 t0e a11ir4ati;e 0ar4s
Frie64an3 (olitical Science at Bernar6 "ni;ersity3 ID
<Je11erey Frie64an3 (oliSci Bernar6 "3 1IID3 VW0at>s Wron8 wit0 Libertarianis43V Critical %eview3
*olu4eL /3 55 7:GB7:I=
(n the one hand, the reclamation of the nlightenment legacy can lead in far more directions than the politicalGscience
path I have suggested. It is surely important to launch anthropological, economic, historical, sociological, and
psychological investigations of the preconditions of human happiness. $nd post-libertarian cultural historians and
critics are uniquely positioned to analy5e the unstated assumptions that take the place of the requisite knowledge in
determining democratic attitudes. $ prime candidate would seem to be the overwhelming focus on
intentions as markers for the desirability of a policy. If a policy is well intended, this is usually
taken to be a decisive consideration in its favor. This heuristic might e1plain the moralism that observers since
Tocqueville have noticed afflicts democratic cultures. To date, this phenomenon is relatively une1plored. $nalogous
opportunities for insightful postlibertarian research can be found across the spectrum of political behavior. 2hat is
nationalism, for e1ample, if not a device that helps an ignorant public navigate the murky waters of politics by applying
a simple :us-versus-them< test to any proposed policyE !ursuit of these possibilities, however, must be accompanied by
awareness of the degeneration of postwar skepticism into libertarian ideology. If the post-libertarian social
scientist yields to the hope of re-establishing through consequentialist research the antigovernment
politics that has until now been sustained by libertarian ideologyJ she will only recreate the
conditions that have served to retard serious empirical inquiry. It is fashionable to call for political
engagement by scholars and to deny the possibility that one can easily isolate one=s work from
one=s political sympathies. But difficulty is no e1cuse for failing to try. %ibertarians have even less of an
e1cuse than most, since, having for so long accused the intellectual mainstream of bias and
insulation from refutation, they should understand better than anyone the importance of subverting
one=s own natural intellectual complacency with the constant reminder that one might be wrong.
The only remedy for the sloppiness that has plagued libertarian scholarship is to become one=s own
harshest critic. This means thinking deeply and skeptically about one=s politics and its premises and,
if one has libertarian sympathies, directing one=s scholarship not at vindicating them, but at finding
out if they are mistaken.
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Go;ern4ents 4ust wei80 conse9uences
$arries3 e6itor an6 1oun6er o1 'ational Interest3 Senior Fellow at Centre 1or In6e5en6ent Stu6ies3 I7
<&wen $arries3 e6itor an6 1oun6er o1 'ational Interest3 Senior Fellow at Centre 1or In6e5en6ent
Stu6ies3 S5rin8 1II/H1II73 %(ower an6 Ci;ili?ation3) The National ,nterest.
!erformance is the test. $sked directly by a 2estern interviewer, :In principle, do you believe in one standard of human
rights and free e1pressionE<, %ee immediately answers, :%ook, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.< This might
appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its conte1t it might also be interpreted as an
appreciation of the fundamental point made by >a1 2eber that, in politics, it is :the ethic of responsibility<
rather than :the ethic of absolute ends< that is appropriate. 2hile an individual is free to treat human
rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and
the competing claims of other ends. &o once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take
their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of
prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever
be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of
implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.
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Moral absolutis4 su11ers 1ro4 tunnel ;ision t0at 8enerates e;il an6 5olitical irrele;ance
Isaac3 (0D.ale3 (ro1 (oliSci In6ianaBBloo4in8ton3 6ir Center 1or t0e Stu6y o1 De4ocracy an6
(ublic Li1e3 K+
<Je11rey C Isaac3 (0D.ale3 (ro1 (oliSci In6ianaBBloo4in8ton3 6ir Center 1or t0e Stu6y o1
De4ocracy an6 (ublic Li1e3 S5rin8 +KK+3 %En63 Means3 an6 (olitics3) /issent +aga0ine, ;ol 7I3 no +=
$s writers such as Iiccolo >achiavelli, >a1 2eber, Reinhold Iiebuhr, and 'annah $rendt have taught, an
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be
morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws; A,C It fails to
see that the purity of one=s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. $b?uring
violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thingJ but if
such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean
conscience of their supportersJ A3C it fails to see that in a world of real violence and in?ustice, moral purity
is not simply a form of powerlessnessJ it is often a form of complicity in in?ustice. This is why, from the standpoint
of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating
violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent in?ustices with any effectJ and ALC it fails to see
that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentionsJ it is the effects of
action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Fust as the alignment with :good<
may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of :good< that generates evil. This is the lesson of
communism in the twentieth century; it is not enough that one=s goals be sincere or idealisticJ it is equally
important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to ?udge these effects in
pragmatic and historically conte1tuali5ed ways. >oral absolutism inhibits this ?udgment. It alienates
those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. $nd it undermines political effectiveness.
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"tilitarianis4 2ey to 5olicy 4a2in8
-atner3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7 <Leonar6 G -atner 5D/1B+3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7
$o1stra Law Journal %#0e "tilitarian I45erati;eL Autono4y3 -eci5rocity3 an6 E;olution)
$ein&nline=
volutionary progression toward ma?oritarian decision-making follows from the utilitarian function of social
organi5ation to enhance human needNwant fulli,lment.: Because the needNwant preference of community
members are best known to them, resource allocations and behavior constraints that significantly
reflect their in- put best implement those preferences. The needNwant fulfillment of such members
e1pands with their approval of community decision-making institutions. &uch approval lowers the
costs of dissenter disruption while increasing psychological security and productive efficiency. The
utilitarian enhanced-fulfillment goal is most effectively implemented by communities that optimi5e
Anot ma1imi5eC individual participation in policy formulation. (ptimal participation involves the selection
of capable officials who make independent community fulfillment decisions but remain sub?ect to effective community
supervision. &elf-constrained ma?oritarianism thus appears to be the evolving political counterpart of utilitarianism, a
continuity suggested by the progression of western nations from autocracy toward representative democracy, the
enhanced needNwant fulfillment that has accompanied the progression, and the inability of totalitarian governments to
match that fulfillment.
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(olicy4a2ers s0oul6 a6a5t utilitarian calculus J a55licable t0rou80out society
Goo6inIK PRobert. 6oodin :The Mtilitarian Response.< d p. ,74-, http;NNbooks.google.comNbooksE
idDlLKBw?@S,Se"[pgD!$B,[lpgD!$B,[dqDj33That,kIksubmit,kiskakfallacy
j33kgoodin[sourceDbl[otsD/hMe6n%T5#[sigDMR'MwLuam)!y#m@wTy6,onBevKI[hlDen[eiD5@1m&sf#>p"t
gf%v!Ly*w[saD^[oiDbookSresult[ctDresult[resnumD,Q
The distinction I shall here propose works along a dimension orthogonal to that one. Instead of differentiating utilitarianisms
on the basis of what they are used to choose, I suggest doing so on the basis of who is supposed to use the utilirarian calculus
to make choices, Implicitly, contemporary discussions of varieties of utilitatianism are all standardly addresses, first and
foremost, to individuals acting in their personal capacities and making choices which, while they may affect others as well,
principally affect the chooser=s own lives, Implicitly, public officials= choices of general social policy. $ different menu of
options 9 in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different- is available to public and private users. That, I
submit, is a fallacy. It does not matter who is using the utilitarian calculus, in what circumstances and for what purposes.
Msing the felicific calculus for micro-level purposes of guiding individuals choices of personal conduct is altogether different
from using it for macro-level purposes of guiding public officials= shoices of general social policy. $ different menu of
options 9 in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different 9 is available to public and private choosers.
Those differences are such as to neutrali5e in the public sphere, most of the ob?ections standardly lodged against
utilitarianism in the private sphere. True through such complaints may be as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of personal
conduct, they are irrelevant Aor anyway much less problematicC as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of public policy. (r
so I shall argue.
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In a nuclear worl63 you 0a;e to wei80 conse9uences
Bo23 (ro1 (0il Bran6eis3 GG
<Sissela Bo23 (ro1 (0il Bran6eis3 1IGG3 Applie& Ethics an& Ethical Theory, e6 Da;i6 -osent0al an6
Fu6lou S0e0a6i3 55 +K+B+K/=
The same argument can be made for @ant=s other formulations of the "ategorical Imperative; :&o act as to use
humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as
a means<J and :&o act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal @ingdom of nds.<
Io one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of
himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal @ingdom of nds for the sake of ?ustice.
To risk their collective death for the sake of following one=s conscience would be, as Rawls said, :irrational, cra5y.<
$nd to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons
from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. )or although it is
true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the %atin ma1im
presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriouslyGperhaps to the point of
deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.
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"tilitarianis4 necessitates 5ublic 5olicy t0at re9uires t0at lea6ers ta2e t0e action w0ic0 is in t0e best
interest o1 5eo5le
S0aw (0iloso50y (ro1essor 1III <Willia4 $ S0aw3 1III3 (0iloso50y an6 C0air o1 t0e (0iloso50y at
SJS"3 %conte45orary et0icsL ta2in8 account o1 utilitarianis4) 5 1D1B+=
Mtilitarianism ties right and wrong to the promotion of well-being, but it is not only n personal ethic or a guide to
individual conduct. lt is also a Hpublic philosophylH - that is, a normative basis for public policy and the structuring of
our social, legal, and political institutions. Indeed, it was ?ust this aspect of utilitarianism that primarily engaged
Bentham, ?ohn &tuart >ill, his father Fames, and their friends and votaries. )or them utilitarianism was, first and
foremost, a social and political philosophy and only secondarily a private or personal moral code. In particular, they saw
utilitarianism as providing the yardstick by which to measure, assess, and, where necessary, reform government social
and economic policy and the ?udicial institutions of their day. In the public realm, utilitarianism is especially
compelling. Because of its consequentialist character, a utilitarian approach to public policy
requires officials to base their actions, procedures, and programs on the most accurate and detailed
understanding they can obtain of the circumstances in which they are operating and the likely
results of the alternatives open to them. Realism and empiricism are the hallmarks of a utilitarian orientation, not
customary practice, unverified abstractions, or wishful !romotion of the well being of all seems to be the appropriate,
indeed the only sensible, touchstone for assessing public policies and institutions, and the standard ob?ections to
utilitarianism as a personal morality carry little or no weight against it when viewed as a public
philosophy. "onsider, for instance, the criticisms that utilitarianism is too impersonal and ignores one0s individual
attachments and personal commitments, that it is coldly calculating and concerned only with ma1imi5ing, that it
demands too much of moral agents and that it permits one to violate certain basic moral restraints on the treatment of
others. The previous two chapters addressed sorne of these criticismsJ others will be dealt with in "hapter 8. The point
here, though, is that far from undermining utilitarianism as a public philosophy, these criticisms
highlight its strengths. 2e want public officials to be neutral, impersonal. and detached and to
proceed with their eyes firmly on the effects of the policies they pursue and the institutions that their
decisions shape. !olicy making requires public officials to address general issues, typical
conditions. and common circumstances. Inevitably, they must do this through general rules, not on a case by
case basis. $s e1plained later in this chapter, this fact precludes public officials from violating the rights of
individuals as a matter of policy. >oreover, by organi5ing the efforts of countless individuals and compelling
each of us to play our part in collective endeavors to enhance welfare, public officials can make it less likely that
utilitarianism will demand too much of any one individual because others are doing too little. Mtilitarians G will
seek to direct and coordinate people0s actions through effective public policy and to reshape, in
utility-enhancing ways, the institutions that structure the choices people face. By doing so,
utilitarians can usually accomplish more good than they can through isolated individual action,
however dedicated and well intentioned. )or this reason, they will strive to aster institutions that false over
from individuals much of the task of promoting the general welfare of society. 6eneral welfare is a broad goal, of
course, and sensible policies and institutions will typically focus on more specific desiderata - such
as promoting productivity, increasing individual freedom and opportunity, improving people=s
physical health, guaranteeing their personal security, and so on G that contribute significantly to
people0s well-being. Implementing even there goals can prove difficult. )urthermore, many of the problems facing
society have no simple answers because they are tangled up with contested issues of fact and controversial questions of
psychology, sociology, and economics. To the e1tent that utilitarians disagree among m themselves over these matters,
their policy recommendations will diverge. Ievertheless, by clarifying what is at stake and continually orienting
discussion toward the promotion of well-being, a. utilitarian approach provides the necessary framework for addressing
questions of institutional design and for fashioning effective public policy. The present chapter e1plicates the utilitarian
approach to three matters that have long engaged social and political philosophers and that concern.
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Conse9uences 4atter J t0e tunnel ;ision o1 4oral absolutis4 8enerates e;il an6 5olitical irrele;ance
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Deontolo8y is ba6 in t0e conteCt o1 5ublic 5olicy J 1i;e reasons
Woller3 1IID <Gary3 Econo4ics (ro1essor at B."3 (olicy Currents3 June3
0tt5LHHa5sa5olicysectionor8H;olDN+HD+561 3 5 11=
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$t the same time, deontologically based ethical systems
have severe practical limitations as a basis for public
policy . $t best, a priori moral principles provide only
general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs
and do not themselves suggest appropriate public
policies, and at worst , they create a regimen of
regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately
address the problem or actually making it worse . )or
e1ample, a moral obligation to preserve the
environment by no means implies the best way , or any
way for that matter, to do so , ?ust as there is no a priori
reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve
the environment will actually do so . $ny number of
policies might work, and others, although seemingly
consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly.
That deontological principles are an inadequate basis
for environmental policy is evident in the rather
significant irony that most forms of deontologically
based environmental laws and regulations tend to be
implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level
enforcement officials. >oreover, ignoring the relevant
costs and benefits of environmental policy and their
attendant incentive structures can , as alluded to above,
actually work at cross purposes to environmental
preservation . AThere e1ists an e1tensive literature on
this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often
perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. &ee, for
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e1ample, $ckerman, ,/8,J Bartrip and )enn, ,/8LJ
'awkins, ,/8L, ,/87J 'awkins and Thomas, ,/87.C
ven the most die-hard preservationistNdeontologist
would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome . The
above points are perhaps best e1pressed by Richard
)lathman, The number of values typically involved in
public policy decisions, the broad categories which
must be employed and above all, the scope and
comple1ity of the consequences to be anticipated
militate against reasoning so conclusively that they
generate an imperative to institute a specific policy . It is
seldom the case that only one policy will meet the
criteria of the public interest A,/-8, p. ,3C. It therefore
follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an
ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy
alternatives and the problems they address, and the
public must be reasonably assured that a policy will
actually do something about an e1isting problemJ this
requires the means-end language and methodology of
utilitarian ethics. 6ood intentions, lofty rhetoric, and
moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times
a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy .
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MaCi4i?in8 all li;es is t0e only way to a11ir4 e9ual an6 uncon6itional 0u4an 6i8nity
"ummiskey, ,//B A*avid, $ssociate !hilosophy !rofessor at Bates "ollege, @antian
Conse9uentialis43 5 17:B17A=
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2e must not obscure the issue by characteri5ing this type
of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract
:social entity.< It is not a question of some persons
having to bear the cost for some elusive :overall social
good.< Instead, the question is whether some persons
must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other
persons. Robert Io5ick, for e1ample, argues that :to
use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect
and take account of the fact that he is a separate person,
that his is the only life he has.< But why is this not
equally true of all those whom we do not save through
our failure to actE By emphasi5ing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to
sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one
life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a
conscientious @antian agent, an agent motivated by the
unconditional value of rational beings, chooseE $
morally good agent recogni5es that the basis of all
particular duties is the principle that :rational nature
e1ists as an end in itself< A6>> 73/C. Rational nature
as such is the supreme ob?ective end of all conduct. If one
truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves
ma1imally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible
Achapter -C. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-
consequentialist @antian needs to ?ustify agent-centered
constraints. $s we saw in chapter ,, however, even
most @antian deontologists recogni5e that agent-
centered constraints require a non- value-based
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rationale. But we have seen that @ant=s normative
theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end.
'ow can a concern for the value of rational beings lead
to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this
would prevent other more e1tensive losses of rational
beingsE If the moral law is based on the value of
rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale
for prohibiting a moral agent from ma1imally
promoting these two tiers of valueE If I sacrifice some for the sake of others,
I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings.
!ersons may have :dignity, that is, an unconditional and
incomparable worth< that transcends any market value A6>> 7LBC, but
persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others
Achapters - and .C. The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may
never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational
beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.
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"tilitarianis4 is t0e 4ost 4oral outloo2 5ro;i6es t0e 4ost bene1its 1or t0e 4ost nu4ber o1 5eo5le
:"alculating "onsequences; The Mtilitarian $pproach to thic<, *eveloped by >anuel *elas9ue?, "laire An6re3
Thomas S0an2s3 &.F., an6 >ichael F. Meyer, This article appeared originally in Issues in thics #3 I, A2inter
1IGIC, http;NNwww.scu.eduNethicsNpracticingNdecisionNcalculating.html
(ver the years, the principle of utilitarianism has been e1panded and refined so that today there are many
variations of the principle. )or e1ample, Bentham defined benefits and harms in terms of pleasure and pain.
Fohn &tuart >ill, a great ,/th century utilitarian figure, spoke of benefits and harms not in terms of pleasure and
pain alone but in terms of the quality or intensity of such pleasure and pain. Today utilitarians often describe
benefits and harms in terms of the satisfaction of personal preferences or in purely economic terms of monetary
benefits over monetary costs. Mtilitarians also differ in their views about the kind of question we ought to ask
ourselves when making an ethical decision. &ome utilitarians maintain that in making an ethical decision, we
must ask ourselves; H2hat effect will my doing this act in this situation have on the general balance of good
over evilEH If lying would produce the best consequences in a particular situation, we ought to lie. (thers,
known as rule utilitarians, claim that we must choose that act that conforms to the general rule that would have
the best consequences. In other words, we must ask ourselves; H2hat effect would everyone0s doing this kind of
action have on the general balance of good over evilEH &o, for e1ample, the rule Hto always tell the truthH in
general promotes the good of everyone and therefore should always be followed, even if in a certain situation
lying would produce the best consequences. *espite such differences among utilitarians, however, most hold to
the general principle that morality must depend on balancing the beneficial and harmful consequences of our
conduct.
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Et0ics are accesse6 t0rou80 t0e e;aluation o1 conse9uences t0rou80 an i45artial outloo2
*avid &anford $orner3 !olicies for a Rnanosociety=; "an we learn now from our future mistakesE +KK: -
bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar
$t the same time >oor wishes to retain the notion that consequences count that is that Rdthe evaluation of a
given policy requires the evaluation of the consequences and often the consequences of that policy compared
with other the consequences of other possible policies= A>oor, ,///, p.BBC. >oor=s approach involves two
stages. )irstly, the application of an Ri45artiality test@ and then secondly the appraisal of the various outcomes
and conse9uences o1 actions an6 5olicies3 wei80in8 t0e 8oo6 conse9uences an6 t0e ba6 conse9uences3 of
those policies surviving the impartiality test. In the first stage deliberation takes place over the various policies
to determine whether or not they meet ethical criteria. $ policy is determined to be ethical if AaC it does not cause
any unnecessary harm to individuals and groups and AbC it supports individual rights, the fulfilling of duties etc.
In the second stage the best policy is selected Rfrom the set of ?ust policies arrived at in the deliberation stage by
ranking ethical policies in terms of benefits and A?ustifiableC harms=. In carrying out this evaluation of policies
we are required to; RdAaC weigh carefully between the good consequences and bad consequences in ethical
policies, and AbC distinguish between disagreements about facts and disagreements about principles and values,
when deciding which ethical policy should be adopted= ATavani, 3447, B4 9 B,C.
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#urn J calculation is ine;itable an6 Eusti1ie6 J e;ery action re9uires calculation3 an6 re1usin8 to
en8a8e in calculation 4eans allowin8 t0e worst atrocities to occur
Ca45bell, !rofessor of International !olitics at the Mniversity of Iewcastle, 1998 P*avid, ational
Deconstruction7 8iolence& 4dentity& and 5ustice in Bosnia, p. ,8B-,88Q
That undecidability resides within the decision, *errida argues, H that ?ustice e1ceeds law and calculation , that the unpresentable e1 ceeds the determinable
cannot and should not serve as alibi for stay ing out of ?uridico-political battles, within an institution or a
state, or between institutions or states and others. H
,4/
Indeed, H incalculable ?us tice requires us to calculate.H )rom where
do these insistences comeE 2hat is behind, what is animating, these imperativesE It is both the character of infinite ?ustice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that
because of its undecidability multiplies responsi bility, and the fact that Hleft to itself, the incalculable and giving 9do natrice: idea of ?ustice is always
very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse cal culation.H ,.4
The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of
madness and compels the decision to avoid Hthe bad,H the Hperverse calculation,H even Hthe worst.H This is
the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point , the Hat least necessary condition,H for
the organi5ation of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. $nd it is a duty that responds to practical
political concerns when we rec ogni5e that *errida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those
violences Hwe recogni5e all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of 1enophobia, racism, anti-
&emitism, reli gious or nationalist fanaticism.H
)urthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recogni5es the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of ?ustice, is not content with simply
avoiding, con taining, combating, or negating the worst-violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility,
commissions a HutopianH strat egy. Iot, a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered Hunrealistic,H but one
which in respecting the necessity of calculation takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, !must
take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable "ones of morality or
politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and inter national, public and private, and so on.! H0 $s *errida declares,
HThe condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain e*perience and e*periment of the possibility of the impossible7 the testing of the aporia from which one may
invent the only possible invention& the impossible invention.;;< This leads *errida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his 'abermasian critics, could hardly
have e1pected; HIothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. 2e cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not
without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities.H
,7
-esi6in8 wit0inBan6 not 1ar below t0e sur1aceBo1 Derri6a>s account o1 t0e eC5erience o1 t0e un6eci6able as t0e conteCt 1or t0e 6ecision is t0e 6uty o1
6econstructi;e t0ou80t3 t0e res5onsibility 1or t0e ot0er3 an6 t0e o55osition to totalitarianis4 it entails #0e Le;inasian su55le4ent t0at Critc0ley ar8ues 6econstruction
re9uires wit0 res5ect to 5olitics t0us 6raws out t0at w0ic0 is alrea6y 5resent It is3 t0ou803 5er0a5s an ele4ent t0at nee6s to be 6rawn out3 1or Derri6a 0as been can6i6
about3 an6 o1ten critici?e6 1or3 0is 5olitical 0esitancy In answer to a 9uestion about t0e 5otential 1or translatin8 t0e Vt0eoretical ra6icality o1 6econstructionV into a Vra6ical
5olitical praxis3V Derri6a con1esse6 <0is ter4= Vt0at I 0a;e ne;er succee6e6 in 6irectly relatin8 6econstruction to e'isting 5olitical co6es an6 5ro8ra44esV
11:
#0is
Vfailure" is derived not from any apolitical sentiment within de constructive thought but from the "fundamentally
metaphysical" nature of the political codes within which both the right and the left presently operate. The
problem for politics that this disjuncture cre ates is, accor6in8 to Derri6a3 that one has "to gesture in opposite di rections
at the same time on the one hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political codes
governing reality! on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical and engaged man ner whenever the
necessity arises." #0is3 Derri6a la4ents3 results in a V6ual alle8ianceV an6 V5er5etual uneasinessV w0ereby t0e lo8ic o1 an ar8u4ent structure6 in ter4s o1
Von t0e one 0an6V an6 Von t0e ot0er 0an6V 4ay 4ean t0at 5olitical action3 w0ic0 1ollows 1ro4 a 6ecision between t0e co45etin8 0an6s3 is in t0e en6 insu11icient to t0e
intellectual 5ro4ise o1 6econstructi;e t0ou80t
1A
But in The 1ther ea&ing, Derri6a>s re1lection on t0e 9uestion an6 5olitics o1 Euro5ean i6entity3 t0e 6i11iculty o1
si4ultaneously 8esturin8 in 6i11erent 6irections is 5ose6 in an a11ir4ati;e 5olitical 4anner
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-eEection o1 5re6iction is an i45licit 5re6iction w0ic0 un6ercuts 8oo6 5re6ictions
Fit?si44ons KA
A>ichael, defense analyst in 2ashington *.". for +lobal )olitics and Strategy. :The !roblem of Mncertainty in
&trategic !lanning.< 787.7 A344BC, pp. ,L,-,7B. nhttp;NNwww.informaworld.comN,4.,484N44L/BLL4B4,4B3848oJ dNl
.N,-N4/C
)inally, the planning for post-war operations in Iraq offers another perspective on the tangled relationship between
uncertainty and strategy. !roblems of predicting the future are at the heart of intelligence analysis and its role in
national-security strategy. 2hile few would question the fragility of intelligence estimates or the chequered history of
?udgements made by the M& intelligence community, prediction remains an important part of its mission. Beyond
collecting and reporting raw information, intelligence organisations are often e1pected to identify trends and consider
the implications of alternative strategies on the behaviour of allies and adversaries. To accomplish this difficult
mission, intelligence analysts must rely on two crucial resources; good analytic tradecraft that provides transparent
standards of evidence, and sub?ect-matter e1pertise that enables an appreciation for the subtleties of comple1 human
phenomena. But standards of evidence and sub?ect-matter e1pertise are e1actly the sorts of factors decision-makers
sceptical of the reliability of prediction might be apt to discount. If uncertainty defines the strategic environment, then
what greater insight can the e1pert analyst bring to bear on strategy than the generalistE This attitude could marginalise
intelligence analysis in strategic decision-making. M& planning for the aftermath of the Iraq 2ar e1emplifies how such
marginalisation has played a significant role in recent strategic decision-making. In the ?udgement of !aul !illar, the
senior M& intelligence official for >iddle ast analysis from 3444 to 344-, Rwhat is most remarkable about prewar
M.&. intelligence on Iraq is not that it got things wrong and thereby misled policymakersJ it is that it played so small a
role in one of the most important M.&. policy decisions in recent decades=.3B 2hile great volumes of ink have been
spilled in the debate over intelligence estimates of Iraqi nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, there is much more
clarity about the intelligence community=s estimates of the political environment the M& would face in post-war Iraq.
Those estimates accurately predicted most of the ma?or challenges that developed, from insurgency and sectarian
violence to the strengthening of Iran=s geopolitical hand and the galvanising effect on foreign radical Islamists.3. The
reported e1pectations of most key administration officials bore little resemblance to these predictions.38 Rumsfeld=s
famous distinction between Rknown unknowns= and Runknown unknowns= came in response to a reporter=s question on
the intelligence supporting assertions of linkages between the Iraqi government and terrorist organisations.3/ The
implication of his remark was that presumption of a genuine Iraqi9terrorist linkage was ?ustified because the absence
of evidence to support the presumption did not conclusively disprove it. 'ere, as with the post-war planning
assumptions, uncertainty served to level the playing field between facts and analysis, on the one hand, and the
preconceptions of senior leadership on the other. >any of the M& government=s e1perts on Iraq and the $rab world
outside the intelligence community were also marginalised in the planning for the Iraq 2ar. In 3443, the &tate
*epartment launched the R)uture of Iraq !ro?ect= to write a detailed plan for the governance of a post-&addam
democratic Iraq. !articipants included do5ens of career >iddle ast specialists from the &tate *epartment and the
intelligence community, as well as native Iraqis. The pro?ect=s report covered a wide variety of topics, from
development of a constitution to the management of municipal utilities. In the end, however, leaders in the 2hite
'ouse and the !entagon viewed the report as too pessimistic and ignored many of its conclusions.L4 $nother well-
publicised instance where decision-makers re?ected e1pert advice on weak grounds was the public e1change between
!entagon civilian leaders and the $rmy chief of staff regarding the number of ground troops required for successful
post-hostilities operations in Iraq. (ne month prior to the invasion, 6eneral ric &hinseki told the &enate $rmed
&ervices "ommittee that establishing security and conditions for political stability in Iraq following the end of ma?or
combat operations would take Rseveral hundred thousand= coalition ground troops. 'is estimate was based on the
application of troop-topopulation ratios from previous security and stabilisation operations.L, 2hile fairly
rudimentary, the thrust of this analysis was shared by a variety of e1pert analysts outside the government. L3 Two days
after &hinseki=s testimony, both Rumsfeld and *eputy &ecretary of *efense !aul 2olfowit5 publicly renounced the
estimate. 2olfowit5 told the 'ouse Budget "ommittee that &hinseki was Rwildly off the mark=, and offered several
unsubstantiated and, in retrospect, incorrect predictions about post-war attitudes toward $merican forces among Iraqis
and M& allies. 'aving made these predictions, he then proceded to re?ect the validity of making predictions, insisting
that the Rmost fundamental point is that we simply cannot predict ... we have no idea what we will need unless and
until we get there on the ground=.LL In effect, by denying the validity of prediction, 2olfowit5 locked himself into a
very specific but implicit prediction that conformed to his own preconceptions. The point is neither that $rmy generals
are always better qualified to make such ?udgements than civilians, nor that hindsight shows &hinseki=s ?udgement to
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be better than 2olfowit5=s. It is that the grounds for the decision that was actually made on troop levels were
conspicuously shakier than those of &hinseki=s ?udgement, and yet they prevailed. The mistakes that were made in the
Bush administration=s post-war planning for Iraq are entirely consistent with a bias in decision-making against the
authority of e1pertise in predicting the future, and the invocation of uncertainty in this instance became a rationale for
rigidity in planning rather than fle1ibility.
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(re6ictions are 2ey to c0ec2 6isasters
Kurasawa K7
P)uyuki @urasawa, !rofessor of &ociology 9 +ork Mniversity of Toronto, :"autionary Tales; The 6lobal "ulture of
!revention and the 2ork of )oresight<, "onstellations, ,,A7C, 3447Q
2hen engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some
intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the e1ercise. $ radically postmodern line of
thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness
in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models,
history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra
scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological
inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance.
Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism
that abandons itself to the twists and turns of historyJ let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies
as they arise 2hile this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it
conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter=s total
opacity and indeterminacy. $cknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does
not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the hori5on and to prepare for crises
already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention
means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended
or une1pected consequences Aa point to which I will return in the final section of this paperC. In addition, from a
normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of
farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The
future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed
off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present 9
including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.
"ombining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early
warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage. *espite the fact that not all humanitarian,
techno- scientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent
sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in
recent years, global civil society=s capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the
impressive number of I6(s that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates. These organi5ations
are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the inter-
national community about impending dangersJ to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm
about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the $I*& crisis in sub-&aharan
$frica, frequently months or even years before 2estern governments or multilateral institutions followed suit
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Des5ite stu6ies 5re6ictions eC5erts are still trustwort0y
Ca5lan R:
PBryan "aplan3 $ssociate !rofessor of conomics at 6eorge >ason Mniversity, con%og, ,3-3B-344-,
http;NNeconlog.econlib.orgNarchivesN344-N,3NtacklingStetlocS,.htmlQ
!hilip Tetlock, one of my favorite social scientists, is making waves with his new book, 1pert !olitical Fudgment.
Tetlock spent two decades asking hundreds of political e1perts to make predictions about hundreds of issues. 2ith all
this data under his belt, he then asks and tries to answer a bunch of Big euestions, including H*o e1perts on average
have a greater-than-chance ability to predict the futureE,H and H2hat kinds of e1perts have the greatest forecasting
abilityEH This book is literally awesome - to understand Tetlock0s pro?ect and see how well he follows through fills me
with awe. $nd that0s tough for me to admit, because it would be easy to interpret Tetlock0s work as a great refutation of
my own. >ost of my research highlights the systematic belief differences between economists and the general public,
and defends the simple HThe e1perts are right, the public is wrong,H interpretation of the facts. But Tetlock finds that
the average e1pert is an embarassingly bad forecaster. In fact, e1perts barely beat what Tetlock calls the HchimpH
stategy of random guessing. Is my confidence in e1perts completely misplacedE I think not. Tetlock0s sample suffers
from severe selection bias. 'e deliberately asked relatively difficult and controversial questions. $s his methodological
appendi1 e1plains, questions had to H!ass the 0don0t bother me too often with dumb questions0 test.H *umb according to
whoE The implicit answer is H*umb according to the typical e1pert in the field.H 2hat Tetlock really shows is that
e1perts are overconfident if you e1clude the questions where they have reached a solid consensus.
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Conse9uentialis4 accesses t0eir internal lin2 we 4a2e t0e best 6ecisions base6 on 4oral A'D
utilitarian conse9uences
Iormative thics by &helley Ka8an, 2estview !ress 1IID, !age B,, http;NNbooks.google.comNbooksE
idD+lln+F/R4q4"[printsecDfrontcover[dqDdeontologykvs.kconsequentialism[clientDfirefo1-
a[sourceDgbsSsimilarbooksSs[cadD,
Conse9uentialis4 is not calculati;ein 1act3 it reEects co45lete calculation because t0at@s not an
accurate way to 6eter4ine i45acts
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Page 235 of 609
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Concrete 6ecision 4a2in8 B &nly "tilitarianis4 4a2es Eusti1ications base6 on t0e en6 result rat0er
t0en a4bi8uous lan8ua8e
-atner3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7 <Leonar6 G -atner 5D:GBI3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7
$ein&nline=
*isregarding the significance of evolutionary survival, nonutilitarian intuitionists deny that utilitarianism provides a
HmoralH basis for choice between competing needNwant fulfillments. They seek instead to identify the intuitive
Hpree1isting rights< that must, they insist, underlie such choice.<0 But they disclose no nonrnystical. source of the
rights,W0< which are, in fact, derived from the search for increased per capita needNwant fulfillment.<l $lthough
frequently accorded a transcendental immutability, rights identify the resource and behavior allocations that are
perceived by the community as enhancing such fulfillment. Indeed, revelation of various a priori rights or
moral standards is often accompanied by disparagement of other such rights or standards as crypto-
nti,itarian.<R $ priori rights divorced from needNwant fulfillment depend on the magic power of
language. 2hen not determined by social consequences, the morality of behavior tends to be
resolved by definition of the words used to characteri5e the behavior. Iecessarily ambiguous
generali5ations, evolved to describe and correlate heterogeneous events, acquire a controlling
normative role. *efinition, of course, reflects human e1perience. But the equivocal significance of that e1perience
may be replaced with the illusory security of fi1ed meaning. thical connotations are then drawn not from the
underlying empirical lessons that provide a conte1t for meaning, but from infle1ible linguistic Hprinciples< and their
emotional overtones. *erivation of meaning from the social purposes that engender the terminology leads to a utilitarian
appraisal of needQ want fulfillment. The pree1isting rights of nonutilitarian morality are usually identified
as components of Hliberty,H Hequality,< and :autonomy,H0l= labels that suggest a concern with
individual needNwant fulfillment and its social constraints. %iberty is perceived as freedom for
behavior that improves the quality of e1istence, such as speech, religion, and other Hcivil rights<
activityJ equality as re?ection of disparate individual worth and HdiscriminatoryH treatmentJ
autonomy as the individual choice implied by liberty and equality.R:
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"tilitarianis4 5re;ents nuclear war
-atner3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7 <Leonar6 G -atner 5D:G3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7
$ein&nline=
2ithout effective reciprocity, self-defense is the only survival remedy. !assive resistance to a 'itler has survival costs
that are acceptable to few communities. Re?ection of those costs is perhaps being accommodated with the intolerable
survival costs of nuclear warfare by payment of more immediate nuclear-deterrence costs.< Iegotiations to reduce the
nuclear-deterrence costs confront the participants with a predicament like the Hprisone,=s dilemmaH:0 if nuclear
weapons can escape detection; although both participants would benefit from a reduction, each is impelled to increase
its nuclear weapons as protection against an undetected increase by the other. But each may also be impelled to refrain
from their use. If that accommodation fails, so may the evolutionary process. 2hile the accommodation holds,
nonnuclear self defense remains the survival remedy pending a reciprocity solution. The survival
costs of nonnuclear warfare of course continue to be high, but when the survival costs of
capitulation are perceived as e1ceeding them, compensation for combatants commensurate with risk
would provide a kind of market accommodation for those induced thereby to volunteer and would
reduce the disproportionate wartime-conm-scription assessment.
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"tilitarianis4 ine;itable
-atner3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7 <Leonar6 G -atner 5D+D3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7
$ein&nline=
utilitarianism reconciles autonomy and reciprocity, surmounts the strident intuitionist attack, and e1poses the utilitarian
underpinning of a priori rights.H In the conte1t of the information provided by biology, anthropology, economics, and
other disciplines, a functional description of evolutionary utilitarianism identities enhanced per capita
needNwant fulfillment as the long-term utilitarian-ma?oritarian goal, illuminates the critical relationship of
self interest to that goal, and discloses the trial-and-error process of accommodation and priority assignment that
implements it.< The description confirms that process as arbiter of the tension between individual
welfare and group welfare Ai.e., between autonomy and reciprocityCWl and suggests a utilitarian
imperative; that utilitarianism is unavoidable, that morality rests ultimately on utilitarian self
interest, that in the final analysis all of us are personal utilitarians and most of us are social
utilitarians.
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"tilitarianis4 is ine;itable B 5eo5le are in0erently utilitarians
Gino et al +KKG TFrancesca Gino KenanBFla8ler Business Sc0ool3 "ni;ersity o1 'ort0 Carolina at
C0a5el $ill3 Don Moore #e55er Business Sc0ool3 Carne8ie Mellon "ni;ersity3 MaC $ Bo?4an
$ar;ar6 Business Sc0ool3 $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity %'o 0ar43 no 1oulL #0e outco4e bias in et0ical
Eu684ents) 0tt5LHHwww0bse6uHresearc0H561HKGBKGK561U
$ home seller neglects to inform the buyer about the home=s occasional problems with flooding in the basement; The
seller intentionally omits it from the house=s legally required disclosure document, and fails to reveal it in the
negotiation. $ few months after the closing, the basement is flooded and destroyed, and the buyer spends _34,444 in
repairs. >ost people would agree that the seller=s unethical behavior deserves to be punished. Iow consider the same
behavior on the part of a second seller, e1cept that it is followed by a long drought, so the buyer never faces a flooded
basement. Both sellers were similarly unethical, yet their behavior produced different results. In this
paper, we seek to answer the question; *o people ?udge the ethicality of the two sellers differently, despite the
fact that their behavior was the sameE $nd if so, under what conditions are people=s ?udgments of ethicality
influenced by outcome informationE !ast research has shown some of the ways that people tend to take
outcome information into account in a manner that is not logically ?ustified ABaron [ 'ershey, ,/88J
$llison, >ackie, [ >essick, ,//BC. Baron and 'ershey A,/88C labeled this tendency as the outcome bias.
1tending prior work on the effect of outcome severity on ?udgments ABerg-"ross, ,/.-J %ipshit5, ,/8/J >itchell [
@alb, ,/8,J &tokes [ %eary, ,/87C, their research found that people ?udge the wisdom and competence of
decision makers based on the nature of the outcomes they obtain. )or instance, in one study
participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario of a surgeon deciding whether or not to
perform a risky operation ABaron [ 'ershey, ,/88C. The surgeon knew the probability of success.
$fter reading about identical decision processes, participants learned either that the patient lived or
died, and were asked to rate the quality of the Io )oul 7 surgeon=s decision to operate. 2hen the
patient died, participants decided it was a mistake to have operated in the first place.
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Conse9uentialis4 is best3 s0ort ter4 i45acts are 2ey e;en w0en t0e lon8Bter4 i45acts are uncertain
Cowen +KK7 T#yler Cowen3 De5art4ent o1 Econo4ics Geor8e Mason "ni;ersity % #0e e5iste4ic
(roble4 6oes not re1ute conse9uentialis4)'o;e4ber+3+KK7 0tt5LHH6ocs8oo8leco4H8;iewO
aP;Q9Pcac0eLJ.K8D"MGC&cJLwww84ue6uHEbcH#ylerHE5iste4ic+561Z
[++nuclearZattac2ZonZMan0attan[++ZcowenQ0lPenQ8lPusU
%et us start with a simple e1ample, namely a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate a nuclear device in midtown
>anhattan. (bviously we would seek to stop the bomber, or If we stop the bomber, we know that in the short run we
will save millions of lives, avoid a massive tragedy, and protect the long-term strength, prosperity, and freedom of the
Mnited &tates. Reasonable moral people, regardless of the details of their meta-ethical stances, should not argue against
stopping the bomber. Io matter how hard we try to stop the bomber, we are not, a priori, committed to a very definite
view of how effective prevention will turn out in the long run. $fter all, stopping the bomber will reshuffle future
genetic identities, and may imply the birth of a future 'itler. ven trying to stop the bomber, with no guarantee of
success, will remi1 the future in similar fashion.&till, we can see a significant net welfare improvement in the short run,
while facing radical generic uncertainty about the future in any case. )urthermore, if we can stop the bomber, our long-
run welfare estimates will likely show some improvement. The bomb going off could lead to subsequent attacks on
other ma?or cities, the emboldening of terrorists, or perhaps broader panics. There would be a new and very real
doorway toward general collapse of the world. 2hile the more distant future is remi1ed radically, we should not
rationally believe that some new positive option has been created to counterbalance the current destruction and the new
possible negatives. To put it simply, it is difficult to see the violent destruction of >anhattan as on net, in e1 ante terms,
favoring either the short-term or long-term prospects of the world. 2e can of course imagine possible scenarios where
such destruction works out for the better e1 postJ perhaps, for instance, the e1plosion leads to a subsequent disarmament
or anti-proliferation advances. But we would not breathe a sigh of relief on hearing the news of the destruction for the
first time. ven if the long-run e1pected value is impossible to estimate, we need only some probability that the relevant
time hori5on is indeed short Aperhaps a destructive asteroid will strike the earthC. This will tip the consequentialist
balance against a nuclear attack on >anhattan.
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"oncept of morals not mutually e1clusive with utilitarianism
-ic0ar6 Morality3 "tilitarianis43 an6 -i80ts Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress (8 +K7B+K:
There is, however, another line of thinking that connects desirability with moral obligation for the utilitarian, and in fact
s0ows w0y a utilitarian re9uires a conce5t o1 4oral obli8ation and what the concept will be. This line of reasoning
goes as follows. 2e begin with the assumption that the utilitarian wants to ma1imi5e happiness in society. Iow, he
knows that one important means to his goal, indeed the only one within our control, is human actions with that effect.
&o he will want acts that produce welfare, ideally ones that will ma1imi5e it as compared with other options. %et us say,
then, that he will want e1pedient acts as a means to happiness. But the thoughtful utilitarian will further ask himself how he can bring it about that
people perform acts which, taken together, will ma1imi5e happiness. (ne way, and surely a good way up to a point, is to employ moral education to
make people more sympathetic or altruisticJ if they become so, they will tend to act more frequently to produce happiness in others. It looks, however,
Jas if such educational encouragement of sympathy is not enough, mainly because people are ill-informed about the probable consequences of what
they do, and in any case because the intent to do as much good as one can may lead to action at cross-purposes rather than to more beneficial
cooperative behavior. &o the utilitarian, who wants ma1imal happiness, will do something more than ?ust try to motivate
people to aim directly at it. It will occur to him that a legal system, with its sanctions and implicit directives, will both
guide people what to do, and at the same time provide motivation to conform to the legal standards. 'e will want, with
Bentham, a legal system which as a whole will ma1imi5e happiness by producing pro-social conduct at the least cost.
>oreover, the one thing should be clear; If the moral system has been carefully devised, there will not be gross disparity
between what it requires and conduct that promises to ma1imi5e benefit. To avoid such disparity, an optimal rule-
utilitarian moral code will contain H escape clauses.H )or instance, it will permit a driver to obstruct a driveway illegally
when there is an emergency situation. But suppose there is a minor disparity between the requirements of the moral
code and what will do most good; suppose >ary will have to walk to work tomorrow, but the gain in convenience to the
person who obstructs her driveway will be; greater than the loss to her. 2ill the consistent utilitarian then advise the
driver to park illegallyE %et us suppose the utilitarian has decided that a utility ma1imi5ing moral code will not direct a
person to do what he thinks will ma1imi5e e1pectable utility in a particular situation, but to follow certain rules -
roughly, to follow his conscientious principles, as amended where long-range utility requires. If he has decided this,
then it is inconsistent of him to turn around and advise individuals ?ust to follow their discretion about what will
ma1imi5e utility in a particular case. (f course, the utilitarian will want everyone to be sensitive to the utility of giving
aid to others and avoiding in?uryJ requirements or encouragement to do so are pan of our actual moral cede, and it is
optimal for the code to be _4. But once it is decided that the optimal code is not that of act-utilitarianism, the utilitarian
will say it is desirable for a person to follow the optimal moral code, that is, follow conscience e1cept where utility
demands amendment of the principles of the code, &o it seems the consistent utilitarian will conclude that there is a
moral obligation not to obstruct >ary0 s driveway illegally, in accordance with the optimal code.
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&uccessful integration of morality into utilitarian calculus possible
-ic0ar6 Morality3 "tilitarianis43 an6 -i80ts Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress (8 +1+
>y conclusion is that if we are to be utilitarians in the sense that we think morality should ma1imi5e long-range utility,
and at the same time think that a utilitarian morality should have room for recognition of rights that cannot be
overridden by marginal gains in utility, there are two positions we must espouse. )irst, we must hold that a person does
the right act, or the obligatory act, not by ?ust following his actual moral principles wherever they may lead, but by
following the moral principles the acceptance of which in society would ma1imi5e e1pectable utility. (f course, this
means that people who want to do what is right may have to do some thinking about their moral principles in particular
situations. &econd, we must emphasi5e that the right act is the one permitted by or required by the moral code the
acceptance of which promises to ma1imi5e utility, and not compromise, e1cept in e1treme circumstances, in order to do
what in a particular situation will ma1imi5e utility , where so doing conflicts with the utility-ma1imi5ing code. (nly if
we do this will we have room for a concept of H a rightH which cannot be overridden by a marginal addition to the
general welfare. It is clear that acting morally in this sense will never be very costly in utility, and where it is costly at
all, that is the price that has to be paid for a policy& a morality of principle. If my e1egesis of F. &. >ill is correct, these
recommendations are ones in which he would ?oin.
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"tilitarianis4 is ine;itable it will in6e1initely 5er4eate
0u4an t0ou80t
Allison3 (ro1essor o1 (olitical (0iloso50y at "ni;ersity o1 Warwic23 1IIK <Lincoln3 %#0e "tilitarianis4
-es5onse)=
$nd yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in
utilitarianism. $s Raymond )rey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theori5ing ... PandQ has come to have a significant
impact uponthe moralthinking ofmanylaymen. Thesimple coreofthedoctrinelies intheideasthatactionsshouldbe?udgedbytheir consequencesandthat the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. 2hat utilitarianism
always e1cludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not e1plicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this
broad sense may well be residual for many people. 2ithout a serious 6od Aone, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instructionC or a convincing deduction of ethical
prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to ?udge actions on there consequences for people0s well-
being.
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Because o1 t0e a6;ent o1 nuclear o4nici6e3 et0ics
s0oul6 not be 0el6 absolute
Jose50 'ye3 Director o1 t0e Center 1or Science an6 International A11airs S $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity3
'uclear Et0ics3 1IGA
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case. Imagine that you are visiting a "entral $merican country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain
is about to order his men to shoot peasants lined up against a wall. 2hen you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain=s men last night. 2hy you ob?ect to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are
told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Fust to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. (therwise both
die. 'e warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. 2ill you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to
play his dirty gameE The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions, Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent
life collapse before the consequentialist burdenE 2ould it matter if there were 34 or ,,444 peasants to be savedE 2hat if killing or torturing one innocent person
could save a city of ,4 million persons from a terrorist=s nuclear deviceE $t some point does not integrity become the ultimate
egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless othersE Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but
?ustify the actions by consequencesE *o absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons :*o what is right though the world should
perish< was a difficult principle even when @ant e1pounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Iow that it may be literally
possible in the Iuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory. $bsolutist ethics
bear a heaver burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
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&nce an action enters t0e 5olicy real4 we 4ust use a
Conse9uentialist a55roac03 t0is is necessary to
4ini4i?e su11erin8 an6 con1lict
Murray in ID3 (ro1essor o1 (olitical #0eory at t0e "ni;ersity o1 E6inbur803 TAlastair J $3
%econstructing %ealism: )etween #ower #olitics an& Cosmopolitan Ethics3 5 11KU
2eber emphasised that, while the 0absolute ethic of the gospel0 must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. $gainst this 0ethic of ultimate ends0 G 6esinnung G he therefore proposed the
0ethic of responsibility0 G #erantwortung. )irst, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between
intention and result. Its adherent 0does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his T&- $E-U own actions so far as he was able to foresee themJ he will say; these results are ascribed to my action0. &econd, the
0ethic of ultimate ends0 is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by
the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends; verything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following
an ethic of responsibility endangers the 0salvation of the soul.0 If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations,
because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 0ethic of responsibility0, on the other hand, can accommodate this parado1 and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which
they imply. Thus, 2eber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 0inner tension0 between the 0demon of politics0 and 0the god of love0. / The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a
political ethic.,4 This influence is particularly clear in >orgenthau.,, In terms of the first element of this conception, the re?ection of a purely deontological ethic, >orgenthau echoed 2eber0s formulation, arguing that; the
political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own
behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his ine1pedient action concern only Pher orQ
himself. 2hat is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. 2hat is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally
defectiveJ for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par e1cellence, is sub?ect.,3
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"tilitarianis4 an6 ot0er 1or4s o1 calculation are
ine;itable
Stel?i83 #o4 JD can6i6ate at " (E''3 1IIG <"ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania Law -e;iew=
If the latter is true, no more need be said to show that deontological norms do not e1haust morality. If the former is correct, because rights claims may be overridden only when substantially more
good will result - Thomason0s Trade (ff Idea n. ,4. - then almost ever situation will involve a true conflict of rights.
*etermining the resolution of these rights-conflicts would require that morality be supplemented
with principles other thanrights. If this is correct, rights would performrelatively little theoretical workbeyond triggering these principles. 2hatever principles
would be regularly invoked for resolving rights-conflicts would do the bulk of the work of
determining right action. &uch a notion does not sit well with the claim that deontology e1hausts morality, for the reason already discussed.
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In6i;i6ual an6 8o;ern4ent c0oices on 4orality are
6i11erent3 once we 5lay t0e role o1 5olicy 4a2ers we
4ust 1ollow a utilitarian calculus
Goo6in3 Fellow o1 50iloso50y at Austialian 'ational "ni;ersity3 1IIK <-obert3 #0e "tilitarian
-es5onse=
That, I submit is a fallacy. It does matter who is using the utilitarian calculus, in what circumstance and for what
propose. Msing the felicific calculus for micro-level purposes of guiding individuals choices of personal conduct is altogether different from using it for macro-level purposes of guiding public officials= choices of general
social policy. $ different menu of option 9 in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different 9 is available to public and private
choosers. Thos differences are such as to neutrali5ed in the public sphere, most of the ob?ections
standardly lodged against utilitarianism in the private sphere. True though such complaints may
be as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of personal conduct they are irrelevant Aor anyway
much less problematicC as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of public policy. (r so I shall argue.
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Conse9uences co4e 1irst 1or 8o;ern4ents B only our e;i6ence 6raws t0e 6istinction between 4oral
t0eories 1or in6i;i6uals an6 8o;ern4ents
$arries3 e6itor o1 'ational Interest3 1II7 <&wen3 #0e 'ational Interest3 S5rin83 5 11=
!erformance is the test. $sked directly by a 2estern interviewer, HIn principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free e1pressionEH, %ee immediately answers, H%ook, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.H
This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its conte1t it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by >a1 2eber that, in politics, it is Hthe
ethic of responsibilityH rather than Hthe ethic of absolute endsH that is appropriate. 2hile an
individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost.
6overnments must weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. &o once the enter the realm of politics,
human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as
national security and the promotion of prosperity.
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Moral ri80ts an6 wron8s are base6 on conse9uences J 5ro;es Conse9uentialis4 is best
Jo0nson3 G: <Conra6 D Jo0nson3 >#0e Aut0ority o1 t0e Moral A8ent>3 Journal o1 (0iloso50y G+3 'o G
<Au8ust 1IG:=3 55 /I1=
If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some wav be
connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the actionJ else why be so concerned about the
killing of an innocentE )urther, if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding
whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the
consequences. )ollowing one line of thought, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such
restrictions on what the agent may take into account.L But then again it is hard to deal with that rare case in which the agent can truly claim that his ?udgement
about the consequences is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought e1periment, has been verified by the Infallible (ptimi5er.
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I8norin8 conse9uences is i44oral B t0ey sacri1ice ot0ers to 5reser;e 4oral 5urity It is 4ost 4oral to
act to 5ro6uce t0e best en6 re8ar6less o1 t0e 4oral cleanliness o1 t0e 4eans
Ailins2y 1ID1 <Saul D3 Acti;ist3 (ro13 Social &r8ani?er wit0 Int>l Fa4e3 Foun6er o1 In6ustrial Areas Foun6ation3 -ules 1or -a6icals3 5 +7BD=

H*oes this particular end ?ustify this particular meansEH %ife and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. 2henever we think about social change, the question of
means and ends arises. The person PmanQ of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. 'e has no other problemJ he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action.
'e asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the costJ of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena
is corrupt and bloody. %ife is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bedJ he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand
6eothe0s Hconscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action in action one does not always
en?oy the lu1ury of a decision that is consistent both with one s individual conscience and the
good of Phumankind. The choice must always be for the latter. $ction is for mass salvation and
not for the individual0s personal salvation. 'e Por she, who sacrifices the mass good for his
personal conscience has peculiar conception of Hpersonal salvationHJ he doesn0t care enough for
people to be HcorruptedH for them. The people PmenQ who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics of means and ends-which with rare e1ception is conspicuous for its
sterility-rarely write about their won e1periences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions.
They are passionately committed to a mystical ob?ectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a none1istent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational
chart on land. They can be recogni5ed by one of two verbal brandsJ H2e agree with the ends but not the means,H or HThis is not the time.H The means-and- end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means.
The means-and- 0ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the 'ave-Iots against the 'aves, should search themselves as to their real political position. In fact, they are passive-but real-allies of the
'aves. They are the ones Facques >aritain referred to in his statement, HThe fear of soiling ourselves by entering the conte1t of history is
not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.H These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight
the Ia5is in the only way they could have been foughtJ they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Fews and political prisoners being dragged through the streetsJ they were the
ones who privately deplored the horror of it all-and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the
nonuse of any means. It is this species of man who so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old %eague of Iations on the ethical differences between defensive
and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of?udgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of
life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. , present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends; first, that one0s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies
inversely with one0s personal interest in the issue. 2hen we are not directly concerned our morality overflowsJ as %a Rochefoucauld put it, H2e all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.H
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Justice J 4ust sa;e 0u4anity an6 wei80
Sissela Bo23 (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y3 Bran6eis3 A55lie6 Et0ics an6 Et0ical #0eory3 E6 Da;i6
-osent0al an6 Fu6lou S0e0a6i3 1IGG
The same argument can be made for @ant0s other formulations of the "ategorical Imperative; H&o act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a
meansHJ and H&o act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal @ingdom of nds.H Io one with a concern for humanity could consistently
will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal @ingdom of nds for the sake of ?ustice.
To risk their collective death for the sake of following one0s conscience would be, as Rawls said, Hirrational, cra5y.H $nd to say that one did not intend such a
catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when
the end of the world was at stake, )or although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the %atin ma1im presents a case where
we would have to take such a responsibility seriously - perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing
an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.
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"tilitarian actions only act as a last resort Lac2 o1 alternati;es 4eans t0e only in0u4an action is to
not act at all
Iielsen, /L J (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y3 "ni;ersity o1 Cal8ary <Kai3 %Absolutis4 an6 Its Conse9uentialist
Critics)3 e6 Jora4 Gra1 $aber (8 1DKBD1=
)orget the levity of the e1ample and consider the case of the innocent fat man. If there really is no other way of unsticking our fat man
and if plainly, without blasting him out, everyone in the cave will drown, then, innocent or not, he should be
blasted out. This indeed overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life, for the
people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such e1treme action is not taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery will obtain.
>oreover, the people who do such a horrible thing or acquiesce in the doing of it are not likely to be
rendered more callous about human life and human suffering as a result. Its occurrence will haunt them for the rest of their lives
and is as likely as not to make them more rather than less morally sensitive. It is not even correct to say that such a desperate act shows
a lack of respect for persons. 2e are not treating the fat man merely as a means. The fat man0s person-his
interests and rights-are not ignored. @illing him is something which is undertaken with the greatest
reluctance. It is only when it is quite certain that there is no other way to save the lives of the others that such
a violent course of action is ?ustifiably undertaken $lan *onagan, arguing rather as $nscombe argues, maintains that Hto use
any innocent man ill for the sake of some public good is directly to degrade him to being a mere meansH and
to do this is of course to violate a principle essential to morality, that is, that human beings should never merely be treated as means
but should be treated as ends in themselves Aas persons worthy of respectC.l, But, as my above remarks show, it need not be the case, and in the
above situation it is not the case, that in killing such an innocent man we are treating him merely as a means.
The action is universali5able, all alternative actions which would save his life are duly considered, the
blasting out is done only as a last and desperate resort with the minimum of harshness and indifference to his
suffering and the like. It indeed sounds ironical to talk this way, given what is done to him. But if such a terrible situation were to arise, there would
always be more or less humane ways of going about one0s grim task. $nd in acting in the more humane ways toward the fat man, as
we do what we must do and would have done to ourselves were the roles reversed, we show a respect for his
person.,3 In so treating the fat man-not ?ust to further the public good but to prevent the certain death of a
whole group of people Athat is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this wayg-the claims of ?ustice are not overriden
either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should reali5e that if he were so stuck rather
than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no question of being unfair &urely we
must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil
cannot be avoidedE That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly
always opt for the lesser evilE $nd is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and
die than that the fat man should suffer and dieE Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck
while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous.
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&;erri6in8 ri80ts is Eusti1ie6 w0en 4ore ri80ts o1 ot0ers an6 li;es are at sta2e
@ateb /3 J Willia4 'elson Cro4well (ro1essor o1 (olitics E4eritus at (rinceton "ni;ersity <Geor8e3
Cornell "ni;ersity (ressY %#0e Inner &ceanL In6i;i6ualis4 an6 De4ocratic Culture) 58 1+=
(ne can even think, against utilitarianism, that any substantive outcome achieved by morally proper procedure is morally right and hence acceptable Aso long as
rights are not in playC. The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary pace in any democratic country0s normal
political deliberations . But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide what the theory of rights leaves alone. 2hen may
rights be overridden by governmentE I have two sorts of cases in mind; overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of
preserving the same right of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will
clumsily call Hcivili5ation values.H $n advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state0s overriding of rights for these
two reasons. The sub?ect is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. )or the state to override-that is, sacrificeGa right of some so that others may keep it.
The situation must be desperate. I have in mind, say, circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a
right of some and letting a right of all be lost. The state Aor some other agentC may kill some Aor allow them to he
killedC, if the only alternative is letting every-one die It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate
situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that Hnumbers count.H Fust as one may prefer saving one0s own
life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third parryGlet us say, the stateGcan Aperhaps mustC choose to save the greater number of lives and
at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist
being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater
number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed.
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We 4ust c0oose t0e lesser e;il $ar6 an6 1ast rules about w0at is ri80t 4ust be 4a6e to li4it 1urt0er
atrocities a8ainst ci;ili?ation
Issac 43 J (ro1essor o1 5olitical science at In6ianaBBloo4in8ton3 Director o1 t0e Center 1or t0e Stu6y o1
De4ocracy an6 (ublic Li1e3 (0D 1ro4 .ale <Je11ery C3 Dissent Ma8a?ine3 *ol 7I3 Iss +3 %En6s3 Means3
an6 (olitics3) 5 (ro9uest=
2'$T 2(M%* IT mean for the $merican left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politicsE )irst, it would mean taking seriously the specific
means employed by the &eptember ,, attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some #uarters of the left to assimilate the death and
destruction of $eptember %% to more ordinary Aand still deplorableC in&ustices of the world system--the starvation of children in $frica, or
the repression of peasants in >e1ico, or the continued occupation of the 2est Bank and 6a5a by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by
ignoring the specific modalities of $eptember %%. It is true that in 'exico, (alestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent
people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the e1perience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. )ut neither the 'exican
nor the Israeli government has ever hi&acked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in
the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. *l-+aeda did
precisely this. That does not make the other in&ustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the &eptember ,,
hi?ackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary in&ustice. It
was an extraordinary in&ustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent
with civili5ed living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. )ecause it threatens everyone, and
threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. $nd it must be fought in a way commensurate
with its malevolence. ,rdinary in&ustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. &econd, it would mean frankly acknowledging
something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century >ar1ist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ
morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. $ ?ust or even a better society can only be reali5ed in and through political practiceJ
in our comple1 and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won0t work. In such
situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is
between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to
oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that !realism! can become a rationale for the 'achiavellian worship of
power. But e#ually great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of
wrong. 2hat is one to doE !roceed with caution. $void casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a >anichean struggle with evil. Be wary of
violence. %ook for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. $nd never sacrifice democratic
freedoms and open debate. $bove all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.
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Moral 5olicy only bloc2s 6ecision 4a2in8 necessary to li4it 1urt0er 6a4a8e InEustice can only be
6estroye6 by inaction to 4a2e sacri1ices
Issac, 43 J (ro1essor o1 (olitical Science at In6ianaBBloo4in8ton3 Director o1 t0e Center 1or t0e Stu6y o1
De4ocracy an6 (ublic Li1e3 (0D 1ro4 .ale <Je11ery C3 Dissent Ma8a?ine3 *ol 7I3 Iss +3 %En6s3 Means3
an6 (olitics3) 5 (ro9uest=
$s a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that M.&. military intervention is an act of
Haggression,H but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status
quo ante in $fghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by
a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most HpeaceH
activists would prefer not to ask; 2hat should be done to respond to the violence of a &addam 'ussein, or a >ilosevic,
or a Taliban regimeE 2hat means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to ?usticeE "alls for diplomacy and international
law are well intended and importantJ they implicate a decent and civili5ed ethic of global order. But they are
also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international
law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it
to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. 'ere what matters is not purity of intention but the
intelligent e1ercise of power.
!ower is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. !ower is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. !olitics, in
large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political
world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. $nd to develop such means is to develop, and to
e1ercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to
morality. $s writers such as Iiccolo >achiavelli, >a1 2eber, Reinhold Iiebuhr, and 'annah $rendt have taught, an unyielding concern with
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility . The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it
suffers from three fatal flaws; A,C It fails to see that the purity of one0s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. $b?uring violence
or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thingJ but if
such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean
conscience of their supportersJ A3C it fails to see that in a world of real violence and in?ustice, moral purity is
not simply a form of powerlessnessJ it is often a form of complicity in in?ustice. This is why, from the standpoint
of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically
repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent in?ustices with any effectJ and ALC it fails
to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentionsJ it is the effects of
action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant . Fust as the alignment with HgoodH may engender impotence, it is
often the pursuit of HgoodH that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century; it is not enough that one0s goals be sincere or idealisticJ it
is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to ?udge these effects in
pragmatic and historically conte1tuali5ed ways. >oral absolutism inhibits this ?udgment. It alienates those
who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. $nd it undermines political effectiveness.
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"tilitarianis4 is t0e only 4oral 1ra4ewor2 an6 alternati;es are ine;itability sel1Bcontra6ictory
Iye, 8B <Jose50 S 1IGAY (06 (olitical Science $ar;ar6 "ni;ersityY Ser;e6 as Assistant Secretary o1
De1ense 1or International Security A11airsY %'uclear Et0ics) 58 1GB1I=
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.L7 Imagine that you are visiting a "entral
$merican country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up
against a wall . 2hen you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain0s men last night. 2hen you ob?ect to the killing of possibly
innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Fust to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands
you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. (therwise both die. 'e warns you not to try any tricks
because his men have their guns trained on you. ill you shoot one person with the conse#uences of saving one, or will you allow
both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game- The point of the story is to show the value
and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. )ut at what
point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the conse#uentialist burden- 2ould it matter if there were
twenty or ,,444 peasants to be savedE hat if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of %. million persons from a
terrorists/ nuclear device- $t some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is
more important than the lives of countless othersE Is it not better to follow a conse#uentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over
the immoral means, but &ustify the action by the conse#uences E *o absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of
nuclear weaponsE H*o what is right though the world should perishH was a difficult principle even when @ant e1pounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is
some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. 0ow that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more
than ever to be self-contradictory.12 *bsolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
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(olitics can only be one o1 res5onsibility -ational 5olicy 4a2ers 4ust consi6er 1irst w0et0er to 5ut
ri80ts be1ore all else
'arris, /7 <&wen S5rin8 1II7Y E6itor o1 'ational Interest J Journal o1 International a11airs an6
6i5lo4acyY %(ower o1 Ci;ili?ations) *ia \uestia=
!erformance is the test. $sked directly by a 2estern interviewer, HIn principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free e1pressionEH, %ee
immediately answers, H%ook, it is not a matter of principle but of practice .H This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But
in its conte1t it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by >a1 2eber that, in politics, it is !the ethic of
responsibility! rather than !the ethic of absolute ends! that is appropriate . hile an individual is free to treat human rights
as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh conse#uences and the competing
claims of other ends. &o once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests,
including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no
responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The
cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered. %ee0s answer might also be compared to dmund Burke0s
conclusions on how ngland should govern its colonies, as e1pressed in his %etter to the &heriffs of the "ity of Bristol in ,...; pIqt was our duty, in all soberness,
to conform our government to the character and circumstances of the several people who composed this mighty and strangely diversified mass. I never was
wild enough to conceive that one method would serve for the whole, that the natives of 3indostan and those of 4irginia
could be ordered in the same manner, or that the Cutchery court and the grand &ury of $alem could be regulated on a
similar plan. I was persuaded that government was a practical thing made for the happiness of mankind, and not to
furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.
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&nly conse9uentialis4 can resol;e con1lictin8 4oral ;alues an6 5ro4ote 0ealt0y society
Bailey, /. <Ja4es Woo6 1IIDY %&C1or6 "ni;ersity (ressY %"tilitarianis43 institutions3 an6 Justice) 58 I=
$ consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision about whether
a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of e1pression. ,B In some circumstances the
effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to ?ustify our banning it, but in others they may be not malign enough to ?ustify any interference in freedom.
IE * deontological theory, in contrast, would be re#uired either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agents from
interfering in the free expression of others and from impairing the moral e#uality of others, or to admit defeat and claim
that no ad&udication between the two rights is possible. The latter admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no
principled resolution of a serious policy #uestion. But the former conclusion is hardly attractive either. 2ould we really wish to establish as true
for all times and circumstances a le1ical ordering between two side constraints on our actions without careful attention to consequencesE 2ould we, for instance,
really wish to establish that the slightest malign inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of e1pression is adequate grounds for an intrusive and costly censorshipE (r
would we, alternatively, really wish to establish that we should be prepared to tolerate a society horrible for women and children to live in, for the sake of not
allowing any infringement on the sacred right of free e1pressionE,8 Conse#uentialist accounts can avoid such a deontological dilemma. In
so doing, they show a certain healthy sense of realism about what life in society is like. In the world outside the theorist/s
study, we meet trade-offs at every tum. 5very policy we make with some worthy end in $ight imposes costs in terms of
diminished achievement of some other plausibly worthy end. Conse#uentialism demands that we grapple with these
costs as directly as we can and &ustify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them with moral sophistries or to ignore
them as if we lived in an ideal world.
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Morals an6 9uestions o1 0u4an 6i8nity will constantly con1lict 4a2in8 6eontolo8ical 5olicy 4a2in8
i45ossible
@ateb /3 J Willia4 'elson Cro4well (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 E4eritus3 (rinceton "ni;ersity <Geor8e3
Cornell "ni;ersity (ressY %#0e Inner &ceanL In6i;i6ualis4 an6 De4ocratic Culture) 58 17B1:=
%et us say that a society of rights-based individualism encourages these and other crepuscular activities to become topics for open and popular discussionJ that
that fact can be taken as a paradoxical sign of the moral grandness of such a society, for practically every desire can be
honestly admitted and talked about despite shame or without shame6 that a society devoted to rights has no absolutely
compelling arguments, in every case, to prohibit them and that, nevertheless, civili5ation Ademocratic or notC so we are trained to understand it commits us
to continue to condemn and prohibit them. The issue must be raised in dismay, and I am not able to deal with it adequately. "an rights conflictE It is not
agreeable to admit that a particular right of one person may apparently conflict with a different right of someone else. 7amiliar
antagonisms include that between the rights to a fair trial unpre&udiced by excessive publicity and the right of press to
report a story and its background fully, or that between the right to privacy again, the right of the press to do what it
thinks is its work. Though I believe, as I have said, that some rights Aincluding freedom of the pressC are more fundamental than
others, in some conflicts no clear priority is likely to be established and only ad hoc ad&ustments are desirable. To be
sure, although these conflicts may be less fre#uent or stark than is claimed by those who are impatient with the rights in
#uestion, conflicts nevertheless take place. This is a fact of life which no appeal to an elaborated theory of rights can eliminate. If it is a shortcoming
in the theory of rights, it is also a shortcoming that no supplementary principle such as utilitarianism can make good.
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$u4an ;alue an6 6i8nity is i45ossible to 6eter4ine eCternally3 utilitarianis4 is only alternati;e
@ateb /3 J Willia4 'elson Cro4well (ro1essor o1 (olitics E4eritus at (rinceton "ni;ersity <Geor8e3
Cornell "ni;ersity (ressY %#0e Inner &ceanL In6i;i6ualis4 an6 De4ocratic Culture) 58 1/B17=
2e can say in regard to the relevant e1amples that no one has the right to enslave or mutilate or ritually kill
another, even with the other=s permission. There is no right to accept another=s renunciation of a right. ,ne cannot cooperate with or
take advantage of another person8s abdication of humanity. 2e can also say, for other activities, that one has no right to use one=s freedom to
abandon it altogether Aas with drug addictionC or alienate it Aas with voluntary slaveryC, for freedom is meaningless when it becomes the instrument of bondage. *ll
these arguments are true but do not reach the deepest level of ob&ection, for all these activities arouse deep and wide
spread disgust and revulsion. To be guided by these feelings, however, is risky because many activities once thought
disgusting and horrible are now allowed and sometimes welcomed and celebrated, at least in some democratic
societies. *lso, we cannot say that the feelings hostile to these activities are instinctual6 though common, such feelings
are culturally deposited. I can understand the wish to say that these activities in?ure the human dignity of people who do them. It can be argued that the
in?ury results not merely because Ain some casesC they are renouncing a right and Ain other casesC using their rights in ways never contemplated by advocates of
rights. Rather, these free or consensual activities degrade people who do them below the level of decent humanity. The
practitioners forfeit respect9 that is the reason they must be controlled. I do not think, however, that I can follow this line
because I do not associate human dignity with any teleology or reason for being, or even with a more bounded
perfectionism $s I understand the theory of rights-based individualism, it disallows universal and enforceable answers to the
#uestions, hy do we live- hat is the point of living- I am therefore reluctant to rest a case for control on the notion of
human dignity itself.
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#0e i45ossibility to attain 2nowle68e o1 e;ery outco4e or abuse lea;es utilitarianis4 as t0e only
o5tion 1or 4ost rational 6ecisionB4a2in8
6oodin /- J (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y at t0e -esearc0 Sc0ool o1 t0e Social Sciences at t0e Australian
'ational "ni;ersity <-obert E3 Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress3 %"tilitarianis4 As a (ublic (0iloso50y) 58
A/=
>y larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes
utilitarianism more plausible for them Aor, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptableC than private
individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that
makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism . "onsider, first the
argument from necessity. (ublic officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that.
$ll choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually
have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative
possible choices might have for them . (ublic officials, in contrast, at relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their
choices will have on individuals, one by one. hat they typically do know are generalities9 averages and aggregates.
They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. )ut that is all . That
is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus 9 if they want to use it at all 9 to choose general rules of conduct.
@nowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be
sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities,
aggregates and averages is &ust not sufficiently fine-grained for that .
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'ot 2nowin8 con6itions 1or eac0 in6i;i6ual or ra4i1ications 1orces us to a6o5t utilitarianis4 (olicy
4a2ers 4ust use in t0eir 6ecision 4a2in8
6oodin /- J (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y at t0e -esearc0 Sc0ool o1 t0e Social Sciences at t0e Australian
'ational "ni;ersity <-obert E3 Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress3 %"tilitarianis4 As a (ublic (0iloso50y) 58
A/=
)urthermore, the argument from necessity would continue, the instruments available to public policy-makers are relatively blunt . They can
influence general tendencies, making rather more people behave in certain sorts of ways rather more often. But perfect compliance is unrealistic. $nd Abuilding on
the previous pointC not knowing particular circumstances of particular individuals, rules and regulations must necessarily be
relatively general in form. They must treat more people more nearly alike than ideally they should, had we perfect
information. The combined effect of these two factors is to preclude public policy-makers from fine-tuning policies very
well at all. They must, of necessity, deal with people in aggregate, imposing upon them rules that are general in form.
0othing in any of this necessarily forces them to be utilitarian in their public policy-making, of course. hat it does do,
however, is force them- if they are inclined to be utilitarian at all-away from direct :act; utilitarianism. The circumstances
surrounding the selection and implementation of public policies simply do not permit the more precise calculations
re#uired by any decision rule more tailored to peculiarities of individuals or situations.
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#rue e9uality is only attainable un6er utilitarian 1ra4ewor2
*workin .. J (ro1essor o1 Law an6 (0iloso50y at 'ew .or2 "ni;ersity <-onal6 1IDD3 %#a2in8 -i80ts
Seriously) 58 +D7B:=
The liberal conception of equality sharply limits the e1tent to which ideal arguments of policy may be used
to ?ustify any constraint on liberty. &uch arguments cannot be used if the idea in question is itself controversial within the community.
Constraints cannot be defended, for e1ample, directly on the ground that they contribute to a culturally sophisticated
community, whether the community wants the sophistication or not, because that argument would violate the canon of the liberal
conception of e#uality that prohibits a government from relying on the claim that certain forms of life are inherently more
valuable than others. <tilitarian argument of policy, however, would seem secure from that ob&ection. They do not
suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead basem their claim, that constraints on liberty
are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, &ust on the fact that that goal happens to be desired
more widely or more deeply than any other. <tilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to
embody the fundamental right of e#ual concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the
community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that that member is more
or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other. This appearance of egalitarianism has, I think,
been the principal source of the great appeal that utilitarianism has had, as a general political philosophy, over the last century. In "hapter /, however, I pointed out
that the egalitarian character of a utilitarian argument is often an illusion. I will not repeat, but only summari5e, my argument here. <tilitarian arguments fix
on the fact that a particular constraint on liberty will make more people happier, or satisfy more of their preferences,
depending upon whether psychological or preference utilitarianism is in play. But people0s overall preference for one policy rather than
another may be seen to include, on further analysis, both preference that are personal, because they state a preference for the assignment of one set of goods or
opportunities to him and preferences that are e1ternal, because they state a preference for one assignment of goods or opportunities to others. But a utilitarian
argument that assigns critical weight to the external preferences of members of the community will not be egalitarian in
the sense under consideration. It will not respect the right of everyone to be treated with e#ual concern and respect.
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**A#L -i80ts H Liberty Co4e First**
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"50ol6in8 li1e is t0e ulti4ate 4oral stan6ar6
"yl an6 -as4ussen3 (ro1@s (0iloso50y Bellar4ine an6 St Jo0n@s3 G1
<Dou8las Den "yl an6 Dou8las -as4ussen3 (ro1@s (0iloso50y Bellar4ine an6 St Jo0n@s3 1IG13
%ea&ing No0ic2, 5 +77=
Rand has spoken of the ultimate end as the standard by which all other ends are evaluated. 2hen
the ends to be evaluated are chosen ones the ultimate end is the standard for moral evaluation. %ife
as the sort of thing a living entity is, then, is the ultimate standard of valueJ and since only human
beings are capable of choosing their ends, it is the life as a human being-man0s life qua man-that is
the standard for moral evaluation.
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Li1e is t0e en6 towar6 w0ic0 all 5ur5ose1ul action is 6irecte6
A*ouglas *en Myl and *ouglas Rasmussen, !rof.=s !hilosophy Bellarmine and &t. Fohn=s, ,/8,, #eading o'ick& p.
377-37-C
2hy should this be the standard for moral evaluationE 2hy must this be the ultimate moral valueE 2hy not HdeathH or
Hthe greatest happiness for the greatest numberHE >an0s life must be the standard for ?udging moral value
because this is the end toward which all goal-directed action Ain this case purposive actionC is directed,
and we have already shown why goal-directed behavior depends on life. Indeed, one cannot make a
choice without implicitly choosing life as the end.
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Li1e is t0e 5rere9uisite to all ot0er ;alue
<Dou8las Den "yl an6 Dou8las -as4ussen3 (ro1@s (0iloso50y Bellar4ine an6 St Jo0n@s3 1IG13
%ea&ing No0ic2, 5 +7:=
In so far as one chooses, regardless of the choice, one choose AvalueC man0s life. It makes no sense to value some ^ without also valuing that which makes the valuing of ^ possible q;notice that this is
different from saying Hthat which makes ^ possibleHC. If one lets ^ be equivalent to HdeathH or Hthe greatest happiness for the
greatest number,H one is able to have such a valuation only because of the precondition of being a
living being. 6iven that life is a necessary condition for valuation, there is no other way we can
value something without also Aimplicitly at leastC valuing that which makes valuation possible.
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"tilitarianis4 5reclu6es any clai4 o1 4oral ri80ts J ri80ts not 9uanti1iable
$J %"tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts) - G Frey "tility an6 -i80ts (8s 1+1B1++
In spite of this, Bentham0s clear apprehension of utilitarianism0s commitment to re?ecting the view that there are certain
basic natural human moral rights that hold of human beings as human beings, very many utilitarians today seek to
reconcile their utilitarianism with theories of human moral rights, with theories of natural moral rights of persons of the
kinds set out in the MI *eclarations, according to which we are claimed to possess various basic, fundamental moral
rights simply by virtue of being human beings, or human persons, and not by virtue of the utility of a belief in and
action on the basis of respect for such rights. Mtilitarianism denies, and is committed to denying, that there are natural
moral rights that hold of persons as persons, of human beings .ua human beings. If its ethic is to be e1pressed in the
language of moral rights, it might be said to hold that it is the greatest good or the greatest =pleasure that has a moral
right to e1ist, that individual persons and animals have no moral right to a specific share in or of the greatest good, I
their roles being those of being instruments for achieving or vehicles for bringing into being and sustaining the greatest
good, they having a moral right to contribute to the common good as vehicles or instruments thereof. (f course, strictly
speaking, an abstraction such as the greatest good cannot in any literal sense of 0moral right,0 possess moral rights,
whilst the rights individuals may possess as vehicles or instruments of the greatest good would be a mi1ed bunch,
including such rights as the rights to live or to be killed, to be free or to be constrained, to be helped or to be harmed or
used-the rights varying from person to person, situation to situation, from time to lime. Thus, if the greatest good could
be reali5ed by promoting the pleasure of only one or other of two distinct groups of one hundred persons, then, in terms
of utilitarianism, it woul6 4orally be in6i11erent w0ic0 8rou5 was c0osen , and no member of either group would
have a moral right to the pleasure. &imilarly, if, in a war, the greatest good could be achieved only be sending a
particular platoon on a suicide mission, the officer in charge would have the moral right to order the platoon to go on the
mission, and the members of the platoon would have the moral right to be killed for the sake of the greatest good. This
is a very different way of thinking about moral rights from that in terms of there being certain basic human moral rights.
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'o le8iti4ate reason to inclu6e ri80ts 6iscussion un6er util 1Hw
$J %"tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts) - G Frey "tility an6 -i80ts (8 1+7
$ utilitarian might seek to accommodate talk about human moral rights within the utilitarian framework by arguing that
there are good utilitarian reasons for attributing human rights to persons who do not possess moral rights, ?ust as there
may be good utilitarian reasons for ascribing responsibility to persons who are not morally responsible for their actions.
This might be urged in terms of act-utilitarianism as a tactical move for ma1imi5ing good. $lternatively, it could be
developed as an element of a rule-utilitarianism. Clearly it woul6 be 6i11icult to 1in6 5lausible actButilitarian reasons
1or 5ro5a8atin8 suc0 a 1alse0oo6. (n the other hand, whilst a rule-utilitarianism that incorporated such a human moral
rights component would normatively be more attractive than many versions of rule-utilitarianism, it would remain
e1posed to the basic criticisms of rule-utilitarianism set out by FF. ". &mart, myself, and others.0
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"tilitarianis4 is t0e only calculus t0at ta2es into account 0u4an res5onse
-atner3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7 <Leonar6 G -atner 5D/:3 5ro1essor o1 law at "SC3 1IG7
$ein&nline=
Because evolutionary utilitarianism is concerned with human survival and depends on human response, its
goal is necessarily fulfillment of human needs and wants. Mtilitarian choices are made by e1isting humans.
The decisions of every human are derived from the e1perience, and reflect the desires, of that human.
'umans may be concerned with the needs and wants of animals or of future generations, but that concern is
inescapably a product of e1isting human needs and wants.
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-i80ts 6on@t co4e 1irst J con1lictin8 ;alues an6 i6eolo8ies
$J %"tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts) - G Frey "tility an6 -i80ts (8 1+I
!roblems of a different kind are encountered by the claim that certain negative rights, for e1ample, the right to life
interpreted as a right not to be killed, are always absolute, namely, that such a claim leads to morally unacceptable
conclusions. *ifferent rights, for e1ample, the rights to life and to moral autonomy and integrity, may conflict with one
another, such that we have morally to determine which to respect and in what wayJ the one right, such as the right to
life, may give rise to conflicts, such that we can protect, save one life, only by sacrificing or not saving another life.
An6 ri80ts 4ay con1lict wit0 ot0er ;alues , such as pleasure or pain, in ways that morally oblige us to qualify our
respect for the right, as in curtailing acts directed at a persons0 self-development to prevent gross cruelty to animals.
Thomists have offered partial, but only partial, replies to criticisms based on these difficulties in terms of theories such
as the *octrine of *ouble ffect, the theory of the Mn?ust $ggressor Awho may be neither un?ust nor morally
responsible for what he doesC. 'owever these replies themselves encounter difficulties of many kinds, including those
of involving their e1ponents in morally abhorrent conclusions not unlike those to which they ob?ect when such I
conclusions are shown to follow from rival theories.
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-i80ts not absolute J 6oesn@t ta2e into account inten6e6 8oo6
Thus the *octrine of *ouble ffect permits the knowing, unintentional killing of thousands of innocent children for the
sake of a proportional goodJ yet it commits its e1ponents to losing a ?ust war if success can be achieved, and millions of
innocent lives be saved, only by the intentional killing of one innocent person. &imilarly ob?ectionable conclusions
follow about the permissibility of killing morally innocent 0un?ust aggressors0 to save one0s life. $t the same time,
acceptance of these supporting theories amounts to an admission that human rights such as the right to life are not
always absolute. 'ow can it be so if we are said to have the moral right intentionally to kill the morally innocent un?ust
aggressor, and knowingly, albeit unintentionally, to kill innocent persons, when and if the intended good is
proportionately good, and cannot be achieved without bringing about the unintended, foreseen goodE
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'o a55ro5riate 6uty to satis1y ri80ts o1 conscience
$J %"tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts) - G Frey "tility an6 -i80ts (8 1+/
The view that rights and duties are correlative would, if true, lend support to the reducibility-of-rights-to-duties thesis.0
'owever, whilst duties and rights may be correlative-as when by a voluntary act a person enters into a promise,
contract, becomes a parent - commonly N rights, and more evidently, basic human moral rights, and duties are not
correlative. This is so with the e1amples cited above. #0ere 4ay be no correlati;e 6uty to a ri80t o1 conscience . 2ith
rights of recipience, rights to aids and facilities, the duties that arise from the right are not the determinate, fi1ed, finite
duties, correlative duties are thought of as being. qually, we may have important duties in respect of other persons,
without those persons necessarily having rights against us. This is often so in respect of duties of benevolence towards
determinate persons. The duty to ma1imi5e good, which dictates that we visit our lonely, ailing I aunt in hospital, need
give her no moral right to our visit.
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'o absolute ri80ts J co45etin8 ;alues an6 ri80ts o1 6i11erent 8rou5s
$ similar distinction needs to be drawn and a similar terminology is required in respect of basic human rights. They are
always rights-inalienable, intrinsic rights-but they are simply prima facie rightsJ they are rights that are absolute rights
only if they are not overridden by more stringent moral rights or other moral considerations. The introduction of this
distinction into human moral rights theory is both right and necessary. It does however greatly complicate the problem
of determining what are the absolute, morally operative rights of a person in any concrete situation. +et the
acknowledgment of this feature of basic human rights is necessary for two reasons, the one because Aphysical resources
may be inadequate to allow all to en?oy their basic rights, and the other because, in specific situations, we may have to
decide between the rights of different persons, and between respecting rights and securing other values.
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(riority o1 liberty not ;iable as basis o1 8o;ern4ent J at best it woul6 be a co45etin8 t0eory a4on8
ot0er liberal conce5tions o1 Eustice
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 +7 (roEect M"SE
Is such acceptance likelyE "onsider the important e1ample of the adherents of utilitarian reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. 2ould a utilitarian be able to endorse a @antian conception of free persons, with its elevation of rationality
over the satisfaction of desire and its consequent implications for agent motivation in the (riginal !ositionE It seems
unlikely that any utilitarian Awith the possible e1ception of Fohn &tuart >ill in his most syncretic moodC would
countenance this variety of asceticism. Thus, utilitarians would be likely to focus on another interpretation of the idea
of free persons or perhaps on an entirely different fundamental idea or set of ideasJ doing so would lead them to
structure the (riginal !osition differently and would presumably produce a political conception of ?ustice that did not
include the !riority of %iberty. Rawls argues in !olitical %iberalism that classical utilitarians Asuch as Feremy Bentham
and 'enry &idgwickC would be likely to endorse a :political conception of ?ustice liberal in content,< but he never
suggests that they would choose the !riority of %iberty, or Fustice as )airness more generally A!%, p. ,.4C. 2e can
conclude from this finding that the class of liberal political conceptions of ?ustice constituting the focus of a realistic
overlapping consensus would include conceptions that did not endorse the !riority of %iberty Aalthough they would all
give the basic liberties :special priority<C. >oreover, Fustice as )airness might not be alone among the liberal
conceptions in endorsing the !riority of %iberty; a reasonable comprehensive doctrine might, for e1ample, support a
@antian conception of free persons but not Rawls=s particular interpretation of society as a :fair system of cooperation,<
leading through the procedures of political constructivism to a liberal conception of ?ustice that endorsed the !riority of
%iberty but re?ected, say, the *ifference !rinciple. Thus, the !riority of %iberty would be one competitor idea among
many in an overlapping consensus, endorsed by both adherents of @antian comprehensive doctrines and their fellow
travelers, but re?ected by others.
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Io ?ustification for violation of rights to prevent e1ternal loss - principle of intervening actions means that
government is not held responsible for death of others.
Gewirt03 5ro1 o1 50iloso50y S " C0ica8o 1II7
$lan. :$re There $ny $bsolute RightsE< $bsolutism and its "onsequentialist "ritics. Foram 6raf 'aber. !gs ,7L.
'e may be said to intend the many deaths obliquely, in that they are a foreseen but unwanted side-effect of his refusal .
But he is not responsible for that side-effect because of the terrorist s0 intervening action. It would be un?ustified to
violate the mother0s right to life in order to protect the rights to life of the many other residents of the city. For ri80ts
cannot be Eusti1iably 5rotecte6 by ;iolatin8 anot0er ri80t which, according to the criterion of degrees of necessity
for action, is at least equally important. 'ence, the many other residents do not have a right that the mother0 s right to
life be violated for their sakes . To be sure , the mother also does not have a right that their equally important rights be
violated in order to protect hers. But here too it must be emphasi5ed that in protecting his mother0s right the son does not
violate the rights of the othersJ for by t0e 5rinci5le o1 t0e inter;enin8 action3 it is not 0e w0o is causally or 4orally
res5onsible 1or t0eir 6eat0s . 'ence too he is not treating them as mere means to his or his mother0s ends.
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6overnment cannot act to uphold the rights of the sub?ect on the basis of moral principle
Gewirt03 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y3 G1
Alan -eason an6 Morality (8 A:
In the agent0s statement, 0I have rights to freedom and well-being,0 the sub?ect of the rights is the agent himself, the same
person for whom freedom and well-being are necessary goods. The ob?ect of the rights is these same necessary goods.
Iow in rights-?udgments, the sub?ect who is said to have rights is not always the same as the person who makes a claim
or a right-m?udgment attributing the rights to the sub?ect. >oreover, a rights-?udgment need not be set forth
independentlyJ it may, instead, figure as a subordinate clause wherein the attribution of rights to the sub?ect is only
conditional. In all cases. however, there is assumed some reason or ground that is held, at least tentatively, to ?ustify that
attribution. This reason may, but need not, be some moral or legal code. In the present case, w0ere w0at is at issue is
t0e Eusti1ication o1 a 4oral 5rinci5le3 suc0 a 5rinci5le cannot3 of course, be a66uce6 as constitutin8 t0e Eusti1yin8
8roun6 1or t0e attribution o1 t0e 8eneric ri80ts to t0e a8ent Rather, in his statement making this attribution, the
?ustifying reason of the generic rights as viewed by the agent is the fact that freedom and well-being are the most
general and pro1imate necessary conditions of all his purpose- fulfilling actions, so that without his having these
conditions his engaging in purposive action would be futile or impossible. Because of this necessity, the agent who is
the sub?ect of the generic rights is assumed to set forth or uphold the rights-?udgment himself, as knowing what
conditions must be fulfilled if he is to be a purposive agentJ and he upholds the ?udgment not merely conditionally or
tentatively but in an unqualified way.
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**A#L "til 'o -i80ts**
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"tility can@t be 4aCi4i?e6 in t0e lon8 ter4 by ;iolatin8 ri80ts
Robert 6oodin, fellow !hilosophy, $ustralian Iational *efense M, ,//4, "he Utilitarian #esponse& p. ,78
>y main argument, though, is that at the level of social policy the problem usually does not even arise. 2hen
promulgating policies, public officials must respond to typical conditions and common circumstances. !olicies, by their
nature, cannot be case- by-case affairs. In choosing general rules ot govern a wide range of
circumstances, it is e1traordinarily unlikely that the greatest happiness can ever be reali5ed by
systematically violating people=s rights. %iberties or integrity 9 or even, come to that, by systematically
contravening the Ten "ommandments. The rules that ma1imi5e utility over the long haul and over the broad
range of applications are also rules that broadly conform to deontologists= demands.
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"tilitarianis4 (rotects Fairness
-obin Barrow3 (ro1 Si4on Fraser "3 1II13 -tilitarianism, 5 +I
'owever the principle of ?ustice may also be equated with the principle of fairness, and utilitarianism does
have such a principle, as it must do, since a fully fledged ethical theory tells us what is right, and no
account of what is right can compete if it makes no reference to the distribution of the good.
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**A#L Free6o4 H Liberty &utwei80s Li1eH"til**
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Libertarianis4 6enies e4otional satis1action outsi6e t0at o1 1ree6o4
Loc2e3 Writer 1or A4erican Conser;ati;e3 K:
<-obert Loc2e3 Writer 1or A4erican Conser;ati;e3 %MarCis4 o1 t0e -i80t3) /B17B+KK:3 %MarCis4 o1
t0e -i80t3) The American Conservative, 0tt5LHHwwwa4con4a8co4H+KK:NK/N17Harticle10t4l=
The most fundamental problem with libertarianism is very simple; freedom, though a good thing, is simply not
the only good thing in life. &imple physical security, which even a prisoner can possess, is not freedom, but one
cannot live without it. !rosperity is connected to freedom, in that it makes us free to consume, but it is not the same
thing, in that one can be rich but as unfree as a #ictorian tycoon=s wife. $ family is in fact one of the least free
things imaginable, as the emotional satisfactions of it derive from relations that we are either born into without
choice or, once they are chosen, entail obligations that we cannot walk away from with ease or ?ustice. But security,
prosperity, and family are in fact the bulk of happiness for most real people and the principal issues
that concern governments. %ibertarians try to get around this fact that freedom is not the only good
thing by trying to reduce all other goods to it through the concept of choice, claiming that
everything that is good is so because we choose to partake of it. Therefore freedom, by giving us choice,
supposedly embraces all other goods. But this violates common sense by denying that anything is good by
nature, independently of whether we choose it. Iourishing foods are good for us by nature, not because we
choose to eat them. Taken to its logical conclusion, the reduction of the good to the freely chosen means
there are no inherently good or bad choices at all, but that a man who chose to spend his life playing
tiddlywinks has lived as worthy a life as a 2ashington or a "hurchill. )urthermore, the reduction of all
goods to individual choices presupposes that all goods are individual. But some, like national security, clean
air, or a healthy culture, are inherently collective. It may be possible to privati5e some, but only
some, and the efforts can be comically inefficient. *o you really want to trace every pollutant in the air back
to the factory that emitted it and sueE
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"tilitarian 5olicyB4a2in8 ensures t0ere will be no unnecessary constrains on liberty because eac0
scenario is wei80e6
*workin .. J (ro1essor o1 Law an6 (0iloso50y at 'ew .or2 "ni;ersity <-onal6 1IDD3 %#a2in8 -i80ts
Seriously) 58 +D:B+DA=
&uppose, for e1ample, that a number of individuals in the community holds racist rather than utilitarian political theories. They
believe, not that each man is to count for one and no one for more than one in the distribution of goods, but rather that a black man is to count for
less and a white man therefore to count for more than one. That is an e1ternal preference, but it is nevertheless a genuine
preference for one policy rather than another, the satisfaction of which will bring pleasure. 0evertheless if this preference or
pleasure is given the normal weight in a utilitarian calculation, and blacks suffer accordingly, then their own assignment
of goods and opportunities will depend, not simply on the competition among personal preferences that abstract
statements of utilitarianism suggest, but precisely on the fact that they are thought less worthy of concern and respect
than others are. $uppose , to take a different case, that many members of the community disapprove on moral grounds of
homosexuality, or contraception, or pornography, or expressions of adherence to the Communist party. They prefer not
only that they themselves do not indulge in these activities, but that no one else does so either, and they believe that a
community that permits rather than prohibits these acts is inherently worse a community. These are e1ternal preferences, but, once
again, they are no less genuine, nor less a source of pleasure when satisfied and displeasure when ignored, than purely personal preferences. (nce again, however if
these external preferences are counted, so as to &ustify a constraint on liberty, then those constrained suffer, not simple
because their personal preferences have lost in a competition for scarce resources with the personal preferences of the
others, but precisely because their conception of a proper or desirable form of life is despised by others . These arguments
?ustify the following important conclusion. If utilitarian arguments of policy are to be used to &ustify constraints on liberty, the care
must be taken to insure that the utilitarian calculations on which the argument is based fix only on personal and ignore
external preferences. That is an important conclusion for political theory because it shows for example, why the
arguments of =ohn $tuart 'ill in ,n >iberty are not counter-utilitarian, but on the contrary, arguments in service of the
only defensible form of utilitarianism .
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**A#L Calculations Ba6**
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#urn J calculation is ine;itable an6 Eusti1ie6 J e;ery action re9uires calculation3 an6 re1usin8 to
en8a8e in calculation 4eans allowin8 t0e worst atrocities to occur
Ca45bell, !rofessor of International !olitics at the Mniversity of Iewcastle, 1998 P*avid, ational
Deconstruction7 8iolence& 4dentity& and 5ustice in Bosnia, p. ,8B-,88Q
That undecidability resides within the decision, *errida argues, H that ?ustice e1ceeds law and calculation , that the unpresentable e1 ceeds the determinable
cannot and should not serve as alibi for stay ing out of ?uridico-political battles, within an institution or a
state, or between institutions or states and others. H
,4/
Indeed, H incalculable ?us tice requires us to calculate.H )rom where
do these insistences comeE 2hat is behind, what is animating, these imperativesE It is both the character of infinite ?ustice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that
because of its undecidability multiplies responsi bility, and the fact that Hleft to itself, the incalculable and giving 9do natrice: idea of ?ustice is always
very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse cal culation.H ,.4
The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of
madness and compels the decision to avoid Hthe bad,H the Hperverse calculation,H even Hthe worst.H This is
the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point , the Hat least necessary condition,H for
the organi5ation of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. $nd it is a duty that responds to practical
political concerns when we rec ogni5e that *errida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those
violences Hwe recogni5e all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of 1enophobia, racism, anti-
&emitism, reli gious or nationalist fanaticism.H
)urthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recogni5es the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of ?ustice, is not content with simply
avoiding, con taining, combating, or negating the worst-violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility,
commissions a HutopianH strat egy. Iot, a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered Hunrealistic,H but one
which in respecting the necessity of calculation takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, !must
take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable "ones of morality or
politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and inter national, public and private, and so on.! H0 $s *errida declares,
HThe condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain e*perience and e*periment of the possibility of the impossible7 the testing of the aporia from which one may
invent the only possible invention& the impossible invention.;;< This leads *errida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his 'abermasian critics, could hardly
have e1pected; HIothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. 2e cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not
without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities.H
,7
-esi6in8 wit0inBan6 not 1ar below t0e sur1aceBo1 Derri6a>s account o1 t0e eC5erience o1 t0e un6eci6able as t0e conteCt 1or t0e 6ecision is t0e 6uty o1
6econstructi;e t0ou80t3 t0e res5onsibility 1or t0e ot0er3 an6 t0e o55osition to totalitarianis4 it entails #0e Le;inasian su55le4ent t0at Critc0ley ar8ues 6econstruction
re9uires wit0 res5ect to 5olitics t0us 6raws out t0at w0ic0 is alrea6y 5resent It is3 t0ou803 5er0a5s an ele4ent t0at nee6s to be 6rawn out3 1or Derri6a 0as been can6i6
about3 an6 o1ten critici?e6 1or3 0is 5olitical 0esitancy In answer to a 9uestion about t0e 5otential 1or translatin8 t0e Vt0eoretical ra6icality o1 6econstructionV into a Vra6ical
5olitical praxis3V Derri6a con1esse6 <0is ter4= Vt0at I 0a;e ne;er succee6e6 in 6irectly relatin8 6econstruction to e'isting 5olitical co6es an6 5ro8ra44esV
11:
#0is
Vfailure" is derived not from any apolitical sentiment within de constructive thought but from the "fundamentally
metaphysical" nature of the political codes within which both the right and the left presently operate. The
problem for politics that this disjuncture cre ates is, accor6in8 to Derri6a3 that one has "to gesture in opposite di rections
at the same time on the one hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political codes
governing reality! on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical and engaged man ner whenever the
necessity arises." #0is3 Derri6a la4ents3 results in a V6ual alle8ianceV an6 V5er5etual uneasinessV w0ereby t0e lo8ic o1 an ar8u4ent structure6 in ter4s o1
Von t0e one 0an6V an6 Von t0e ot0er 0an6V 4ay 4ean t0at 5olitical action3 w0ic0 1ollows 1ro4 a 6ecision between t0e co45etin8 0an6s3 is in t0e en6 insu11icient to t0e
intellectual 5ro4ise o1 6econstructi;e t0ou80t
1A
But in The 1ther ea&ing, Derri6a>s re1lection on t0e 9uestion an6 5olitics o1 Euro5ean i6entity3 t0e 6i11iculty o1
si4ultaneously 8esturin8 in 6i11erent 6irections is 5ose6 in an a11ir4ati;e 5olitical 4anner
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Multi5lyin8 5robability by 4a8nitu6e is t0e only 4oral o5tion J 0ar6 4oral rules result in circular
5re1erences an6 0orrible conse9uences
+udkowsky 48 J FullBti4e -esearc0 Fellow at t0e Sin8ularity Institute 1or Arti1icial Intelli8ence an6
Co1oun6er <Elie?er3 January ++
n6
+KKG3 %Circular Altruis4)=
&uppose that a disease, or a monster, or a war, or something, is killing people. $nd suppose you only have enough resources to implement one of the following
two options;
,. &ave 744 lives, with certainty .
3. &ave -44 lives, with /4j probabilityJ save no lives, ,4j probability .
>ost people choose option ,. 2hich, I think, is foolishJ because if you multiply -44 lives by /4j
probability, you get an e1pected value of 7-4 lives, which e1ceeds the 744-life value of option ,. A%ives saved
don0t diminish in marginal utility, so this is an appropriate calculation.C
H2hatTH you cry, incensed. H3ow can you gamble with human lives E 'ow can you think about numbers when so much is at stakeE 2hat if that ,4j
probability strikes, and everyone diesE &o much for your damned logicT +ou0re following your rationality off a cliffTH $h, but here/s the interesting
thing. If you present the options this way ;
,. ,44 people die, with certainty .
3. /4j chance no one diesJ ,4j chance -44 people die.
Then a ma?ority choose option 3. ven though it0s the same gamble. +ou see, ?ust as a certainty of saving 744
lives seems to feel so much more comfortable than an unsure gain, so too, a certain loss feels worse than an
uncertain one. +ou can grandstand on the second description too; H'ow can you condemn ,44 people to certain death when there0s such a good chance you
can save themE 2e0ll all share the riskT ven if it was only a .-j chance of saving everyone, it would still be worth it -
so long as there0s a chance - everyone makes it, or no one doesTH +ou know whatE This isn0t about your feelings. $ human
life, with all its ?oys and all its pains, adding up over the course of decades, is worth far more than your
brain0s feelings of comfort or discomfort with a plan. *oes computing the e1pected utility feel too cold-
blooded for your tasteE 2ell, that feeling isn0t even a feather in the scales, when a life is at stake. Fust shut
up and multiply . !reviously on (vercoming Bias, I asked what was the least bad, bad thing that could happen, and suggested that it was getting a dust speck in your eye that irritated you for a fraction of
a second, barely long enough to notice, before it got blinked away. $nd conversely, a very bad thing to happen, if not the worst thing, would be getting tortured for -4 years. Iow, would you
rather that a googolple1 people got dust specks in their eyes, or that one person was tortured for -4 yearsE I
originally asked this question with a vastly larger number - an incomprehensible mathematical magnitude -
but a googolple1 works fine for this illustration. >ost people chose the dust specks over the torture. >any
were proud of this choice, and indignant that anyone should choose otherwise; H'ow dare you condone
tortureTH This matches research showing that there are Hsacred valuesH, like human lives, and Hunsacred
valuesH, like money. 2hen you try to trade off a sacred value against an unsacred value, sub?ects e1press
great indignation Asometimes they want to punish the person who made the suggestionC. >y favorite anecdote along these lines - though my books are
packed at the moment, so no citation for now - comes from a team of researchers who evaluated the effectiveness of a certain
pro?ect, calculating the cost per life saved, and recommended to the government that the pro?ect be
implemented because it was cost-effective. The governmental agency re?ected the report because, they said, you couldn0t put a
dollar value on human life. $fter re?ecting the report, the agency decided not to implement the measure .
Trading off a sacred value Alike refraining from tortureC against an unsacred value Alike dust specksC feels really awful. To merely multiply utilities would be too
cold-blooded - it would be following rationality off a cliff... But let me ask you this. &uppose you had to choose between one person
being tortured for -4 years, and a googol people being tortured for 7/ years, LB7 days, 3L hours, -/ minutes
and -/ seconds. +ou would choose one person being tortured for -4 years, I do presumeJ otherwise I give
up on you. $nd similarly, if you had to choose between a googol people tortured for 7/./////// years, and a
googol-squared people being tortured for 7/.//////8 years, you would pick the former . $ googolple1 is ten to the googolth
power. That0s a googolN,44 factors of a googol. &o we can keep doing this, gradually - very gradually - diminishing the degree of discomfort, and multiplying by a factor of a googol each time, until we choose between
a googolple1 people getting a dust speck in their eye, and a googolple1Ngoogol people getting two dust specks in their eye. If you find your preferences are circular here,
that makes rather a mockery of moral grandstanding. If you drive from &an Fose to &an )rancisco to (akland to &an Fose, over and over
again, you may have fun driving, but you aren0t going anywhere. >aybe you think it a great display of virtue to choose for a
googolple1 people to get dust specks rather than one person being tortured. But if you would also trade a
googolple1 people getting one dust speck for a googolple1Ngoogol people getting two dust specks et cetera,
you sure aren0t helping anyone. "ircular preferences may work for feeling noble, but not for feeding the
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hungry or healing the sick. $ltruism isn0t the warm fu55y feeling you get from being altruistic. If you0re doing it for the spiritual benefit, that is
nothing but selfishness. The primary thing is to help others, whatever the means. &o shut up and multiplyT
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**A#L Catastro50es J Low (robability**
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(olicyB4a2in8 re9uires assess4ent o1 all ris2s 6es5ite 5robability
n6
(verly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety; H^ is not an e1istential risk and you
don0t need to worry about it, because $, B, ", *, and HJ where the failure of any one of propositions $, B, ", *, or potentially
extinguishes the human species. H2e don0t need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a MI commission will initially develop the technology
and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary
nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely.H 4ivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability
estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk
scenarios. >ore generally, people tend to overestimate con&unctive probabilities and underestimate dis&unctive probabilities.
ATversky and @ahneman ,/.7.C That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of /4j probability will all occur. "onversely, people
tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of ,4j probability will occur. &omeone ?udging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup,
must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right Athere will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the productC
while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur Athe bank refuses a loan, the biggest pro?ect fails, the lead scientist diesC. This
may help explain why only ??@ of entrepreneurial ventures survive after ? years. A@naup 344-.C *awes A,/88C observes; 0In their
summations lawyers avoid arguing from dis?unctions AHeither this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusionHC in
favor of con?unctions. Rationally, of course, dis?unctions are much more probable than are con?unctions.0 The scenario of humanity going extinct in
the next century is a dis&unctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book -
or some other cause which none of us fore saw. Aet for a futurist, dis&unctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-
sounding prophecy.
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(olicy 4a2ers ris2 5olitical bac2las0 w0en 5ro5er action isn@t ta2en to 5re;ent catastro50e
n6
The lesson of history is that swan happens. !eople are surprised by catastrophes lying outside their anticipation, beyond
their historical probability distributions. Then why are we so taken aback when Black &wans occurE 2hy did %T"> borrow leverage of _,3-
billion against _7..3 billion of equity, almost ensuring that any Black &wan would destroy themE Because of hindsight bias, we learn overly specific lessons.
$fter &eptember ,,th, the M.&. )ederal $viation $dministration prohibited bo1-cutters on airplanes. The
hindsight bias rendered the event too predictable in retrospect, permitting the angry victims to find it the
result of 0negligence0 - such as intelligence agencies0 failure to distinguish warnings of $l eaeda activity
amid a thousand other warnings . 2e learned not to allow hi?acked planes to overfly our cities. 2e did not learn the lesson; HBlack &wans occurJ do
what you can to prepare for the unanticipated.H Taleb A344-C writes;It is difficult to motivate people in the prevention of Black
&wans... !revention is not easily perceived, measured, or rewardedJ it is generally a silent and thankless
activity. Fust consider that a costly measure is taken to stave off such an event . (ne can easily compute the costs while the
results are hard to determine. 'ow can one tell its effectiveness, whether the measure was successful or if it ?ust
coincided with no particular accidentE ... Fob performance assessments in these matters are not ?ust tricky, but may be biased in favor of the
observed Hacts of heroismH. 'istory books do not account for heroic preventive measures.
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**A+L Stri;e 1or (er1ection <I4a8ination=**
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I4a8ination 1ails J can@t c0an8e reality
Bi66le, editor and publisher of The (b?ective &tandard, KA
A"raig Biddle, editor and publisher of The (b?ective &tandard, The (b?ectivist &tandard, &pring 344B, #ol. ,, Io. ,,
:Introducing The (b?ective &tandard,< http;NNtheob?ectivestandard.comNissuesN344B-springNintroducing-the-ob?ective-
standard.aspC
2e hold that reality is an absoluteGthat facts are facts, regardless of anyone=s hopes, fears, or desires. There
is a world independent of our minds to which our thinking must correspond if our ideas are to be true and
therefore of practical use in living our lives, pursuing our values, and protecting our rights. Thus, we re?ect
the idea that reality is ultimately determined by personal opinion or social convention or :divine decree.< $n
individual=s ideas or beliefs do not make reality what it is, nor can they directly change anything about itJ
they either correspond to the facts of reality, or they do not. $ person might think that the &un revolves
around the arth Aas some people doCJ that does not make it so.
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**Deontolo8y Ba6**
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*eontology is bad when people disagree about what is right or wrong.
Daar K/ AFudith ). *aar, professor of law at 2hittier %aw &chool, :The !rospect of 'uman "loning; Improving
Iature or *ooming the &peciesE< &eton 'all %aw Review, %e1isIe1is $cademicC
$ second criticism of deontology is its assumption about the moral rightness and wrongness of human conduct.
*eontologists operate from the premise that there are moral absolutes in the worldJ certain conduct is morally
correct and other actions are morally wrong.
n,3,
But in our diverse and changing world, a system that depends
on moral absoluteness is destined for challenge. 2ho or what is to be the arbiter of moral rightnessE $ctions
that a large PW-74Q group might consider morally wrong an equally large group could view as morally
acceptable. $ 6allup !oll conducted in >arch 3443 is a chilling illustration that one person0s sin is another
person0s sanctity.
n,33
The poll asked citi5ens of @uwait, the country the Mnited &tates defended in the ,//,
!ersian 6ulf 2ar, if the &eptember ,,, 344, attacks on the 2orld Trade "enter could be morally ?ustified.
n,3L
$
full thirty-si1 percent responded that the perpetrators were morally ?ustified in killing nearly L444 individuals.
n,37 Though the survey was not conducted on M.&. citi5ens, it seems reasonable to assume that few if any
$mericans would find moral ?ustification for the &eptember ,,th attacks.
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W0ile t0e et0ical c0oice is nor4ally a 8oo6 i6ea3 a t0res0ol6 s0oul6 be use6 in t0e 1ace o1 a
catastro50e
AleCan6er an6 Moore KD A%arry $le1ander and >ichael >oore, &tanford ncyclopedia of !hilosophy, :*eontological thics,< Iovember ,, 344.
http;NNplato.stanford.eduNentriesNethics-deontologicalNC
The second plausible response is for the deontologist to abandon @antian absolutism for what is usually called
:threshold deontology.< $ threshold deontologist holds that deontological norms govern up to a point despite
adverse consequencesJ but when the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated threshold,
consequentialism takes over A>oore ,//., ch. ,.C. $ may not torture B to save the lives of two others, but he
may do so to save a thousand lives if the :threshold< is higher than two lives but lower than a thousand.
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Morality coBo5ts et0ical be0a;ior because t0e 1ocus 1alls on i6eolo8y3 not action
conomic $nalysis, "ommon-&ense >orality and Mtilitarianism $uthorAsC; F. More0 &ource; rkenntnis A,/.--C,
#ol. L., Io. , AFul., 1II+C, pp. ,,--,7L !ublished by; &pringer &table MR%; http;NNwww.?stor.orgNstableN344,373.
$ccessed; 33N4.N344/ ,L;37
>oral rules are very stringent. %ying is allowed only in a small number of situations, e.g., in a crisis Aif one0s life
or that of another person is endangered by a malevolent character, it is permitted to lie to the latter to protect the
victimC or in certain market places where it is accepted that telling lies is part of the bargaining process. In the
latter case, care should be taken that deceit does not spill over into other situations ABok, ,/84, "hap. 8 and p.
,L,C. >oral philosophers generally agree that moral rules are severe. &ome argue in favour of severity, e.g., Bok
whose book A,/84C is concerned mainly with lying and refers to many authorities favouring stringency of the
rule forbidding lying. Bar-lli and 'eyd A,/8BC uphold the stringency of the rule against vengeance, though
they grudgingly admit that it may be regarded as morally ?ustified by the special kind of personal relationship in
the particular situation Ap. 8-C. &ome philosophers critici5e the severity of the demands made by some moral
rules, because of the inconsistencies and asymmetries or even absurdity they are thought to lead to. I shall refer
to two authors; 2illiams and &lote. 2illiams critici5es morality for attaching disproportionate importance to
obligations and giving them priority over other ethical considerations. (ne may not break a promise even if
what was promised was in itself of minor importance and keeping it would prevent one from furthering some
important cause A2illiams, ,/8-, pp.
,,8 F. >(R' B-., ,84, ,8. and 333, footnote .C. &lote A,/8-, "hap. ,C notes the asymmetry in the prescriptions of
moral rules and permissions allowed by them between the moral agent and others. $ moral agent is allowed to
sacrifice a great deal of hisL welfare for the purpose of promoting the welfare of others by a much smaller
amount, yet he is forbidden to do the reverse Ai.e., promote his welfare by a great deal at the e1pense of someone
else0s welfareC. &lote contends that if all people count equally, the latter action should be permitted. Ior is one
entitled to sacrifice the life of one person in order to save the lives of several others. &uch an e1emption to the
rule 0do not kill0 is not allowed. Ievertheless, a person is permitted to sacrifice his own life for the sake of
saving that of others. &lote mentions these e1amples to show that morality is not impartial between the self and
others, as it should be. I am, however, using them to illustrate the austerity of moral rules.
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Deontolo8y is unable to 6istin8uis0 between %better) et0ics3 but is lo8ically no lon8er et0ical w0en
5eo5les@ li;es are at ris2
AleCan6er an6 Moore KD A%arry $le1ander and >ichael >oore, &tanford ncyclopedia of !hilosophy, :*eontological thics,< Iovember ,, 344.,
http;NNplato.stanford.eduNentriesNethics-deontologicalNC
)ourth, there is what might be called the parado1 of relative stringency. There is an aura of parado1 in asserting
that all deontological duties are categorical G to be done no matter the consequences G and yet asserting that
some of such duties are more stringent than others. $ common thought is that :there cannot be degrees of
wrongness with intrinsically wrong actsd,< A)rey ,//-, .8 n. LC. +et relative stringency G :degrees of
wrongness< G seems forced upon the deontologist by two considerations. )irst, duties of differential stringency
can be weighed against one another if there is conflict between them, so that a conflict-resolving, overall duty
becomes possible if duties can be more or less stringent. &econd, when we punish for the wrongs consisting in
our violation of deontological duties, we ArightlyC do not punish all violations equally. The greater the wrong,
the greater the punishment deservedJ and relative stringency of duty violated Aor importance of rightsC seems the
best way of making sense of greater versus lesser wrongs.
)ifth, there are situations G unfortunately not all of them thought e1periments G where compliance with
deontological norms will bring about disastrous consequences. To take a stock e1ample of much current
discussion, suppose that unless $ violates the deontological duty not to torture an innocent person ABC, ten, or a
thousand, or a million other innocent people will die because of a hidden nuclear device. If ) is forbidden by
deontological morality from torturing B, many would regard that as a reductio a& a*"ur&u+ of deontology.
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$atre6 between 8rou5s o1 5eo5le 4a2e 0u4an ri80ts ;iolations ine;itable
@ohen, $ssistant !rofessor. !h.*. *uke Mniversity "ontemporary !olitical &cience 4-
Ari Ko0en V#0e (ossibility o1 Secular $u4an -i80tsL Alan Gewirt0 an6 t0e (rinci5le o1 Generic
ConsistencyV (eer -e;iewe6 #aper presente& at the annual meeting of the 3estern #olitical Science
Association, +arch 45, 6778, http;NNwww.springerlink.comNcontentN8cr?wyetBgBmr/fhNfullte1t.pdf
The trouble with this response is pointed out by Richard Rorty, who offers the re?oinder, made by an agent who
wants to infringe upon the rights of another, that philosophers like 6ewirth Hseem ,oblivious to blatantly
obvious moral distinctions, distinctions any decent person would draw. 008q )or Rorty, the problem
cannot be solved by sitting down with a chalkboard and diagramming how the agent and his
potential victim are both !!$s. It is, he argues, a problem that will not be solved by demonstrating
that the agent violates his victim on pain of self-contradiction because, for this agent, the victim is not
properly a !!$, despite looking and acting very much like one. The old adage about looking, swimming, and
quacking like a duck comes to mind hereJ no amount of quacking will convince the agent that his
victim is, in fact, a duck. $s Rorty points out,
This re?oinder is not ?ust a rhetorical device, nor is it in any way irrational. It is heartfelt. The identity of these people,
the people whom we should like to convince to ?oin our urocentric human rights culture, is bound up with their sense
of who they are not . . . . 2hat is crucial for their sense of who they are is that they are not an infidel, not a queer, not a
woman, not an untouchable .... &ince the days when the term Hhuman beingH was synonymous with Hmember of our
tribe,H we have always thought of human beings in terms of paradigm members of the species. 2e have contrasted us&
the real humans, with rudimentary or perverted or deformed e1amples of humanity. 83
There are, I believe, two problems for 6ewirth0s theory here. The first is that an agent can quite
clearly sidestep rational inconsistency by believing that his victim is somehow less of an agent Aand, in the case
presented by Rorty, less of a human beingC than he is himself. The agent, here, might recogni5e that his victim
is a !!$, but other factors Abeing an infidel, a queer, a woman, or an untouchableC have far greater resonance
and preclude her having the same rights as the agent. 'e might also recogni5e his victim as a potential !!$,
but not one in the fullest sense of that term or one who has actually achieved that statusJ as 6ewirth himself notes,
Hthere are degrees of approach to being prospective purposive agents. 008L It seems to me that the Ia5is knew quite
well that their Fewish victims could be !!$s in some senseJ the Iuremberg %aws of ,/L- confirm their
awareness that Fews could plan and e1ecute the same sorts of actions they could Avoting and working, for e1ampleC. The
rights of the Fews could be restricted, however, because Fews were quite different from 6ermansJ rather than !!$s in
the fullest sense, they were, in the eyes of the Ia5is, what Rorty calls Hpseudohumans. 00q7 (n this point, Rorty0s point
is both clear and compelling; HResentful young Ia5i toughs were quite aware that many Fews were
clever and learned, but this only added to the pleasure they took in beating such Fews. Ior does it do
much good to get such people to read @ant and agree that one should not treat rational agents simply as means. )or
everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a rational agent in the only relevant sense--the sense in
which rational agency is synonymous with membership in our moral community. 00s- The second problem for the
!6" pointed out by Rorty is that it is overly academic and insufficiently pragmatic. In other words, its
fifteen steps might be logically compelling to those in a philosophy department, but not to those who
are actually making these decisions on inclusion and e1clusion. HThis is not,H Rorty tells us, Hbecause they
are insufficiently rational. It is, typically, because they live in a world in which it would be ?ust too risky-- indeed,
would often be insanely dangerous--to let one0s sense of moral community stretch beyond one0s family, clan, or tribe.
008B This second point leads to the final critique of 6ewirth0s argument for the !6".
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*eontology does not hold up against the threat of nuclear war
$ar6in an6 Mears0ei4er G: T -ussell $ar6in an6 Jo0n Mears0ei4er are bot0 (ro1essors o1 (olitical
Science at t0e "ni;ersity o1 C0ica8o3 ol I:3 'o /3 S5ecial IssueL Sy45osiu4 on Et0ics an6 'uclear
Deterrence JS#&- U
*iscussion among philosophers often stops at the point of fundamental disagreement over moral
principles, ?ust as discussion among strategists often stops at the point of disagreement over hypothetical assertions
about deterrence. But most moral theorists -- and all utilitarians -- also require consideration of hypothetical
assertions to reach their conclusions, although they are typically even less adept at ob?ective, causal argument
than are strategists, who are themselves often quite casual with their social scientific claims. ven if one
wishes to argue principally from deontological principles, one must have some confidence in one0s
social scientific e1pectations to decide whether consequences might not in this instance be
overriding. (nly a deontologist who held the e1traordinary position that consequences never matter
could easily reach a conclusion on nuclear weapons without considering the quality of various
outcomes. $las, on this dreadful issue good causal arguments are desperately needed.
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Deontolo8y is a terrible syste4 1or 5olicyB 5olicies 4ust use 4eans to an en6 1ra4ewor2 an6 are
Eu68e6 by t0eir e11ecti;eness
Institute For (ublic (olicy ID T Institute For (ublic (olicy 'ew MeCico June3 1IID %A Foru4 on t0e
-ole o1 En;iron4ental Et0ics) 0tt5LHHa5sa5olicysectionor8H;olDN+HD+561U
$t the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for
public policy. $t best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas
in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create
a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or
actually making it worse. )or e1ample, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means
implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, ?ust as there is no a priori reason to
believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. $ny number of
policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That
deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that
most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian
manner by street-level enforcement officials. >oreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy
and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental
preservation. AThere e1ists an e1tensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse
outcomes of regulatory policy. &ee, for e1ample, $ckerman, ,/8,J Bartrip and )enn, ,/8LJ 'awkins, ,/8L, ,/87J
'awkins and Thomas, ,/87.C ven the most die-hard preservationistNdeontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this
outcome. The above points are perhaps best e1pressed by Richard )lathman, The number of values typically
involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all,
thescope and comple1ity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning
soconclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case
that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest A,/-8, p. ,3C. It therefore follows that in a
democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy
alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy
will actually do something about an e1isting problemJ this requires the means-end language and
methodology of utilitarian ethics. 6ood intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an
insufficient,though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.
.
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Deontolo8y is irrele;ant in 5olicy 4a2in8 B intentions are i45ossible to 2now3 only t0e outco4e
4atters
$in4anIG
A%awrence 'inman is a professor of thics< thics; $ !luralistic $pproach to >oral Theory<, p. ,8BC
2hen, for e1ample, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we
may well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. $fter all good laws may
be passed for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite
good intentions. Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what effects the legislation may have on the
people. 2hen we make this shift, we are not necessarily denying that individual intentions are important
on some level, but rather confining our attention to a level on which those intentions become largely
irrelevant. This is particularly appropriate in the case of policy decisions by governments, corporations, or other
groups. In such cases there may be a diversity of different intentions that one may want to treat as
essentially private matters hwen assessing the moral worth of the proposed law, policy, or action.
Therefore, rule utilitarianism0s neglect of intentions intuitively makes the most sense when we are
assessing the moral worth of some large-scale policy proposed by an entity consisting of more than
one individual.
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Deontolo8y in 5olicy 4a2in8 1ails to u50ol6 6e4ocracy an6 le8iti4i?es o55ression
Institute For (ublic (olicy ID T Institute For (ublic (olicy 'ew MeCico June3 1IID %A Foru4 on t0e
-ole o1 En;iron4ental Et0ics) 0tt5LHHa5sa5olicysectionor8H;olDN+HD+561U
Regarding the policymaking role of deontological philosophy in a democracy, I am concerned about
the
same issue that concerned scholars such as 'erman )iner and #ictor Thompson--the specter of
policymakers Awhether elected or unelectedC imposing their own perceptions of higher-order moral
principles on an unwilling or uninformed society. 'istory has shown that the imposition of higher-
order moral principles from above all too often degenerates into instrumental oppression. Thus as
)iner has--I believe correctly--pointed out, the crucial difference between democracy and totalitarianism is
the people0s power to e1act obedience to the public will. In a democracy, values are not
HdiscoveredH by policy activistsJ instead, yhey emerge out of the democratic process. )or this reason I
find very troubling the suggestion by Foel @assiola that environmental ethics requires that :such long-standing and
powerful values as national sovereignty and property rights will have to be ethically assessed and, perhaps, redefined or
subordinated to a
more morally-weighty, environmentally-based values and policies.< I cannot help but wonder ?ust who will
be doing the :refining< and :subordinating< of these values and how this is to be done. $s @urt Baier reminds us,
in a democracy :the moral rules and convictions of any group can and should be sub?ected to certain
tests< A,/-8, p. ,3C. That test is the submission of those moral rules and convictions
to the sovereign public. 2hile policymakers are e1pected to sort out the value conflicts that arise in
light of their duty to serve the public interest, they are seldom entitled to act solely according to
some perceived a priori moral imperative. AThose who would act this way in the case of environmental policy
are aptly described by Bob Taylor as :environmental ethicists who discover 0truth0 even though this truth can0t or won0t
be seen by their fellow citi5ens.<C 'erein lies one of the important moral dilemmas of democratic
government. Individuals are free, within the constraints of law, to act on perceived moral
imperativesJ democratic governments are not. It is, for e1ample, one thing for individuals to donate
their property for environmental preservation, but it is quite another thing for the government
to sei5e private lands Ai.e., redefine property rightsC for the same purpose.
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Deontolo8y 1ailsBB no way o1 e;aluatin8 con1lictin8 obli8ations
-ainbow +KK+ P "atherine Rainbow is a teacher at *avidson "ollege.:*escriptions of thical Theories and
!rinciples< http;NNwww.bio.davidson.eduNpeopleNkaberndNIndepNcarainbowNTheories.htmQ
$lthough deontology contains many positive attributes, it also contains its fair number of flaws. (ne
weakness of this theory is that there is no rationale or lo8ical basis 1or 6eci6in8 an in6i;i6ual>s
6uties . )or instance, businessman may decide that it is his duty to always be on time to meetings.
$lthough this appears to be a noble duty we do not know why the person chose to make this his
duty. !erhaps the reason that he has to be at the meeting on time is that he always has to sit in the same chair. $ similar
scenario unearths two other faults of deontology including the fact that sometimes a person0s duties conflict, and that
deontology is not concerned with the welfare of others. )or instance, if the deontologist who must be
on time to meetings is running late, how is he supposed to driveE Is the deontologist supposed to
speed, breaking his duty to society to uphold the law, or is the deontologist supposed to arrive at his
meeting late, breaking his duty to be on timeE #0is scenario o1 con1lictin8 obli8ations 6oes not
lea6 us to a clear et0ically correct resolution nor does it protect the welfare of others from the
deontologist0s decision. &ince deontology is not based on the conte1t of each situation, it does not
provide any guidance when one enters a comple1 situation in which there are conflicting obligations
A,,3C.
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#0e nee6 1or eCce5tions 4eans 6eontolo8y 1ails as a t0eory
#reasury Boar6 +KKA TCana6ian #reasury Boar6 %(ro1essional Et0ics an6 Stan6ar6s 1or t0e
E;aluation Co44unity in t0e Go;ern4ent o1 Cana6a) 0tt5LHHwwwtbsB
sct8ccaHe;alH6e;HcareerH5esec8cBen5ce8cH5esec8cBen5ce8cNeas5U
$mong the criticisms of deontological theory is that it is difficult to get universal agreement on
what principles should be considered fundamental. It is also difficult to prioriti5e and to apply
such abstract principles as truth telling and the sanctity of life to specific cases that arise in one=s
day-to-day work. In addition, the application of certain principles, without reference to
consequences, can have e1tremely negative resultsGfor e1ample, when telling the truth results
in penalties for well-intentioned actions. >oreover, it is often the case that one principle will
come into conflict with another. $ celebrated e1ample is truth telling versus the sanctity of life
when one is considering whether to lie to a prospective murderer about the location of the
intended victim. It is also argued that if e1ceptions are made in the application of a principle, it
cannot be consi6ere6 a 1un6a4ental one. >any deontologists, however, would approve of
e1ceptions when a greater moral principle is at stake. $t a less dramatic level than life and death,
one can envisage an evaluator having to choose between the public=s right to know and a client=s
right to privacy.
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#0e subEecti;ity o1 w0at ri80ts are i45ortant 4eans 6eontolo8y 1ails
-ainbow +KK+ P "atherine Rainbow is a teacher at *avidson "ollege.:*escriptions of thical Theories and
!rinciples< http;NNwww.bio.davidson.eduNpeopleNkaberndNIndepNcarainbowNTheories.htmQ
In the rights ethical theory the rights set forth by a society are protected and given the highest priority. Rights
are considered to be ethically correct and valid since a large or ruling population endorses them. Individuals
may also bestow rights upon others if they have the ability and resources to do so A,C. )or e1ample, a person
may say that her friend may borrow the car for the afternoon. The friend who was given the ability to borrow
the car now has a right to the car in the afternoon. $ ma?or complication of this theory on a larger scale,
however, is that one must decipher what the characteristics of a right are in a society. The society has to
determine what rights it wants to uphold and give to its citi5ens. In order for a society to determine what
rights it wants to enact, it must decide what the society0s goals and ethical priorities are. Therefore, in order
for the rights theory to be useful, it must be used in con?unction with another ethical theory that will
consistently e1plain the goals of the society A,C. )or e1ample in $merica people have the right to choose
their religion because this right is upheld in the "onstitution. (ne of the goals of the founding fathers0 of
$merica was to uphold this right to freedom of religion. 'owever, under 'itler0s reign in 6ermany, the Fews
were persecuted for their religion because 'itler decided that Fews were detrimental to 6ermany0s future
success. The $merican government upholds freedom of religion while the Ia5i government did not uphold it
and, instead, chose to eradicate the Fewish religion and those who practiced it.
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Deontolo8y@s absolutis4 5rioriti?es 4orality as a conce5t o;er 4oral results
'ielsen I/ P@ai Iielsen is a !hilosophy !rofessor at Mniversity of "algary
:$bsolutism and It "onsequentialist "ritics<dited by Foram 'aber, p. ,.4-3Q
Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more
monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square
either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the
worse for such commonsense moral convictions. (ne could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite
different purpose-an argument of *onagan0s. "onsequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so
persuasive Ha theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to
suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt.H 6iven the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of
consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such
a
theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions
that would be another matter indeed $nticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will
sanction such killing of the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater
inhumanity, con?oined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and
then e1cuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to
prevent itE In such a conte1t, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral
evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible
and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he
allows. when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. 'e tries to keep his 0moral
purity0 and PtoQ avoid 0dirty hands0 at the price of utter moral failure and what @ierkegaard called 0double-mindedness.0
It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right.
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Deontolo8y@s absolutis4 4eans it will ine;itably 1ail
(ritc0ett 'o Date P $drian !ritchett is a Mniversity of 6eorgia graduate and an attorney. !aper written post ,//8.
:@ai Iielsen=s &upport of "onsequentialism and Re?ection of *eontology<
http;NNpritchea.myweb.uga.eduNphilL344paper,.htmQ
Throughout the article, Iielsen concurrently argues that deontology should be re?ected but that consequentialism is
viable. 2e may reconstruct his argument as follows; *eontology, as a morally absolute theory, makes
mistakes. %ikewise, an absolutist form of consequentialism also makes mistakes. &o absolutism is wrong.
Mnfortunately, deontology can only be formulated as some type of :moral absolutism,< while
consequentialism can be fle1ible. Therefore, deontology should be re?ected, and by re?ecting
deontology we are left with consequentialism as a viable theory.Iielsen relied heavily on e1amples to
support his first premise that deontology makes mistakes. 'e discussed warfare to show how it is not the case that
one is necessarily morally corrupt if he or she knowingly kills the innocent while making moves to kill combatants, but
this point would not have been salient without having seen the movie he referred to, "he Battle of $lgiers. Iielsen did
present an effective e1ample, though, with the :case of the innocent fat man.< In this thought e1periment, a fat man is
leading a group of people out of a cave when he gets hopelessly stuck in the opening. There is a
rising tide that will cause everyone inside the cave to drown unless they can get out. The only
option for removing the fat man is to blast him out with dynamite that someone happens to have.
Iielsen e1plains that the deontologist would hold that the fat man must not be blasted and killed
because this would violate the prohibition against killing and it is only nature responsible for
everyone else drowning. Iielsen challenges this principle by declaring that anyone in such a
situation, including the fat man, should understand that the right thing to do is blast the fat man out
in order to save the many lives in the cave. )urthermore, the deontologist e1hibits :moral evasion<
whenever he stands idly by and allows a greater tragedy than is necessary to occur. Iielsen e1plains
that this is the kind of e1ample that highlights the corrupt nature of deontology.
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"tilitarianis4 is t0e only way to access 4orality Sacri1ice in t0e na4e o1 5reser;in8 ri80ts 6estroys
any 0o5e o1 1uture 8enerations attainin8 ot0er ;alues
De1ense 1or International Security A11airsY %'uclear Et0ics) 58 7:B7A=
Is there any end that could ?ustify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the speciesE Is not all-out nuclear war ?ust
as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of beingE $ome people argue that !we are re#uired to undergo gross in&ustice
that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder.H.L &till others say that Hwhen a person makes
survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civili"ation to sacrifice itself makes no sense since
there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical BsicC act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal.! Is it
possible to avoid the !moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead
or red :while increasing the chances of both;!-.7 'ow one ?udges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks
Hwhat is worth a billion lives Aor the survival of the speciesC,H it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, His it
possible to imagine any threat to our civili"ation and values that would &ustify raising the threat to a billion lives from one
in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific periodEH Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and
cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. hen we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that
they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that
value and little else. $urvival is a necessary condition for the en&oyment of other values, but that does not make it
sufficient. %ogical priority does not make it an absolute value. )ew people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would
never enter an automobile. e can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paraly"ing status of an
absolute value. $ome degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the
#uality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a &ustifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.
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Destruction o1 social institutions t0at li4it ri80ts literally cause social c0aos an6 4a2e it i45ossible to
5roEect ri80tBbase6 econo4ies elsew0ere
'arris /7 <&wen S5rin8 1II7Y E6itor o1 'ational Interest J Journal o1 International a11airs an6
6i5lo4acyY %(ower o1 Ci;ili?ations) *ia \uestia=
'ad the Mnited &tates been as demanding on human rights and democracy towards Taiwan and &outh @orea
in the ,/B4s as it is now towards "hina, those countries would never have e1perienced their economic
miracles, and they and the region would be in much worse shape as a result. But perhaps the most cutting riposte that these &ingaporeans make is that the
internal condition of the Mnited &tates itself today--the evident conse#uence of pressing its own principles to extremes--deprives it of
any authority to preach to others, to insist that all must follow its ways. %isten to this, from @ishore >ahbubani, a recent &ingaporean
ambassador to the Mnited Iations and visiting fellow at 'arvard; But freedom does not only solve problems6 it can also cause them. The
<nited $tates has undertaken a massive social experiment, tearing down social institution after social institution that
restrained the individual. The results have been disastrous. &ince ,/B4 the <.$. population has increased ?% percent while
violent crime has risen by 2D. percent, single-mother births by ?%E percent, divorce rates by 1.. percent and the
percentage of children living in single-parent homes by 1.. percent. This is massive social decay. >any a society shudders at the
prospects of this happening on its shores. But instead of traveling overseas with humility, *mericans confidently preach the virtues of
unfettered individual freedom, blithely ignoring the visible social conse#uences.ALC 'ow is one to respond to all thatE (ne might I
suppose simply say, thank Fod they didn/t bring up $lavery and the ,pium Trade, and leave it at that. But in this issue ric Fones takes
the &ingaporean case seriously, analy5es its arguments, and then speculates fascinatingly on "hina0s possible futures. $s he says, in one sense the debate is one
between those who assert the primacy of history and those who assert the primacy of economics. But as Irwin &tel5er shows, there is room for interesting
differences of opinion even among those who agree on the latter.
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#0ere is no "to5ia in w0ic0 we can 8et ri6 o1 6i11icult 4oral 6ecisions (olitical inaction in ti4es o1
ris2s can only be 1or t0e worst
De1ense 1or International Security A11airsY %'uclear Et0ics) 58 +:B+A=
'ow do we reconcile rules and consideration of consequences in practiceE ,ne way is to treat rules as prima facie moral duties and to
appeal to a conse#uentialist critical level of moral reasoning to &udge competing moral claims. )or e1ample, in ?udging the moral
acceptability of social institutions and policies Aincluding nuclear deterrenceC, a broad consequentialist might demand that the benefit they produce be not only large
but also not achievable by an alternative that would respect rules. 74 In addition, to protect against the basic difficulties of comparing
different people/s interests when making utilitarian calculations, a broad conse#uentialist would re#uire very substantial
ma&orities6 otherwise he would base his decisions on rules and rights-based grounds. * conse#uentialist argument can
also be provided for giving some weight to motives as well as means. )or e1ample 2illiam &afire argues that Hthe protection of
acting in good faith, with no malicious intent, is what make decision-making possible. It applies to all of us. . . . The doctor
who undertakes a risky operation, the lawyer who gambles on an unorthodo1 defense to save his client, the businessman who bets the company on a new
product.H73 hile such an argument can be abused if good motives are treated as an automatic one-dimensional
exculpation, it can be used by broad conse#uentialists as a grounds for including evaluation of motives in the overall
&udgment of an act . 2hether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more eclectic way to include and reconcile the three
dimensions of comple1 moral issues,7L there will often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not ?ust because of the comple1ity of the problems !but
simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues-at least none that appears to avoid in practice what most men
would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of value.!?? hen value is sacrificed, there is often the problem of !dirty
hands.! 0ot all ethical decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the problem of dirty hands, but often at the cost
of having no hands at all. 'oral theory cannot be !rounded off and made complete and tidy.H That is part of the modern human condition.
)ut that does not exempt us from making difficult moral choices.
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(olitical inaction to 5re;ent 1urt0er 6eat0 is t0e 8reatest in0u4anity one can co44it
Iielsen /L J (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y3 "ni;ersity o1 Cal8ary <Kai3 %Absolutis4 an6 Its Conse9uentialist
Critics)3 e6 Jora4 Gra1 $aber (8 1D1BD+=
$nticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent,
but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, con?oined with evasiveness, of
those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then e1cuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend
the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it- In such a conte1t, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent
seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a
horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse.
3e tries to keep his /moral purity/ and avoid /dirty hands/ at the price of utter moral failure and what Gierkegaard called
/double-mindedness./ It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it
right >y consequentialist reasoning about such cases as the case of the innocent fat man is very often resisted on the grounds that it starts a very dangerous
precedent. (eople rationali"e wildly and irrationally in their own favor in such situations. To avoid such rationali"ation, we
must stubbornly stick to our deontological principles and recogni"e as well that very fre#uently, if people will put their
wits to work or &ust endure, such admittedly monstrous actions done to prevent still greater evils will turn out to be
unnecessary.
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Atte45ts to totali?e syste4s o1 4orals is i45ossible
6reen 43 <Jos0ua Da;i6Y Assistant (ro1essor De5art4ent o1 (syc0olo8y $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity 'o;e4ber
+KK+ V#0e #errible3 $orrible3 'o Goo63 *ery Ba6 #rut0 About Morality an6 W0at #o Do About ItV3 58
+GG=
I maintain, once again, that this sort of moral theori"ing fails because our intuitions do not reflect a coherent set of moral truths and
were not designed by natural selection or anything else to behave as if they were. $nd note that this is the case for a single person=s
intuitions. Troubles only multiply when one must reconcile the conflicting intuitions of many different people. Thus, while
antirealism does not rule out the possibility of reinventing normative ethics as an attempt to organi"e our moral intuitions
and values, it8s not likely to work. If you want to make sense of your moral sense, turn to biology, psychology, and
sociologyHnot normative ethics.
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Construction o1 4oral lines is counterB5ro6ucti;e to 6ecision 4a2in8
+KK+ V#0e #errible3 $orrible3 'o Goo63 *ery Ba6 #rut0 About Morality An6 W0at #o Do About ItV3 58
/1K=
>oral realists, and those anti-realists who would emulate them, have the option of dogmatism, of blindly acting by moral norms that one takes to be authoritative.
Revisionists, in contrast, have no choice but to acknowledge that all moral ?udgment is an imprecise process of weighing values. The nature of moral
action re#uires the drawing of lines ; (ne either ?umps in and saves the drowning child, or one does not. (ne either votes to allow abortion or one does
not. (f course, one will sometimes make compromises by adopting middle-ofthe- road courses of action, but, at some level, all action is discrete. To any
particular course of action one must say either IyesJ or Ino.J Thus, while the inputs to moral ?udgment are fu55y, fluid, and continuous
considerations, the practical outputs of moral ?udgment are discrete actions. Keontology is intuitively appealing because it offers answers as
clear and forceful as our intuitions, drawing theoretical lines that translate into practical lines, the kinds of lines that we,
like it or not, are forced to draw by the nature of action. )ut, contrary to appearances, nature contains no true moral
lines. e begin with only a mush of 3/8 morally relevant considerations, things we care about, and any lines that get
drawn must be drawn by us. Therefore, any attempt to settle a moral #uestion with deontological appeals to rights,
obligations, etc. always begs the #uestion. $uch appeals are merely attempts to settle moral issues by insisting that they
have, in effect, already been settled by 'other 'oral 0ature and the lines she has drawn .
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ECce5tions to all concrete lines o1 4orals 5ro;e t0ere eCists no true 6eontolo8ical 1ra4ewor2
+KK+ V#0e #errible3 $orrible3 'o Goo63 *ery Ba6 #rut0 About Morality An6 W0at #o Do About ItV3 58
/1+=
2hat goes for private debates about marital infidelity goes for public moral debates as well. In the context of an openly anti-realist dialogue,
what would it mean to say that a fetus has a right to life or that a woman has a right to choose- If all one means in saying these
things is that one is against abortion, or in favor of allowing it, then why not ?ust say thatE,. !ackaging one=s opinion as a claim about :rights< is ?ust pointless
propaganda. (erhaps, one might argue, that an appeal to a right can be understood as an appeal to a default assumption. To
appeal to the moral right to free speech, for e1ample, might be to appeal to the generally accepted principle that people should be able to say what they want in
almost all cases. The problem is that in any real controversy in which IrightsJ are invoked, the #uestion is inevitably about the
limits of those rights. Therefore, it is pointless%L for civil libertarians to defend flag-burning by appeal to the right to free
speech, regardless of how natural this feels. veryone is generally in favor of free speech. The debate is about whether to make an
exception for this sort of speech. (ointing out that this case would be an exception does nothing to change the minds of
those who want it to be an exception. In this case, as in others, appeals to rights are, once again, &ust #uestion-begging
propaganda, useless in the face of anti-realists who know the meta-ethical truth and aren8t willing to play along.
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Alternati;es to costBbene1it analyses woul6 result in 5olitical 5aralyses an6 crus0 6ecisionB4a2in8
6reen 43 J Assistant (ro1essor De5art4ent o1 (syc0olo8y $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity <Jos0ua3 'o;e4ber +KK+
V#0e #errible3 $orrible3 'o Goo63 *ery Ba6 #rut0 About Morality An6 W0at #o Do About ItV3 58 /1/=
In contrast, one can appeal to :good< and :bad< consequences without propagandi5ing . $ pro-life conservative might say, for e1ample, that restricting
abortion rights is :good< Aor :good< in certain respectsC because it teaches people important lessons in personal responsibility. This claim is not empty. $ young woman who gets pregnant as a result of irresponsible choices and is forced to carry a baby to term and give it up for adoption is likely to learn some valuable life
lessons that she might not learn if given the option to end her pregnancy with a pill. This sort of claim contributes to a meaningful dialogue because it=s something a pro-choice liberal can acknowledge. 3e can agree that there is an up side to anti-
choice legislation, but then go on to argue that these advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages, IbadJ things that
an honest conservative can acknowledge as bad, such as harm caused by illegal abortions. (f course, this kind of dialogue may
not resolve the issue. There may remain untestable factual assumptions on either side concerning, for e1ample, the e1istence of 6od and the nature of 'is will.
%ikewise, there may remain brute evaluative differences, for e1ample, over the various weights to attach to the mutually acknowledged :good< and :bad<
consequences of AdisCallowing abortion. )ut getting rid of #uestion-begging talk of IrightsJ and establishing some common ground
about advantages and disadvantages may help focus the issue. If, for example, the pro-choice camp could get the pro-
life camp to acknowledge that its opposition to abortion is ultimately grounded in untestable religious beliefs and nothing
else, that would be a very worthwhile achievement.
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*****"#IL BAD H DE&' G&&D*****
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**"til Ba6**
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(eo5le are not a 4eans to a result3 t0e results o1 an action are ne;er as i45ortant as t0e action itsel1
Sc0a5iro +KK1 T#a4ar Sc0a5iro is 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y at Stan1or6 %#0ree Conce5tions o1 Action
in Moral #0eory) 1us3 Mar +KK13 *ol /: Issue 13 5I/3 +:5 EbscoU
@amm=s view of action, though less e1plicit and developed, shares this propositional orientation. $n action in
accordance with moral constraints, @amm claims, states that another person has or lacks value as a matter of
fact. $nd since there is such a fact of the matter, actions can succeed or fail to e1press the truth.,8 $nd yet on
both 2ollaston=s and @amm=s accounts, t0e worl6 to w0ic0 action relates us 6escri5ti;ely is not t0e
utilitarian@s worl6 o1 natural causes an6 e11ects #0e clai4 t0at %you@re really so4et0in8) is a
not a clai4 about a 5erson@s e45irical or 5syc0olo8ical stateY rat0er it is a clai4 about 0is
status1I &imilarly, the e1amples 2ollaston invokes to illustrate his theory of action all involve claims about
the status of an agent in relation to others. Thus 2ollaston=s view, echoed by @amm, seems to be that action
%trac2s) certain 5ractical 1actsM1acts about %w0ere we stan6) in relation to one anot0er as
4e4bers o1 a social worl6 2ollaston=s conception of action seems to presuppose a moral psychology
which is different from "umberland=s. W0ile Wollaston woul6 not 6eny t0at e;ery action in;ol;es an
eCercise o1 e11icient causality3 0is ;iew su88ests t0at our ulti4ate 5ractical concern is not 1or t0e
e11ects we can 5ro6uce. Indeed his conception implies that in addition to a causal element, action contains
a re1leCi;e ele4ent #0e eCercise o1 0u4an a8ency, according to 2ollaston, involves a reflective
awareness of ourselves in relation to others.34 Action eC5resses a conce5tion o1 %w0ere we stan6) in
relation to t0e ot0er constituents o1 t0e worl63 concei;e6 as a real4 o1 status relations Moreo;er3
t0is awareness 6eter4ines an ulti4ate en6 o1 action w0ic0 is not an e11ect to be brou80t about
#0at en6 is t0e 1ait01ul re5resentation o1 t0e inter5ersonal or6er o1 w0ic0 we are 4e4bers
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'or4ality bias causes us to un6eresti4ate t0e i45act o1 6iscri4inatory outco4es #0is Eusti1ies a
1ee6bac2 loo5 w0ere we acce5t t0e establis0e6 or6er an6 treat 6isa6;anta8e6 5o5ulations as suitable
;icti4s necessary 1or our sa1ety
%u-in Wan8, !rofessor of %aw O Mniversity of !ittsburgh &chool of %aw, 34KA :*iscrimination by *efault; 'ow
Racism Becomes Routine< !g /4-/.
The Iormalcy and Iormali5ation of *iscrimination Because counterfactual thinking influences our reactions to
and e1planations of negative events, biases in counterfactual thinking have the potential to distort our
assessments of discriminatory outcomes at several levels. )irst, they can mute our reactions to discrimination
generally, leading us to tolerate and even to accept unequal outcomes. (ur acceptance of discrimination is not
due solely to a general indifference or hardness toward groups that are vulnerable to discrimination, but results
in part from the specific ways in which our preference for the normal or customary affects how we process and
evaluate events and behavior. That is, the normality bias leads us to react less strongly to Aand perhaps to not
even noticeC misfortunes that we take for granted or that follow an e1pected pattern. This bias also promotes the
entrenchment of those patterns because it leads us to accept the established order but to nd ?arring, and
therefore to resist, challenges to those accepted ways. )urthermore, it makes it easier for us to ?ustify the
established patterns by viewing them as rational and even fair. &econd, when a case of alleged discrimination
does come under scrutiny, biases in counterfactual thinking can distort our causal e1planations of the events in
question and our evaluations of the parties. Because determining whether discrimination has occurred is
:fundamentally an e1ercise in causal attribution,H. the relative normality or mutability of the parties0 conduct
can influence our ?udgments of their roles in producing the outcome in a way that leads us to reduce the
perpetrator=s responsibility and ascribe undue responsibility to the victim. >ore broadly, our ?udgments of
blame and sympathy create a feedback loop that reinforces the norms, e1pectations, and practices that
contributed to our biased ?udgments and perpetuate discriminatory reactions and behavior. Immutable 2rongs
and &uitable #ictims The more easily we can imagine the victim of a tragic fate avoiding it, the more badly we
will feel that be has suffered, so that the level of sympathy we feel and the amount of compensation we dole out
may turn on trivial differences in the circumstances of a tragedy. In the burglary study discussed earlier, for
e1ample, sub?ects e1pressed greater sympathy for victims if their homes were burglari5ed the night before they
returned from vacation than if the burglary occurred several weeks before their return. &imilarly, sub?ects in
another study recommended significantly higher compensatory awards for a convenience store customer who
was shot during a robbery at a store he rarely patroni5ed than for a customer who was shot at his regular store.
They also awarded significantly higher amounts to a plane crash victim who managed to walk miles through a
remote area only to die one-quarter of a mile from the nearest town than to one who traveled ?ust as far but
died seventy-five miles from the nearest town.< In none of the studies did the victims= losses or suffering differ
based on the circumstances of their misfortunes. Ievertheless, the fate of the more highly compensated victims
seemed more poignant and the victims themselves more deserving of sympathy, because sub?ects could more
easily imagine positive outcomes for them. $ positive counterfactual also may come more easily to mind, as
*elgado=s e1amples suggest, when it is not normal for a person to suffer a particular fate. Recall the bursting of
the :dot-com bubble,< when unemployment figures began to reflect not ?ust the usual losses of blue-collar and
lower-skilled service ?obs but also substantial losses of high-paying, white-collar ?obs. Iumerous news articles
highlighted and analy5ed the trend, labeling the f downturn a Hwhite-collar recession< and sympathetically
profiling the newly idle Aand mostly 2hiteC college educated professionals for whom unemployment was both a
hardship and a shock. $lthough white collar professionals during that period did $ indeed suffer higher rates of
unemployment than were typical for that group, they were not, as many assumed, the hardest hit; the groups that
:usually get clobbered< by unemploymentGblue- collar workers, lower-skilled workers, people of colorG
continued to bear disproportionately higher ?ob losses. The misfortunes of unemployed professionals drew more
attention and greater sympathy in part because, as one economist put it, :They are not the people who come
right to mind when you think about the ?obless.<mWl &imilarly, our attention and sympathy for crime victims
varies according to how accustomed we are to seeing themGor, to be more precise, people like themGsuffer
crime and violence. ven the same, equally appalling forms of victimi5ation can elicit different degrees of
concern depending on race and class. $ couple of high-profile cases from recent years illustrate this point. >any
readers will likely recall the highly publici5ed ,/8/ case of the "entral !ark ?oggerGa case so famous that this
reference to its victim generally suffices to identify it. $s @imberle "renshaw has noted, this case, which was
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believed at the time to have involved the gang rape and brutal beating of a 2hite investment banker by as many
as twelve Black youths,< drew massive, sensationali5ed media "overage, provoked widespread public outrage,
and even prompted *onald Trump to take out :a full page ad in four Iew +ork newspapers demanding that
Iew +ork RBring Back the *eath !enalty, Bring Back (ur !olice.H=< 2hile she does not suggest that the
"entral !ark ?ogger=s ease did not merit great concern, "renshaw does point out the dramatic disparity between
the level of concern that case evoked and the virtual silence of the media with regard to the :twenty-eight other
cases of first-degree rape or attempted rapeH that were reported in Iew +ork that same weekGmany of which
were :as horrific as the rape in "entral !ark,H< but most of which included victims who were women of color.
&imilarly, the great attention paid to a more recent and perhaps equally famous caseGthe Fune 3443 abduction
of li5abeth &mart, a 2hite teenager from an affluent Mtah familyGcontrasted sharply with the relative lack of
coverage given a similar case that same spring; the disappearance of $le1is !atterson, a seven-year-old $frican
$merican girl, in $pril 3443. By one account, the &mart story received ten times the media coverage given
!atterson=s case; one thousand newspaper articles and television reports on &mart versus one hundred on
!atterson.L7 Reporters, editors, and producers denied that the victims= race played any role in the amount of
attention their cases received, pointing out that a number of factors distinguished them; &mart was abducted
from her own bedroom in the middle of the night while !atterson disappeared during her walk to school, the
police departments may have worked differently in sharing information with the media, and the &mart parents,
with their HperfectH family, may have been perceived more sympathetically than the !attersons. $side from
these circumstantial differences, however, a number of ?ournalists and commentators noted that race probably
did make a differenceGnot because the media consciously resist reporting stories with Black victims, but
because of their sense of Hwhat makes a compelling nationalm story.HL 2hat makes a compelling story, however,
often correlates with race and class. $s one veteran Black ?ournalist put it bluntly, Hwhatever happens in a black
neighborhood doesn=t really surprise anybody. The public is conditioned to e1pect that. HL. In other words, the
e1planation may be simply that crime and violence are an accepted part of Black people=s Hrough road in
life.HL8 Their suffering is normal and therefore unremarkable. )urthermore, we take for granted not ?ust who
suffers but also how their suffering plays out. That is, we become inured to misfortunes that a story line with
which we are familiar, because the victims= e1periences are hard to imagine otherwise. The more muted
reactions to deaths from enemy versus friendly illustrate this point. )amiliarity accustoms us to racial and other
group-based discrimination as well, because that kind of misfortune often follows standard scripts. In their
analysis of reactions to the bombing of a synagogue in )rance that in?ured several people, social psychologists
*ale T >iller and 2illiam Turnbull pointed out that one need not embrace a discriminatory viewpoint in order
to assimilate the e1pectation that certain harms are normal for some people but not for others; )rance=s then
!rime >inister publicly denounced the attack and e1pressed his sympathy for both the ?ews who were inside the
synagogue and the Hinnocent passersby.H The !rime >inister=s differentiation of the victims and innocent
passersby provoked considerablPeQ outrage because many interpreted it as implying that he did not consider the
?ews to be as innocent as the passersby. "ertainly the term innocent has a strong moral connotation, but should
we assume that the !rime >inister=s remarks reflect anti-&emitismE Iot necessarily. 'is failure to apply the
term innocent to the ?ews inside the synagogue may reflect the fact that his mental representation of a synagogue
enabled him to mentally remove passersby from the vicinity more easily than the attending ?ews. That the
passersby were not the intended victims of the attack also makes their in?uries less taken-for-granted and thus
easier to undo mentally Aalthough no more or less deservedC than those of the ?ews. 2hat need not have been,
ought not to have been.L= $s this incident suggests, the more readily we recogni5e the patterns that
discrimination follows, the harder it is for us to undo mentally the routine discrimination we e1pect and witness,
the more congruous and less remarkable we find its victims=m losses, and the more acceptable they become. $s a
result, even e1treme acts of discrimination such as bias-motivated violence can play a role in normali5ing
discrimination to the e1tent that they define the e1pected targets for aggression and ill treatment. (bservers of
bias, crimes understand immediately and viscerally why the victim was singled out because they recogni5e the
pattern that such crime follows. $s Iris >arion +oung has e1plained, the social environment surrounding acts of
violence, harassment, intimidation, and ridicule of particular groups makes those acts Hpossible and even
acceptable. This pattern of acceptance also characteri5es the less dramatic, more mundane types of
discrimination that members of some groups e1perience routinely. *orothy . Roberts has pointed out, for
e1ample, that habitual racial profiling in law enforcement contributes to an environment in which both the
imposition of physical suffering on members of certain groups and the infringement of their constitutional rights
are e1pected and minimi5ed. )irst, discriminatory targeting by law enforcement officers reinforces the
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perception that some groups are Hsecond-class citi5ensH for whom police surveillance and even arrest are
Hperfectly natural.H In turn, this belief promotes the view that those groups are entitled to fewer liberties and that
their rights are Hmere Ramenities= that may be sacrificed to protect law-a biding people.H $cceptance of this view
results in an environment in which a pattern of discriminatory targeting seems benign, for Hwhen social
understandings are so uncontested that they become invisible, the social meanings that arise from them appear
natural. &imilarly, *eseriee $. @ennedy has e1plained that consumer discriminationGthe commercial version
of racial profiling in which retail establishments single out Black and Brown shoppers for heightened
surveillance and other ill treatmentGalso insinuates itself into our e1pectations of how people of color should
be treated; Hveryday racism perpetuates itselfGit becomes integrated into everyday situations and becomes
Rpart of the e1pected, of the unquestionable, and of what is seen as normal by the dominant group.HH=3 $nd as
we shall see, a history of inferior care has led to the view that minorities inevitably will suffer worse health
outcomes because :those peopleH generally don=t do well.7L In addition to being familiar and therefore normal,
our scripts, schemas, and prototypes for discrimination incorporate other factors that make discriminatory
outcomes seem inevitable and lead us to take them for granted. The standard discrimination schema includes a
perpetrator who intentionally targets a member of a disfavored group for ill treatment and whose intentional
wrong- doing is triggered by his Htaste for discriminationHGa force both irrational and outside his control. Both
the assumptions that discrimination is intended and that its perpetrators are driven to it tend to make
discrimination seem ineluctable, with all the implications that the appearance of immutability carries. $s >iller
and Turnbull suggested with reference to the synagogue bombing, when a victim is seen as an intended target,
the victim=s fate is harder to undo mentally. $s they also have e1plained, victims= losses are more easily taken
for granted when the harm they suffer was required in order for the perpetrator to achieve his goalsGHeven
when PthoseQ goals PareQ reprehensible.<7R This tendency was confirmed in yet another victim compensation
study, in which sub?ects showed less sympathy toward and recommended less compensation for a victim whose
dog was killed by a burglar when the dog=s barking Hthreatened the burglar=s missionH than when the dog was
killed when no one was nearby to hear the barking. It is also harder to imagine a different outcome if an actor=s
behavior is viewed as out of his control than when it is controllable. )or e1ample, to the e1tent that people
accept the stereotype of a rapist as being Hse1-starved, insane, or both,H they have a hard time imagining him
behaving differently and refraining from his attack on the victim.HB Taken as a whole--and as unrealistic and
inaccurate as they may sometimes beGour scripts, schemas, and prototypes of discrimination lead us to take for
granted and thus to accept in- equitable outcomes. $nd by incorporating the assumptions implicit in these
conceptions of discrimination, the legal model of intentional discrimination reinforces and institutionali5es this
effect. 2e come, in other words, to view members of certain groups as appropriate or acceptable targets for the
kinds of mistreatment that we are used to seeing them suffer. ven those of us who are vulnerable to common
forms of discrimination may adopt this perspective to some degree, as we shall see below. Those who do not see
themselves as likely targets of discrimination, on the other handGthat is, members of typically dominant groups
Gmay even find comfort in these patterns. (ne of the less noble tendencies of human beings is to gauge our
own vulnerability to negative events by comparison to othersGand to prefer to compare Hdown- ward,< to less
fortunate others. *ownward social comparison gives us a favorable, self-enhancing view of ourselves, thereby
reducing an1iety and improving our sense of well-being.7. $ccordingly, individuals who can distinguish
themselves from potential targets are able to reap psychological benefits from drawing that distinction. To the
e1tent that racially discriminatory patterns of mistreatment provide nontarget individuals with more vulnerable,
less fortunate groups with which to compare themselves, these patterns also provide nontarget persons with a
means of enhancing their positive views of themselves and the worldGto see the world as safe and ?ust and
themselves as invulnerable and worthy. To the e1tent that viewing some groups as e1pected, even accepted,
targets for mistreatment provides a nontarget individual with a way of differentiating herself from that victim,
she may feel even more insulated from or immune to such treatment because her group identity protects her. The
comfort that comes from seeing others as more vulnerable than ourselves in turn serves to reinforce the
designation of those others as suitable victims.78
ECten6 Wan83 K+ J utilitarianis4 5er5etuates t0e eCclusion o1 t0e 4ar8inali?e6 #0is rein1orces
syste4atic bias base6 on race3 class3 an6 8en6er 1or t0e bene1it o1 a 5ri;ile8e6 class #0e nor4ality o1
6iscri4ination 5ro6uces a 1ee6bac2 loo5 w0ere our reaction to su11erin8 is 4ute6 an6 our biase6
Eu684ents rein1orce t0e nor4s t0at contribute6 to 6iscri4ination in t0e 1irst 5lace #0ese biases
6istort 5erce5tions o1 cause an6 e11ect an6 our e;aluation o1 t0e e;ents in 9uestion &nce we are
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accusto4e6 to t0e syste4atic 0ar4 o1 6isa6;anta8e6 in6i;i6uals it 4a2es it 5ossible to i8nore t0eir
su11erin8 w0ile o;eresti4atin8 t0e i45act o1 e;ents t0at t0reaten to c0an8e t0e social or6er
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-is2 assess4ent is 6istorte6 by 5o;erty J tra6in8 on ca5ital reser;es eCclu6e t0e 5oor
Tim $o5e, !rofessor of "riminology O @eele Mniversity, +KKK, :"rime, disorder, and community safety< !g ,/L-
,/7
2e live in both a risk society ABeck ,//3C and an e1clusive society A+oung ,///C. $t the same time as we
orient to ourselves around the risks and dangers which we see surrounding us in our everyday lives, so also do
our social and political arrangements lend themselves to the magnification of inequalities in access to those
goods which reassure, protect or e1pose ourselves to risk. $s our perception of the Rbads= increases, so do we
seek to gamer the Rgoods= which would keep them at bay, trading on our capital reserves and capacities across
the various spheres of economy, community and culture. The Rontological insecurity= which the condition of late
modernity inspires in us A6iddens ,//4J +oung ,///C fuses with the apprehension of mundane insecurities,
pressuring us to invest in the means of risk avoidance A'ope and &parks 3444C. $s we feel increasingly that the
public sphere alone can no longer guarantee sufficiently the public goods of everyday safety Asee 6arland ,//BC,
so we are thrown upon our own individual and collective resources and strategies to acquire the private goods
which would remedy our perceived security deficit. $nd our incapacity to protect ourselves from risk leads to
frustration with government - still seen as the primary g provider of safety in modem society G and with
ourselves, as a reflection of our own powerlessness in the face of the risks and harms that surround us. +et,
access to capital in one sphere - for instance. through income and of such a process is at work in contemporary
society we might e1pect to see consequences in observed structure of outcomes 9 both of risk and of risk
avoidance. ven if we have little access to the decision making processes of individuals, and little chance of
observing their pursuit of strategies of risk avoidance in their everyday lives, we may still be able to infer their
operation from the observed structural patterns of risk. In this vein, this chapter essays an :actuarial< analysis of
the distribution of the risk to private citi5ens of household property crime victimi5ation in ngland and 2ales,
as measured by the British "rime &urvey.
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Ju68e 4ust reco8ni?e t0eir co45licity in rein1orcin8 belie1s w0ic0 Eusti1y a continuation o1 racis4
2endy Brown Scott II, professor of O Tulane %aw &chool in Iew (rleans :Transformative desegregation;
liberating hearts and minds,< L,-
Fudges and college and university faculty members, the ma?ority of whom are white and male, must be willing
to cross borders and divest their hearts and minds of the belief in the superiority of 2estern culture. $s $rthur
&chlesinger put it, ?udges must Hface the shameful fact; historically $merica has been a racist nation.HHR Fudges
must see that they are steeped in the very traditions and values inculcated by urocentric curriculum, and that
the incantation of neutrality is not sufficient to overcome their inherent biases.H= Then they can weigh their
own traditions and values, which have historically denigrated or denounced difference, against traditionally
subordinated concepts Asuch as R multiculturalism and $frocentrismC in order to determine whether the failure to
include these perspectives in curricula violates the "onstitution. In this same vein, bell hooks argues that not
only must the black life e1perience be Hdecoloni5ed,H but that whites must be Hdecoloni5edH themselves.3,B
hooks describes the problem which requires decoloni5ation; *uring that time of my life when racial apartheid
forbid possibilities of intimacy and closeness with whites, I was most able to forget about the pain of racism----
"lose to white folks, I am forced to witness firsthand their willful ignorance about the impact of race and
racism. The harsh absolutism of their denial. Their refusal to acknowledge accountability for racist conditions
past and present3,. &he defines decoloni5ation as the process of whites Hunlearning white supremacy by
divesting of white privilegeH and blacks divesting of the Hvestiges of internali5ed racism.H3,, Those vestiges
include; the belief among white $mericans, which perpetuates the e1ercise of white privilege, that they are not
responsible for racismJ their belief that black people should be feared and dreadedJ the belief among black and
white people that racism is intractable and permanent, and that no meaningful bonds of intimacy can be formed
between blacks and whites and therefore, white supremacy should not be resistedJ and the economic necessity of
the repression of black rage directed toward whites.3,/ &he states that HPtQhe political process of decoloni5ation
is. . . a way for us to learn to see Pone another moreQ clearly. It is the way to freedom for both coloni5ed and
coloni5er.H334
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A5ocaly5tic 5re6ictions are constructe6 by alar4ists to a6;ance 5ersonal interests
Kurasawa, $ssociate !rofessor of &ociology, !olitical &cience, and &ocial and !olitical Thought at +ork Mniversity
in Toronto, 3447 A)uyuki @arasawa, :"autionary Tales; The 6lobal "ulture of !revention and The 2ork of
)oresight<, I>, http;NNwww.yorku.caNkurasawaN@urasawaj34$rticlesN"onstellationsj34$rticle.pdfC
Mp to this point, I have tried to demonstrate that transnational socio-political relations are nurturing a thriving
culture and infrastructure of prevention from below, which challenges presumptions about the inscrutability of
the future AIIC and a stance of indifference toward it AIIIC. Ionetheless, unless and until it is substantively Rfilled
in,= the argument is vulnerable to misappropriation since farsightedness does not in and of itself ensure
emancipatory outcomes. Therefore, this section proposes to specify normative criteria and participatory
procedures through which citi5ens can determine the Rreasonableness,= legitimacy, and effectiveness of
competing dystopian visions in order to arrive at a socially self-instituting future. )oremost among the possible
distortions of farsightedness is alarmism, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded doomsday scenarios.
&tate and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of
reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to e1aggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet
again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. $ccordingly,
regressive dystopias can operate as Tro?an horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that
would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the
dystopian imaginary are plentiful; the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat
of use of Rweapons of mass destruction=J the severe curtailing of $merican civil liberties amidst fears of a
collapse of Rhomeland security=J the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an
ideologically constructed fiscal crisisJ the conservative e1pansion of policing and incarceration due to
supposedly spiraling crime wavesJ and so forth. $larmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways,
producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. $s much as
alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true.
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(re6ictions out o1 6ebate 4ay be 8oo63 but in 6ebate t0ey s0oul6 be 0el6 to a ;ery low stan6ar6 #0e
5robability o1 one s4all 5olitical c0an8e 1ro4 t0e status 9uo causin8 nuclear war or eCtinction is not
only in1initesi4al3 it@s also ri6iculous
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Moral conscience 5rece6es rational 6ecision 4a2in8 J 6ecisions are base6 o11 a 4oral bac26ro5
Bau4an3 meritus !rof of &ociology at the Mniversity of %eeds3 1II/
AKygmunt, )ostmodern !thics, 37B-3-4C
But the moral crisis of the postmodern habitat requires first and foremost that politics - whether the politics of
the politicians or the policentric, scattered politics which matters all the more for being so elusive and
beyond control S be an e1tension and institutionali5ation of moral responsibility. 6enuine moral issues of the high-tech
world are by and large beyond the reach of individuals Awho, at best, may singly or severally purchase the right not to worry about them, or buy a temporary
reprieve from suffering the effects of neglectC. The effects of technology are long-distance, and so must be the preventive and remedial action. 'ans Fonas0s 0long-
range ethics0 makes sense, if at all, only as a political programme - though given the nature of the postmodern habitat, there is little hope that any political party
competing for state power would be willing, suicidally, to endorse this truth and act upon it. "ommenting on dgar $llan !oe0s story of three fishermen caught in
the maelstrom, of whom two died paralysed with fear and doing nothing, but the third survived, having noticed that round ob?ects are sucked into the abyss less
quickly, and promptly ?umping into a barrel - Iorbert lias sketched the way in which the e1it from a none1it situation may be plotted. The survivor, lias
suggests, :began to think more coollyJ and by standing back, by controlling his own fear, by seeing himself as it were from a distance, like a chessman forming a
pattern with others -on a board, he managed to turn his thoughts away from himself to the situation in which he found himself... &ymbolically representing in his
mind the structure and direction of the flow of events, he discovered a way of escape. In that situation, the level of self-control and the level of process-control were
... interdependent and complemen tary.0s< %et us note that !oe0s cool and clever fisherman escaped alone. 2e do not know how many barrels there were left in the
boat. $nd barrels, after all, have been known since *iogenes to be the ultimate individual retreats. The question is - and to this question private cunning offers no
answer -- to what e1tent the techniques of individual survival Atechniques by the way, amply provided for all present and future, genuine and putative maelstroms,
by eager-tooblige-and-profit merchants of goods and counselsC can be stretched to-embrace the-collective survival.--The-maelstrom-of the kind we are in - all of us
together, and most of us individually - is so frightening because of its tendency to break down the issue of common survival into a sackful of individual survival
issues, and then to take the issue so pulveri5ed off the political agenda. "an the process be retracedE "an that which has been broken be made whole againE $nd
where to find an adhesive strong enough to keep it wholeE If the successive chapters of this book suggest anything, it is that moral issues cannot be 0resolved0, nor
the moral life of humanity guaranteed, by the calculating and legislative efforts of reason. >orality is not safe in the hands of reason,
though this is e1actly what spokesmen of reason promise. Reason cannot help the moral self without
depriving the self of what makes the self moral; that unfounded, non-rational, un-arguable, no-e1cuses-given
and noncalculable urge to stretch towards the other, to caress, to be for, to live for, happen what may. Reason is
about making correct decisions, while moral responsibility precedes all thinking about decisions as it does not, and cannot
care about any logic which would allow the approval of an action as correct. Thus, morality can be
frationali5ed0 only at the cost of self-denial and self attrition. )rom that reason assisted self-denial, the self emerges morally disarmed,
unable Aand unwillingC to face up to the multitude of moral challenges and cacophony of ethical prescriptions. $t the far end of the long march of reason, moral
nihilism waits; that moral nihilism which in its deepest essence means not the denial of binding ethical code, and not the blunders of relativistic theory - but the loss
of ability to be moral. $s far as the doubts in the ability of reason to legislate the morality of human cohabitation are concerned, the blame cannot be laid at the
doorstep of the postmodern tendency to dismiss the orthodo1 philosophical programme. The most pronounced manifestations of programmatic or resigned - moral
relativism can be found in the writings of thinkers who re?ect and resent postmodern verdicts and voice doubts as to the very e1istence of a postmodern perspective,
let alone the validity of ?udgements allegedly passed from its vantage point. $part from value-signs added Aoften as an afterthoughtC, there is little to choose
between ostensibly 0anti-postmodern, scientific recordings of the ways and means of fembedded selves0, and the enough space and enough time. There is little
disagreement between them as to the assumption - authenticated by the long managerial efforts of modern times and the realities of the social habitat these efforts
managed to produce - that in order to act morally the person must first be disowned of autonomy, whether by coercive or purchasable e1pertiseJ and as to another
assumption Awhich also reflects the realities of the contemporary modee of lifeC, that the roots of action are likely to be assessed as moral, and the criteria to assess
the morality of acts, must be e1trinsic to the actor. There is little difference between two ostensibly opposite standpoints in the way they disallow or neglect the
possibility that it may be precisely the e1propriation of moral prerogatives and the usurpation of moral competence by agencies e1trinsic to the moral self Amultiple
agencies, contestant and combative, yet equally vociferous in their claims to ethical infallibilityC which stand behind the stubborn unassailability of ethical
relativism and moral nihilism. There is little reason to trust the assurances of the e1propriatingN usurping agencies that the fate of morality is safe with themJ there is
little evidence that this has been the case thus far, and little encouragment can be derived from the scrutiny of their present work for the hope that this will be more
of the case in the future. $t the end of the ambitious modern pro?ect of universal moral certainty, of legislating the morality of and for human selves, of replacing
the erratic and unreliable moral impulses with a socially underwritten ethical code - the bewildered and disoriented self finds itself alone in the face of moral
dilemmas without good Alet alone obviousC choices, unresolved moral conflicts and the e1cruciating difficulty of being moral. )ortunately for humanity
Athough not always for the moral selfC .and despite all the e1pert efforts to the contrary, the moral conscience
- that ultimate prompt of moral impulse and root of moral responsibility ---has.only been anaesthesi5ed not
amputated, It is still there, dormant perhaps, often stunned, sometimes shamed into silence - but capable of
being awoken, of that %evinas0s feat of sobering up from inebriated torpor. The moral conscience commands obedience without proof that the command
should be obeyedJ conscience can neither convince nor coerce. "onscience wields none of the weapons recogni5ed by the modern world as insignia of authority.
By the standards which support the modern world, conscience is weak. The proposition that conscience of the moral self is humanity0s only warrant and hope may
strike the modern mind as preposterousJ if not presposterous, then portentous; what chanceS for a morality having conscience Aalready dismissed by the authority-
conscious mind as fickle, fmerely sub?ective0, a freakC for its sole foundationE $nd yet.. . &umming up the moral lessons of the 'olocaust, 'annah $rendt
demanded :that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all they have to guide them is
their own ?udgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard as the
unanimous opinion of all these around them... These few who were still able to tell right from wrong went
really only by their own ?udgments, and they did so freelyJ there were no rules to be abided by... because no
rules e1isted for the unprecedented .H 2hat we know for sure is that curing ostensible feebleness of moral conscience left the moral self, as a rule,
disarmed in the face of the funanimous opinion of all these around them0, and their elected or self-appointed spokesmenJ while the power which that unanimous
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opinion wielded was in no way a guarantee of its ethical value. @nowing this, we have little choice but to place our bet on that conscience which, however wan,
alone can instil the responsibility for disobeying the command to do evil. "ontrary to one of the most uncritically accepted philosophical a1ioms, there is no
contradiction between the re?ection of Aor scepticism towardsC the ethics of socially conventionali5ed and
rationally ffounded0 norms, and the insistence that it does matter, and matter morally, what we do and from
what we desist. )ar from e1cluding each other, the two can be accepted or re?ected only together. If in doubt
- consult your conscience.
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#0e 9uest 1or sur;i;al 6estroys all 0u4an ;alues
Calla0an3 6irector o1 #0e $astin8s Institute3 D/
*aniel "allahan, "o-founder and former director of The 'astings Institute, !h* in philosophy from 'arvard
Mniversity, :The Tyranny of &urvival< ,/.L, p /,-/L
There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival , no
rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recogni5e the danger when survival
is falsely and manipulatively invoked. *ictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the
fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is
directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would
ignore, suppress, or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is
that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values, &urvival can become an obsession and a disease,
provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing . 2e come here to the fundamental moral dilemma.
If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for
any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life- then
how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival, without in the process, destroying everything in
human beings which makes them worthy of survivalE To put it more strongly3 if the price of survival is human
degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the !yrrhic
victory to end all !yrrhic victories +et it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly
manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.
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"tilitarianis4 in0erently only 1a;ors a 5ri;ile8e6 1ew
Liu ($D "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania +KKK A*r. %iu, !'* O Mniversity of !ennsylvania, writes 3444
Pnvironmental Fustice $nalysis; theories, methods and practice, 3444 I&BI;,-BB.474L4, p.34-3,QC
'owever, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantifications techniques are far from being simple,
straightforward, and ob?ective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also to fle1ible and
sub?ect to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. >ore importantly, they fail to deal the issue of
equity and distributive ?ustice. &eemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and costs, each
person is counted as one and only one. II other words, people are treated equally. )or >ill, :?ustice arises from the
principle of utility<. Mtilitarianism in concerted only the aggregate effect, no matter how the aggregate
is distributed. )or almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. &ome
people win, while others lose. The !areto optimality would is almost none1istent. $ policy=s outcome is !areto
optimal if nobody loses and at least one person gains.
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Calculation re6uces li1e to ?ero
Dillon RII A>ichael, !rofessor of IR O %ancaster, :$nother Fustice< !olitical Theory, #ol. 3., Io. 3. $pril, pp. ,B-C
conomies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.Ls Thus no valuation without mensuration and no
mensuration without inde1ation. (nce rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily
submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. *evaluation, logically, can e1tend to the
point of counting as nothing. 'ence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract
about this; the declension of economies of value leads to the 5ero point of holocaust. 'owever liberating and
emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for e1ample, they run the risk of counting out the
invaluable. "ounted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. 'erewith, then, the necessity of
championing the invaluable itself. )or we must never forget that, Hwe are dealing always with whatever e1ceeds
measure.H
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" tilitarianis4 causes s5ecies eCtinction
Weber I/ TDarren Weber3 5ostB6octoral 1ellow at "CSF3 En;iron4ental Et0ics an6 S5ecies V#o be or
not to beOV 'o;e4ber 1II/ 0tt5LHH6nlucs1e6uHusers H6weberHessaysHen;Nt5+561
$ problem with utilitarian ethics is that the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number could entail that some species are
disadvantaged or actively e1terminated. )irstly, the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number is very difficult when it is
restricted to humanity. The present satisfaction of a portion of humanity, let alone all of humanity, is very difficult to evaluate and the
different degrees of satisfaction to be had by various people from various sources of satisfaction is very difficult to predict, so the
determination of the greatest good for the greatest number after the distribution of limited resources is very, very difficult to evaluate. $s applied to all sentient species, it is virtually
impossible to evaluate, since it is very difficult to know the feelings of sentient animals other than people. &econdly, utilitarianism can lead to significant
inequalities in the distribution of limited resources. )or e1ample, among a group of people with -4 units of satisfaction there could be a small group with about 84
units of satisfaction and another larger group with about 74 units of satisfaction, since the small group have e1clusive control of some equipment. $ccording to utilitarianism, another ,4
units of satisfaction should be distributed to the small group when it can use its equipment to transform ,4 units of simple satisfaction into 34 units of added value satisfaction.
$ssuming that it is possible to know the feelings of sentient animals, a sentient species Ae.g., a predatorC that inflicts pain on another
sentient species should be disadvantaged or e1tinguished when the satisfaction of that species is less than the satisfaction of the
species that suffer pain. Thus, although the utilitarian principle may apply to all sentient species, the difficulties of utilitarianism are
insurmountable or the inequalities implied by utilitarianism are likely to promote the e1tinction of species.
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"tilitarianis4 is unsustainable a6;ocates ulti4ately re;ert bac2 to 4orals to 4a2e 6ecisions
$ccessed; 33N4.N344/ ,L;37
Iot only does Mtilitarianism lack a device for reducing the infringement of its rules, but because its rules are
very demanding, many utilitarian writers go in the opposite direction and accord moral agents some freedom in
the implementation of its rules. $ccording to 'arsanyi A,/8-, p. 7BC supererogation may be accommodated into
Rule Mtilitarianism by permitting the moral agent free choice between two acts $ and B. The moral agent may
carry out the act with the lower total utility as long as the difference between the ensuing utilities does not
e1ceed a given amount A"f. &cheffler0s idea referred to belowC.,4 &ome utilitarian writers have advocated
permissiveness following 2illiams0s incisive criticism of Mtilitarianism. $ccording to 2illiams A,/.LC
Mtilitarianism is too demanding in that it fails to give adequate recognition to a person0s own pro?ects which give
meaning to his life, and impose upon him responsibility for ma1imi5ing the good. Because of the need to make
Mtilitarianism more permissive, it would be contradictory to require that at the same time it be made more
severe.
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(re6iction 6estroys 0u4an a8ency
Blei2er +K
ARoland, !rofessor of International Relations at the Mniversity of eueensland. :!opular *issent, 'uman $gency and
6lobal !olitics.< 3444. !ub. "ambridge Mniversity !ressC
The very notion of prediction does, by its own logic, annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a
domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable through a convincing set of theoretical propositions is
to assume that the source of global politics is to a certain e1tent predetermined. )rom such a vantage-point, there is no
more room for interference and human agency, no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. $ predictive app
roach thus runs the risk of ending up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static image upon a far more comple1 set of
transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to ignore the constantly changing
domain of internationals relations. Rather, the main ob?ective must consists of facilitating and hindering of transversal
struggles that can grapple with those moment when people walk through walls precisely when nobody e1pects them to
do so. !rediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important
theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, may well predict certain events only because their
theoretical premises have become so ob?ectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political
dynamics. *issent, in this case, is the process that reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuing political
practices. *escribing, e1plaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first
sight. If one abandons the notion of Truth, the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order,
authentically and scientifically, as something that e1ists independently of the meaning we have given it 9 if one
abandons this separation of ob?ect and sub?ect, then the process of ?udging a particular approach to describing and
e1plaining an event becomes a very muddles affair. There is no longer an ob?ective measuring device that can set the
standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event, such as the collapse of the Berlin 2all, is true or
false. The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-
changing forms of linguistic e1pression that imbue the event with meaning. -B
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"tilitarianis4 P Killin8
Sa;in8 li;es isn@t enou80 o1 a Eusti1ication 1or actions"tilitarianis4 Eusti1ies t0e 2illin8 o1 t0e
4inority in or6er to sa;e t0e 4aEority
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#0e calculation o1 utilitarianis4 is t0e 1oun6ation o1
totalitarianis4
Geor8e Kateb3 (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 (rinceton3 #$E I''E- &CEA'3 1II+3 5 11
I do not mean to take seriously the idea that utilitarianism is a satisfactory replacement for the theory of rights. The
well-being Aor mere preferencesC of the ma?ority cannot override the rightful claims of individuals. In a time when
the theory of rights is global it is noteworthy that some moral philosophers disparage the theory of rights. The
political e1perience of this century should be enough to make them hesitate; it is not clear that, say, some version of
utilitarianism could not ?ustify totalitarian evil. It also could be fairly easy for some utilitarians to ?ustify any war
and any dictatorship, and very easy to ?ustify any kind of ruthless-ness even in societies that pay some attention to
rights. There is no end to the immoral permissions that one or another type of utilitarianism grants. verything is
permitted, if the calculation is right. Io, an advocate of rights cannot take utilitarianism seriously as a competing
general theory of political morality, nor any other competing general theory. Rather, particular principles or
considerations must be given a place. $ theory of rights may simply leave many decisions undetermined or have to
admit that rights may have to be overridden Abut never for the sake of &ocial well-being or mere policy preferenceC.
$lso, kinds of rights may sometimes conflict, and it is not always possible to end that conflict either by an
elaboration of the theory of rights or by an appeal to some other
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E;ery alternati;e to ri80ts lea6s to tyranny
6eorge Kateb, !rofessor of !olitics, !rinceton, T' IIIR ("$I, ,/I+, p. -
$t the same time, there are other theories that seem to affirm human dignity yet give rights only a lesser or
probationary or instrumental role. 1amples are utilitarianism, recent communitarianism, recent republicanism, and
radical egalitarianism. The first and last , will return to shortlyJ my response to the others appears here and there in
this volume. A$ll I wish to say now is that unless rights come first they are not rights. They will tend to be sacrificed to
some purpose deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. There will be little if any concept of the
integrity or inviolability of each individual. The group or the ma?ority or the good or the sacred or the vague future will
be preferred. The beneficiaries will be victimi5ed along with the victims because no one is being treated as a person
who is irreplaceable and beyond value. To make rights anything but primary, even though in the name of human
dignity, is to in?ure human dignity.
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Go;ern4ent coercion 4ust be 4orally reEecte6
*r. dward .oun2ins, business professor, 2heeling Fesuit, "I#I% &("IT+; T' R$%> () )R*(>,< Fune
,4, +KKK, p. http;NNwww.quebecoislibre.orgN444B,4-,,.htm
Recently Aand ironicallyC, government pro?ects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state
subsidi5ation or coercive mandates. &uch coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. &tatists who support
such pro?ects believe only in the power of political society 9 they don0t reali5e that the subsidi5ed or mandated
activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don0t
understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity , but simply its
coercion. If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace
mandates with the rule of law. $ccording to the "ato 'andbook for "ongress, "ongress should; before trying to
institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program
that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate itJ ask by what legal
authority in the "onstitution "ongress undertakes an action ...J recogni5e that when government undertakes a
program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear
redundant, with significant negative effectsJ and begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government
programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recogni5ing that
accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates
more efficient outcomes. very time ta1es are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program
is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral
imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians U
solve V our problems and run our lives.
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Conse9uentialis43 by ;ery nature3 will 1ail in 5ublic 5olicy to i45ro;e t0e wellBbein8 o1 ot0ers
Sc0e11ler3 5ro1 50iloso50y3 (rinceton3 I7
A&amuel &cheffler, prof philosophy, !rinceton, ,,N37N/7, The Re?ection of "onsequentialism, p. ,7-,B,
http;NNbooks.google.comNbooksE
hlDen[lrD[idD>/-wBe/p5Ks"[oiDfnd[pgD!$,7[dqDre?ectkconsequentialism[otsDhbe)BohbT%[sigD#g*h.p
!Bs$hF,I@6aB$LB2.hi,+C
I will maintain shortly that a hybrid theory which departed from consequentialism only to the e1tent of incorporating an
agent-centred prerogative could accommodate the ob?ection dealing with personal integrity. But first it is necessary to
give fuller characteri5ation of a plausible prerogative of this kind. To avoid confusion, it is important to make a sharp
distinction at the outset between an agent-centred prerogative and a consequentialist dispensation to devote
more attention to one=s own happiness and well-being than to the happiness and well-being of
others. "onsequentialists often argue that a differential attention to one=s own concerns will in most
actual circumstances have the best overall results, and that such differential treatment of oneself is
therefore required on consequentialist grounds. Two sorts of considerations are typically appealed to in support of
this view. )irst, it is said that one is in a better position to promote one=s own welfare and the welfare of those one is
closest to than to promote the welfare of other people. &o an agent produces ma1imum good per unit of
activity by focusing his efforts on those he is closest to, including himself. &econd, it is said that human
nature being what it is, people cannot function effectively at all unless they devote somewhat more energy to promoting
their own well-being than to promoting the well-being of other people. 'ere the appeal is no longer to the immediate
consequantialist advantages of promoting one=s own well-being, but rather to the long-term advantages of having
psychologically healthy agents who are efficient producers of the good. 2e find an e1ample of the first type of
argument in &idgwick=s remark that Reach man is better able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other
persons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs, and his greater opportunities of gratifying
them.= >ill, in the same vein, writes that Rthe occasions on which any person Ae1cept one in a thousandC has it in his
powerdto be a public benefactor 9 are but e1ceptionalJ and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public
utilityJ in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.=
&idgwick suggests an argument of the second type when he says that because Rit is under the stimulus of self-interest
that the active energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn out=, it would Rnot under actual
circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with the happiness of others as
much as with his own.=
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Conse9uentialis4 is base6 on t0e 8reater 8oo63 not on sel1Binterests
Ka8an3 5ro1 social t0ou80ts an6 et0ics3 .ale3 G7
A!hilosophy and !ublic $ffairs, @agan, prof social thoughts and ethics, +ale, #ol. ,L, Io. L A&ummer, ,/87C, pp. 3L/-
3-7 http;NNwww.?stor.orgNstableNpdfplusN33B-7,L.pdfC
"onsequentialism claims that an act is morally permissible if and only if it has better consequences
than those of any available alternative act. This means that agents are morally required to make their largest
possible contribution to the overall good-no matter what the sacrifice to themselves might involve Aremembering
only that their own well-being counts tooC. There is no limit to the sacrifices that morality can requireJ and
agents are never permitted to favor their own interests at the e1pense of the greater good.
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#0ere is a li4it to w0at 4orality can re9uire 1or us3 w0ic0 conse9uentialis4 1ails to incor5orate
(ur ordinary moral intuitions rebel at this picture. 2e want to claim that there is a limit to what morality can
require of us. &ome sacrifices for the sake of others are meritorious, but not requiredJ they are
supererogatory. "ommon morality grants the agent some room to pursue his own pro?ects, even though other
actions might have better consequences; we are permitted to promote the good, but we are not required to do so. The
ob?ection that consequentialism demands too much is accepted uncritically by almost all of usJ most moral philosophers
introduce permission to perform nonoptimal acts without even a word in its defense. But the mere fact that our
intuitions support some moral feature hardly constitutes in itself adequate philosophical ?ustification. If we are to go
beyond mere intuition mongering, we must search for deeper foundations. 2e must display the
reasons for limiting the requirement to pursue the good.
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Conse9uentialis4 can result in sacri1ices on so4e 1or t0e sa2e o1 ot0ers
)urthermore, discussions of the claim that consequentialism demands too much are often undermined by failure to
distinguish this claim from the widely discussed ob?ection that consequentialism permits too much-
improperly permitting sacrifices to be imposed on some for the sake of others. &ome theories
include deontological restrictions, forbidding certain kinds of acts even when the consequences
would be good. I will not consider here the merits of such restrictions. It is important to note, however, that even a
theory which included such restrictions might still lack more general permission to act nonoptimally-requiring agents to
promote the good within the pennissible means. It is only the grounds for re?ecting such a general requirement to
promote the overall good that we will e1amine here.
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"tilitarianis4 cant a66ress t0e issues o1 e9uity an6 6istributi;e Eustice
Liu ($D "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania +KKK <Dr Liu3 ($D S "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania3 writes +KKK
TEn;iron4ental Justice AnalysisL t0eories3 4et0o6s an6 5ractice3 +KKK ISB'L1:AADK7K/K3 5+KB+1U=
'owever, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantifications techniques are far from being simple,
straightforward, and ob?ective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also to fle1ible and
sub?ect to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. >ore importantly, they fail to deal the issue of
equity and distributive ?ustice. &eemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and costs, each
person is counted as one and only one. II other words, people are treated equally. )or >ill, :?ustice arises from the
principle of utility<. Mtilitarianism in concerted only the aggregate effect, no matter how the aggregate
is distributed. )or almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. &ome
people win, while others lose. The !areto optimality would is almost none1istent. $ policy=s outcome is !areto
optimal if nobody loses and at least one person gains.
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"tilitarianis4 5olicies result in ine9uality
Liu ($D "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania +KKK <Dr Liu3 ($D S "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania3 writes +KKK
TEn;iron4ental Justice AnalysisL t0eories3 4et0o6s an6 5ractice3 +KKK ISB'L1:AADK7K/K3 5+KB+1U=
Besides these ridiculous policy implications in the Mnited &tates and in the world, the logic underlying &ummers=
proposal represents :cultural imperialism,< the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and :a particular kind of
political-economic power and its discriminatory practices< A'arvey ,//B;LB8C. 1cept for its beautiful guise of
economic logic, the proposal is nothing new to those familiar with the history. The capitalistic powerhouses in urope
practiced material and cultural imperialism against countries in $frica, $merica, and $sia for years. They did it by
raising the banner of trade and welfare enhancement. They did it through guns and powder. (f course, they had their
logic for e1porting opium to "anton A6uang5houC in "hina through force. Iow, we see a new logic. This time, it is
economic logic and globali5ation. This time, the end is the same, but the means is not through guns and powder.
Instead, it is political-economic power. This e1ample illustrates clearly the danger of using the utilitarian perspective as
the only means for policy analysis. )undamentally, the utilitarian disregards the distributive ?ustice issue
altogether and espouses the current mode of production and consumption and the political-
economic structure, without any attention to the inequity and inequality in the current system. ven
worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of :it e1ists, therefore it=s good.< 'owever, :?ust
because it sells, doesn=t mean we have to worship it< A!eirce ,//,C.
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"tilitarian t0in2in8 results in 4ass 4ur6er
Cle;elan6 (ro1essor o1 Business A64inistration an6 Econo4ics +KK+ A"leveland 3443 !aul $., !rofessor of
Business $dministration and conomics at Birmingham-&outhern "ollege, The )ailure of Mtilitarian thics in !olitical
conomy, The Fournal of !rivate nterprise, http;NNwww.independent.orgNpublicationsNarticle.aspEidD,B43C
$ final problem with utilitarianism that ought to be mentioned is that it is sub?ect to being critici5ed because of a
potential fallacy of composition. The common good is not necessarily the sum of the interests of individuals. In their
book, $ ,istory of !conomic "heory and -ethod, kelund and 'ebert provide a well-conceived e1ample to
demonstrate this problem. They write; It is presumably in the general interest of $merican society to have every
automobile in the Mnited &tates equipped with all possible safety devices. 'owever, a ma?ority of individual car buyers
may not be willing to pay the cost of such equipment in the form of higher auto prices. In this case, the collective
interest does not coincide with the sum of the individual interests. The result is a legislative and
economic dilemma. Indeed, individuals prone to political action, and held under the sway of
utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of the supposed collective interest over and
against that of the individual. But then, what happens to individual human rightsE $re they not
sacrificed and set aside as unimportantE In fact, this is precisely what has happened. In democratic
countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred years has occurred primarily for this
reason. In addition, such thinking largely served as the ?ustification for the mass murders of millions of
innocent people in communist countries where the leaders sought to establish the :workers=
paradise.< To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to discern between the
various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to provide an
adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is e1tremely important for a
whole host of policy issues. $mong them, the issue of the government=s provision of public goods is worth our
consideration.
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"tilitarianis4 is use6 to Eusti1y 4ass 4ur6er by 8o;ern4ents
Cle;elan63 (ro1essor o1 Business A64inistration an6 Econo4ics +KK+ A"leveland 3443 !aul $., !rofessor
of Business $dministration and conomics at Birmingham-&outhern "ollege, The )ailure of Mtilitarian thics in
!olitical conomy, The Fournal of !rivate nterprise, http;NNwww.independent.orgNpublicationsNarticle.aspEidD,B43C
Indeed, the widespread confusion over this point is one of the primary reasons why western market economies have continued to drift towards the
ready acceptance of socialist policies. dmund (pit5 has rightly observed that utilitarianism with its :greatest happiness principle< completely
neglects the spiritual dimension of human life. Rather, it simply :asserts that men are bound together in societies solely on the basis of a rational
calculation of the private advantage to be gained by social cooperation under the division of labor.<
P3Q
But, as (pit5 shows, this perspective gives rise
to a serious problem. &ince theft is the first labor saving device, the utilitarian principle will tend to lead to the collective
use of government power so as to redistribute income in order to gain the :greatest happiness< in
society. Regrettably, the rent seeking behavior that is spawned as a result of this mind set will prove
detrimental to the economy. Ievertheless, this kind of action will be ?ustified as that which is most socially
e1pedient in order to reach the assumed ethical end. :Mtilitarianism, in short, has no logical stopping place
short of collectivism.<PLQ If morality is ultimately had by making the individual=s happiness
subservient to the organic whole of society, which is what Bentham=s utilitarianism asserts, then the human
rights of the individual may be violated. That means property rights may be violated if it is assumed to promote
the utilitarian end. 'owever, property rights are essential in securing a free market order. $s a result, utilitarianism
can then be used to ?ustify some heinous government actions. )or instance, the murder of millions
of human beings can be ?ustified in the minds of reformers if it is thought to move us closer to
paradise on earth. This is precisely the view that was taken by communist revolutionaries as they
implemented their grand schemes of remaking society. $ll of this is not to say that matters of utility are
unimportant in policy decisions, but merely to assert that utilitarian ethics will have the tendency of promoting
collectivist policies.
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>edical utilitarian calculus ensures human dehumani5ation and annihilation
S4it0 +KK+ <Mic0ael G S4it0 +KK+3 Lea6ers0i5 "ni;ersity3 R#0e (ublic (olicy o1 Casey * (lanne6
(arent0oo6@ 0tt5LHHwwwlea6eruco4H0u4anitiesHcaseyHc0/0t4l=
)urthermore, abandoning the principle of human equality could lead to eugenics because eugenics is founded
on the same philosophy that some people are of lesser value than others. ugenics is founded on the utilitarian
philosophy of 6erman philosopher 'egel. Mtilitarianism, also known as pragmatism, holds that Hthe end ?ustifies
the means.H If a means provides a solution to a practical problem, it is morally ?ustifiable.r8Bg The
'olocaust, in which Ia5i 6ermany saw a problem in the e1istence of Fews, 6ypsies, and mentally and
physically handicapped people, was founded on 'egel=s pragmatic philosophy.r8.g ".6. "ampbell,r88g
!resident of the $merican ugenics &ociety Inc. in ,/L,r8/g has written; H$dolf 'itler ... guided by the nation0s
anthropologists, eugenicists and social philosophers, has been able to construct a comprehensive racial policy of population
development and improvement ... it sets a pattern ... these ideas have met stout opposition in the Rousseauian social
philosophy ... which bases ... its whole social and political theory upon the patent fallacy of human equality ... racial
consanguinity occurs only through endogamous mating or interbreeding within racial stock ... conditions under which racial
groups of distinctly superior hereditary qualities ... have emerged.H Amphasis addedC.r/4g >r. "ampbell, a leader in the
eugenics movement,r/,g has clearly re?ected the idea of human equality. This re?ection helped pave the
way toward intellectual acceptance of Ia5i 6ermany=s H)inal &olution.H and has helped pave the way toward
$merica=s final solution to problem pregnancy. HIa5i 6ermany used the findings of eugenicists as the basis for the killing of
people of inferior genetic stock.Hr/3g $nother leader in the eugenics movement, >adison 6rant,r/Lg connected the
purported inequality of the unborn to the goals of the eugenics movement. H...Indiscriminate efforts to preserve babies among
the lower classes often results in serious in?ury to the race ... >istaken regard for what are believed to be divine laws and
sentimental belief in the sanctity of human life tend to prevent both the elimination of defective infants and the sterili5ation of
such adults as are themselves of no value to the communityH Amphasis addedC.r/7g $s recently as si1 years ago, two
medical ethicists, @uhse and &inger, have argued that no human being has any right to life.r/-g Msing a utilitarian
approach, they have concluded that Hmentally defectiveH people, unborn people, and even children
before their first birthday, have no right to life because these people are not in full possession of their
faculties.r/Bg These utilitarian authors are fully consistent with other utilitarians in that they first re?ect
the principle that are humans have equal moral status, then, using sub?ective criteria that appeals to
themselves personally, they identify certain humans they find e1pendable. 2hile @uhse and &inger may be
personally comfortable with their conclusions, this approach leaves all of us less than secure from being dehumani5ed. If
newborn infants can be found to lack equal moral status, then surely there are other innocent and vulnerable member of
society who can be similarly found to lack equal moral status. The Ia5is left few people in 6ermany safe from the gas
chambers, and any other society that uses utilitarianism in medical ethics also leaves great portions of society at risk of death
at the convenience of society at large. "learly, the equal moral status of all humans must be recogni5ed by the law.
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"tilitarianis4 ta2es away all ;alue to li;e
Cle;elan6 (ro1essor o1 Business A64inistration an6 Econo4ics +KK+ A"leveland 3443 !aul $., !rofessor of
Business $dministration and conomics at Birmingham-&outhern "ollege, The )ailure of Mtilitarian thics in !olitical
conomy, The Fournal of !rivate nterprise, http;NNwww.independent.orgNpublicationsNarticle.aspEidD,B43C
$nother problem with utilitarianism is that it has a very narrow conception of what it means to be a
human being. 2ithin Bentham=s view, human beings are essentially understood to be passive creatures
who respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion. $s such, there are no :bad< motives, only
:bad< calculations. In these terms, no person is responsible for his or her own behavior. In effect, the idea
being promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. This
notion reduces a human thought to nothing more than a series of bio-chemical reactions. +et, if this is true, then
there is no meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point
of being meaningless.
PBQ
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-i80ts inco45atible wit0 utilitarianis4
-ic0ar6 Morality3 "tilitarianis43 an6 -i80ts Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress (8 1IA
The first thing to notice is that utilitarianism is a general normative theory either about what is desirable& or about what
conduct is morally right& but in the first instance not a t0eory o1 ri80ts at all 3 e1cept by implication. $ philosopher can
be a utilitarian without offering any definition of Ha rightH and indeed without having thought about the matter. It is true
that some definitions of Ha rightH are so manifestly incompatible with the normative theses of utilitarianism that it is
clear that a utilitarian could not admit that there are rights in that sense. )or instance, if someone says that to have a
right Alife, libertyC is for some sort of thing to be secured to one absolutely, though the heavens fall, and that this is a
self-evident truth, then it is pretty clear that a utilitarian will have no place for rights in his sense. $gain, if one follows
'obbes and says, HIeither by the word right is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make
use of his natural faculties according to right reason,H one is not going to be able to accept a utilitarian normative
theory , for a utilitarian is not going to underwrite a man0s absolute liberty to pursue his own good according to his own
?udgment.
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"til i8nores 1un6a4ental ri80ts an6 creates a sli55ery slo5e until ri80ts lose all si8ni1icance
Bentley +2 P @ristina $. Bentley graduate of the *epartment of government at the Mniversity of >anchester.
:&uggesting $ R&eparate= $pproach To Mtility and Rights; *eontological &pecification and Teleogical nforcement of
'uman Rights,< &eptember. http;NNwww.abdn.ac.ukNpirNpostgradNvol,SissueLNissueLSarticle,.pdfQ
Mtilitarian theories usually present the view that they are capable of accommodating the idea of legal rights, as well as
providing a normative theory about such rights, which %yons calls :the legal rights inclusion thesis< A%yons, ,//7;
,-4C. (n the other hand however, utilitarian theorists are sceptical of the idea of moral rights unsupported by legal
institutions, as such rights would then in certain circumstances preclude the pursuit of the most utile course of action
owing to their :moral force, or normative force< A%yons, ,//7; ,-4C. "onversely, legal rights are seen as being
compatible with utilitarian goals as they are normatively neutral, being :morally defensible< Awhich :entails the idea of
a moral presumption in favour of respecting them<C only in so a far as they contribute to overall utility A%yons, ,//7;
,-4C. The problem then, as conceived by %yons, is whether or not utilitarians can account for the moral force of legal
rights Awhich people are commonly regarded as having by rights theorists and utilitarians alikeC, as; although there are
often utilitarian reasons for respecting ?ustified legal rights, these reasons are not equivalent to the moral force of such
rights, because they do not e1clude direct utilitarian arguments against e1ercising such rights or for interfering with
them A%yons, ,//7; ,-4C. This being the case, the utilitarian finds herself in the uncomfortable position of having to
e1plain why rights ought to be bothered with at all, as if they may be violated on an ad hoc basis to satisfy the demands
of ma1imal utility, then they seem as confusing on this scheme as natural or moral rights are claimed to be. This then
raises the question as to whether or not utilitarianism can accommodate any rights at all, even legal rights as its
e1ponents claim it is able to do, in its rule formulation at least. 'owever, leaving this debate aside as it e1ceeds the
scope of this paper, an alternative approach, that of :government house utilitarianism< Asee 6oodin, ,//-; 3.C is worth
considering as a possible means to a solution.
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Morality is co45leC J Blan2et clai4s t0at we nee6 to sa;e 5eo5le in 5o;erty 5re;ent us 1ro4 4a2in8
rational c0oices
Stubbs3 G1
A$nne, O the M of "ombridge, HThe !ros and "ons of "onsequentialism,H (ct, !hilosophy, #ol. -B, Io. 3,8 A(ct.,
,/8,C, pp. 7/.--,B, ?stor, $*; BNL4N4/C ?l
There is a common criticism of absolutism which, if sound, could be taken to demonstrate its irrationality. It is
that the absolutist refuses to consider the details of particular cases and insists instead on the automatic
application of a blanket ruleJ he thus fails, it is said, to 0take each case on its merits0. Iow there may be
absolutist positions which are vulnerable to this kind of ob?ectionJ for e1ample, the position that one is never
?ustified in taking a human life, whatever the circumstances. &omeone might reasonably ob?ect that there are
moral distinctions to be made over which this view simply rides rough-shod. &omeone may kill a fellow human
being in many different circumstances and for many different reasonsJ for personal gain of some kindJ to put a
loved one out of his miseryJ in self-defenceJ in ?ust war or revolutionJ as retributionJ and so on. &urely it would
be irrational, if not absurd, to insist on making the same moral ?udgment about all these cases. 'owever, even if
this is correct, it is a count against only some absolutist positions, not against all. It is commonly assumed that
the absolutist must operate with some highly general, e1ceptionless rulesJ but this is not an accurate picture of
the kind of absolutism of which I have been speaking throughout this paper. I have spoken, not so much of
moral rules, but of specific moral notions, concepts, or categories-murder, courage, cowardice, honesty, loyalty,
etc.J and I have maintained that these operate as fundamental in moral assessment, in the sense that their
applicability to a particular action will often be morally decisive, and, for some of them, will always be so.,7
%et us consider the e1ample of murder, which is a notion the applicability of which to an action is always
morally decisive. >y absolutist claims, not that killing can never be ?ustified, but that murder can never be
?ustifiedJ and he will not classify all cases of killing as cases of murder. Thus it is simply not true that he does
not have to investigate the details of a particular caseJ indeed it is only through such an investigation that he can
be in a position to decide whether or not the action in question is properly classifiable as 0murder0 . )urther-more,
he will take into account many features of the situation not con-sidered relevant by the consequentialist, for
e1ample, the agent0s motive for the killing. Indeed, it could be maintained that the consequentialist0s claim to
consider each case 0on its merits0 is vitiated by his e1tremely restricted conception of where these merits must
lie. I maintain that it is he, with his e1clusive concentration upon consequences, who abstracts from morally
relevant features of particular cases. $gain, this is a point to which I will return. Thus, if readiness to pay
attention to the details of individual cases be a test of rationality, my absolutist passes it with his colours flying
rather more conspicuously than those of the supporters of consequentialismJ they, after all, have theformula.
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#0e utilitarian ;iew5oint is 1lawe6 It is i45ossible 1or society to be ;iewe6 as a sin8le
entity wit0out sacri1icin8 t0e 0u4an 6i8nity o1 t0e in6i;i6ual
2ill Ky4lic2a, 1IGG A!rof. of !hilosophy at eueen=s M, !ress, !hilosophy and !ublic $ffairs, #ol. ,., Io. L.,
pp. ,.3-,/4, RRawls on Technology and *eontology< F&T(RC
$ccording to Rawls, then, the debate over distribution is essentially a debate over whether we should or should not define the right as ma1imi5ing the good. But is
this an accurate characteri5ation of the debateE Mtilitarians do, of course, believe that the right act ma1imi5es happiness, under some description of that good. $nd
that requirement does have potentially abhorrent conse9uences But do utilitarians believe that it is right because it ma1imi5es happinessE *o they hold that the
ma1imi5ation of the good defines the right, as teleological theories are said to doE %et us see why Rawls believes they do. Rawls says that utilitarianism is
teleological Athat is, defines the right as the ma1imi5ation of the goodC because it generali5es from what is rational in the one-person case to what is rational in many-
person cases. &ince it is rational for me to sacrifice my present happiness to increase my later happiness if doing so will ma1imi5e my happiness overall, it is rational
for society to sacrifice my current happiness to increase someone else0s happiness if doing so ma1imi5es social welfare overall. )or utilitarians, utility-ma1imi5ing
acts are right because they are ma1imi5ing. It is because they are ma1imi5ing that they are rational. Rawls ob?ects to this generali5ation from the one-person to the
many person case because he believes that it ignores the separateness of persons.E Alt0ou80 it is ri80t an6 5ro5er t0at I sacri1ice 4y
5resent 0a55iness 1or 4y later 0a55iness i1 6oin8 so will increase 4y o;erall 0a55iness3 it is wron8 to 6e4an6
t0at I sacri1ice 4y 5resent 0a55iness to increase so4eone else>s 0a55iness In t0e 1irst case3 t0e tra6eBo11 occurs
wit0in one 5erson>s li1e3 an6 t0e later 0a55iness co45ensates 1or 4y current sacri1ice In t0e secon6 case3 t0e
tra6eBo11 occurs across li;es3 an6 I a4 not co45ensate6 1or 4y sacri1ice by t0e 1act t0at so4eone else bene1its
My 8oo6 0as si45ly been sacri1ice63 an6 I 0a;e been use6 as a 4eans to so4eone else>s 3. Fohn Rawls, $ Theory
ofF5qsticeA"ambridge; 'arvard Mniversity !ress, rg.,C, p. L, L. Ibid., p. 3.. !hilosophy 6 !ublic $ffairs happiness.
Trade-offs that make sense within a life are wrong and unfair across lives. "tilitarians obscure this point by ignoring
the fact that separate people are involved. They treat society as t0ou80 it were an in6i;i6ual3 as a sin8le or8anis43
wit0 its own interests3 so t0at tra6eBo11s between one 5erson an6 anot0er a55ear as le8iti4ate tra6eBo11s wit0in
t0e social or8anis4
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"tilitarians ;iew society as a sin8le entity3 w0ic0 6e;alues t0e ri80ts an6 0u4an 6i8nity o1
t0e in6i;i6ual
&cott 6ordon echoes this interpretation of utilitarianism when he says that utilitarians adopt the view Hthat 0society0 is an
organic entity and contend that its utility is the proper ob?ective of social policy.H This view, he says, Hpermits flirtation
with the grossest form of anti-individualistic social philosophy.H7 This, then, is Rawls0s ma?or e1ample of a
HteleologicalH theory which gives priority to the good over the right. 'is re?ection of the priority of the good, in this
conte1t, is ?ust the corollary of his affirmation of the separateness of persons; promoting the well-being of the social
organism cannot be the goal from which people0s rightful claims are derived, since there is no socialorganism. &ince
individuals are distinct, they are ends in themselves, not merely agents or representatives of the well-being of the social
organism. This is why Rawls believes that utilitarianism is teleological, and why he believes that we should re?ect it in
favor of a deontological doctrine.
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"tilitarianis4 ;iews 5eo5le as locations o1 utilities3 w0ose 5ur5ose is to brin8 8oo6 to t0e
w0ole3 e;en i1 t0at entails t0e lower stan6ar6 or li1e 1or t0e in6i;i6ual
There is, however, another interpretation of utilitarianism, one that seems more in line with Rawls0s characteri5ation of
the debate. (n this second interpretation, ma1imi5ing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only
because that ma1imi5es value. &ur 5ri4ary 6uty is not to treat 5eo5le as e9uals3 but to brin8 about ;aluable states
o1 a11airs Rawls on Teleology and *eontology $s Bernard 2illiams puts it, 5eo5le are ;iewe6 4erely as locations o1
utilities3 or as causal le;ers 1or t0e Vutility networ2VL Vt0e basic bearer o1 ;alue 1or "tilitarianis4 is t0e state o1
a11airs. . . . as a Mtilitarian agent, I am ?ust the representative of the satisfaction system who happens to be near certain causal levers at a certain time.HIo
Mtilitarianism, on this view, is primarily concerned not with persons, but with states of affairs. This second interpretation is not merely a matter of emphasi5ing a
different facet of the same theoretical structure. Its distinctiveness becomes clear if we look at some utilitarian discussions of population policy, like those of
Fonathan 6lover and *erek !arfit. They ask whether we morally ought to double the population, even if it means reducing each person0s welfare by almost half
Asince that will still increase overall utilityC. They think that a policy of doubling the population is a genuine, if somewhat repugnant, conclusion of utilitarianism. But
it need not be if we view utilitarianism as a theory of treating people as equals. Ione1istent people have no claims-we have no moral duty to them to bring them into
the world. $s Fohn Broome says, Hone cannot owe anyone a duty to bring her into e1istence, because failing in such a duty would not be failing anyone.HH &o
what is the duty here, on the second interpretationE #0e 6uty is to 4aCi4i?e ;alue3 to brin8 about ;aluable states o1
a11airs3 e;en i1 t0e e11ect is to 4a2e all eCistin8 5ersons worse o11 t0an t0ey ot0erwise woul6 0a;e been. To put the
difference another way, if I fail to bring about the best state of affairs, by failing to consider the interests of some group of people, for e1ample, then I can be
critici5ed, on both interpretations, for failing to live up to my moral duty as a utilitarian. But, on the second interpretation, those whose interests are neglected have
no special grievance against me.
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A6a5tin8 t0e conse9uentialist ;iew5oint Eusti1ies t0e 6eat0s o1 4illions o1 innocents in
or6er to brin8 about an en6s
Thomas Donal6son, 1II: A!rof. of Business thics at 6eorgetown M, thics and International $ffairs,
:International *eontology *efended; $ Response to Russell 'ardin<, pg. ,7.-,-7C
The supposed :unrealism< of deontology also seems to lie behind 'ardin=s concerns over nuclear deterrence. $fter noting that @antians typically have condemned
the indiscriminate destruction implicit in a policy of deterrence, he adds that :it therefore seemed Pto @antiansQ profoundly immoral to destroy cities full of children
merely for the sake of the theory of deterrence.< The word :seemed< is surprising. &houldn=t most people, not only @antians, be appalled by the prospect of
destroying cities full of childrenE To not be appalled, I submit, is the result of either having been swept away by the morality of consequences or having studied too
much political science. It is noteworthy that the reason we are appalled relies on a @antian-style e1planation. I1 we were to a6o5t an eCclusi;e
conse9uentialist ;iew3 i1 t0e en6s were always ca5able o1 Eusti1yin8 t0e 4eans3 t0en t0e 6eat0 o1 4illions o1
innocents s0oul6 be tri;ialM4ere 1lu11 in t0e 1ace o1 4oral trut0 The idea that there are some things that should not
be done is precisely a deontological notion. #0e i6ea t0at3 no 4atter 0ow 5ower1ul a 6eterrent it 4ay be3 t0e
stra55in8 o1 babies to t0e 1ront o1 tan2s is nonet0eless wron83 cannot be un6erstoo6 entirely in conse9uentialist
ter4s It does not follow that the policy of nuclear deterrence is wrong from the viewpoint of deontology. &ome deontologists accept nuclear deterrence while
others do not. But deontologists insist correctly that not only the assessment of the consequences, but an assessment of the means used to achieve consequences, must
be factored into the moral evaluation of nuclear deterrence.
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"tilitarianis4 ta2en alone allows unEusti1ie6 warY 1ull wei80t 4ust be 8i;en to
6eontolo8ical analysis in or6er to ac0ie;e t0e best 5olicy o5tion
ric $ein?e in II Aassistant prof. of polisci O Mniversity of (klahoma, 'uman Rights [ 'uman 2elfare,
:2aging 2ar for 'uman Rights; Towards a >oral-%egal Theory of 'umanitarian Intervention<,
http;NNwww.du.eduNgsisNhrhwNvolumesN344LNhein5e-344L.pdf, p. -C
By itself, this :utilitarianis4 of rights< test has serious problems when employed as a threshold level of human
suffering that triggers a humanitarian intervention. This is because it su88ests t0at a88re8ate 0u4an su11erin8 is t0e
only 4oral concern t0at s0oul6 be a66resse6 A>ontaldi ,/8-; ,L-C. If we are to accept the general presumption
against war as enshrined in $rticle 3 of the MI "harter, we do so because of war=s inherent destructiveness and its
detrimental effect on international security. The use of force, including humanitarian intervention, will always result in
at least some loss of life. The principle of utility ameliorates this effect of intervention, but once an inter;ention is
e45loye6 to 0alt suc0 wi6es5rea6 su11erin83 a 5ure utilitarian et0os woul6 sanction t0e 5ursuit o1 t0is 5ri4ary
en6 Aachieving the military andNor humanitarian ob?ectiveC wit0out eCce5tion, so long as fewer people are killed than
are rescued in an intervention. 'ot only 6oes t0is re6uce t0e 4oral rele;ance o1 t0e in6i;i6ual3 it o5ens u5 t0e 6oor
1or a88ression 6is8uise6 as 0u4anitarian inter;ention3 as lon8 as t0ere are in6i;i6uals w0o are su11erin8 an6
6yin8 wit0in a stateMe;en i1 t0eir su11erin8 is entirely acci6ental. Taken as part and parcel of the utilitarian
framework, therefore, military intervention must only be sanctioned when it is in response to violations that are
intentionally perpetrated Thus, as )ernando Tessn eloquently e1plains in his chapter, :The %iberal "ase for
'umanitarian Intervention3) t0e best case 1or 0u4anitarian inter;ention contains a 6eontolo8ical ele4entGthat is,
a principled concern for the respectful treatment of individuals Anot intentionally or maliciously mistreating themCGas
well as a consequentialist oneGthe utilitarian requirement that interventions cause more good than harm A'ol5grefe and
@eohane; ,,7C. Consi6er 'A#&@s inter;ention in Koso;o3 w0ere a si8ni1icant nu4ber o1 Serbian ci;ilians were
2ille6 by 'A#& bo4bs in the process of coercing the >ilosevic regime to stop its ethnic cleansing of @osovars.
-e8ar6less o1 w0et0er 4ore li;es were sa;e6 t0an lost3 in acci6entally 2illin8 nonco4batants3 'A#& was in
essence acce5tin8 t0e notion t0at 0u4an ri80ts are not absolute #0is is 6es5ite t0e 1act t0at suc0 2illin8 was
6one in or6er to sa;e t0e li;es o1 ot0er innocent ci;ilians
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(olicy 6ecisions 6irecte6 at 4aintainin8 0u4an sur;i;al t0rou80 w0ate;er 4eans will encoura8e
8enoci6e3 war3 an6 t0e 6estruction o1 4oral ;alues
"allahan .L J CoBFoun6er an6 1or4er 6irector o1 #0e $astin8s Institute3 (0D in 50iloso50y 1ro4
$ar;ar6 "ni;ersity <Daniel3 %#0e #yranny o1 Sur;i;al)3 5 I1BI/=
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of
social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported
threat of "ommunist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter
what the cost to other social needs. *uring 2orld 2ar II, native Fapanese-$mericans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps.
This policy was later upheld by the &upreme "ourt in @orematsu v. Mnited &tates A,/77C in the general conte1t that a threat to national security can ?ustify acts
otherwise blatantly un?ustifiable. The survival of the *ryan race was one of the official legitimations of 0a"ism. Mnder the banner of
survival, the government of &outh $frica imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The #ietnamese war has seen one of the
greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival; the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that
survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. ). $kinner offers in Beyond )reedom and *ignity for the
controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. )or Facques >onod, in "hance and Iecessity, survival requires that we overthrow
almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful
prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. &ome have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our
misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus
procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite !aul hrlich, whose works have shown a high
dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations
which have not enacted population-control policies. )or all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a
!tyranny of survival.! There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake
of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recogni5e the danger when survival is
falsely and manipulatively invoked. *ictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the
hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity
which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable,
if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. &urvival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive single-mindedness
that will stop at nothing. 2e come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if
survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to lifeGthen how will it be
possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it
more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the
!yrrhic victory to end all !yrrhic victories. +et it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they
succeeded in not doing so.
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"tilitarianis4 6isre8ar6s res5ect 1or t0e in6i;i6ual an6 5er5etuates societal ine9uality by e;aluatin8
utility as a w0ole
)reeman /7 J A;alon (ro1essor in t0e $u4anities at t0e "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania3 (0D $ar;ar6
"ni;ersity3 JD "ni;ersity o1 'ort0 Carolina <Sa4uel3 %"tilitarianis43 Deontolo8y3 an6 t0e (riority o1
-i80t3) (0iloso50y an6 (ublic A11airs3 *ol +/3 'o 73 Autu4n3 55 /1/B/7I3
0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8HstableH++A:7A/=
The inclusion of all sentient beings in the calculation of interests severely undermines the force of any claim
that utilitarianism is an HegalitarianH doctrine, based in some notion of equal concern and respect for persons.
But let us assume @ymlicka can restore his thesis by insisting that it concerns, not utilitarianism as a general moral doctrine, but as a more limited thesis about
political morality. A'ere I pass over the fact that none of the utilitarians he relies on to support his egalitarian interpretation construe the doctrine as purely political.
The drift of modern utilitarian theory is ?ust the other way; utilitarianism is not seen as a political doctrine, to be appealed to by
legislators and citi5ens, but a nonpublic criterion of right that is indirectly applied Pby whom is a separate issueQ to
assess the nonutilitarian public political conception of ?ustice.C &till, let us assume it is as a doctrine of political morality that
utilitarianism treats persons, and only persons, as equals. ven in this form it cannot be that ma1imi5ing utility is Hnot a goalH
but a Hby-product,H Hentirely derived from the prior requirement to treat people with equal considerationH A"!!,
p. L,C @ymlicka says, HIf utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of ma1imi5ing welfareH A"!!, p.
L-, emphases addedC. But how can this beE AiC 2hat is there about the formal principle of equal consideration Aor for that matter occupying a universal point of
viewC which would imply that we ma1imi5e the aggregate of individuals0 welfareE 2hy not assume, for e1ample, that equal consideration requires ma1imi5ing the
division of welfare Astrict equality, or however equal division is to be construedCJ or, at least ma1imi5e the multiple Awhich would result in more equitable
distributions than the aggregateCE (r, why not suppose equal consideration requires equal proportionate satisfaction of each person0s interests Aby for e1ample,
determining our resources and then satisfying some set percentage of each person0s desiresC . (r finally we might rely on some !aretian principle; equal
consideration means adopting measures making no one worse off. )or reasons I shall soon discuss, each of these rules is a better e1plication of equal consideration
of each person0s interests than is the utilitarian aggregative method, which in effect collapses distinctions among persons. A3C
>oreover, rather than construing individuals0 HinterestsH as their actual Aor rationalC desires, and then putting them all on a par and measuring according to intensity,
why not construe their interests le1ically, in terms of a hierarchy of wants, where certain interests are, to use &canlon0s terms, more HurgentH than others, insofar as
they are more basic needsE qual consideration would then rule out satisfying less urgent interests of the ma?ority of people until all means have been taken to
satisfy everyone0s more basic needs. ALC )inally, what is there about equal consideration, by itself, that requires ma1imi5ing anythingE 2hy does it not require, as in
*avid 6authier0s view, optimi5ing constraints on individual utility ma1imi5ationE (r why does it not require sharing a distributionE The point is ?ust that, to say
we ought to give equal consideration to everyone0s interests does not, by itself, imply much of anything
about how we ought to proceed or what we ought to do. It is a purely formal principle, which requires certain added,
independent assumptions, to yield any substantive conclusions. That AiC utilitarian procedures ma1imi5e is not a Hby-productH of
equal consideration. It stems from a particular conception of rationality that is e1plicitly incorporated into the procedure. That A3C individuals0
interests are construed in terms of their ArationalC desires or preferences, all of which are put on a par, stems
from a conception of individual welfare or the human good; a person0s good is defined sub?ectively, as what he
wants or would want after due reflection. )inally ALC, aggregation stems from the fact that, on the classical view, a single individual takes
up everyone0s desires as if they were his own, sympathetically identifies with them, and chooses to ma1imi5e
his HindividualH utility. 'are, for one, e1plicitly makes this move. Fust as Rawls says of the classical view, 'are He1tendPsQ to society the principle of
choice for one man, and then, to make this e1tension work, conflatPesQ all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectatorH ATF,
p. 3.C. If these are independent premises incorporated into the ?ustification of utilitarianism and its decision procedure, then ma1imi5ing aggregate
utility cannot be a Hby-productH of a procedure that gives equal consideration to everyone0s interests. Instead,
it defines what that procedure is. If anything is a by-product here, it is the appeal to equal consideration.
Mtilitarians appeal to impartiality in order to e1tend a method of individual practical rationality so that it may be applied to society as a whole Acf. TF, pp. 3B-3.C.
Impartiality, combined with sympathetic identification, allows a hypothetical observer to e1perience the desires of others as if they were his own, and compare
alternative courses of action according to their conduciveness to a single ma1imand, made possible by equal consideration and sympathy. The significant
fact is that, in this procedure, appeals to equal consideration have nothing to do with impartiality between persons.
2hat is really being given equal consideration are desires or e1periences of the same magnitude. That these
are the desires or e1periences of separate persons Aor, for that matter, of some other sentient beingC is simply an incidental
fact that has no substantive effect on utilitarian calculations. This becomes apparent from the fact that we can more accurately
describe the utilitarian principle in terms of giving, not equal consideration to each person0s interests, but instead equal consideration to equally intense interests, no
matter where they occur. Iothing is lost in this redescription, and a great deal of clarity is gained. It is in this sense that persons enter into utilitarian
calculations only incidentally. $ny mention of them can be dropped without loss of the crucial information
one needs to learn how to apply utilitarian procedures. This indicates what is wrong with the common claim
that utilitarians emphasi5e procedural equality and fairness among persons, not substantive equality and
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fairness in results. (n the contrary, utilitarianism, rightly construed, emphasi5es neither procedural nor substantive equality among persons. *esires and
e1periences, not persons, are the proper ob?ects of equal concern in utilitarian procedures. 'aving in effect read persons out of the picture at the procedural end,
before decisions on distributions even get underway, it is little wonder that utilitarianism can result in such substantive
inequalities. 2hat follows is that utilitarian appeals to democracy and the democratic value of equality are
misleading In no sense do utilitarians seek to give persons equal concern and respect.
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Alt0ou80 utilitarianis4 clai4s to result in e9uality3 its nature to only re8ar6 5eo5le as one entity
rat0er t0an a 8rou5 o1 in6i;i6uals in0erently contra6icts t0e 5rinci5le o1 e9uality
To sum up, though utilitarianism incorporates equality as a property of the ?ustification of the principle of
utility, and of the decision process through which that principle gets applied, it does not leave any place for e#uality in the content of that
principle. (n its face, this standard of right conduct directs that we ma1imi5e an aggregate. *s a result neither e#uality or any other distributive
value is assigned independent significance in resulting distributions of goods. @ymlicka claims that, because Rawls sees utilitarianism as
teleological, he misdescribes the debate over distribution by ignoring that utilitarians allow for equality of distribution too. But the distribution debate
Rawls is concerned with is a Alevel 3C debate over how what is deemed good :welfare, rights, resources, etc.; within a
moral theory is to be divided among individuals. It is not a Alevel LC debate over the distribution of consideration in a procedure which decides the
distribution of these goods. Ior is it a Alevel ,C debate over the principles of practical reasoning that are invoked to ?ustify the fundamental standard of distribution.
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&wnin8 onesel1 is a 4oral i45erati;e J utilitarianis4 i45oses inter5ersonal obli8ations to society3
w0ic0 6estroys 4orality
@ymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism; teleological and egalitarian. *ccording to Rawls/s teleological interpretation, the
!fundamental goal! A%"", p. LLC of utilitarianism is not persons, but the goodness of states of affairs. *uty is defined by what best
brings about these states of affairs. H P>Q a1imi5ing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that ma1imi5es value. ,ur primary
duty isn/t to treat people as e#uals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs! A%"", p. 3.C. It is difficult to see, @ymlicka says,
how this reading of utilitarianism can be viewed as a moral theory. 'orality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter of
interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each other. )ut to whom do we owe the duty of maximi"ing utility-
$urely not to the impersonal ideal spectator . . . for he doesn/t exist. Ior to the ma1imally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs
don0t have moral claims.H A%"", p. 38-3/C @ymlicka says, HThis form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a political moralityH A%"", p. 3/C.
&uppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose Hfundamental principleH is Hto treat people as equalsH A%"", p. 3/C. (n this egalitarian reading,
utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It0s
a moral theory which purports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one.
A%"", p. 3-C
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Ai4s to 4aCi4i?e o;erall utility 6es5ite co45etin8 interests in t0e 5ublic is utilitarianis4 J 6estroys
in6i;i6ualis4
&chroeder 8B J (ro1essor o1 Law at Du2e <C0risto50er $3 (ro1 o1 Law at Du2e3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3)
A5ril3 Colu4bia Law -e;iew3 55 7I:B:A+3 0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8H5ssH11++A/A=
$t first glance, this structure may seem vulnerable to two different ob?ections. )irst, any proposal to compare or balance competing
interests can be critici"ed as leading ineluctably back to some form of utilitarianism Aperhaps a Hutilitarianism of rightsHC..3
If the adverse consequences of a right must be weighed in some manner against the benefits of the right, how can any barriers against loss of
autonomy surviveE There will always be some concatenation of conse#uences that those bent on overcoming the
right will assert outweighs the claim of the individual. *oes not this kind of relativism ultimately degenerate into some reconstituted
version of utilitarianism, effectively leveling the moral landscape into continual balancing e1ercisesE
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"tility 4aCi4i?ation 6estroys in6i;i6ualis4
&chroeder 8B J (ro1essor o1 Law at Du2e <C0risto50er $3 (ro1 o1 Law at Du2e3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3)3
In defining those rights, it seems natural to begin by stating clearly which aspects of an autonomous individual re#uire protection from
consideration of utility maximi"ation. The rights in the system constrain the behavior of others that might harm
these aspects of the individual. (ne might begin with the idea of preservation. $ecuring the moral significance of the
individual should at least center on preserving that individual/s life. !reservation ought then to be e1tended to include the broader
concept of physical or bodily integrity, because many physical assaults short of death can so damage or in?ure an individual as to reduce dramatically the
quality of that individual0s life. Rights should at least prevent substantial invasions of bodily integrity.
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"tilitarianis4 1orces in6i;i6uals to sacri1ice t0eir own 8oals in or6er to increase utility
(dell 47 JAssociate (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y at t0e "ni;ersity o1 Illinois <Jac23 %&n Conse9uentialist
Et0ics3) Wa6swort03 #0o4son Learnin83 Inc3 55 IGB1K/=
This ob?ection can, as &amuel &cheffler has pointed out, be integrated with ob?ection . Remember that Rawls claimed that utilitarianism fails to //take
seriously the distinction between persons.! ,ne person can be forced by utilitarianism to give up far too much, including the
life plan that he or she has formulated for himself or herself. Rational agents who are fully aware of what they would be putting on the line if they were to agree to
a utilitarian society would never adopt utilitarianism. They would perceive that such a society could re#uire them to sacrifice their individual
pro&ects, their freedom, and even their lives for the sake of the aggregate or total satisfaction of the group. To agree to such a collective approach would be to
degrade their autonomy, and this is a matter of integrity. $s &cheffler observes regarding the integration of A'C and AFC, Hthe two ob?ections focus on two different
ways of making the same supposed mistake; two different ways of failing to take sufficient account of the separateness and nature of persons.H
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-is2s ta2en by t0e 8o;ern4ent to increase o;erall utility will se;erely co45ro4ise t0e in6i;i6ual
w0ic0 will result in 1atality
quity has provided a limited answer to the question of acceptable risk. The traditional doctrine of in?unctions against tortious
behavior holds that courts may en&oin behavior that is virtually certain to harm an identifiable individual in the near future.03
This body of law, however, focuses more on avoidance of harm to specific persons than on regulation of risk.0L It is thus inapposite to the questions of modern
technological risk, risk that is #uite unlikely to in&ure any identifiable individual in the short-term, but that carries severe
conse#uences that are certain to occur to someone in the medium to distant future. "onsider the paradigm of the $cme "hemical
"ompany; $cme "hemical "ompany is discovered to be storing chemical wastes on its land in such a way that seepage containing traces of those wastes are
entering an underground water system that serves as the sole drinking water supply for a town several miles away. (ne of the chemicals has been classified as a
carcinogen in laboratory e1periments on mice. $lthough e1trapolating from these results to predictions of human carcinogencity is somewhat controversial, federal
agencies routinely do so. Mnder one of a number of plausible sets of assumptions, a concentration of ten parts per billion AppbC in drinking water is estimated to
increase a human0s chance of contracting cancer by one in one hundred thousand if the human is assumed to consume a normal intake over the course of twenty
years. $nalyses show that the current concentration in the underground aquifer near $cme0s plant is ten ppb. This case e1hibits the typical features of risky actions
associated with modern technology. The probability of risk to any individual is relatively small while its severity is substantial,
perhaps fatal. Risk is being imposed on individuals who have not consented to it in any meaningful sense. )inally, risk is
unintentional in the sense that imposing risk on others is not an ob?ective of $cme0s plan.07 2e may assume its e1ecutives in fact would be tremendously relieved if
they could avoid the risk.
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Go;ern4ent coercion t0reatens in6i;i6ual 1ree6o4 an6 ren6ers 4orality 4eanin8less
6authier 3@ <Can6ace3 (0D Associate (ro1essor in t0e De5art4ent o1 (0iloso50y an6 -eli8ion at t0e
"ni;ersity o1 'ort0 Carolina3 Kenne6y Institute o1 Et0ics Journal=
Instances of coercion and constraint also may e1empt agents from ?udgments of moral responsibility. Coercion and constraint, as used here,
should be understood as the imposition of some external force that compels or precludes a particular choice or a
particular action itself. "ertainly there are degrees of coercion and constraint, and consideration of the form and degree of e1ternal force imposed can affect
the e1tent to which one considers an action to have been less than voluntary. The greater the threat imposed by some external force, the
more it eliminates or controls choice. &ome e1ternal threats are so great as to totally bypass choice, leading directly to action, while others may control
choice to the e1tent that a particular action is virtually ensured. 7inally, some threats reduce the voluntariness of an action by making any
other choice extremely difficult for an individual to make in the face of the relevant threat . Thus, the greater the coercion or
constraint, the less likely we will be to consider the action voluntary and the less moral responsibility we will assign to the
agent. Pnd !age L7LQ 2hen the autonomy of those who have the capacity for rational agency is respected, they are permitted to make choices and act according
to their beliefs and values, to the e1tent that their actions pose no risk of harm to individuals or to the community. In the absence of overwhelming
coercive factors or controlling constraints, we hold these autonomous individuals morally responsible for their choices and
actions. This does not mean that those beliefs and values are themselves totally chosen. "ertainly, moral responsibility can be and is assigned with the
understanding that the person who has voluntarily chosen and acted is the product of a family, a community, and all of the other societal influences that make
individuals who they are. The assignment of moral responsibility is part of an important method of social control through which the community furthers common
ends and interests A&miley ,//3, pp. 3L8--7C. $lthough moral responsibility in the first sense discussed here is a neutral ?udgment, recogni5ing both causality and
moral agency, it is the basis for praise and blame, reward and punishment. These are essential ways in which communities may effect personal change in their
members toward behavior that is more in concert with communal values and ends. )or e1ample, if ?udgments of praise and blame are internali5ed, they create the
Hsocial emotionsH of guilt, shame, and pride that contribute to the development of conscience A6aylin and Fennings ,//B, pp. ,L.-7/C. $s part of the social control
provided by praise and blame, the assignment of moral responsibility operates within a pluralistic democratic society by permitting areas of life in which the
individual may choose and act, free of coercion and constraint, but with the understanding that these choices and actions are sub?ect to ?udgment and criticism by
others in the community. 'owever, communitarians sometimes appear to go even farther, to seek even more social control based
on a shared vision of the good life that is determined either by the ma&ority or by the elites. This tendency is an He1cessH of the
communitarian movement that may lead to a !tyranny of the ma&ority.! (ushing the laudable communitarian concern with shared
values and the common good to this extreme would destroy the individual , create persons Hconstituted by the group0s shared aims,H and
Hleave little or no room for criticism of the group willH A@uc5ewski ,//., pp. ,4B-8C. >oreover, without individuals who are free to make choices
based on their traditions, histories, and a variety of communal influences as well as their own consideration of all of these factors, moral responsibility has
no meaning. ,nce the force of law is behind shared values and how they are to be honored in individual lives and
decisions, we would have a level of control through legal coercion that would leave little room for moral responsibility
based on the voluntarily chosen actions of moral agents. Thus, the imposition of communal values, in all areas of life, would ?eopardi5e the social practice of
assigning moral responsibility for individual action.
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"tilitarianis4 5ro4otes ine9uity an6 in0erently 6iscri4inates a8ainst 4inority li2e sla;ery
(dell, 47 J "ni;ersity o1 Illinois is an Associate (ro1essor o1 (0iloso50y <Jac23 (0D3 %&n
Conse9uentialist Et0ics3) Wa6swort03 #0o4son Learnin83 Inc3 55 IGB1K/=
$ classic ob?ection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity, and is related to the kind of ob?ection raised by
Rawls, which I will consider shortly. &uppose we have two fathers-$ndy and Bob. &uppose further that they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three
children, make the same salary, have the same living e1penses, put aside the same amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. &uppose that
every week $ndy and Bob ask themselves what they are going to do with this e1tra money, and $ndy decides anew each week A$MC to divide it equally among his
three children, or he makes a decision to always follow the rule ARMC that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. &uppose
further that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. &uppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors his oldest son,
Bobby, decides anew each week A$MC to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he instructs Bobby not to tell the others,
or he makes a decision to follow the rule ARMC to always give the total sum to Bobby. &uppose also that Bobby gets I& units of pleasure from his allowance and that
his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both fathers is the same-I& units of pleasure. >ost, if not all, of us would agree that although
$ndy0s conduct is e1emplary, Bob0s is culpable. Ievertheless, according to both $M and RM the fathers in question are morally e.ual. Ieither father is more or less
e1emplary or culpable than the other. I will refer to the ob?ection implicit in this kind of e1ample as A'C and state it as; 0 A'C )oth act and rule
utilitarianism violate the principle of &ust distribution. hat Rawls does is to elaborate ob&ection A'C. <tilitarianism,
according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive &ustice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of
the concept of !&ustice.! $s I pointed out when I discussed Russell0s views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a ma&ority of a
given population while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population :as
occurs in societies that allow slavery; can maximi"e the general good, and do so even though the minority group may
have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to ma1imi5e the good in the world is due to its failure to 00take seriously the
distinction between persons.Hm ,ne person can be forced to give up far too much to insure the maximi"ation of the good, or the total
aggregate satisfaction, as was the case for those young $5tec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the 6ods for the welfare of the group.
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"tilitarianis4 6estroys ;alue to li1e by 1orcin8 t0e in6i;i6ual to ta2e ris2s on a costBbene1it basis in an
e11ort to increase o;erall utility o1 an entity3 w0ile 6e4orali?in8 t0e in6i;i6ual@s own syste4 o1 ;alues
)rom the individual0s point of view, the balancing of costs and benefits that utilitarianism endorses
renders the status of any individual risk bearer profoundly insecure. $ risk bearer cannot determine
from the kind of risk being imposed on him whether it is impermissible or not. The identical risk may be
?ustified if necessary to avoid a calamity and un?ustified if the product of an act of profitless carelessness, but the nature and extent of the
underlying benefits of the risky action are fre #uently unknown to the risk bearer so that he cannot know
whether or not he is being wronged. 7urthermore, even when the gain that lies behind the risk is well-known, the status of a
risk bearer is insecure because individuals can &ustifiably be inflicted with ever greater levels of risk in
con&unction with increasing gains. "ertainly, individual risk bearers may be entitled to more protection if the risky action e1poses many
others to the same risk, since the likelihood that technological risks will cause greater harm increases as more and more people e1perience that risk.
This makes the risky action less likely to be ?ustifiable. (nce again, however, that insight seems scant comfort to an individual, for
it reinforces the reali"ation that, standing alone, he does not count for much. $ strategy of weighing gains against risks
thus renders the status of any specific risk victim substantially contingent upon the claims of others, both those who may share his victim status and
those who stand to gain from the risky activity. The an1iety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun by larger
social considerations underlies what '.%.$. 'art has aptly termed the Hdistinctively modern criticism of utilitarianism,H-8 the criticism that, despite
its famous slogan, !everyone BisC to count for one,!2E utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary
place in its system of values. #arious versions of utilitarian ism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to ma1imi5e
happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.B4 2hatever the specific formulation, the goal of maximi"ing some
mea sure of utility obscures and diminishes the status of each individual . It reduces the individual to a conduit, a reference
point that registers the appropriate Hutiles,H but does not count for anything independent of his monitoring function.B, It also produces moral
re#uirements that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximi"e utility, since once the net effects of a
proposal on the maximand have been taken into account, the individual is expendable. "ounting pleasure and pain
equally across individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only plea sure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals and the
trampling of the few in furtherance of the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any individual radically
contingent. The individual0s status will be preserved only so long as that status con tributes to increasing total utility. (therwise, the individual can
be discarded.
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#0e only way to 5reser;e in6i;i6ualis4 is to allow all 5ersons to 0a;e t0e ri80t to own t0e4sel;es
re8ar6less o1 any ne8ati;e conse9uentialist i45acts
3. %iberal Theories in the HRightsH Tradition. $ second group of theories avoids the modern criticism of utilitarianism by making the
individual central. "ontemporary theorists as diverse as Fohn Rawls, Robert Io5ick, Richard pstein, "harles )ried, and Ronald *workin continue a tradition
variously described as the @antian, natural rights, or !rights! tradition.B3 They all define the re#uirements of &ustice in terms of recogni"ing
and preserving the essential characteristics of individuals as free and autonomous moral agents.D1 In this approach, the
individual is defined prior to articulating the terms under which that individual can be acted upon or interacted with, and
those terms are conse#uently specified so as to protect and preserve what is essential to the individual . In this conte1t, rights
have been called HtrumpsH since they constrain what society can do to the individual.D? These theories all aspire to make the
individual more secure than he is under utilitarianism . In the rights tradition, the crucial criteria for assessing risks derive from the impact of
those risks on risk victims, and the criteria are defined independently of the benefits flowing from risk creation. To be plausible, such a program cannot totally
prohibit risk creation, but the ostensible advantage of this program over utilitarianism is that risk creation is circumscribed by criteria e1clusively derived from
considerations of the integrity of the individual, not from any balancing or weighing process.B- The root idea is that nonconsensual risks are violations of
Hindividual entitlements to personal security and autonomy.HBB This idea seems highly congruent with the ideology of environmentalism e1pressed in our national
legislation regulating technological risk. Indeed, two scholars have recently suggested a modern rendering of @ant0s categorical imperative; H*ll rational
persons have a right not to be used without their consent even for the benefit of others.HB. If imposing risk amounts to using
another, this tradition seems to be the place to look to secure the status of the individual.
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"tilitarianis4 allows lar8er 5owers li2e t0e 8o;ern4ent to control t0e in6i;i6ual as lon8 a 8reater
utility is ac0ie;e6 It is i44oral to ;iolate t0e sanctity o1 0u4an li1e
&chroeder 8B J (ro1essor o1 Law at Du2e <C0risto50er $3 (ro1 o1 Law at Du2e3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3)
In modern society, the overwhelming power of centrali5ed authority, whether of the state or of other large
institutions, looms over every individual. Mtilitarianism is a philosophy that legitimi5es that power and
countenances the an1iety that comes with it so long as total utility is increased. In the process of that legitimi5ation,
utilitarianism fails to accommodate society/s deeply held moral ideals concerning the special sanctity of human life. HP2Qe
prefer to think of PlivesQ as beyond price. . . . To the e1tent that our lives and institutions depend on the notion that life is beyond price . . . a refusal to save lives is
horribly costly.HB8 Cost-benefit analysis flaunts the legitimacy of placing a price on life. The depth of hostile reactions to the utilitarian
tradition that has been displayed in the environmental era cannot fully be comprehended until the antipathy to this aspect of that tradition is understood.
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"tilitarianis4 su55resses in6i;i6ual c0oiceB4a2in8 J 1ree6o4 8i;es ;alue to li1e
&chroeder 8B J (ro1essor o1 Law at Du2e <C0risto50er $3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3) A5ril3 Colu4bia Law
-e;iew3 55 7I:B:A+3 0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8H5ssH11++A/A=
Mnder this concept of rules, rules may intervene to preclude or limit the consideration of conse#uences, and thus such consideration will
not inevitably collapse all issues of moral choice into a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis. $ny theory intent on maintaining individual integrity and autonomy will
likely generate some rules that protect individuals from the radical contingency associated with utilitarianism. $utonomy implies some moral space within
which an individual can make choices even if those choices do not maximi"e utility. HRightsH in theories emphasi5ing individual
autonomy function as rules providing individuals with moral space. They eliminate from consideration of the ?ustness of an action some arguments and factual
aspects that might otherwise bear on that ?udgment. Iotice that this idea of rights is consistent with taking consequences into account. "onsequences can be taken
into account at the rule formulation stage. If a rule then makes certain consequences irrelevant to its subsequent application, these Hrights regardless of
consequencesH ignore consequences only because the consequences of granting those rights had been taken into account when the rights were formulated. ithin
a nonutilitarian theory, then, there is a valid distinction between weighing the conse#uences of a risky action and
weighing the conse#uences of a rule regulating risky actions . (ne point this section makes is that this distinction cannot plausibly result in a
rule that risks should be regulated regardless of consequences, but that fact alone does not demonstrate that either the structure of the arguments supporting this
conclusion or the norms of behavior derived from them are simply reformulations of utilitarianism..B ven if the proposal to take consequences into account does
not reproduce a form of utilitarianism, a second ob?ection may be voiced. It might be thought that the proposal embodies the same fundamental mistake that has
resulted in criticism of utilitarianism. (nce again an individual0s security will become contingent upon the consequential value to others of actions affecting that
individual0s vital interests. $lthough the problem of contingency is real, the criticism of utilitarianism outlined above cannot be leveled against the manner in which
contingency has been reintroduced. This is because, notwithstanding the current fashion of equating HconsequentialismH with Hutilitarianism,H.. utilitarianism is a
unique subset of consequentialism, and arguments aimed at it cannot simply be appropriated to indict all theories that consider consequences to be relevant.
<tilitarianism/s special use of conse#uences isolates a single conse#uential aspect of actions contribution to the
maximand-and assesses the propriety of action exclusively by that measure. It is this feature of utilitarianism, not the
simple ingredient of considering conse#uences, that makes it vulnerable to the charge of ignoring individuals.ML It is
perfectly feasible to construct moral theories that employ conse#uences in their evaluation of the rightness of actions
without thereby endorsing utilitarian reductionism../ In specific cases, one individual might be given his HrightsH by a second individual only at
the second individual0s great discomfort, inconvenience, and perhaps even risk of life.
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Go;ern4ents 0a;e a res5onsibility to 4aintain 0u4an ri80ts an6 in6i;i6ualis4 J utilitarianis4
un6er4ines 0u4an ri80ts
@ateb /3 J (ro1essor o1 (olitics at (rinceton "ni;ersity <Geor8e3 %#0e Inner &ceanL In6i;i6ualis4 an6
De4ocratic Culture3) 5 :=
To tie dignity to rights is therefore to say that governments have the absolute duty to treat people Aby actions and
abstentionsC in certain ways, and in certain ways only. The state=s characteristic domination and insolence are to be curbed for the sake of rights. !ublic and
formal respect for rights registers and strengthens awareness of three constitutive facts of being human; every person is a creature capable of
feeling pain, and is a free agent capable of having a free being, of living a life that is one8s own and not somebody else8s
idea of how a life should be lived, and is a moral agent capable of acknowledging that what one claims for oneself as a right
one can claim only as an e#ual to everyone else Aand relatedly that what one wants done to oneself one should do to othersC. Respect for rights
recogni5es these capacities and thus honors human dignity. I know that adequate recognition of these human capabilities does not entail respect for rights as the
sole and necessary conclusion. This respect is not a matter of logical inference. Rather, given initial sentiments 9 say, fellow feeling or special sensitivity to pain or
dislike of power 9 recognition can lead to or add up to a theoretical affirmation of rights. The most important sentiment by far is for the idea that every
individual is e#ually a world, an infinity, a being who is irreplaceable. $t the same time, there are other theories that seem to
affirm human dignity yet give rights only a lesser or probationary or instrumental role. 5xamples are utilitarianism, recent
communitarianism, recent republicanism, and radical egalitarianism. The first and last I will return to shortlyJ my response to the others appears her and there in
this volume. *ll I wish to say now is that unless rights come first, they are not rights. They will tend to be sacrificed to some purpose
deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. The group or the ma?ority or the good or the sacred or the vague future will be preferred. The
beneficiaries will be victimi5ed along with the victims because no one is being treated as a person who is irreplaceable and beyond value. To make rights anything
but primary, even though in the name of human dignity, is to in?ure human dignity.
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#0eories o1 ri80t 5reser;e ;alue to li1e J 8o;ern4ent 5olitics wit0 t0e intention o1 increasin8 o;erall
utility t0rou80 en;iron4entalis4 6estroy 4orality an6 6ecei;es t0e in6i;i6ual
Theories in the rights tradition resonate with ideals regarding life and its sanctity. These theories, however, can
provide a reliable guide to risk regulation only if they can fit their analysis of rights against risk with other
legitimate values to comprise a coherent theory of government. It is the thesis of this $rticle that the notion of a right against risk that trumps all
considerations of countervailing values cannot be so validated by any theory in the rights tradition. *espite the appealing absolutist language of nonutilitarian
theories, the countervailing benefits of risky actions persistently return and demand consideration. This is so at
the level of practical politics, where the years after passage of our ma?or environmental statutes have
witnessed creative maneuvers by courts, agencies, and "ongress to avoid actually implementing absolute
rights against risk whenever the substantial costs of achieving e1tremely low levels of risk become
undeniable.B/ It is also true at the level of theory. (nce one looks beyond the glitter of catchphrases to e1amine their accounts, seemingly absolutist
nonutilitarian theories do not support absolute rights against risk. $ny defensible theory of risk regulation must acknowledge the
relevance of countervailing interests and values. 6iven the modern attack on utilitarianism,.4 a proposed theory must also avoid comparing benefits and risks in a
way that collapses the theory into utilitarianism. Mnfortunately, HabsolutistH rhetoric applied to risk regulation is so obsessed with avoiding the
error of utilitarianism that it commits an opposite mistake by obscuring the interests of risk creators.
nvironmentalists, as well as others concerned about risk regulation, ought to divorce themselves from much of the popular
language of rights as absolutes because the terminology evokes a misleading e1pectation of a theoretical ?ustification
for risk rules that cannot in fact be supplied. $n attempted ?ustification fails if it ignores the legitimate interests of risk creators and others who benefit from the
creation of risk. &till, a nonabsolutist understanding of risk must preserve the essential moral insight of the rights
tradition that individuals matter as autonomous moral agents worthy of respect. This $rticle moves in the direction of such
an understanding by e1amining the nature of the conflict between the interests of risk creator and risk bearer, and how modern rights theories deal with that
conflict. lth "are
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"tilitarianis4 ine;itable e;en in 6eontolo8ical 1ra4ewor2s
6reen, 43 J Assistant (ro1essor De5art4ent o1 (syc0olo8y $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity <Jos0ua3 'o;e4ber +KK+
V#0e #errible3 $orrible3 'o Goo63 *ery Ba6 #rut0 About Morality An6 W0at #o Do About ItV3 /17=
&ome people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that=s what we mean by L43
:balancing rights,< then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. *ttempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological
algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. 3owever, it8s likely that when some people talk
about Ibalancing competing rights and obligationsJ they are already thinking like conse#uentialists in spite of their use of
deontological language . (nce again, what deontological language does best is e1press the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions;
:It doesn=t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rightsT<,/ That is why angry
protesters say things like, I*nimals 3ave Rights , TooNJ rather than, I*nimal Testing9 The 3arms ,utweigh the )enefitsNJ
,nce again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer . But sometimes rights talk
persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. (ne thinks, for e1ample, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were
tested on animals and the :rights< of those children. ,ne finds oneself balancing the IrightsJ on both sides by asking how many rabbit
lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one8s underlying
thought is as thoroughly conse#uentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. $nd what=s wrong with thatE Iothing, e1cept
for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are :rights,< etc. )est to drop it. hen deontological talk
gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly conse#uentialist.
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Co45ro4isin8 4oral ;alues an6 tra6in8 o11 1or ot0er inEustices 5ro;es 6eontolo8y is i45ossible
&pragens 3@ J Assistant (ro1essor De5art4ent o1 (syc0olo8y $ar;ar6 "ni;ersity <#0o4as A3 (olitical
#0eory an6 (artisan (oliticsB V-ationality in Liberal (oliticsV 58 G1B+=
>y thesis that all three layersNforms of political association are important in a well-ordered liberal democracy also implies the untenability of Rawls0s argument that
agreement regarding norms of social ?ustice is a possible and sufficient way to overcome the deficiencies of the modus vivendi approach. In the first place, as I
have argued in more detail elsewhere, the fundamental unfairness of life and the presence of gratuitous elements in the moral
universe make it impossible to settle rationally upon a single set of distributive principles as demonstrably fair A&ee also,
&pragens ,//LC. &imply put, the problem is that the contingencies of the world ineluctably allocate assets and sufferings quite unfairly. e can cope with
and try to compensate for these !natural in&ustices,! but only at the price of introducing other elements of unfairness or
compromising other moral values The other ma?or problem in this conte1t is that real world human beings are not deontologists9
their moral intuitions about distributive &ustice are permeated and influenced by their moral intuitions about the/ good. The
empirical consequence of these two difficulties is the falsification of Rawls0s hermeneutic claims about an overlapping consensus. Rational people of good
will with a liberal democratic persuasion will be able to agree that some possible distributive criteria are morally
unacceptable. )ut, as both experience and the literature attest, hopes for a convergence of opinion on definitive
principles of distributive &ustice are chimerical .
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A8e o1 nuclear 6eterrence 4a2es 5re;entati;e 4easures necessary It@s too late to consi6er ot0erwise
De1ense 1or International Security A11airsY %'uclear Et0ics) 58 A+BA/=
$ntinuclear consequentialists often ob?ect to the whole approach to deterrence in terms of probability . )or
e1ample, the sociologist Todd 6itlin argues that Hsince deterrence works only if it works forever, it is an all-or-nothing proposition, so applying the language of
probability to it is misleading. H,,3 )ut his argument is not compelling. Fitlin seems to assume that failures of deterrence or
inevitable accidents must lead to all-out nuclear war, but that is far from self-evident . Indeed, a case can be made that an accident or
partial failure of deterrence may be the prelude to substantial changes that reduce risks or reliance on nuclear deterrence in the long term. But even if he were right
about catastrophe, it is odd for 6itlin to discount Hmicroscopic probabilityH by asking, HKo we feel secure playing Russian roulette if the
revolver has a hundred chambers-! (erhaps not, but if we had to play, I doubt that we really would not care if a revolver
had one hundred chambers rather than sixN $nd if he readmits probabilistic reasoning, then it can also be applied to the #uestion of
relative risks between unilateral disarmament :!refusing to play!; and trying to increase the number of chambers in a
world where the game of nuclear deterrence already exists .
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**Deon Goo6**
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Conse9uences can only be e;aluate6 AF#E- 4orals -i80ts co4e 1irst
Ka44 +KK/ *eontology by &tephen *arwall, page ,B7, 344L, !ublished By 2iley-Blackwell , 'arming &ome to
&ave (thers, )rances >yrna @amm, http;NNbooks.google.comNbooksE
idDt5rrw'-'5we"[pgD!$,,B[dqDdeontologykvs.kconsequentialism[clientDfirefo1-a
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Deontolo8y Ine;itable It is 8roun6e6 in 0u4an be0a;ior
$ccessed; 33N4.N344/ ,L;37
"ommon-sense morality is grounded in the consciousness of ordinary human beings and the stringency of moral
rules is a device based on psychological grounds meant to prevent the erosion of moral rules. In other words, the
tendency for self-deception in order to reduce cognitive dissonance gives rise to high information costs and
causes "onscience to set up a fence around moral rules. By contrast, Mtilitarianism has been thought out by
moral philosophers as an ethical system which people are advised to adopt. Because of the intellectual character
of Mtilitarianism, it has evolved no processes for hedging around its rules. (ne therefore understands 'arsanyi
A,/8-, p. 7/C when he describes utilitarian rules as 0conditional imperatives0, that is, people should folE low them
because in this way they will ma1imi5e e1pected social utility. (f course, he e1pects all rational people to have
an interest in promotE ing the common good and therefore to be utilitarians. ABy contrast, many people regard
moral rules as unconditionally binding or 0categori cal imperatives0C.
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Deontolo8y 5reclu6es utilB t0e ;alues o1 6eontolo8y co4e 1irst
Mcnau80ton an6 -awlin8 IG P*avid >cIaughton and !iers Rawling are professors of philosophy at @eele
Mniversity and the Mniversity of >issouri-&t. %ouis. Ratio, :(n *efending *eontology<, issue ,,, p. 78-7/ bscoQ
Iagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be
defended by showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be
reali5ed, and then seeks to show that deontology is such a system The claim is not, of course, that agent-
relative reasons rest directly on considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the "#"J rather, the
grounding is indirect 9 the notion is that worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which
there are not. Iagel argues that an agent relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable.
Thus we concur with 'ooker A,//7C, then, pace 'oward-&nyder A,//LC, that rule consequentialism is not a 0rubber
duck0. Thus rights Athe obverse of constraintsC have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic
structure of moral theory R$ right is an agent-relative, not an agent-neutral, value=, says Iagel A,//-, p.88C. This
is precisely because it is supposed to resist the "#" Aone is forbidden to violate a right even to
minimi5e the total number of such violationsC. &o Iagel faces the &cheffler problem; R'ow could it
be wrong to harm one person to prevent greater harm to othersE 'ow are we to understand the value that
rights assign to certain kinds of human inviolability, which makes this consequence morally intelligibleE= Ap.8/, our
emphasis 9 note the presumption inherent in the questionC. #he answer Rfocuses on the status conferred on all
human beings by the design of a morality which includes agent-relative constraints= Ap.8/C. That
status is one of being inviolable Awhich is not, of course, to say that one will not be violated, but that one
may not be violated 9 even to minimi5e the total number of such violationsC. $ system of morality
that includes inviolability encapsulates a good that its rivals cannot capture )or, Rnot only is it an
evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the person in
those ways is an additional and independent evil= Ap./,C. &o there is a sense in which we are better off if there
are rights Athey are a Rkind of generally disseminated intrinsic good= Ap./LCC. 'ence there are rights. In short, we are
inviolable because
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Deontolo8y co4es 1irst3 t0e 4eans 4ust Eusti1y t0e4sel;es J utilitarianis4 Eusti1ies t0e $olocaust
An6erson3 +KK7 <Kerby An6erson is t0e 'ational Director o1 (robe Ministries International3 3 (robe
Ministries %"tilitarianis4L
#0e Greatest Goo6 1or t0e Greatest 'u4ber) 0tt5LHHwww5robeor8Ht0eolo8yBan6B
50iloso50yHworl6;iewBB50iloso50yHutilitarianis4Bt0eB8reatestB8oo6B1orBt0e8reatestBnu4ber0t4l=
(ne problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an Hend ?ustifies the meansH mentality. If any
worthwhile end can ?ustify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that
the end does not ?ustify the means. If that were so, then 'itler could ?ustify the 'olocaust because the end
was to purify the human race. &talin could ?ustify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to
achieve a communist utopia. The end never ?ustifies the means. The means must ?ustify themselves.
$ particular act cannot be ?udged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be
?udged by some ob?ective and consistent standard of morality. &econd, utilitarianism cannot protect
the rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. $mericans in the
eighteenth century could ?ustify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a
ma?ority of $mericans. "ertainly the ma?ority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black
slaves were much worse. $ third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on
results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of
any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong.
$ fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be ?udged. 2hen results
occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results. Mtilitarianism provides no ob?ective
and consistent foundation to ?udge results because results are the mechanism used to ?udge the
action itself.inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
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Deontolo8y 5reclu6es utilB t0e ;alues o1 6eontolo8y co4e 1irst
Mcnau80ton an6 -awlin8 IG P*avid >cIaughton and !iers Rawling are professors of philosophy at @eele
Mniversity and the Mniversity of >issouri-&t. %ouis. Ratio, :(n *efending *eontology<, issue ,,, p. 78-7/ bscoQ
Iagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be
defended by showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be
reali5ed, and then seeks to show that deontology is such a system The claim is not, of course, that agent-
relative reasons rest directly on considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the "#"J rather, the
grounding is indirect 9 the notion is that worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which
there are not. Iagel argues that an agent relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable.
Thus we concur with 'ooker A,//7C, then, pace 'oward-&nyder A,//LC, that rule consequentialism is not a 0rubber
duck0. Thus rights Athe obverse of constraintsC have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic
structure of moral theory R$ right is an agent-relative, not an agent-neutral, value=, says Iagel A,//-, p.88C. This
is precisely because it is supposed to resist the "#" Aone is forbidden to violate a right even to
minimi5e the total number of such violationsC. &o Iagel faces the &cheffler problem; R'ow could it
be wrong to harm one person to prevent greater harm to othersE 'ow are we to understand the value that
rights assign to certain kinds of human inviolability, which makes this consequence morally intelligibleE= Ap.8/, our
emphasis 9 note the presumption inherent in the questionC. #he answer Rfocuses on the status conferred on all
human beings by the design of a morality which includes agent-relative constraints= Ap.8/C. That
status is one of being inviolable Awhich is not, of course, to say that one will not be violated, but that one
may not be violated 9 even to minimi5e the total number of such violationsC. $ system of morality
that includes inviolability encapsulates a good that its rivals cannot capture )or, Rnot only is it an
evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the person in
those ways is an additional and independent evil= Ap./,C. &o there is a sense in which we are better off if there
are rights Athey are a Rkind of generally disseminated intrinsic good= Ap./LCC. 'ence there are rights. In short, we are
inviolable because
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Deontolo8y co4es be1ore utilB utilitarianis4 can be a last resort to 5reser;e 1un6a4ental ri80ts
Kateb 1II+ TGeor8e Kateb is Willia4 'elson Cro4well (ro1essor o1 (olitics3 E4eritus3 at (rinceton
"ni;ersity %#0e Inner &cean) 0tt5LHHboo2s8oo8leco4Hboo2sOi6PMtGJ64?9L,oCQ69P2atebZ
[++w0atZ6oesZaZt0eory[++QsourceP8bsNna;lin2sNsU
2hat does a theory of rights leave undecidedE >any issues of public policy do not affect individual rights, despite
frequent ingeniuous efforts to claim that they do. &uch issues pertain to the promotion of a better life, whether for the
disadvantaged or for everyone, or involve the clash of interests. &o long as rights are not in play, advocates of rights can
rightly allow a loose utilitarianism as the proper guide to public policy, though they should always be eager to keep the
state=s energy under suspicion. (ne can even think, against utilitarianism, that any substantive outcome
acheived by morally proper procedure is morally right and hence acceptable Aso long as rights are
not in playC. The main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary place in any democratic
country=s normal political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is
only to help to decide what theory of rights leave alone. 2hen may rights be overridden by the governmentE
I have two sorts of cases in mind; overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right
of others, and overriding the same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call :civili5ation values.< $n
advocate of rights could countenance, perhaps must countenance, the state=s overriding of rights for these two reasons.
The sub?ect is painful and liable to dispute every step of the way. )or the state to override-that is, sacrifice- a
right of some so theat others may keep it, the situations must be desperate. I havein mind, say,
circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be
lost. The state Aor some other agentC may kill some or allow them to be killedC, if the only
alternative is letting everyone die. It is the right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about
desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed the precept that numbers count. Fust as one may prefer
saving one=s own life to saving that of another when both cannot be saved, so a third party-let us say, the state- can
Aperhaps mustC choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of the lesser number, when there is otherwise
no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed are immoral if they resist being
sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the lives of the lesser for the
lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser are also not wrong if
they resist being sacrificed. To accept utilitarianism Ain some loose senseC as a necessary
supplement. It thus should function innocently, or when all hope of innocence is gone. I emphasi5e,
above all, however, that every care must be taken to ensure that the precept that numbers of lives count
does not become a license for vaguely con?ectural decisions about inflicting death and saving life
and that desperation be as strictly and narrowly understood as possible. ABut total numbers killed do
not count if members of one group have to kill members of another group to save themselves from
threatened massacre of enslavement or utter degradation or miseryJ they may kill their attackers in
an attempt to end the threat.C
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Deontolo8y 5reser;es 1un6a4ental ri80ts an6 still accesses t0e ulti4ate 8oo63 accessin8 t0e sa4e
t0in8s as util
Bentley 'o Date P @ristina $. Bentley graduate of the *epartment of government at the Mniversity of >anchester.
:&uggesting $ R&eparate= $pproach To Mtility and Rights; *eontological &pecification and Teleogical nforcement of
'uman Rights< http;NNwww.abdn.ac.ukNpirNpostgradNvol,SissueLNissueLSarticle,.pdfQ
The second area of departure between utilitarianism and rights-based theories is that :utilitarians advocate a simple
ma1imising strategy< as the aim is :to ma1imise social utility and a society is ?ustified in doing whatever enhances its
aggregate utility< AFones, ,//7; -3C. "onversely, the opponents of this view hold that rights constitute an area which is
beyond the reach of such calculations, as it would be pointless if rights could be :set aside in a mere calculus of
competing preferences< AFones, ,//7; -LC. This is because rights are regarded as being considerations which are
special in the sense that they protect individuals from the potential e1cesses of such calculations. "onsequently, to
refer back to 6ewirth=s e1ample, according to the rights-based account, it would always be morally wrong to torture an
innocent person, even if this would result in a large increase in aggregate utility in such a society, while a utilitarian
approach would weigh up the evidence, such that if thousands of lives would be saved by the torture, then it ought to
be done. This roughly reflects *workin=s notion of :Rights as Trumps< which override, or supersede ordinary notions
of well-being. The difference however is that *workin=s theory occupies some middle ground, as it does not rule out
rights being overridden by such considerations when other fundamental rights are threatened AFones, ,//7; -LC. &o
while *workin would probably argue that to torture someone to give others in society pleasure at the sight would be
trumped by the right not to be tortured, he would perhaps concede that to torture an individual to prevent the
detonation of a nuclear bomb, as is the case in 6ewirth=s e1ample, may be ?ustified, as the right to life of all others in
society may, in this instance, trump the right of an individual not to be tortured. *workin=s formulation again places
the domain of rights beyond the reach of ordinary considerations of utility, but he does make provision for rights to be
balanced against one another Ato :trump< one anotherC in cases of e1treme gravity for rights themselves . "onsequently,
theories of rights quite simply consider respect for rights to be the primary consideration in the course of social
deliberation, while utilitarians consider the ultimate :good< or :utility< on the balance to be the correct goal to pursue,
even if this potentially infringes on individual rights. 'owever, assertions that these conceptions of ?ustice are
incompatible are not always acknowledged by e1ponents of consequentialism. $s Richard B. Brandt states; :There is a
fundamental incompatibility between utilitarianism and human rights. >ost utilitarians of course have not thought
there is such an incompatibility< ABrandt, ,//3; ,/BC.
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E;aluatin8 t0e 6eontolo8ical as5ects o1 a 5olicy is critical to 5olicy 4a2in8
(instru5BAn6ersen3 +KK:. Pthics and economic policy for the food system. 6eneral &essions, 4,-
*"-4-, $merican Fournal of $gricultural conomics bsco 'ost.Q
conomists seldom address ethical questions as they infringe on economic theory or economic
behavior. They Aand IC find this sub?ect comple1 and elusive in comparison with the relative precision and
ob?ectivity of economic analysis. 'owever, if ethics is influencing our analyses but ignored, is the precision and
ob?ectivity ?ust an illusionE $re we in fact being normative when we claim to be positive or are we, as suggested by
6ilbert
Ap. 1viC, ignoring social ethics and, as a consequence, contributing to a situation in which we know Hthe
price of everything and the value of nothingEH The economists0 focus on efficiency and the !areto
!rinciple has made us less relevant to policy makers, whose main concerns are who gains, who
loses, by how much, and can or should the losers be compensated. By focusing on the
distribution of gains and losses and replacing the !areto !rinciple with estimates of whether a big
enough economic surplus could be generated so that gainers could compensate losers, the socalled
new welfare economics Awhich is no longer newC was a step toward more relevancy for policy
makers AFust, 'ueth, and &chmit5C. $nother ma?or step toward relevancy was made by the more recent
emphasis on political economy and institutional economics. But are we trading off scientific validity for
relevancyE Robbins Ap. /C seems to think so, when he states that Hclaims of welfare economics to be
scientific are highly dubious.H But if $ristotle saw economics as a branch of ethics and $dam &mith was a moral
philosopher, when did we, as implied by &tigler, replace ethics with precision and ob?ectivityE (r, when did we as
economists move away from philosophy toward statistics and engineering and are we on our way back to a more
comprehensive political economy approach, in which both quantitative and qualitative variables are taken
into accountE I believe we are. *oes that make us less scientific, as argued by RobbinsE
I am not questioning whether the quantification of economic relationships is important. It is. In the
case of food policy analysis, it is critically important that the causal relationship between policy
options and e1pected impact on the population groups of interest is quantitatively estimated. But not
at the e1pense of reality, conte1t, and ethical considerations, much of which can be described only
in qualitative terms. conomic analyses that ignore everything that cannot be quantified and
included in our models are not likely to advance our understanding of economic and policy
relationships. Ieither
will they be relevant for solving real world problems. The predictive ability is likely to be low and,
if the results are used by policy makers, the outcome may be different from what was e1pecte.
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*eontology key to giving human life value
Ka44 I+ P )> @amm is %ittauer !rofessor of P,ilo"o$,- an& Pu*lic !olicy, @ennedy &chool Ion-
consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status.<, !hilosophy and !ublic $ffairs, : p. L/4
F&T(RQ
If we are inviolable in a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable onesJ such a
higher status is itself a benefit to us . Indeed, we are creatures whose interests as recipients of such
ordinary benefits as welfare are more worth serving. The world is, in a sense, a better place, as it has
more important creatures in itL0 In this sense the inviolable status Aagainst being harmed in a certain wayC of any
potential victim can be taken to be an agent-neutral value. This is a nonconsequential value. It does not follow
Acausally or noncausallyC upon any act, but is already present in the status that persons have.
nsuring it provides the background against which we may then seek their welfare or pursue other
values. It is not our duty to bring about the agent-neutral value, but only to respect the constraints
that e1press its presence. @agan claims that the only sense in w0ic0 we can s0ow 6isres5ect 1or
5eo5le is by usin8 t0e4 in an unEusti1ie6 way 'ence, if it is ?ustified to kill one to save five, we
will not be showing disrespect for the one if we so use him. But there is another sense of disrespect tied to
the fact that we owe people more respect than animals, even though we also should not treat animals in an un?ustified
way. $nd this other sense of disrespect is, I believe, tied to the failure to heed the greater inviolability of persons.
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Deontolo8y 6oes not 6is4iss conse9uences3 cate8orical i45erati;e 4eans 6eont still 4aCi4i?es
0a55iness
Donal6son I: AThomas Donal6son is !rofessor of Business thics at 6eorgetown M, thics and International
$ffairs,:International *eontology *efended; $ Response to Russell 'ardin<, pg. ,7.-,-7C
2hen discussing nuclear deterrence or intervention it is common to e1aggerate the nonconsequential nature
of @antianism. It is a false but all-too common myth that @ant believed that consequences were
irrelevant to the evaluation of moral action In his practical writings @ant e1plicitly states that each of us
has a duty to ma1imi5e the happiness of other individuals, a statement that echoes >ill=s famous principle of
utility. But @ant=s duty to promote beneficial consequences is understood to be derived from an even
higher order principle, namely, the categorical imperative that requires all of us to act in a way that
respects the intrinsic value of other rational beings. @ant does not dismiss consequences. 'e simply
wants them in their proper place.
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Calla0an e4braces reason an6 says it 4ust be use6 in co4bination wit0 a 4oral obli8ation to 4a2e
6ecisions
Calla0an3 14r Director o1 t0e $astin8s Institute3 D:
DA'IEL CALLA$A'3 F4r Director o1 t0e $astin8s Institute3 aut0or o1 #0e #yranny o1 Sur;i;al Q
Senior Fellow at .ale3 February 1ID:3
0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8HstableH/:AKI:A
A -ECE'# corres5on6ent , after praising the position I took in opposition to 6arrett 'ardin0s H%ife-boat thicH AH*oing
6ood by *oing 2ell,H *ec. ,/.7C, ended her letter with a complaint. I had, she implied, fallen into a fatal trap by trying
to argue with 'ardin=s thesis on Hrationalistic rounds. The issue at stake is HhumanitarianismH and the future of altruism,
neither of which will be saved if they must be defended on the narrow base of reason and logic. Indeed, she see4e6 to
be sayin83 t0ere is an in0erent con1lict between 0u4anitarianis4 an6 rationalis4 $s an unreconstructed
rationalist, I bal2 at a64ittin8 suc0 a 6ualis43 Eust as I rebel at t0e 8eneral blac2Bballin8 o1 reason an6 lo8ic which
seems to many to offer the only antidote to the generally insane, depressing state of the world. (ne can well understand how rationality has come to
have a bad name. 2e have in the twentieth century been sub?ected to endless wars, ills and disasters carried out in the name of somebody or other0s
impeccable logic and assertedly rational deliberations. (ne can also understand the sense of distaste any feel in the face of articulate proponents of
HtriageH in our dealings with poor countries and a Hlifeboat ethicH in deter-mining our own moral responsibilities toward the starving, particularly
when such positions are advanced in the name of no-nonsense rational calculation. )or all that, I a4 1ar 4ore 1ear1ul o1 a 6eliberate
aban6on4ent o1 reason t0an o1 t0e e;ils w0ic0 can be 6one in its na4e #0e 1ault wit0 t0e latter 1or4 o1
attac2in8 VreasonV is t0at it ta2es t0ose ar8uin8 in its na4e too 4uc0 at t0eir own wor6 (o2e aroun6 a bit
un6er t0e 1aca6e o1 care1ullyB0one6 rationality an6 5recise lo8ical 4o;es an6 w0at 6oes one usually 6isco;erO
(ure 4us0 #0ose ;ast3 intricate e6i1ices rest on a bowl o1 5orri68e3 4a6e u5 o1 irrational sel1Binterest3 t0e worst
1or4s o1 senti4entality <or 5ure cruelty=3 utterly unanaly?e6 assu45tions about 5olitics3 or et0ics3 or human
nature, tribalism, and 8o6 2nows w0at else 'one o1 t0at 0as 4uc0 i1 anyt0in8 to 6o wit0 reason A recent article
by -obert %. $eilbroner, author of the much-acclaimed book, $n Inquiry Into the 'uman !rospect, is in6icati;e o1
t0e 4u66le create6 w0en one calls 1or an aban6on4ent o1 rationality in 1a;or o1 so4et0in8 4ore Illu4inatin8. In
H2hat has !osterity ver *one for >eEH AIew +ork Times >aga5ine, Fanuary ,/, ,/.-C, !rof. 'eilbroner tries to make the case that contemporary
human beings will never learn to take responsibility for the future of mankind until they give up trying to find a compelling reason why they should.
(nly some fundamental revelatory e1perience-to wit, famine, war and the like-will bring people back to what is an essentially HreligiousH insight, that
of Hthe transcendent importance of posterity for them.H It is intriguing to see the way 'eilbroner develops his case. H2hy,H he asks, Hshould I lift a
finger to affect events that will have no more meaning for me .- years after my death than those that happened .- years before I was bornE There is
no rational answer to that terrible question. Io argument based on reason will lead me to care for posterity or to lift a finger in its behalf. Indeed, by
every rational consideration, precisely the opposite answer is thrust upon us with irresistible force.H 6oing on, 'eilbroner quotes an anonymous
H*istinguished +ounger conomistH who has concluded that he really doesn0t HcareH whether mankind survives or not. HIs this,H 'eilbroner queries,
Han outrageous positionE I must confess it outrages me. But this is not because the economist0s arguments are 0wrong0-indeed, within their rational
framework they are indisputably right. It is because their position reveals the limitations-worse, the suicidal dangers-of what we call 0rational
argument0 when we con-front questions that can only be decided by an appeal to an entirely different faculty from that of cool reason. H I 1in6
$eilbroner>s 6es5air at 1in6in8 a rational basis to care about 5osterity, or the distant past, si45ly startlin8. &urely, to
begin with the past, he can hardly believe Ato stick to his own field of economicsC that $dam &mith and the other Hworldly philosophersH have no
significance whatever any more, despite the fact that they had a critical place in shaping the world in which we live today. $nd surely, as an
$merican, he must find some slight trace of present and personal meaning in the historical fact that some distant people once upon a time signed a
Hdeclaration of independence.H >y beginning with the past is no accident. If a case is to be made for caring about the fate of posterity, it will arise out
of the highly rational recognition that Afor better or worseC we are where we are because it seemed to our ancestors only sensible to worry about the
fate of their descendants, ?ust as Aalso for better or worseC still earlier generations had worried about their descendants. >ore deeply, unless one has
decided that human life is, regardless of its condition, meaningless and terrible-in which case, what the hell-one will also recogni5e the moral
interdependence of generations as one of the conditions for e1tracting whatever possibilities there are for human happiness. To love and believe in life
at all is not ?ust to love one0s own lifeJ it is to love both the fact and idea of life itself, including the life of those yet to be born. >y point here,
however, is not to make the rational case for obligations toward posterity. It is only to indicate there are rational ways of going about it Aand if you
don0t like the reasons I0ve given, I can think of still othersC, ?ust as t0ere are rational ways o1 establis0in8 a ;ariety o1 other 4oral
6uties. #0e truly 0a?ar6ous 5art o1 6es5airin8 o1 reason3 an6 lon8in8 1or a return to so4et0in8 4ore 5ri4iti;e3
can rea6ily be seen in t0e te1ture of some of 'eilbroner0s other arguments. 'e is looking for what he calls the
Hsur;i;alistV 5rinci5le, by which he seems to mean some deep sense of obligation toward the future, powerful enough to give us the courage
and the toughness to take those immediate steps necessary to discharge our obligation. H(f course,H he writes, Hthere are moral dilemmas to be faced
even if one takes one0s stand on the 0survivalist0 principle.... PButQ this essential commitment to life0s continuance gives us the moral authority to take
measures, per-haps very harsh measures, whose ?ustification cannot be found in the precepts of rationality, but must be sought in the unbearable
anguish we feel if we imagine ourselves as the e1ecutioner of mankind.H (f course we may have to act harshly. But, to bring the circle full turn, how
are we to act harshly, to whom and under what circumstancesE $re we also meant to abandon reason in trying to answer that questionE Are we
su55ose6 to sol;e the e;i6ent V4oral 6ile44asH to which 'eilbroner refers by a 6e5en6ence3 not on reason3 but on
a sense o1 Vunbearable an8uis0HEI see no reason to hope that even a fully shared sense of anguish would tell us how to resolve moral
dilemmas. >oreover, 'eilbroner himself cites at least one person who does not share his feelings, and unless we are to suppose that person to
represent a class of one, the pillar to the center of the earth 'eilbroner offers us begins to look like a piece of balsa wood. The amusing side of all this
is that the two principal HsurvivalistsH of our day, 6arrett 'ardin and Robert 'eilbroner, seem to come out at opposite poles in the place they give to
reason. 'ardin appears the very paradigm of that cool rationality which 'eilbroner believes to be our greatest threat to survival. $nd 'eilbroner0s
quest for some deeper affective, HreligiousH motivation for survival seems the very model of that soft-hearted and woolly-headed humanitarianism
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which 'ardin identifies as the villain. Ieither is likely to carry the day, and for very healthy reasons. $eilbroner is correct w0en 0e
6iscerns t0at t0e a55eal to reason 0as its li4itations It ta2es 4ore t0an 4ere lo8ic to 4o;e 5eo5le 6ee5ly3
es5ecially to 4o;e t0e4 to act >ore than that, the frequently indignant reaction which greeted 'ardin0s Hlifeboat ethicH indicates that many
are not about to adopt a policy of calculating callousness, HlogicalH though that may seem. 'ardin is correct when he says that we must think very
hard about the question of survival, however much such thought may end by posing hard, even revolting, choices. But he seems not to have reali5ed
that, unless the drive for survival has a moral basis and a saving reference to some-thing deeper than rational calculation, some and perhaps many
people will decide that survival at any price is not a moral good. 'ot0in8 I have said here sol;es t0e ;eCin8 5roble4 o1 t0e ri80t
relations0i5 between reason an6 1eelin8 in t0e 4oral li1e But it see4s to 4e at least clear t0at t0e worst 5ossible
solution is to c0oose one at t0e eC5ense o1 t0e ot0er3 or to t0in2 t0at we can 4a2e a 1lat c0oice between t0e4
#0ere is enou80 e;i6ence 1ro4 recent 5syc0olo8ical researc0 to in6icate t0at our 1eelin8s an6 e4otions are
;i8orously tutored by our perceptions and cognitionJ reason has its say even in the way we feel. $ no less important insight is that there is all the
difference in the world between being Hrational :and being Hlogical.H$lmost anyone can work through a simple syllogism, presuming he is spared the
ordeal of worrying about whether the premises are correct. It is a far more difficult matter to be rational, particularly where ethics is concerned
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(olicy 4a2ers cannot 6e5en6 solely on econo4ics3 but nee6 to a55ly et0ics to 4a2e e11icient 5olicies
(instru5BAn6ersen, !er. +KK:. Athics and economic policy for the food system. 6eneral &essions, 4,-*"-4-,
$merican Fournal of $gricultural conomics.C
Econo4ists sel6o4 a66ress et0ical 9uestions as t0ey in1rin8e on econo4ic t0eory or econo4ic be0a;ior They
Aand IC find this sub?ect comple1 and elusive in comparison with the relative precision and ob?ectivity of economic
analysis. $owe;er3 i1 et0ics is in1luencin8 our analyses but i8nore63 is t0e 5recision an6 obEecti;ity Eust an
illusionO $re we in fact being normative when we claim to be positive or are we, as suggested by 6ilbert Ap. 1viC,
ignoring social ethics and, as a consequence, contributing to a situation in which we know Hthe price of everything and
the value of nothingEH #0e econo4ists> 1ocus on e11iciency an6 t0e (areto (rinci5le 0as 4a6e us less rele;ant to
5olicy 4a2ers3 w0ose 4ain concerns are w0o 8ains3 w0o loses3 by 0ow 4uc03 an6 can or s0oul6 t0e losers be
co45ensate6 By 1ocusin8 on t0e 6istribution o1 8ains an6 losses an6 replacing the !areto !rinciple with esti4ates
o1 w0et0er a bi8 enou80 econo4ic sur5lus coul6 be 8enerate6 so t0at 8ainers coul6 co45ensate losers3 t0e
socalle6 new wel1are econo4ics Awhich is no longer newC was a ste5 towar6 4ore rele;ancy 1or 5olicy 4a2ers
AFust, 'ueth, and &chmit5C. $nother ma?or step toward relevancy was made by the more recent emphasis on political economy and institutional economics. But are
we trading off scientific validity for relevancyE Robbins Ap. /C seems to think so, when he states that Hclaims of welfare economics to be scientific are highly
dubious.H But if $ristotle saw economics as a branch of ethics and $dam &mith was a moral philosopher, when did we, as implied by &tigler, replace ethics with
precision and ob?ectivityE (r, when did we as economists move away from philosophy toward statistics and engineering and are we on our way back to a more
comprehensive political economy approach, in which both quantitative and qualitative variables are taken into accountE I believe we are. *oes that make us less
scientific, as argued by RobbinsE I am not questioning whether the quantification of economic relationships is important. It is In t0e case o1 1oo6 5olicy
analysis3 it is critically i45ortant t0at t0e causal relations0i5 between 5olicy o5tions an6 eC5ecte6 i45act on t0e
5o5ulation 8rou5s o1 interest is 9uantitati;ely esti4ate6 But not at the e1pense of reality, conte1t, and ethical
considerations, much of which can be described only in qualitative terms. Econo4ic analyses t0at i8nore e;eryt0in8
t0at cannot be 9uanti1ie6 an6 inclu6e6 in our 4o6els are not li2ely to a6;ance our un6erstan6in8 o1 econo4ic
an6 5olicy relations0i5s 'eit0er will t0ey be rele;ant 1or sol;in8 real worl6 5roble4s #0e 5re6icti;e ability is
li2ely to be low an63 i1 t0e results are use6 by 5olicy 4a2ers3 t0e outco4e 4ay be 6i11erent 1ro4 w0at was
eC5ecte6
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Deontolo8y is essential 1or t0e 4aintenance o1 international 0u4an ri80ts because it restricts t0e
5ractice o1 Eusti1yin8 t0e actions o1 t0e 8o;ern4ent by t0e en6s ac0ie;e63 creatin8 w0at is essentially a
0u4ane international or6er
Thomas Donal6son, 1II: A!rof. of Business thics at 6eorgetown M, thics and International $ffairs,
:International *eontology *efended; $ Response to Russell 'ardin<, pg. ,7.-,-7C
It may appear that I am defending @antian deontology as a comprehensive moral language to use in interpreting
international events. But I mean not to assert that Kantian 6eontolo8y is sufficient, only that it is necessary. &uch a
perspective contributes fundamental, often neglected, insights. )irst it 5ro;i6es a 4oral 8roun6in8 1or any ri80tsB
base6 a55roac0 to international a11airs This includes not only the general interpretation of international policy
through broad notions of human rights, but also the application of specific rights such as those found in the U
Universal Declaration of ,uman #ights. In6ee63 4ost conte45orary ri80tsBbase6 t0eories are 6eontolo8ical
t0eories Rights are principles that assign claims or entitlements to someone against someone and are usually interpreted as :trumping< or taking precedence
over consequential claims made in the name of collective welfare.7 'ence, both in their similarity of form Aas a principle universally applicable to relevantly
similar situationsC and in their similarity of function Aas taking precedence over collective, consequential considerationsC, rights satisfy two key @antian-
deontological criteria. &econd, Kantianis4 entails clear restrictions on t0e 8eneral be0a;ior o1 states &1 8reatest
i45ortance is t0e 1act t0at t0ese restrictions alert us to t0e 6an8er o1 lettin8 t0e en6s Eusti1y t0e 4eans
W0ate;er t0e 1laws o1 t0e Kantian 6eontolo8ical tra6ition3 an6 no 4atter w0at ;er6ict we 1inally reac0 on t0e
co45re0ensi;eness o1 6eontolo8ical 4oral lo8ic3 t0e insistence on 5rinci5le o;er 4ere calculation o1 1uture
conse9uences stan6s as 6eontolo8y@s 5ractical raison 6@etre Deontolo8y 4ay not be su11icient3 but it is
necessary 1or a 0u4ane international or6er
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Certain 5re4ises 0a;e an intrinsic 4oral ;alue t0at co4es be1ore conse9uences o1 actions E;aluatin8
conse9uences 1irst 5uts our 1ate an6 t0e 1ate o1 t0e 4asses in t0e 0an6s o1
belli8erent ot0ers
Igor (ri4orat? in K: A!rincipal Research )ellow O "enter for $pplied !hilosophy amd !ublic thics, The
!hilosophical )orum, #olume LB, Io. ,, :"ivilian Immunity in 2ar<, &pring, p. 77-7BC
Conse9uentialist t0in2ers usually present their view on civilian immunity against the background of a critique of
attempts of philosophers and legal thinkers to account for civilian immunity in deontological terms. 'aving satisfied
themselves that those attempts have been unsuccessful, they 5ut 1orwar6 t0e clai4 t0at ci;ilian i44unity 0as
not0in8 to 6o wit0 ci;ilians@ acts or o4issions3 8uilt or innocence3 res5onsibility or lac2 o1 it3 but is 4erely a
use1ul con;ention It is useful since it rules out targeting a large group of human beings, and thus helps reduce greatly
the overall killing, mayhem, and destruction in war. #0e conse9uentialist ;iew o1 ci;ilian i44unity is eC5ose6 to
two obEectionsL t0e 5rotection it o11ers to ci;ilians is too wea23 an6 t0e 8roun6 5ro;i6e6 1or it in6icates a
4isun6erstan6in8 o1 t0e 4oral issue in;ol;e6. The protection is too weak because civilian immunity is understood
as but a useful convention. This makes it doubly weak. )irst, i1 it is 4erely a use1ul con;ention3 i1 all its 4oral 1orce
is 6ue to its utility3 t0en it will 0a;e no suc0 1orce in cases w0ere it 0as no utility This is a familiar flaw of
consequentialism. It denies that moral rules have any intrinsic moral significance, and e1plains their binding force
solely in terms of the good consequences of acting in accordance with them. Therefore it cannot 8i;e us any 8oo6
conse9uentialist reason to a60ere to a 4oral rule in cases w0ere a60erin8 to it will not 0a;e t0e 8oo6
conse9uences it usually 0as3 an6 w0ere better conse9uences will be attaine6 by 8oin8 a8ainst t0e rule.B This means
that we should respect civilian immunity when, and only when, doing so will have the good consequences adduced as its ground; when it will indeed reduce the
overall killing, maiming, and destruction. (n the other hand, whenever we have good reasons to believe that, by targeting civilians, we shall make a significant
contribution to our war effort, thus shortening the war and reducing the overall killing and mayhem, that is what we may and indeed ought to do. Ci;ilian
i44unity is t0us 4a6e 0osta8e to t0e ;a8aries o1 war3 instea6 o1 5ro;i6in8 ci;ilians wit0 ironBcla6 5rotection
a8ainst t0e4 #0is is not a 5urely t0eoretical concern $s @ai Iielsen has pointed out, systematic attacks on
civilians in the course of a war of national liberation can make an indispensable contribution to the successful
prosecution of such a war. That was indeed the case in $lgeria and &outh #ietnam, and may well have been the case in
$ngola and >o5ambique as well. Then again, i1 ci;ilian i44unity is 4erely a use1ul con;ention3 t0at wea2ens it
by 4a2in8 it 0osta8e to t0e stance ta2en by ene4y 5olitical an6 4ilitary lea6ers0i5 #0ey 4ay or 4ay not
c0oose to res5ect t0e i44unity o1 our ci;ilians I1 t0ey 6o not3 on t0e conse9uentialist ;iew o1 t0is i44unity3 we
are not boun6 to res5ect t0e i44unity o1 t0eir ci;ilians Being a convention, it binds only if, or as long as, it is accepted by both parties to
the conflict. $s an important statement of this view puts it, :for convention-dependent obligations, what one=s opponent does, what Reveryone is doing,= etc., are
facts of great moral importance. &uch facts help to determine within what convention, if any, one is operating, and thus they help one discover what his moral
duties are.<8 To be sure, even if no such convention is in place, but we have reason to believe we can help bring about its acceptance by unilaterally acting in
accordance with it and thereby encouraging the enemy to do the same, we should do that. But if we have no good reason to believe that, or if we have tried that
approach and it has failed, our military are free to kill and maim enemy civilians whenever they feel they need to do that. #0us our 4oral c0oice is
6eter4ine63 be it 6irectly or ulti4ately3 by t0e 4oral <or i44oral= c0oice o1 ene4y 5olitical an6 4ilitary
lea6ers So is t0e 1ate o1 ene4y ci;ilians #0e 1act t0at t0ey are ci;ilians3 in itsel13 counts 1or not0in8. This brings
me to the second ob?ection; #0e conse9uentialist 4isses w0at anyone else3 and in particular any civilian in wartime,
woul6 consi6er t0e cruC o1 t0e 4atter. )aced with the prospect of being killed or maimed by enemy fire, a ci;ilian
woul6 not 4a2e 0er case in ter4s o1 6isutility o1 2illin8 or 4ai4in8 ci;ilians in war in 8eneral3 or o1 2illin8 or
4ai4in8 0er t0en an6 t0ere S0e woul6 rat0er 5oint out t0at s0e is a civilian, not a soldierJ a bystander, not a
participantJ an innocent, not a guilty party. &he would point out that s0e 0as 6one not0in8 to 6eser;e3 or beco4e
liable to3 suc0 a 1ate S0e woul6 5resent t0ese 5ersonal facts as considerations whose moral significance is intrinsic
and decisive, rather than instrumental and 1ortuitous, mediated by a useful convention Awhich, in different
circumstances, might en?oin limiting war by targeting only civiliansC. $nd 0er ar8u4ent3 couc0e6 in 5ersonal ter4s3
woul6 see4 to be 4ore to t0e 5oint t0an t0e i45ersonal calculation o1 8oo6 an6 ba6 conse9uences by 4eans o1
w0ic0 t0e conse9uentialist woul6 settle t0e 4atter
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-eco8ni?in8 ri80ts an6 5uttin8 t0e4 be1ore a utilitarian calculus is t0e only rational an6
4oral o5tion
'. %. $. $art in DI Aformer principal of (1ford Mniversity, Tulane %aw Review, :The &hell )oundation %ectures,
,/.8-,/./; Mtilitarianism and Iatural Rights<, $pril, -L Tul. %. Rev. BBL, lNnC
$ccordingly, the contemporary modern philosophers of whom I have spoken, and preeminently Rawls in his "heory of
5ustice, have argued that any 4orally a6e9uate 5olitical 50iloso50y 4ust reco8nise t0at t0ere 4ust be3 in any
4orally tolerable 1or4 o1 social li1e3 certain 5rotections 1or t0e 1ree6o4 an6 basic interests o1 in6i;i6uals which
constitute an essential framework of individual rights. #0ou80 t0e 5ursuit o1 t0e 8eneral wel1are is in6ee6 a
le8iti4ate an6 in6ee6 necessary concern of governments, it is so4et0in8 to be 5ursue6 only wit0in certain
constraints i45ose6 by reco8nition o1 suc0 ri80ts The modern philosophical defence put forward for the recognition of basic human rights
does not wear the same metaphysical or conceptual dress as the earlier doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Rights of >an, which men were said to
have in a state of nature or to be endowed with by their creator. Ionetheless, the most complete and articulate version of this modern critique of Mtilitarianism has
many affinities with the theories of social contract which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries accompanied the doctrine of natural rights. Thus Rawls has
argued in $ "heory of 5ustice that t0ou80 any rational 5erson 4ust 2now t0at in or6er to li;e e;en a 4ini4ally tolerable
li1e 0e 4ust li;e wit0in a 5olitical society wit0 an or6ere6 8o;ern4ent3 no rational 5erson bar8ainin8 wit0
ot0ers on a 1ootin8 o1 PWB./Q e9uality coul6 a8ree to re8ar6 0i4sel1 as boun6 to obey t0e laws o1 any
8o;ern4ent i1 0is 1ree6o4 an6 basic interests, what >ill called Hthe groundwork of human e1istence,H were not
8i;en 5rotection an6 treate6 as 0a;in8 5riority o;er 4ere increases in a88re8ate wel1are even if the protection
cannot be absolute.
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Deontolo8ical 5rinci5les o1 ri80ts s0oul6 be consi6ere6 1irst J ot0er inter5retations are assi8ne6 no
4oral ;alue i1 con1lictin8 wit0 t0e 5rinci5les o1 ri80ts because ;iewin8 t0e 6ebate 1ro4 a 6eontolo8ical
5ers5ecti;e is t0e only way to 8uarantee 1ree6o4
The priority of right asserts then that the reasons supplied by moral motives-principles of right and their
institutional requirements-have absolute precedence over all other considerations $s such, moral motives must occupy a
separate dimension in practical reasoning. $uppose then a supplementary stage of practical reasoning, where the interests and pursuits that figure
into ordinary deliberation and which define our conception of the good are checked against principles of right and &ustice. *t
this stage of reasoning, any ends that directly conflict with these moral principles :e.g., racist ends or the wish to
dominate othersC, or whose pursuit would undermine the efficacy of principles of right Ae.g., desires for unlimited accumulation of wealth whatever the
consequences for othersC, are assigned no moral value, no matter how intensely felt or important they may otherwise be. Being
without moral value, they count for nothing in deliberation. Conse#uently, their pursuit is prohibited or curtailed by the priority given to
principles of right. The priority of right then describes the hierarchical subordination in practical deliberation of the desires, interests, and plans that define a
person0s rational good, to the substantive demands of principles of right.L3 !urposes and pursuits that are incompatible with these principles must be abandoned or
revised. The same idea carries through to social and political deliberations on the general good. In political deliberative procedures, the priority of right means that
desires and interests of individuals or groups that conflict with the institutional requirements of principles of right and ?ustice have no legitimate claim to
satisfaction, no matter how intense peoples0 feelings or how large the ma?ority sharing these aims. "onstitutional restrictions on ma?ority rule e1hibit the priority of
right. In democratic procedures, ma?orities cannot violate constitutional rights and procedures to promote, say, the "hristian religion, or any other aspect of their
good that undermines others0 basic rights and opportunities. &imilarly, the institutional requirements of Rawls0s difference principle limit, for e1ample, property
owners0 desires for ta1 e1emptions for capital gains, and the ?ust savings principle limits current ma?orities0 wishes to deplete natural resources. These desires are
curtailed in political conte1ts, no matter how intense or widely held, because of the priority of principles of right over individual and general good.LL The priority
of right enables Rawls to define a notion of admissible conceptions of the good; of those desires, interests and plans of life that may legitimately be pursued for
political purposes. ,nly admissible conceptions of the good establish a basis for legitimate claims in political procedures Acf. TF,
p. 77/C. That certain desires and pursuits are permissible, and political claims based on them are legitimate, while others
are not, presupposes antecedently established principles of right and &ustice. Racist conceptions of the good are not politically
admissibleJ actions done in their pursuit are either prohibited or discouraged by a ?ust social scheme, and they provide no basis for legitimate claims in political
procedures. 1cellences such as knowledge, creativity, and aesthetic contemplation are permissible ends for individuals so long as they are pursued in accordance
with the constraints of principles of right. &uppose these perfectionist principles state intrinsic values that it is the duty of everyone to pursue. ARawls leaves this
question open. cf. TF, p. L38.C $till, they cannot supply a basis for legitimate political claims and expectations6 they cannot be
appealed to in political contexts to &ustify limiting others/ freedom, or even the coercive redistribution of income and
wealth Acf. TF, pp. LL,-L3C. This is because of the priority of right over the good. Iow return to @ymlicka0s argument. @ymlicka says both Rawls and utilitarians
agree on the premise of giving equal consideration to everyone0s interests, and that because utilitarians afford equal consideration, Hthey must recogni5e, rather than
deny, that individuals are distinct persons with their own rightful claims. That is, in Rawls0s classification, a position that affirms the priority of the right over the
goodH A%"", p. 3BC. &ince HRawls treats the right as a spelling-out of the requirement that each person0s good be given equal consideration,H there is no debate
between Rawls and utilitarians over the priority of the right or the good A%"", p. 74C. *eontology 6ood 9 "omparative
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By 8ui6in8 social c0oice3 6eontolo8y ulti4ately ac0ie;es t0e sa4e result as utilitarianis4 wit0out
co45ro4isin8 t0e in6i;i6ual
&chroeder 8B J (ro1essor o1 Law at Du2e <C0risto50er $3 %-i80ts A8ainst -is2s3)3 A5ril3 Colu4bia Law
-e;iew3 55 7I:B:A+3 0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8H5ssH11++A/A=
The rights tradition and utilitarianism, the two grand opponents in $merican ?urisprudence, clash on many different issues and fronts.3L- There are, however, many
ways to classify ethical theories, and in one crucial respect these two belong together. They seek the same kind of answer to the question of conflicting values. )or
its part, utilitarianism aspires to clear and unique answers for every question of public choice. If only we can determine the various utility functions of individuals
affected by those decisions-a heroic assumption-the absolutely correct action will be known. Mtilitarianism employs a method for producing
that absolute answer that threatens to obliterate the individual, and hence rights theories re?ect that method.
In affirming the primacy of the individual , however, those theories do not abandon utilitarianism0s ultimate
ob?ective to identify absolutes-clear and definite answers-to guide social choice or to determine the
constraints of ?ustice. In this respect, such theories still live in utilitarianism0s shadow.
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An action ta2en to 4aCi4i?e utility by a 5ower1ul entity li2e t0e 8o;ern4ent is ille8iti4ate an6
i44oral Deontolo8ical 4oral law 8ui6es t0e in6i;i6ual to reali?e obli8ations 0e 0as to society an6 will
ulti4ately sol;e 1or society@s 5roble4s
6authier 3@ J (0D Associate (ro1essor in t0e De5art4ent o1 (0iloso50y an6 -eli8ion at t0e "ni;ersity o1
'ort0 Carolina3 Kenne6y Institute o1 Et0ics Journal <Can6ace (=
>ill is especially helpful in responding to the communitarian critique of respect for autonomy because he is careful to emphasi5e that his conception of
liberty is neither selfish nor indifferent to the self-regarding behavior of others. 'ill A,/.8 P,8-/Q, pp. .7-.-C identifies a number
of ways in which members of the community should influence each other toward the !self-regarding virtues,! which
include education, conviction, persuasion, encouragement, and advice. 3owever, he re&ects the coercion of the law and the
overwhelming power of public opinion as illegitimate forms of control over self-regarding conduct A>ill ,/.8 P,8-/Q, p. /C. The practical
application of these principles from @ant and >ill does not require a concept of the self as unencumbered or isolated in its decision making. Gant/s concept
of the person, with the capacity for rational Pnd !age L74Q agency, is based on human freedom from natural forces, not our freedom
from attachments and commitments to other persons or the influence our histories, traditions, and families have on our values, choices,
and actions . @ant is pointing out that we are neither like chairs, without the capacity for choice or action, nor like nonrational animals, whose actions are
determined by instinct and the forces of nature. $s persons, we are the products of our families, traditions, and communities. +et, because we are persons, our
actions may be the result of more than these influences. They may also be the result of our rational capacities. >oreover, according to @ant, our choices and
actions are not supposed to be based simply on our own goals and ends. Rather, Gant believes that the moral law will
lead us to recogni"e duties and obligations we have to others, for e1ample, to respect and further their ends. $uch obligations could
certainly be directed toward the shared goals of the community as a whole. )or >ill, even self-regarding choices and actions are
properly sub?ect to influence from others, for e1ample through their natural reactions to an individual0s self-destructive behavior. In fact, he advocates our
responsibility to help each other H. . . distinguish the better from the worse . . .H through conviction, encouragement, persuasion, and education A>ill
,/.8 P,8-/Q, pp. .7-.BC. )urthermore, in the category of other-regarding behavior >ill includes the risk of damage not only to specific others, but to the society, as
well Ap. 84C.
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#0e utility o1 a society only 0as ;alue w0en its in6i;i6uals are treate6 wit0 6i8nity A 1ree society t0at
sacri1ices so4e o1 its own in6i;i6uals to 5re;ent 0u4an eCtinction is 4orally corru5t
&hue 8/ J (ro1essor o1 Et0ics an6 (ublic Li1e3 (rinceton "ni;ersity <$enry3 %'uclear Deterrence an6
Moral -estraint3 55 171B+=
6iven the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches one can take
in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy. (ne approach is to stick doggedly with one of the established moral
theories constructed by philosophers to :rationali5e< or :make sense of< everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on
the morality of nuclear weapons use. $ more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and
principles are inevitable in response to constantly changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen
challenges may impel citi5ens of 2estern societies to ad?ust the way they rank their values and principles to
ensure that the moral order survives. Iuclear weapons are putting ?ust such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the emergence of a nuclear-
armed communist state capable of threatening the e1istence of 2estern civili5ation, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve 2estern values
may have appeared wholly un?ustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be that 2estern democracies, if
they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent life the full
protection demanded by Fust 2ar morality. It might be ob?ected that the freedoms of 2estern society have value only
on the assumption that human beings are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Fust 2ar theory. Innocent
human life is not ?ust another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison d=etre of 2estern political, economic, and social
institutions. $ free society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to
save itself from e1tinction would be :morally corrupt,< no better than soviet society, and not worth defending. The only
morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at the hands of tyranny,
if need be. This ob?ection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually sacrifices innocent human lives for the sake of common social
goods is a contradiction in terms. (n the other hand, even Fust 2ar doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some innocent human life under certain hard-
pressing circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes e1tremely high 9 but not absolute 9 value to innocent human life. The
problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.
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Maintainin8 5ro5er 4oral ;alues is t0e only way to obtain a 1ree society3 w0ic0 outwei80s nuclear
eCtinction
&hue 8/ <$enry3 (ro1essor o1 Et0ics an6 (ublic Li1e3 (rinceton "ni;ersity3 %'uclear Deterrence an6
Moral -estraint3 55 1/7B:=

But is it realistic to suppose that $merican citi5ens would risk not ?ust their own lives but their families and their nation in using nuclear weapons to save 2estern
urope and other free societies from &oviet domination, especially if the Mnited &tates= allies are not willing to risk nuclear destruction themselvesE $ccording to
one ,/87 poll, .7 percent of $mericans queried believe :the M.&. should not use nuclear weapons if the Russians invade 2estern urope.< Iuclear !rotectionists,
however, would reply that further public debate might convince more $mericans that deterrence cannot be had on the moral cheap. If the Mnited &tates
is determined to deter a &oviet attack on urope, it must have a moral nuclear strategy that it is willing to
implement. 2ithout effective population defenses, such a strategy could require that the Mnited &tates accept an unequal
risk of nuclear destruction to ensure the survival of free society . In the e1treme, this could mean that the Mnited &tates
must be willing to sacrifice itself for values higher than its own national survival . Thus, Iuclear !rotectionism views both
Fust 2ar morality and national :self-centered< as unworkable foundations for M.&. security policy.
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Li;in8 wit0out 1ree6o4 transcen6s nuclear war
>ohan /L J (ro1essor at LS" <BriE3 %Ecli5se &1 Free6o43) 5 /B7=
The ordeal of e1istence transcends the thermonuclear fever because the latter does not directly impact the
day-to-day operations of the common people. The fear of crime, accidents, loss of ?ob, and health care on the
one handJ and the scourges of racism, se1ism, and agism on the other hand have created a counterculture of
denial and disbelief that has shattered the fatade of civility. "ivili5ation loses its significance when its social
institutions have become counterproductive. It is the aspect of the mega-crisis that we are concerned about. The :ordeal of e1istence<, as I see
it, has three relevant facets; "risis of modernity, "ontradictions of paradigms, "omple1ity of social phenomenon. Reinventing civility calls for an e1position of
these elements without a vituperative intent. ach of these aspects has normative and structural dimension involving a host of theories. The politics, metaphors, and
rhetoric, however, color the shape and substance of each analytical output. Therefore, a value-neutral assessment cannot be a politically
correct statement on the human condition.
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A 6eontolo8ical 1ra4in8 4aCi4i?es t0e 8oo6 by e450asi?in8 ri80ts an6 actin8 on an in6i;i6ualist
basis
>any moral views can admit that right acts in some sense promote the good. In @ant, for e1ample, all have a duty to promote the Realm of ndsJ each person0s
doing so is, we might say, instrumental to reali5ing this ideal community. But here the goodness of this end is not an independent variable that is being promotedJ
this good is &ust defined as the state of affairs in which conscientious moral agents all freely act on and from the moral
law. )y acting and willing according to this principle, all treat the humanity of others as an end in itself. 'oreover, to say
this good is !maximi"ed! when everyone does his or her duty really adds nothing6 and it misleads us as to the structure
and content of Gant/s principle of right. By contrast teleological views :%; define the good independent of any moral
concepts6 and then :O; define the right purely in instrumental terms of principles of expedience, i.e., as what most
effectively and probably reali"es the greatest amount of good.
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Bot0 utilitarian@s an6 nonButilitarian@s res5ect t0e 4oral 5rinci5le o1 e9uality an6 1ree6o4 $owe;er3
only 6eontolo8y can 4eet t0is 5rinci5le because it allows 1or in6i;i6ual 6ecisions
)reeman /7 <Sa4uel3 A;alon (ro1essor in t0e $u4anities at t0e "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania3 (0D
$ar;ar6 "ni;ersity3 JD "ni;ersity o1 'ort0 Carolina3 %"tilitarianis43 Deontolo8y3 an6 t0e (riority o1
-i80t3) (0iloso50y an6 (ublic A11airs3 *ol +/3 'o 73 Autu4n3 55 /1/B/7I3 3
!hillipa )oot has said that what makes consequentialism so compeling is Hthe rather simple thought that it can never be right to prefer a worse state of affairs to a
better.H- But deontological theories, suitably construed, can account for this Hsimple thoughtH ?ust as well Afor reasons I discuss in &ection #IC. The force of
consequentialism must then ie elsewhere; it embodies a powerful conception of practical reason. If we assume that rationality consists in ma1imi5ing an aggregate,
and that in ethics it involves ma1imi5ing overall good, then we are able to say that there is a rational choice between any two alternative actions, laws, or
institutions. Therefore under all conceivable conditions, there is a uniquely rational, hence right, thing to do . 6ranted, it
may not be knowable by us, but the idea of ma1imi5ing the good provides a way to assign a truth value to any statement
about what persons or groups ought to do. Io other conception of rationality offers such practical
completeness. &idgwick, well aware of the force of the idea of ma1imi5ing an aggregate, used it quite effectively to argue that hedonism
must be true, and that rational egoism and utilitarianism were the only two Hrational methodsH in ethics.B 'e could not decide which of the two was more
rational, but assuming that egoism is not a moral conception at all, then, given &idgwick0s premises, utilitarianism prevails without opposition. These introductory
remarks supply background I later refer to. >y aim is to elucidate the teleologyNdeontology distinction. I begin with the contention that teleological theories are not
moral theories at all. 2ill @ymlicka argues that the teleologicalNdeontological distinction relied on by Rawls and others is misleading. Iot only does the morally
right act not ma1imi5e the goodJ any view which defines the right in this way is not a moral conception.. Right actions, @ymlicka says, concern our duties, and
duties must be owed to someone. But if moral duty is defined as ma1imi5ing overall good, H2hom is it a duty toEH A%"", p. 38C. @ymlicka argues for the A@antianC
claim that morality concerns respect for persons, not the good impersonally construed. $nd the most credible moral conceptions, the only ones worth attending to,
hold that Heach person matters equally,H and deserves equal concern and respect A%"", p. 74C. @ymlicka0s aim here is not to attack teleological views, but to show
that Rawls0s teleologicalNdeontological distinction cannot do the work Rawls wantsJ indeed it is Hbased on a serious confusionH A%"", p. 3,C. )or utilitarians,
@ymlicka claims, are ?ust as committed to equality, equal respect for persons, and fair distributions as everyone else. The difference is they interpret these abstract
concepts differently. 'ere @ymlicka follows Ronald *workin0s suggestion; Hthat Rawls and his critics all share the same 0egalitarian plateau0; they agree that 0the
interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equallyH0 A%"", p. 3,C. Mtilitarians like 'are and 'arsanyi, non-utilitarians like Rawls, Io5ick, and
*workin, and even many !erfectionists A@ymlicka mentions >ar1C, all accept that equal concern and respect is the fundamental
moral principle. H$ll these theories are deontological in that they spell out an ideal of fairness or equality for
distinct individualsH A%"", p. 3BC. If so, @ymlicka argues, the dispute between utilitarians and their critics cannot be depicted in terms of Rawls0s
misleading distinction, or in terms of the priority of the right or the good. $t issue in these debates are different conceptions of the political value of equality. I shall
argue Ain &ections II and IIIC that @ymlicka, not Rawls, is culpable of Hserious confusion.H 'e confuses deontology-a claim about the
content of principles of right-with the principles that are invoked in ?ustifying and applying the content of a
moral view. >oreover, he confuses deontology with a related idea, the priority of right. The priority of right has received a great deal of attention from
Rawls0s communitarian critics. This is surprising in view of the fact that Rawls has so little to say about it in Theory ofFustice.8
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Deontolo8y 4orality 4aCi4i?es 8oo6 to its 1ullest eCtent w0ile utilitarianis4 is in6i11erent to
6istribution o1 8oo6
It is perhaps a moral truism to say that people ought to do what they can to make the world as good a place
as possible . But construed in a certain way, this becomes a highly controversial thesis about morality; that the right act in any circumstance is one most
conducive to the best overall outcome Aas ascertained, say, from an impersonal point of view that gives equal weight to the good of everyoneC. This is
"onsequentialism.0 >ore simply, it holds Right conduct ma1imi5es the 6ood. 6. . >oore held this thesis self-evident. Ion-consequentialists argue nothing could
be further from the truth. $o far as they do, it appears :to conse#uentialists at least; they are committed to the indefensible idea
that morality re#uires us to do less good than we are able to. Fohn Rawls0s teleologicalNdeontological distinction is different .
Teleo logical views affirm the consequentialist thesis that the Right ma1imi5es the 6ood. But they hold an additional thesis; Hthe good is defined
independently from the rightH ATF, p. 37C, or, as Rawls often says, independ ent of any moral concepts or principles.3 To see how this view differs from
consequentialism, consider a thesis once proposed by T. >. &canlon.1 * standard ob&ection to consequentialist views like utilitarian ism is
that they are indifferent to the distribution of the good6 this is purportedly a necessary feature of such views, since
they define right and &ustice as what maximi"es overall, or aggregate, good . &canlon argued there should be a way to incorporate
distributive concerns into a two-level consequentialist view. If we treat fairness or distributive equality as a good in itself, then it must be considered along
with other goods like net aggregate satisfaction in determining the value of overall outcomes that are to be ma1imi5ed. Rights could then be introduced at the
level of casuistry, to promote the good of equitable states of affairs. The two-level consequentialist view &canlon suggests would not be teleological on Rawls0s
accountJ it would be deontological. $s Rawls says; If the distribution of goods is also counted as a good, perhaps a higher-order one, and the theory
directs us to produce the most good Aincluding the good of distribution among othersC we no longer have a teleological view in the classical sense. The problem
of distribution falls under the concept of right as one intuitively understands it, and so the theory lacks an independent definition of the good. ATF, 3.C
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E;aluatin8 4orality t0rou80 ri80ts an6 Eustice is intrinsically 8oo6 w0ile utilitarianis4 6enies 0u4ans
o1 t0eir basic ri80ts
Rawls0s thought may be this; in order to define the distributions Ae.g., equal states of affairsC that are
intrinsically good, and then practically apply this definition to determine what we ought to do, we must appeal to some process of distribution that
can only be described by antecedent principles of right or &ustice. )ut once we do that, then it is no longer the case that the right is
exclusively defined in terms of what maximi"es the good. )or e1ample, suppose fairness or the equal capacity of persons to reali5e their good is
among the intrinsic goods in a conse#uentialist view9 we are to act in whatever ways best promote fairness or e#uality of
capacity for all persons. It is difficult to see how such vague ends can be specified for practical purposes without
appealing to principles or procedures defining peoples/ e#ual basic rights, powers, and entitlements. )ut once this
specification is incorporated into the maximand, the right is no longer simply a matter of maximi"ing the good. )or the
concept of the good itself, in this instance, cannot be described without an antecedent nonma1imi5ing moral principle of right9 that people ought to
be treated fairly, afforded certain basic rights and powers, and so on. Iot only is such a view by Rawls0s definition nonteleologicalJ it
is also not conse#uentialist if by this is meant that to maximi"e the good is the sole fundamental principle of right.
Incorporating rights or other moral dictates into the maximand is incompatible with this very idea.7
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Deontolo8ical 4orality 5ro4otes in6i;i6ualis43 5rotectin8 0u4ans 1ro4 utilitarian obli8ations to
society
&tel5ig /8 9 Masters 6e8ree in 50iloso50y 1ro4 t0e "ni;ersity o1 Illinois at C0ica8o3 obtaine6 JD 1ro4
"ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania an6 is currently an attorney 1or t0e FCC <#i43 %Deontolo8y3 Go;ern4ental
Action3 an6 t0e Distributi;e ECe45tionL $ow t0e #rolley (roble4 S0a5es t0e -elations0i5 between
-i80ts an6 (olicy3) "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania Law -e;iew3 *ol 17A3 'o /3
0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8HstableH//1+A1/=
*eontology is the theory of moral obligation, and, by connotation, encompasses moral theories that emphasi5e
rights and duties. !ut another way, deontological theories are those moral theories of a vaguely @antian stripe. @ant held that one should HPaQct in
such a way that PoneQ always treatPsQ humanity, whether in Pone0sQ own person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. H33 It was not always so. 2hen Feremy Bentham, one of
utilitarianism0s founders, first coined the word in ,8,7, HdeontologyH referred to the marshaling of self-interested reasons for agents to act for the general good.
ssentially, this was a utilitarian theory of obligation, and was quite distinct from modern use. >odern-day deontologists focus much
attention on rights.3B It might be thought that this focus is merely a preference, for rights are often taken to be correlative with duties. )or e1ample, where
this relation holds, if I have a right not to be punched, you are under an obligation not to punch me, and conversely. Thus, deontology may be articulated through
either related element. >ore generally, in theories holding that rights and duties are correlative, one may give an account of rights and then define duties by
reference to rightsJ one may define rights in terms of an antecedent theoretic account of dutiesJ or one may give separate theoretic accounts of rights and duties.3.
Rights need not be completely correlative with duties.38 )or e1ample, take the notion of privileges, understood here as a subspecies of
rights. The lone occupant of a small and isolated island presumably possesses a privilege to sing show-tunes at the top of her voice.3 This right, however, has no
correlative obligation. It is not ?ust that the island, being otherwise deserted, has no one in whom the obligation inheres. Rather, it is a structural feature of the
e1ample that no obligation not to interfere can e1ist. Introducing another person onto the island would destroy the privilege, for it would be immoral for the singer
to sub?ect another person to her showmanship without the other person0s consent. %ikewise, there may be obligations for which correlative rights do not e1ist. )or
e1ample, one may be under an obligation to write letters to her grandfather without her grandfather having the right to receive letters written by his
granddaughter.L4 H(missionsH may also be understood as obligations for which there are no corresponding rights. If you may easily save somebody from great
harm or death without substantial risk to yourself, a moral obligation e1ists to so help them.Ll >ost people, however, do not think that the victim has a right to your
efforts.L3 $lthough more could be said, my point is that whether or not one takes rights to be correlative with duties has
implications for other aspects of moral theory. )or the purposes of this "omment, there is no need to trace the contours of deontology with
precision. Thus, although it is a simplification, this "omment will focus only on rights. The ultimate goal, again, is to discover when we may appeal to
rights as a way of protecting ourselves against the demands of society. The ne1t !art e1amines the nature of rights more closely.
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$u4ans s0oul6 4orally 0a;e a ri80t to t0e4sel;es an6 t0e ri80t to t0eir 5ro5erty J t0e 8o;ern4ent is
i44oral to 6eny 5ro5erty ri80ts re8ar6less o1 t0eir utilitarian intentions
&tel5ig /8 9 Masters 6e8ree in 50iloso50y 1ro4 t0e "ni;ersity o1 Illinois at C0ica8o3 obtaine6 JD 1ro4
"ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania an6 is currently an attorney 1or t0e FCC <#i43 %Deontolo8y3 Go;ern4ental
Action3 an6 t0e Distributi;e ECe45tionL $ow t0e #rolley (roble4 S0a5es t0e -elations0i5 between
-i80ts an6 (olicy3) "ni;ersity o1 (ennsyl;ania Law -e;iew3 *ol 17A3 'o /3
0tt5LHHwwwEstoror8HstableH//1+A1/=
Rights, for *workin, are understood functionally through their distributional character, and are distinguished from goals.74 Take first the distributional character of
collective goals. These goals seek to achieve some particular, even if vaguely defined, distribution within the society.70 )or e1ample, *workin notes that economic
efficiency is within a collective goal. Importantly, with respect to collective goals, Hdistributional principles are subordinate to some conception of aggregate
collective good, so that offering less of some benefit to one PpersonQ can be ?ustified simply by showing that this will lead to a greater benefit overall.H7L 'ence, the
collective goals of a community are appropriate fodder for consequentialist reasoning. Rights , however, have a different distributional character . $s
*workin states; HIf someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it
would be in the general interest to do so.!77 !ut another way, the right is prior to the good. Thus, for *workin, Hindividual rights are
political trumps held by individuals<.
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*****M&-ALI#. G&&D H BAD*****
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**Morality Goo6L &bli8ations3 Moral Laws3 etc**
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>oral ?ustice vital 9 sets us apart from animalistic tendencies
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 1+ (roEect M"SE
Reasonableness, or the capacity for a sense of ?ustice, is the ability to limit the pursuit of one=s conception of the good
out of a respect for the rights and interests of other people and out of a desire to cooperate with them on fair terms. $
person who acts reasonably acts according to a principle of reciprocity; he seeks to give :?ustice to those who can give
?ustice in return< Ap. 77.C. The tight connection between reasonableness and autonomy is e1plained by Rawls in sec. 8B
of "heory; :the sense of ?ustice . . . reveals what the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for the self free
reign but to give way to the contingencies and accidents of the world< Ap. -4LC. 2hen we act reasonably, says Rawls,
we demonstrate an ability to subordinate the pursuit of our own good, which may be unduly influenced by the
:contingencies and accidents of the world,< to those principles we would choose as members of the intelligible realmG
our reasonableness, in other words, is emblematic of our autonomy, our independence from natural and social
contingencies. This e1plains our sense of shame w0en we fail to act reasonablyL we be0a;e t0en as i1 we were
4e4bers o1 a %lower or6er) o1 ani4al , whose actions are determined by the laws of nature rather than the moral law
Ap. 33-C.
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Moral law outwei80s ot0er consi6erations J inte8ral to 0u4an nature
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 1/ (roEect M"SE
The !riority of Right over the 6ood and the !riority of Fustice over 2elfare and fficiency are both e1pressions of our
nature as reasonable beings, i.e., beings able to act in conformity with, and out of respect for, the moral law. In @ant=s
terms, to sacrifice ?ustice for the sake of welfare or e1cellence of character would be to sacrifice what is of absolute
value Athe good willC for what is of merely relative value Aits complementsC. Rawls himself makes the same strong
connection between reasonableness and these two kinds of priority; But the desire to e1press our nature as a free and
equal rational being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and >ustice as having first priority . . . .
Therefore in order to reali5e our nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of ?ustice as governing
our other aims. This sentiment cannot be fulfilled if it is compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire
among the rest ATF, p. -4L, emphasis addedC. Fust as reasonableness is a key facet of our autonomy, so the priorities of
right and ?ustice are e1pressions of our reasonableness; we best indicate our commitment to guide our actions by the
principles of ?ustice by refusing to compromise those principles for the sake of our other ends.
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Moral rationality 2ey to sustainable 6ecision4a2in8 J a;oi6s ani4alistic ten6encies
(ress (0iloso50y Q (ublic A11airs /13 'o /3 (8 17 (roEect M"SE
Rationality is our capacity for a conception of the good, which we pursue through a plan of life. 2e schedule, prioriti5e,
temper, and prune our desires in accordance with this planJ rather than living from impulse to impulse, as other animals
do, we arrange the pursuit of our interests and ends according to a coherent scheme Asecs. BL9B7C. Iow, given what was
said in the previous subsection, one may find it difficult to see the connection between rationality, so defined, and
autonomy; if our desires are largely the product of natural and social contingencies, then how can acting in accordance
with a plan to advance them be an aspect of our autonomyE In other words, if rationality is merely the :slave of the
passions,< ,, and these passions are the result of such contingencies, then how can rationality possibly e1press our nature
as free and equal beingsE $ccording to Rawls, however, rationality is much more than a :slave of the passions.< The
e1ercise of rationality involves a clear distancing from one=s immediate desires, as Rawls indicates in the following
passage; The aim of deliberation is to find that plan which best organi5es our activities and influences the formation of
our subsequent wants so that our aims and interests can be fruitfully combined into one scheme of conduct Desires t0at
ten6 to inter1ere wit0 ot0er en6s3 or w0ic0 un6er4ine t0e ca5acity 1or ot0er acti;ities3 are wee6e6 outY whereas
those that are en?oyable in themselves and support other aims as well are encouraged. ,3 The image of rationality here is
active, not passive. Rather than being haplessly driven on by the dominant desires, rationality e1ercises authority over
them; rationality elevates some desires and lays low othersJ it integrates retained desires into :one scheme of conduct<J
and it even shapes the development of future desires. )ar from being a slave of desire, rationality is its master. This
conception of rationality is consistent with at least one reading of @ant=s idea of practical reason as applied to the
pursuit of happiness; '. F. !aton notes that prudential reasoning in @ant=s moral theory involves :a choice of ends as
well as means< and a subsequent :ma1imum integration of ends.< ,L
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"tilitarianis4 1ails to ta2e into account 5ri4a 1acie ri80tsJ 4oral resolution o1 con1licts necessary
McClos2ey3 5ro1essor o1 50iloso50y 1IGA
$J "tilitarianis4 an6 'atural $u4an Moral -i80ts (8 1//
The theory of prima facie human rights that is outlined here is one in terms of prima facie rights, many of which are
rights of recipience, in which the rights create obligations and claims that collide with one another and with the moral
demands created by other values. >any of these conflicts are to be resolved without reference , or with only negative
reference, to consequences. 2hen the consequences do enter seriously into the resolution of the conflicts, the solution
arrived at is often very different from that which would be dictated by utilitarian con siderations. The points made in the
preceding section may be illustrated by reference to conflicts of prima facie human rights such as the right to life,
viewed as a right of recipience, the right to moral autonomy and integrity- and values such as pleasure and happiness,
and the absence of pain and suffering. $ consideration of the morally rightful resolution of such conflicts brings out the
inadequacy of the utilitarian calculus as a basis for determining the morally right response to such situations and
conflicts.
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)ailure to satisfy moral obligations leads to violent backlash.
-ic0ar6 Morality3 "tilitarianis43 an6 -i80ts Ca4bri68e "ni;ersity (ress (8s 1GGB1GI
'ow can we absorb this idea into the conceptual scheme developed so farE >orality, as I have described it, is a feature
of agents - their motives, dispositions to fed guilt - and of the attitudes of the generality of other persons toward agents -
approval or disapproval of them. In my account nothing has been said about the patients, the targets of the behavior of
agents. I now suggest that we should e1tend our description of moral codes, to include something about patients. )irst.
patients may have a disposition to resent infringements of the rules we have been talking about when these impinge on
them, when they are the parties in?ured. or deprived. or threatened. (f course, people tend to resent any deliberate in?ury
. so this reaction is not specific to rules of rights.,4 &econd, persons who resent it when they are in?ured or deprived in
one of these ways or even when they are threatened because of the none1istence of institutions able to protect them,
may also be inclined not to feel ashamed or embarrassed to protest on their own behalf. This feature need not occur, and
in societies in which individuals have felt it is their place to be downtrodden, ill-treated, and so on, it was not the case.
(f course there are several levels of this. The first is e1pression of resentment to the in?uring party. $ second level is
public protest, or ?oining in a public protest, calling attention to the situation and inviting sympathy and support,
particularly for the institution of legal devices for prevention of what has occurred or redress or punishment when it
already has occurred. $ third level is that of passive disobedience, lack of cooperation, perhaps nonviolent economic
pressure that causes inconvenience or discomfort on behalf of a cause. )inally there is violent action, willingness to
cause personal or 5ro5erty 6a4a8e3 in or6er to brin8 about a c0an8e in t0ose w0o are in1rin8in8 4oral
obli8ations or to bring about legal institutions to prevent or punish such infringements. !resumably the level of protest
will normally correlate with the strength of the obligation being infringed and the seriousness of the damage or threat.
The practice of company stores might elicit one level of protest, the practice of lynch law on members of a racial
minority quite another.
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**Morality Ba6**
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Et0ics is structurally 1lawe63 in t0at it i45lies a trans8ression
,u5ancic3 researc0er3 Institute o1 (0iloso50y in t0e Slo;ene Aca6e4y o1 Sciences3 KK
A$lenka Kupancic, researcher, Institute of !hilosophy in the &lovene $cademy of &ciences, 3444, thics of the Real, p.
/--/BC
This is why we propose to maintain the concept of the act developed by @ant, and to link it to the
thematic of Roverstepping of boundaries,= of Rtransgression=, to the question of evil. It is a matter of
acknowledging the fact that any AethicalC act precisely in so far as it is an act, is necessarily Revil=.
2e must specify, however, what is meant here by Revil=. This is the evil that belongs to the very
structure of the act, to the fact that the latter always implies a Rtransgression=, a change in Rwhat is=.
It is not a matter of some Rempirical= evil, it is the very logic of the act which is denounced as
Rradically evil= in every ideology. The fundamental ideological gesture consists in providing an
image for this structural Revil=. The gap opened by an act Ai.e. the unfamiliar, Rout-of-place= effect
of an actC is immediately linked in this ideological gesture to an image . $s a rule this is an image of
suffering, which is then displayed to the public alongside this question; 4s this what you want E $nd
this question already implies the answer; 4t would be impossible& inhuman& for you to want this?
'ere we have to insist on theoretical rigour, and separate this Ausually fascinatingC image e1hibited
by ideology from the source of uneasiness 9 from the Revil= which is not an Rundesired=, Rsecondary=
effect of the good but belongs, on the contrary, to its essence. 2e could even say that the ethical
ideology struggles against Revil= because this ideology is hostile to the Rgood=, to the logic of the act
as such. 2e could go even further here; the current saturation of the social field by Rethical
dilemmas= Abioethics, environmental ethics, cultural ethics, medical ethicsdC is strictly correlative
to the Rrepression= of ethics, that is, to an incapacity to think ethics in its dimension of the Real, an
incapacity to conceive of ethics other than simply as a set of restrictions to yet another aspect of
Rmodern society=; to the Rdepression= which seems to have became the Rsocial illness= of our time
and to set the tone of the resigned attitude of the RApostCmodern man= of the Rend of history=. In
relation to this, it would be interesting to reaffirm %acan=s thesis according to which depression
Risn=t a state of the soul, it is simply a moral failing, as *ante, and even &pino5a, said; a sin, which
means a moral weakness=. It is against this moral weakness or cowardice P lachete morale Q that we
must affirm the ethical dimension proper.
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#0e i6eolo8y o1 R8oo6 an6 e;il@ is in0erently 1lawe6
/4-/,C
The first difficulty with this concept of diabolical evil lies in its very definition; that diabolical evil
would occur if we elevated opposition to the moral law to the level of a ma1im Aa principle or lawC.
2hat is wrong with this definitionE 6iven the @antian concept of the moral law 9 which is not a
law that says Rdo this= or Rdo that=, but an enigmatic law which only commands us to do our duty,
without ever naming it 9 the following ob?ection arises; if the opposition to the moral law were
elevated to a ma1im or principle, it would no longer be an opposition to the moral law, it would be
the moral law itself. $t this level no opposition is possible. It is not possible to oppose oneself to
the moral law at the level of the AmoralC law. Iothing can oppose itself to the moral law on
principle 9 that is, for non-pathological reasons 9 without itself becoming a moral law. To act
without allowing pathological incentives to influence our actions is to do good. In relation to this
definition of the good, AdiabolicalC evil would then have to be defined as follows; it is evil to oppose
oneself, without allowing pathological incentives to influence one=s actions, to actions which do not
allow any pathological incentives to influence one=s actions. $nd this is simply absurd.
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#0e real 6ri;e be0in6 et0ics is 6esire3 not t0e Rwill to 6o 8oo6@
L-7C
@ant=s second break with the tradition, related to the first, was his re?ection of the view that ethics is
concerned with the Rdistribution of the good= Athe Rservice of goods= in %acan=s termsC. @ant re?ected an ethics
based on Rmy wanting what is good for others, provided of course that their good reflects my own=.
It is true that %acan=s position concerning the status of the ethics of desire continued to develop. 'ence his position in
Seminar @4 9"he Four Fundamental Concepts of )sychoA$nalysis: differs on several points from the one he adopted in
Seminar 844 9"he !thics of )sychoanalysis:. That Rthe moral law, looked at more closely, is simply desire in
its pure state= is a ?udgment which, had it been pronounced in Seminar 844, would have had the value of a
complimentJ clearly this is no longer the case when it is pronounced in Seminar @4. +et even though the later %acan
claims that Rthe analyst=s desire is not a pure desire=, this does not mean that the analyst=s desire is pathological Ain the
@antian sense of the wordC, nor that the question of desire has lost its pertinence. To put the matter simply, the question
of desire does not so much lose its central place as cease to be considered the endpoint of analysis. In the later view
analysis ends in another dimension, that of the drive. 'ence 9 as the concluding remarks of Seminar @4 have
it 9 before this dimension opens up to the sub?ect, he must first reach and then traverse Rthe limit within which, as
desire, he is bound=.
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>orality is a demand for the impossible as it is based on our desires
LC
@ant is admired by %acan above all for his break, at two crucial points, with Rtraditional= ethics. The first
is his break with the morality that spelled out obligations in terms of the possibility of fulfilling them.
$ccording to %acan, the crucial point here is that morality as such, as @ant well knew, is a demand for the
impossible; Rthe impossibility in which we recogni5e the topology of our desire=. By insisting on the fact that
the moral imperative is not concerned with what might or might not be done, @ant discovered the
essential dimension of ethics; the dimension of desire, which circles around the real .ua impossible. This
dimension was e1cluded from the purview of traditional ethics, and could therefore appear to it only as an e1cess. &o
@ant=s crucial first step involves taking the very thing e1cluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning it into
the only legitimate territory for ethics. If critics often critici5e @ant for demanding the impossible, %acan
attributes an incontestable theoretical value to this @antian demand.
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Et0ics is 4erely a tool by w0ic0 5ersonal 4orals are i45ose6 on ot0ers3 w0ic0 is t0e root o1 6iscontent
in society
,C
The R)reudian blow= to philosophical ethics can be summari5ed as follows; what philosophy calls the moral law 9
and, more precisely, what @ant calls the categorical imperative 9 is in fact nothing other than the superego.
This ?udgment provokes an Reffect of disenchantment= that calls into question any attempt to base ethics on foundations
other than the Rpathological.= $t the same time, it places Rethics= at the core of what )reud called das Unbehagen
in der Bultur. the discontent or malaise at the heart of civili5ation. In so far as it has its origins in the
constitution of the superego, ethics becomes nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology which
may try to pass off its own commandments as the truly authentic, spontaneous and Rhonourable=
inclinations of the sub?ect. This thesis, according to which the moral law is nothing but the superego, calls, of
course, for careful e1amination, which I shall undertake in "hapter . below.
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It is i45ossible to 6eter4ine w0et0er an action is truly et0ical or not
,B-,.C
By spelling things out in this way we can see clearly that the ethical is, in fact, essentially a supplement. %et us, then,
begin with the first level Athe legalC. The content of action Aits Rmatter=C, as well as the form this content,
are e1hausted in the notion of Rin conformity with duty=. $s long as I do my duty nothing remains
to be said. The fact that the act that fulfils my duty may have been done e1clusively for the sake of
this duty would change nothing at level of analysis. &uch an act would be entirely indistinguishable
from an act done simply in accord with duty, since their results would be e1actly the same. The
significance of acting Ae1clusivelyC for the sake of duty will be visible only on the second level analysis, which we will
simply call the level form. 'ere we come across a form which is no longer the form of anything, of some content of
other, yet it is not so much an empty form as form Routside= content, a form that provides form only for itself. In other
words, we confronted here with a supply which at the same time seems to be Rpure waste=, something that serves
absolutely no purpose.
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Et0ics in ter4s o1 atte45ts to 6o so4et0in8 R8oo6@ only reBentrenc0es t0e 5resence o1 t0e o4ni5resent
e;il
8BC
The theme of Rradical evil= is currently something of a hot topic, and @ant, as a Rtheoretician of radical evil=, is sub?ect
to very diverse and sometimes contradictory readings. In his book, (!thi.ue $lain Badiou points out that the
topic of radical evil has become a spectre raised by Rethical ideologists= every time a will to do
something AgoodC appears. very Rpositive= pro?ect is capable of being undermined in advance on
the grounds that it might bring about an even greater evil. thics would thus be reduced to only one
function; preventing evil, or at least lessening it. It seems that such an ethics of Rthe lesser evil= is ?ustified in
its reference to @ant. The criticism of @ant according to which he defined the criteria of the AethicalC act in such a way
that one can never satisfy them goes as far back as 'egel . )rom this point it follows that all our actions are
necessarily Rbad=, and that one can remain Rpure= only if one chooses not to act at all. In this
perspective, good does not e1ist, whereas evil is Romnipresent=.
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(eo5le alrea6y reali?e t0ey 0a;e a 4oral obli8ation but 6on@t actually 1ollow t0e4 or treat t0e4 as
anyt0in8 but anot0er obli8ation
Leiter 1IID
ABrian, !rofessor at the Mniversity of "hicago, !rinceton MniversityJ F*, ,/8., !h* Aphilosophy : Iiet5sche and the >orality
"ritics<, "hicago FournalsC >)
>orality0s purportedly threatening notion of Hobligation,H for e1-ample, is constructed by 2illiams entirely from the works of @ant and Ross, with no gesture at
showing what relation their philosophically refined notions of HobligationH bear to those in play in ordinary life. +et where is the evidence, one might ask, that real
5eo5le treat H 4oral obli8ationsU TasU inesca5ableV <EL(3 5 1DD= an6 t0at t0ey acce5t t0e i6ea t0at
Vonly an obli8ation can beat an obli8ationV A%!, p. ,84CO Surely t0e e;i6ence is not in t0e way 5eo5le
actually li;e3 in t0e way t0ey actually 0onorBor3 4ore o1ten3 breac0Bt0eir 4oral obli8ations3 a 5oint
'iet?sc0e well un6erstoo6>D W0at is t0e e;i6ence t0at3 in our relati;istic culture3 in6i;i6uals t0in2
t0at V4oral obli8ation a55lies to 5eo5le e;en i1 t0ey 6o not want it to H A%!, p. ,.8CE ven 2illiams, in leading up to the
specter of morality dominating life, says that Hthe thought can gain a footing AI am not saying that it has toC that I could be better employed than in doing something
I am under no PmoralQ obligation to do, and, if I could be, then I ought to beH A%!, p. ,8,, emphasis addedC. But surely this HthoughtH might only gain a footing for
@ant or Ross, or some other philosopher who followed out to its logical conclusion a deontological theory. It is a 5ure 50iloso50er>s 1antasy to
t0in2 t0at real 5eo5le in t0e 4oral culture at lar8e 1in6 t0e4sel;es o;erw0el4e6 by t0is bur6enso4e
sense o1 4oral obli8aB tion . %ike the other >orality "ritics, 2illiams writes as though he is attacking Hmorality,H when what he is really attacking is
HmoralityH as conceived, systemati5ed, and refined by philosophers. &uch a critique may be a worthy endeavor, but it is far different from worrying about the
HdangersH of ordinary morality as understood-unsystematically and inchoately-by ordinary people. 2hat, then, distinguishes a >orality "ritic from a Theory "ritic
if both are ultimately talking about moral theoryE Roughly, the idea is this; for the former, there is always room, in principle, for a better theory to thwart the
criticsm, while for the latter, #0eory <in t0e tec0nical sense= is t0e 0eart o1 t0e 5roble43 not 5art o1 t0e solution
These points are well illustrated in &tocker0s well-known paper HThe &chi5ophrenia of >odern thical Theories.H08 &tocker argues that Hi1 we e4bo6y
in our 4oti;es3 t0ose ;arious t0in8s w0ic0 recent et0ical t0eories 0ol6 to be ulti4ately 8oo6 or ri80t3
we will3 o1 necessity3 be unable to 0a;e t0ose 4oti;esV <p. 7B,C an6 t0us be unable to reali?e t0e
associate6 8oo6s Ae.g., friendship, love, pleasureC. &tocker claims, however, that a suitable ethical theory must be one in which reasons and motives can
be brought into harmony, such that one can be moved to act by what the theory identifies as HgoodH or Hright.H &tocker0s point isn0t, then, that theori5ing in ethics is
a misguided enterpriseJ it0s ?ust that we need better theories, ones in which theoretical reasons can also serve as motives for action. %ike a >orality "ritic, &tocker
holds that adherence to morality as it is Aread; moral theory as it isC is incom-patible with having the motives requisite for certain personal goods AHlove, friendship,
affection, fellow feeling, and community,H p. 7B,CJ unlike a Theory "ritic, he allows, or at least implies, that a better Ai.e., nonschi5ophrenicC theory could solve the
problem.0/
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Et0ics 1ails to ta2e into account 0u4an nature an6 t0ere1ore 6oes not allow t0e in6i;i6ual to e4brace
onesel1 Instea63 it 1orces a 4o6el t0at is not 8roun6e6 in 0u4anity an6 actually alienates 0u4an li1e

Dai8er +KKA
A"hristine, )""ociate Profe""or Pre"i&ent. $SS /,air. 01uit- /o++ittee. C)$ Me+*er of t,e 2%ea+ /P)3
B.$. "oncordia, >.$. MniversitY de >ontrYal, *octoral studies Brock University& Ciet'sche7 8irtue !thics.. 8irtue )oliticsC&)ro>ect -useC: -F
In this section, I will delineate Iiet5sche=s own brand of virtue ethics. It should be clear that 'iet?sc0e 6oes in6ee6 s0are t0e critical
5ro8ra4 o1 ;irtue et0icists $is attac2s a8ainst t0e tra6itional ;iew o1 4orality an6 t0e ni0ilis4 0e
5ro5oses 4a2e clear t0at3 1or 0i43 tra6itional 4orality is alienatin8 to any 0u4an li1e. In "he +ay Science he
says; :In the main all those moral systems are distasteful to me which say; R*o not do thisT RenounceT (vercome thyselfT=(n the other hand I am favorable to those
moral systems which stimulate me to do something, and to do it again from morning till evening, to dream of it at night, and think of nothing else but to do it well,
as well as is possible for me aloneT P. . .Q I do not like any of the negative virtues whose very essence is negation and self-renunciation< AuL47C. lsewhere, in
Twilight of the Idols, he tal2s about a sin o1 4oralityL %#0e 4ost 8eneral 1or4ula at t0e basis o1 e;ery reli8ion
an6 4orality isL RDo t0is an6 t0isMan6 you will be 0a55y! &t0erwise @ E;ery 4orality3 e;ery
reli8ion is this i45erati;eMI call it t0e 8reat ori8inal sin o1 reason3 immortal unreason ) A:rrors< 3C.
Iiet5sche=s view of traditional morality can be found throughout his writingsJ however, I think these quotations are satisfactory for our purpose. These two clarify
the spirit with which Iiet5sche approaches morality. #0e 5roble4 wit0 tra6itional 4orality is t0at it 6oes not ta2e into
consi6eration 0u4an nature It 6oes not loo2 at t0e in6i;i6ual as 0e is an6 ai4 to e4brace w0at 0e is
but3 rat0er3 ai4s to i45ose a 4o6el on 0i4 t0at 0as no 8roun6 in t0e reality o1 t0e 0u4an #0is 4o6el
is o1 a transcen6ent nature an6 6oes not 1it t0e i44anent nature o1 t0e 0u4an bein8
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(0iloso50ers 5ro;i6e6 et0ics as a rational 1oun6ation 1or t0ou80t an6 4oral res5onsibility but ne;er
really 9ueste6 or co45are6 t0e43 only w0en 9uestione6 can t0ey actually be consi6ere6
2alter Kau14ann 1IGK
From Shakespeare to !*istentialism http;NNtaimur.sarangi.infoNte1tNkaufmannSniet5sche.htm
:(ne should own up in all strictness what is still necessary here for a long time to come, what alone is ?ustified so far; to collect material, to
conceptuali5e and arrange a vast realm of subtle feelings of value and differences of value which are alive, grow, beget, and perish - and perhaps
attempts to present vividly some of the more frequent and recurring forms of such living crystalli5ations - all to prepare a typology of morals. To
be sure; so far one has not been so modest. 2ith a stiff seriousness that inspires laughter, all our 50iloso50ers 6e4an6e6
so4et0in8 1ar 4ore eCalte63 5resu45tuous3 an6 sole4n 1ro4 t0e4sel;es as soon as t0ey a55roac0e6
t0e stu6y o1 4oralityL t0ey wante6 to su55ly a rational foun&ation 1or 4oralsY an6 e;ery 50iloso50er
so 1ar 0as belie;e6 t0at 0e 0as 5ro;i6e6 suc0 a 1oun6ation Moral ity itsel13 0owe;er3 was acce5te6 as
V8i;enV $ow re4ote 1ro4 t0eir coarse 5ri6e was t0at tas2 w0ic0 t0ey consi6ere6 insi8ni1icant an6
le1t in 6ust an6 6irt - the task of description, although the subtlest fingers and senses can scarcely be subtle enough for it. Because
our 4oral 50iloso50ers 2new t0e 1acts o1 4orality only ;ery a55roCi4ately in arbitrary eC tracts or in
acci6ental e5ito4es B for e1ample, as the morality of their environment, their class, their church, their time, their climate and part of the
world - because they were poorly informed and not even very curious about different peoples, ages, and the past, they never laid eyes on the real
problems of moralityJ for t0ese e4er8e only w0en we co4 5are many 4oralities In all 5re;ious stu6ies o1
4orality one t0in8 was lac2in83 stran8e as t0at 4ay soun6L t0e 5rob le4 o1 4orality itsel1 Y what was lacking
was the suspicion that there was anything at all problematic here. 2hat the philosophers called Ha rational foundation for moralityH and tried to
supply was, properly considered, only a scholarly variation of a common faith in the prevalent moralityJ a new means of e*pression of this faithJ
in short, itself simply another feature of, or rather another fact within, a particular moralityJ indeed, in the last analysis, a kind of denial that this
morality might ever be considered problematic 9 certainly the very opposite of an e1amination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection of this very
faith.<
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Et0ics is a 1a]a6e3 a bac2 bone by w0ic0 western 50iloso50ers coul6 bounce contri;e6 i6eas 3 et0ics as a
w0ole 4ust be 9uestione6 to criti9ue t0e culture t0at creates it instea6 o1 t0e inconse9uential
rationali?ations
From Shakespeare to !*istentialism http7==taimur.sarangi.info=te*t=kaufmannDniet'sche.htm
Iiet5sche revolutioni5ed ethics by asking new questions. $s he saw it, his predecessors had simply taken for granted that they knew what was
good and what was evil. >oral ?udgments had been accepted as incontrovertible facts, and the philosophers had considered it their task to find
reasons for them. In other words, tra6itional 4oral 50iloso50ers 4a6e it t0eir business to rationali?e t0e 4oral
i6iosyncrasies o1 t0eir en;iron4ent 2hat ). '. Bradley was to say of metaphysics in his !reface to $ppearance and #eality
A,8/,C is what Iiet5sche said in effect of traditional ethics; it is Hthe finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct.0H But Iiet5sche
would not have added like Bradley that Hto find these reasons is no less an instinct.0H Ior, indeed, did he consider moral idiosyncrasies instinctive
in any literal sense. )ar from construing them as part of our biological make-up, Iiet5sche was struck by the great variety of moral views in
different times and places.To cite Iiet5sche0s 6arathustra AH(n (ld and Iew Tablets,H E1.: VW0en I ca4e to 4en I 1oun6 t0e4
sittin8 on an ol6 conceitL t0e conceit t0at t0ey 0a;e lon8 2nown w0at is 8oo6 an6 e;il 1or 4an All tal2
o1 ;irtue see4e6 an ol6 an6 weary 4atter to 4anY an6 w0oe;er wante6 to slee5 well still tal2e6 o1
8oo6 an6 e;il be1ore 8oin8 to slee5V Wit0 'iet?sc0e3 our co44on 4oral ;aluations are su66enly
consi6ere6 9uestionable3 an6 et0ics3 instea6 o1 bein8 a 4atter o1 inconse9uen tial rationali?ations3
beco4es a criti9ue o1 culture3 a ;i;isection o1 4o6e4 4an
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Morality is co45leC J Blan2et clai4s t0at we nee6 to sa;e 5eo5le in 5o;erty 5re;ent us 1ro4 4a2in8
rational c0oices
Stubbs3 G1
A$nne, O the M of "ombridge, HThe !ros and "ons of "onsequentialism,H (ct, !hilosophy, #ol. -B, Io. 3,8 A(ct.,
,/8,C, pp. 7/.--,B, ?stor, $*; BNL4N4/C ?l
There is a common criticism of absolutism which, if sound, could be taken to demonstrate its irrationality. It is
that the absolutist refuses to consider the details of particular cases and insists instead on the automatic
application of a blanket ruleJ he thus fails, it is said, to 0take each case on its merits0. Iow there may be
absolutist positions which are vulnerable to this kind of ob?ectionJ for e1ample, the position that one is never
?ustified in taking a human life, whatever the circumstances. &omeone might reasonably ob?ect that there are
moral distinctions to be made over which this view simply rides rough-shod. &omeone may kill a fellow human
being in many different circumstances and for many different reasonsJ for personal gain of some kindJ to put a
loved one out of his miseryJ in self-defenceJ in ?ust war or revolutionJ as retributionJ and so on. &urely it would
be irrational, if not absurd, to insist on making the same moral ?udgment about all these cases. 'owever, even if
this is correct, it is a count against only some absolutist positions, not against all. It is commonly assumed that
the absolutist must operate with some highly general, e1ceptionless rulesJ but this is not an accurate picture of
the kind of absolutism of which I have been speaking throughout this paper. I have spoken, not so much of
moral rules, but of specific moral notions, concepts, or categories-murder, courage, cowardice, honesty, loyalty,
etc.J and I have maintained that these operate as fundamental in moral assessment, in the sense that their
applicability to a particular action will often be morally decisive, and, for some of them, will always be so.,7
%et us consider the e1ample of murder, which is a notion the applicability of which to an action is always
morally decisive. >y absolutist claims, not that killing can never be ?ustified, but that murder can never be
?ustifiedJ and he will not classify all cases of killing as cases of murder. Thus it is simply not true that he does
not have to investigate the details of a particular caseJ indeed it is only through such an investigation that he can
be in a position to decide whether or not the action in question is properly classifiable as 0murder0 . )urther-more,
he will take into account many features of the situation not con-sidered relevant by the consequentialist, for
e1ample, the agent0s motive for the killing. Indeed, it could be maintained that the consequentialist0s claim to
consider each case 0on its merits0 is vitiated by his e1tremely restricted conception of where these merits must
lie. I maintain that it is he, with his e1clusive concentration upon consequences, who abstracts from morally
relevant features of particular cases. $gain, this is a point to which I will return. Thus, if readiness to pay
attention to the details of individual cases be a test of rationality, my absolutist passes it with his colours flying
rather more conspicuously than those of the supporters of consequentialismJ they, after all, have theformula.
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**Et0ical Action Q Le8ality Mutually ECclusi;e**
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Et0ical action can@t be base6 on t0e le8al an6 ille8al
,3C
2e might say that the ethical dimension of an action is Rsupernumerary= to the conceptual pair
legalNillegal. This in turn suggests a structural connection with the %acanian notion of the Real. $s
$lain Badiou has noticed, %acan conceives of the Real in a way that removes it from the logic of
the apparently mutually e1clusive alternatives of the knowable and the unknowable. The
unknowable is ?ust a type of the knowableJ it is the limit or degenerate case of the knowableJ where
the Real belongs to another register entirely. $nalogously, for @ant the illegal still falls within the
category of legality 9 they both belong to the same register, that of things conforming or failing to
conform with duty. thics 9 to continue the analogy 9 escapes this register. ven though an ethical
act will conform with duty, this by itself is not and cannot be what makes it ethical. &o the ethical
cannot be situated within the framework of the law and violations of the law. $gain, in relation to
legality, the ethical always presents a surplus or e1cess.
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Et0ical action an6 le8ality cannot be relate6
,7-,BC
But then, what e1actly is Rat stake=, what is this pure formE )irst of all, it is clear that the form in question cannot be
Rthe form of the matter=, simply because @ant situates the legal and the ethical in two different registers. 'ence matter
and form, the legal and the ethical, are not two different aspects of one and the same thing. *espite this, several
commentators have suggested the following solution to the @antian problem of form; every form has a content
associated with itJ we are always and only dealing with a form and a content. &o, in this view, if we
are to decide whether an act is ethical or not, we simply have to know which in fact determines our
will; if it is the form, our actions are pathologicalJ if it is the form, they are ethical. This indeed, would
rightly be called formalism 9 but it not what @ant is aiming at this his use of the concept of Rpure form=. )irst of all we
should immediately note that the label Rformalism= is more appropriate for what @ant calls legality. In terms of
legality, all that matters is whether or not an action conform with duty 9 the Rcontent= of such an action, the
real motivated for this conformity, is ignoredJ it simply does not matter. But the ethical, unlike the legal,
does in fact present a certain claim concerning the Rcontent= of the will. thics demands not only
that an action conform with duty, but also that this conformity be the only Rcontent= or Rmotive= of
that action. Thus @ant=s emphasis on form is in an attempt to disclose a possible drive for ethical action. @ant is
saying that Rform= has to come to occupy the position formerly occupied by Rmatter=, that form itself has to function as a
drive. )orm itself must be appropriated as a material surplus, in order for it to be capable of the will. @ant=s point, I
repeat, is not that all traces materiality have to be purged from the determining ground of the moral will but, rather, that
the form of the moral law has itself become Rmaterial=, in order for it to function as a motive force of action. $s result of
this we can see that there are actually two different problems to be resolved, Rmysteries= to be cleared up, concerning the
possibility of a Rpure= ethical act. The first is the one we commonly associate with @antian ethics. 'ow is it possible to
reduce or eliminate all the pathological motives or incentives of our actionsE 'ow can a sub?ect disregard all
self-interest, ignore the Rpleasure principle=, all concerns with her own well-being and the well-
being of those close to herE 2hat kind of a monstrous, Rinhuman= sub?ect does @antian ethics presupposeE This
line of questioning is related to the issue of the Rinfinite purification= of the sub?ect=s will, with its logic of Rno matter
how far you have come one more effort will always be required=. The second question that must be dealt with concerns
what we might call the Rethical transubstantiation= required by @ant=s view; the question of the possibility of converting
a mere form into a materially efficacious drive. This second question is, in my view, the more pressing of the two,
because answering it would automatically provide an answer to the first question as well. &o 9 how can something
which is not in itself pathological Ai.e. which has nothing to do with the representation of pleasure or pain, the
Rusual= mode of sub?ect=s casualityC nevertheless become the cause or drive of a sub?ect=s actionsE The
question here is no longer that of a Rpurification= of motives and incentives. It is much more radical;
how can Rform= become Rmatter=, how can something which, in the sub?ect=s universe, does not qualify as a cause,
suddenly become a causeE This is the real Rmiracle= involved in ethics. The crucial question of @antian ethics is thus
not Rhow can we eliminate all the pathological elements of will, so that only the pure form of duty remainsE= but rather,
Rhow can the pure form of duty itself function as a pathological element, that is, as an element capable of
assuming the role of the driving force or incentive of our actionsE=. If the latter were actually to take place
9 if the Rpure form of duty= were actually to operate as a motive Aincentive or driveC for the sub?ect 9 we would no
longer need to worry about the problems of the Rpurification of the will= and the elimination of all pathological
motives.This, however, seems to suggest that for such a sub?ect, ethics simply becomes Rsecond
nature=, and thus ceases to be ethics altogether. If acting ethically is a matter of drive, if it is as effortless as that, if
neither sacrifice, suffering, nor renunciation is required, then it also seems utterly lacking in merit and devoid of virtue.
This, in fact, was @ant=s contention; he called such a condition the Rholiness of the will=, which he also thought was an
unattainable ideal for human agent. It could equally be identified with utter banality 9 Rthe banality of the radical good
to paraphrase 'annah $rendt=s famous e1pression. Ievertheless 9 and it is one of the fundamental aims of this study to
show this 9 this analysis moves too quickly, and therefore leaves something out. (ur theoretical premiss here is that it
will actually be possible to found an ethics on the concept of the drive, without this ethics collapsing into either the
holiness or banality of human actions.
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**State Et0ics Ba6**
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A Go;ern4ent t0at 6ro5s 5olitical obli8ation in or6er to obtain correct %4oral) or %et0ical)
res5onsibility 0as t0e ability to %totali?e) into a 6estructi;e re8i4e t0at stri5s 0u4an 6i8nity <turn=
Di5rose KG
<)hilosophy Social Criticism 3448J L7J B,. Rosalyn *iprose, Aren6t an6 'iet?sc0e on res5onsibility an6 1uturity
http;NNpsc.sagepub.comNcgiNcontentNabstractNL7NBNB,.C
The final point I want to highlight about $rendt=s account of responsibility is this; she asks the burning question, what provides the criterion of
?udgment if not moral norms one has inherited or e1plicit laws that may have been reversed by those who govern the public sphereE (n the basis of the idea that
?udgment is a reflective self-relation in the form of a dialogue with oneself, $rendt argues that the criterion that limits what one permits oneself to do is set by what
would allow one to live at Rpeace with oneself= A&e>! ,48C. )ollowing &ocrates, conscience, she argues, is governed by the desire to avoid self-contradiction or,
following @ant, the desire to avoid self-contempt.,L !ut simply Rit is better to suffer wrong than do wrong= Aa dictum that she claims, while originating with
&ocrates, underlies all moral philosophyC because you could not, logically and with dignity, live with that other part of yourself that you would kill or make suffer.
$s a lover of contradiction Iiet5sche would not hold to this idea that making peace with oneself either inspires or provides the criteria for conscience. 2hile I think
he is right about that, I am not convinced that he succeeds in coming up with appropriate alternative criteria. That is what I will attempt to do. 2hat is radical
about 'iet?sc0e@s a55roac0 to res5onsibility, and what will be my focus in the ne1t section, is that he locates the condition of conscience,
normativity and responsibility, not first of all in reflective thinking or ?udgment, but in responsiveness based on what I will call somatic refle*ivity. )or him,
w0at o5ens t0at 8a5 between 5ast an6 1uture is t0e constitution o1 a cor5oreal an6 a11ecti;e sel1B
relation t0at 4ani1ests as a 1utural ability to res5on6 to circu4stances wit0 conscience an6 in eCcess o1
eCistin8 law an6 custo4 #0is is an i45ortant inter;ention into t0e 4eanin8 o1 bein8Bres5onsible3 1or
se;eral reasons First3 it 4o;es t0e 6ebate about res5onsibility beyon6 t0e i45asse between 1ree6o4
an6 6eter4inis4 by 5ro5osin8 t0at t0e relation between t0e sel1 an6 t0e Euri6icoB4oral co6e is
constituti;e <an6 t0ere1ore 0abitual=3 but3 as wit0 Aren6t3 it 4ust also be eCcessi;e3 sel1Bcritical an6
5otentially trans1or4ati;e o1 nor4s. &econd, in a departure from $rendt, 'iet?sc0e@s i6ea t0at t0is constituti;e an6
trans1or4ati;e relation in;ol;es 1eelin83 or t0e c0annelin8 o1 a11ect into action an6 t0ou80t, is crucial I think
for eC5lainin8 0ow 5olitical i6eals o1 national i6entity t0at e11ect a re;ersal o1 4oral nor4s in t0e 5ublic
real4 can 0a;e suc0 a ra5i6 an6 5otentially 6estructi;e i45act on a 5o5ulation. Third, in placing the highest value
in the uniqueness and opacity of this somatic refle1ivity, rather than in, say, Rlife itself=,7 or human Rdignity= based on autonomous practical reason, Iiet5sche
revises the very basis of normativity in ethics and politics; this somatic refle1ivity is that through and for which we are, most fundamentally, responsible whatever
the other characteristics Ase1, race, religion, ageC that corporeality may signify. This responsiveness and, hence, responsibility, as mmanuel %evinas later puts it, is
Rwhat first enables one to catch sight of and conceive of value=.,- )ourth, Iiet5sche=s emphasis on the temporal dimension of somatic refle1ivity reveals what is
most at stake in a crisis of morality in politics. It is the body open to an undetermined future that is a condition of agency, normativity and responsibility and it is
this futural inclination or futurity of the body that is most at risk in such a crisis. 2here $rendt improves on Iiet5sche is through implying another criteria of
?udgment besides the criterion she highlights, the supposed desire to avoid self-contradiction. This other criterion of ?udgment that would limit what we can do in
good conscience is implied in her work on political community where it becomes apparent that we are not only responsible through our own futurity, we are also
responsible for maintaining the world for the disclosure of the Rwho= and hence the futurity of others. $nd this is where morality meets politics. The political
concern is not whether the act of striking somebody un?ustly or being struck is more disgraceful. The concern is e1clusively with having a world in which such acts
do not occur. A&e>! /LC (rdinarily, 4orality3 un6erstoo6 as 1iCe6 5rinci5les 1or 8ui6in8 action t0at ;ary between
in6i;i6uals an6 8rou5s3 alon8 wit0 in6i;i6ual t0ou80t itsel13 0a;e no 5lace in 5olitics3 as 5olitics is
concerne6 wit0 collective 6ialo8ue an6 action an6 t0e 4aintenance o1 law re8ar6e6 as Ressential to t0e
inte8rity o1 our co44on 0u4anity@ A!R* 33C. 2hile one may concede that compromise lies at the heart of the political, there is a conceptual
difficulty with the way $rendt always insists that thinking is individual, is distinct from and runs counter to the collective speech and action that characteri5es the
political.,B This is why she describes the moral I have been discussing as a Rborderline phenomenon=; moral ?udgment is only relevant to politics in times of crisis,
that is, when customary moral standards, which would ordinarily guide action without thinking, have been suspended or reversed in the public realm A&e>! ,479
-C. It is also why she needs to posit ?udgment of particulars, e1perienced as conscience, as the bridge and arbiter between thinking and morality, on the one hand,
and politics and law on the other. Morality an6 law intersect3 1or eCa45le3 inso1ar as t0ey R6eal wit0 5ersons@
rat0er t0an institutions an6 syste4s A&e>! -.C an6 t0ey 5resu55ose t0e sa4e R5ower o1 Eu684ent@ o1
w0at is ri80t an6 wron8 A!R* 33C. I su88est t0at 4orality is a bor6erline 5olitical issue also in t0e sense
t0at w0en 5olitical initiati;es o1 8o;ern4ent 5reci5itate a con1lict t0en 6a45enin8 o1 conscience
wit0in a citi?enry w0at t0is eC5oses is t0at t0ese initiati;es 0a;e un6er4ine63 not Eust custo4ary
4oral stan6ar6s3 but wit0 t0at t0e basis o1 normativity t0at bot0 liberal 6e4ocratic 5olitics an6
4orality woul6 or6inarily s0are3 w0ate;er 5articular 4oral ;alues one 0ol6s. Taking into account the corporeal and
affective basis of conscience, I will ar8ue t0at t0e basis o1 nor4ati;ity in bot0 5olitics an6 4orality in a secular
6e4ocracy is not only t0e 5reser;ation o1 0u4an R6i8nity@ understood as the capacity for ?udgment in $rendt=s sense but, more
fundamentally, and as a precondition of ?udgment, maintenance of the collective e*posure to each other of the uni.ueness of the futurity of bodies. 6overnment that
puts this in ?eopardy, by abandoning political responsibility for maintaining the conditions for this, is no longer anonymous in the )oucauldian sense 9 it has
separated itself from the collectivity of the polis that it would then totali5e.
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Et0icoB5olitics 8i;es 8o;ern4ents t0e lo8ocentric nature t0at lea6s to t0e worst atrocities in 0u4anity
suc0 as t0e $olocaust <turn=
S0ar5e K+
A*epartment of !hilosophy and $shworth "enter for &ocial Theory, Mniversity of >elbourne, >elbourne, $ustralia, !'I%(&(!'+ [ &("I$% "RITI"I&> v vol
38 no 3 v pp. ,.L9,8/C
I hope that this necessarily overbrief argument has served to lay down the coordinates for a thinking together of "amus and *errida. )or both authors, the
possibility of an identity wholly insulated from PtheQ (therPsQ is debarred to us as finite. Indeed, a further parallel between their works consists in how both consider
the Rlure= of this possibility profoundly dangerous. In "he #ebel, Ca4us ar8ue6 t0at t0e cri4es o1 t0e $olocaust <li2e t0ose o1
t0e Gula8= re5resente6 not outbrea2s o1 c0aos wit0in t0e enli80tene6 worl63 but t0e 5ro6ucts o1 an
in0u4anity e;er close to t0e enli80ten4ent@s ele;ation o1 reason. F2hat a clean upT= Cla4ence li2ewise
re4ar2s o1 t0e 'a?is@ Rspacing . . . out= of the Fewish quarters of $msterdam, where AsignificantlyC "amus has him residing in "he Fall;
RSe;entyB1i;e t0ousan6 Jews 6e5orte6 or assassinate6Y t0at@s real ;acuu4 cleanin8 I a64ire t0at
6ili8ence3 t0at 4et0o6ical 5atience! W0en one 0as no c0aracter one has to a55ly a 4et0o6@ A,/BL; ,4C.
R$a;en@t you notice6 t0at our society is or8ani?e6 1or t0is 2in6 o1 li9ui6ationO= Aibid.; 8C.*errida=s comparative
6eitdiagnose, defended in such pieces as FThe !rinciple of Reason= A,/8LC, is more widely known. Indeed, what I will argue gives deconstruction its Rprophetic=
tone is how *errida like "amus always argues that untainted Identity is not only impossible, but to be prohibited. #0ere is always a 6an8er3
Derri6a ar8ues3 o1 a R5olitics o1 t0e arc0i;e@ t0at 6econstruction resists an6 6ecries Acf. "aputo, ,//.;3B-C It is
an Ret0icB5olitics@ t0at 8i;es bo6y to t0e lo8o centric 6esire w0ic0 0e 0as always ar8ue6 or8ani?es e;en
t0e 4ost a55arently eCtra 50iloso50ical 5raCes an6 institutions It 0as t0e 1or4 o1 t0e clai4 t0atR %we)
are t0e uni9uely c0osen arc0i;e o1 t0e #rut0@, Ca5uto writes in The !rayers and Tears of Facques *errida; In t0at
sense3 t0e 4al 6@arc0i;e lies at t0e basis o1 e;ery 1e;eris0 racis43 nationalis43 1un6a4entalis43 or
4essianis43 at t0e root o1 e;ery Ri6entitarianis4@Burnin8 wit0 t0e 6esire to 2ill o113 to incinerate3 t0e
4e4ory an6 t0e trace o1 t0e ot0er3 arc0i;e 1e;er is not a 1inite3 li4ite6 t0reat3 no tone t0reat a4on8
ot0ers Arc0i;e e;il3 4al 6@arc0i;e 3 is t0e root o1 all e;il . A"aputo, ,//.; 3B-C The question then becomes 1or bot0
Ca4us an6 Derri6a w0at ;iable alternati;e eCists to suc0 a 1e;ere6 Ret0ic 5olitics@ For t0e 1a4e6
R6eat0 o1 Go6@ in 4o6ernity 0as not 9uelle6 its Rra6ical e;il@3 bot0 a8ree It 0as only 8i;en rise to
re1i8urations o1 t0is e;il.B $s "lamence again re?oins towards the end of "he Fall; 'e who clings to a law does not fear the ?udgement that puts him
in his place within an order he believes in. . . . PTQhe keenest of human torments is to be ?udged without law. +et we are in that torment PtodayQ. *eprived of their
natural curb, the ?udges, loosed at random, are racing through their ?ob. 'ence we have to try to go faster than they, don=t weE $nd it=s a real madhouse. !rophets
and quacks multiply; they hasten to get there with a good law or a flawless organi5ation before the world is deserted. A,/BL; 8B9.C 'ow does *errida respond to
this Rmadhouse=E In )assions, in fact, he takes up the logic of responding tout court. The conte1t is an invitation he has received to speak on the occasion of the
publication of Derrida7 $ Critical #eader. 'ow should he have taken up this invitationE *errida asks himself. To speak authoritatively, he notes, would involve
running the risk of claiming an e1clusive patent over the signifier 9Derri6a $ an6 t0e teCts w0ic0 it na4es3 as i1 0e 0a6 t0e ri80t
an6 t0e ca5ability to assu4e suc0 an aut0ority #o Rnot res5on6@3 0e notes3 0owe;er3 woul6 be no less
6an8erous3 since silence is a 4o6e o1 6iscourse w0ic0 can 0u4iliate ot0ers 4ore ;iolently t0an
anyt0in8 sai6 As Ca5uto notes3 t0en3 0ere Derri6a a66uces a moral refiguring of the &ou)le )in&
9Eit0er way@3 0e says3 Derri6a R is sacri1ice6L t0is is a 6ouble bin6 in w0ic0 0is two 0an6s are tie6 or
naile6 6own@ A"aputo, ,//.; ,4BC.
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W0ene;er et0ics is rein1orce6 t0rou80 i6eals an6 nor4s c0osen by t0e state it results in a worl6 w0ere
5eo5le are 6esensiti?e6 Any uni;ersally i45ose6 et0ics will result in t0e 6estruction o1 4an as 5eo5le
8ain t0e conscience o1 a 4ac0ine <turn=
Rosalyn Di5rose 34KG
$rendt and Iiet5sche on responsibility and futurity
2ith regard to this overarching concern for the body=s futurity, Iiet5sche has three related criticisms of ?uridical self-responsibility. )irst, insofar as t0e
constitution o1 t0e res5onsi;e sel1 is nor4ali?in83 wit0 re1erence to a R4orality o1 4ores an6 t0e social straitEac2et@
t0at 8ui6es 1uture action3 any res5onsibility t0e in6i;i6ual assu4es 1or suc0 action is not 8enuine A6> II 3 and '$'
,4-=L res5onsibility cannot rest on blin6 obe6ience to i6eals an6 nor4s t0at 0a;e been i45ose6 rat0er t0an c0osen
&econd, and conversely, Iiet5sche is critical of the Rfable of responsibility= insofar as it rests on the illusion of free will A'$' L/C. Two aspects of his well-known
critique of free will are relevant here. (ne is that the illusion of free will carries with it the illusion that we can choose and predict the future in advance A'$' ,4-C.
The other is Iiet5sche=s claim that the individual is not responsible for anything arising from Rhis nature= because Rhis nature= is not freely chosenJ it is to some
e1tent inherited 9 it is Ran outgrowth of the elements and influences of past and present things= A'$' L/J see also 6> I ,LC. 2hile, for Iiet5sche, we cannot
choose the future or our inheritance, we can, through somatic refle1ivity, transform our inheritance and so keep the future open. Iiet5sche=s third criticism of
?uridical self-responsibility follows from the other two and is the one I wish to emphasi5e; in pre-empting a future3 Euri6ical sel1Bres5onsibility
6a45ens res5onsi;eness an6 1orecloses 1uturity ++ Inso1ar as t0e Rlast 4an@3 1or eCa45le3 is t0e e4bo6i4ent o1 a
socially 5rescribe6 8oo63 in 0i4 t0e 1uture3 or6aine6 in a6;ance3 is actuali?e6 $e is t0e en65oint o1 a teleolo8ical
conce5tion o1 0istory w0ere e;eryt0in8 lea6s towar6 t0e reali?ation o1 so4e i6eal i6entity But, if such an ideal could be
reali5ed, those who embody it would be Runable to create=, unable to respond to Relements and influences= of concrete e1istence in a way that keeps the body open
to the future and keeps affects and their interpretations open to revaluation. Any set o1 i6eas or Rle8al or6er t0ou80t o1 as so;erei8n an6
uni;ersal woul6 be a 5rinci5le 0ostile to li1e3 an a8ent o1 t0e 6issolution an6 6estruction o1 4an3 an atte45t to
assassinate t0e 1uture o1 4an@ A6> II ,,C.3L The Rlast man= is the end of history, the end of spatio-temporali5ation, and so would be as Rdyspeptic= as
the self for whom the force of forgetting is dysfunctional 9 Rhe cannot :have done< with anything= A6> I ,C. $e woul6 0a;e t0e Rconscience@ o1 a
4ac0ine
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#0e a11ir4ati;e can@t reac0 out to t0e ot0er w0en 4an6ate6 by t0e state to 6o so3 your e;i6ence is
5er;erte6 on t0is3 usin8 t0e state allows aut0oritati;e action a8ainst t0e ot0er
Sa;u K1@
Facque *errida N $nne *ufourmantelle. /f ,ospitality. $nne Dufourmantelle 4nvites 5ac.ues Derrida to #espond. Trans. Rachel Bowlby.
&tanford, "$; &tanford M!, 3444.
http;NNmuse.?hu.eduN?ournalsNsymplokeNv44/N/.,savu.html
2hen revisited in li80t o1 5ressin8 conte45orary to5ics an6 e;ents suc0 as i44i8ration3 terroris43 t0e
Internet an6 its censors0i5 or sur;eillance by t0e State ApoliceC, civil wars, etc., these canonical te1ts re;eal to
Derri6a t0e 0etero8eneous yet irre6ucible relation between a 8enuine et0ics o1 0os5itality an6 a
5olitics o1 0os5itality W0ereas absoluteHuncon6itionalHallBinclusi;e 0os5itality su88ests a Vlaw wit0out
i45erati;e3 wit0out or6er an6 wit0out 6utyV A8LC, t0e laws o1 or6inaryHcon6itionalHeCclusi;e 0os5itality
re1er to t0e actual con6itions o1 0os5itality3 its ri80ts an6 6uties3 w0ic0 5reeCist t0e subEect an6 are
inscribe6 in t0e socialH5olitical or6er A3-C. #0ese 5olitical structures s0are a 50allo8ocentric 4o6el t0at
Derri6a traces bac2 to t0e GrecoB-o4an an6 t0e Ju6eoBC0ristian tra6itions Accor6in8 to t0e43 it is
always a 4ale 1i8ure o1 aut0ority t0at3 in layin8 6own t0e laws o1 0os5itality3 testi1ies to t0e V;iolence
o1 t0e 5ower o1 0os5italityV A,7/C. (layin8 u5on t0e ambiguity of the )rench word HhwteH--which can mean both HguestH and
HenemyH--Derri6a re1lects on t0e 5ara6oCical status o1 t0e 0ost at t0e 4o4ent o1 0isH0er initial encounter
wit0 t0e 'enos #0is 5roCi4ity between V0ostV an6 V0osta8eV also accounts 1or t0e neCus between
0os5itality an6 0ostility3 w0ic0 Derri6a turns to w0en 0e consi6ers t0e 1alse 6ualities o1 5ri;ate an6
5ublic3 5ri;ate law an6 5ublic law Derri6a>s careful analysis o1 the 5olitical uses an6 abuses o1 an ideal
0os5itality lea6s 0i4 to su88est t0at 5olitical action s0oul6 ta2e 5lace in t0e s5ace between et0ics an6
5olitics *igressive and informal, his discourse on hospitality is also rich in potentialities due to the deconstructive method through which he
uncovers the mystery at the heart of the Hnaturally obviousH A,LBC. In the sense that it e1pands, or, to quote *ufourmantelle, Htakes to the limitH
the Hfield of the thinkable,H the movement of *errida0s Hspoken reflectingH A,4C is indeed Hhyperbolic,H ?ust as it constitutes an act of
remembrance, in that it Hrevives questions held in forgetfulness and secrecyH A,74C. Thus both lectures deserve credit not only for representing a
significant step in *errida0s reflection on ethics and politics but also for prompting us to begin our own deconstructive work and rethink our
identity.
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#0e 8oal o1 et0ics to t0e ot0er an6 t0e et0ics o1 t0e re1u8ee actually 1urt0ers state control &nly by
c0allen8in8 so;erei8nty can we 0a;e in6e5en6ent et0ics
(o52e RK/
AFeffrey, *epartment of 6eology, ast "arolina Mniversity, :!oststructuralist ethics; sub?ectivity, responsibility and
the space of community<&ageC >)
In sum, t0e subEect o1 4o6ern et0ics is a subEect 1un6a4entally constitute6 t0rou80 t0e 4aintenance o1
boun6aries3 bot0 social an6 s5atial. !artly for this reason, 4uc0 4o6ern et0ical t0ou80t 0as 1ocuse6 concern on
t0ose 6istant ot0ers w0o are locate6 Ron t0e ot0er si6e o1 t0e boun6ary=. Indeed, as Kygmunt Bauman A,//,; -/C
has noted, within the modern spatiali5ation of sub?ectivity3 t0e 1i8ure o1 t0e stran8er beco4es t0e 5rototy5ical
et0ical 5roble43 because Rt0e stran8er is so4eone w0o re1uses to re4ain con1ine6 to t0e %1ar away) lan6 or
8o away 1ro4 our own an6 0ence 6e1ies t0e easy eC5e6ient o1 s5atial or te45oral se8re8ation.= In a similar
vein, >ichael *illon A,///C has argued that t0e re1u8ee3 eCistin8 outsi6e o1 onto5olitical bor6ers3 0as co4e to
re5resent Ra scan6al@ 1or 4o6ern 5olitical subEecti;ity3 callin8 into 9uestion t0e nature o1 5olitical an6 et0ical
con6uct #0e ty5ical res5onse to suc0 5roble4s 0as been to en6ow t0e autono4ous subEect wit0 a set o1 ri80ts3
w0ic0 can be le8ally en1orce6 wit0in t0e boun6aries o1 5olitical Euris6iction . (ne of the most important figures in
this conception of ethics is @ant, who believed that the pro?ect of modernity could be universally e1tended for the
benefit of humankind through the application of reason and ?udgment A&hapiro, ,//8C. @ant=s philosophy, as 2alker
A,///; 1C notes, was an Rattempt to internali5e the law of reason, to develop the autonomous rationality, the mature
personality reali5able within each individual so that it might act in accordance with some universal moral norm=.
Importantly, @ant viewed this Runiversal norm= arising from the spatial interconnections between different parts of the
world, which necessitated a Rcosmopolitical right= that would guarantee conditions of Runiversal hospitality=. @ant
writes A,/L/; 3.C; Pdue toQ the connections, more or less near, which have taken place among the nations of the earth,
having been carried to that point, that a violation of right, committed in one place, is felt throughout the whole, the idea
of a cosmopolitical right . . . is the last step of perfection necessary to the tacit code of civil and public right. )or @ant, this
notion of a Rpublic right= was Rfounded upon a federation of free states= A,/L/; ,8C, an6 t0us 6e5en6e6 u5on a boun6e6 notion o1 state
citi?ens0i5 #0ese two notions J t0e autono4ous subEect o1 5olitical reason an6 t0e territoriali?ation o1 t0e state
syste4 J 0a;e co4e to 6e1ine conte45orary 5olitics base6 u5on an e5iste4olo8y o1 sovereignty . Recent work in
international relations theory has posed significant challenges to this conception of sovereignty, politics and space
Adkins et al., ,///J "ampbell and &hapiro, ,///bC. -at0er t0an acce5tin8 state territoriali?ation an6 citi?ens0i5
as natural3 suc0 wor2 su88ests t0at we ;iew it as 5art an6 5arcel o1 t0e 50iloso50ical in1rastructure o1
4o6ernity $s &hapiro notes A,///; B4C, our un6erstan6in8sL ten6 to be constructe6 wit0in a statecentric3
8eostrate8ic carto8ra50y3 w0ic0 or8ani?es t0e inter5retation o1 en4ities on t0e basis o1 an in6i;i6ual an6
collecti;e national subEect an6 crossBboun6ary anta8onis4s Et0ical a55roac0es ai4e6 at a nor4ati;e
in0ibition o1 t0ese anta8onis4s continue to 5resu4e t0is sa4e 8eo5olitical carto8ra50y (ne of the provocations
of poststructuralism would be to call into question this conception of sub?ectivity and space, to follow Fean-%uc Iancy
A3444; ,LBC in assertin8 t0at Rin or6er to t0in2 t0e spacing o1 t0e worl6 t0e en6 o1 so;erei8nty 4ust be 1ace6
0ea6Bon@ It is in t0is sense t0at W0at4ore <1IID= 0as calle6 1or a R6issectin8 o1 t0eautono4ous sel1@ in or6er to
5ro4ote a Rrelational et0ics@ Asee also "loke, 3443= We nee63 as Da;i6 Slater <1IIDL AG= 5uts it3 to Rret0in2 w0at
we 4i80t 4ean by res5onsibility to ot0erness #0is res5onsibility can be lin2e6 to a notion o1 ra6ical
inter6e5en6ence3 in w0ic0 t0e et0ics o1 intersubEecti;ity are in t0e 1ore8roun6@
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Deconstructin8 uni;ersal conce5tions o1 ri80t an6 et0ics actually o5ens u5 t0e 5ossibility 1or
res5onsibility to t0e ot0er Wor2in8 wit0in t0e state reBentrenc0es current o55ressi;e 6ualis4s
(o52e RK/
$lthough I am sympathetic with the impulse behind such sentiments, I think that &mith mischaracteri5es the nature of Rpostmodern thinking=, and I would suggest
that a deeper engagement might be possible between the concerns of poststructuralism and geographical ethics. #0is en8a8e4ent woul6 reEect
any nor4ati;e 8roun6 1or et0ical con6uct3 not in or6er to e;a6e our res5onsibility to 6istant ot0ers3
but rat0er because 1oun6ational nor4ati;e t0eories 5ro;i6e t0e 4eans by w0ic0 our et0ical
res5onsibility can be eli6e6 . )rom this perspective, t0e 6econstruction o1 uni;ersalist conce5tions o1 ri80ts3
et0ics an6 Eustice s0oul6 be ;iewe6 as a 4eans o1 o5enin8 5ossibilities3 rat0er t0an closin8 t0e4 In what
follows, I want to elaborate on this perspective, focusing attention on three areas in particular; the nature of the sub?ect, the question of politics, and the ways in
which these imply particular understandings of space. >ost renditions of moral or ethical theory have their roots in nlightenment thinking, when the decentering
of the authority of 6od and monarch placed human individuals at the center of the social world, and thus provided the possibility for an ethics that would be based
upon human reason and agency A#enn, 3444C. The locus of this agency is the "artesian sub?ect, endowed with autonomy and rationality, and thereby capable of
making moral decisions There are two dimensions in particular of this modern sub?ectivity that are worth highlighting here. )irst, t0e 4o6ern
subEect@s co0erence an6 autono4y 0as been 4ana8e6 an6 4aintaine6 t0rou80 re5eate6 atte45ts to
6e1ine3 cate8ori?e an6 classi1y a ran8e o1 6e;iant Rot0ers@ Mo6ern notions o1 autono4y an6 a8ency3 in
ot0er wor6s3 0a;e been 6e5en6ent u5on t0e s5eci1ication an6 control o1 6i11erence Aethnic, racial,
gender, class, etc =3 a8ainst w0ic0 t0e 5ositi;e i6entity an6 sel1Bi4a8e o1 t0e Awestern, maleC
nlightenment subEect coul6 be 4aintaine6 #0e birt0 o1 t0e 4o6ern subEect3 in t0is sense3 is ti80tly
boun6 u5 wit0 t0e 5rocesses o1 colonialis43 in6ustriali?ation an6 8o;ern4entality t0rou80 w0ic0
certain 2in6s o1 6i11erence were 4a6e to 4atter in bot0 conscious an63 5er0a5s es5ecially3 unconscious
ways A!ile, ,//BJ 2ilton, ,//8J #enn, 3444C. The second and related point is that the ways in which these various a1es of identityNdifference have been
mobili5ed are fundamentally spatial. Mo6ern subEecti;ity is not only inscribe6 t0rou80 a 6ualis4 between sel1 an6
ot0er3 but also between 0ere an6 t0ere3 ;ia t0e s5atiali?ation o1 inclusion an6 eCclusion3 5resence an6
absence3 an6 t0e s5eci1ication o1 w0at is RinB5lace@ an6 RoutBo1B5lace@ A&hields, ,//3J &ibley, ,//-J "resswell, ,//BJ @irby,
,//BC. The "artesian sub?ect is interpellated within ametaphysics of spatial presence 9 in 'eidegger =s terms, Dasein, or being-there 9 and circumscribed by a
location or place from which it can negotiate the world. *errida A,//7a; 83C has referred to this metaphysics as ontopology, Ran a1iomatics linking indissociably the
ontological value of present-being to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general=.
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Go;ern4ent en1orce4ent o1 res5onsibility ta2es away 1ro4 t0e in6i;i6ual@s ability to t0in2 an6 act on
an in6i;i6ual le;el o1 4orality3 w0ic0 is 2ey to re8ainin8 lost sense o1 4orality in 5olitics
Di5rose KG
)irst, in R&ome euestions of >oral !hilosophy= and RResponsibility Mnder *ictatorship= Aor what $rendt prefers to call Rtotalitarianism=C, and crucially for a
revision of the ?uridical sense of responsibility, Aren6t3 1ollowin8 'iet?sc0e3 ar8ues t0at conscience3 an6 0ence t0e
ca5acity 1or 5ersonal or sel1Bres5onsibility3 is not 6eter4ine6 eit0er by t0e 4oral nor4s we in0erit or
by t0e 5articular laws o1 t0e society into w0ic0 we are born &t0erwise 0ow coul6 suc0 nor4s be so
easily re;erse6 an6 t0e re;ersal e4brace6 by a 4aEority o1 a citi?enry3 an63 1urt0er3 as 'iet?sc0e
woul6 say3 0ow can we be res5onsible 1or acts 6eter4ine6 by con;entions we 6i6 not c0ooseE $rne #etlesen
shows, in his comprehensive analysis of $rendt=s thoughts on the relation between conscience an6 6oin8 e;il3 t0at s0e actually
5oints to two 2in6s o1 conscienceL t0at e;er 5resent conscience t0at o5erates 0abitually an6 is
in1luence6 by 5re;ailin8 nor4s an6 laws AT>" ,8BC, an6 conscience t0at3 as t0e ReC5erience@ o1 Eu684ent
o1 R5articulars@ AT>" ,8/C t0at is a RbyB5ro6uct o1 t0in2in8@3 4a2es t0in2in8 R4ani1est in t0e worl6@ A%> I
,/LC3 w0ere t0e t0in2in8 t0at conscience 4a2es 4ani1est is not 2nowle68e o1 t0e R8oo6@ but t0e
c0allen8in8 o1 all establis0e6 criteria3 ;alues an6 Racce5te6 rules o1 con6uct@ AT>" ,88C.8 This second kind of
conscience is what matters to $rendt. !ut simply, both she and 'iet?sc0e 5osit a 6i11erence between actin8 0abitually in
accor6ance wit0 4oral an6 le8al rules t0at 6ictate w0at is ri80t an6 wron8 an6 w0at 'iet?sc0e woul6
call R8enuine@ conscience J t0e eC5erience o1 t0e ca5acity to Eu68e w0at is ri80t or wron8 for oneself .
&econd, in linking conscience to reflective critical thought or ?udgment3 $rendt posits a connection between the e1perience of conscience and both the
undeterminable and futural character of the self. That is, reflective thinking Ahence ?udgment of particulars e1perienced as conscienceC, and along with it our
finitude, temporali5e the self in a way necessary for both responsibility and an undetermined future. $rendt=s account of the historicity of the self borrows from
Iiet5sche=s concept of time in "hus Spoke 6arathustra, RThe #ision and the Riddle=./ $gainst both cyclic and linear notions of time, Karathustra formulates time in
terms of two paths e1tending from the present gateway called the Rmoment= in which human beings stand, one toward the past and the other toward a future that
contradicts the past. In (ife of the -ind Aespecially %> I 3439,LC $rendt argues that it is the act of reflective thought that opens this gap between past and future to
disrupt the passive passing of linear historical time between those two e1emplars of human finitude; the moments of birth and death.,4 &nly a 1inite
bein8 can in0erit a tra6ition o1 laws an6 4oral nor4s3 but in in0eritin8 a tra6ition t0at woul6
6eter4ine t0e 5at0 one ta2es3 t0e act o1 re1lection3 t0at is3 re4e4brance an6 antici5ation3 o5ens an
un6eter4ine6 1uture. Iiet5sche=s gateway, for $rendt, is R. . . PtQhe path paved by thinking Por ?udgmentQ . . . within the space-time given to natal and
mortal men. )ollowing that course, the thought-trains, remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time.
This small non-time space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into which we are born, cannot be inherited and handed down by tradition=.
A%> I 3,4C #0is 8a5 between t0e 5ast <tra6ition 4e4oriali?e6= an6 an un6eter4ine6 1uture3 w0ic0
t0in2in8 o5ens an6 conscience 4a2es 4ani1est3 constitutes t0e sel1@s 1uturity An6 it is t0is 1uturity
t0at is 1oreclose6 in a 6a45enin8 o1 conscience an6 a 1ailure o1 5ersonal res5onsibility. 'ot only 6o
Rtotalitarian@ 8o;ern4ent an6 a re;ersal o1 nor4s 1or t0e treat4ent o1 ot0ers Eeo5ar6i?e t0is
1un6a4ental un6eter4ine6 1utural as5ect o1 t0e 0u4an con6ition3 but it also 6estroys 0u4an 5lurality
in 8eneral,, $rendt=s third salient point then is that the capacity for ?udgment Aand therefore conscienceC e1presses what she had referred to in "he ,uman
Condition as the Rwho= as opposed to the Rwhat= of the person A'" ,./C. 'er model of ?udgment in her reflections on responsibility is e1plicitly @antian, although
it owes much to &ocrates. "onscience is at once the capacity to ?udge particulars autonomously and rationally and it is a self-relation, that is, it is self-awareness
and an internal dialogue with oneself Ae.g. &e>! .BJ see also %> I ,./9/LC. $s an internal dialogue between the habitual self and the self=s other internal witness,
?udgment e1presses both Rdifference in identity= AT>" ,8L97C and the person=s capacity to transform the past and embark on a new path; ?udgment or thinking
e1presses the person in his or her uniqueness, and conscience is the e1perience of this uniqueness made manifest in the world. The process of thinking, as opposed
to knowing, therefore indicates that humans Re1ist in the plural= A&e>! /BC and Rthinking and remembering . . . is the human way of striking roots, of taking one=s
place in the world into which we all arrive as strangers. 2hat we usually call a person . . . as distinguished from a mere human being or nobody, actually grows out
of this root-striking process of thinking= A&e>! ,44C. &o, although $rendt does not put it this way, this capacity to discourse with oneself, including the ?udgment
of what is right and wrong, is, for her, the basis of normativity in two senses; it is the capacity through which we arrive at our own norms of conduct and, as a
capacity in others, it is what gives other persons moral value. Actin8 accor6in8 to conscience3 bein8 res5onsible in a nonB
Euri6ical sense3 rat0er t0an bein8 coor6inate6 by a totali?in8 5olitics3 is3 s0e says3 0ow one can re8ain
w0at t0ose in R1or4er ti4es@3 inclu6in8 Kant3 Rcalle6 t0e 6i8nity or t0e 0onor o1 4anL not 5er0a5s o1
4an2in6 but o1 t0e status o1 bein8 0u4an@ <!R* 78C.
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Go;ern4ent establis0e6 nor4s o1 et0ical an6 4oral ri80t an6 wron8s lea6 to t0e 6ullin8 conscience o1
t0e in6i;i6ual ta2in8 out all sol;ency It also lea6s to acce5tin8 t0e s0i1t to totalitarian re8i4es in t0e
na4e o1 crises
Di5rose KG
#0e Euri6ical conce5t o1 sel1Bres5onsibility cannot eC5lain3 an6 in6ee6 4ay eCacerbate3 a
conte45orary crisis o1 conscience o1 t0e or6er t0at concerne6 Aren6tL w0en liberal 6e4ocratic
8o;ern4ents initiate 5ro8ra4s t0at citi?ens 1eel are contrary to w0at t0ey 0a6 assu4e6 <ri80tly or
wron8ly= to be law or 4oral custo4.7 1amples of this abound in the present; a government engages in what its citi5ens consider to be an
un?ustified war or it anne1es part of its territory for what its citi5ens may consider to be immoral and illegal treatment of refugees Ain the case of $ustraliaC or
prisoners of war Ae.g. 6uantanamo Bay in the case of the M&$C. (r, as happened in $ustralia in *ecember 344-, a government implements Aanti-terrorismC
legislation that puts in ?eopardy fundamental rights and freedoms of its own citi5ens Afor e1ample, provisions allowing preventative detention without charge and
control of the movement of individuals or groups merely suspected of terrorist activities, and antisedition provisions that criminali5e activities that urge disaffection
against the governmentC.- (r less dramatic but of a similar order, un6er t0e u4brella o1 econo4ic rationalis4 a 8o;ern4ent
8ra6ually ab6icates res5onsibility 1or t0e wellBbein8 o1 t0e 6isa6;anta8e6 or t0e sic2 Suc0
8o;ern4ent initiati;es can 5reci5itate a crisis o1 conscience3 an6 res5onsibility <in t0e Euri6ical sense
o1 eit0er 6uty or bla4e= see4s to ;anis0 or 1alls 6is5ro5ortionately towar6 wo4en3 5articular racial
an6 et0nic 8rou5s3 t0e socially 6isa6;anta8e6 an6Hor t0e 6is5ossesse6. -at0er t0an eCa4ine t0is s0i1t
in t0e 6istribution o1 res5onsibility3 4y concern is wit0 t0e 4ec0anis4 o1 t0e 6a45enin8 o1 conscience
t0at 6isables it or 5reci5itates its re6istribution #0is crisis3 t0en 6a45enin83 o1 conscience can
4ani1est in 6i11erent ways Citi?ens 4ay ta2e t0e 8o;ern4ent initiati;e to be establis0in8 an eCe45lar
1or t0e illBtreat4ent or ne8lect o1 5articular 8rou5s an63 wit0out 9uestion or e;en 5assionately3 0ol6
t0ose 8rou5s res5onsible 1or t0eir own su11erin8 or 1or 1elt insecurity in a 5o5ulation3 an6 1ollow t0e
8o;ern4ent@s eCa45le in t0eir con6uct towar6 t0ese Rot0ers@. $rguably, the race riot on "ronulla beach in &ydney on ,,
*ecember 344- Athe week after that anti-terrorism legislation was rushed through !arliament amid a flurry of publicityC was a particularly graphic e1ample of this
Rflow-on= effect, where a large group of flag-waving inebriated and largely $nglo-"eltic $ustralians aggressively sought to Rprotect their beach= from what they
felt to be an invasion by unwelcome %ebanese youth.B 2hile the !rime >inister e1plained the riot in terms of isolated criminal behavior and others viewed it as an
eruption of wider suppressed racism, it could be equally well e1plained in terms of an unthinking imitation, albeit disordered and e1treme, of norms of conduct
toward particular groups emerging from several years of a nationalistic politics of division and fear that would direct blame for felt insecurity toward those
considered Run-$ustralian=. A 6ullin8 o1 conscience an6 6isablin8 o1 res5onsibility un6er suc0 circu4stances can
ta2e less s5ectacular but no less a11ecti;e 1or4s "iti5ens may feel uncomfortable or distressed about such trends but turn a blind eye in
the belief either that this is a locali5ed problem or that the rule of law, more compatible with their own moral sensibility, will be restored. (r citi5ens may strongly
oppose such government initiatives, and abhor their flow-on effects, but, in the absence of any obvious culpable agent, may feel powerless to do anything about it
Aafter all, this is government of the people by the peopleC. In any case ;olatile e4otions or 5assi;e co45liance or con1usion about
w0at is ri80t an6 wron8 8o;ern our con6uct towar6 ot0ers #0at we are reluctant or cannot 1in6
so4eone to bla4e 1or acts carrie6 out in accor6ance wit0 suc0 8o;ern4ent initiati;es is in 5art
because3 inso1ar as 4o6ernity can be c0aracteri?e6 by anony4ous 8o;ern4ent3 as Foucault 1ollowin8
'iet?sc0e 0as analy?e63 t0is in;ol;es a trans1er o1 res5onsibility 1or u50ol6in8 law an6 4oral nor4s
1ro4 t0e state to t0e 6isci5line63 sel1B8o;ernin8 in6i;i6ual "n6er suc0 con6itions liberal 6e4ocratic
8o;ern4ents can act a55arently wit0out conscience but wit0 i45unity w0ile t0e in6i;i6ual citi?ens
w0o bear t0e bur6en o1 res5onsibility3 in t0e Euri6ical sense3 see4 unable to assu4e it W0at is at issue
w0en suc0 8o;ern4ents see4 to initiate a re;ersal in custo4ary stan6ar6s o1 con6uct towar6 ot0ers is
not only w0et0er in6i;i6uals s0oul6 be 0el6 res5onsible 1or acts co44itte6 in accor6ance wit0 t0at
re8i4e3 but also w0et0er t0ey 0a;e t0e ca5acity to assu4e res5onsibility in any ensuin8 6ullin8 o1
conscience. 2hat happens to the capacity for responsibility, and to the normative basis of conscience, ?udgment and conduct, when the laws and moral
norms we supposedly embody through a disciplinary regime of anonymous government are undermined by that same government which remains, nonetheless,
anonymous and beyond ?udgmentE This was $rendt=s concern. Iot so much the transfer of responsibility from the state to the individual or any ensuing failure of
leadership in upholding political responsibility, but t0e 6ullin8 o1 conscience an6 1ailure o1 5ersonal res5onsibility t0at
1ollows #0e 8o;ern4ent s0e 0a6 in 4in6 was totalitarian J not a 6ictators0i53 s0e 0astens to a66 J but
totalitarian in t0e sense o1 8o;ern4ent t0at reac0es beyon6 t0e 5olitical into all Rs50eres o1 li1e@ an6
t0at Rcoor6inates@ 0u4an eCistence towar63 1or eCa45le3 a uni1or4 national i6entity <(-D //J7=D
Inso1ar as suc0 8o;ern4ent can be 6e4ocratically electe6 an6 ent0usiastically e4brace6 in ti4es o1
1elt insecurity3 Aren6t@s 9uestion as to w0y so 4any went alon8 wit0 an6 allowe6 t0e4sel;es to be
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Rcoor6inate6@ by t0e 'a?i re;ersal o1 law an6 4oral nor4s is Eust as 5ertinent now, L4 years after she last asked it.
$s a consequence of neglecting the corporeal and affective dimension of conscience, $rendt, I will argue, cannot adequately e1plain how conscience can be
dampened and personal responsibility fail under such government AI will turn to Iiet5sche for thatC. But she does pinpoint what is at stake in such a failure Athe
Rhumanness= or value of personsC and why conscience must be restored if the world of potentiality and plurality that we share is to endure. I now draw together and
provisionally summari5e her salient claims about conscience and responsibility that move the meaning of responsibility away from, without abandoning,
its ?uridical sense.
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Forcin8 et0ical ;iews u5on 5eo5le t0rou80 5olitics results in t0e et0ics bein8 s0ort li;e6 as in6i;i6uals
are unable to 1eel in;este6 in t0ese new i6eals
Iancy LuCon 34KG
thics and &ub?ectivity; !ractices of &elf-6overnance in the %ate %ectures of >ichel )oucault
.et3 alt0ou80 0e belie;es suc0 et0ical wor2 4i80t 5re5are 1or 5ublic en8a8e4ent3 Foucault a;oi6s any
clai4 t0at suc0 et0ical culti;ation translates 6irectly into 5olitical action In6i;i6uals may 0a;e a ric0er
set o1 et0ical resources u5on w0ic0 to 6raw an6 5otentially enter 5olitics3 but it re4ains to t0e4 to
4a2e t0at c0oice Forcin8 t0at connection 4i80t be 5erilous A clue to t0e 5erils o1 suc0 sel1B
8o;ernance 1or 5olitics a55ears in AleCan6er@s 1a4ously re5orte6 co44ent to Dio8enesL %i1 I were not
AleCan6er3 I s0oul6 li2e to be Dio8enes) (olitically3 t0is re4ar2 4i80t be inter5rete6 as re1lecti;e o1
AleCan6er@s own 0u4ility an6 o1 t0e 4o6eration wit0 w0ic0 0e eCercise6 0is own 5ower .et it also
alerts us 4o6ern rea6ers to anot0er 6an8erL 1or AleCan6er to eC5ress 0i4sel1 as 6oes Dio8enes woul6
be to re9uire 0i4 to be so4eone ot0er t0an w0o 0e3 in 1act3 is It woul6 be to 6eny 0is currency3 0is
5ower1ul 5osition3 an6 t0e ;ery real relations t0at constitute t0e 5olitical an6 social ter4s o1
co44unityGin "hristian terms, it would be an act of self-renunciation, while in *eleu5ian terms it would be an act made from longing.-/ In both instances,
t0e cost o1 lon8in8 or sel1Brenunciation woul6 be t0at stability o1 4in6 an6 5resence to onesel1 t0at
Foucault 1in6s to be so 6i11icult to establis0 an6 so in0erently 1ra8ile. Renunciation and desire simply return individuals to
the unsteady longing to be other than what they are. !arado1ically, the daily ad?ustments of parrhesia result in a greater steadiness both in thought and action.
-e9uirin8 in6i;i6uals to be ot0erwise is to unsettle t0e4 wit0out e6ucatin8 t0e4 to t0e tec0ni9ues by
w0ic0 t0ey 4i80t re8ain t0eir balance As a 5olitical 5ro8ra43 t0en3 its e11ects will be 1leetin83 as
in6i;i6uals are unable to situate t0e4sel;es in t0ese new i6eals or to 1eel in;este6 in t0e relationsGto
themselves, to others, to truthGthat sustain it.
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State et0ics ;iolate t0e ;ery i6ea o1 6e4ocratic et0ics <no sol;ency=
Feffrey Minson ,/G:
6enealogies of >orals; Iiet5sche, )oucault, *on5elot and the ccentricity of thics. %ecturer in the &chool of 'umanities 6riffith Mniversity, eueensland,
$ustralia
>idgley argues in a semi-genealogical fashion that t0e current tarnis0e6 i4a8e o1 4orality, by which she means its equation with
moralism and its vulnerability to social criticism, 4ay be trace6 bac2 to an 0istorical e;ent So4ew0ere bac2 in t0e
ei80teent0 an6 nineteent0 centuries3 4orality beca4e 6eli4ite6 in bot0 law an6 o5inion as a 5ro;ince
o1 social li1e an6 t0ou80ts in its own ri80t3 alon8si6e 5olitics, economics, the fine arts and so on. In identifying this
representation as an historical-intellectual development, >idgley predictably cites F. &. >il=s essay R(n liberty= as a milestone in that history. In this essay, which is
often regarded as the definitive philosophical manifesto of liberalism, >ill delineates a s50ere o1 in6e5en6ent action an6 4oral
Eu684ent 1or e;ery 4orally co45etent citi?en o1 a 4o6ern <6e4ocratic= state In6e5en6ence is cas0e6
out in ter4s o1 Mill@s 1a4ous 6istinction between 5ri;ate an6 5ublic 6o4ains #0e et0ical is t0us
6e1ine6 as a 6o4ain o1 5ersonal 1ree6o4 o1 t0ou80t an6 actionY it is a 5ri;ate 6o4ain inso1ar as
neit0er law nor or8ani?e6 5ublic o5inion are 5er4itte6 to inter;ene into t0is 6o4ain in or6er to
en1orce collecti;e 4oral stran6ar6s Aor even to prevent self-inflicted damageC.
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**"ni;ersal H Absolutist Et0ics Ba6**
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"ni;ersal 4orality is i45ossible because e;eryone 0as in6i;i6ual 5assions an6 ;iews
From Shakespeare to !*istentialism http7==taimur.sarangi.info=te*t=kaufmannDniet'sche.htm
The highest type, to Iiet5sche0s mind, is t0e 5assionate 4an w0o is t0e 4aster o1 0is 5assions3 able to
e45loy t0e4 crea ti;ely wit0out 0a;in8 to resort to asceticis4 1or 1ear t0at 0is 5assions 4i80t con9uer
0i4 But not e;erybo6y is ca5able o1 t0is ac0ie;e4ent3 an6 'iet?sc0e 6oes not belie;e in t0e 5os sibility
o1 a uni;ersal 4orality $e 5re1ers sel1Bcontrol an6 sub li4ation to bot0 license an6 asceticis43 but
conce6es t0at 1or so4e asceticis4 4ay be necessary #0ose w0o re9uire suc0 a ra6ical 5rescri5tion
stri2e 0i4 as wea2er3 less 5ower1ul ty5es t0an 4en li2e Goet0e3 1or eCa45le The will to power is,
according to Iiet5sche, a universal drive, found in all men. It prompts the slave who dreams of a heaven
from which he hopes to behold his master in hell no less than it prompts the master. Both resentment and
brutality, both sadism and asceticism are e1pressions of it. Indeed, 'iet? sc0e t0in2s t0at all 0u4an
be0a;ior is re6ucible to t0is sin8le basic 1orce $e 6oes not en6orse t0e will to 5ower any 4ore t0an
Freu6 en6orses seCual 6esireY but 0e t0in2s we s0all be better o11 i1 we 1ace t0e 1acts an6 un6erstan6
oursel;es t0an i1 we con6e4n ot0ers 0y5ocritically3 wit0out un6erstan6in8
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Institutional et0ics results in a 0o4o8enous 4in6less unconscious &nly by a6;ocatin8 in6i;i6ual
et0ics can 0u4ans 8ain ;alue 1or t0e4sel;es
Dai8er +KKA
A"hristine, )""ociate Profe""or Pre"i&ent. $SS /,air. 01uit- /o++ittee. C)$ Me+*er of t,e 2%ea+
/P)3 B.$. "oncordia, >.$. MniversitY de >ontrYal, *octoral studies Brock University& Ciet'sche7 8irtue !thics..
8irtue )oliticsC&)ro>ect -useC: -F
%et us remember the three points under criticism in the critical program of virtue ethicists; the overreliance on rule models of moral choice, the overly rationalistic
accounts of moral agency, and the formalism inherent in such theories. If we did not know that we are talking about virtue ethicists, we would readily say that this
pertains to Iiet5sche. 'iet?sc0e 6oes reEect rule 4o6els $is et0ics o1 creati;ity ar8ues t0at one 4ust create
;alues 1or onesel1 an6 not rely on any eCternal <transcen6ent= rule. Iiet5sche also fiercely re?ects the rationalistic account
of moral agency. 'e struggles to rehabilitate the repressed parts of human nature, claiming that reason is but a very small part of ourselves. 'e talks of the human
being in terms of a fiction Asee D ,4-C. 2e are wronged in the conception of ourselves; we are led to believe that we are neatly divided between reason and instinct.
But this division is illusory. The human being is a :social structure of many Rsouls=< AB+! ,/C. 2e possess a soul that is a :social structure of the instincts and
passions< AB+! ,3C. Iiet5sche says further that :PiQf we desired and dared an architecture corresponding to the nature of our soul Awe are too cowardly for itTCG
our model would have to be the labyrinthT< AD ,B/C. 2e are indeed very far from the traditional picture of the self and also far from the superiority of reason that is
proposed by traditional philosophical approaches and moralities in particular. %ast, it is also evident that 'iet?sc0e reEects t0e 1or4alis4
in0erent in tra6itional 4oralities as 0e woul6 8enerally reEect any 1or4alis4 in t0ou80t . Iiet5sche does share
the critical program of virtue ethicists. #0e ni0ilis4 0e 5ro5oses is su55ose6 to re4e6y t0e alienatin8 tra6itional
50iloso50ical <an6 reli8ious= 6iscourse. But does he stop at the nihilistic momentE Is his program purely nihilistic, as %eiter suggestsE I have
argued elsewhere that far from being purely nihilistic, 'iet?sc0e@s 50iloso50y is entirely constructi;e1I $is c0allen8e
consists in reEectin8 t0e eCistin8 4orality to construct anew #0e ol6 syste4@s 6e1iciencies cannot be
a6Euste6 by reor8ani?ation &ne 4ust erase e;eryt0in8 an6 start 1ro4 scratc0 This is where his attacks on morality
come into play. In this moment Iiet5sche announces the death of 6od and its metaphysical import. Iiet5sche is clear about his self-attributed immoralism; :$t
bottom my e1pression immoralist involves two denials. I deny first a type of man who has hitherto counted as the highest, the good, the benevolent, beneficentJ I
deny secondly a kind of morality which has come to be accepted and to dominate as morality in itselfGdGcadence morality, in more palpable terms Christian
morality< A!, :*estiny< 7C. $is reEection o1 4orality is t0us clearly i6enti1ie6 by 0i4 as a reEection o1 tra6itional
4orality 'e also says of fellow immoralists, they :see PtheirQ honor in affirming< A"4 :>orality< BC.34 There is no question of abandoning ethics. thics is
needed and will be his preoccupation for the first steps of his reconstruction, for it was a preoccupation before his reconstruction as it lead to the re?ection of the
defective ethics. Iihilism is a necessary step toward this reconstruction. $s he says in "he +ay Science; :We 6eny3 an6 4ust 6eny3 because
so4et0in8 in us wants to li;e an6 a11ir4 itsel13 so4et0in8 w0ic0 we 5er0a5s 6o not as yet 2now3 6o not
as yet see!) <L4.C. 2hat is it that wants to affirm itselfE In Schopenhauer as !ducator, Iiet5sche says that :We are accountable to
oursel;es 1or our own eCistenceY conse9uently3 we also want to be t0e real 0el4s4en o1 our eCistence
an6 2ee5 it 1ro4 rese4blin8 a 4in6less coinci6ence< A,C. The xbermensch, in "hus Spoke 6arathustra, is the figure who is
successful in becoming his own master. 'e is an (verman, more than a man, a human being that is human and more. 2hy moreE The xbermensch is the individual
who has overcome the fragmentation inherent in tradition. It is the person who has reunited himself, who has decided to live fully as he is. It is also the person who
knows that life is will to power and that he himself is an instance of this will to power. $ccordingly, he wishes to embody and respect the will to power within
himself. In addition to all of this, he accepts the eternal return hypothesis. 'e is ready to suppose that the actions and decisions he makes during his life will return
eternally the same. The change from man to xbermensch is tremendous. &o much so that we cannot talk about an elevation from man to xbermensch but really of a
transfiguration, as Iiet5sche himself refers.3, ven the highest type of human being present in Iiet5sche=s writings, the strong man, is far below the xbermensch.
'e says; :+our souls are so unfamiliar with what is great that the &uperman would be fearful to you in his goodnessT $nd you wise and enlightened men, you
would flee from the burning sun of wisdom in which the &uperman ?oyfully bathes his nakednessT +ou highest men my eyes have encounteredT This is my doubt of
you and my secret laughter; I think you would call my &upermanGa devilT< A6 :>anly !rudence<C. The xbermensch is an ideal type of human being. very
individual should emulate this figure as an illustration of what one can become if only one were to engage oneself in the way of creation. 2hen I speak of an ideal
type, the xbermensch, I mean that it is a figure toward which one must strive, not to be confused as a state one can reach. )or one thing, it is not clear in
Iiet5sche=s mind whether there will ever be Hbermenschen. )or another thing, I think we should interpret the figure he presents to us as a dynamic state of being.
If the xbermensch accepts life and himself as an instance of the will to power, he will be in constant becoming. The drive for more power, characteristic of
Iiet5sche=s being, will lead the individual into a continuous flu1 and constant overcoming of oneself. This is how one should understand the Hber of Hbermensch.
But even if we are talking about a :state of flu1,< this is a state that one should strive to acquire while engaging in the process of attainment. $ccording to
Iiet5sche, there are certain things that one must do in order to approach this e1cellence and in turn become an xbermensch. $mong these things are t0e
creation o1 onesel1 an6 t0e creation o1 ;alues t0at is essential in su55ortin8 a new et0ics #0e 0u4an
bein8 s0oul6 be t0e creator o1 onesel1. &he should be her own master and define her own rules Awhich is what is truly meant by the famous,
or infamous, :>aster morality<C.33 (nce the sky of values has been emptied, the task is to fill it again for oneself. The individual should no longer rely on any
transcendent to provide these values, as the previous e1periment of "hristianity and its transcendent morals has proven that its only possible result is alienation.
$u4an bein8s 4ust create an et0ics 1or 0u4an bein8s #0e in6i;i6ual 4ust create an et0ics t0at
res5ects one@s nature as 0u4an an6 as will to 5ower This is e1pressed in Iiet5sche=s ma1im; :%hat Saith thy ConscienceEGThou
shalt become what thou art< A+S 3.4C. +ou must flourishT Iote that there is nothing in Iiet5sche=s writings until Beyond +ood and !vil that indicates that the way
of the xbermensch is bared for certain individuals. 'e makes clear that this potentiality e1ists in every individual. It is only a matter of the individual choosing to
actuali5e his or her own self as will to power.3L Thus the emphasis is placed on the flourishing of the agent via the adoption of certain virtues in line with one=s
own being.
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Any 5roEect t0at 6e1ines a uni;ersal et0ical clai4 1osters in6i11erence &nly by 1in6in8 et0ics in t0e
absence o1 uni;ersal nor4s can et0ical action ta2e 5lace

(o52e RK/
)rom an empirical perspective, these insights have provoked a re-e1amination of geographical phenomena in a wide range of domains, with emphasis increasingly
placed upon the ways in which social meanings and categories take on the appearance of truth or ob?ectivity. Recent work has e1amined, for e1ample, the
discourses governing geopolitics Ay Tuathail, ,//BJ y Tuathail and *alby, ,//8C, the economy ABarnes, ,//BJ 6ibson-6raham, ,//BC, urban space A&o?a, ,//BJ
*ear, 3444C, colonialism and development AFacobs, ,//BJ +apa, ,//BC, the environment ABraun and "astree, ,//8C and the nature of identity, particularly the
spatial structuring of genderNse1ual and racialNethnic difference A&ibley, ,//-J *wyer and Fones, 3444J Iast, 3444C. The poststructuralist intervention has also
prompted a series of philosophical debates, which have posed a challenge to traditional understandings of metaphysics and epistemology. In this more theoretical
vein, poststructuralism offers a critique of logocentrism, the centering or grounding of claims to truth or ob?ectivity . )rom this perspective, the apparent stability of
meaning embedded in any system of thought is potentially destabili5ed by elided traces of difference, and by the multiple conte1ts in which knowledge is produced,
received and interpreted. $s &trohmayer and 'annah A,//3; LBC put it, Rthe truth of any statement, scientific or otherwise, which ultimately must rely on some
anchoring in order to avoid being completely arbitrary, is undecidable .= This Rdeconstruction= of universals poses a significant
challenge to traditional understandings of ethics, for the anti-foundational stance of poststructuralism implies
that any 5roEect ai4e6 at 6e1inin8 an et0ics3 or a nor4ati;e t0eory o1 society3 woul6 be 6oo4e6 to
1ailure )rom a poststructuralist perspective, uni;ersal clai4s to 2nowle68e an6 trut0 can beco4e a barrier to
1osterin8 a sensiti;ity to 6i11erence3 an6 t0us et0ics woul6 nee6 to 1in6 its 5urc0ase in t0e ra6ical
instability o1 4eanin8 an6 t0e 6econstruction o1 uni;ersal nor4ati;e clai4s. The goal of such an anti-essentialist
approach, as *avid &later A,//.; B/C has noted, is to cultivate a Rpolitical openness, or an :ungrounded ground<, where foundations or norms or universal
prescriptions only e1ist to be put into question as a permanent feature of the process of democrati5ation=. &ome commentators have gone so far as to suggest that
we s0oul6 ta2e u5 a 5osition a8ainst et0ics3 in t0e sense o1 a 4o6el o1 4oral or et0ical actions3 an6
instea6 wor2 to 1oster Ran et0ics o1 encounter wit0out a co44it4ent to resolution or closure = A"ampbell
and &hapiro, ,///a; 1i, 1viiJ see also "aputo, ,//LC. I will try below to suggest how we might imagine such an Rethics of encounter=, but first I turn to e1amine
some of the responses within geography to the postmodern challenge to ethics.
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#0eir 1or4 o1 4oral absolutis4 5rioriti?es clean 4oral
0an6s o;er 4oral resultsL t0ey are 4ore concerne6
wit0 not actin8 6irectly i44oral t0an 5re;entin8
4uc0 lar8er i44oral conse9uences
'ielsen 1II/ A@ai, !hil. !rof O M. "algary, $bsolutism and It "onsequentialist "ritics, ed. Foram 6raf 'aber, p. ,.4-3C
Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more
monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with
certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. (ne could even usefully and relevantly
adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of *onagan0s. "onsequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive Ha theoretical basis for common morality
that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt.H 6iven the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism,
it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our
considered moral convictions that would be another matter indeed $nticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who
will sanction such killing of the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the
even greater inhumanity, con?oined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death
and far greater misery and then e1cuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death
and misery but merely forbore to prevent itE In such a conte1t, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to
constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this
circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he PitQ allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still
many times worse. 'e tries to keep his 0moral purity0 and PtoQ avoid 0dirty hands0 at the price of
utter moral failure and what @ierkegaard called 0double-mindedness.0 It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right .
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I8norin8 conse9uences is i44oral B t0ey sacri1ice
ot0ers to 5reser;e 4oral 5urity It is 4ost 4oral to
act to 5ro6uce t0e best en6 re8ar6less o1 t0e 4oral
cleanliness o1 t0e 4eans
Ailins2y 1ID1 <Saul D3 Acti;ist3 (ro13 Social &r8ani?er wit0 Int>l Fa4e3 Foun6er o1 In6ustrial Areas Foun6ation3 -ules 1or -a6icals3 5 +7BD=

H*oes this particular end ?ustify this particular meansEH %ife and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. 2henever we think about social change, the question of
means and ends arises. The person PmanQ of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. 'e has no other problemJ he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action.
'e asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the costJ of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena
is corrupt and bloody. %ife is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bedJ he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand
6eothe0s Hconscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action in action one does not always
en?oy the lu1ury of a decision that is consistent both with one s individual conscience and the
good of Phumankind. The choice must always be for the latter. $ction is for mass salvation and
not for the individual0s personal salvation. 'e Por she, who sacrifices the mass good for his
personal conscience has peculiar conception of Hpersonal salvationHJ he doesn0t care enough for
people to be HcorruptedH for them. The people PmenQ who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics of means and ends-which with rare e1ception is conspicuous for its
sterility-rarely write about their won e1periences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions.
They are passionately committed to a mystical ob?ectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a none1istent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational
chart on land. They can be recogni5ed by one of two verbal brandsJ H2e agree with the ends but not the means,H or HThis is not the time.H The means-and- end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means.
The means-and- 0ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the 'ave-Iots against the 'aves, should search themselves as to their real political position. In fact, they are passive-but real-allies of the
'aves. They are the ones Facques >aritain referred to in his statement, HThe fear of soiling ourselves by entering the conte1t of history is
not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.H These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight
the Ia5is in the only way they could have been foughtJ they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Fews and political prisoners being dragged through the streetsJ they were the
ones who privately deplored the horror of it all-and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the
nonuse of any means. It is this species of man who so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old %eague of Iations on the ethical differences between defensive
and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of?udgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of
life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. , present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends; first, that one0s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies
inversely with one0s personal interest in the issue. 2hen we are not directly concerned our morality overflowsJ as %a Rochefoucauld put it, H2e all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.H
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**Aest0etic Et0ics Goo6**
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Foucault 5ro5ose6 an aest0etical et0ics in w0ic0 in6i;i6uals c0oose t0eir et0ics base6 on an aest0etic
eCistence
(oster KD
>ark, &wan=s 2ay; "are of &elfin the 'yperreal Mniversity of "alifornia, Irvine "onfigurations, 344., ,-;,-,9,.- z 344/ by The Fohns
'opkins Mniversity !ress and the &ociety for %iterature and &cience.
#o be sure3 in t0e late 5roEect on et0ics3 Foucault 6oes not 5ro5ose a new ;ersion o1 t0e liberal notion
o1 t0e autono4ous in6i;i6ual3 sel1Breliant an6 1ree3 one w0o buil6s a stable i6entity3 li2e t0e co4ic
c0aracter Baron ;on Munc0ausen3 by li1tin8 0i4sel1 u5 by 0is own bootstra5s #0is Western conceit
is3 a1ter all3 t0e 4ain subEect o1 Foucault@s criti9ue3 an6 t0e c0ie1 5reoccu5ation o1 0is wor2 #0e 5ost
structuralist in 1act 5resents 0is notion o1 sel1BsubEecti;ation as an alternati;e3 an6 o;erloo2e6 or
re5resse63 strea4 o1 t0in2in8 in t0e West, one that has been overshadowed by the in?unction :know thyself) Foucault
1or4ulates t0e tra6ition 0e 5oints to as %t0e care o1 sel13) i45lyin8 t0at t0is so4ew0at un6er8roun6
alternati;e culture4i80t 5ro;i6e resources in t0e 5resent 1or new ty5es o1 e4anci5ator en6ea;ors
$ere 0e ta2es 0is cue 1ro4 'iet?sc0e3 w0o 1oresaw a%trans;aluation o1 ;alues) in w0ic0 et0ics woul6
be base6 not on renunciation an6 sel1 restraint but on aest0etics.L, )oucault anticipates the pro?ect of the hermeneutics of the
sub?ect contributing to a culture in which :everyone=s life PmightQ become a work of art.<L3 I shall raise the question of the care of self in relation to
cosmeticsurgery reality T#, but before embarking on this pro?ect, a thorough understanding is required of )oucault=s idea of the care of self. In the ,/83 lectures at
the "ollZge de )rance, )oucault presented a genealogy of ethics in the ancient world, concentrating on the 'ellenistic period where :the care of self< reached its
richest point of development. 'e contrasts the care of self with the relation to the self in !latonism, "hristianity, and modern philosophy, primarily *escartes. In all
three cases, Foucault stri;es to 6istin8uis0 t0e care o1 sel1 as a %s5iritual) 5ractice in w0ic0 t0e sel1 is
trans1or4e6 In t0e care o1 sel13 t0e sel1 is not 6isco;ere6 as it is in Descartes3 or reali?e6 in its
aut0enticity as it is in SartreY rat0er3 $ellenistic care o1 sel1 is a co45leC o1 li1elon8 5ractices in w0ic0
t0e in6i;i6ual atte45ts to c0an8e 0i4sel1H0ersel1 It is not a case o1 atte45tin8 to 6isco;er t0e trut0 o1
onesel13 as in (lato3 or to con;ert onesel1 in t0e i4a8e of a transcendent principle, as in "hristianity. 'ere is one definition )oucault
gives of the 'ellenistic care of the self; The 6reeks of the 'ellenistic period developed a culture of self-constitution, potentially open to all, through meditation,
writing e1ercises, group meetings, and other practices. The direct goal was an art of living, an aesthetic of self-relation, an ethic of spiritual formation.
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'arcissis4 were t0e &t0er is su55ose6 to 6isco;er t0e4sel;es is o55ose6 by Foucault3 in6icatin8 t0at
we s0oul6 li;e aest0etically instea6 an6 6raws a line between t0is narcissistic enli80ten4ent an6
aest0etic ;alues
(oster KD
>ark, &wan=s 2ay; "are of &elfin the 'yperreal Mniversity of "alifornia, Irvine "onfigurations, 344., ,-;,-,9,.- z 344/ by The Fohns
'opkins Mniversity !ress and the &ociety for %iterature and &cience.
(ne more aspect of )oucault=s position must be clarified before I begin. $s we have seen, )oucault rarely addresses the idea of the care
of self in relation to contemporary culture. But one 6istinction about t0e care o1 sel1 is crucial an6 4ust be borne in 4in6 In response
to a question from !aul Rabinow and 'ubert *reyfus su88estin8 t0e co44on narcissis4 in 4o6ern society an6 ancient Gree2 et0ics3
Foucault o11ers t0e 1ollowin8 co44entL %In t0e Cali1ornian cult o1 t0e sel13 one is su55ose6 to 6isco;er one@s true sel1 not only
6o I not i6enti1y t0is ancient culture o1 t0e sel1 wit0 w0at you 4i80t call t0e Cali1ornian cult o1 t0e sel13 I t0in2 t0ey are
6ia4etrically o55ose6) 74 If 4 %ant a Famous Face and "he Swan are understood only as depictions of individuals in quest of their true
selves, then clearly the issue is not one that concerns )oucault=s idea of the care of self. I want rather to inquire if there is a hint of care of
self in these most ab?ect television series. For as Foucault writes3 our culture3 co45leC as it is3 6oes not easily su55ort t0is i6eaL %We
0a;e 0ar6ly any re4nant o1 t0e i6ea in our society t0at t0e 5rinci5al wor2 o1 art w0ic0 one 4ust ta2e care o13 t0e 4ain area to
w0ic0 one 4ust a55ly aest0etic ;alues3 is onesel13 one@s li1e3 one@s eCistence)7, &urgeries Ree1amined The question I shall pose in
relation to "he Swan and 4 %ant a Famous Face is this; 2hat can be learned about these shows when they are approached from the
vantage point of the concept of the care of selfE $nd what does such an interrogation reveal about popular culture at a time when the
media are disseminated throughout society ever more densely and with increasing variation and intermediationE73
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Aest0etic Eu684ents3 or Eu684ents 1ree o1 bias an6 societal o5inion3 are t0e best alternati;es to
Eu68in8 4orals an6 et0ics wit0out 5lacin8 our own ;anity an6 e8os as t0e 0i66en 5riority
Downar6 K7
AIorthern $ri5ona Mniversity. iet'sche and Bant on the )ure 4mpulse of "ruth. The Fournal of Iiet5sche &tudies 3.C
'iet?sc0e 4aintains t0at art an6 not 4orality is t0e ori8in o1 our 5ure i45ulse to trut0 I believe that
'iet?sc0e>s 5ur5ose in a55ealin8 to art is to 1in6 a basis 1or establis0in8 an6 5er0a5s i45ro;in8 our
1ree6o4 as in9uirers Accor6in8 to bot0 'iet?sc0e an6 Kant3 aest0etic Eu684ents eC5ress a s5ecial
2in6 o1 1ree6o4 Kant 4aintains t0at t0is 1ree6o4 sur5asses e;en t0e autono4y o1 our 4oral a8ency
11
Li2e 4oral Eu684ents3 aest0etic Eu684ents 4ust be 1ree 1ro4 any 8i;en inclination or contin8ent
5ur5ose "nli2e 4oral Eu684ents3 aest0etic Eu684ents 4ust be 1ree 1ro4 any 8i;en conce5t or
5rinci5le3 inclu6in8 t0e en6s an6 5rinci5les o1 reason. 6iven Iiet5sche0s larger philosophical pro?ect, this fact makes it easy to see
why he would appeal to art. 'is question is one of how the capacity to act from a pure impulse ever evolved from natural inclinations. )urthermore, he wants to
give an account of how this capacity evolved that does not make an appeal to either language or reason. It is the independence of art from both the concepts
embodied in language and the principles of reason that makes art an especially appealing candidate. $t this point, I would like to review the general features of
@ant0s account of aesthetic ?udgment. $t the same time, I will offer some te1tual evidence TEn6 (a8e /KU for thinking that there are substantial agreements between
@ant and Iiet5sche about the nature of aesthetic ?udgments. In his early essay on truth, Iiet5sche does not offer an account of aesthetic ?udgment. $s such, I would
like to start by briefly reviewing the agreements that Iiet5sche e1presses in both "he Birth of "ragedy and 6arathustra with @ant0s aesthetics. $ccording to both
@ant and Iiet5sche, there are two types of aesthetic ?udgments. 2e e1perience the sublime when we confront the infinitude of abysses, mountains, and storms. 2e
e1perience the beautiful when we hear the harmony of a piano sonata or see the unity in a painting. &etting to the side the differences between these two types of
?udgments, let us focus on the points that are common to both. @ant0s analytic is an attempt to make sense of three conflicting intuitions that we share about
aesthetics.
,3
(n the one hand, matters of art are a matter of personal taste. $esthetic estimations are sub?ective ?udgments. Because they are sub?ective, there are no
ob?ective proofs to which we could appeal to settle disputes. $t the same time, we do quarrel about matters of beauty and sublimity. If I find a painting beautiful
and you think it is ugly, we take ourselves to be engaged in a real disagreement even if there are no ob?ective grounds to settle the dispute. In order to help settle
our quarrel, I might point to the harmony of shapes, while you might point to the unattractive colors. 'iet?sc0e 4aintains t0at t0e
6istinction between t0e subEecti;e an6 t0e obEecti;e cannot be use6 in aest0etics to 6o any
50iloso50ical wor2 'iet?sc0e>s 4ain 5oint3 li2e Kant>s3 is t0at aest0etic Eu684ents are not 4erely
subEecti;e #0ey are not eC5ressions o1 w0at is 4erely a8reeable 1or an in6i;i6ual A Eu684ent o1 taste
cannot be base6 on t0e satis1action o1 5ersonal 5re1erencesL Vt0e stri;in8 in6i;i6ual bent on 1urt0erin8
0is e8oistic 5ur5osesMcan be t0ou80t o1 only as an ene4y to art3 ne;er as its sourceV < :T, 71= At t0e
sa4e ti4e3 aest0etic Eu684ents are not 6eter4inati;e Eu684ents3 1or t0ere are no obEecti;e 8roun6s
1or 4atters o1 taste 'iet?sc0e c0allen8es t0e i6ea t0at aest0etics is 8roun6e6 on stan6ar6s o1 reason
<;, 1AA= $e wants to su88est t0at t0e aest0etics 4ust be in6e5en6ent o1 suc0 6eter4inate conce5ts an6
5rinci5les Iiet5sche recogni5es that there can be quarrels over matters of taste. In fact, he elevates the idea to a crucial position in his argument in
6arathustra when he challenges those who would maintain that ?udgments of taste are merely sub?ective e1pressions of personal preference; HPtQasteGthat is at the
same time weight and scales and weigherJ and woe unto all the living that would live without disputes over weight and scales and weighersTH A6& ,,.C. #0e
1un6a4ental 5rere9uisite to bein8 a sel1Bcon9ueror is t0at one o;erco4e one>s 5ersonal biases an6
5reEu6ices. $ccording to @ant0s transcendental analysis, ?udgments of taste must be grounded on a disinterested pleasure. In order for the pleasure that we
take in an aesthetic e1perience to be disinterested, we must seek a higher ground for our ?udgments. In e1ercising TEn6 (a8e /1U his ?udgment, Karathustra tells us
that he Hhad to fly to the highest spheres that AheC might find the fount of pleasure againH A6& /8C. 'ot only 6o we nee6 to set asi6e our
interest in w0at we 1in6 a8reeable an6 w0at we 1in6 to be consistent wit0 our 5ru6ential interests3 but
we 4ust also set asi6e our interest in satis1yin8 t0e re9uire4ents o1 4orality AB"& ,73C. Accor6in8 to
Kant>s analysis3 aest0etic Eu684ents 4ust be 5ur5osi;e wit0out any 8i;en 5ur5ose ,arat0ustra
teac0es us to li;e wit0out any 6e5en6ence u5on 8i;en en6s $e ur8es us to renounce any ser;itu6e
un6er 8i;en 5ur5oses &1ten3 'iet?sc0e re1ers to suc0 a con6ition as a 4atter o1 c0ance or acci6ent It
is t0rou80 t0e 5ur5osi;eness o1 art t0at 5ur5oses 8row 1ro4 4ere acci6ents A6& B3C. (ur5osi;eness is
reali?e6 w0ere 0ar4ony an6 unity are restore6 to w0at was 4erely 1ra84entary. Mnder the last two moments of
@ant0s analysis, aesthetic ?udgments must make claims of sub?ective universality and sub?ective necessity. W0en we esti4ate t0e beauty or
subli4ity o1 an obEect3 we 4a2e clai4s to t0e e11ect t0at all ot0er 0u4an bein8s ou80t to a8ree wit0
our Eu684ent
1/
#0e Eu684ent is uni;ersal inso1ar as it 4a2es a clai4 on all ot0ers Accor6in8 to
'iet?sc0e3 Eu684ents o1 taste 0el5 us to beco4e reconcile6 to one anot0er by teac0in8 t0e V8os5el o1
uni;ersal 0ar4ony V AB"& ,/-37C. $ ?udgment of taste is necessary insofar as it makes a claim on how others ought to estimate the ob?ect. $ccording to
Iiet5sche, in the $pollonian state we e1perience dreams with a sense of real necessity. )or Karathustra, the HThou shalt is higher than to command for those that
are sublimeH A6& 78C. Iiet5sche recogni5es that it is possible to make such claims of necessity only where you have set aside personal biases and pre?udices. As
suc03 you can only 4a2e suc0 clai4s w0ere you call t0is cessation o1 all nee6 VnecessityV A6& .., 333C. &o far,
we have reviewed the agreements between @ant and Iiet5sche on aesthetic ?udgments and have found them to be in substantial agreement on ma?or points. The
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fact that the agreements are found in both "he Birth of "ragedy and 6arathustra is evidence that Iiet5sche did not dramatically alter his position on these points in
aesthetics between his early and later periods.
,7
)urthermore, the fact that HTruth and )alsity in Their Mltramoral &enseH and "he Birth of "ragedy were published
at about the same time indicates that Iiet5sche was likely working with such ideas in his early essay on truth. @ant tells us that the key to the critique of taste is in
the solution to the following problem. The question is whether the feeling of pleasure that we take in an aesthetic ?udgment follows from the ?udgment, or whether
the feeling of pleasure precedes the ?udgment.
,-
(nly if the feeling of pleasure follows from the ?udgment is the ?udgment free from determination by e1ternal
causes. (nly if the ?udgment is free from such causes can we presume to require that others agree with our ?udgment. As an aest0etic re1lecti;e
Eu684ent, Pnd !age L3U t0e basis 1or t0e correctness o1 t0e Eu684ent is t0e co45lete 1ree6o4 o1 t0e
subEect 'ere we find what may be the key to understanding Iiet5sche0s account of aesthetic ?udgments. In Iiet5sche0s terms, the purely perspectival character
of aesthetic ?udgments is the key to their legislative authority. )or @ant, one who is engaged in an act of aesthetic ?udgment can tell us how we ought to ?udge
because only a sub?ective necessity is presupposed by such ?udgments. Taste claims a special kind of autonomy. (nly where we have overcome all of the e1ternal
causes of bias in ?udgment, including the tyranny of our feelings, the tyranny of reason Ascientific, prudential, and moralC and even the tyranny of the ob?ect and the
truth of its e1istence, does our ?udgment have autonomy. (nly where autonomy has been reali5ed can we presume to tell others how they ought to ?udge, assuming
that they have adopted an aesthetic perspective and distanced themselves from their own biases and pre?udices. The structural similarities between @ant0s two
arguments against consequentialism are striking. In both @ant0s ethics and his aesthetics, the issue is one of the purity of the ?udgment. Because o1 t0e
structural si4ilarities between t0e two ar8u4ents3 we can 4a2e t0e sa4e 2in6s o1 ar8u4ents a8ainst
rationalist an6 e45iricist accounts o1 trut0 1ro4 t0e 5ers5ecti;e o1 art as can be 4a6e 1ro4 t0e
5ers5ecti;e o1 et0ics &n Kant>s account3 aest0etic re1lecti;e Eu684ents s0are so4e o1 t0e sa4e
1eatures as 6eter4inati;e 4oral Eu684ents Most i45ortant3 aest0etic re1lecti;e Eu684ents are
cate8orical in t0eir 1or4 e;en t0ou80 t0ey are sin8ular Eu684ents an6 are not 6eter4ine6 by an
obEecti;e 5rinci5le o1 reason Because t0ey are cate8orical an6 not 0y5ot0etical3 aest0etic Eu684ents
4ust be 8roun6e6 in a 5ure i45ulse. @ant claims that the e1perience of the sublime teaches us to esteem in opposition to our interests and that
the e1perience of the beautiful teaches us to love. In a si4ilar 1as0ion3 'iet?sc0e clai4s t0at t0e eC5erience o1 t0e
subli4e 8i;es us a 0ei80t abo;e our ;anity an6 t0e eC5erience o1 t0e beauti1ul teac0es 0ow to lo;e
so4et0in83 suc0 as t0e trut03 1ro4 a 5ure i45ulse A6& ,,B-,8C.
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By 5lacin8 our own in6i;i6ual art an6 Eu684ent be1ore t0e worl6@s et0ics we 0a;e t0e ability to
9uestion t0e institutionali?e6 et0ics t0at lea6s our li;es an6 1or4 our own i6ea o1 %et0ics) by t0e
su5erior i45erati;es
Downar6 K7
W0y s0oul6 we t0in2 t0at 'iet?sc0e is ri80t to clai4 t0at art is t0e ori8in o1 our 5ure i45ulse to trut0E
2hy shouldn0t we agree with @ant that a pure impulse to the truth can and should be grounded in practical reasonE I
believe that 'iet?sc0e can 4a2e t0e sa4e criticis4 o1 Kant t0at 0e 0as 4a6e o1 e45iricist an6 es5ecially
rationalist accounts o1 trut0 'a4ely3 t0at on certain 9uestions3 Kant>s account o1 trut0 is 8roun6e6 in
a 5rinci5le o1 sel1Blo;e #0e 4ain TEn6 (a8e /DU reason Kant 1alls 5rey to suc0 an obEection is t0at
t0ere are a w0ole 0ost o1 9uestions Kant is unable or unwillin8 to a64it are real 9uestions %et us start
with Iiet5sche0s e1ample of honesty. $ccording to @ant, why should we be honestE The answer is that any minimally
rational agent recogni5es a duty to be honest. Rational agents need no further reason to do their duty because the
principles of morality give them overriding reasons to be moral. (n @ant0s account, can a moral agent honestly
question what it is to be honestE 2hat I mean is, supposing the circumstances are perfectly clear, and supposing that
there are no apparent conflicts of duty, can a moral agent honestly raise the question, what ought I to doE @ant
maintains that any minimally rational agent already knows the answer. &uch an agent may feel a temptation to violate
the duty to be honest, but the agent recogni5es that the duty to be honest should always be given the highest respect.
Iiet5sche seems to think that we can raise honest questions about our values. (n the one hand, the requirements of
conscience do appear to impose necessary obligations for our conscience. (n the other hand, we can raise questions
about what, in particular, is required by an obligation. )urthermore, we can raise questions about the legitimacy of an
obligation itself. $s moral agents, we reali5e that social traditions and personal biases may unduly affect our
conception of the requirements of morality. ven those requirements of conscience that seem the clearest and the
strongest may, in a manner great or small, be infected by certain biases and pre?udices. @ant insists that all minimally
rational agents know what duty requires and, as such, are aware of the principles of morality. 2hen a question about
the requirements of morality arises, all we need to do is carefully abstract from our personal biases and pre?udices and
focus our attention on the principles that are innate to our power of practical reason. In effect, the answers to any moral
questions that might arise are already contained in the principles embedded in our conscience. 2e can rest assured that
the principles are absolutely universal and necessary. $s a system of principles, the set is complete, consistent, and
unchanging. 2hy does @ant believe that the system of moral principles has these general featuresO In et0ics3 0e
ta2es a stron8er stan6 t0an 0e 6oes in natural science #0e i6eas o1 1ree6o43 i44ortality3 an6 Go6 are
re8ulati;e i6eas t0at are Eusti1ie6 only as 5ractical 5ostulates But t0e i6eas t0at t0e re9uire4ents o1
4orality are absolutely uni;ersal3 necessary3 co45lete3 consistent3 an6 unc0an8in8 are constituti;e o1
t0e ;ery i6ea o1 a cate8orical i45erati;e In et0ics3 we 2now wit0 si8ni1icantly 4ore certainty t0at t0e
re9uire4ents o1 4orality really 6o 0a;e t0ese 8eneral 1eatures
34
'iet?sc0e is 1ree to 9uestion Kant>s
assu45tions on suc0 8eneral 5oints $ow 6o we 2now t0e trut0 about 0onesty wit0 suc0 certaintyO
Kant>s res5onse is t0at we Eust 2now t0e 5rinci5les o1 4orality 'iet?sc0e>s 5oint is t0at suc0 a
res5onse is e45ty It is not an answer to t0e 9uestion -at0er3 it is an atte45t TEn6 (a8e /GU to a;oi6
t0e 9uestion. 2hy does @ant seek to avoid the questionE 'is reason seems to be that the question leads us to
skepticism about the requirements of morality. $ natural response to @ant0s worry is that such questions may lead us to
be skeptical about claims to certainty in ethics, but it is an open question as to whether or not we need such certainty in
ethics. Kant>s 4ista2e was to turn 0is bac2 on 9uestions t0at we ou80t not i8nore $e closes t0e 6oor to
in9uiry by settin8 to t0e si6e 9uestions to w0ic0 we ou80t to see2 answers #0at is a ba6 0abit to
inculcate 'iet?sc0e>s criticis4 wor2s e9ually well a8ainst bot0 t0e rationalists an6 Kant < <+, +GIBI+=
#0e atte45t to a;oi6 real 9uestions by sayin8 t0at t0e 9uestion 0as no answer3 or by si45ly assu4in8
an answer3 is ulti4ately 8roun6e6 on ;anity. The fact that you happen not to like the consequences that follow
from the question is not sufficient reason to set the question to the side. @ant would have been better off to forward
such claims as regulative principles. 'e could have made his claims about the absolute necessity and universality of
the principles of duty as transcendental hypotheses. 2hile such a move would have avoided premature claims to
certainty, it would not remove Iiet5sche0s ob?ection. $s a hypothesis, the claim that the principles of practical reason
are absolutely universal and necessary is not a good hypothesis. The problem is not that it is false. For all we 2now3
t0e 5rinci5les o1 4orality 4ay be absolutely necessary an6 uni;ersal #0e 5roble4 is t0at3 as a
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0y5ot0esis3 it 6oes not answer real 9uestions $ow can I be so sure t0at 4y un6erstan6in8 o1 4y 4oral
6uties is correctO I 0a;e a clear un6erstan6in8 o1 t0e 5rinci5les o1 4orality an6 it is 5lausible to
su55ose t0at t0ose 5rinci5les are absolute Si45ly assertin8 t0at t0e 5rinci5les o1 4orality are
absolutely uni;ersal an6 necessary 6oes not answer t0e 9uestion3 re8ar6less o1 w0et0er t0e assertions
are 1orwar6e6 wit0 certainty or only as 0y5ot0eses 'aving made what I take to be the main point of
Iiet5sche0s criticism in his early essay on truth, and having turned the criticism toward @ant0s ethics, let us step back
and consider how he might have obtained the upper hand in the debate. The main question is, 2hen engaged in
inquiry, why ought I to commit myself to standards of correctness in generalE @ant and Iiet5sche agree that the
pursuit of truth must be grounded on a free impulse. #0e a6;anta8e o1 4o6elin8 t0e stan6ar6s o1 correctness
on aest0etic Eu684ents an6 not 4oral Eu684ents o1 6uty is t0e 1ollowin8 #0e 1or4er but not t0e latter
are 1ree 1ro4 6eter4ination by any 8i;en 5ur5ose or rule As suc03 'iet?sc0e 6oes not nee6 to 4a2e
nearly as 4any 5resu45tions about t0e nature o1 trut0 as Kant #0e 1act t0at aest0etic Eu684ents are
not 6eter4ine6 by obEecti;e 5rinci5les was t0ou80t to be t0eir 8reatest wea2ness But 'iet?sc0e see2s
to turn a wea2ness into a source o1 stren8t0 #0e 8reatest stren8t0 o1 aest0etic Eu684ents is t0eir
su5erior 1ree6o4 1ro4 suc0 5resu45tions Aest0etic Eu684ents are a natural 4o6el 1or suc0
0y5ot0eses because neit0er 4a2es a clai4 TEn6 (a8e /IU to trut0 W0en we 1orwar6 a 0y5ot0esis3 we
say t0at it woul6 eC5lain a certain 50eno4enon i1 it were trut0 We t0in2 it is a 5lausible conEecture3
but we 6o not <at least yet= clai4 t0at it is true Si4ilarly3 t0e 1ree6o4 o1 an aest0etic Eu684ent is
5re6icate6 u5on its in6e5en6ence 1ro4 any clai4s to trut0. Iiet5sche wants to raise further questions. 2hat
is the origin of our pure impulse to the truthE 'ow can beings that were once governed entirely by self-interest ever
gain the capacity for freedomE In order to gain the upper hand on these questions, Iiet5sche does not need to assume
that the capacity to act from pure impulses did in fact evolve from natural inclinations. The main advantage to his
position is not merely that he can give answers to questions that @ant cannot. Rather, the main advantage to his
position is that he can raise the questions in the first place. Because he does not need to presuppose the status of any
rules or ends, he is free to pursue any line of inquiry whatsoever, let the consequences of what he discovers be damned.
&nce we 0a;e 6eci6e6 to a66ress suc0 9uestions in t0e ter4s o1 art3 we 0a;e new resources a;ailable
to us Instea6 o1 0a;in8 to i8nore certain 6i11iculties3 we can stare t0e4 in t0e 1ace For 'iet?sc0e3
o;erco4in8 our ser;itu6e to ;anity is t0e 8reatest 0ur6leL V'ature t0rew away t0e 2eyY an6 woe to t0e
1atal curiosity w0ic0 4i80t be able 1or a 4o4ent to loo2 out an6 6own t0rou80 a cre;ice in t0e
c0a4ber o1 consciousness3 an6 6isco;er t0at 4an is in6i11erent to 0is own i8norance3 is restin8 on t0e
5itiless3 t0e 8ree6y3 t0e insatiable3 t0e 4ur6erous3 an63 as it were3 0an8in8 in 6rea4s on t0e bac2 o1 a
ti8erV <#F3 1DD= "lti4ately3 t0e way in w0ic0 we nee6 to 1ace suc0 c0allen8es is to let t0e subli4ity o1
t0e tas2 re4in6 us o1 t0e subli4ity in oursel;es
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**A#L Kant@s Cate8orical I45erati;e**
Page 466 of 609
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Institutionali?e6 et0ics3 suc0 as t0e Kant@s Cate8orical I45erati;e3 5laces re8ulations o1 w0at is
%ri80t) an6 w0at is t0ou80t to be %wron8) wit0out eC5lanation or 1ree6o4 to assu4e an alternati;e
5at0way by t0e in6i;i6ual
Downar6 K7
$ll four types of moral theories fall prey to the same ob?ection. The principles that they hold up as the primary principle of morality all have the form of a
hypothetical imperative. 'ypothetical imperatives establish only that a means is good relative to some end. In order to show that a given end is worth Pnd !age
3.Q pursuing, all of these moral theorists simply assert that we are inclined toward such an end either because it is something that we desire, or because we have
rational impulses that move us in such a direction. Accor6in8 to Kant3 all such incentives, regardless of whether they are empirical or rational in
character, are impure. $s such, they fail to e1press our freedom as moral agents. (nly an incentive of respect that is generated by an awareness of the categorical
imperative is pure. The reason is that only a principle of this form e1presses our autonomy as moral agents. The difference is a matter of priority #0e 1eelin8
o1 res5ect is 5ure because it 1ollows 1ro4 t0e 4oral law All ot0er 4oral t0eories use a 1or4 o1
Eusti1ication t0at 5uts t0e incenti;e 1irst an6 t0e 5rinci5le secon6 At t0is 5oint3 let us turn to
'iet?sc0e>s ar8u4ent a8ainst bot0 rationalist an6 e45iricist accounts o1 trut0. I hope to show that Iiet5sche0s
criticisms can be defended using @ant0s moral argument against consequentialism. If Iiet5sche0s criticisms can be defended in this manner, then his criticisms will
work against any philosophical account of truth that is grounded on a principle of self-love. The targets of Iiet5sche0s criticisms in his early essay on truth can be
divided, according to @ant0s table, along the a1es of sub?ective and ob?ective accounts. Taking them in reverse order from @ant0s argument, let us first e1amine
rationalist accounts of truth. $ccording to Iiet5sche, such theories posit the following kinds of claims. -ational bein8s control t0eir
be0a;ior entirely by abstractions #0eir ai4 is to a;oi6 bein8 carrie6 away by a 6isor6erly array o1
5erce5tual i45ressions Abstract conce5ts can be 5ut into a 5yra4i6al or6er o1 8enus an6 s5ecies3
wit0 t0e unruly i45ressions resi6in8 at t0e botto4 Stan6in8 bac23 loo2in8 at t0e 5yra4i6 t0at we
0a;e constructe63 we are i45resse6 by t0ose conce5ts t0at are V4ore 1iCe63 8eneral3 2nown3 0u4an o1
t0e two an6 t0ere1ore t0e re8ulatin8 an6 i45erati;e oneH AT), ,8,C. In creatin8 suc0 a worl6 o1
conce5ts3 our con6uct is re8ulate6 by i45erati;es #0ese i45erati;es 8ui6e t0e con6uct o1 our in9uiry
an6 6eter4ine 0ow we ou80t to 1or4 conce5ts an6 6istin8uis0 between t0ose assertions t0at are
wort0y o1 bein8 belie;e6 an6 t0ose t0at ou80t to be treate6 as 1alse #0e tar8et o1 'iet?sc0e>s criticis4
is3 1irst an6 1ore4ost3 t0e i45erati;es t0at rationalists t0in2 s0oul6 8ui6e t0e con6uct o1 our in9uiry3
an6 only secon6ly t0e belie1s t0at are 0el6 to be true at any 8i;en ti4e as a result o1 1ollowin8 t0ose
i45erati;es. Iiet5sche makes his criticism of rationalist accounts of truth in the following terms. 2hen someone hides something behind a bush and looks
for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. +et this is how matters stand regarding seeking and
finding HtruthH within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare Hlook, a mammalH I have indeed
brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. Pnd !age 38Q Iiet5sche0s criticism has the same structure as @ant0s criticism of 2olff0s moral
theory. &n bot0 accounts3 t0e 4ista2e o1 t0e rationalists was to assu4e t0at 4erely lo8ical 5rinci5les
coul6 establis0 0ow we ou80t to con6uct oursel;esMeit0er 4orally or in scienti1ic in9uiry Lo8ical
5rinci5les cannot establis0 w0at we ou80t to 0ol6 as true any 4ore t0an t0ey can establis0 en6s t0at
are 4orally wort0y o1 our 5ursuit In order to hide this flaw, rationalists try to sneak in a given end or belief. But the question remains, is that
end really worth pursuing and is that assertion really worth believingE 2e should note that 'iet?sc0e 6oes not assert t0at t0e belie1
a6o5te6 on t0e basis o1 suc0 a 5roce6ure is 1alse -at0er3 0e says t0at it 0as li4ite6 ;alue as a trut0
#0e reason is t0at t0e belie1 is3 to some e1tent3 i45ro;e6 by 1ollowin8 t0e rationalists> 4et0o6 It is
ren6ere6 4ore consistent an6 0ar4onious wit0 all t0e ot0er assertions t0at are 0el6 to be true But t0e
rationalists 0a;e 1aile6 to use a 4et0o6 t0at 0onestly as2s w0et0er or not t0e belie1 itsel1 is wort0y o1
bein8 belie;e6. By way of contrast, empiricists e1plain the origins of our beliefs in the following kinds of terms. $ habitual relation between a word and
certain images is caused by mere repetition. $ nerve stimulus causes an image to appear in our consciousness as a sound or a sight. (b?ects e1ternal to us cause the
stimulation of our nerves. Iiet5sche0s first point against an empiricist account is that the appeal to an ob?ect outside of us is the Hresult of a wrong and un?ustifiable
application of the concept of causalityH AT), ,..C. This concept has led empiricists to formulate a chain of causes, each one e1plaining what follows it in the series.
mpiricists such as 'obbes and 'ume openly assume that all ob?ects have the same basic nature Amaterial ob?ects for 'obbes and conscious impressions for
'umeC, and all relations between things must be understood in terms of de facto causes. But insufficient ?ustification is given for the presumption that words,
images, nerve impulses, and ob?ects e1ternal to us all have the same nature and can all stand in causal relations to one another. mpiricists believe that these kinds
of philosophical assumptions should guide our inquiry. 'iet?sc0e ta2es issue 1irst an6 1ore4ost wit0 t0e i45erati;es t0at
t0ey t0in2 s0oul6 re8ulate our con6uct W0at is t0e basis o1 t0ese i45erati;esE 2hy not think that there
is a difference in kind between nerve impulses and conscious imagesE 2hy not think that the relation between the two is fundamentally an aesthetic relation and
not a merely de facto causal relationE The question that Iiet5sche puts to the empiricists is at root the same as the question he puts to the rationalists #0e
5oint o1 'iet?sc0e>s criticis4 o1 bot0 rationalists an6 e45iricists can be un6erstoo6 by consi6erin8 0is
account o1 our 4o;e 1ro4 t0e state o1 nature to t0e state o1 society In or6er to en6 t0e war o1 all
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a8ainst all3 0u4an bein8s 1or8e a 5eace treaty in w0ic0 t0ey a8ree to use conce5ts accor6in8 to 1iCe6
con;entions #0is treaty establis0es t0e 6i11erence between trut0 an6 lie #0e Pnd !age 3/U 0onest 5erson
1ollows t0e 1iCe6 con;entions3 t0e liar uses t0e 1iCe6 con;entions to 4a2e t0in8s t0at are Vunreal
a55ear to be realV AT), 3C. 'e reverses the fi1ed conventions and says, for e1ample, HI am honest,H when the correct word for his actions is Hdishonest.H
The liar misuses the proper designations for his own selfish purposes and causes harm to others. #0e 4aEority o1 5eo5le 1ollow t0e
establis0e6 con;entions3 but are t0eir actions any less 1rau6ulentO W0at t0e 4aEority o1 5eo5le 0ate is
not bein8 6ecei;e63 but t0e 0ar41ul conse9uences o1 bein8 6ecei;e6 &nce a8ain3 'iet?sc0e 6oes not
assert t0at t0ere is no ;alue to suc0 a 8ra6e o1 trut0 -at0er3 0e wants to 9uestion w0et0er t0ere is a
0i80er 8ra6e o1 trut0 t0at we ou80t to 5ursue #0e 5oint o1 0is criticis4 o1 bot0 rationalists an6
e45iricists is to 9uestion w0et0er or not t0e i45erati;es t0at t0ey reco44en6 1or t0e con6uct o1 our
in9uiry can li1t us out o1 t0e t0is state In t0is state3 we can establis0 a certain 5eace We can rest in
con1i6ence t0at t0e 1iCe6 con;entions 0a;e t0e status o1 acce5te6 certainties But we lac2 1ree6o4
'iet?sc0e 6oes not belie;e t0at eit0er account can i45ro;e our 1ree6o4 #0e reason is t0at neit0er
teac0es us to act 1ro4 a 5ure i45ulse to trut0 -at0er3 t0ey encoura8e us to see2 t0e 5leasant
conse9uences o1 5reser;in8 t0e 1iCe6 con;entions.
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Kant@s cate8orical i45erati;e results in 6uty bein8 i45ersonal #0is results in a society w0ere we
wor2 si45ly out o1 necessity an6 no 5erson c0oice resultin8 in t0e 6estruction o1 oursel;es li2e t0e
Ger4an writer $einreic0 ;on Kleis
F. Thomas $owe 34K/
Faithful to the !arth. F. Thomas 'owe studied at %ake )orest "ollege AB$, ,/8/C, +ale *ivinity &chool A>$R, ,//LC, and "laremont 6raduate Mniversity A!h*,
,///C. 'e teaches at the Iliff &chool of Theology and Regis Mniversity in *enver, "olorado
Wit0 t0is 5oint in 4in63 'iet?sc0e ta2es Kant@s cate8orical i45erati;e as t0e %;ery reci5e 1or
6eca6ence3 e;en 1or i6iocy@ A$,,,C. #0e i6eas o1 a 8oo6BinBitsel1 an6 uni;ersal Anonconte1tualC notions o1 cirtue
an6 6uty are %c0i4eras an6 eC5ressions o1 6ecline3 o1 t0e 1inal eC0austion o1 li1e) A$, ,,= #0ey 4a2e
6uty i45ersonal 'iet?sc0e 6oes not 6is4iss notions o1 6uty an6 ;irtue but only su88ests t0at t0ey
4ust be 5ersonal 6isco;eries -e8ar6in8 Kant3 0e says; +et this nihilist with his "hristian dogmatic entrails considered pleasure an
ob>ection. W0at coul6 6estroy us 4ore 9uic2ly t0an wor2in83 t0in2in83 an6 1eelin8 wit0out any inner
necessity3 wit0out any 6ee5ly 5ersonal c0oice3 wit0out 5leasureMas an auto4aton o1 %6utyO) A$,,,C<
For 'iet?sc0e3 t0e result o1 t0is is a 8eneral wea2enin8 o1 t0e 0u4an 5ersonality $long similar lines, Iiet5sche
takes @ant=s aesthetics to lead to the same sort of weakening of human personality. )or @ant, Iiet5sche quotes, the beautiful is that :which gives us pleasure
without interestC A6>, III;BC. Iiet5sche is amused by this, writing, :Ifd one can even view undraped female statues Rwithout interest,= one may laugh a little at
their e1pense< A+-& III;,3C. Iiet5sche offers &tendhal=s idea of beauty as a contrast to @ant=s disinterested aesthetic. &tendhal :calls the beautiful une promesse de
Bonheur&C which ought to :arouse the will< A+-& III;BC. In schopenhauer, Iiet5sche finds a manifestation of the @antian aesthetic that brings its nihilism into clear
light. >aking use of the @antian notion of disinterested beauty, &chopenhauer finds aesthetic contemplation to be :lupulin and camphor,< a sort of anesthesia for
the will. $sking us to listen to its tone and sentiment, Iiet5sche quotes &chopenhauer; This is the painless condition that picurus praised as the highest good and
the condition of the godsJ for a moment we are delivered from the vile urgency of the willJ we celebrate the &abbath of the penal servitude of volition, the wheel of
I1ion stands stillT A+-& III;BC< &chopenhauer thought that the beautiful should calm the will, and, by calming it, the human being can find a degree of relief. Iot far
down the road from this point in intellectual history is Iiet5sche=s :last man,< who no longer desires anything. #o be sure3 t0ere is a 6i11erence
between t0e last 4an an6 t0e 0u4an bein8 Kant en;isione6 as 8o;erne6 by t0e cate8orical i45erati;e
But inso1ar as Kant rele8ate6 t0e s50ere o1 4eanin81ulness to t0e s50ere o1 t0e nou4ena3 0e 4a6e
suc0 a real4 ulti4ately una;ailable I1 suc0 a 5erson were to li;e accor6in8 to t0e Kantian worl6;iew3
wit0 a 0i80 6e8ree o1 0onesty3 0e or s0e woul6 rese4ble3 as 'iet?sc0e writes3 t0e Ger4an writer
$einric0 ;on Kleist In 1G113 Kleist co44itte6 suici6e $is 6esire to li;e was 6i4inis0e6 earlier w0en
0is con;iction t0at t0e worl6 was 4eanin81ul3 5ur5ose1ul3 an6 2nowable was s0attere6 by Kant@s
e5iste4olo8y Iiet5sche writes in Schopenhauer as !ducator that Kleist su11ere6 1ro4 a %6es5air o1 trut0) <SE, /= #0is
6an8er3 0e continues3 %acco45anies e;ery t0in2er w0ose startin8 5oint is Kantian 50iloso50y) AS!& LC.
'iet?sc0e t0en 8oes on to 9uote a letter 1ro4 KleistL A s0ort w0ile a 8oF I beca4e ac9uainte6 wit0
Kant@s 50iloso50yMan6 I 4ust now s0are wit0 you one of his ideas, w0ereby I 6are not 1ear t0at it will
s0atter you as 6ee5ly an6 5ain1ully as it 6i6 4e 2e cannot decide whether what we call truth is really truth, or whether it only
appears to us to be such. If the latter is the case, then the truth we collect here is nothing upon our death. $nd all our efforts to procure a possession that will follow
us to the grave are in vaind My sole3 4y su5re4e ai4 0as 6isa55eare63 an6 I 0a;e no ot0er AS!& LC.
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Kant@s cate8orical i45erati;e creates a worl6 w0ere 5eo5le are i45ersonal to t0e notion o1 6uty A
nation 1ollowin8 t0is cate8orical i45erati;e o1 i45ersonal 6uty will assure its 6estruction as it 4a2es a
nation o1 conscience lac2in8 4ac0ines
)riedrich 'iet?sc0e ,8I:
"he $ntichrist
A wor6 now a8ainst Kant as a 4oralist A ;irtue 4ust be our in;entionY it 4ust s5rin8 out o1 our
5ersonal nee6 an6 6e1ence In e;ery ot0er case it is a source o1 6an8er #0at w0ic0 6oes not belon8 to
our li1e 4enaces itY a ;irtue w0ic0 0as its roots in 4ere res5ect 1or t0e conce5t o1 V;irtue3V as Kant
woul6 0a;e it3 is 5ernicious V*irtue3V V6uty3V V8oo6 1or its own sa2e3V 8oo6ness 8roun6e6 u5on
i45ersonality or a notion o1 uni;ersal ;ali6ity^^t0ese are all c0i4eras3 an6 in t0e4 one 1in6s only an
eC5ression o1 t0e 6ecay3 t0e last colla5se o1 li1e, the "hinese spirit of @onigsberg. euite the contrary is demanded by the most profound
laws of self{preservation and of growth; to wit, that every man find hisown virtue, his own categorical imperative. A nation 8oes to 5ieces w0en
it con1oun6s its 6uty wit0 t0e 8eneral conce5t o1 6uty 'ot0in8 wor2s a 4ore co45lete an6
5enetratin8 6isaster t0an e;ery Vi45ersonalV 6uty3 e;ery sacri1ice be1ore t0e Moloc0 o1 abstraction^
^#o t0in2 t0at no one 0as t0ou80t o1 Kant>s cate8orical i45erati;e as 6an8erous to li1eT...The theological
instinct alone took it under protection T{{$n action prompted by the life{instinct proves that it is a right action by the amount of pleasure that goes with it; and yet
that Iihilist, with his bowels of "hristian dogmatism, regarded pleasure as an ob?ection . . . W0at 6estroys a 4an 4ore 9uic2ly t0an to
wor23 t0in2 an6 1eel wit0out inner necessity3 wit0out any 6ee5 5ersonal 6esire3 wit0out 5leasure^âs a
4ere auto4aton o1 6utyO #0at is t0e reci5e 1or 6eca6ence3 an6 no less 1or i6iocy Kant beca4e an
i6iot{{$nd such a man was the contemporary of 6oetheT This calamitous spinner of cobwebs passed for the 6erman philosopherGstill passes todayT . . . I
forbid myself to say what I think of the 6ermans. . . . Di6n>t Kant see in t0e Frenc0 -e;olution t0e trans1or4ation o1 t0e
state 1ro4 t0e inor8anic 1or4 to t0e or8anicE *idn0t he ask himself if there was a single event that could be e1plained save on the
assumption of a moral faculty in man, so that on the basis of it, Hthe tendency of mankind toward the goodH could be e1plained, once and for all timeE @ant0s
answer; HThat is revolution.H Instinct at fault in everything and anything, instinct as a revolt against nature, 6erman decadence as a philosophy{{that is @antT
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#0e cate8orical i45erati;e 6estroys any in6i;i6ualis4 an6 5ro4ote so;erei8nty by clai4in8 in t0e
na4e o1 sel1B5reser;ation we 4ust e4brace a uni;ersal et0ics
W0ite ID
AMniversity of Illinois !ress, iet'sche and the problem of sovereignty:
@ant=s philosophy may have enabled the resurgence of tragic wisdom. But it soon became clear to Iiet5sche that while his own philosophy was also concerned
with the sovereignty of the individual, @antian solutions, like the categorical imperative, must entail the complete oblivion of the individual as such. In The
$ntichrist, for e1ample, 'iet?sc0e 6escribes t0e cate8orical i45erati;e as ty5ical 4eta50ysical 5loy $e ;iews it
as an atte45t to esca5e or re6ee4 in6i;i6ual eCistence by 6irectin8 it a1ter a law t0at is bot0
%uni;ersal) an6 %necessary) %#0e 1un6a4ental laws o1 sel1B5reser;ation an6 8rowt0 6e4an6 t0at
e;eryone in;ent 0is own ;irtue3 0is own cate8orical i45erati;e3) 0e writes %'ot0in8 ruins us 4ore
5ro1oun6ly3 4ore inti4ately t0an e;ery Ri45ersonal@ 6uty3 e;ery sacri1ice to t0e Moloc0 o1
abstraction) $" sec. ,,C. 2e might say that for @ant we are only moral Aand hence autonomousC agents insofar as we disregard the particularities of space
and time to consider ourselves the embodiment of universal law. $rguing from the perspective of sovereignty, 'iet?sc0e asserts t0at t0e
cate8orical i45erati;e is t0ere1ore an %i44oral) conce5t since it su55resses t0e sin8ularity o1
in6i;i6ual eCistence wit0in t0e 4onotonous rule o1 %law) In 1act3 'iet?sc0e reali?e6 t0at by reason by
itsel13 or t0rou80 t0e 4e6itation o1 t0e cate8orical i45erati;e3 4ay ne;er be use6 to 6irect or
6eter4ine t0e nature o1 in6i;i6ual so;erei8nty #0is conclusion is in 2ee5in8 wit0 our basic
un6erstan6in8 o1 w0at so;erei8nty 4eans I1 so;erei8nty really is t0e celebration o1 t0e in6i;i6ual3 or
t0at 4o6e o1 bein8 in w0ic0 t0e in6i;i6ual ac0ie;es so4e 2in6 o1 sel1B5ossession3 t0e le8islation o1 any
s5eci1ic 1or4ula 1or so;erei8nty actually 6enies in6i;i6uality by atte45tin8 to or6er it in a6;ance The
parado1 here is that no one may simply :legislate< sovereignty, since sovereignty is precisely the commandment one has over oneself. Thus, in !cce ,omo
Iiet5sche celebrates his own life and the pro?ect of self-appropriation, but he deliberately frustrates all imitation when he warns about the danger of all books, or
when he counters the heroic portrayal of himself as the champion of impossible causes with a warning to beware of all great posesA' :2hy I $m &o "lever< sec.
,4C. "learly, he understood that to prescribe the specific content of sovereignty is ipso facto to destroy itJ and he was therefore bound to re?ect @an=s
circumspection of autonomy and sovereignty in the formula of the categorical imperative. In the end, Iiet5sche=s criticism of @ant is really a critique from within.
)or it is an attempt to radicali5e @ant that is still guided by the same sovereign ideal that is common to both of them. $nd perhaps for this reason 3
'iet?sc0e@s in;ecti;e a8ainst Kant is so relentless an6 i45assione6Y 1or in t0is way 0e e45at0i?es t0e
essential 6i11erence between t0eir retros5ecti;e 5roEects In 1act3 'iet?sc0e@s 4e6itation on Kant@s
6octrine o1 so;erei8nty su88ests t0e 5ara6oCical nature o1 'iet?sc0e own 50iloso50ical 8oal In all o1
t0e 5assa8es 9uote6 abo;e3 'iet?sc0e critici?es Kant because t0e latter 0as aban6one6 t0e in6i;i6ual
to t0e rule o1 t0e i45ersonal law Clearly3 'iet?sc0e@s 8oal is so4e0ow to rescue in6i;i6uals 1ro4
w0ate;er ;alues3 institutions3 or 4oralities constrain t0e4 an6 encourea8e sel1Bobli;ion. But if sovereignty is
to be identified with the affirmation of the individual as such, then it follows that sovereignty can never be conceptually appropriatedJ the individual is that which
cannot be analy5ed, reduced, or repeated in language; individuum ineffabile est. In this sense, however, a :philosophy of sovereignty< is bound to e1press that
which can never be said. 'ence it must remain deeply problematic and will require every kind of ruse and strategy if it is ever to succeed.
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*****BI&(&WE-*****
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**Lin2L State Et0ics**
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#0e a11ir4ati;es atte45t to %secure society) allows 1or t0e 8o;ern4ent to rule a state o1 eCce5tion on
be0al1 o1 $u4anitarian I45erati;es It allows t0e so;erei8ns bio5ower to 8o 8lobal
Doucet +KKG
A>iguel *e %arrinaga and >arc 6, $ssistant !rofessor at the Mniversity of (ttawa, $ssociate !rofessor at the
*epartment of !olitical &cience at &aint >ary=s Mniversity, :&overeign !ower and the Biopolitics of 'uman &ecurity<
&age FournalsC >)
The second area of complementarity can be seen as relating to the manner in which $gamben articulates the
relationship between bare life and the e1ercise of sovereign power as one that operates through the state of e1ception.
2hat we argue here is that 0u4an security is instru4ental in so;erei8n 5ower@s ability to 6elineate t0e
circu4stances in w0ic0 suc0 a state o1 eCce5tion can be 5roclai4e6 . W0at t0e 6iscourse o1 0u4an
security 6oes3 whether broad or narrow, is to 0el5 6e1ine t0e eCce5tional circu4stances t0at re9uire t0e
international co44unity@s inter;ention , w0et0er on be0al1 o1 0u4anitarian i45erati;es as initially
conceived or in the service of maintaining global order as made evident more recently. It 6oes so by initially
constructin8 t0e ter4s t0at in1or4 t0e eCce5tional circu4stances t0at 6e1ine t0e ran8e o1 t0reats to
0u4an li1e. In turn, it contributes to t0e labour o1 6e1inin8 an6 aut0ori?in8 w0en t0e sus5ension o1
con;entional international law o1 nations can occur The question that surfaces at this ?uncture is what
authori5es the suspension of the law in the name of human security when the discourse of human security has yet to
find its codification as international lawE In other words, what allows human security to stand before the lawE
Returning to $gamben, human security can be understood here as participating in the institution of a form of sovereign
power insofar as it simultaneously operates within and outside the law. It points towards a 5one of indistinction in
relation to its efforts to codify the authori5ation of a form of international intervention that becomes apparent in the
fact that this authori5ation has yet to receive the status of international law while, at the same time, it must invoke the
force that law normally assumes. The human security discourse thus finds itself in an aporia in relation to international
law, which it must suspend while simultaneously invoking its force. (n this point, $gamben=s reading of the
relationship between sovereign power and biopower clearly brings back an element of analysis that is intentionally left
aside in )oucault=s biopolitici5ation of sovereign power highlighted through his reading of racism noted earlier.
$gamben allows us to reintroduce the connection between the institution of the ?uridico-political order and biopower,
which much of )oucault=s work on modern forms of power Runder the rubric of a multiplicity of force relations= sought
to sever AIeal, 3447; L.-C. 'aving said that, $gamben=s reading is not entirely satisfactory either, which leads us to
the final element of the assemblage between sovereign power and biopower brought to light by the human security
discourse. )ollowing "onnolly=s critique noted earlier, $gamben appears to maintain a view of the logic and parado1
of sovereign power as coherent and ultimately centred on the sovereignty of the state. The cartography of the form of
sovereign power that articulates itself through the human security discourse would seem to complicate this view.
$u4an security can be rea6 as in1or4in8 t0e institution o1 a 1or4 o1 so;erei8n 5ower t0at ulti4ately
0as as its 5lane o1 eCercise t0e 8lobe #0is ele4ent o1 8lobality e4er8es 4ost clearly in t0e 4anner in
w0ic0 t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse articulates t0reats Constitutin8 t0reats s5eci1ically in ter4s o1
t0reats to 0u4an li1e 4eans t0at t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse3 t0rou80 a cate8ori?ation an6
accountin8 o1 suc0 t0reats3 4ust constitute t0e4 wit0 a ;iew o1 <in=security t0at is 8lobal In conceptual
terms, ;iewin8 0u4an li1e as a 8roun6s u5on w0ic0 t0e <in=security 6ile44a is 5laye6 out 4a2es t0e
li1e o1 t0e 0u4an s5ecies t0e re1erent o1 security A*illon, 344.C. To be sure, the 0u4an security 6iscourse
in 5ractice i6enti1ies t0ese t0reats as e4anatin8 1ro4 s5eci1ic locales inso1ar as its inter;entions tar8et
6eli4ite6 nonBWestern 5o5ulations3 an6 t0us t0e Western state clearly continues to 5lay a central role
in 4ountin8 t0e recent series o1 international inter;entions. 'owever, too much emphasis on the state misses
how such interventions have come to depend upon Rstrategic comple1es= of global governance that bring together
Rstate and non-state actors, public and private organi5ations, military and civilian organisations= A*uffield, 344,; 7-C
In 0el5in8 to constitute 2ey ele4ents o1 t0e state o1 eCce5tion3 t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse 5re5ares
t0e conce5tual 8roun6 u5on w0ic0 suc0 co45leCes are boun6 u5 wit0 institutin8 a 1or4 o1 8lobal
so;erei8n 5ower un4oore6 1ro4 t0e 1or4al Euri6icoB5olitical so;erei8nty o1 any one state or coalition
o1 states. 2ithin the post-/N,, moment, then, 0u4an security can be seen as 0a;in8 lai6 t0e conce5tual
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terrain 1or a 1or4 o1 0u4an subEecti;ity a4enable to t0e eCercise o1 8lobal so;erei8n rule. Rather than
seeing a dis?uncture between pre- and post-/N,,, human security proposes a form of life that is intimately connected to
the assemblages of biopower and sovereign power that mark this rule.
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#0e 4o6ern 0u4anitarian 4o;e4ent is ren6ere6 in bio5olitical ter4s an6 actually wor2s to eCten6
t0e state@s bio5olitical control to a 8lobal scale
Doucet +KKG
&age FournalsC
This article has sought to e1plore the interconnections between biopower and sovereign power in relation to the human
security discourse. $n entry point into understanding factors contributing to such an assemblage is to be found
precisely in the shifting conceptions of security in the postwar period. In this frame, the circulatory dynamics become
the new grounds upon which to understand global order in terms of security. )rom here, t0e broa6enin8 an6
6ee5enin8 o1 security can be trace6 to t0e a55re0ension o1 irre4e6iable t0reats at a 8lobal le;el. It is
from this general conte1t that we can comprehend the advent of the human security discourse in both its broad and
narrow forms. 2hile the human security discourse draws from the transformations of security in the postwar
environment, it also, we argued, moves towards new terrain. >ost notably, it casts the problematique of AinCsecurity in
biopolitical terms by having the health and welfare of populations as its referent. Muc0 o1 t0e initial wor2 o1 t0e
0u4an security 6iscourse 0as been about 5ro5erly or6erin83 cate8ori?in8 an6 accountin8 1or t0e Rtrue@
t0reats to 0u4an li1e. >ore recently, the formali5ation and institutionali5ation of the human security discourse
within the MI has begun to locate areas of strategic intervention that, informed by rationalities of governmentality, are
meant to minimi5e risks by distinguishing between Rgood= and Rbad= circulation. In the post-/N,, era, we identify
continuity rather than rupture in the human security discourse. W0ile 4any woul6 see t0e 0u4anitarian
i45ulse wit0in t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse as anat0e4a to e4er8in8 5atterns o1 worl6 or6er si8ne6
by t0e R8lobal war on terroris4@3 we 4a2e t0e ar8u4ent t0at3 in ren6erin8 li1e in bio5olitical ter4s3
t0is 6iscourse in 1act 5re5ares t0e 8roun6 1or t0e o5eration o1 a 1or4 o1 so;erei8n 5ower t0at clai4s
t0e 8lobe as its 1iel6 o1 o5eration 2hat an institutional e1amination of the human security discourse affords us is
a way in which we can trace the assemblage of sovereign power and biopower in the contemporary moment while
concurrently revealing a comple1ity to this articulation that escapes its more formal theori5ation. In ren6erin8 li1e
bare an6 5olitically un9uali1ie63 0u4an security enables a 1or4 o1 0u4an subEecti;ity a4enable to t0e
sway o1 so;erei8n 5ower eCercise6 1ro4 t0e 8lobal real4. >oreover, we argue that the human security
discourse is intimately bound with the problematique of e1ceptionality, and thus participates in providing the ground
for the ?ustification of suspending founding elements of international law while simultaneously seeking the force that
law must entail in order to authori5e a new form of international intervention. )inally, we suggest that t0is
5ro6uction o1 0u4an subEecti;ity t0at t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse 5artici5ates in enablin83 cou5le6
wit0 t0e lo8ic o1 eCce5tionality in t0e 5ostBIH11 4o4ent3 can be un6erstoo6 as 5ro;i6in8 t0e 8roun6s
1or an eCercise o1 so;erei8n 5ower on a 5lanetary scale
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#0e State@s atte45t to be et0ical is Eust a co;er to increase bio5olitical control o;er t0e 5o5ulation
$u4anitarian inter;ention is 4eant to Eusti1y state s5onsore6 security an6 control o;er li1e
Doucet +KKG
&age FournalsC
Durin8 t0e 1IIKs3 t0e conce5t o1 0u4an security circulatin8 a4on8 aca6e4ics3 8o;ern4ents3 5olicy
institutes3 non8o;ern4ental or8ani?ations3 inter8o;ern4ental bo6ies an6 t0e 4e6ia beca4e
increasin8ly in1luential in narratin8 t0e c0an8in8 5atterns o1 worl6 or6er an6 5rescribin8 action
wit0in t0e4 Meant to 1i8ure t0e s0i1tin8 source an6 4eanin8 o1 t0reats3 0u4an security coinci6e6
wit0 t0e broa6er labour o1 re6e1inin8 tra6itional notions o1 national security that had begun in the ,/.4s
but intensified with the collapse of the "old 2ar. $lthough the discursive economy of human security tended to be
divided between strong notions Aemphasi5ing threats such as famine, hunger, disease and economic crisisC and narrow
readings Afocusing on violence, state failure, civil war, crimes against humanity and genocideC, t0e co44on t0rea6
t0at tie6 t0e 6iscourse to8et0er was t0e e450asis on s0i1tin8 t0e re1erent 1ro4 t0e state to t0e
in6i;i6ual an63 t0us3 brin8in8 security 6own to t0e li;es o1 0u4an bein8s . In so doing, t0e 6iscursi;e
econo4y o1 0u4an security not only sou80t to unra;el t0e notion o1 security 1ro4 statis4 an6 t0e
interstate syste43 but also atte45te6 to cou5le security wit0 t0e concerns o1 international
0u4anitarianis4 an6 0u4an 6e;elo54ent The responses to world order marked by the events of /N,, seem to have created two
positions with regards to the present and future of the concept of human security., (n the one hand, there are those who would argue that /N,, sounded the death
knell of the human security discourse The military actions and the counter-insurgency campaigns waged in various parts of the globe that sign the Rglobal war on
terror= would suggest a violent and brutal return to the discourse of traditional state-centric security and the concomitant collapse of the vaunted Iew 2orld (rder
foretold in the early ,//4s from which the notion of human security emerged. Fro4 unsanctione63 5ree45ti;e 4ilitary actions
a8ainst 0arbourin8 states an6 ro8ue states an6 tar8ete6 4ilitary o5erations to su55ort t0e Rwar on
terror@3 to eCtrale8al 6etention centres3 stateBs5onsore6 assassinations3 ReCtraor6inary ren6ition@3
6e5ortation wit0out 6ue 5rocess3 sus5ension o1 0abeas cor5us an6 in6e1inite 6etention3 t0e
conte45orary 4o4ent certainly 6oes not see4 to lea;e 4uc0 s5ace 1or 8o;ernance wit0 a R0u4an
1ace@ (n the other hand, for others, while the policies and actions unleashed by the Rglobal war on terror= certainly
appear to mark a setback in the form of world order that is necessary for the continued implementation of human
security, /N,, served as a stark reminder of the kinds of socio-economic conditions that the broader human security
discourse was meant to remedy. $dvocates would point to t0e continue6 institutionali?ation o1 t0is 6iscourse
wit0in t0e Mnited Iations as evidence that the unilateral measures of the "nite6 States 6o not ob;iate t0e nee6
1or3 an6 0a;e not 4iti8ate6 t0e continue6 articulation o1 5olicies an6 5ractices ai4e6 at3 t0e
6e;elo54ent o1 a 4ore 0u4ane 1or4 o1 8lobal 8o;ernance This article argues that both possible responses
leave unattended the manner in which the human security discourse works towards setting the terrain for the transition
from the pre- to the post-/N,, world order. #0e initial 0u4anitarian i45erati;es t0at 6ri;e t0e 6iscussions
surroun6in8 t0e nee6 to brin8 8reater security to 0u4an li;es 0el5 to constitute a 1or4 o1 li1e
a4enable to an eCercise o1 t0e 1or4 o1 so;erei8n 5ower t0at 0as 4ar2e6 t0e 5ostBIH11 era. This article
traces this alternative reading by illustrating how t0e conce5t o1 0u4an security can be rea6 as wor2in8 to set
t0e 6iscursi;e terrain 1or t0e 6ual eCercise o1 so;erei8n 5ower an6 bio5ower. Msing the work of >ichel
)oucault and 6iorgio $gamben, we outline this duality by e1amining not only how the human security discourse
participates in defining the conditions of e1ceptionality, thus enabling the e1ercise of sovereign power, but also how3
in 0a;in8 0u4an li1e as its tar8et3 0u4an security ulti4ately enacts t0e 0u4an in bio5olitical ter4s .
&een from this vantage point, t0e conce5t o1 0u4an security in1or4s t0e current bio5olitical networ2s o1
8lobal 8o;ern4entalities an6 wor2s in conEunction wit0 J rat0er t0an a8ainst J t0e eCercise o1
so;erei8n 5ower 4a6e e;i6ent by t0e R8lobal war on terroris4@. The article also seeks to turn the discussion
towards theory by bringing to light how our reading of the conceptual deployment of human security from the vantage
point of the international leads to assemblages of sovereign power and biopower unanticipated by the theoretical
articulations offered by )oucault and $gamben. (ur initial aim is to e1amine what, at first sight, may appear as two
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competing modalities of power 9 that is, sovereign power and biopower. 2e then turn to the concept of security with
regards to the conditions of possibility for the development of the human security discourse in the post-"old 2ar
world. This sets the stage for our e1amination of human security. 'ere, our ob?ective is twofold; AaC to interpret the
concept of human security through biopower and sovereign power, as noted above, and AbC, conversely, to use t0e
0u4an security 6iscourse as a ;anta8e 5oint 1ro4 w0ic0 to rea6 t0e way in w0ic0 t0ese tec0nolo8ies o1
5ower can be seen as interwo;en in ways not 4a6e e;i6ent by t0eir t0eoretical articulation
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#0e i6ea o1 0u4an ri80ts an6 a state@s obli8ation to 5rotect t0in8s li2e 0un8er is Eust t0e 4o;in8 o1
security 6iscourse into t0e 5ri;ate li1e #0is i6ea o1 an et0ical res5onsibility is Eust t0e state@s eCcuse
1or 1urt0er bio5olitical control o1 e;ery6ay li1e
Doucet +KKG
&age FournalsC *T
2hat we propose below is an e1amination of the complementarity between sovereign power and biopower via the concept of human security as it has been
articulated from the realm of the international, while concurrently revealing how the human security discourse itself provides a way of tracing some of the
comple1ity highlighted above, thus problemati5ing the more formal and theoretical assemblage of sovereign power and biopower found in the work of )oucault
and $gamben. In order to place this analysis in conte1t, we begin by tracing the discourse of security from the post-2orld 2ar II conte1t onward. 2hat we intend
to show is that the shift from the term Rdefence= to Rsecurity= helps set the terrain from which the interweaving of biopower and sovereign power found in the
concept of human security is rendered possible. The formal origins of the concept of human security are to be found in the worldview of an international
organi5ation that was concerned with post- "old 2ar humanitarian issues, and only subsequently became enmeshed in the discourse of national foreign policy
concerns and academic debates on security. 6enerally attributed to the ,//7 MI*! 'uman *evelopment Report and some of the concurrent writings of >ahbub
ul-'aq, t0e initial i45ulse was to s0i1t t0e re1erent 1ro4 t0e state to t0e Rle8iti4ate concerns o1 or6inary
5eo5le w0o sTee2U security in t0eir 6aily li;es@ AMI*!, ,//7; 33C. In other words, t0e obEecti;e was to brin8
security 6own to t0e le;el o1 0u4an li1e by see2in8 to 6e;elo5 strate8ies in t0e 5ro;ision o1 bot0 Rsa1ety
1ro4 suc0 c0ronic t0reats as 0un8er3 6isease an6 re5ression@ an6 R5rotection 1ro4 su66en an6 0urt1ul
6isru5tions in t0e 5atterns o1 6aily li1e J w0et0er in 0o4es an6 Eobs or in co44unities = AMI*!, ,//7; 3LC.
In so doing, security was to be 6ecou5le6 1ro4 t0e 5articular national interest o1 states an6 tie6 to t0e
Runi;ersal concernTs U@ AMI*!, ,//7; 33C o1 all 5eo5le In articulating itself universally, 0u4an security was t0ere1ore
initially 4eant to be built u5on t0e be6roc2 o1 uni;ersal 0u4an ri80ts #0is 4o;e woul6 be
acco45anie6 by e11orts to i6enti1y a co45re0ensi;e list o1 t0reats t0at t0e Rall enco45assin8@ <"'D(3
1II7L +7= conce5t o1 0u4an security woul6 res5on6 to J t0at is3 econo4ic3 1oo63 0ealt03 en;iron4ental3
5ersonal3 co44unity an6 5olitical security AMI*!, ,//7; 3793-C. "lear connections were made between severe impediments
to human development and pervasive and chronic threats to the fulfilment of human potential. &uch a broad formulation sought to transcend the
state, insofar as it brought into question its role as a provider of security relative to other actors 9 for e1ample, international organi5ations, I6(s
and non-military government agencies 9 while simultaneously identifying the state itself as a potential source of insecurity. This elision of the
state also served to make the quotidian the ob?ect of security. 2hereas security tended to be understood in terms of defining historical moments
centred around the survival and integrity of the state, we now see emerging an understanding of AinCsecurity that Rarises more from worries about
daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event= AMI*!, ,//7; 33C. In this way, human security certainly participated in the broader
redefinition of security begun in the ,/.4s and ,/84sJ however, it also set off on new terrain, in that shifting its referent to the individual
introduces as threats a host of contingencies that emerge from daily life. This initial deployment of the concept in the mid-,//4s was
subsequently accompanied by other efforts to theori5e human security in ways that would be more amenable to the multilateral and middle-power
approaches found in the foreign policy concerns of certain states. ECa45les li2e t0e %esponsi)ility To #rotect 8enerally
4o;e6 away 1ro4 t0e broa6er 6e;elo54ent concerns o1 t0e $u4an De;elo54ent -e5ort towar6s a
4ore narrow 1ocus on intro6ucin8 a new set o1 international nor4s on inter;ention t0at woul6 8ui6e
an6 restrict t0e con6uct o1 t0e state an6 t0e international co44unity in ReCtre4e an6 eCce5tional
cases@ AI"I&&, 344,; L,C. 'ere, t0e t0reats are conco4itantly narrowe6 6own to R;iolent t0reats to
in6i;i6uals@ <'uman &ecurity "enter, 344-; viiiC, suc0 as R4ass 4ur6er an6 ra5e3 et0nic cleansin8 by 1orcible
eC5ulsion an6 terror3 an6 6eliberate star;ation an6 eC5osure to 6isease@ AMnited Iations, 3447; B-C. mphasis
shifts from an understanding of threats that stem from a broad set of quotidian political, social, economic and environmental contingencies, to
what are deemed to be Ravoidable catastrophePsQ= AMnited Iations, 3447; B-C. 2ithin this conte1t, there is a partial but significant return to the
state, in that it is through the ne1us of the state that the provision of both security and insecurity, by state and non-state actors, is predominantly
understood.
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#0e State eC5loits an6 6estroys t0e &t0er in t0e na4e o1 0u4anitarian inter;ention an6 1or t0e sa2e
o1 0u4anity as a w0ole
Doucet +KKG
&age FournalsC >)
#0e tra6itional a55aratus o1 t0e state as concerns its 4ono5oly o;er t0e <il=le8iti4ate use o1 ;iolence
also 4a2es its return in t0e 1or4 o1 4ilitary inter;ention as a res5onse o1 last resort to t0e eCtre4e
;iolation o1 ri80ts t0at are 0el6 as in;iolable #0is t0en enables t0e s0i1t towar6s tyin8 security to t0e
notion o1 t0e state@s ability or inability to 1ul1il its res5onsibility to 5rotect t0e 0u4an bein8s wit0in its
care In this sense, t0e re1erent an6 t0reats continue to be articulate6 in nonBterritorial 1or4s3 as wit0in
t0e broa6er notion o1 0u4an security3 but t0e res5onses are 1ra4e6 wit0in t0e neCus o1 t0e state an6
t0ere1ore call 1ort0 a statist conce5tion o1 security #0is return to t0e state is 4a6e all t0e 4ore e;i6ent
in t0e 4anner in w0ic0 t0e narrower conce5t o1 0u4an security centres aroun6 <re=6e1inin8 nor4s
surrounding the legitimacy of the international community=s right to intervention. Suc0 an e11ort atte45ts to
inau8urate an6 co6i1y a new law aroun6 a set o1 nor4s t0at si4ultaneously re9uires t0e sus5ension o1
certain 1oun6ational ele4ents o1 international law in Rcases o1 ;iolence w0ic0 so 8enuinely %s0oc2 t0e
conscience o1 4an2in6)3 or w0ic0 5resent suc0 a clear an6 5resent 6an8er to international security3
t0at t0ey re9uire coerci;e 4ilitary inter;ention@ AI"I&&, 344,; L,C on the part of the international community.
It is the concept of human security that serves to define and identify the e1treme and e1ceptional circumstances that it
itself requires in the subsequent formulation of its responses. In so doing, t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse
5artici5ates in settin8 t0e con6itions 1or bot0 t0e sus5ension o1 t0e law an6 t0e aut0ori?ation o1 its
re1oun6in8 in t0e 1or4 o1 new nor4s o1 inter;ention. $s we will e1plore below, this 4ar2s a 2ey
6i4ension o1 t0e o5eration o1 t0e conce5t o1 so;erei8n 5ower elaborated earlier. The bulk of the most current
stage of the development of the human security discourse can be found in the institutionali5ation of that discourse
within the MI, beginning with the 3447 report by the 'igh-%evel !anel on Threats, "hallenges and "hange AMnited
Iations, 3447C, the MI &ecretary-6eneral=s 344- report 4n (arger Freedom AMnited Iations, 344-aC, the 6eneral
$ssembly=s 2orld &ummit (utcome *ocument in &eptember 344- AMnited Iations, 344-bC, and MI &ecurity "ouncil
Resolutions ,B.7 and ,.4B, adopted in $pril and $ugust of 344B, respectively. These documents which set the stage
for the formali5ation of the human security discourse within the MI via its two main bodies.,4 In parallel with these
developments, the independent $dvisory Board on 'uman &ecurity and the 'uman &ecurity Mnit A'&MC within the
(ffice for the "oordination of 'umanitarian $ffairs A("'$C were created in 344L and 3447, respectively. Both were
fashioned as a result of the recommendations formulated in the 'uman &ecurity "ommission=s A344LC report ,uman
Security ow, and both were charged with disseminating and integrating human security within the MI and beyond.
These activities have been financed by the MI Trust )und for 'uman &ecurity AMIT)'&C, set up by the government
of Fapan, which also sponsored the establishment of the "ommission.,, The 'uman &ecurity Mnit reports that an
average of 37 pro?ects have been funded per year since 3447. 2hile these developments are recent and cannot be
overstated given the chill that /N,, brought to the debates on international humanitarian intervention, they do however
indicate an attempt at mainstreaming the concept of human security through a process of initiating formali5ation and
institutionali5ation. 2hat follows is a reading of the broad and narrow conceptions of human security informed by our
earlier elaboration of the concepts of sovereign power and biopower.
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#0e ability o1 t0e state to a55ly 8oo6 or ba6 et0ical clai4s is t0e root o1 security 6iscourse In t0e
na4e o1 et0ics t0e a11ir4ati;e 8i;es t0e state increase6 bio5olitical control
Doucet 34KG
&age FournalsC >)
In <re=6e1inin8 t0e t0reats to 0u4an li1e as its 4ost basic o5eration3 t0e 6iscourse o1 0u4an security
4ust be8in by 6e1inin8 an6 enactin8 t0e 0u4an in bio5olitical ter4s #0e tar8et o1 0u4an security3
w0et0er broa6 or narrow3 is to 4a2e li;e t0e li1e o1 t0e in6i;i6ual t0rou80 a co45leC o1 strate8ies
initiate6 at t0e le;el o1 5o5ulations In 6e1inin8 an6 res5on6in8 to t0reats to 0u4an li1e3 t0ese
strate8ies 0a;e as t0eir ai4 t0e a;oi6ance o1 ris2 an6 t0e 4ana8e4ent o1 contin8ency in t0e o;erall
8oal o1 i45ro;in8 t0e li1e li;e6 by t0e subEects in;o2e6 in t0eir own o5eration. In this sense, as with
)oucault=s understanding of the biopolitical, the health and welfare of populations is human security=s frame of
interventionJ however, until its recent institutionali5ation within the MI3 t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse , from the
vantage point of the international3 0as been 4ar2e6 4ostly by 6e1inin8 an6 i6enti1yin8 t0e 8lobal 5atterns
an6 tren6s o1 0u4an in security . In other words3 t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse@s initial 4o;e is 1oun6 in
creatin8 t0e 4easure4ents t0at a88re8ate t0e t0reats to 0u4an li1e. The clearest e1ample of this initial
labour in relation to the narrower understanding of human security can be found in the 'uman &ecurity Report in
344-, which boasts that Rno annual publication maps the trends in the incidence, severity, causes and consequences of
global violence as comprehensively= A'uman &ecurity "entre, 344-; viiiC. This quest to properly order, categori5e and
account for the Rtrue= threats to human life in the post-"old 2ar world is also e1emplified in the series of MI*!
reports. $s >ark *uffield [ Iicholas 2addell A344B; -C point out, Rthe MI*! . . . launched its annual ,uman
Development #eport in ,//4, dedicating it to :. . . ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth
alone<=. It is t0rou80 t0is 4a55in8 t0at t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse t0en a6;ocates on be0al1 o1
s5eci1ic areas o1 strate8ic inter;ention in t0e na4e o1 t0e 0ealt0 an6 wel1are o1 tar8ete6 5o5ulations .
$lthough still in their infancy, t0e strate8ies are 4eant to 1oster 6e;elo54ent as a 4eans o1 securin8 t0e
0ealt0 an6 wel1are o1 tar8ete6 5o5ulations. Recent programmes detailed by the 'uman &ecurity Mnit include
preventing the abuse of illicit drugs in $fghanistanJ addressing the health of women and adolescents affected by 'I#
in 'onduras, l &alvador and 6uatemalaJ contributing to the provision of more secure access to small-scale energy
services for local basic necessities in &enegal, Burkina )aso, 6hana and 6uineaJ combating the trafficking of women
and children in "ambodia and #ietnamJ providing access to education in @osovoJ integrating displaced peoples in
"olombiaJ promoting the radio broadcasting of information covering humanitarian issues in areas of $frica and
$fghanistanJ building civic participation and self-reliance in Timor-%esteJ and stabili5ing refugee host communities
through a multifaceted strategy that includes the reduction of small arms and the provision of basic education, food and
environmental security in Tan5ania AMnited Iations 'uman &ecurity Mnit, 344BC. &uch programmes operate at the
level of the chronic insecurities in the day-to-day life of targeted populations. They envision human security as part of
Rcomprehensive, integrated, people-centered solutions= AMnited Iations 'uman &ecurity Mnit, 344B; 3C that are meant
to provide a measure of remedy to quotidian threats. 2hile the programmes target specific populations in delimited
locales, t0e t0reats are t0e4sel;es 1ra4e6 in re8ar6s to circulation an6 see2 to ulti4ately 6istin8uis0
t0e ba6 1ro4 t0e 8oo6 1lows in ter4s o1 <in=security. In this scenario, following from the programme e1amples
above, R8oo6 circulation@ woul6 inclu6e in1or4ation on 0u4anitarian issues3 ci;ic 5artici5ation an6
sel1BrelianceY Rba6 circulation@ woul6 entail3 inter alia3 tra11ic2in83 illicit 6ru8s an6 s4all ar4s
Returning to )oucault=s understanding of security and circulation elaborated earlier, t0e 1ra4e o1 inter;ention o1
t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse3 in see2in8 to 4aCi4i?e t0e 5ositi;e ele4ents an6 4ini4i?e t0e ris2s to
0u4an li1e3 o5erates on a terrain o1 calculability t0at atte45ts to 4ana8e t0e incalculable t0rou80
5robabilities In its initial stages, t0e obEecti;e o1 t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse3 in see2in8 to 6istin8uis0
between ba6 an6 8oo6 circulation3 0a6 as its 5ri4ary 8ra44ar o1 re1erence sustainable 0u4an
6e;elo54ent.,3 2ith the post-/N,, moment and the ensuing Rwar on terror=, however, the distinction between good
and bad circulation tends to take as its frame of reference global order. 2ith the attacks on the 2orld Trade "enter and
the !entagon, as well as the subsequent bombings in >adrid and %ondon, the globality of the circulation of threats for
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the R2est= becomes more e1plicit, and consequently a new cartography of threats and vulnerabilities is drawn up and
rationalities and technologies are deployed to counter them. $s *uffield [ 2addell A344B; ,4C e1plain in relation to
the Rwar on terrorism=; #0e 5re6o4inance o1 security concerns3 es5ecially 0o4elan6 security3 4eans t0at
issueso1 8lobal circulation J o1 5eo5le3 wea5ons3 networ2s3 illicit co44o6ities3 4oney3 in1or4ation3
an6 so on J e4anatin8 1ro43 an6 1lowin8 t0rou80 t0e worl6@s con1lict ?ones3 now in1luence t0e
consoli6atin8 bio5olitical 1unction o1 6e;elo54ent. Mnlike *uffield [ 2addell=s work, t0e tac2 we woul6
li2e to 1ollow in t0e section below is not 6irecte6 towar6s tracin8 t0e bio5olitical 1unction o1
international 6e;elo54ent 5ractices in relation to t0e Rwar on terror@3 but to t0e way in w0ic0 t0e
0u4an security 6iscourse 5artici5ates in settin8 t0e terrain 1or an6 t0e 6e5loy4ent o1 so;erei8n
5ower
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In t0e na4e o1 0u4anitarian an6 et0ical concerns t0e 8o;ern4ent inter;enes e;en 4ore into t0e
5erson li1e o1 t0e 5eo5le #0e bio5olitical or6er is rein1orce6 by t0e i6ea t0at t0e state 0as a
res5onsibility to its 5eo5le an6 t0ere1ore 0as a ri80t to control it
Doucet +KKG
&age FournalsC >)
(ne would be hard pressed to find a more paradigmatic symbol of the post- /N,, world order than "amp *elta.
Guant_na4o Bay 0as beco4e t0e 5ri4e eCa45le t0rou80 w0ic0 t0e 9uestion o1 eCce5tionalis4 an6 its
boun6e6 relations0i5 to so;erei8nty 0as co4e to t0e 1ore.,L 'ow is it possible to reconcile the biopolitical
function of human security outlined above with the e1ceptional times of the post-/N,, worldE 2hat are the
mechanisms and assemblages through which we can understand the complementarity between biopower and sovereign
powerE In this final section, we e1plore what we understand to be two key dimensions that mark the complementarity
between these forms of power while simultaneously showing how their articulation problemati5es the way in which
they have been understood in theoretical terms. 2e have already e1plored via $gamben=s work how rendering life
bare can be seen as the originary activity of sovereign power. 2hat can be brought to light here, in relation to our
discussion of human security above, is that the life lived by the sub?ects of the human security discourse can be seen as
life lived as Rbare= inasmuch as this discourse is not meant to qualify political life. $s e1plored previously, life through
the lens of human security is understood primarily in terms of providing for the basic sustenance of day-to-day life.
Brou80t into t0e 5ostBIH11 conteCt3 w0at t0is enables is an o5enin8 towar6s 4a55in8 8lobal or6er in a
way t0at a55ortions t0is bare li1e in relation to ?ones o1 eCce5tionality a4enable to t0e lo8ic o1 an
eCercise o1 so;erei8n 5ower #0is is re1lecte6 in t0e way 6e;elo54ent obEecti;es an6 0u4anitarian
8oals now ten6 to sub4it 4ore 6irectly to t0e 6ictates o1 t0e 4ana8e4ent o1 8lobal or6er . Instead of
targeting 5o5ulations t0at are 4ost insecure as 4easure6 by t0e 0u4an security 6iscourse an6 ;iewin8
t0e 5ro;ision o1 security to t0ose 5o5ulations as an en6 in itsel13 t0e tar8etin8 is now o;erri66en by t0e
0ar6 security concerns o1 0o4elan6s an6 en6s un6erstoo6 increasin8ly in ter4s o1 t0e ai4s o1 t0e
R8lobal war on terror@.,7 2hile the human security discourse could always be critically interpreted as prioriti5ing
its responses to populations that are threatened in relation to servicing the maintenance of the global liberal order
A"handler, 3447C, t0e s0i1t 0ere can be un6erstoo6 as one w0ere t0is ser;icin8 re;eals a 4ore inti4ate
connection between so;erei8n 5ower3 bio5olitics an6 t0e 4aintenance o1 5ostB IH11 or6er This
connection comes in the way in which the human security discourse prepares conceptually a form of life that is at hand
for the mounting of proactive interventions of pre-emption and prevention. 2e can see elements of this shift in the
most recent institutional developments of the human security discourse within the MI. To be certain, t0e 5ostB IH11
4o4ent can be ta2en as a 4o;e4ent away 1ro4 a 1urt0er co6i1ication o1 8roun6s 1or 0u4anitarian
inter;ention t0at woul6 0a;e as its obEecti;e t0e 0ealt0 an6 wel1are o1 5o5ulations as an en6 in itsel1.
$s $le1 Bellamy A344B; ,B-C chronicles, t0e lan8ua8e o1 t0e Worl6 Su44it &utco4e Docu4ent as it
relates to t0e 4o6el o1 0u4anitarian inter;ention outline6 in t0e +KK1 ICISS re5ort was watere6 6own
in 1a;our o1 rein1orcin8 not only t0e 5rinci5le t0at t0e bur6en o1 5rotectin8 5o5ulations 1ell c0ie1ly on
in6i;i6ual states3 but also t0e i6ea t0at t0e t0res0ol6 1or inter;entions on 0u4anitarian 8roun6s
s0oul6 be 0i80. Thus, t0ere was a clear s0i1t in t0e 6ocu4ent away 1ro4 w0at was 4eant to be s0are6
res5onsibility between t0e international co44unity an6 t0e 0ost state t0rou80 a reBe450asis o1 t0e
res5onsibility o1 t0e latter. $t the same time, the document also moved towards safeguarding the &ecurity
"ouncil=s political discretion to choose when and whether it would intervene rather than endorsing binding criteria that
would compel the "ouncil to act in cases of clear humanitarian emergencies, as prescribed in the I"I&& report
ABellamy, 344B; ,BB9,B.C. 2hile t0ese c0an8es can be seen as weakening the case for binding the "ouncil to
intervene on humanitarian grounds, they can also be rea6 as broa6enin8 t0e sco5e 1or inter;entions on
6iscretionary 8roun6s They do this by further codifying the range of ?ustifications for intervention that emerged
from &ecurity "ouncil resolutions during the ,//4s while simultaneously reaffirming the "ouncil=s ability to choose
which cases merit its attention. !erhaps most i45ortantly3 t0e outco4e 6ocu4ent retains t0e un6erstan6in8
o1 so;erei8nty as res5onsibility outline6 in t0e ICISS re5ort3 rein1orcin8 t0e notion t0at it is t0e 0ost
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state t0at 0as t0e 5ri4ary res5onsibility to 5rotect #0e test o1 res5onsibility 0ere re4ains couc0e6 in
ter4s o1 t0e bio5olitical 1unctions o1 t0e state inso1ar as w0at is 4easure6 is t0e latter@s ability or
inability to 5ro;i6e 1or t0e 0ealt0 an6 wel1are o1 t0e 5o5ulations wit0in its care $s recounted by Bellamy
A344B; ,B79,B.C, the negotiations leading to the final draft of the outcome document came as a result of pressure from
representatives of states that wanted either a free hand to determine whether and when to intervene Athe M&$C or to
retain the traditional supremacy of sovereignty in terms of political and legal autonomy ARussia and "hinaC. $lthough
this can be taken as a deferral to the norms of territorial inviolability, t0ere is a continue6 a60erence to an
un6erstan6in8 o1 so;erei8nty t0at is 9uali1ie6 in line wit0 t0e state@s bio5olitical 1unctions3 in t0at
Reac0 in6i;i6ual State 0as t0e res5onsibility to 5rotect its 5o5ulations 1ro4 8enoci6e3 war cri4es3
et0nic cleansin8 an6 cri4es a8ainst 0u4anity@ AMnited Iations, 344-b; para. ,L8C. "ombined with the
endorsement of the &ecurity "ouncil=s political discretion on intervention, t0ese 4ost recent institutional
6e;elo54ents coul6 also be rea6 as a co6i1ication o1 so;erei8nty in bio5olitical ter4s3 an6 t0us as
rein1orcin8 t0e lin2a8es between so;erei8n 5ower an6 bio5ower
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**Lin2L Et0ics**
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Foun6ationalis4 is a 4oral stance t0at lea6s towar6s a 0o4o8enous bio5olitical structure
Feffrey >inson ,/8-
6enealogies of >orals; Iiet5sche, )oucault, *on5elot and the ccentricity of thics
=oun&ationalism we 6e1ine abstractly as 1ollows It ;iews et0ical consi6erations as always 8roun6in83
an6 t0ere1ore i6eally o;erri6in8 ot0er consi6erations #0e et0ical cannot be con1ine6 to ot0er 5ro;ince
o1 0u4an an6 social li1e but rat0er subsu4es all ot0er 5ro;inces #0is subsu45tion consists in always
bein8 entitle6 to subEect econo4ic3 5olitical3 artistic3 le8al or any ot0er as5ects o1 situation to its
criteria o1 e;aluations. >oral evaluations takes priority over other particularistic and consequently one-sided types of evaluationsJ these themselves lie
under an in?unction to attempt to take their cue from the ethic mode of evaluations which transcends them all. E;aluations ta2es t0e 1or4 o1
subEectin8 actions or state o1 a11airs to t0e test o1 w0et0er t0ey con1or4 to t0e 1irst 5rinci5les o1 t0at
et0ic. To take a well-known e1ample from eighteenth century political philosophy, Feremy Bentham=s Fragment on +overnment advertised the merits of the
principle of utility as the Rrock= on which all rationally ?ustifiable !arliamentary legislation and social administration must be grounded; Rd accurately apprehended
and steadily applied Athe principle of utilityC affords the only clue to guide a man through these straits= ABentham ,/B., pp. /L, /.C. $owe;er3
50iloso50ical t0eories 0ol6 no 4ono5oly on t0is 1or4 o1 ar8u4ent. $nticipating the case-study on abortion in "hapter 8
below, it is on the basis of ethical foundationalism that people view abortion as primarily a moral issue, the questionable corollary of this view being that principled
abortion law and policy must flow from a prior consideration of its moral ?ustifibiability. )oundationalism is never a purely ethical stanceJ over and above
principles of evaluations or ?ustification, it always embodies a view Aif not in e1plicit empirical propositions, then in its metaphors, imagery and rhetoricC about its
moral constituency i.e. the nature of the agents who are sub?ected to its constraints. 2hen >ary >idgley seeks to base her ethics on universal human needs, she
neglects to take account of the e1tent to which the ethical 1oun6ationalis4 1ra4ewor2 or6ers t0e s5ace in w0ic0 t0ese
uni;ersal 0u4an attributes can a55ear as t0e 5rior an6 et0ically 6ecisi;e one Foun6ationalis4@s
4o6e o1 e;aluation con;eys two i45lications in res5ect to c0an8eL <i= i1 so4et0in8 is 4orally wron83
t0ere1ore we ou80t to 4o;e 0ea;en an6 eart0 to c0an8e itY an6 <ii= an i45erialist i45ulse towar6s
0o4o8eni?ation3 ie an ur8e to re4oul6 t0e w0ole worl6 in t0e i6eal i4a8e o1 its 1irst 5rinci5les For
t0ese reasons 1oun6ationalis4 4ay be sin8le6 out as t0e sin8le 4ost i45ortant 2ey to t0e eni84a o1
t0e soBcalle6 eccentricity o1 et0ics which was first broached in the preface.
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Atte45ts to coerci;ely 8enerali?e et0ical stances results in rein1orcin8 t0e alrea6y 0ierarc0al an6
6o4inatin8 syste4 o1 t0e state3 t0is coerci;ely brin8s 5eo5le into t0e state@s control an6 is bio5olitical
Richard Day 34K1
thics, affinity and the coming communities. B.$.&c.AMB"C, >.$.A+ork,TorontoC, !h.*.A&)MC
$ssociate !rofessor
Conte45orary Western societies are not only societies of the treeJ they are also societies o1 t0e state 1or4 Since it is
i45ossible to 6o Eustice to t0is conce5t 0ere3 I will restrict t0e 6iscussion to t0e cou5let warB
4ac0ineHstate 1or43 and the relations of this couplet with the arborescentNrhi5omatic distinction. State 1or4s3 at t0e 0i80est le;el o1
8enerality3 are a55aratuses o1 ca5ture t0at brin8 Routsi6e@ ele4ents Rinsi6e@ by connectin8 t0e4 u5
wit0 an arborescent system. 2hile *eleu5e and 6uattari do provide elements of a genealogy A,/8B; 7379L.C, they are careful to point out that the state form cannot
be traced back to a point of origin. Rather, Rthere have been states always and everywhere= A73/C, coe1isting in relations of competition and cooperation with war-machines, forces that are
e1terior to the state apparatus and attempt to Runtie the bonds= of capture AL-3C, to Rdestroy the &tate and its sub?ects= A*eleu5e and !arnet, ,/8L; ,47C. In terms of social and political
effects, states tend to perpetuate already instantiated AarborescentC forms, while war-machines tend to destroy old forms and instantiate new ones through rhi5omatic connections. Thus, for
*eleu5e and 6uattari, Rrevolutionary organi5ation must be that of the war machine and not of state apparatus= A6uattari, ,//-; BBCJ indeed, they see their own writing as an operation that
Rweds a war machine and lines of flight, abandoning . . . the &tate apparatus= A*eleu5e and 6uattari, ,/8B; 37C. +et, ?ust as arborescent forms can grow rhi5omatic appendages, states can 9
and must 9 incorporate warmachines, tame them and put them to use in Ran institutionali5ed army=, make them part of the Rgeneral police= function A*eleu5e and !arnet, ,/8L; ,4LC. This
is the Rspecial danger= of the war-machine; if it does not succeed in warding off the development of a state form, it must pass into the service of the state or destroy itself A,47C. It is here,
in the form of ecstatic in?unctions accompanied by somber warnings, that *eleu5e and 6uattari, like )oucault, present not only a Rnegative= call to resistance, but also a consistent and
Rpositive= ethicopolitical stance. $t times, they take us even further than this, advocating what @eith $nsell-!earson has called Rnovel images of positive social relations= A$nsell-!earson,
,//8; 7,4C. Thus *eleu5e; RWe 0a;e no nee6 to totali?e t0at w0ic0 is in;ariably totali?e6 on t0e si6e o1 T6ea6U
5owerY i1 we were to 4o;e in t0is 6irection3 it woul6 4ean restorin8 t0e re5resentati;e 1or4s o1
centralis4 an6 a 0ierarc0ical structure We 4ust set u5 lateral a11iliations an6 an entire syste4 o1
networ2s an6 5o5ular bases@ A)oucault, ,//B; .8C. This system of networks and popular bases, organi5ed along rhi5omatic lines and actively
warding off the development of arborescent structures, woul6 5ro;i6e bases 1or social 1orces t0at neit0er as2 1or 8i1ts 1ro4
t0e state Aas in the liberal-democratic new social movementsC nor see2 state 5ower t0e4sel;es Aas in classical >ar1ismC. "nli2e t0e
4olar 1or4s o1 social trans1or4ation3 t0ese 4olecular 4o;e4ents woul6 resist t0e will to 6o4ination
in Foucault@s sense3 in 1a;our o1 a11inityY t0at is3 t0ey woul6 ta2e u5 et0icoB5olitical 5ositions but
re1use to try coercively to generali0e t0ese 5ositions by 4a2in8 4oral3 ontolo8ical3 or ot0er
1oun6ational clai4s
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*****G&*E-'ME'# (-&*ISI&'*****
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**-i4al**
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Aut0oritarianis4 an6 constraints are 2ey to a;oi6 o;er5o5ulation an6 resource crunc0 t0at will en6
li1e
Leeson DI A6Eunct (ro1essor at t0e "ni;ersity o1 &re8on Sc0ool o1 Law3 For4er (ro1essor o1 (olitical
Science at Willa4ette "ni;ersity3 For4er Ju6icial Fellow 1or t0e "S Su5re4e Court an6 Justice 1or t0e
&re8on State Su5re4e Court TSusan3 %(0iloso50ical I45lications o1 t0e Ecolo8ical CrisisL #0e Aut0oritarian
C0allen8e to Liberalis4) (olity *ol 113 'o /3 58 /K/B/1G3 EstorU
ssays on the ecological crisis usually stress the point that resources are finite. The conditions that make life
possible are being threatened by overpopulation and by industrial processes which deplete resources
and pollute air and water. Typically, the crisis is considered the result of increasing shortages in the physical
environment. 'owever, a more complete understanding of the ecological crisis requires an e1amination
of human nature, especially as it has been reflected in and shaped by modern political thought since
the Renaissance. >odern political thought, in a departure from classical modes of reasoning,
emphasi5ed secularism, materialism, individualism, and individual rights-the cornerstones of the
political ideology of liberalism and the foundation of the $merican political system. The resulting
view of man0s relations to his fellow man and to the physical environment makes solutions to the
ecological crisis particularly difficult in the Mnited &tates because, contrary to the liberal ideology and
political institutions so long en?oyed here, solutions will re9uire constraints on in6i;i6ual an6 8rou5
be0a;ior. The radical departure of modern political philosophy from the classical tradition becomes apparent on recalling !lato0s Republic, in
which &ocrates and the interlocutors sought to discover the meaning of ?ustice as it appeared in the soul and in the city. Their dialetical search for a
?ust H"ity in &peechH-a hypothetical city-led them first to the simple city which provided for man0s basic needs. It was well ordered but assured
adequate provisions for only the necessities of life. Though &ocrates called it the city healthy, 6laucon called it a Hcity of pigs,H for it failed to satisfy
man0s desire for those comforts and conveniences which go far beyond life0s necessities. This point forced the interlocutors to continue the search for
the "ity in &peech, e1amining not only the requirements of ?ustice but the nature of human desires and the source of proper limits for the soul and the
city.0 "reation of the ?ust "ity in &peech reflected the ancient understanding that human beings must control their desires, and
the discovery and implementation of proper controls, said &ocrates, required rule by philosophers. In
order for the "ity in &peech to come into being, philosophers would have to become kings or vice versa. But since
chances of wisdom coinciding with consent were slight, &ocrates completed the dialogue by showing how the "ity in &peech could degenerate
because of the triumph of governing principles other than wisdom. The "ity in &peech was left to stand only as a standard by which to evaluate actual
political communities. Its creation in the dialogue, however, e1posed enduring political problems, among
them how to control human desires for material comforts and conveniences. The classical tradition
assumed that part of the art of governing was the control of such desires.3 In many ways modern political
philosophy stood this classical tradition on its head by emphasi5ing popular consent rather than
philosophic wisdom as a ma?or goal of politics. Individual rights and liberties became the source of
limits on governmental authority. 6overnment came to be understood as originating from a contract agreed to by
autonomous individuals. $nd the pursuit of happiness became largely a pursuit of material goods for
which there were no natural limits. This modern political philosophy has nurtured the liberal
tradition in $merica. (ne of the ma?or accomplishments of the )ounders was creation of a political
system that legitimi5ed the pursuit of material comforts, that thinkers in the classical tradition had sought to
harness. 'owever, the success of the )ounders0 e1periment in liberal government depended on the
infinite availability of the natural resources necessary for such pursuits. "ontemporary discovery of the
earth0s Hcarrying capacity,H or limits to nature0s Hcommons,H appears to ?eopardi5e the continued
success of the $merican e1periment. I1 A4erican 5olitical i6eolo8y an6 institutions 0a;e been
success1ul in encoura8in8 5ursuit o1 0a55iness t0rou80 4aterial ac9uisition3 t0ey a55ear
inca5able o1 i45osin8 t0e li4its w0ic0 are re9uire6 to 1orestall ecolo8ical 6isaster . This
incapability, in turn, leads to arguments that popular government must give way to authoritarianism. But if
authoritarianism is the response to the inability of popular government to impose the limits required to avoid ecological disaster, such a response
merely reflects the crisis to which modern political philosophy and liberalism have ledJ it is not itself a solution. There is no assurance that
authoritarianism is any more capable of proper limits than is popular government. !erhaps the best illumination of the dilemma posed by the
ecological crisis is a review of the philosophy of Fohn %ocke, whose thought profoundly influenced the )ounders of the $merican republic.
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Constitutional liberties encoura8e an unsustainable relations0i5 wit0 natural resources
%ockean thought legitimated virtually endless accumulation of material goodsJ helped equate the process of
accumulation with liberty and the pursuit of happinessJ helped implant the idea that with ingenuity man can go beyond
the fi1ed laws of nature, adhering only to whatever temporary laws he establishes for himself in the process of pursuing
happinessJ and helped instill the notion that the HcommonsH is served best through each man0s pursuit of private gain,
because there will always be enough for all who are willing to work. In short, %ockean philosophy led to a strong
ideology of man0s relationship to man and the earth, in which autonomous individuals seek comfort and en?oyment
through hard work and material acquisitions. &uch beliefs, added to the doctrine of inalienable rights and the argument
of limited government, have played a significant role in the design of the $merican "onstitution and political
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(ri;ate 5ro5erty an6 liberty encoura8es unsustainable resource consu45tion
%ess than forty years after the adoption of the "onstitution, $le1is de Tocqueville observed that in $merica,
HIothing checks the spirit of enterprise.H 'e noted that the en?oyment of liberty could not be separated
from the Hproductive industryH fostered by free enterprise.,7 The dream of life lived for the
en?oyment of liberty Afreedom to pursue abundance through productive enterpriseC and happiness
Athe securing of abun- danceC appeared to be coming true. Iothing in the constitutional structure
threatened the dream, and it was increasingly clear that government in the Mnited &tates e1isted to
secure the blessings of property, ?ust as %ocke had taught. By the nineteenth century the radically secular
orientation of $merican liberalism was bolstered by developments in modern natural science.,-
&cientific advances provided new insights into the workings of the physical environment and ways
to control it. Technology and industrial- ism provided seemingly unlimited opportunities to create
the material abundance associated with happiness. %iberalism, argues %ouis 'art5, proved its real strength in
driving out any ideological forces which sought to compete with growing visions of abundance and happiness on
earth.,B $lthough liberal ideology and institutions nurtured the commitment to material abundance and earthly
happiness in $merica, they neglected to instill an understanding of $merica0s dependence on natural
resources. )oreign observers saw the dependence much more clearly. )or e1ample, Tocqueville noted that; The
physical causes, independent of the laws, which contribute to promote general prosperity, are more
numerous in $merica than they have been in any other country in the world, at any other period of
history. In the Mnited &tates not only is legislation democratic, but Iature herself favors the cause of
the people.,. 'owever, Fohn &tuart >ill contended that despite such conditions unlimited growth was impossible
because the resources of nature were not infinite. >ill considered nature0s physical limits a blessing and looked forward
to a Hstationary stateH in which population and capital would be balanced. 'e said such a state would still man0s
productive passions and allow him to cultivate social and moral endowments.l8 Iineteenth-century 6erman biologist
rnest 'aeckel coined the term HecologyH in his effort to point out man0s dependence on his physical environment.
very system, he argued, reflects three qualities-interdependence, comple1ity, and limitation.l/ But ecological
lessons ran contrary to the liberal belief that nature could and must be conquered to serve man0s
purposes. $nd repeated warnings in this century that man could e1ceed the carrying capacity of the
environment if he did not limit population or industrial processes have gone largely unheeded.34
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Wel1are is 2ey to a;oi6 t0e resource crunc0 t0at will en6 all li1e
(f late, the warnings have intensified, notably in the reports of the "lub of Rome. In ,/.3 a sophisticated
computer model developed by the "lub pro?ected that unless population or industriali5ation is curtailed
drastically, worldwide collapse of the ecosphere will occur within ,44 years.3, In ,/.7 an updated study
responded to many of the criticisms leveled at the ,/.3 report but came to only slightly more optimistic conclusions;
sur;i;al is 5ossible3 but only i1 4an 6i;erts 1ro4 t0e 5at0 o1 Vun6i11erentiate6 8rowt0V to
Vor8anic 8rowt0.H That is, growth compatible with the requirements and limits of physical nature;
)or the first time in man0s life on earth, he is being asked to refrain from doing what he can doJ he is
being asked to restrain his economic and technical advancement, or at least to direct it differently
from beforeJ he is being asked by all the future generations of the earth to share his good fortune
with the unfortunate-not in a spirit of charity, but in a spirit of survival.33
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#yranny is ine;itable J its only a 9uestion o1 0ow 9uic2ly we allow it to 1or4
Ironically, those who now foresee and advocate authoritarianism as the only workable response to
ecological problems anticipate the demise of the liberal e1periment in much the same way &ocrates
anticipated the demise of democracy in Book vIII of the Republic. &ocrates argued that democracy
inevitably leads to tyranny because of the refusal of the many to accept proper limits. The absence
of limits leads to chaos, which in turn gives way to tyranny because any order is better than no
order. The democratic man, unable to distinguish right from wrong, proper from improper,
eventually accepts tyranny in preference to the chaos which makes life unlivable. 'ardin, 'eilbroner,
and (phuls suggest that modern man is, or soon will be, in a similar situation with respect to the
ecological crisis. *espite the hopes of Htechnological optimistsH the carrying capacity of the earth is
bound to be e1ceeded unless rigid limits are imposed. )aced with chaos and e1tinction, modern man
will find authoritarianism the only alternative.
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FrontlineL Mutual coercion a8ree6 u5on by t0e 4aEority will c0ec2 ba6 instances o1 coercion
'ardin contends that coercion is the only remedy. $s a safeguard against arbitrary coerion, he
prescribes Hmutual coercion mutually agreed upon by the ma?ority of the people affected.H 7-
!resumably, ma?ority rule will reduce the possibility of arbitrariness since it will merely coerce the
minority to behave in ways that will not destroy the commons.
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"ni9uenessL A 8lobal aut0oritarian re;olution is co4in8 J t0ere is a lac2 o1 5olitical interest in t0e
5ro4otion o1 6e4ocratic 1ree6o4s
Win6sor, director of )reedom 'ouseJ Ge64in an6 Liu, presidents of Radio )ree uropeNRadio %iberty [ Radio
)ree $sia, KI
AFennifer 2indsor, director of )reedom 'ouseJ Feffrey 6edmin and %ibby %iu, presidents of Radio )ree uropeNRadio
%iberty [ Radio )ree $sia, Fune 344/, :Mndermining *emocracy; 3,st-"entury $uthoritarians,<
http;NNwww.underminingdemocracy.orgNoverviewNC
2hen asked not long ago about the effectiveness of the uropean Mnion=s posture toward an increasingly assertive and illiberal Russia, former "5ech president and
communist-era dissident #aclav 'avel argued that the uropean democracies had lost their voice and needed to take a firmer,
more open stand against abuses by their large and strategically important neighbor to the east.W 'e warned
that today=s Russia is advancing a new form of authoritarianism, with methods of control that are significantly more sophisticated
than the classic totalitarian techniques of the &oviet Mnion. )inally, the former "5ech leader lamented that as democratic states increasingly gave primacy to
economic ties in their relations with Russia, the promotion of human rights was being shunted to the margins. The @remlin was intensifying its
repression of the political opposition, independent ?ournalists, and civil society organi5ations, but t0e
res5onse 1ro4 establis0e6 6e4ocracies 0a6 so1tene6 to t0e 5oint o1 inau6ibility . 'avel was referring
only to Russia, but he could ?ust as easily have been speaking of "hina, another authoritarian country whose
high rates of economic growth and rapid integration into the global trading system have had the effect of
pushing the issues of democratic governance and human rights to a back burner. "hina, like Russia, has
moderni5ed and adapted its authoritarianism, forging a system that combines impressive economic
development with an equally impressive apparatus of political control. $s in Russia, political dissidents and human rights
defenders in "hina continue to challenge the regime. "hinese activists recently published :"harter 48,< a human rights and democracy manifesto that draws its
inspiration from "harter .., the "5echoslovak human rights movement of which 'avel himself was a founder. But while urope=s anticommunist dissidents were
the focus and beneficiaries of a worldwide protest movement, the "hinese intellectuals who endorsed "harter 48 labor in virtual anonymity. )ew in the Mnited
&tates and urope are familiar with the name of %iu îaobo, a respected literary figure and leader of "harter 48, who has been imprisoned by the "hinese
authorities since *ecember 8, 3448, for his advocacy of democracy and the rule of law in "hina. 'avel too spent years in ?ail during the &oviet period for
questioning the communist authorities= monopoly on power and their denial of basic human and democratic rights. But the world paid attention to his plightJ even
government leaders raised his case in meetings with communist officials. In "hina, %iu remains in detention and effectively incommunicado, and democratic
leaders rarely speak out publicly on his behalf. Today=s advocates for freedom may be receiving less attention, and less
assistance, from their natural allies in the democratic world because the systems that persecute them are
poorly understood in comparison with the communist regimes and military ?untas of the "old 2ar era. $s a
result, policymakers do not appear to appreciate the dangers these 3,stcentury authoritarian models pose to democracy and rule of law around the world. It is
within this conte1t of shifting and often confused perceptions of threats and priorities that )reedom 'ouse, Radio )ree uropeNRadio %iberty, and Radio )ree $sia
undertook an e1amination of five pivotal statesGRussia, "hina, Iran, #ene5uela, and !akistanGto advance our common understanding of the strategies and
methods these regimes are employing, both within and beyond their borders, to impede human rights and democratic development. The countries
assessed in Mndermining *emocracy were selected because of their fundamental geopolitical importance. They are integrated into larger economic, political,
and security networks and e1ert a powerful influence on international policy at the regional and global levels. 'owever, they are also geographically,
economically, ideologically, and politically diverse. Iran, a unique authoritarian polity ruled by &hiite >uslim clerics, looms
over the >iddle ast. The governing cliques in Russia cloak their kleptocracy in a contradictory blend of &oviet
nostalgia and right-wing nationalism. #ene5uela is ruled by a novel type of %atin $merican caudillo who holds
up )idel "astro as his mentor. "hina sets the standard for authoritarian capitalism, with rapid economic growth
sustaining a single-party political system. !akistan, a &outh $sian linchpin, is faltering under the legacy of military
rule and an e1tremist insurgency. Three of these countriesGIran, Russia, and #ene5uelaGare heavily dependent on
oil and gas e1ports, and e1hibit all of the peculiar distortions of so-called petrostates. The present analysis comes at
a time of global : 5olitical recession .< $ccording to recent findings from )reedom in the 2orld, )reedom 'ouse=s
annual survey, political rights and civil liberties have suffered a net global decline for three successive years,
the first such deterioration since the survey=s inception in ,/.3. )reedom 'ouse=s global analysis of media
independence, )reedom of the !ress, has shown a more prolonged, multiyear decline. 2hile the consolidated
authoritarian systems of "hina, Russia, and Iran are rated Iot )ree in )reedom in the 2orld, and the rapidly
evolving, semi-authoritarian states of !akistan and #ene5uela are currently rated !artly )ree, all five have played
an important role in contributing to the global setbacks for democracy.
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"ni9uenessL Aut0oritarianis4 is s5rea6in8 8lobally J it@s alrea6y en4es0e6 in 8lobal 5olitical an6
econo4ic institutions
Ec2ert, Reuters $sia "orrespondent, AB7
A!aul ckert, Reuters $sia "orrespondent, Fune 7, 344/, :*emocracy seen threatened by new authoritarianism,<
http;NNuk.reuters.comNarticleNidM@TR--L77#344/4B47EspDtrueC
2$&'II6T(I AReutersC - "hina, Iran, Russia and #ene5uela form a clique of authoritarian states that use
their wealth and influence to undermine global democracy and rule of law, a study by M.&.-funded agencies said
on Thursday. The report, released on the 34th anniversary of "hina0s suppression of the Tiananmen democracy
movement, says these states0 challenge to 2estern democratic institutions represents a far Hmurkier pictureH
than the "old 2ar because they are integrated into the global economy and world bodies. H!olicymakers do
not appear to appreciate the dangers these 3,st century authoritarian models pose to democracy and rule of
law around the world,H said the study by )reedom 'ouse, Radio )ree uropeNRadio %iberty, and Radio )ree $sia, all
prominent M.&. democracy-promotion bodies. HFust as they rule without law within their borders, authoritarian
regimes are ero6in8 t0e international rules an6 stan6ar6s built u5 by t0e 6e4ocratic worl6 o;er t0e
5ast se;eral 6eca6es3 t0reatenin8 to eC5ort t0e instability an6 abuses t0at t0eir syste4s en8en6er,H it
said. The study said manufacturing and trading power "hina and petro-states Iran, Russia and #ene5uela
shared strong similarities despite their distinct political systems and backgrounds. $uthoritarian capitalist
"hina and Russia have built systems that twin Himpressive economic development with an equally
impressive apparatus of political control,H it said. "MRB& (I (!!(&ITI(I, >*I$ &hiite >uslim clergy-
ruled Iran and #ene5uela, run by Ha novel type of %atin $mericanH strongman, held managed elections amid curbs
on the opposition and on media, it said. Ruling powers in the four states buttressed their control with tight
restrictions on the Internet and media, promotion of nationalist versions of history in school te1tbooks and
use of state wealth to serve their own interests, said the report. Internationally, C0ina 0as built a stron8
1ollowin8 in A1rica an6 Latin A4erica wit0 8enerous noBstrin8sBattac0e6 ai6 5ac2a8es -ussia3 Iran
an6 *ene?uela 0a;e use6 oil wealt0 to su55ort re8ional clients, said the report. H$t the regional and
international level, these authoritarian regimes are undercutting or crippling the democracy-promotion and
human rights efforts of rules-based organi5ations,H it said. Targets included the Mnited Iations, the (rganisation
for &ecurity and "ooperation in urope A(&"C, and the (rganisation of $merican &tates A($&C, added the report.
The report also included !akistan because of its struggling democracy, history of military rule and growing
e1tremist insurgency.
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**A#L (ri;ati?ation**
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(ri;ati?ation Fails More #0an Succee6s
*estal3 Sta11 Writer o1 Statelineor83 KA A"hristine #estal, &taff 2riter of &tateline.org, 8N7N4B, :&tates &tumble
!rivatising &ocial &ervices<, http;NNwww.stateline.orgNliveNdetailsNstoryEcontentIdD,L,/B4C
$dvocates for the poor worry that putting too much responsibility in the hands of profit-motivated companies could
endanger the vulnerable people the programs are intended to help. )ederal rules require state employees to make final
decisions for some entitlement programs, but letting a private contractor make the initial eligibility cut could have a
profound effect on welfare outcomes, they say. &upporters of privati5ation argue that antiquated state eligibility
systems no longer are cost-effective, and say improvements best can be accomplished by a high-tech, profit-motivated
contractor with incentives to operate efficiently. Te1as policy-makers say their plan not only will save ta1payer dollars
but moderni5e the social services eligibility process, allowing people to apply for support over the Internet, by fa1,
through call centers and at self-serve kiosks. "urrently social services applicants must travel to their local social
service offices during business hours and wait in line to talk to a caseworker. *aniels, who left his post as Bush=s top
budget advisor to run for governor in 344L, grabbed headlines this year when he privati5ed an Indiana toll road,
granting a .--year lease to a foreign consortium for _L.8 billion. >ost agree that the state welfare eligibility process 9
with long lines, limited office hours and error rates in the 3- percent rage -- needs improvement. But advocates for the
poor argue that the problems result from underfunding and understaffing, not lack of e1pertise. :The only people with
e1perience in the comple1 and sensitive work of determining welfare eligibility are state workers. 2hy would you hire
a high-tech company to do thatE< asks &tacey *ean of the "enter on Budget and !olicy !riorities, an advocacy group
for the poor. (ther privati5ation critics argue that transferring public services to private companies has been plagued
by quality-of-service problems for the last two decades. The concept makes sense and state policy-makers always are
eager to save money, but in practice, privati5ation has failed more than it has succeeded, says >ildred 2arner, a
privati5ation e1pert at "ornell Mniversity. In an analysis of privati5ation of state and local services over the last 34
years, 2arner concluded that the ma?ority of pro?ects failed because of deteriorating quality of service. $nd in more
than half the cases, the pro?ects did not save ta1payer dollars, she said.
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'o 4oral co44on 8oo6 eCists J ar8u4ents t0at t0e 1ree 4ar2et will 5ro;i6e 1or t0ose in 5o;erty are
loose 5re6ictions an6 are nto 4orally 4oti;ate6
Barry an6 Ste50ens IG (ro1essor o1 Sociolo8y at *an6erbilt "ni;ersity an6 Associate (ro1essor E4eritus
o1 Mana8e4ent at *ir8inia (olytec0nic Institute an6 State "ni;ersity TBruce an6 Carroll "3 %&bEections
to an &bEecti;ist A55roac0 to Inte8rity) Aca6e4y o1 Mana8e4ent -e;iew *olu4e +/3 'o 13 58 1A+B1AI3
EstorU
I fully accept, however, that solidarity is desirable for and conducive to the stability of the welfare state, although I will
not venture an opinion as to whether it is necessary. I also reali5e that questions of stability and legitimacy have
a lot to do with each other Astability may for instance depend upon the state0s beingperceived as legitimateC but I
still insist that the two questions should be kept distinct analytically. Ieedless to say, in an all-things-considered
?udgment, the question of what makes the welfare state function Aa question of which stability is a partC will
have to be addressed but that is not what I do here. Besides, it is hardly a question best dealt with by
philosophers. I will concentrate on the normative question of legitimacy3. (ne thing to note here is that for solidarity to
do anything at all for the legitimacy of a certain state arrangement it has to be solidarity on a state wide level. HThose
very sentiments of loyalty and solidarityH mentioned above are sentiments for all people within the same state. 2hen
the e1istence of, or the likelihood of, such sentiments is made a component of legitimation, a picture
is called to mind of a consensus oriented society with a substantially moral common good that
commands everyone0s allegiance. The unreality of this picture aside, inte8ratin8 suc0 senti4ents in t0e
le8iti4ation o1 t0e wel1are state is to 4a2e t0e stren8t0 o1 t0e Eustice clai4s o1 t0e less
1ortunate 6e5en6ent u5on t0e 4oral 4oti;ation o1 t0e 4ore 1ortunate I 6o not acce5t t0at
Le8iti4ation re9uires 4oral ar8u4ent3 not loose 5re6ictions about w0at 5eo5le 4ay or 4ay
not be 4orally 4oti;ate6
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(ri;ati?ation -aises Deat0 -ate
BBC 'ews3 KI A,N,-N4/, http;NNnews.bbc.co.ukN3NhiNhealthN.838/4,.stmC
The researchers e1amined death rates among men of working age in the post-communist countries of eastern urope
and the former &oviet Mnion between ,/8/ and 3443. They concluded that as many as one million working-age men
died due to the economic shock of mass privatisation policies. )ollowing the break up of the old &oviet regime in the
early ,//4s at least a quarter of large state-owned enterprises were transferred to the private sector in ?ust two years.
This programme of mass privatisation was associated with a ,3.8j increase in deaths. The latest analysis links this
surge in deaths to a -Bj increase in unemployment over the same period. 'owever, it found some countries with good
social support networks withstood the turmoil better than others. 2here 7-j or more of the population were members
of at least one social organisation, such as a church group or labour union, mass privatisation did not increase
mortality. But Russia, @a5akhstan, %atvia, %ithuania and stonia were worst affected, with a tripling of unemployment
and a 73j increase in male death rates between ,//, and ,//7.
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In6i;i6ual in;estors will be less 5ro1itable t0an t0e 8o;ern4ent ensurin8 t0e 1ailure o1 5ri;ati?ation
Anri83 ;ice 5resi6ent o1 5olicy at #0e Century Foun6ation3 is t0e aut0or o1 #0e Conser;ati;es $a;e
'o Clot0esL W0y -i80tBWin8 I6eas Kee5 Failin83 K7
<Gre8 Anri83 ;ice 5resi6ent o1 5olicy at #0e Century Foun6ation3 is t0e aut0or o1 #0e Conser;ati;es
$a;e 'o Clot0esL W0y -i80tBWin8 I6eas Kee5 Failin83 1+H17H+KK73 %#wel;e -easons W0y (ri;ati?in8
Social Security is a Ba6 I6ea)3 #0e Century Foun6ation=
!rivati5ation advocates like to stress the appeal of Hindividual choiceH and Hpersonal control,H while
assuming in their forecasts that everyone0s accounts will match the overall performance of the stock
market. But studies by +ale economist Robert F. &hiller and others have demonstrated that individual investors
are far more likely to do worse than the market generally, even e1cluding the cost of commissions
and administrative e1penses. Indeed, research by !rinceton Mniversity economist Burton >alkiel found that even
professional money managers over time significantly underperformed inde1es of the entire market.
>oreover, a number of surveys show that most people lack the knowledge to make even basic
decisions about investing. )or e1ample, a &ecurities and 1change "ommission report synthesi5ing
surveys of investors found that only ,7 percent knew the difference between a growth stock and an
income stock, and ?ust L8 percent understood that when interest rates rise, bond prices go down.
$lmost half of all investors believed incorrectly that diversification guarantees that their portfolio won0t suffer if the
market drops and 74 percent thought that a mutual fund0s operating costs have no impact on the returns they receive.
2hile predictions vary significantly about how investment markets will perform in the decades ahead, it0s safe to say
that any growth in individual accounts under privati5ation will be significantly lower than what the
overall markets achieve.
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(ri;ati?ation 'ot E11icient
#owns3 -an2in8 De4ocratic 4e4ber3 ID ARep. dolphus Towns, Ranking *emocratic >ember, ,,N7N/., :&ocial
&ervices !rivati5ation; The Beneftis $nd "hallenges To "hild &upport nforcement !rograms<, 'earing before the
&ubcommittee on 'uman Resources of the "ommittee on 6overnment Reform and (versight 'ouse of
RepresentativesC P&ohnQ
!rivati5ation is the shifting of activities or functions from the governmental sector to the private sector through
vouchers, contracts or ?oint ventures. Before we begin that shift, we should ask whether the activity is uniquely
governmentalJ whether privati5ation would improve the economy and efficiency of the activity and whether there is
some reason to transfer a revenue stream from public to private hands. $ccording to the Mrban Institute, there is no
evidence that private service delivery is more effective than public service delivery. The effectiveness of any service
delivery depends on the same key factors that the "ommittee on 6overnment Reform and (versight have always
considered; authority, accountability, and clarity. The 6eneral $ccounting (ffice found that privati5ation in the social
service arena may be difficult to achieve because of a lack of qualified bidders. In addition to possible contractor
ine1perience, there may also be a problem with governmental ine1perience in developing contract specifications,
reviewing contractor bids, negotiating bond and performance issues and monitoring overall outcomes. >r. "hairman, I
hope that we consider those findings today and determine if those problems still e1ist.
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(ri;ati?ation Creates Disaster
Lantos3 "S Con8ress4an3 ID ATom %antos, M& "ongressman, ,,N7N/., :&ocial &ervices !rivati5ation; The Beneftis
$nd "hallenges To "hild &upport nforcement !rograms<, 'earing before the &ubcommittee on 'uman Resources of
the "ommittee on 6overnment Reform and (versight 'ouse of RepresentativesC P&ohnQ
>r. "hairman, many of my friends on the other side of the aisle tend to view government as a disaster and they are all
too eager to solve a problem by turning it over to the private sector. Is >edicare too e1pensiveE Bring in private-sector
'>(s. Irritated by the IR&E %et0s hire private companies and sign a contract. But back in "alifornia, we have learned
an important lesson; The private sector can create some spectacular boondoggles of their own at the e1pense of the
ta1payer. "alifornia0s e1perience with contracting out government services to the private sector involves a )ortune -44
"orporation, a big pot of ta1 dollars, and a computer system that is stuck in an endless loop of delays, cost overruns,
and e1cuses.
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"(R!(R$TI(I& RMIIII6 T' !RI#$TIK* "(I(>+ $R $I$%(6(M& T( BI6 6(#RI>IT&
$eni83 5olitical science 5ro1essor3 IK
<Je11rey - $eni83 5olitical science 5ro1essor3 1IIK3 (ri;ati?ation in t0e "nite6 StatesL #0eory an6
(ractice3 (olitical Science \uarterly=
The first of these themes involved the analogy between government and private monopolies.
"haracteri5ing government as a public monopoly ACC&M(LIS$ED #$-EE #$I'GS FI-S#3 I# Made criticisms
of big government more accessible and acceptable to a mass public that already had internali5ed the
association between monopoly and inefficiency, unresponsiveness, and waste. SEC&'D3 I# gave
criticisms of big government an anchor in traditional microeconomic theory at the very time that the
assumption that economists could provide an ob?ective and scientific under pinning for public policy
was on the rise. #$I-D3 it made an important step toward e1panding the hegemony of economic
theory. conomists previously had based their claim to e1pertise upon the distinctiveness of the
economic sphereJ the analogy
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*****#$E "SFG*****
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*****Courts*****
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**Social -e1or4 H Mo;e4ents**
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Ju6icial rulin8s 1ail to s5ur social 4o;e4ents on t0eir own
-osenber83 6erald I. +KKI PMniversity of "hicago political science and law professor, law degree from
Mniversity of >ichigan, !'. *. from +ale. :Romancing the "ourt<. Boston Mniversity %aw Review, lNn, I&Q
In other words, for ?udicial opinions to foster democratic accountability there must be public and elite support, pre-
e1isting groups and resources committed to the issue, a committed leadership, and a predisposed target audience. 2hen
all these conditions are present, law can, but not necessarily will, make a difference. >c"ann puts it this way; :ven
under the most propitious circumstances . . . the contributions of legal maneuvers to cataly5ing defiant collective action
will be partial, conditional, and volatile over time.< 83 >c"ann=s analysis suggests that demos prudential dissents are
neither necessary nor sufficient for mobili5ing social movements. They are not necessary because if there is an active
social movement in place then no Eu6icial 0el5 is nee6e6 . They are also not sufficient because without a pree1isting
movement and the other factors >c"ann identifies, such dissents will accomplish nothing. Indeed, 6uinier provides two
e1amples of successful mobili5ation without demosprudential dissents. &he describes an e1tremely well-organi5ed and
successful movement to restore voting rights to e1-felons in Rhode Island.8L &he postulates that, :PaQ dissent from the
&upreme "ourt could help in such an effort,<87 but activists in Rhode Island did not need it. &imilarly, she tells the
story of how social movements in >issouri defeated an attempt to enact a very strict voter identification bill,8- also
without the help of demosprudential opinions.
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Courts can@t 5ro6uce social re1or4 J / reasons
-osenber83 6erald I. +KKI PMniversity of "hicago political science and law professor, law degree from
Mniversity of >ichigan, !'. *. from +ale. :The 'ollow 'ope<. Mniversity of "hicago !ress, p ,4, lNn, I&Q
The view of courts as unable to produce significant social reform has a distinguished pedigree reaching back to
the founders. !remised on the institutional structure of the $merican political system and the procedures and
belief systems created by $merican law, it suggests that the conditions required for courts to produce significant
social reform will seldom e1ist. Mnpacked, the "onstrained "ourt view maintains that courts will generally not
be effective producers of significant social reform for three reasons; the limited nature of constitutional rights,
the lack of ?udicial independence, and the ?udiciary=s inability to develop appropriate policies and its lack of
powers of implementation.
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**Courts Goo6L Generic**
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Ju6icial su5re4acy 2ey to 4aintainin8 constitutional unity an6 ri80ts o1 4inorities
W0ittin8ton in D n@eith . A2illiam Ielson "romwell !rofessor of !olitics, !rinceton MniversityC, )olitical foundations of >udicial supremacy7 the
presidency& the supreme court& and constitutional leadership in U.S. history, 344.o
There are a number of ?ustifications for ?udicial supremacy, and these ?ustifications tend to overlap with the more political ?ustifications for ?udicial review. )or
some, ?udicial supremacy is essential to preserving the rule of law and preventing constitutional anarchy. Thinking particularly
of the competing constitutional assertions of the state governments, this was *aniel 2ebster=s concern when he asked his congressional colleagues, :P"Qould
anything be more preposterous than to make a government for the whole Mnion, and yet leave its powers sub?ect, not
to one interpretation, but to thirteen, or twenty-four, interpretationsE Instead of one tribunal, established by and
responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular bodies,
each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of othersE< 'e doubted whether the
government would be capable :of long e1isting< under such circumstances. )or others, the value of ?udicial supremacy is not in its
capacity to provide authoritative legal settlements, but in its capacity to provide substantively desirable legal settlements, but in its capacity to provide substantively
desirable legal outcomes. The ?udiciary alone serves as a :forum of principle< within the $merican constitutional system, capable of focusing on :questions of
?ustice< free from the din of :the battleground of power politics.< )or still others, ?udicial supremacy is regarded as :a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system< because the "ourt alone functions as a counterma?oritarian
institutions securing the liberties of individuals and political minorities. Mnfettered by political interests or popular pre?udices, the
?udiciary can penetrate to the true meaning of the "onstitution and the subtle requirements of its principled
commitments. &ome questionsGquestion of ?ustice and rightsGare too important to be left in the hands of legislative
ma?orities or :the people themselves.< Fudicial supremacy insures that they are not.
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'ot a60erin8 to 5rece6ent 2ills Court le8iti4acy
$ans1or6 an6 S5ri88s in A nThomas 6. A$ssociate !rofessor of !olitical &cience, Mniversity of "alifornia, >ercedC, Fames ). A!rofessor of
!olitical &cience, !rofessor of %aw, )ellow in the "enter for mpirical Research in %aw, 2ashington Mniversity in &aint %ouisC, "he )olitics of )recedent on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 344Bo
$s a result of the norm of stare decisis, the "ourt can incur legitimacy costs by negatively interpreting a vital insititionali5ed
precedent. If instead of following a highly institutionali5ed, bedrock precedent Ai.e., a highly vital precedentC the "ourt chooses
to treat the precedent in a negative manner, then the new policy set by the "ourt may be perceived as being less
legitimate. In other words, ?ust as there are greater legitimacy benefits to following a particularly vital precedent, there are potentially greater
legitimacy costs to overruling or otherwise undermining a precedent that is highly vital. There will be less of a legitimacy cost, on
the other hand, when the "ourt negatively interprets a precedent that is not particularly institutionali5ed or authoritative.
The vitality of a precedent, therefore, determines the e1tent to which the ?ustices bear a legitimacy cost when negatively interpreting the precedent. The more
vital a precedent is, the greater the cost that results from treating the precedent negatively. The ideological distance between the
?ustices and the precedent has no effect on the costliness, in terms of legitimacy, resulting from negative treatment. This argument can be represented as;
legitimi5ation of new policyD-b8A#C.
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"n6er4inin8 t0e Constitution causes eCtinction
'enkin Atlantic Co44 \tly 88 <Colu4bia3 1IGG3 <3 S5rin8=
%awyers, even constitutional lawyers, argue Htechnically,H with references to te1t and principles of construction,
drawing lines, and insisting on sharp distinctions. &uch discussion sometimes seems ludicrous when it addresses
issues of life and death and $rmaggedon. But be0in6 t0e wor6s o1 t0e Constitution an6 t0e tec0nicalities o1
constitutional construction lie t0e basic ;alues o1 t0e "nite6 States9limited government even at the cost of
inefficiencyJ sa1e8uar6s a8ainst autarc0y an6 oli8arc0yY 6e4ocratic ;alues represented differently in the
presidency and in "ongress3 as well as in t0e intelli8ent 5artici5ation an6 consent o1 t0e 8o;erne6 In the
nuclear age the technicalities of constitutionalism and of constitutional jurisprudence safeguard also
the values and concerns of civilized people committed to human survival.
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**$ollow $o5e H Courts Ba6**
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#0e Su5re4e Court (re;ents 6e4ocracy
,inn3 historian, 34K:
'oward Kinn, The !rogressive, It=s Iot Mp to the "ourt, http;NNprogressive.orgNmagS5inn,,4-
&till, knowing the nature of the political and ?udicial system of this country, its inherent bias against
the poor, against people of color, against dissidents, we cannot become dependent on the courts, or
on our political leadership. (ur culture--the media, the educational system--tries to crowd out of our
political consciousness everything e1cept who will be elected !resident and who will be on the
&upreme "ourt, as if these are the most important decisions we make. They are not. They deflect us
from the most important ?ob citi5ens have, which is to bring democracy alive by organi5ing,
protesting, engaging in acts of civil disobedience that shake up the system. That is why "indy &heehan0s
dramatic stand in "rawford, Te1as, leading to ,,B44 anti-war vigils around the country, involving ,44,444 people, is
more crucial to the future of $merican democracy than the mock hearings on Fustice Roberts or the ones to come on
Fudge $lito.
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Lin2B En;iron4ent #0e Courts were only able to 0el5 t0e en;iron4ent once t0e ot0er branc0es 0a6
acte6
-osenber8, 6erald I. Mniversity of "hicago political science and law professor. "he ,ollow ,ope7 Can Courts Bring
$bout Social ChangeE ,/I/. 3.,.
The decades of the ,/B4s and ,/.4s witnessed attempts to change much of $merican society. $mong these attempts
was a movement to protect the environment. !art of that movement, viewing courts as the crucial institution capable of
producing change, focused on litigation. >aking e1plicit analogies from the civil rights movement=s use of the courts,
early environmental litigators e1plicitly aimed to contitutionali5e a right to a healthy environment. In later years, after a
great deal of congressional legislation, environmental litigator went to court aiming to broadly interpret and strictly
apply these legislative attempts to protect the environment. In this overview, I argue that while the attempt to
constitutionali5e a right to a healthy environment could not overcome the constraints of the ?udicial
system, once the other branches acted, litigation was able to contribute to environmental protection
when one of the four conditions were present. That is, when other actors added incentives or costs,
courts were effective. &imilarly, when market forces supported court decisions, litigation helped. )inally, litigation
made a difference when those officials necessary for implementation were willing to act and use courts as cover.
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Contro;ersial Su5re4e Court 6ecisions s5ur con1usion3 acco45lis0in8 not0in8
Del8a6o, Mniversity *istinguished !rofessor of %aw [ *errick Bell )ellow, Mniversity of !ittsburgh &chool of %awJ
Mniversity !rofessor of %aw *esignate, &eattle Mniversity, KG
Richard *elgado, Iorthwestern Mniversity %aw Review, $ "(>>IT (I R(&IBR60& I2 *ITI(I ()
T' '(%%(2 '(! ,4N48
http;NNwww.le1isne1is.comNusNlnacademicNresultsNdocviewNdocview.doE
doc%inkIndDtrue[risbD3,ST.,,4L488-.[formatD6IB)I[sortDR%#$I"[start*ocIoD,[resultsMrl@eyD3/S
T.,,4L488B4[cisbD33ST.,,4L488-/[tree>a1Dtrue[tree2idthD4[csiD.L-4[docIoD,
$ second, closely related, mechanism deals with words and meaning. &uppose, as a hypothetical
e1ample, that the &upreme "ourt one day announces a new approach to pupil assignment rules.
&eparate but equal educational facilities no longer satisfy the requirements of equal protection. n3.
Instead, public school authorities may not use race as a criterion for assigning students to schools,
especially if they intend to produce separate schools for white and black children.
euestions immediately arise as to what the &upreme "ourt meant. *oes the ruling apply only in the
&outhE n38 >ust school districts bus children to achieve racial balance, or may they rely on
remedies that operate on the PW,-,Q basis of school choiceE n3/ 2hat about segregation resulting
from housing patterns and neighborhood preferencesE
nL4
&uppose, in the wake of the ruling, most of the
white parents move out of a city and take up residence in all-white suburbsE
nL,
*oes the ruling apply to public
accommodations, swimming pools, and movie theaters, or ?ust to schoolsE 2hat about singles ads in newspapers and
separate high school promsE
Immediately after a law-reform ruling like Brown, public authorities will confront a host of
questions like those ?ust listed. $nd because the new ruling appears to go against the grain,
authorities, even those with good will, likely will conclude that the &upreme "ourt could not have
meant that. nL3 In the end, the surprising new ruling will end up meaning very little.
nLL
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#0e Su5re4e Court un6er4ines 4inority ri80ts 4o;e4ents causin8 tension in A4erican co44unities
an6 6e5en6ence on 1lawe6 le8islation
2illiams3 news analyst wit0 '(- 'ews3 4/
A11ir4ati;e action 6ies in 4ultiBracial "S Au8ust D3 +KKI
http;NNwww.a?c.comNopinionNaffirmative-action-dies-in-,,,,7..html
&o, why nowE >ore often than not, it is the $merican left that gets lost in absurd fantasies about
race in this country. They pretend there has been no progress in recent decades, even when they see
the rise of a black middle class and witness the election of a mi1ed-race president and the likely
confirmation of a 'ispanic woman to the &upreme "ourt. But today, it is the right wing and its
supporters on the high court who are making stuff up. They pretend that the nation is already so
transformed that a colorblind $merica is a reality and that affirmative action is superfluous, so
much so that white employees in a city fire department G an arena long dominated by Irish- and
Italian-$mericans G need help from the &upreme "ourt to get a promotion.
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Liti8ation 6istracts ti4e an6 4oney 1ro4 success1ul 8rassroots 4o;e4ents
&tephen Carter, !rofessor of %aw O +ale, >ichigan %aw Review, ln, I+
Rosenberg goes beyond the assertion that litigation strategies rarely if ever produce significant change. 'e argues,
correctlyH at they are often counterproductive, for they can distort perceptions about where resources are needed App.
LL/-73C. The particular case of abortion, Rosenberg notes that Hreliance on t0e Court seriously wea2ene6 t0e
5olitical e11icacy o1 5roBc0oice 1orces A1ter t0e 1ID/ 6ecisions3 4any 5roBc0oiceL acti;ists si45ly assu4e6 t0ey
0a6 won an6 sto55e6 i1 5roBc0oice acti;ity #0e 5olitical or8ani?ation an6 4o4entu4 t0at 0a6 c0an8e6 laws
nationwi6e 6issi5ate in celebration o1 t0e Court ;ictoryH Ap. LL/C. The result, of course, was that pro-choice forces
abandoned the political arena to pro-life forces --and then professed surprise when prolife forces won important
electoral victories. The current broad public support for at least some abortion rights has arisen largely because of the
more recent decision of pro-choice forces to return to the grass roots --the place, Rosenberg tells us, where real social
changes take place Ap. L7,C.
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Courts 4erely Eoin 4o;e4entsB t0ey 6on@t 5ro6uce social c0an8e
*evins, /3
Associate (ro1essor o1 Law an6 Lecturer in Go;ern4ent3 Colle8e o1 Willia4 an6 Mary3 -E*IEW
ESSA.L Ju6icial MattersL #0e $ollow $o5eL Can Courts Brin8 About Social C0an8eO By Geral6 '
-osenber8 Cali1ornia Law -e;iew3 L'
Rosenberg convincingly shows that courts cannot do it alone. "ongress, the 2hite 'ouse, the states, and interest
groups also play a pivotal role. &tate efforts to legali5e abortion before Roe, congressional and administrative efforts to
eliminate dual school systems, and the civil rights and women0s movements highlight a remarkable inventory of non-
?udicial influences identified by Rosenberg. The 'ollow 'ope also does an e1traordinary ?ob of demonstrating that
numerous landmark &upreme "ourt opinions were little known and even less discussed at the time of decision. In fact,
Rosenberg0s evidence of the paramount role played by non?udicial forces is one of the strongest to date.
The 'ollow 'ope then offers abundant support for a more modest, more accurate, and equally important thesis; the
&upreme "ourt works within and hence both influences and is influenced by a larger culture of political and
social interests. 2hile severe problems in analysis still remain, this rearticulation accomplishes Rosenberg0s
principal ob?ective of sobering those who endorse an active ?udicial role.
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Court r0etoric 5re;ents t0e 4obili?ation o1 t0e 5ublic3 s0ort circuitin8 5ersonal autono4y
T' '(%%(2 '(! ,4N48
(ne way to understand this mechanism is by means of a device that narrative theorist Fean &tefancic and I
have called the Hempathic fallacy.H nL7 $ counterpart of the Hpathetic fallacy,H familiar from literary
theory, the empathic fallacy is the mistaken belief that one can change another0s beliefs and attitudes
through words alone. In literature, the pathetic fallacy holds that nature is like us with moods, feelings, and
intentions that we can read and understand. The poet, seeing rain, writes HThe world weeps with me.H
nL-
The empathic fallacy, which we coin, holds that narratives are of relatively slight use in dispelling
pre-e1isting ones. $ reader confronted with a new narrative--a black heroine, for e1ample, when she has come to
believe that blacks are lascivious and la5y, the opposite of heroic--will disbelieve it, or else pronounce the present case
an e1ception. 2e are, in a sense, our stock of narratives.
nLB
These long held narratives form the basis against which we
?udge and interpret new ones, such as ones about intelligent $frican $mericansJ brave, resourceful womenJ energetic,
hardworking undocumented aliensJ or loving parents who are gay or lesbian. Mnless the new PW,-3Q narrative is
unusually clever, calculated to resonate with another that we already hold, we tend to re?ect it as
outrageous, e1treme, or wrong.
nL.
&upreme "ourt opinions are, of course, narratives--stories--and thus sub?ect to both mechanisms.
(ver the course of history, a few &upreme "ourt opinions have contained such memorable language
AH!oor Foshua,H
nL8
HThere is no caste hereH
nL/
C that they have moved significant numbers of readers and hastened
reform. Rosenberg correctly notes their rarity, although he would be wrong if he maintains that the number is
5ero.
"(I"%M&I(I
Rosenberg0s new edition, then, soberly reminds reformers not to place undue reliance on courts and
litigation. If dispossessed groups wish to combat unfair practices and laws, the legal profession may
offer them symbolic victories, but little more. To secure real gains, they will need to e1plore other
avenues, including storytelling and literature, electoral politics, and the oldest remedy of all--self-
help and resistance to illegitimate authority.
n74
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Ci;ic En8a8e4ent is 2ey to 6e4ocracy
Fret?3 Director3 Ser;iceBLearnin8 Center3 'aro5a "ni;ersity3 K7
<Eric3 Director3 Ser;iceBLearnin8 Center3 'aro5a "ni;ersity3 V#eac0in8 Liberty an6 (racticin8
Deliberati;e De4ocracy in t0e Classroo43V +KK73 #0e Ca45us Co45act -ea6er3 Winter3
0tt5LHHwwwco45actor8Hrea6erHwinterK7Harticle+B 1 0t4l=
Introduction; In the past decade, many $merican citi5ens have ?oined a choir of voices lamenting the demise of public
life in the Mnited &pates. The common chorus goes like this; $mericans have forgotten how to be citi5ens in a
democracy and architects of public life. (ur democratic imagination is blunt, and public life in the Mnited &tates is
dying a slow death. "ivic 9 engagement, the hallmark of $merican democracy, is in rapid decline. $ccording to
the "ommittee for the &tudy of the $merican lectorate, less than -4j of eligible voters participated in the ,//B
election and since the ,/B4s, voter participation has declined by more than 3.-j. "lose to 84j of the
population ignores local elections. The percentage of $mericans who regularly attend public, school or
political meetings is at all-time lows, and we seem willing to trust our government only in times of e1treme
threat to the republic. The general consensus seems to be there0s not too much to be done about these problems
of public apathy. $ ,//- Iew +ork Times I"B& Iews poll revealed that -/j of the people polled could not point to
one elected official they admired, and ./j believed the government is Hrun by a few big interests looking out for
themselvesH ABoyte, HThe 2ork of "iti5enshipH 7C. Increasingly, $mericans see local and federal government as
entities that are separate from their own interests and needs. 2e have lost a sense of $braham %incoln0s vision at
the fields of 6ettysburg when he declared Hthat this nation, under 6od, shall have a new birth of freedom--and that
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.H
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**A#L $ollow $o5e H Courts Goo6**
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Ci;il obe6ience 1ollows le8islationB social c0an8e is a 5ro6uct o1 con8ressional law
T' '(%%(2 '(! ,4N48
"ivil disobedience might appear to be a narrow e1ception to the rule that law generally shapes
behavior. n,7 But the civil disobedient breaks the PW,7/Q law openly, nonviolently, and prepared
to suffer the consequences.
n,-
$lthough one could think of it as illustrating law0s inefficacy, civil
disobedience occurs rarely enough that it does not shake our faith in the system. $nd because the
violator is prepared to accept punishment, it is scarcely a frontal challenge to that system as a whole.
The same is true for cases in which a minority group believes the law is both un?ust and unlikely to
change anytime soon. Then the group may seek actively to frustrate enforcement. $nti-snitching
campaigns in the black community or efforts by %atino organi5ations to provide sanctuary or
supplies to undocumented immigrants crossing the desert on foot are recent e1amples. n,B But even
here, the law e1hibits a kind of efficacy--the group seeking to nullify it has to go through great
efforts and incur considerable risk to do so.veryday e1perience with cases like these, then, conveys
the impression that law Hreally works.H 'ow could Rosenberg seemingly maintain the oppositeE
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Lawsuits can 1acilitate social 4o;e4ents
'a8in The +ale %aw Fournal "ompany, KG
Tomiko Brown Iagin, H(ne of These Things *oes Iot BelongH; Intellectual !roperty and "ollective $ction $cross
Boundaries .N48
T.,,4L488B4[cisbD33ST.,,4L488-/[tree>a1Dtrue[tree2idthD4[csiD.LBL[docIoD,,
Mltimately, @apc5ynski wants to achieve even more. &he seeks to theori5e how legal concepts mediate the
interpretative frames that socio-political mobili5ations, such as $3@, deploy to assert their interests.
@apc5ynski0s discussion of framing theory advances the scholarly conversation about law and popular mobili5ations in
a crucial way; it helps to bury H5ero-sumH propositions about law0s effects on social movements.
n3
Those with a
5ero-sum view imagine law as a blunt instrument, either breathing life into or taking it away from
social movements. (ther scholars have offered a more satisfying account of law0s impact on social movements, one
that emphasi5es that even PW383Q failed lawsuits can facilitate movements0 cultural and political agendas.
But, as I have previously argued, even these scholars sometimes duplicate the 5ero-sum theorists0 tendency to ascribe far
too much agency to the law,
nL
a supposed Hmaster frameH that animates activists0 each and every move.
@apc5ynski posits a more dynamic model of interaction between law and social mobili5ations. I! law and legal
concepts are constitutive, but not the center of the universe, in her analysis. &he considers the internal dynamics of the
$3@ mobili5ation on its own terms, and ascribes tremendous agency to the activists, who manipulate law to great
effect. @apc5ynski0s Hgravitational pullH thesis deftly illustrates her conception of I! law as an important, but interactive
and dialogic, instrument of meaning. )rame theorists claim that collective actors use frames for diagnosis, prognosis,
and motivation. %egal concepts can be deployed in a variety of ways within the framing process,
@apc5ynski argues, occupying architectural, discursive, and strategic roles. $3@ activists have
manipulated legal concepts to serve their interests, she shows. But so, too, have corporate actors. In fact, some of the
article0s most engaging passages e1plore not the $3@ mobili5ation, but how I! industries articulated and advanced their
goal of e1panding I! protection in the marketplace of ideas.
n7
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Court 6ecision can be trans1or4ati;eMit@s 5ro;en by t0e 1act t0at Brown a11ecte6 1ar 4ore t0an Eust
5ublic sc0ools
Fohn Kincai6, Robert B. and 'elen &. >eyner !rofessor of 6overnment and !ublic &ervice and *irector of the
>eyner "enter for the &tudy of &tate and %ocal 6overnment, %afayette "ollege, aston, !$. )ellow and former
1ecutive *irector A,/88-,//7C of the M.&. $dvisory "ommission on Intergovernmental Relations, 2ashington, *.".J
ditor, !ublius; The Fournal of )ederalism, &t. %ouis -2arsaw Transatlantic %aw Fournal, ,//- &t. %ouis 2arsaw
Trans0l ,L L, 1II:, p. ,7.
%astly, the federal courts, especially the M.&. &upreme "ourt, have played important roles in national
standard -setting since ,/-7 when the high "ourt struck down state laws permitting racial segregation
in public schools. nLL By relying on the )ourteenth $mendment to apply the M.&. Bill of Rights to
state and local action, the "ourt has virtually transformed race relations as well as standards of practice
in many state and local government institutions, such as schools, libraries, ?ails, prisons, and
mental -health facilities.
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Court 6ecisions are insu11icient in c0an8in8 5ublic o5inion
T' '(%%(2 '(! ,4N48
2hen Brown v. Board of ducation came down, did $mericans begin thinking about and acting
toward blacks differentlyE By and large they did notJ Rosenberg provides impressive evidence on this point.
n,.
2hen the &upreme "ourt decided Roe v. 2ade, did a woman0s access to abortion services
improveE $gain, noJ social disapproval did the work that an e1plicit legal prohibition formerly did,
so that women desiring abortions were little better off than before.
n,8
$nd we find the same in other
areas where law-reform advocates secure a breakthrough victory. n,/ Rulings like those upholding
same-se1 marriage were soon rolled back by narrow construction, administrative foot-dragging, or
delay resulting in little progress for the HvictoriousH group.
n34
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Ju6icial ;ictories 6o not 0a;e a catalytic e11ect
Mic0ael McCann3 5ro1essor o1 5olitical science at t0e "ni;ersity o1 Was0in8ton3 Social Mo;e4ents
an6 A4erica (olitical Institutions3 e6 Costain an6 McFarlan63 1IIG3 5 +K:
The movement-centered approach urged here tends to interpret this latter aspect of legal Hconsciousness raisingH
somewhat differently than many characteri5ations by legal scholars. Fudicial victories Aor other legal actionsC
do not HrevealH in?ustice to oppressed groups so much as improve the chances that such in?ustices
might be effectively challenged by movement action in and out of the courts A>c"ann ,//7C.
>oreover, formal legal action alone rarely is likely to generate this HcatalyticH or HtriggeringH effect
on movement constituents ARosenberg ,//,C. (nly when concerted efforts are made by movement leaders and
organi5ations to publici5e such evolving opportunities and to use legal resources for movement-building purposes is
successful organi5ing likely A>c"ann ,//7C. ;,
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Courts 4obili?e social c0an8e J wa8e 6iscri4ination rulin8s 5ro;e
'oward Gill4an, %aw !rofessor, 1III AT' &M!R> "(MRT II $>RI"$I !(%ITI"&, p. .3C
!erhaps the best documented responses to ?udicially created opportunities and catalysts to action
involve the mobili5ation of political interest groups and social movements. &tuart &cheingold
demonstrated decades ago that "ourt actions could be resource in mobili5ing activity in a variety of
ways, including activating and organi5ing core constituent groups members as well as realigning
support from third parties. >y own research on the politics of gender as pay equity Aor comparable worthC reform
provided a detailed account of this process. The very reform strategy its ;;If was conceived by union and civil rights
lawyers responding to emerging "ourt ruling that demonstration of race- or ,e1-based discriminatory impact could
establish a ?udiciable claim under the ,/B7 "ivil Right $ct. 2age discrimination claims were filed in federal courts
during the ,/.4s in an attempt primarily to develop new case law, but in many loA;al conte1ts such lawsuits also became
key resources for organi5ing women into unions or activating grassroots involvement among the already organi5ed.
This activity increased dramatically in local and state venues around the nation after the ,/8, "ourt finding of se1-
based wage discrimination against female prison guards in "o. of 2ashington v. 6unther. In short, the movement was
conceived, born, and developed as a formidable political force from opportunities and resources created by federal
court, and especially &upreme "ourt, rulings. !arallel accounts have been provided for a variety of both women0s rights,
animal rights, and the right of physically and mentally disabled.
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Sy4bolic le8al su55ort to ri80ts clai4s a6;ance social 4o;e4ent
Mic0ael McCann3 5ro1essor o1 5olitical science at t0e "ni;ersity o1 Was0in8ton3 Social Mo;e4ents
an6 A4erica (olitical Institutions3 e6 Costain an6 McFarlan63 1IIG3 5 +KG
)inally, the symbolic normative power of rights claims themselves should not be discounted. This
point links &cheingold0s A,/.7C Hmyth of rightsH and Hpolitics of rightsH analysis. Because citi5ens in our society are
responsive to Alegally sensibleC rights claims, defiant groups often can mobili5e legal norms, conventions,
and demands to compel concessions even in the absence of clear ?udicial Aor other officialC support.
This power of legal discourse has several related and indistinguishable dimensions, including; abstract appeals to the
moral sensibilities of dominant groupsJ more concrete appeals to the interests of dominant organi5ations in maintaining
cooperative relations with victimi5ed groups, such as workers or consumersJ and, perhaps, most important, indirect
appeals for moral censure from the general public regarding the actions of specific powerful groups. The latter factor of
stigmati5ing publicity distinguishes somewhat the potential impact of legal action in high-visibility social struggles
from that in everyday disputes. )ormal legal actions by movements threaten to transform disputes by
mobili5ing not ?ust ?udges as third -party intervenors but also a variety of social advocacy groups,
non?udicial state officials, and broader public sentiment or voting power through the catalytic
dynamic discussed in the last section. In other words, litigation often provides a powerful means for, in
&chattschneider0s A,/B4C terms, He1panding the scope of conflictH in ways that enhance the bargaining
power of disadvantaged groups and raise the perceived risks of hard line opposition from their foes.
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E;en losses in t0e Courts lay t0e 8roun6wor2 1or 5olitical success
Richard Ga4bitta, $ssistant !rofessor of !olitical &cience at the Mniversity in Te1as at &an $ntonio, +overning
through Courts& ,/G1, p. 3.B-...
$ court defeat or victory is a single episode in the litigation process, quite as it is in the policy process.
"oncentration on the impact of those episodes should not blind us to the functions performed by the litigation itself.
These latter need e1amination and e1plication as well. &pace limitations prevent a full discussion here, but a few items
may be listed, as an outgrowth of my research on Rodrigue5, that may provide a beginning. )irst , litigation provides
access to influential government arenas where those without political power in ma?oritarian institutions
can raise issues of concern, e1plain their contentions and political grievances, and receive an
attentive hearing on the merits of their cause A&cheingold, ,/.7C. &econd, through the auspices of the court,
including the vehicles of discovery and subpoena, answers may be secured to questions that might
otherwise be ignored by bureaucrats, elites, private persons, and corporations. 6ochman secured answers to
e1tensive interrogatories detailing the e1tent of educational disparities in Be1ar "ounty and in Te1as. $t that time, these
vehicles provided not only an e1peditious and efficient method of securing that information, but perhaps the only one as
well. Third, litigation is a means of publici5ing an issue, of catching the attention, and perhaps the
sympathies, of various segments of the population. !eriodically, with increased frequency after the lower
court victory, headlined or featured articles would appear in newspapers and maga5ines reporting the information that
the litigants had acquired. )or a five-year period, the magnitude of the inequality resulting from the Te1as school
finance policy appeared in the press. )ourth, the litigation process can legitimi5e a political issue, regardless
of the final ?udicial outcome. The lower court victory in Rodrigue5 especially increased the legitimacy of the
dgewood cause. $nd the five to four &upreme "ourt decision did not return that cause to its original state. )ifth,
litigation has the potential to mobili5e and solidify political support for an issue. It can do so for the
defendant as well as the plaintiff, but if one has little active support and few resources to begin with, this
function generally proves of positive worth. It did so in Rodrigue5. >ost importantly, litigation, as mentioned
earlier, often contributes to the establishment of a legislative agenda. &ignificant lawsuits can recast the nature of a
debate, whether or not they are ultimately victorious in court. In Rodrigue5, earlier legislative dialogue on reform
focused on increased foundation support, not on equali5ation. &ubsequently, both topics were salient considerations.
The lower court decision has established school finance reform as a legislative priority. %itigation can facilitate debates
that otherwise may not occur, thus setting in motion, at times, the process of policy change, as it did in all three school
finance cases. In a sense, litigation can be viewed as a political campaign. The success of any campaign needs to
be measured not only by the vote registered in the final election or court decision, but also by the
impact that the campaign has on current and future public policy. %ike an independent political
campaign challenging the status quo, litigation that seeks policy change often raises issues that
incumbent legislators have traditionally refused to address. $lso, it may distribute unfamiliar information on
the operations of a particular system, publici5e certain abuses resulting from the implementation of ongoing policies,
and attempt to recast public and governmental debates, forcing a legislative agenda that might lead to reform. >oreover,
a lower court victory, like an early primary victory, may change the course of public policy and affairs even though that
early win is never repeated and is subseqently reversed.
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Social success re9uires a s0i1t in i6eolo8y t0at t0e Courts an6 in6i;i6uals 4ust ac0ie;e to8et0er
T' '(%%(2 '(! ,4N48
If ?udicial rulings are relatively ineffective in changing social values and practices in highly
contested areas such as school desegregation, abortion, environmentalism, and same-se1 marriage,
what accounts for this failureE
I believe that the answer has to do with two related mechanisms. I call the first the reconstructive parado1.
n3,
This
theory holds, essentially, that the greater a social evil--say, women0s subordination or black slavery--the
more massive the social effort required to eradicate it.
n33
>oreover, because the belief or practice is
so deeply embedded, it is invisible to many.
n3L
)urthermore, the massive social effort necessary to
alter a historical social practice will inevitably collide with other social values--property rights,
settled e1pectations, the southern way of life, etc.--that are widely held.
n37
This effort will require shifts in
spending and changes in the way we relate to one another.
These efforts for social change, by contrast, will be out in the open, where they will spark sharp resistance and the
accusation that the reformers are totalitarians, moving too fast, imposing costs on innocent people, reviving old grudges,
and the like.
n3-
These considerations will enable the opposition to feel righteous and believe that the reformers sacrifice
real liberty and security for a nebulous goal. )or these reasons, social reform and reconstruction will strike most, at first,
as dubious, premature, dangerous, and wrong.
n3B
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-osenber8@s 0ollow 0o5e analysis is 1lawe63 court 6ecisions 5olari?e citi?enry in eCce5tional ways
pstein 3$enry Wa6e -o8ers (ro1essor 'ort0western "ni;ersity Sc0ool o1 Law3 /,
Lee E5stein3 Was0in8ton "ni;ersityBSt Louis re;iew3
#$E $&LL&W $&(EL CA' C&"-#S B-I'G AB&"# S&CIAL C$A'GEO I1
http;NNwww.bsos.umd.eduNgvptNlpbrNsubpagesNreviewsNrosenber.htm
$s Rosenberg knows, the key precedential cases were brought to the "ourt by interest groups or
movements. $ccording to 6reenberg0s account in the FM*I"I$% !R("&& $I* &("I$%
"'$I6, for e1ample, the %*) sponsored the litigation needed to achieve victory in BrownJ it
was the group0s persistence and not Hluck,H that weakened Hthe remaining legal constraint.H I think
this is an important link, but one Rosenberg largely overlooks.
$nother quibble I have is that some of his analyses are too casual. Those on public opinion immediately come
to mind. Because he does not e1amine trends in survey data in a rigorous way, his observations tend
toward the pedestrian. 'ere is what he writes about public opinion on abortion; Hthere was clearly
no rapid or large change in $merican0s support of abortion after the "ourt0s decisionH Ap.3L8C. 'e
may be correct on an aggregate, first blush, level, but he misses an important point brought to light in
)ranklin and @osaki0s A$!&R, ,/8/; .-,-...C intriguing study; Roe did have the effect of polari5ing the
citi5enry in an unprecedented way
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Ju68es are seen by t0e 5ublic as essential to social c0an8e
Ste50en Carter3 Willia4 'elson Cro4well (ro1essor o1 Law3 .ale "ni;ersity BA 1IDA3 Stan1or6Y
JD 1IDI3 .ale BB E63 Mic0i8an Law -e;iew3 IK Mic0 L -e; 1+1A3 May 1II+3 5 1+1AB1+1D
&ince the pioneering work of Robert $. *ahl, most theorists have viewed the "ourt as one of many actors in
the development of national policies on a variety of issues. nL The implication is that the Fustices
are serious players in the game of societal transformation. &ome scholars, $le1ander Bickel to the fore, have
been more cautious, suggesting a "ourt of limited ability to make changes. n7 Bruce $ckerman, for e1ample, has
compared the "ourt to a group of brakemen sitting in the last car of a train, able to make it stop but not to make it go. n-
+et in the popular image -- the one enshrined by the political rhetoric of left PW,3,.Q and right alike
--the Fustices ride right up in the engine and choose which track to take.
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Courts can@t sol;e broa6er wo4en@s ri80ts J e;en 5rece6ent settin8 6ecisions 1ail because courts lac2
t0e essential tools to sol;e 1or alt causalities
Ieal De;ins A$ssociate !rofessor of %aw and %ecturer in 6overnment, "ollege of 2illiam and >aryC 1II+; Fudicial
>atters; The 'ollow 'ope; "an "ourts Bring $bout &ocial "hangeE "alifornia %aw Review. %e1is
The 'ollow 'ope0s assessment of abortion and women0s rights, while less detailed and less systematic, reaches similar
conclusions. Indeed, Rosenberg uses identical metaphors, speaking of the "ourt as H?oinPingQ,H Hnot creatPingQ,H Ha
current of social change and a tide of historyH Ap. 3B-C. >oreover, like his analysis of civil rights, Rosenberg sees
courts as trying to play a leadership role but failing; H$s with civil rights . . . the "ourt is far less responsible for the
changes that occurred than most people thinkH Ap. 34,CJ Hadvocates of women0s rights have 0won0 quite a number of
legal casesH Ap. 3,3C, but V5rece6entBsettin8 6ecisions in wo4en>s ri80ts 0a;e 5ro6uce6 little because courts lac2
all t0e essential tools re9uire6 o1 any institution 0o5in8 to i45le4ent c0an8eH Ap. 33.C.
Roe v. 2ade, rather than being characteri5ed as a watershed, is seen as solidifying a Hwidespread, vocal, and effectiveH
pro-choice lobby Ap. ,87C. That forty-si1 state laws were invalidated under Roe is downplayedJ highlighted, in its
stead, are statistics showing that the rate of legal abortions rose more dramatically the two years before Roe AL44j,
from ,/L,-44 in ,/.4 to -8B,844 in ,/.3C than the two years after Roe PW,4L-Q A-3j, from -8B,844 in ,/.3 to
8/8,B44 in ,/.7C App. ,.8-84C. Rosenberg also minimi5es Roe 0s impact by arguing that non?udicial market
mechanisms were critical in effectuating the decision. &pecifically, had Roe demanded that abortions be performed in
hospitals, the widespread refusal of hospitals to perform abortions Aonly ,.j of public and 3Lj of private hospitals
perform abortionsC suggests that the case0s impact would have been negligible App. ,8/-34,C.
Rosenberg0s e1amination of Hwomen0s rightsH is also critical of the "ourt. Ioting that the gap between men0s and
women0s earnings has stayed constant since ,/--, that litigation has not affected the wage structure, that most
employment is se1-segregated, and that the $B$ "ommittee on Fudicial &election typically gives better ratings to men
than women, Rosenberg deems court action in this area inconsequential App. 34.-,3C. The cru1 of the problem, instead,
is a long list of social ills, including domestic violence, disproportionate household work, inadequate child support, and
biased laws App. 3,3-3BC.
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-osenber8 is wron8 J ba6 t0eory an6 no reason w0y con8ress an6 t0e eCecuti;e 6o 5ro;i6e c0an8e
*avid Sc0ult? AMniversity of >innesota, #ice !resident, >innesota "ivil %iberties MnionC an6 &tephen . Gottlieb
A"leveland->arshall &chool of %awC 1IIA; %egal )unctionalism and &ocial "hange; $ Reassessment of Rosenberg0s
The 'ollow 'ope; "an "ourts Bring $bout &ocial "hangeE Fournal of %aw and !olicy. %e1is
"ertain deficiencies in Rosenberg0s approach do limit the value of his conclusions about functionalism. )unctionalism
is a theory about how law and its interpretation by courts influence society. Rosenberg is unable to address questions
of influence fully because he uses inappropriate methods and because he ignores the most important aspect of ?udicial
influence -- the power of courts to redefine structures and e1pectations. $dmittedly, whatever their mode of influence,
?udges are not always able to effectuate their goals. Rosenberg claims that such failures illustrate the ultimate
impotence of the courts. Ionetheless, he fails to e1plain how he can conclude, at the same time, that the legislature and
the e1ecutive are effective institutions even though these bodies face implementation difficulties comparable to those
which, for Rosenberg, illustrate that courts are ineffective agents of change. )inally, Rosenberg fails to inquire whether
results would be different if courts did not seek to effect change. 2ithout answering this question, Rosenberg cannot
compare the relative effectiveness of various government branches or definitively conclude that courts do not influence
society.
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(er4 on t0e counter5lan sol;es t0e DA J to be e11ecti;e3 t0e court 4ust wor2 wit0 ot0er branc0es o1
8o;ern4ent
*espite the deficiencies in Rosenberg0s analysis, his work still offers important contributions to the ongoing discussion
of functionalism. 2e conclude that Rosenberg0s analysis actually demonstrates that the "ourt is, indeed, an effective
institution. 2hen we reali5e that t0e Court is but one branc0 o1 8o;ern4ent3 w0ic03 li2e e;ery ot0er branc03 4ust
wor2 wit0 ot0ers to e11ect its 8oals3 Rosenberg0s claim that courts can effect change in combination with others is in
reality an important affirmation of ?udicial efficacy and, ultimately, of the functional role of law.
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Courts sol;e social c0an8e J 4assi;e swin8s in 5ublic o5inion 6on@t 4atter3 4inor c0an8es in
assu45tions o;erti4e buil6 u5 an6 in1luence actors
Rosenberg0s inquiry is flawed from the outset because he fundamentally misperceives the nature of influence and
which evidence properly indicates its presence. Influence need not be manifested as blatantly as Rosenberg suggests it
must be, but it may involve subtle changes in assumptions and minor shifts among coalitions. &imilarly, Rosenberg0s
theory of causation fails to recogni5e that ma?or changes most often unfold over e1tended periods of time and that
people may not respond to a particular event immediately. If Rosenberg is to provide sufficient support for his theory,
he must e1pand his inquiries far beyond their current limits and reestablish them upon a different and improved
foundation. Rosenberg assumes that the influence of any event may be adequately measured by noting direct responses
to it; actors may acknowledge its influence, or their reactions may betray its direct effect on their decisions.
n8,
+et it is
also likely that they will attempt to mask this influence. They may, for instance, wish to give the impression that they
have been right from the beginning. !oliticians are not big on footnotes.
n83
Fust as the origins of reform may be
masked, so too advances in reform need not be indicated by wild swings in public opinion. (olitics is o1ten a 8a4e o1
inc0es . The civil rights movement broke out in a country where candidates were considered HsafeH if they gained --j
of the vote, and a large percentage of districts were not safe.
n8L
ven the e1pectation of small changes in public
opinion could have a significant impact on political actors. (ften, this Hswing voteH was held by blacks. Rosenberg
thus errs in assuming that the "ourt could only influence policy by engendering massive swings in public opinionJ
altering the views of only a few may have an e1plosive impact in such an atmosphere.
n87

In this political environment,
the mere fact that Brown altered the law of the land could have had significant impact itself. It was not even necessary
that anyone be converted to the cause of desegregation. &ome of those who disagreed with the "ourt might have
become convinced that the rule of law was more important than continued support for segregation. ven such limited
and tepid support for Brown could have supplied the necessary margin of political victory to reformers in certain
districts.
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Social c0an8e 6oesn@t nee6 to be seen3 court 6ecisions si45ly nee6 to c0allen8e current assu45tions to
5ro;i6e 1or c0an8e elsew0ere
ven if Brown actually engendered opposition to segregation itself, such opposition need not have been open and
active. )urther, the decision need not even have gained a visible and prominent place in public or elite discussion.
6ame theory teaches that merely altering signals to indicate that additional choices are available may suffice to induce
significant change in a situation where players previously doubted the availability of alternatives.
n8-
Brown need only
have challenged the assumption that there was no option but loyalty to the segregationist status quo.
n8B
Iot only did
Rosenberg entirely fail to address this possibility, but his insistence upon a purely statistical approach disables him
from adequately analy5ing this important possibility. >anifestations of power and influence cannot be adequately
investigated with a purely quantifiable approach, as *ahl0s attempt to do so indicates.
n8.
This means that assessments
of influence may require historical or other indices of impact.
Fudicial decisions can change assumptions not only by opening new options for opposition, but also through their
power to grant legitimacy to certain claims and to redefine norms of institutional action. Mndoubtedly, by changing the
constitutional rule, Brown opened new doors for resisting segregation through actions at law . But it did more. It
invalidated arguments in favor of segregation, both by e1cluding them from the courtroom and by stigmati5ing their
use in public debate.
n88
It also opened an avenue for changing the law elsewhere, as courts and others applied the
newly approved desegregationist argument in other situations.
n8/

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#0e $ollow $o5e t0eory is wron8 J -osenber8 4isre5resents t0e e11icacy o1 t0e lower courts in court
6ecision en1orce4ent
Rosenberg also fundamentally misunderstands the nature of ?udicial policy making and policy making in general. 'is
approach evaluates ?udicial and legislative policy making under different standards and, as a result, unreasonably
elevates legislative and e1ecutive influence over that of courts. W0en ;iewe6 in li80t o1 t0e true nature o1 t0e 5olicy
4a2in8 5rocess3 -osenber8>s analysis actually 6e4onstrates t0at t0e Court is an e11ecti;e a8ent o1 social
c0an8e.
Rosenberg paints an unfairly impotent picture of the &upreme "ourt, in part, because he refuses to e1amine the work
of lower courts. The &upreme "ourt generally does not implement the rules it develops, but relies upon lower courts to
apply its rules in particular cases. %ower courts are like street-level bureaucrats or administrative agencies undertaking
the enforcement work of "ongress or a legislature.
n,4L
The policy implementation literature stresses that once
"ongress passes a law, the real implementation and battles over enforcement occur as officials seek to ascertain and
implement what "ongress intended.
n,47
$n effective analysis of &upreme "ourt influence cannot disregard the
application of its decisions by inferior tribunals. 'ow closely were important &upreme "ourt decisions followed, and
how often were they relied uponE 2ere these decisions applied in new situations and e1tended to other areas of the
lawE 2ere lower courts amenable to claims under these rules, or did they consistently resist their implementationE
2ho won and who lost, and how was this changed by decisions of the &upreme "ourtE 'ow did new found success or
failure in litigation affect policy in other arenasE By refusing to pursue this rich line of inquiry and preferring to reign
his inquiry within an arbitrary time period, Rosenberg0s analysis is severely impoverished and his conclusions are
brought into question.
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-osenber8 1ails to ta2e into account 5roble4s wit0 i45le4entation at t0e Con8ressional le;el
2hile Rosenberg may have forsworn systematic analysis of the process through which "ourt decisions are
implemented, he did not forswear all reference to the process. Rosenberg argues that biased ?udges and obstructionist
interest groups placed such monumental obstacles in the path of ?udicial efficacy that the courts could not be labeled
HdynamicH institutions, at least when compared with other bodies like "ongress.
n,4-
+et Rosenberg0s analysis seems to
embrace a double standard.
n,4B
'e makes no reference to the obstacles legislatures face in implementing policy. &tate
and federal officials may do much to interfere with effective implementation,
n,4.
and interest groups effectively can
close down the legislative arena for years.
n,48
Rosenberg notes none of these obstacles . 'e seems far more eager to
ascribe change to forces other than the "ourt on the basis of purely post hoc argument.
n,4/
'e also fails to restrain his
inquiry into the role of other institutions and phenomena within the same strict temporal limits as he did the inquiry
into ?udicial efficacy.
n,,4
In short, there may be no institution that lives up to Rosenberg0s HdynamicH model. 'is failure
to focus equally on the obstacles faced by various institutions brings his e1altation of "ongress as the ultimate agent of
social change into significant question.
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Courts are i45ortant J t0e $ollow $o5e 1ails to ta2e into account t0at t0e Eu6iciary wor2s wit0 an6
results in t0e action o1 ot0er branc0es o1 8o;ern4ent to en1orce 6ecisions
Ieal De;ins A$ssociate !rofessor of %aw and %ecturer in 6overnment, "ollege of 2illiam and >aryC 1II+; Fudicial
>atters; The 'ollow 'ope; "an "ourts Bring $bout &ocial "hangeE "alifornia %aw Review. %e1is
PW,4B.Q "ourts matter. They matter a lot. &ometimes their orders set in motion market mechanisms which guarantee
their effectiveness.
n,//
&ometimes the threat of ?udicial action prompts either settlement or legislative initiative.
n344

Their opinions influence legislative deliberations
n34,
and change the status quo.
n343
(ccasionally, they trump agencies
and interpose their normative views into the law. It may be that these influences sometimes result in unwise policy
decisions and sometimes e1ceed the proper ?udicial role in our system of separated powers, but they are ?udicial
influences nonetheless.
The 'ollow 'ope unduly discounts these ?udicial contributions. "ourts are given inadequate credit for what they do, as
well as too much blame for what they do not do.
n34L
2hile Rosenberg does a masterful ?ob of showing that courts do
not effect change alone, he goes too far in refusing to recogni5e that the ?udiciary is actively involved in a partnership
with elected government. 'is repeated broadsides at the ?udiciary sound a message of ?udicial irrelevance rather than
one of limited governmental partnership.
n347
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-osenber8 as2s too 4uc0 o1 court 6ecisions J 0e i45lies t0ere is intent w0ere t0ere isn@t J Eustices rely
on en1orce4ent at t0e local le;el
Iot only does Rosenberg fail fully to e1plore the nature of ?udicial and legislative policy implementation, but he also
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of those portions of ?udicial decision making which he does e1plore. By
demanding that the "ourt elicit broad acquiescence to the principles of its decisions if it is to be deemed effective,
Rosenberg demands of courts results that litigants and ?udges rarely intend. 6enerally, their aims are far narrower . It
has long been disputed in the public policy literature what relationship the intentions of actors should play to the
standard by which their success in policy implementation is measured.
n,,,
Fudicial decisions may have effects beyond
what litigants or ?udges sub?ectively intend, but it seems unreasonable consistently to hold courts to a standard they
rarely seek to reach. &uch an approach seems to constitute little more than assigning intent to actors with no more
evidence that they entertained such an intent than that a decision has, years later, come to stand for a principle of social
reform.
n,,3
>erely bringing a case and having it heard may be all litigants actually seek.
n,,L
(thers may wish to
overturn a particular law without intending to restructure social policy across the nation.
n,,7
)urthermore, the "ourt
may consciously avoid direct and immediate ?udicial coercion, as in Brown , where the "ourt ordered local officials
themselves to adopt remedial measures.
n,,-
ven the Hall deliberate speed orderH of Brown II was not a fully complete
remedial decree; the Fustices still chose to rely on local officials for implementation.
n,,B
The &upreme "ourt did not
clarify implementation orders until after ,/B7 and into the ,/.4s. It was only in 6reen v. "ounty &chool Board
n,,.
and
&wann v. "harlotte->ecklenburg Board of ducation,
n,,8
decided after the ,/B7 "ivil Rights and ,/B- &$ $cts,
that the "ourt demanded particular affirmative steps toward desegregation.
n,,/
It was during this time period that some
of the most pronounced changes in integration occurred.
n,34
!erhaps, then, the cases that ought to be e1amined are the
cases in the late ,/B4s and early ,/.4s, and Rosenberg0s ten year time frame should be ad?usted accordingly. $s
Iathan 'akman, one of our constitutional law mentors, used to say, H"ourts first decide cases and not causes.H
Rosenberg has entirely missed this simple truth.
)inally, Rosenberg0s definition of what constitutes the Hsignificant social reformH that he seeks to e1amine is
dangerously imprecise.
n,3,
'ow many people must be affected for reform to be significantE 2hat types of peopleE
'ow much must change before reform has HoccurredHE $ll these questions are left open, and the indeterminacy of this
phrase undermines the force of Rosenberg0s arguments throughout.
n,33
-osenber8@s clai4s aren@t warrante6B 8rou5s 0e says lose 0o5e are acti;ist lawyers
Malcol4 M Feeley3 5ro1essor3 Sc0ool o1 Law3 "ni;ersity o1 Cali1ornia3 1II+ %-E*IEW SEC#I&'
S.M(&SI"M #0e Su5re4e Court an6 Social C0an8e) 0tt5LHH0einonlineor8H$&LH(a8eO
collectionPEournalsQ0an6leP0einEournalsHlsoci91DQty5eP#eCtQi6PD:/
$lthough he draws on many sources and quotes many of them at length, Rosenberg is not at all systematic in
his effort to locate those reformers and other observers whose hopes he finds hollow. !erhaps he
views it as unnecessaryJ after all, these views may be so commonly held that it is impossible to locate a school of
proponents. But to say that he has not clearly identified this group does not mean that he has not identified
anyone. By my rough count, he mentions 73 advocates of the Hdy- namic courtH whose hopes he concludes are
hollow.04 AThe inclusion of several of these people might be challenged because he mentions them only in passing or
only briefly quotes from them.C (f this list nearly half are activist lawyers and another quarter are ?udges
and law professors. The rest are a smattering of political scientists, ?ournalists, and others whose
professions I cannot identify. But with respect to the frequency of cita- tions and the length of quotes, the focus is
overwhelmingly on activist lawyers and ?udges. In essence, he contrasts the wishes, desires, and hopes of these
reformers with subsequent social policy developments related to important &upreme "ourt decisions. &o far as I can
tell3 t0is 8rou5 o1 re1or4ers is an a6 0oc collection o1 acti;ists <an6 t0eir 1rien6s= w0o
eCa88erate clai4s about t0eir own e11icacy That there is a huge gap between their views and subsequent
policies is hardly surprising. Imagine such a study of sports teams, contrasting coaches0 preseason rhetoric with the
teams0 performances during the season AHThis team has a legitimate shot at the championshipJ on a good day it can
beat anyoneH-yet the team finishes three games out of the cellarC. (r imagine someone reporting that there is a huge gap
between candi- dates0 campaign pronouncements and policies after election. 2ould anyone complain that the coaches
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had hollow hopes or that the information about the candidates is newsworthyE I suspect that no one other than a few
sports writers, or opposition candidates, would find it worthwhile to take such rhetoric seriously. "ertainly no one
would take it as a disinterested diagnosis of the strength of the team or the candidate. +et this is more or less
what Rosenberg has doneJ he has taken the rhetoric of the intensely partisan at face value and then
shown that performance falls short of rhetoric. 2hat he does not do is offer any reason-
convincing or not-why observations of this group should be taken so seriously. I emphasi5e this
because his book is so relentless. ach case study follows a similar format; each begins with a mobili5ation of quotes
by reformers which are then followed by a piling on of data to show that they were wrong. But Rosenberg never pauses
to ask what the views of these reformers signify or why they are privileged voices to be taken so seriously.
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In cases o1 lost 0o5e3 t0e court 6i6n@t actually act on t0e social c0an8eB 0ollow 0o5e is a 4yt0
In each of these case studies-and others not mentioned here-Rosenberg concludes that the "ourt was weak
because the goals of the reformers were not met. But as I have tried to show, the "ourt never even attempted
to do what he observes it did not do. It is hard to know what to make of such observations. $t best it is myth
debunking, although if so, we need to know more about the myth than he tells us. 'e promises to e1plicate this
myth with his second provocative metaphor, Hflypaper.H But, as we shall see, he-does not keep the promise.
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-osenber8 an6 1ollowers eCa88erate t0e 5ower t0e court 0as to lose 0o5e
2ho is attracted to the "ourt and whyE $ substantial number of people attribute e1aggerated powers to
the courts. It would be interesting to know who they are. Mnfortunately Rosenberg does not e1plore this
group systematically. $t the outset of each case study he marshals quotes from a variety of sources revealing that a
number of prominent people have had great e1pectations from litigation. But he provides no sustained
discussion as to how he selected those to be quoted, or who they are-why their views matter. (ne
way to summari5e his argument is as follows; H A lot o1 5eo5le t0in2 t0e Court is really
5ower1ul3 but 4y stu6y re;eals t0at it isn>tV ven if he is correct, and I am impressed with the data he has
marshaled, his study is at most a successful effort at debunking an ill-defined myth than it is in e1plaining the nature
of the "ourt0s powers or the pervasiveness and significance of the myth. $ more sociological and theoretically
informed study would have used the myth-the Hhollow hopeH-as the beginning of inquiry rather than the conclusion. It
would have gone beyond myth debunking and asked, 2ho holds this Hhollow hopeHE 2hy do they persist in holding a
belief that is so patently falseE 2hat functions does the myth serveE 2hat is the nature of the flypaper "ourtE 2hat
functions does it serveE Throughout the book, Rosenberg raises such questions, but he never addresses them.
Indeed, his brief concluding chapter, HThe )ly !aper "ourt,H is a dis- appointment. The metaphor promises to e1plore
the seductions of the "ourt and those attracted to it. +et it only reiterates his point that those who place their faith in
the "ourt as an engine of social change are misguided. This, of course, is an important point, but the question is, 2hy
are so many people then attracted to the "ourtE 2e know why flies are attracted to flypaperJ flypaper is aromatic and
flies are dumb. But the people Rosenberg identifies who are attracted to litigation are not so dumbJ they are
prominent lawyers, ?ournalists, and public officials. 'ow can they be so misguidedE (ne can also ask, Is the
metaphor aptE "ertainly the metaphor is powerful; The "ourt attracts would-be reformers only to entrap them in a
futile struggle. But flypaper is designed for this purpose. Is the "ourtE Is the "ourt responsible for trapping would-be
reformersE (r has someone else fostered the mythE $nd is it in fact as dysfunctional as Rosenberg arguesE
2hatever the case, the anomaly Rosenberg has identified-the deep belief in a powerful "ourt coupled with a finding of
ab?ect weakness- should have been a central problematic in the study. To conclude that the "ourt is like
flypaper that entangles would-be reformers in a fruitless enterprise is to pose a problem, not
conclude the analysis. Thus the unasked and unanswered questions; 2ho fosters the myth of the dynamic courtE
2ho maintains itE 2hat social functions does it serveE Rosenberg0s book would have been far more satisfying had he
pursed such questions.
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#urnL Court action encoura8es 1urt0er liti8ation an6 strate8yB Brown 5ro;es
Da;i6 S Meyer3 (ro1essor o1 Sociolo8y an6 (olitical Science an6 Ste;en A Boutc0er3 Doctoral
Can6i6ate in Sociolo8y3 "ni;ersity o1 Cali1ornia3 Marc0 +KKD3 %Si8nals an6 S5illo;erL Brown ; Boar6
o1 E6ucation an6 &t0er Social Mo;e4ents) 0tt5LHHEournalsca4bri68eor8H6ownloa6505O1ileP
[+F((S[+F((S:NK1[+FS1:/D:I+DKDKDKKDDa561Qco6ePKI:/1A1bG16bG/aea++b:+16I11:KG7a
Ie1t, we can consider emulation. "ivil rights activists= success in using the courts led a range of
other interests to adopt litigation strategies, and indeed, even the organi5a- tional structure of the
I$$"! and its %egal *efense )und. (="onnor, for e1ample, describes pressure from board members of the
Iational (rgani5ation for 2omen AI(2C to create a subsidiary directed to litigate on behalf of women=s rights. L/
Baker, Bowman, and Torrey report that the feminist movement=s concern with discrimination against women, and
inequality between women and men, led them to adopt the I$$"!=s approach as :the only obvious model . . . . .
following the I$$"!=s e1ample, liberal feminists worked within the system to achieve change by focusing on
Rgaining equal opportunity for women as individuals.= < 74 They report that I(2 deliberately :copied the
methods, structures, and funding techniques of the I$$"! %egal *efense )und and concentrated,
like that organi5ation, on the courts as an instrument of change through litigating cases raising
constitutional claims.< 7, "ostain notes that members of "ongress made the connection between
women and blacks, and copied legislative provisions for civil rights as well.73 The successful
e1ample of litigation, and the simple story about social change implicit in a ?udicial pronounce-
ment, encouraged the strategy, and groups sought to frame themselves as like $frican $mericans in some way,
usually as a distinct group that suffers discrimination. $ctivists organi5ed to provide for equal protection
under the law, the same standard articulated in Brown, regardless of the nature of their
constituency.7L The model was most easily adopted by other ethnic minorities and women, but it
spread to consumers, disabled people, anti-war activists, crusaders against poverty, and even animal
rights and environmental activists. 'andler reports that the war on poverty=s legal services program, started in ,/B.,
was e1plicitly modeled on the I$$"! and the %egal *efense )und,77 as was the nvi- ronmental *efense )und, also
founded in ,/B..7- In these cases, as with the I$$"!, dedicated organi5ations raised money to hire lawyers to cle
litigation to achieve their political goals, to win political visibility, and to raise more money. The iconic status of the
Brown decision, in which the &upreme "ourt reversed a long-standing precedent and articulated a clear
vision of individual rights that mandated, although it did not effect immediate change in laws and policies,
provided an incredible temptation for environmental groups. If the "ourt could cnd a right for equal access to
education, perhaps it could also cnd a "onstitutional right to a clean environment.7B
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Social 4o;e4ents will continue e;en i1 t0ey 6on@t winB resources3 nee6 to 1i80t o55osition
Da;i6 S Meyer3 (ro1essor o1 Sociolo8y an6 (olitical Science an6 Ste;en A Boutc0er3 Doctoral
Can6i6ate in Sociolo8y3 "ni;ersity o1 Cali1ornia3 Marc0 +KKD3 %Si8nals an6 S5illo;erL Brown ; Boar6
o1 E6ucation an6 &t0er Social Mo;e4ents) 0tt5LHHEournalsca4bri68eor8H6ownloa6505O1ileP
[+F((S[+F((S:NK1[+FS1:/D:I+DKDKDKKDDa561Qco6ePKI:/1A1bG16bG/aea++b:+16I11:KG7a
&econd, some social movement organi5ations have e1tensive resources invested in the pursuit of
social change through litigation. $ctivists are committed to social change, but they are also bound to
support the survival of their organi5ations, and to make best use of the tools and e1pertise they have.
&ocial movements comprise multi- organi5ational celds, including groups that speciali5e in
litigation. In order to sustain the bow of resources into these groups, they must maintain an identity distinct
from their allies, and continue to offer the promise of victory.-8 Continue6 liti8ation `lls a 6istinct
or8ani?ational nic0e wit0in a social 4o;e4ent3 an6 4a2es use o1 wellBestablis0e6
or8ani?ational eC5ertiseY e;en in t0e absence o1 social c0an8e3 it is an or8ani?ational sur;i;al
strate8y Third, like organi5ations, individuals have investments in particular identities and tactics. %awyers
committed to social change employ familiar tactics and make use of the skills they have. The choice of the legal
system as a venue for political action rebects not only beliefs, but educational and professional investments that
support those beliefs. It=s easy to imagine the cause lawyer doubting the effectiveness of shifting his or her skills and
efforts to an alternative political venue. )inally, advocates of social change continue to litigate at least
partly because their opponents do. 2hen an oppos- ing group seeks to pursue its interests through
the courts, it virtually forces its opponent to do the sameGor risk leaving a potentially important
front in the political battle undefended.-/ 6roups can try to respond to their opponents by bringing alternative
cases to the legal system, ones with more favorable facts or district ?udgesJ minimally, they can cle amicus curiae
briefs in opposition to other advocates As lon8 as eit0er si6e sees t0e courts as a 5otentially rele;ant
institution3 nu4erous 8rou5s will continue to c0annel t0eir e11orts t0ere Clearly3 e11orts to
5ursue social c0an8e t0rou80 t0e courts continue a8ainst lon8 o66s o1 success
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*****Con8ress*****
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**Social -e1or4 H Mo;e4ents**
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Con8ress is t0e 4ost e11ecti;e a8ent 1or sol;in8 societal 5roble4s
*odd3 Lawrence 344, TLawrence Do66 is a (ro1essor at t0e "ni;ersity o1 Flori6a3 (ublis0e6 in
Con8ress -econsi6ere63 Dt0 E6ition3 E6ite6 by Lawrence C Do66 an6 Bruce I &55en0ei4er3
Was0in8ton3 D C3 C\ (ress3 5a8es /GIB717 %-eBEn;isionin8 Con8ressL #0eoretical (ers5ecti;es on
Con8ressional C0an8e)U
2hat we know at this point is that we have ad?usted our governing perspectives during these decades and that, despite
the bitter partisan battles that have come with the e1perimentation and shift , and to some e1tent because of them, our
society is as prosperous and productive as ever. 2e also know one other thing; that "ongress, the parties, and the
electorate are capable of reassessing governing strategies, e1perimenting with new ones, learning innovative
approaches, and addressing societal problems. To appreciate this capacity, we must attend to the conceptual lenses
through which we e1amine "ongress and craft multiple theoretical perspectives that can aid us in looking beyond
momentary personalities and short-term stalemate to see the dynamic, historical processes at play. In doing so, we must
bring to "ongress the common-sense ?udgment we bring to daily life, taking care to focus on the motives and strategic
behavior of participants in the foreground, on the shifting background conte1ts, and then ultimately on the critical ways
in which the ideas that participants hold about politics and society shape their strategies and actions. $s we do so,
crafting social choice theories to analy5e the foreground, social structure theories to interpret the background, and social
learning theories to comprehend the role of ideas, we see an overall pattern that no one of our theories could fully
illuminate, and that helps us understand how "ongress can constructively respond to societal problems. Through these
multiple lenses, we see the contest for governing power that ensures partisans will highlight societal problems as they
challenge for control of "ongress. 2e see the dynamic societal changes that generate new citi5en demands and policy
challenges. $nd we see the coming of a new generation of legislators, social activists, and engaged citi5ens who push
"ongress to e1periment with fresh ideas, address the pressing policy challenges, and solve societal problems.
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**Centrali?ation H Go;ern4ent Ba6**
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#0e a11ir4ati;es acce5tance o1 centrali?ation 5re;ents social 4o;e4ents by 6iscoura8in8 in6i;i6ual
actionMt0e result is eCtinction
(a5wort0 K1 <Jo0n3 Senior E6itor S Ecolo8ist Z Foun6er o1 Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 (eace #0rou80
Social E45ower4ent3 V(ri4ary Causes3V
0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Haca6e4icinnHE5170t4l =
It is simply thisJ that our primary problem is not war, or the environment, or population pressures, nor the squandering
of the planet0s finite resources, nor the alienation from life of many millions of peopleJ T' !RI>$R+ !R(B%> I&
T'$T () &IK, si5e developed on such a scale as to disempower people and which makes their moral ?udgements
irrelevant to the passage of events. If we ignore that and simply focus our energies on particular abuses then, however
commendable our ob?ectives and our efforts, we are dealing with the effects of the abuses of power and ignoring their
causes. It was instein who remarked 0+ou cannot solve a problem with the mindframe that has created it0. In saying as
much he was pointing to the core of our problemJ a ,/th century mindframe which accepts, without question or
challenge, giant centralised states and economic entrepreneurship global in its scope, which together have created a
doomsday scenario for the human race. Io body can be healthier than the cells of which it is comprised. If the cells of
small-scale community life are debilitated or non-e1istent in the body politic then what we are confronted with is a
form of social and political leukaemia, a destroyed immune system which cannot prevent multitudinous forms of life-
threatening malignancy, such as monster global wars, from flourishing. 2e are not going to solve the problems of the
3,st century with the mind-frame of the ,/th. &ocial empowerment, involving the deliberate creation of an organic,
multi-cellular structure and process of our political and economic institutions, is today the only realistic path to
enduring peace and to any genuine social progress.
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*otin8 ne8ati;e c0allen8es t0e ine;itability o1 centrali?ation an6 o5ens u5 local co44unities 1or action
(a5wort0 K1 AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, !eace Through &ocial
mpowerment, H!rimary "auses,H http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNacademicinnN?p,7.htmlC
&upposing then our reform movements changed tackE &upposing they tackled the problem of giantism and of
e1cessive si5e in order to restore control of affairs back in citi5en handsE $nd suppose all these reform and protest
organisations ?oined hands to do soE 2hat then would be involvedE They would be agents of the most thoroughgoing
and peaceful revolution the world has ever seen. $ revolution not to capture power but to dissolve it. To dissolve it
into people0s hands where it rightly belongs in the manifold neighbourhoods, villages, parishes and human scale
political structures throughout the world. They would be putting paid to the absurd notion that the citi5en can have a
meaningful voice or influence in political parties or in governments so enormous as to make it inevitable that power
will be in the hands of those who are controlling things at the centre, a control which ensures that they control the party
conferences, agendas, policies, candidate lists and so on. &o persuasive is the power of established practice, and the
powerful propaganda that accompanies it in asserting the natural and inevitable validity of our current institutions, that
it requires a real effort of mind to recognise that far from being natural or inevitable they are neither. They are based in
fact on quite unsustainable assumptions and not least of these assumptions relates to current scheming and plotting Ait
really is nothing lessC to unite urope under one Brussels-dominated 6overnment.
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Decentrali?ation Sol;ency B See2in8 institutional solutions w0ile 1ailin8 to 9uestion t0e assu45tions
t0at un6erlie suc0 institutions will ine;itably 1ail
(a5wort0 K+ AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, :"ut the "ackle,H )ourth 2orld
Review, http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNadobeNfwr,,8.pdfC
2hen confronted with a crisis of epic proportions, it might be thought that it would evoke a concern of like
degree, that if it was so obvious that something was quite fundamentally wrong with our political and
economic arrangements we would be posing no less fundamental questions about them. 2e are not. 2e are
sedulously avoiding any serious attempt to probe the assumptions on which those arrangements are based,
instead we are continuing to seek solutions which leave those assumptions untouched, and therein lies the
roots of the modern crisis. 2hat we need to think we instinctively regard as unthinkable, and the most
imposing peak of this untouchable realm of our own minds relates to the si5e and scale of our institutions.
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'o net bene1itMt0ere is only a ris2 t0e C( alone sol;es best
Fe6eral action coo5ts local 4o;e4ents
(a5wort0 K1 AFohn, ditor O cologist k editor of )ourth 2orld Review, Bringing Mp the %ocal Issues, The
cologist, Fune, http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNacademicinnN?pL.htmlC
2e now have 0national0 schemes and ministries for health, education, welfare and other essentially local matters. The
evidence abounds and grows that these bodies are increasingly wasteful and inefficient, where they are not indeed
riddled with the maggot of corruption, and not least of course they operate on organisational parameters which make a
mockery of democratic principle. &omehow the illusion has been fostered, for e1ample, that people who have devoted
their lives to clambering to the top of the greasy pole are better qualified to ordain how children should be educated
than are the parents and their local committees. &o our public prints are loaded with otiose speculation about 0national0
e1amination standards and results, and about the content of 0national0 educational curriculaJ meanwhile, in rural areas,
large numbers of children are bussed to giant 0comprehensive0 schools where they learn about computers and nothing
about how to grow food. %ocal government, instead of being a power in its own right but working in tandem, where
necessary, with national government, is now the pawn of the latter, which is making a mess of the whole works. It is
time to cry halt to the assault on freedom involved in all this centralisationJ time to restore the power and the spirit of
local power, responsibility and commitment of genuine local government as a precondition of a healthy democratic
way of life.
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Centrali?ation an6 in6i;i6ualis4 are ?eroBsu4Mt0e 8rowin8 5ower o1 centrali?e6 5ower necessarily
6ecreases t0e si8ni1icance o1 in6i;i6uals
(a5wort0 K1 AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, !eace Through &ocial
mpowerment, HIntroduction,H http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNacademicinnN?p,,.htmlC
$s any political Aor otherC unit grows in si5e, the significance of the individual proportionately declines. If you are a
member of a -44 strong community, in the governance of its affairs your membership and your morality matter simply
because your membership is both morally and statistically significant. They will matter even more if you are deeply
concerned, since a large number of people in any community are generally, because of age or disposition, unable or
unwilling to care. But if your political unit numbers -44 million your significance is reduced from ,N-44th to ,N-44
millionthT +et despite this shrinking of your significance to proportions so minute as to be infinitesimal, the power of
the unit itself has increased to quite staggering proportions; 2here then is that power locatedE It is of course at the
centre. The price of your diminished power is the tribute you pay to the swollen octopus of power at the centre.
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#0e centrali?ation o1 5ower in t0e center o1 an or8ani?ation ine;itably tra6es o11 wit0 t0e in6i;i6ual
(a5wort0 K: 9 AFohn, &enior editor of the cologist, baker, and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, #illage
*emocracyC
To enlarge the scale of such relationships to a giant mass is to effect a near total transformation of reality . )or
e1ample, the workings of a modern mass political party, which may number millions, becomes an entity where the
morality factor has largely been supplemented by that of power. 2hatever moral ob?ectives an individual may seek to
pursue by ?oining a large mass organisation, his relationship with it can only be a power relationship. This is
fundamental to his reasons for becoming a member at allJ he is seeking, after all, to change the way power in society is
used, but his individual power is emphatically unequal to that of the central controlling mechanisms. It is in 1act
5ower 0e surren6ers by t0e 4ere 1act o1 beco4in8 a 4e4ber #0e sa4e 5ower cannot be in two 5laces at t0e
sa4e ti4e3 eit0er a 4e4ber 0as it , as in his bowls club by the small si5e of the club, where his membership is a
significant factor in controlling such power as it may deploy3 or 0e 6oesn>t, as in a mass political party where he is an
insignificant cog in a massive wheel controlled by others at the centre. The mere fact of enlarged si5e makes si5e itself
an assault on the democratic ethic as a matter of course.
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(er4 1ailsB 5ower cannot resi6e in two 5laces at once
(a5wort0 : A Fohn, &enior editor of the cologist, baker, and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, #illage
*emocracyC
"urrent thinking in any case takes no account of an essential prerequisite for the successful working of any
federation. 'istory is eloquent that if the members of a federation are significantly unequal in si5e and
strength it will only be a matter of time before the bigger members dominate it. This proved the case in
06ermany0, which, after its formation by Bismark, soon became dominated by !russia and in the M&&R, which
was dominated by Russia. 2hat ensues is not so much a federation as an empire under the dominance of the
most powerful member. It is noticeable that in the M&$ and in &wit5erland, two of the most successful
federations in the record, no single member is strong enough to dominate the rest. This does not of course resolve the
problem of the power drives of any federation when it gets big enough to dominate other federations, as the M&$ does today. 2e can anticipate the
prospect of "hina, or India, achieving a degree of power to rival that of the M&$, especially when the power of the latter inevitably declines. But this
does not resolve the problem of war so much as open up the prospect of even bigger global wars between rival federations. 'ence any pro?ects for a
world federation will need to involve a massive scaling down of the big powers that now dominate world affairs so that the members achieve some
appro1imation of parity in terms of si5e and strength. #0e sa4e 5ower cannot be in two 5laces at t0e sa4e ti4eY eit0er
5eo5le 0a;e 5ower in t0eir 0an6s or t0ey 6on>t Eit0er 8iant 8o;ern4ents an6 cor5orations 0a;e it in
t0eir 0an6s or t0ey 0a;en>t. Ievertheless the dream of some such international authority continues to shine
like a beacon in the eyes of many pacifists and peace lovers, as well as being vaguely acknowledged as a good
thing by a great many other people. #0e 1act is t0at t0ey 0a;e no 8ras5 at all o1 t0e 5ower realities
in;ol;e6 or t0at any suc0 bo6y woul6 be only too to li2ely 4a2e 5eaceBlo;ers an6 t0eir i6eals its 1irst
;icti4s. But then, an an1ious enquiring voice will be heard to venture, 02on0t largely self-governing local
communities or bioregional provinces sometimes want to make war on other neighbouring communitiesE0
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#0e 5er4 cannot sol;e #0e en6orse4ent o1 a 4ass 4o;e4ent3 no 4atter 0ow well 4eant3 will
ine;itably lea6 to a loss o1 in6i;i6ual 5ower
(a5wort03 Albery3 an6 Sale 1 9 &enior editor of the cologist and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, *irector of
the >iddlebury Institute, )ounder of the institute for &ocial Inventions AFohn, @irpatrick, Iicholas, "ommon &ense,
http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNadobeNcommonsense3448.pdfC
2e cannot e1pect to transform the bureaucratic and market dominated subversion of democracy now prevalent
overnight. &o often we are not even in contact with our neighbours, and in seeking change we ten6 to i44erse
oursel;es in 4ass 5olitical bo6ies B t0e4sel;es 5art o1 t0e 6isease rat0er t0an its cure , or in good causes such as
ca45ai8nin8 1or Rpeace=, or for t0e 0o4eless, or to save the rain forests, where concerned people tend to find
themselves in a moral ghetto largely talking to each other. $ new approach to secure neighbourhood power implies a
need to focus on the neighbourhood and on its problems and possibilities for both local and wider social
transformation. Io body can be healthier than the cells of which it is comprised. 2e cannot begin to do this if we are
not in contact with our neighbours and this means we need to e1plore and adopt such measures as enable us to form
and maintain working community relationships. >ass anonymity is its own form of mass powerlessness. !ower cannot
be in two places at once. I1 centrali?e6 8o;ern4ent controlling a mass electorate 0as t0e 5ower3 t0en t0e citi?en in
no way 0as it or3 on such a basis, can 0a;e it .
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Centrali?e6 5ower ine;itably tra6es o11 wit0 t0e local
(a5wort0 an6 Sale 1 J &enior editor of the cologist and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, A'D *irector of
the >iddlebury Institute, and $lbery , )ounder of the instiute for &ocial inventions, 4, AFohn, @irkpatrick,Iicholas,
"ommon &ense,
(ver the last century or more t0ere 0as been a se6ulous trans1er o1 t0e 5ower o1 local ;illa8es, parishes and
neighbourhoods to t0e a4bit o1 central 8o;ern4ent . The measures involved have been presumed to be ?ustified on
the grounds of efficiency and economy. Ieither has been ?ustified by events. Iumerous services heretofore often
conducted on a voluntary basis by dedicated, public-spirited local citi5ens have been taken over by salaried officials
appointed by the central government, with a number of consequences which has helped to create a gratuitous social
tragedy of ever widening dimensions. It is a tra8e6y w0ic0 0as been accentuate6 by t0e e4er8ence o1 new 1or4s
o1 5ower in commerce, communications and transport w0ic0 0a;e also been 6e5loye6 on a nonBlocal basis and
which have served even more to divorce the citi5en from any real control over many of the many factors that now
dominate citi5en life. Two centuries ago an average villager had a distinct element of control over his school,
medicine, police, entertainment, dress, cookery, food production, transport, shopping, welfare and social provision.
Today such control has passed from citi5en hands into the hands of powerful central bureaucracies appointed by the
central government or into the hands of no less powerful commercial concerns. This process has often been ?ustified by
reference to the e1tension
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Central 8o;ern4ent action 6iscoura8es in6i;i6ual 4o;e4ents to sol;e t0e 5roble4 because t0ey 5osit
5roble4s as %out o1 our control)
(a5wort0 K+ AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, :"ut the "ackle,H )ourth 2orld
Review, http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNadobeNfwr,,8.pdfC
(ver half a century ago an $ustrian professor of economics asserted, RIf anything is wrong it is because it is too big.=
!erhaps an oversweeping statement, but all e1perience since simply confirms it. Too big. Fust that. &o government is
too big, banks, shops, farms, industries and fisheries are too big, and even more imposingly unthinkable, nations are
too big. 2hyE Because giantism has made them unmanageable in keeping the peace or in ensuring economic ?ustice
and stabilityJ t0e 1orces 6o4inatin8 t0e4 are out o1 control an6 5ro6ucin8 e11ects we are 5owerless to 5re;ent or
to alle;iate This despite the ballot bo1 and freedom of speech. Too big is the problem of the modern world and the
challenge confronting us all is to reduce the si5e and scale of things so as to enable us to control them. Iobody would
want a pair of shoes which was too large, so why do we tolerate far more important matters which suffer the same
defectE 2e need to challenge that deep-rooted assumption in our minds that making things bigger makes them better
when we are living in a crisis which howls with evidence indicating the contraryJ evidence indicating that the small is
generally better3 1ar 4ore stable3 res5onsi;e3 bene1icial3 controllable3 5eace1ul an6 5ros5erous
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#0e 8o;ern4ent is t0e root cause o1 5roble4s
(a5wort0 I: AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, &mall is !owerful, :The
>onster<, page 3-L, ,//-C
2e need to see that in any mass form of society Ai.e., one in which empowered local communities ?ust do not e1istC, these powerful forces have little difficulty in
deploying their abundant resrouces so as to secure an almost unlimited degree of acquiescence to their standards and values of a vast mass of uncritical, and all too
often uncaring, individuals- who nevertheless have the power to vote. (rdinarily nature provides an abundance of leadership in every kind of
community which will take the initiative in tackling its problemsJ but when communities as such cease to e1ist, as
centrali?e6 1or4s o1 5ower co4e to eCercise a 6o4inance o;er t0e a11airs o1 t0e 4ass3 suc0 locali?e6 lea6ers0i5
loses t0e 4ains5rin8 o1 its ca5acity to act J it no longer has a stage, one might say, on which it can perform. It is this
factor of negated or sub?ugated leadership which gives added signifncance to the proliferating number and variety of
protest, reform or campaigning groups which today are such a marked feature of public life. $n empowered
community would not find itself faced with such groups for the simple reason that the conduct of its affairs would
reflect the wishes of its members as a matter of course. Its leaders, instead of founding or ?oining some national
movement, would be largely running the local showJ but since there is no local show to run, if matters as coffee mornings, ?umble sales, or
discos to raise funds for table tennis tables for teenagers are e1cluded, what role is there left for it to play in matters which will help to determine its character, its
use of local resources or the general quality of lifeE &o that what we are now observing is a form of government which, because of
the nature of the behind-the-scenes forms of power which sustain it and because of the values these forces are
concerned to promote, is compelled to act in accordance with those values Awhich a mass electorate has been
manipulated into adopting as its ownC, is creatin8 a 4ultitu6e o1 5roble4s w0ic0 t0e 4ore 5ublic s5irite6 ele4ents
are bein8 6ri;en to see2 eit0er to re1or43 co4bat or ne8ate . &o that in a very real sense we are in the grip of a
process of government of the people and supposedly for the people which is creatin8 5roble4s3 o1ten o1 crisis
5ro5ortions3 w0ic0 un6er a syste4 o1 8o;ern4ent by t0e 5eo5le woul6 scarcely arise at all
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Decentrali?ation sol;es 6e4ocracy an6 5o;erty
Kau?ya K: B #0e C0ie1 in t0e Di;ision 1or (ublic A64inistration an6 De;elo54ent Mana8e4ent3 "nite6
'ations De5art4ent o1 Econo4ic an6 Social A11airs <Jo0n Mary3 %Decentrali?ationL (ros5ects 1or (eace3
De4ocracy3 an6 De;elo54ent)3 Se5te4ber +KK:3
0tt5LHHun5an1unor8Hintra6ocH8rou5sH5ublicH6ocu4entsHunHun5anK+1:1K5613 K War6=
$s part of the efforts to promote the participation of the people in the decision-making processes as well as the
development activities, the policy of devolution of power and authority to sub-national governments Agenerally
referred to as decentrali5ationC is increasingly adopted and applied in many countries as one of the tenets of :good
governance<. This is based on the premise that decentrali5ed governance provides a structural arrangement and a level
playing field for stakeholders and players to promote peace, democracy, and development. >any countries are
promoting decentrali5ed governance as a measure for democrati5ation, people empowerment and poverty reduction.
'owever, the efforts in this regard are not moving at the same pace, with the same political conviction, using equally
competent capacities, and with the same success. &ome countries have gone beyond political hesitation and put in
place policies of decentrali5ation but they lack the requisite capacities for the implementation. (thers are still
politically hesitant, not sure of the role of decentrali5ed governance in democrati5ation, people empowerment, and
poverty reduction.
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#0e 8o;ern4ent is t0e root cause o1 en;iron4ental 6estruction3 wars3 an6 econo4ic u50ea;als
(a5wort0 I: AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, &mall is !owerful, :The
>onster<, page ,4-,,, ,//-C
'ence to assert that our societies are out of control is surely to assert something too patent to be gainsaidJ and that they
are out of control because they have overreached themselves and have become too big is no less obvious. Too big, both
in terms of the private and public institutions within each state and also in terms of the si5e of the states themselvesJ
too big to be able to respond to the moral ?udgements of the generality of their members, in the way in which
responsive human scale communities are able to evoke as a matter of courseJ in consequence our societies are in effect
running amok in terms of environmental destruction, social despoliation, the squandering of the earth=s finite
resources, economic upheaveals, a propensity for massive wars and even in terms of an uncontrolled proliferation of
human numbers.
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#0e centrali?ation o1 5ower ine;itably lea6s to 8lobal 6estruction
(a5wort0, &enior editor of the cologist and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, an6 Sale 1 9 *irector of the
>iddlebury Institute, and $lbery, )ounder of the instiute for &ocial inventions
AFohn, @irkpatrick, Iicholas, "ommon &ense,
(ne overall consequence of this lack of citi5en control is control by boardroom moguls pursuing purely short-term
pecuniary gains as obliged by company law and the shareholder primacy system in some countries. It is a 6e5loy4ent
o1 5ower3 un6e4ocratic3 irres5onsible3 5er;asi;e an6 i45ortunate, which has come to act on a global scale and
helped to create the current ever deepening global crisis that now dominates all human life. It is a crisis which is
destroying significant elements of the life support systems of the planet, vast proportions of irreplaceable reserves of
finite resources and involving a wholesale degradation of the quality of life at numerous levels. Iot least it has set in
train a number of forces which betoken the most catastrophic consequences, whether in terms of another 8lobal war3
en;iron4ental colla5se or social 6isinte8ration3 which ought now to be the central concern of all public policy
considerations. It is a crisis which can only have ensued from a grotesque distortion of the decision-making power
within human societies and can only be resolved if that distortion is corrected so that such power is effectively in the
hands of the people in their neighborhood communities.
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In6i;i6ual en8a8e4ent in 6e4ocracy is 2ey to 5re;entin8 a colla5se
Watson K7 J $ssistant !rofessor of sociology and gerontology coordinator O &tephen ). $ustin &tate Mniversity
AF.B. 2atson, :$ Fustification of the "ivic ngagement >odel,< p. .L-.7, &ervice %earning; 'istory, Theory, and
IssuesC
The civic engagement of ordinary citi5ens with voluntary associations, social institutions, and government in local
communities is a central feature of strong democracies. )urther, a fundamental feature of democratic governmental
structure is its relationship to civil society, defined as Hvoluntary social activity not compelled by the stateH
ABahlmueller, ,//., p. LC. Through voluntary participation in civil society associations at the local and regional level,
citi5ens pursue activities that potentially serve the public good. Through this rudimentary civic engagement, citi5ens
learn the attitudes, habits, skills, and knowledge foundational to the democratic process-A!atrick, ,//8C. Mnfortunately,
in ,//8 the Iational "ommission on "ivic Renewal AI""RC highlighted the declining quantity and quality of civic
engagement at all levels of $merican life. $ number of other studies concur on the decline of involvement in civic
activities ABahlmueller, ,//.J >c6rath, 344,J !utnam, ,//-C. This concern about the nature and e1tent of civic
engagement in the Mnited &tates has impacted the debate on the proper role of higher education in a democracy.
'igher education institutions, as transmitters of essential elements of the dominant culture, struggle with the
development of mechanisms to sociali5e the ne1t generation about democratic values. $ national debate has emerged
on the higher education response to this perceived need for revitali5ing constructive democratic engagement, building
civil society, and increasing citi5en participation in government at all levels. "olleges and universities have responded
with a number of civic engagement initiatives, including university-community partnerships, empirical studies of
political engagement, community-based AcollaborativeC research, and the development of new Aor e1pandedC service-
learning programs AFacoby 344LC.
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Decentrali?e6 8o;ern4ent is 2ey to 6e;elo54ent o1 6e4ocracy
-osenbau4 II J Director o1 t0e Institute o1 (ublic Mana8e4ent at t0e Flori6a International "ni;ersity
<Allan3 %De4ocracy3 Go;ernance3 an6 Decentrali?ation)3 1III3 0tt5LHHwww1iue6uHai54csHarticlesH6860t43
K War6=
In general, decentrali5ed government can be a very important element in the facilitation of an active and lively civil
society. The more decentrali5ed government is, and the stronger local governance capacity is, the more
opportunities - in essence, the more arenas - are provided for the emergence of civil society institutions. In fact,
very often it is the e1istence of local governance, combined with the emergence of local civil society institutions ,
that truly creates the pluralism that is so central to democratic institutional development . In that regard, local
governments can and have played crucial facilitating roles in the development of vibrant civil societies. %ocal
government policy and administrative practice can profoundly impact upon the capacity for civil society to emerge
and play a role in governance. %ikewise, the actions of local political leaders can either be supportive of or create
ma?or impediments to civil society development.
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Locali?ation is a 5reBre9uisite to sol;in8 6e4ocracy
!apworth 4, <Jo0n3 Senior E6itor S Ecolo8ist Z Foun6er o1 Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 (eace #0rou80 Social
E45ower4ent3 V(ri4ary Causes3V 0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Haca6e4icinnHE5170t4l=
(ur prospects of countering the evil forces promoting the global crisis and of making any significant progress are bleak indeed
if we do not grasp that if people have no real power to enable their moral ?udgements to be reflected in the general life
processes of their own communities, if they do not themselves control their social structures, their schools, post office, bank,
police, hospital, transport and their welfare servicesJ if they have no local power to determine these matters, if they do not have
their own locally elected representatives to sit, with others similarly elected, on boards which govern matters of wider import,
including public utilities such as water, gas, electricity and not least, governing the content of radio and television, they have no
effective power at all. The very structures disempower them and it is a mere abuse of language to describe any such process as
democratic. *emocracy, we should never cease to hold, does not mean government of the people, nor government for the
people, both are essentially totalitarian concepts, it means government by the people. $ll else is claptrap and delusion.
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Locali?e6 e11orts are 2ey to sol;e war an6 6e4ocracy
!apworth 43 <Jo0n3 Senior E6itor S Ecolo8ist Z Foun6er o1 Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 %Cut t0e Cac2le3V Fourt0
Worl6 -e;iew3 0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeH1wr11G561=
To talk of the need for a new party is the old fashioned giantist approachJ what we need is thousands of new locally-based
independent political parties up and down the countryT $nd in the world at large millions of them. The pressing need of the
moment is for a political and economic programme they could adopt which affirms at every level the imperative need for the
human scale as a prerequisite for the effective working of democracy. $nd the programmesE ach local neighbourhood party
will decide its own as a matter of course, which does not mean they would not promote a common series of principles which
serve their common interests. &uch principles would relate at the national level to fundamental provisions for liberty, freedom
and independence, involving of course a complete re?ection of any association with the uropean "ommunity. But cut the
cackle all along the lineJ currently discussion is non-stop about what government policy should be on a host of matters which
have been removed from local control. (ur millions of new parties will assume as a matter of right the power to establish their
own elected regional bodies to run services where such co-operation with other communities may be needed such as specialist
hospitals, colleges, police, radio and T#, transport, utilities, banking and investment. This is a programme of liberation, a
programme to get government off people=s backs and into their own hands. &uch a political structure would at last enable
people=s wishes to prevail on the issues of war, ecological sanity and economic ?ustice. $cross the world people would insist
on the most rigorous controls on armaments production, where it was permitted at all, and of associated scientific research. $t
last the questions of war and peace would not be matters of power-brokering and diplomacy in the hands of giant states but
moral questions of right and wrong in the hands of people. The centrali5ation of power kills democracy, by concentrating
decision making beyond the reach of the average citi5en. !apworth, &ale, and $lbery , 9 &enior editor of the cologist and
founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, *irector of the >iddlebury Institute,, )ounder of the institute for &ocial inventions,
4,AFohn, @irkpatrick,Iicholas http;NNwww.williamfranklin.comN7thworldNadobeNcommonsense3448.pdfC of the franchise, but
again what is evident is an increasing decline of citi5en influence or capacity to control as giant political parties, sub?ect to their
own highly centrali5ed bureaucracies, ordain their workings and their general policy direction. 2hat emerges from this process
is not one in which the citi5en is able to e1press preferences which party or government then seeks to effect, rather it is a matter
of policy decisions by powerful centrali5ed bodies to which the citi5en has no effective response e1cept to assent. It is a
process which gives enormous powers of patronage to party leaders and even more to heads of government and it is one quite
incompatible with the spirit and practice of the democratic ethos. &uch patronage is a powerful weapon in the hands of those
who deploy it to secure subservience to their wishes rather than concurrence with the wishes of the citi5en.
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Decentrali?ation 5ro4otes 6e4ocracy
Kau?ya K: B The "hief in the *ivision for !ublic $dministration and *evelopment >anagement, Mnited Iations
*epartment of conomic and &ocial $ffairs AFohn >ary, :*ecentrali5ation; !rospects for !eace, *emocracy, and
*evelopment<, &eptember 344-,
0tt5LHHun5an1unor8Hintra6ocH8rou5sH5ublicH6ocu4entsHunHun5anK+1:1K561, @. 2ardC
#iewed in this light, political decentrali5ation Abeing a process of transferring decision making power and
authorityC becomes a strong vehicle for championing local diversity and local autonomy. Through it, local interests
are articulated, and local socio-cultural systems are strengthened. *ecentrali5ation provides a structural and
institutionali5ed venue through which local people can participate and e1ert :more influence in the formulation and
implementation of policies< and the determination of their development in general.7 If it is taken that democracy
means the rule of the people, then political decentrali5ation, by facilitating participation of the people in decision-
making, promotes democracy.
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Decentrali?ation 5ro4otes 6e4ocracy
Kau?ya K: B The "hief in the *ivision for !ublic $dministration and *evelopment >anagement, Mnited Iations
*epartment of conomic and &ocial $ffairs AFohn >ary, :*ecentrali5ation; !rospects for !eace, *emocracy, and
*evelopment<, &eptember 344-,
0tt5LHHun5an1unor8Hintra6ocH8rou5sH5ublicH6ocu4entsHunHun5anK+1:1K561, @. 2ardC
2hen political decentrali5ation is understood in the preceding sense, then it becomes clear that it can be a vehicle
for promoting democratic participation. In fact, one would not see any value in political decentrali5ation if it was
not linked to the promotion of participation of local people or their representatives in the process of decision-
making and implementation. In a general way, what is difficult about using political decentrali5ation to promote
democratic participation is not in understanding the linkage between the two but rather how to, through the process
of decentrali5ation, create structures that inspire as well as energi5e local people, and facilitate their participation in
the decision-making and implementation process.
#0e 8o;ern4ent is t0e root cause o1 ci;ic 6isen8a8e4ent
!apworth /- AFohn, &enior ditor O cologist k )ounder of )ourth 2orld Review, &mall is !owerful, :The
>onster<, page 7--, ,//-C
In posing such questions let us be clear how the argument is shaping. 2e are noting that society at large is
afflicted with an increasing number of problems in almost every aspect of its affairsJ we are suggesting that
these problems taken together point to a general cause or causes from which they stem and that one aspect of
those causes relates to the fact that our affairs are conducted on a mass basis rather than on a localised,
empowered community basis. 2e are also saying that the mere e1istence of the mass form of society affirms the
e1istence of a ma?ority which is ignorant of any serious consideration of its problems and which is for the most
part indifferent to any need to resolve them, and that this mass unconcern is the material which dominant forces
are able to manipulate to achieve ends which are sharply at variance with the general interests of societyJ in so
doing they are prompting governments to pursue courses which cannot fail to multiply problem areas which, in
turn prompts the emergence of protest or reform groups of people who are informed, who do care about the
general well-being of society and who, in empowered communities, as distinct from the mass form of society,
would be the natural leaders who would be harkened to and followed by their neighbours. To this it needs to be
added that the problems which now beset our societies are so numerous, as well as enormous, as to constitute an
overall crisis of a magnitude which is no only causing the everyday workings of the social order to malfunction
but which now threatens its prospects of survival as the sedulous process of social disintegration which is thus
created gathers momentum.
A 4ass 6e4ocracy is an oCy4oron As t0e si?e o1 a 5olitical unit increases t0e 4oral Eu68e4ent o1 eac0 o1
its 4e4bers because uni45ortant
(a5wort0 A J Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew <Jo0n3 #0e Fourt0 Worl6
-e;iew3 #0e ABC>s o1 (olitics II3'o 1/A3 58 + 0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeH1wr51/D561=
In ter4s o1 6e4ocratic co45re0ension 5ower entities suc0 as RIn6ia@3 t0e R"SA@3 RC0ina@3 R-ussia@3 RGer4any@3 RFrance@3 RBritain@
etc are si45ly a re5u6iation o1 any 5ossibility o1 6e4ocratic 5ractice R*emocracy= is a moral concept implying a condition
of human freedom, and morality in turn is wholly a function of human relationships, which is why the
numbers of humans involved in asserting and upholding moral principles is all important. Iumbers of a si5e that enables
each person=s moral ?udgement and decision to be significant must be limited if such decisions are to
be operative. The mere e1istence of giant multi-million states, especially when power is concentrated
in single centres, is an effective repudiation of any possibility of democratic practice. $ mass
democracy is an o1ymoron. The centrali5ation of power ensures that economic interests will triumph over
those of the individual, killing democracy !apworth, &enior editor of the cologist and founder of the )ourth 2orld
Review, 4,, AFohn, The )ourth 2orld Review, The "ommunity Revolution. Ios ,4/ [,,4C Radical activists really
must wake up here. The sheer scale and degree of centralised power of most governments puts them effectively
beyond the reach of any prospect of citi5en controlJ but governments are not, in any case, any longer masters of
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their own house. That office is now decisively in the hands of a mere score or so of globally operating
boardrooms. In this light, however commendable it may be for radical activists to stage street protests or to petition
governments to remedy this or that abuse, there is a need, more urgent than ever before, to define what we are protesting for and
the kind of world we are seeking in which to live, one which re?ects greed for profit or power as a motivating principle and one which restores power to the people.
It is an ob?ective which must imperatively re?ect any form of mass organisation, precisely the form which has robbed people
of power and enabled boardroom greed to achieve its dominanceJ it is one that commands imperatively a human-scale approach, one which enables
personal decision-making again to become meaningful and vibrant. Revolutionary politics today is community politics, and its weapons are not guns and
violence but clarity of thought and ever persistent peaceful persuasion.
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Ine11iciencies o1 t0e 1e6eral 8o;ern4ent are ine;itable t0is is an in0erent c0aracteristic in 1e6eral
enter5rise tra6ition resultin8 in corru5tion an6 4isallocation
Rothbard 47 J Foun6er Center 1or Libertarian Stu6ies3 Doctor o1 (0iloso50y in Econo4ics3 Distin8uis0e6
(ro1essor at t0e "ni;ersity o1 'e;a6a <Murray ' %t0e Myt0 o1 E11icient Go;ern4ent Ser;ice)
#0e Lu6wi8 ;on Mises Institute /B1GBK7 0tt5LHH4isesor8HstoryH17D1=
The well-known inefficiencies of government operation are not empirical accidents, resulting perhaps from the
lack of a civil-service tradition. They are inherent in all government enterprise, and the e1cessive demand
fomented by free and other underpriced services is ?ust one of the many reasons for this condition. Thus, free
supply not only subsidi5es the users at the e1pense of nonusing ta1payersJ it also misallocates resources by
failing to supply the service where it is most needed. The same is true, to a lesser e1tent, wherever the price is
under the free-market price. (n the free market, consumers can dictate the pricing and thereby assure the best
allocation of productive resources to supply their wants. In a government enterprise, this cannot be done. %et us
take again the case of the free service. &ince there is no pricing, and therefore no e1clusion of submarginal uses,
there is no way that government, even if it wanted to, could allocate its services to the most important uses and
to the most eager buyers. $ll buyers, all uses, are artificially kept on the same plane. $s a result, the most
important uses will be slighted, and the government is faced with insuperable allocation problems, which it
cannot solve even to its own satisfaction. Thus, the government will be confronted with the problem; &hould we
build a road in place $ or place BE There is no rational way by which it can make this decision.
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$ealt0care is t0e e5ito4e o1 o;ercentrali?ation It>s current 5ractice 6enies t0e 5ower o1 local
co44unities3 w0ilst sacri1icin8 9uality 0ealt0care 1or 5ro1its
!apworth - J < Jo0n3 Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist3 ba2er3 an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3
*illa8e De4ocracy=
$ further factor here is the role of drugs and drug companies in a national service. (ne medical authority has
declared that 0In urope and the M&$ the drug companies now control the medical profession. To a large e1tent
doctors have become the marketing arms of the pharmaceutical industry. The same author asserts many widely used
drugs are dangerous and often do more harm than healing. 2hat stands out is that most drugs are e1cessively
overpriced and that their cost, as well as the costs of medical equipment and mundane ancillary items such as
bandages, plays a quite disproportionate role in health care budgets. $ local health service would be free to break
out of the current constraints imposed by giant drug companies. %ocal labour could be employed to make
equipment and such items as bandages at a fraction of the prevailing charges, and the way would also be open to
employ natural traditional remedies from local services such as herb gardens. There is a pronounced tendency to
dismiss remedies based on natural ingredients as being so much hocus pocusJ it is an attitude which ignores how
much more hocus pocus there is in the promotion of high powered products of the giant pharmaceutical companies.
The si5e of their advertising budgets is a key pointer hereJ the whole emphasis of the industry is not on healing but
in making money, often in ways which are none too scrupulous with regard to the long term effects of repeated use.
2hat is noticeable about a national service is its disregard of positive health promotion. It is really a Iational
&ickness service. #ery few people have any detailed understanding of how their bodies work and are generally
ignorant of the needs of their respiratory, digestive, e1cretory and other organsJ it is this ignorance which enables
advertisers to persuade them to purchase highly flavoured, devitalised and chemicalised items masquerading as
food on such a regular basis as to make one form of ill health or another inevitable. >ost of the shelves in most
food stores today are institutionalised assaults on any attempt to provide a proper health serviceJ a locally run
service would be aware of the relationship between this factor and the effect on its health budget and be concerned
to promote locally-produced chemical-free food and to make people aware of the true conditions of bodily health.
'elping people to understand you cannot buy good health, you can only Five it, and a genuinely democratic local
health authority would be a front runner in promoting the ways decent health can be attained. It may well be
asserted, indeed it frequently is, that village people are apt to make mistakes with their limited knowledge and that
these can carry a heavy cost in terms of both money and resources, mistakes which e1perts with their greater
knowledge can avoid. this of course is only too true. Inadequate supervision of local building operations may
prompt a contractor to install drainage pipes of smaller than specified dimensions, or to use sub-standard
construction materials and so on, practices which only come to light after a lapse of time and when invoices have
been finally processed.
The centrali5ation of power inevitably trades off with local power and results in gross inefficiency and a
destruction of the value of life, turning case. (a5wort0 , J Senior E6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist an6 Foun6er o1
Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 <Jo0n3 Co44on Sense3 A1terwor6
0tt5LHHwwwcescnetHra6icalwebHsc0olarsH5a5wort0Ha1terwor60t4l =
$nd the damage the boardroom brigands have done to work is reflected in what the politicians have done to our
social structures. %ocal government once involved the energies, dedication, commitment and genuinely altruistic
spirit of service to the community of a high proportion of local people. Today a kind of )abian fascism has
brushed all this aside as being of no account. Instead of members of a local community hospital or welfare
committee being involved in the day-to-day running of local institutions, organising fetes and celebrations to
raise funds and keeping the show on the roadJ doing it in ways which gave their lives meaning, status and, again
that word, fulfilment, they are now relegated to the role of voting fodder in the mass political charade. 2e now
have 0national0 schemes and ministries for health, education, welfare and other essentially local matters. The
evidence abounds and grows that these bodies are increasingly wasteful and inefficient, where they are not
indeed riddled with the maggot of corruption, and not least of course they operate on organisational parameters
which make a mockery of democratic principle. &omehow the illusion has been fostered, for e1ample, that
people who have devoted their lives to clambering to the top of the greasy pole are better qualified to ordain
how children should be educated than are the parents and their local committees. &o our public prints are loaded
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with otiose speculation about 0national0 e1amination standards and results, and about the content of 0national0
educational curriculaJ meanwhile, in rural areas, large numbers of children are bussed to giant 0comprehensive0
schools where they learn about computers and nothing about how to grow food. %ocal government, instead of
being a power in its own right but working in tandem, where necessary, with national government, is now the
pawn of the latter, which is making a mess of the whole works.
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#0e concentration o1 5ower 4a2es 5o5ulis4 ine;itableMall social 4o;e4ents will re8ress to
ine11ecti;eness because o1 t0eir 6e4an6s 1or uni;ersality
!apworth B J Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist3 ba2er an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew <Jo0n3 #0e
Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 #0e ABC>s o1 (olitics III3'o 1/GB1/I3 58 7
0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeH1wr51/G[+A561=
$ tennis club member can communicate on the club=s concerns with his fellow club member, perhaps in the
club room bar or on its notice boardJ multi-million members of an electorate are dependent on communicating
on their common concerns, if at all, through mass newspapers or T# programmes. But the power of such
communication is not in the members= hands, it is in the hands of those who own or control such means. (n the
basis of the personal nature of the relationships that prevail, the club member is in a position to e1ercise a
significant measure of influence on its policies and programmes, the ordinary member of a mass electorate has
none; If, by e1cessive wealth or talents, or of oratory or authorship, he can e1ercise significant influence he is
not an ordinary member. In the tennis club the natural leaders and spokespersons communicate with their fellow
members by the ordinary force of moral suasion, the member the mass is not a communicator to any significant
degree at all, he is a recipient. This means that the moral force of his views inevitably becomes at a discount
since they are subservient to the governing, determining and manipulating forces at the centre. These forces
control the levers of power in the pursuit of money or power concerns which may be, as commonly they are, at
variance with the interests of the citi5en or indeed the basic moral concerns of civilisation. The moral
implications of this, however carefully disregarded, are frighteningJ such moral force as may be given leadership
in the tennis club will naturally appeal to what is best in people. 2here mass leadership may be at stake it can
only do so successfully by appealing to the most general propensityJ the proportion of the highest common
factor gives way to the promotion of the lowest common denominator. The mass society becomes inevitably an
embodiment of institutionalised vulgarity. The aff can0t solve without the alternative. $ll reform movements
are doomed fail so long as governmental power remains centrali5aed. !apworth - 9 A Fohn, &enior editor of the
cologist, baker, and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review, #illage *emocracyC )or generations the reformist agenda of
policy change has held the stage on the assumption that if enough support can be garnered it will impel the
necessary policy changes, meanwhile the general crisis of our civilisation has continued to deepen until today it
overshadows the entire human adventure. The reformist agenda, whether for peace, for economic sanity or for
much needed changes on many pressing problems is simply a diversion from the guts of the problem. That
agenda has failed, and that failure stems from a single cause, that the scale of government or of economic
activity has become so large as to be beyond any citi5en capacity to e1ercise the control needed to make it work
for the general interest. If we are serious about the need for change we need to recognise the sheer irrelevance of
postulating high-minded moral goals when there is no form of power available to achieve them. 2e need to
create those new forms of power, forms which put power where in democratic terms it belongs, in the hands of
concerned citi5ens. The modern e1perience, and much ancient wisdom, is eloquent that for democratic power to
be effective it must be locally based in local community hands. To that goal all serious political effort needs to be directed if
moves for change are to have any prospect of success.
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Decentrali?ation o1 5ower is 2ey to sol;in8 t0e 5o5ulation crisis
!apworth, $lbery, and &ale , J Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3
Director o1 t0e Mi66lebury Institute3 Foun6er o1 t0e institute 1or Social In;entions<Jo0n3 Kir5atric23
'ic0olas3 Co44on Sense3 0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeHco44onsense+KKG561=
The largely unconscious biological mechanisms, which control numbers in the animal world were also operative
in human societies until quite recent times. They operated on the basis of decisions made consensually Aand
frequently instinctivelyC in small groupings. Today there is a need for those responses to be reinforced by a
conscious process of reasoningJ instead we have largely destroyed the small communities, which were their
basis. This is the real cause of the population crisis. Io small self-governing community threatened to be
swamped by its own numbers would fail to do something to prevent it if it had the power to do so. 2e declare
that the need for base power in our village societies is imperative if the crisis in human numbers is to be
resolved. Io government of a mass society can solve this problem e1cept by means, which are totalitarian and
an assault on human dignity. "ommunity responsibility for community affairs is a precondition for the control
of community numbers. It follows that community power is a precondition for community survival.
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We can>t 5ro;i6e a blue5rint 1or t0e worl6 o1 t0e alternati;e Doin8 so woul6 only 1urt0er t0e
6o4ination o1 centrali?e6 5ower
!apworth, $lbery, and &ale , J Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3
Director o1 t0e Mi66lebury Institute3 Foun6er o1 t0e institute 1or Social In;entions <Jo0n3 Kir5atric23
'ic0olas3 Co44on Sense3 0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeHco44onsense+KKG561=
To draw up a plan or a blueprint for the creation of a humanscale non-centralised global order would be as
foolish as it would be futile. If the principle of the human scale is accepted then clearly each human scale
community will be concerned to work out its own way of life, in accordance with its own ?udgements. $ny
suggestion of acting in accordance with a centralised plan would be the e1tension of a disease rather than the
application of a remedy. !eople will only act in accordance with a principle if they understand and accept the
principle itself and to that end a ma?or and multifaceted drive to educate and to generally promote the principle
of the human scale is now a task of the utmost urgency. 2hile small communities might take sometimes take
reprehensible action, their limited si5e ensures that the scope of negative action will be limited, but the positive
action0s is not. !apworth , 9 &enior editor of the cologist and founder of the )ourth 2orld Review AFohn, The
)ourth 2orld Review, The "ommunity Revolution. Ios ,4/ [,,4,
0tt5LHHwwwwillia41ran2linco4H7t0worl6Ha6obeH1wr1KI[+A561 C There is a tragic failure here to grasp
some quite elementary factors relating to the political processJ that, for e1ample, affairs conducted on a small
scale may well produce small-scale horrors, whereas when conducted on a giant scale they produce giant
horrors. There is an equal failure to grasp that when affairs are conducted on a small, local scale they are capable
of producing, as indeed they have done, glory unlimited in every sphere of human creativity, whereas on a giant,
mass scale, the chief orientation of modern life of the last century or more, we have produced the first ugly
civilisation in the human record.
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#0eir e;i6ence is biase6B t0e 4e6ia will use it>s control o1 in1or4ation to 4aintain its 0ol6 on 5ower
!apworth - J < Jo0n3 Senior e6itor o1 t0e Ecolo8ist3 ba2er3 an6 1oun6er o1 t0e Fourt0 Worl6 -e;iew3 *illa8e
De4ocracy=
Two questions arise hereJ how can the media avoid using its immense power to cultivate and pro?ect the values
which sustain its overall questE 'ow can it avoid conditioning the public consciousness to accept the mores of
profit-seeking as a supreme social ob?ectiveE %ife in modern so called developed societies is dominated by the
continuous and highly skilled propaganda of advertising in its promotion of an e1aggerated emphasis on the
acquisition of material goods, and the use of such services as travel, as an ultimate purpose of living. It does this
regardless of the social consequences or indeed of any other consequences e1cept its own enrichment. &o the
non-stop promotion of car ownership will ignore the effects on global warming, its effects on distorting and
often destroying social relationships and community structures, on family life, on the deliberate run-down of
finite resources such as oil and the consequent impoverishment of future generations, on the high rate of
accidentsJ3 on the distortion of priorities in relation to public rail services, the e1tension of the working day by
car commuting, with its concomitant of stress of mind and body and, not least, the perpetual ordeal of noise,
stink and poisoned air suffered by millions who live alongside busy urban roads.
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Centrali?ation is bein8 bro2en 6own in t0e status 9uoBtec0nolo8y allows in6i;i6uals to reac0 lar8e
au6iences
Lee KD $ffiliate of the "enter for Information Technology !olicy at !rinceton Mniversity PTimothy B. :+ochai
Benkler and the %ibertarian "enter.< The "ato Institute. .-,/-4.. 0tt5LHHwwwcatoBatB
libertyor8H+KKDHKDH1IHyoc0aiBben2lerBan6Bt0eBlibertarianBcenterHQ
I found Fonah 6oldberg=s follow-up contribution particularly interesting. 'e points out that much of what was
wrong with the progressive movement of the early 34th century was due to its infatuation with centrali5ing
institutions that were ascendant at the time; the army, heavy industry, and later, large-scale scientific endeavors
like the >anhattan !ro?ect. Bigness and centrali5ation were in, and intellectuals believed that the entire country
should be governed in a similarly hierarchical fashion. 6oldberg thinks liberals will ?ust discard the economic
argument for central planning and move on to another one; public health, the environment, whatever. But I
wanted to point out that there are also some liberals who are adopting a more appropriately skeptical attitude
toward central planning itself. (ne reason to think the 3,st century is going to be more libertarian than the 34th
is that the defining technology of our generation, the Internet, is radically decentrali5ing. $fter a century in
which our cultural and economic lives were dominated by large, vertically-integrated corporations, we=re
entering an era in which decentrali5ation and disintermediation are the dominant trends. Instead of producing
components in house, they develop networks of independent suppliers, knit together by sophisticated supply
chains. $nd instead of vertically-integrated media companies like the Iew +ork Times and IB", we=re
increasingly moving toward a world in which writers, musicians, and other creators can reach their audiences
directly.
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**Centrali?ation Goo6 H States Ba6**
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Furt0erin8 t0e neoliberal a8en6a Eusti1ies 8enoci6e an6 eCtinction
Santos, *irector of the "enter for &ocial &tudies at the Mniversity of "oimbra, 34K/
ABoaventura de &ousa &antos, :"ollective &uicideE<, !ublicado na )olha de &ao !aulo em 38 de >arco de 344L, I>,
http;NNwww.ces.uc.ptNopiniaoNbssN4.3en.phpC
$ccording to )ran5 'inkelammert, the 2est has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save
humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to
radically materiali5e all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to
have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the $frican
slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world
wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in &talinism, with the 6ulag and in Ia5ism, with the
holocaust. An6 now to6ay3 t0is is 0ow it is in neoliberalis43 wit0 t0e collecti;e sacri1ice o1 t0e
5eri50ery an6 e;en t0e se4i5eri50ery o1 t0e worl6 syste4. 2ith the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask
whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all
appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicali5ation and the ultimate perversion of the
western illusion; destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it
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Fe6eral 6e;olution to t0e states eCacerbates neoliberalis4
Boyer, "linical $ssistant !rofessor of *ept. of &cience and Technology &tudies at Resselaer !olytechnic, 34KA
A@ate Boyer, ditorial Board of $ntipode, :Reform and Resistance; $ "onsideration of &pace, &cale and &trategy in %egal
"hallenges to 2elfare Reform<, I>C
2elfare reform has been marked by a downward transfer of decisionmaking power regarding the content and
administration of welfare policy from federal, to state and local governments as well as the private sector
AdevolutionC. 2ith this change has also come a shift in the level at which services themselves are provided,
such that for- and not-for-profit organi5ations as well as RRfaith-based== groups now compete with the public
sector for funds ABoyer, %awrence and 2ilson 344,C. *evolution e1presses the goals of a broader neoliberal
agenda by enabling both inter-locality competition and, especially, privati5ation. By transferring some of the
responsibilities that were once under the auspices of the federal government downward and outward to the
private sector, devolution can be seen as an e1pression of RRhollowing out== some of the responsibilities of
the federal government under neoliberalism described by Fessop A,///C.
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De;olutionary 5olicies can lea6 to a 1ull blown neoliberal s0i1t
Willia4s an6 Mooney, !rof of &ocial Fustice at @eele Mniversity and &enior &ocial !olicy %ecturer at the (pen
Mniversity in &cotland, 34KG.
A"harlotte 2illiams, :*ecentring &ocial !olicyE *evolution and the *iscipline of &ocial !olicy; $ "ommentary<,
I>, http;NN?ournals.cambridge.orgNactionNdisplay)ullte1tEtypeD,[fidD,8/..B8[?idDF&![volumeIdDL.[issueIdD4L[aidD,8/..B4C
2e are nonetheless faced with considering both the tensions and possibilities devolution portends for the
discipline; to reflect it uncritically as an e1ercise in the technocratic pragmatism of the neo-liberal
agenda is one possibility, or to engage with it as part of the Re1panding the social policy imaginary= approach A%ewis,
3444C. 2e contend that devolution represents a potential paradigmatic shift for the discipline if we engage
with it as a new dimension in the Rrethinking= story of contestation, conflicts and struggles over welfare
arrangements, delivery and outcomes, through the forging of new arenas of analysis, new methodologies
and concepts in a multi-nation, neo-liberal M@.
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(olicies 5asse6 to t0e state rein1orce neoliberal i6eolo8ies
"AA-3 "rban A11airs Annual -e;iews3 1IID
A#olume 78, :&tate *evolution in $merica; Implications )or a *iverse &ociety< edited by %ynn $. &taeheli, Fanet . @odras, and "olin )lint,
I>C
)irst, local states are left with less control to position themselves within a volatile global economy, even
as the national stale passes off addi tional responsibility for them to attempt this A!eck I Tickell, ,//7o.
*evolution of the national state does open new Hregulatory spatesH for local initiative, and Uthe
geographic consequences of this particular mode of restructuring will reflect the relative capacities of
local states to respond, as discussed above. But these regulatory spaces will be con strained in all places by
competitive pressures imposed by global capital and reinforced by neoliberalism in the national slate A!eck, ,//LC.
The accelerating global mobility of capital accentuates fine distinctions between placeW A'arvey. ,/8/C and e1erts Heconomic discipline
-
on localeW to
conform to its demands A'arvey. ,/8-C. The ensuing rivalry for investment among local states will require reducing the regulatory role previously played by
government, while the ta1es that underwrite governmental assistance will he kept to a minimum to ensure the area0s boundaries. ational stales increasingly
operate within a global economy that they are unable to control A"lark I *ear, ,/87C as nation-based fordist production, regulated by the @eynesian welfare
stale, yields to globally e1tensive posttordisr production, emancipated through deregulation by the neoliberal state AFessop. ,VLJ !eck I Tickell, ,//7C. The
neoliberal restructuring of the national slate, taking the particular forms of devolution and privati5ation in the Mnited &lates, passes greater responsibility
onto heal states& which are even less capable of e1erting power within a globali5ed economy. )inally, despite the prospect of migration for some individuals,
civil society remains the most place-bound and locally dependent- due to material, familial, and emotional tics to community ABey non I 'udson, ,//LJ "o1
[ >air. ,/88C. *avid 'arvey A,/8/C nails the pointJ H%abor power has to go home every nightH Ap. ,/C These interconnected trendsG
globali5ation of capital, devolution and privati5ation of the state, and locali5ation of civil soci etyGshift
power increasingly toward capital A(ffe. ,/8-J !eck, ,//-J &torper I 2alker, ,/8/C, an asymmetrical power relation
termed Hglo-cali5ationH by &wyngcdouw A,//3C.
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De;olution to t0e states rein1orces lowBinco4e 6is5arities
Boyer, "linical $ssistant !rofessor of *ept. of &cience and Technology &tudies at Resselaer !olytechnic, 34KA
A@ate Boyer, ditorial Board of $ntipode, :Reform and Resistance; $ "onsideration of &pace, &cale and &trategy in %egal
"hallenges to 2elfare Reform<, I>C
In spite of the benefits devolution might offer as a RRlaboratory for policy innovation== at the state level, there
are concerns about the potential for the downward transfer of decision-making power to intensify inequality
of access to opportunity between different places A"ashin ,///J @arger ,//,C. Benefit levels vary widely
between states, and are not calibrated to cost-of-living differences between states or between different areas
within a state. 2e also find considerable unevenness in what it means to be on welfare from state to state. $s research
from the $pplied Research "enter suggests, as of 344, welfare recipients in >innesota were allowed to earn wages
to supplement cash benefits, while clients in "alifornia were sanctioned and even imprisoned for doing the
same A6ordon 344,C. In this sense devolution is of a piece with neoliberal polices and practices which work
to RRfi1== disenfranchised peoples in place to their detriment. $ccording to $ndrew 'erod and >elissa 2right, such
policies; locali5e poor peoples at a supposed time of growing planetary spatial integration of capital flows,
goods and services, information, and wealthy people. $pparently, despite the one-world rhetoric of
neoliberalism, some people face tremendous obstacles in linking their worlds and becoming fully-fledged
citi5ens of the RRglobal village== about which we hear so much A'erod and 2right 3443;,3C #0ese criti9ues
su88est t0at 6e;olution 0as t0e 5otential to eCacerbate3 rat0er t0an re6ress3 8en6ere63 raciali?e63 an6
5laceBbase6 6is5arities in access to social an6 econo4ic o55ortunity
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De;olution to t0e states 6estroys 5olitical in1luence 1or t0e lowBinco4e
Winston3 +KK/
A!amela 2inston, :2elfare !olicymaking in the &tates The *evil in *evolution<, I>, p. LC
The ,//B welfare law raises additional questions about our commitment to political self-determination. *evolution of
welfare policy also may be making it more difficult for poor familiesGor groups that represent
themG to have a role in shaping the policies that most affect them if, in fact, it is harder for them to
participate effectively in the states and localities than in the nation0s capital. $mericans commonly support the
idea that parents should have a voice in education policy, old people should have influence on the
shape of >edicare and &ocial &ecurity, and business organi5ations should effectively e1press their
views about regulation. These groups may not always get what they want, but it is regarded as entirely legitimateG
in fact, necessaryGthat they have a role in the policymaking process in our pluralist system. If the effect of
devolution, however, is to send welfare policymaking to political spheres where representatives of
poor families are weakest, it will further diminish their political voice.
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(assin8 Euris6iction to t0e states increases 8o;ern4ental control o;er in6i;i6uals
(ec23 50D at "ni;ersity o1 Manc0ester3 +KK1
AFamie !eck, :2orkfare &tates<, I>, 6uilford !ressC
The political implications of this are nontrivial. 2hile the politics of workfare advocacy have assumed an increasingly aggressive,
generic, and transnational form, for the most part anti-workfare politics remain defensive, particulari5ed, and locali5ed. Indeed, e1plicit
ob?ectives around the weakening, division, and locali5ation of sources of political opposition are often reflected in welfare-restructuring
strategies. It seems that once the national defenses of welfarism have been breached, the path is opened
decisively to downscale residual welfare and emergent workfare functions. This involves reregulation not
only at the state and local scales but also at that of the individual bodies of welfare recipientsGgiven the
preoccupation in M.&. reforms, for e1ample, with regulating the repro ductive as well as the productive lives
of welfare recipients, through such measures as the denial of aid to teen parents, Hman in the houseH rules, leamfare, family
caps, and so forth. This downloading of risks and regu latorC0 responsibilities to the level of the individual is also
evident in workfares labor-regulatory functions, because as the epitome of supply-side policymaking it seeks
to make a virtue of individuali5ed, Hfle1ibleH labor relations. The ideology that frames these programs,
indeed, is rooted in the notion of independence through wage labor.
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De;olutionary 5olicies increase t0e sti84ati?ation 5lace6 on t0e 5oor
Winston3 +KK/
A!amela 2inston, :2elfare !olicymaking in the &tates The *evil in *evolution<, I>, p. LC
The ,//B welfare law raises additional questions about our commitment to political self-determination. *evolution of
welfare policy also may be making it more difficult for poor familiesGor groups that represent themG to have a role
in shaping the policies that most affect them if, in fact, it is harder for them to participate effectively in the states and
localities than in the nation0s capital. $mericans commonly support the idea that parents should have a voice in
education policy, old people should have influence on the shape of >edicare and &ocial &ecurity, and business
organi5ations should effectively e1press their views about regulation. These groups may not always get what they
want, but it is regarded as entirely legitimateGin fact, necessaryGthat they have a role in the policymaking process in
our pluralist system. If the effect of devolution, however, is to send welfare policymaking to political spheres
where representatives of poor families are weakest, it will further diminish their political voice. "ertainly
poor people are no longer regarded as a group with legitimate political grievances, as they were briefly during
the Iew *eal and the 6reat &ociety. >ost $mericans do not appear to think a great deal about poor people, and
when they do, it often is with pity or disapproval. Ieither, however, are $mericans in general likely to be entirely
comfortable with the prospect that in a range of ?urisdictions the perspectives of low-income families may have
virtually no influence on the design of policies that are vital to their well-being.H
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De;olutionary 5olicies in0erently brin8 6estabili?ation an6 2ills sol;ency
The mainsireaming of workfarist discourse and practice, of course, hardly ever occurs by way of quantum shifts in policy. Instead,
change is typically more incremental and more comple1. The course of workfare politics has run differently in "anada, the Mnited
&tates, and the Mnited @ingdom, as powerful legacies of path-dependency remain alongside revealing convergences in rhetoric and
practice. &o this is not, nor is it ever likely to be, a story of simple convergence toward a unitary workfarist model, but an uneven
process of mutually referential ad?ustment. In this conte1t, !R2(R$ retains a talismanic significance, as a truly radical moment of
reform. $s Rodgers A3444; -C puts it, H!R2(R$ completely changes the philosophy of welfare policy.H
2hile this may understate some important continuities with past M.&. practice, it quite correctly
draws attention to the potentially phase-shifting consequences of work enforcement by way of
devolution to the states. The variegated and com petitive local reform dynamic that this entails
threatens to leave the postwelfare Mnited &tates in a perpetual state of destabili5ation and e1 -
perimentation. This, in turn, facilitates a continuation of the cafeteria-style reform process
established under the waiver regime, broadening and deepening the workfarist repertoire and
creating the basis for further rounds of fast-policy transfers. )acilitated by an increasingly technocratic and
essentialist evaluation literature, plus the earnest endeavors of consultants, this fast-policy regime has taken on an internationalGand
in an important sense interlocalGcharacter Asee Fessop and !eck, 3444J !eck and Theodore, 344,C.
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State 5olicies are ine11icient J i45le4entation 6i11erences
There is an important sense, then, in which local political struggles usually reflectGthough are not determined by
Gthe local form of work-fare strategies. 2here workfare slots are located in the public sector, the strategy is e1posed to the
threat of unioni5ationJ where workfare relies on nonprofit-sector placements, then the obvious line of resistance is to choke off the supply
of places through social-sector campaigning and lobbyingJ where workfare is oriented to wage employment in the e1ter nal labor marketG
in many ways its tendential formGresistance is rendered difficult due to the diffuse and individuali5ed nature of this strategy, but may take
the form of boycotts, unioni5ation drives, or research-based campaigns. $t the very least, different workfare strategies call for
different forms of local political responseJ they are also differentially vul nerable to disruption, reform,
and implementation failure at the local level, depending on their Ainherently unpredictableC interactions
with lo cal political, economic, and institutional structures . $nd, of course, the geography of oppositional
politics also reflects the uneven terrain of pree1ising political forces and resources at the local level. In
Baltimore, for e1ample, responses to workfare have been shaped by previous patterns of activism around the city0s H%iving 2ageH
campaign.
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De;olution in0erently 4a2es 5olicies less e9ual
"AA-3 "rban A11airs Annual -e;iews3 1IID
A#olume 78, :&tate *evolution in $merica; Implications )or a *iverse &ociety< edited by %ynn $. &taeheli, Fanet . @odras, and "olin )lint,
I>C
*evolution refers to the transfer, or decentrali5ation, of government functions from higher to lower levels of
the federal hierarchy. $s a transformation internal to the state that alters the scale of activities, devolution redefines government
responsibilities for regulating civil society, transfers authority across levels and administrative units of government, redraws the map of
government costs and benefits, and changes accessibility and entitlement to government services. In shift ing responsibilities and resources to
lower tiers in the federal hierarchy, the national government still retains authority to set the direction for change, as Hthis comple1 subnational
reconstitution of state power and regulatory structures is occurring within a set of political, discursive, and institutional parameters established by
Aor mediated byC the nation-stateH A!eck, ,//B, p. LC. *evolution is an inherently spatial process of state changeGfirst,
because the $merican federal structure is a hierar chical organi5ation of territorially demarcated
governments, and sec ond, because the uneven development of different local states generates dissimilar
initiatives in response to devolution according to local needs, perceptions, and abilities.
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En1orcin8 neoliberalis4 causes en6less wars
$ar6t an6 'e8ri3 (ro1essor o1 Co45 Lit at Du2e an6 Anarc0ist Intellectual3 +KK73
A>ichael 'ardt and $ntonio Iegri, :>ultitude<, I>, p.,.B-,.8
Big government actually never went away, but certainly it has become 0more clearly evident in recent years,
especially since &eptember ,,, 344,.0 The various military and legal pro?ects for global security led primarily
by the Mnited &tates since that date, for e1ample, are oriented in part toward stabili5ing and guaranteeing the
global economic order. In some respects, after &eptember ,, the private forms of authority over the global economy,
such as the new (e* mercatona& along with all the mechanisms or international trade and the macroeconomic equilibria
that.make them possi-, Fole, went into crisis. The dominant nation-states had to intervene to guarantee all levels
of economic interactionsGfinancial transactions, in surance relationships, air transportation, and so forth . The
crisis gave a quick reminder of ?ust how much capital needs a sovereign authority standing behind it, a truth that rises
up into view every time there are serious cracks in the market order and hierarchy. The big government that
guarantees market order must be in pan a military power. "apital occasionally has to call on an army to force
open unwilling markets and stabili5e e1isting ones. In the early nineteenth century, for e1ample, British capital
needed the British military to open up the "hinese market with its victory in the (pium <%ar. This is not to say,
however, that all military actions are e1plained by specific economic interests. It is not adequate to think, for e1ample,
that the M.&.-led military ac-i dons in recent decadesG$fghanistan and Iraq, much less &omalia, 'aiti, and !anamaG
were primarily directed at a specific economic advantage, such as access to cheap oil. &uch specific goals are
secondary. The primary link between military action and economic interest e1ists only at a much more
general level of analysis, abstract from any particular national inter est. >ilitary force must guarantee the
conditions for the functioning of the world market, guaranteeing, that is, the divisions of labor and power of
the global political body. This effort is parado1ical, however, because the relationship between security and profits
cuts two ways. (n one hand, the de ployment of state military power is necessary to guarantee the security of
the global markets but, on the other hand, the security regimes tend to raise national borders and obstruct the
global circuits of production and trade that had been the basis of some of the greatest profits. The Mnited
&tates and other military powers must discover a way to make the interests of security and economic profits compatible
and complementary. 2e should be clear that the newly prominent need for a big government to support the economy,
especially since &eptember ,,, does not represent in any way a return to @eyncsianism. Mnder @eynesianism the
nation-state supported the stability and growth of the economy by providing mechanisms to mediate the conflicts and
interests of the working class and in the process e1panded the social demand for production. The forms of sovereignty
we see now, on the contrary, reside completely on the side of capital without any mediatory mechanisms to negotiate
its conflictual relationship with labor. It is interesting in this regard how ambivalent the position of capital is when risk
is the dominant characteristic of economic activity and development, and indeed of all social interaction. The world is
a dangerous place, and the role of big government and military inter vention is to reduce risks and provide
security while maintaining the pres ent order .o N 2 E
8

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'eoliberalis4 4a2es 5o;erty ine;itable
$ar6t an6 'e8ri3 (ro1essor o1 Co45 Lit at Du2e an6 Anarc0ist Intellectual3 +KK73
A>ichael 'ardt and $ntonio Iegri, :>ultitude<, I>, p.3..-384C
$fter recogni5ing the e1tent of poverty in the world today, one has to recogni5e also its uneven geographical
distribution. In each nation-state, poverty is distributed unequally along lines of race, ethnicity, and gender.
In many countries throughout the world, for e1ample, there are signifi cantly higher rates of poverty among
women than men, and many ethnic minorities, such as the indigenous populations throughout the $mericas,
have significantly higher rates of poverty. %ocal and national variations in the rate of poverty, however, are dwarfed by
the inequalities of wealth and *ovcrtv on a global scale. &outh $sia and &ub-&aharan $frica account for about .4
percent of the global population living on less than a dollar a day, up from about B4 percent ten yean ago. The average
income of the richest 34 countries is thirty-seven times greater than the average in the poorest twentyGa gap that has
doubled in the past forty years.
B8
ven when these figures are ad?usted for purchasing powerGsince some basic
commodities cost more in rich countries than in poorGthe gap is astonishing. The construction of the global market
and the global integration of the national economies has not brought us together but driven us apart,
e1acerbating the plight of the poor. There are millions of specific e1pressions across the world of indignation and
generosity with respect to die poor, often through courageous |crs of charity and self-sacrifice. Ionprofit, and
religious charity organi5ations provide enormous assistance for those in need, but they cannot vchange the system that
produces and reproduces poverty. It is impressive, in fact, how so many people who begin in volunteer charity work
pass to activism and protest against the economic system.fry. &ome protests against the systemic reproduction of
poverty, such as the Fubilee >ovement International, focus on the fact that foreign debt obligations serve as a
mechanism that keeps the poor countries poor and their populations hungry.
B/
It is clear that no matter what economic
policies they enact the poorest countries cannot repay their current foreign debts or even keep up with interest
payments, perpetuating an inescapable cycle of misery. )urthermore, many claim that these debts were incurred origi-
nally through dubious or illegitimate means. It is always the same story; debt serves as a legal mechanism of
enslavement.
.4
The difference here is } that this logic of bondage is applied not merely to the individual indentured
worker or even to a specific racial group or indigenous population Awhere the assumption of a civili5ing mission is the
basis of debtC but rather to entire nations.
J
In more general terms many economic grievances against the global system
arc based on the assumption that the inequalities and in?ustices of the global economy result primarily from the fact
that political powers are less and less able to regulate economic activity. 6lobal capital, the argument goes, since its
movement and reach e1tend well beyond the limits of national space, cannot be effectively controlled by states. >any
labor unions, particularly in the dominant countries, protest the fact that the mere threat of the mobility of capitalGdie
threat, for e1ample, of moving production and ?obs to another country where state regulations ano#or labor costs are
lower and more favorableGcan convince states to abandon or temper their own regulatory powers. &tates conform to
and even anticipate the needs of capital for fear of being subordinated in the global economic system. This
creates a son of race to the bottom among nation-states in which the interests of labor and society as a whole
take a backseat to those of capital. Ieoliberalisrn is generally the name given to this form of state economic
policy. Ieoliberalism, as we claimed in part 3, is not really a regime of unregulated capital but rather a form
of state regulator that best facilitates the global movements and profit of capital. (nce again in the era of
neoliberalism, it might be helpful to think of the state as the e1ecutive committee assigned the task of
guaranteeing the long-term well-bring of Hcollective capital The fundamental task of the neoliberal state, fron
this perspective, like all forms of the capitalist state, Is to regulate Hcapitalist development in the interest of
global capital itself.
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E;en sin8le 5olicies ris2 a 0u8e i6eolo8ical s0i1t J e45irically 5ro;en
Willia4s an6 Mooney, !rof of &ocial Fustice at @eele Mniversity and &enior &ocial !olicy %ecturer at the (pen
Mniversity in &cotland, 34KG.
A"harlotte 2illiams, :*ecentring &ocial !olicyE *evolution and the *iscipline of &ocial !olicy; $ "ommentary<,
I>, http;NN?ournals.cambridge.orgNactionNdisplay)ullte1tEtypeD,[fidD,8/..B8[?idDF&![volumeIdDL.[issueIdD4L[aidD,8/..B4C
There may be considerable disagreement as to the e1tent to which devolution represents a significant
departure in terms of divergent policymaking. It is a simple enough task to point to policy differences such as free
personal care for the sick and elderly or the student fees policy in &cotland, or free prescriptions and the abolition of school
league tables in 2ales. &ome would argue the differences are marginal to the overarching continuities ensured by %abour-
dominated administrations Aat least prior to the >ay 344. electionsC across the devolved polities, and the quiet manipulation
of the policy strings by civil servants in 2hitehall A'udson and %owe, 3447C. It is clearly important to view devolution
within the conte1t of the Iew %abour Rmodernising= pro?ect and as a product of its wider socio-economic and neo-liberal
agendas. The devolved &cotland,2ales and Iorthern Ireland are part of this mission. 'owever, it can be argued that
the devolved nations open up new sites of struggle and contestation, new processes and practices which
challenge the ideological and geo-political boundaries of the British 2elfare &tate, and this encapsulates a
significant shift which impacts on the central concerns of the discipline. Interestingly, "larke, writing within a
transnational frame, draws our attention to these very limits of neo-liberalism in practice as it forms an interface with
particular geopolitical and cultural entities, when he says this philosophy may encounter Rdiverse forms of
resistance and refusals to :go with the flow<=A3447; /C.
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**Se5aration o1 (owers**
Page 60 of 609
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Colla5se o1 constitutional balance o1 5ower ris2s tyranny an6 rec2less war4on8erin8
-e6is0 (ro1essor o1 Law an6 (ublic (olicy an6 Cisar Law Cler2 1II1 Martin3 at 'ort0western3
Eli?abet03 at t0e Se;ent0 Circuit Court o1 A55eals3 71 Du2e LJ 77I3 5 7D+B/
In any event, the political history of which the )ramers were aware tends to confirm that quite often concentration of
political power ultimately leads to the loss of liberty. Indeed, if we have begun to take the value of separation of
powers for granted, we need only look to modern $merican history to remind ourselves about both the general
vulnerability of representative government, and the direct correlation between the concentration of political power and
the threat to individual liberty. The widespread violations of individual rights that took place when !resident %incoln
assumed an inordinate level of power, for e1ample, are well documented. $rguably as egregious were the threats to
basic freedoms that arose during the Ii1on administration, when the power of the e1ecutive branch reached what are
widely deemed to have been intolerable levels. $lthough in neither instance did the e1ecutive0s usurpations of power
ultimately degenerate into complete and irreversible tyranny, the reason for that may well have been the resilience of
our political traditions, among the most important of which is separation of powers itself. In any event, it would be
political folly to be overly smug about the security of either representative government or individual liberty. $lthough
it would be all but impossible to create an empirical proof to demonstrate that our constitutional tradition of separation
of powers has been an essential catalyst in the avoidance of tyranny, common sense should tell us that the
simultaneous division of power and the creation of interbranch checking play important roles toward that end. To
underscore the point, one need imagine only a limited modification of the actual scenario surrounding the recent
!ersian 6ulf 2ar. In actuality, the war was an e1tremely popular endeavor, thought by many to be a politically and
morally ?ustified e1ercise. But imagine a situation in which a !resident, concerned about his failure to resolve
significant social and economic problems at home, has callously decided to engage the nation in war, simply to defer
public attention from his domestic failures. To be sure, the !resident was presumably elected by a ma?ority of the
electorate, and may have to stand for reelection in the future. 'owever, at this particular point in time, but for the
system established by separation of powers, his authority as "ommander in "hief to engage the nation in war would be
effectively dictatorial. Because the "onstitution reserves to the arguably even more representative and accountable
"ongress the authority to declare war, the "onstitution has attempted to prevent such misuses of power by the
e1ecutive. It remains unproven whether any governmental structure other than one based on a system of separation of
powers could avoid such harmful results. In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude
that, but for the e1istence of separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question is
whether we wish to take that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that might result. 6iven both the relatively
limited cost imposed by use of separation of powers and the great severity of the harm sought to be avoided, one
should not demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. )or ?ust as in the case of the
threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, HI told you so.H
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Lac2 o1 se5aration o1 5owers causes nuclear war
Forrester (ro1essor S $astin8s Colle8e o1 t0e Law -ay3 1IGI "ni;ersity o1 Cali1ornia Au8ust #0e
Geor8e Was0in8ton Law -e;iew :D Geo Was0 L -e; 1A/A %(resi6ential Wars in t0e 'uclear A8eL
An "nresol;e6 (roble4)
$bramson, 2herever !resident 6oes, the Iuclear 2ar 0)ootball0 is Beside 'im, %os $ngeles Times, $pril L, ,/8,, at
,4, col. , Acopyright, ,/8,, %os $ngeles Times. Reprinted by permissionC. (n the basis of this report, the startling fact
is that one man PpersonQ alone has the ability to start a nuclear war. $ basic theory--if not the basic theory of our
"onstitution--is that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to PhumankindQmankind.
The "onstitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers
between the !resident, "ongress, and the &upreme "ourt. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked
power. +et, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for
world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. $s a result of public indignation aroused by the #ietnam
disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of !residents, "ongress
in ,/.L adopted, despite presidential veto, the 2ar !owers Resolution. "ongress finally asserted its checking and
balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars.
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