291 8.

2 History as the Re-enactment of Past Thought

actual, not something dead? Or is this a consequence of its being historically known?
Neither: it is the same thing as its being historically known. There are (of course) no condi-
tions of a things being knowable that is the error of realism (PH, 2445).
Collingwoods conception of the relation between past and present is also of
importance with regard to his philosophy of mind. As we have seen in Sect. 4.8 he
identi es a mans character with his past, the latter being the determining factor of
present actions.
10
In the same vein Collingwood asserts in his short manuscript
History as the Understanding of the Present that the past is the substantial being
of the present: to know the past is to know not how the present came to be what it is
but what it is (PH, 141).
11
Having a past is a necessary aspect of mind. The relation
of mans present to his past is essentially different from the one of nature. When
pointing out this fact Collingwood refers to the idea of history as a philosophical or
transcendental concept, that is, that history should be seen as a universal and neces-
sary aspect of the human mind.
12
The fundamental nature of this idea may be illus-
trated by a passage in his manuscript on cosmology, when Collingwood discusses the
concept of consciousness:
Consciousness lies not merely in passing through any special sequence or cycle of percep-
tions, but in passing through any sequence of them, no matter what, and holding them
together in a present act of mind for which the past as such , as well as the present, is an
object. This may be called a survival or revival of the past, if we like, but we must remember
what a very curious thing it is: not a survival of something in its effects, or a revival in
something of the same kind, but its survival in itself, alongside of its effects.
13

Collingwood then illustrates this view with the following example: [M]y having
eaten something unwholesome in the past, if I am a merely sentient but unconscious
animal, is present to me now only in the shape of its effect, viz. feeling unwell;
whereas in consciousness the same thing is present twice over, both in its effects
(feeling unwell) and in itself (remembering the act of eating).
14

Summing up we may conclude that Collingwoods idea of a living past is an
important element both of his re-enactment doctrine and his philosophy of mind.
We have seen that the same may be said of his process-view of history, with the
corollary that historical continuity is emphasized. Besides these, the idea of a living
past is also important in connection with Collingwoods view on the practical value
of history. The latter aspect, however, will be considered afterwards.
8.2 History as the Re-enactment of Past Thought
Collingwoods conception of the re-enactment of past thought has already come up
for discussion at various places in this study. In the third chapter it was dealt with in
the general survey of The Idea of History ( Sect. 3.2 ), the section on the re-enactment
doctrine itself ( Sect. 3.3.5 ), and the section on explanation and understanding ( Sect.
3.3.6 ), while in the fourth chapter aspects of it were discussed in the treatment of the
1928 lectures ( Sect. 4.5 ) and the Notes on the History of Historiography and
Philosophy of History of 1936 ( Sect. 4.9 ).