"Did They Teach You How To Lie Yet?" (May 27, 2009 Revised 9/09)

“DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?
”
Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,
and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman
By GuyMontag425 feralfirefighter.blogspot.com
May 27, 2009 [last updated 9-08-09]
Marie Tillman (wife), Mary Tillman (mother), Rich Tillman (brother),

Kevin Tillman( brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father)
“… we have all been betrayed. It isn‟t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they
betray all of us.” … “We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your
heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat &
Kevin] could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would
use him the way they did” …
-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)
“I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was
merely that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one
man while flight could make another man king.”
-- James Webb, “The Emperor‟s General‟ (1999)
“They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.” “Yeah, I called
my pa last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days,
now. Did they teach you how to lie yet?”
-- James Webb, “A Country Such As This” (1983)
“DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?”
Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,
and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman
“… we have all been betrayed. It isn‟t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they betray all of
us.” … “We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are your
kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin] could die or they could
come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him the way they did …”
“I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely that I
was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man while flight could
make another man king.”
“They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.” “Yeah, I called my pa last
night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach
you how to lie yet?”
-- James Webb, “A Country Such As This”(1983)
DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PDF Page #:
Memorial Day Letter to Senator James Webb (May 25th 2009) 4
Senate Armed Services Committee’s May 15th 2008 Confirmation Hearing: 10
Senate Armed Services Committee’s June 2nd 2009 Confirmation Hearing [Postscript 9/09]: 19
General Wallace’s Review of Tillman Fratricide (2007): 29
House Oversight & Reform Committee’s Tillman Fratricide Hearings (2007-2008): 35
April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb: 43

Notes from James Webb’s Novels -- 1978 to 1991: 51
APPENDICES:
A: General McChrystal Responsible for Fratricide Investigation & Notification to Family:
Operational & Administrative Chain of Command for Tillman‟s Unit DoDIG 1

Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process DoDIG 3
Appendix C: Fratricide Investigation Process [Postscript 8/09 DoDIG 6.1
B: General McChrystal’s Early Knowledge of Tillman Fratricide Confirmation:
Appendix B: Chronology DoDIG 7

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification & Notes Guy Montag
IG Gimble Testimony Waxman 4/07 26
Sworn Statement of General McChrystal Jones 15-6 28
General Abizaid Testimony Do DIG, Waxman 8/07 30
Interview of LTC Bailey & CSM Birch Jones 15-6 33
C: General McChrystal “Declines” to Appear at Waxman Hearing: www.oversight.house.gov 38
D: General McChrystal’s Misleading P4 Memorandum:
P4 Concerning Information on CPL Tillman‟s Death McChrystal 40

“Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms?” www.johntreed.com 41
E: General McChystal’s Fraudulent Silver Star Citation:
Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process DoD IG 45

Appendix F: Silver Star Award Details DoD IG 47
Appendix G: Justification Submitted to Support Silver Star DoD IG 48
Valorous Award Witness Statement (PFC O‟Neal) www.oversight.house.gov 49
Discussion - Silver Star Award (p.53-59) DoD IG 50
F: General McChrystal’s Testimony at June 2 nd 2009 Confirmation Hearing [Postscript, 8-29-09]: 58

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
DoDIG: Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, Inspector General Department of Defense,
Report Number IPO2007E001, 3-26-07 http://defencelink.mil/home/pdf/Tillman_Redacted_Web_0307.pdf
Jones 15-6: CPL Tillman AR 15-6 Investigation, BG Gary M. Jones, 12-28-04

(http://www.rmda.belvoir.army.mil/rmda/rmdadocuments/ERR%20DOCUMENTS/Tillman-15-6_Investigations.pdf
Waxman 4/24/07: Oversight Committee Holds Hearing on Tillman, Lynch Incidents (oversight.house.gov)
Waxman 8/01/07: The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew (oversight.house.gov)
LETTER TO SENATOR JAMES WEBB
Marine and LT Jim Webb – Vietnam 1968
Pat and Kevin Tillman -- just before entering Iraq, March 2003
“They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.” “Yeah, I called my pa last night and
he says, “Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to lie
yet?”
-- James Webb, “A Country Such As This” (1983)
Memorial Day 2009
Senator James Webb,
Five years ago on Memorial Day weekend, five weeks after he was killed in Afghanistan, Pat
Tillman‟s parents were finally told their son was “probably” killed by friendly fire.
This Memorial Day weekend, the Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled General
Stanley McChrystal‟s confirmation hearing for June 2nd. Chairman Carl Levin and Senator
John McCain don‟t foresee any problem with his confirmation.
However, Pat Tillman‟s parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up of
their son‟s fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified
homicide investigation.” Mary Tillman said, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be
scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."
I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should postpone General McChrystal‟s
confirmation and take a closer look at McChrystal‟s central role in the Army‟s handling of Pat
Tillman‟s fratricide.
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‟s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty
of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‟s highest rank, and
handed his fourth star.
...
Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from close
scrutiny and protected him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up
of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide:
Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General
McChrystal‟s role in the Army‟s handling of the Tillman fratricide. On May 15th 2008 the
Senate Armed Services Committee met in “executive” (closed) session to consider
McChrystal‟s nomination. On May 22th 2008, General McChrystal was unanimously
confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.
Last year, I spoke with you on the Diane Rhem NPR radio program (May 27th 2008; at 40:56).
You said he “went through a fairly thorough review of that process [what happened in the
aftermath of his death] at the request of the Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services
Committee [Senator Levin].” … “the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly
quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied
otherwise…I‟m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain
of command, how it was handled publicly… You cannot help but still feel angry about how his
death was used.”
I share your anger about how Pat Tillman‟s death was used. But, I don‟t understand why you
were unable to determine “where responsibility for that decision really lies” to cover up
Tillman‟s fratricide. I doubt you actually conducted a “fairly thorough review” of General
McChrystal‟s role. General McChrystal was the central figure in the Army‟s cover up of
Tillman‟s friendly fire death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‟s fratricide within
two days, had the responsibility to tell the family, made the decision not to tell the family about
fratricide, and he approved the “misleading” Silver Star award.
...
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General
William Wallace‟s review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal
received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead, General
Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public believing
the Army covered up the Tillman fratricide.
However, Secretary Geren and General Cody‟s defense of McChrystal doesn‟t hold up under
scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was
scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to “inform the family about
friendly fire,” failed to “inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,” failed “to
inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide
investigation,” and (arguably) made “false official statements.”
...
During 2007, Congressman Waxman‟s House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted an
investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide. However, Congressman
Waxman‟s Committee appeared to conduct a half-hearted investigation.
Chairman Waxman‟s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only “look up” the
chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal. The Committee permitted General
McChrystal to “decline” to appear and they never interviewed him later. After raising
questions about the Silver Star, they didn‟t look into McChrystal‟s role in approving the Silver
Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements. The Committee
never questioned the “timeliness” or misleading contents of General McChrystal‟s P4 memo
...
The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd confirmation of General McChrystal will be
the final layer of the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‟s death.
During the April 24th 2007 Congressional hearing, Mary said,
“… Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this country,
and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. It is not perfect.
No one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it to work, and
your job is to find out what happened to Pat.”
In your 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued: “And no, the
military isn‟t just fine. The point is, it isn‟t corrupt. It‟s a system with human failures.”
But when “human failures” systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-
command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of
Defense) up to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single
institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership,
Congress, White House and the mainstream media.
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in your novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:
“How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before
the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their
knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized
politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before
they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.”
***
“Across the room … my mother‟s father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me … as he has done in every
office I have occupied for more than twenty years. … Defiant he was, and tragic too. He was a fighter, a
lonely champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes he championed.”
-- James Webb, “A Time to Fight” (2008)
Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Herrod case. A Marine patrol was accused of
killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five months, had
been found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven days in Vietnam
had been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he had actually killed
anyone. From Robert Timberg‟s “The Nightingale‟s Song”:
“The case continued to bedevil Webb …. He wanted to help Green, but wasn‟t sure
what he could do. … He joined forces, pro bono, … to try to get the conviction
overturned in a civilian court. … The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. … About
two weeks later, in August 1975, Webb received a telegram …: TRAGIC
CONCLUSION SAM GREEN DESTROYED HIMSELF.”
“He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had committed
himself to clearing his name. … He felt helpless, his sense of futility laced with
outrage. Isn‟t any of this going to come out right? … Green was dead, but Webb
couldn‟t let the case go. He … filed an appeal … asking that Green‟s dishonorable
discharge be upgraded to honorable. Webb personally argued the case before the
board.”
“In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Green‟s
suicide, Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: “At last, Sam‟s name is cleared.” He explained
that her son‟s discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. … “This is small
solace, I know,” wrote Webb, „I only regret we were unable to do more for him
sooner.”
...
I never met Pat Tillman. I never really knew anything about him until a year and a half after
his death. But, I‟ve taken the cover-ups of his death a bit personally the last few years. Why?
I feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. I‟m not in his league, but I was an Airborne Ranger
and an autodidact and a bit of maverick. And I‟ve always had outrage for injustice and rooted
for the underdog.
I‟ve been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For five years, I haven‟t been able to let the case go.
I hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the other
shit going on the past few years. It would be nice if this “letter” of mine would make a
difference.
...
For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and betrayal.
Re-reading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the story of Pat
Tillman‟s death. On April 3, 2008, I sent your office a letter asking you to become an
advocate in the Senate for Mary Tillman‟s struggle for the truth about her son‟s death (I doubt
my letter made it past your gatekeeper Gordon Peterson).
I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:
The Tillman‟s are of Scots-Irish descent. Military service was prevalent and respected
in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‟s uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a
Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Mary wrote, “From the
time I was very little, I was aware of my father‟s pride in being a Marine. When I was
three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft leather
of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs.”
“Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote,
“Pat was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions
taken in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those weren‟t just
adjectives in Pat Tillman‟s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of
loyalty and commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right
by the people who mattered to him.”
Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, “If nothing ever works
out all the way, and if all things change, what‟s left? Your family and your friends and
your values, that‟s what‟s left. And your duty to them. … They‟re the only important
things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong
or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to
survive the judgment of the ages.”
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‟s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty
of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, promoted to
the Army‟s highest rank, and handed his fourth star.
But, perhaps you were right years ago in your novel, “A Sense of Honor,” when CPT Lenahan
said, “I guess that‟s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty
are traps with no reward.”
...
I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a “hold” on General
McChrystal‟s nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd.
Yeah, that could be a lost cause. You‟d piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would give
Mary Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate willing to
stand as her advocate. Someone willing to “be a lonely champion of lost causes…” Perhaps
you need to take a long look at the picture staring at you from your office wall?
You‟ve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an
Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I haven‟t always agreed with your
positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But I‟ve never before doubted your integrity. I‟ve always
trusted your sense of honor.
I‟d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‟t yet learned the lesson your
grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in Washington DC,
“Did they teach you how to lie yet?”
Sincerely,
******
*********************
*********************
2008 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE’S
CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL
“It went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. Basically
we … came to USASOC when … everything opened up and now all of a sudden, okay, it‟s sort
of like, „Here is the steak dinner, but we‟re giving it to you on this … garbage can cover. You
know, „You got it, you work it.‟”
-- General Yellen, Deputy Commander SOCOM
“How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the days of
multimillion-dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees before the monied
temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that cause them to await the
wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from
the get-go, myths to feed the public.”
-- James Webb, “Something to Die For” (1991)
2008 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
On May 11th 2009, Defense Secretary Gates nominated Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the new
commander of the Afghanistan War. The Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, don‟t foresee any problem with McChrystal‟s promotion
to four-star general. His confirmation hearing is scheduled for June 2nd.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "We feel terrible for what the Tillman family went
through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by
outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing
by Gen. McChrystal."
However, Pat Tillman‟s parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up of their
son‟s fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified homicide
investigation.” Mary Tillman e-mailed AP, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be
scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."
Mary Tillman has harshly criticized the actions of General McChrystal, especially regarding his
“Personal For” (P4) memo sent on April 29th 2004 (ostensibly to alert President Bush against
making embarrassing public statements about Tillman‟s heroism or his Silver Star):
In her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk,” Mary wrote:
“Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat‟s death, …
he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His statement [P4 memo]
indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by
fratricide unless forced to do so.”
And shortly after General Wallace‟s findings were released in July 2007, Mary said:
"That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is
writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script
the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need
to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the
circumstances of Pat's death should become public … “
“He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're going
to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he
was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this false,
elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious.”
...
Last year, on May 27th 2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio during “The
Diane Rhem Show.” Webb spoke of a recent review of the handling of the Tillman fratricide:
“I think what happened in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‟s death was really tragic.
I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the Chairman
of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] and the bottom ...
I talked to his father years ago when my book „Born-Fighting‟ came out.
What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this
was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a
ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, and his own brother, which had served
with him, it was kept from him until the ceremony took place.
I‟m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of
command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong.
Someone like me has to have a tremendous amount of respect for what Pat Tillman did in
terms of stepping forward among other things. You cannot help but still feel angry about
how his death was used.”
I was surprised to learn of Senator Webb‟s review. Although I was familiar with Congressman
Henry Waxman‟s (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on the Tillman fratricide, I
was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.
When I attempted to follow up to find out more about the Senate review, I was stonewalled by
Senator Webb‟s Military Legislative Aide Gordon Peterson:
“Regarding your questions about the radio interview, I‟m not in a position to elaborate. I
did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have no information to
provide to you. The senator‟s involvement occurred in his capacity as a member of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with Senator Webb, and he has nothing
more to add to what he said last week. If you have any additional questions you should
contact a representative for the Committee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of
the office until next week.”
To my regret, I never followed up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl Levin). I
was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman case) and figured I
was just getting blown off.
A year later, after General McChrystal‟s nomination as the new commander of the Afghanistan
War, I finally realized Senator Webb‟s review was for a previous Senate confirmation of General
McChrystal. On May 15th 2008 the Senate Armed Services Committee met in “executive”
(closed) session to consider McChrystal‟s promotion. On May 22th 2008 General McChrystal
was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.
...
“I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the Chairman of
the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin]… I’m not sure where responsibility for
that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled publicly … You
cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used”:
I share Senator Webb‟s anger about how Pat Tillman‟s death was used. But, I don‟t
understand why Webb was unable to determine where responsibility lay for the decision
to cover-up Tillman‟s friendly fire death. I doubt Senator Webb actually conducted a
“fairly thorough review” of how the Army handled Tillman‟s fratricide.
General McChrystal played a key role in the Army‟s cover up of Tillman‟s friendly fire
death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‟s fratricide within two days, had the
responsibility to inform the family, yet made a decision not to tell the family about
fratricide, and he approved a misleading Silver Star recommendation (no mention of
fratricide, altered witness statements by someone in the approval chain, and “inaccurate”
assertions in the citation and supporting narrative)
“What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this was a
friendly fire incident fairly quickly,”:
COL Nixon said it took a “considerable time to get the truth”. General Abizaid told
Congress, “But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April,
and that on the 28th of May [36 days later] we conclusively stated it was fratricide … in
terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that‟s not a slow investigation. That‟s a
fast investigation.”
Yet, there was nothing “potential” or “suspected‟ about Tillman‟s fratricide. The troops
on the ground immediately knew it was friendly fire. Confirmation of Tillman‟s
fratricide was passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two days after
Tillman‟s death by the first investigating officer!
On the 23rd, the day after Tillman‟s death, CSM Birch was “70% sure” and LTC Bailey
“was certain” it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer, confirmed
Tillman‟s fratricide just two days after Tillman‟s death (not five weeks), and immediately
passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who told Col. Nixon:
“And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]
confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, “Sir, I
want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews” in fact, that was, I guess,
the next day.” … “So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and
said, “Sir, I‟m certain. I‟m sure.” And then I called [Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th.
(p. 53). (Note that General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of command,
followed by Abizaid at CENTCOM).
It‟s puzzling that the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told of
suspected fratricide on the 23rd, but told McChrystal only of Tillman‟s death, which
McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in General Jones 15-
6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon “… about a day [23rd] or two [24th]
after the incident. No more than three days later [25th].” Which account is correct?
Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).
In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with
confirmation on the 24th. This information surely went up to the Secretary of Defense
and the White House.
“… they did not tell the family,”:
General McChrystal said in his Jones 15-6 statement: “there was a conscious decision on
who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all the facts. … I
believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give
them some half-baked finding.” Then, he immediately contradicted himself, saying: “I
did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had another [son] in the
firefight.”
...
When General Cody was asked why McChrystal couldn‟t have just called Tillman‟s
family about potential fratricide he replied, “in the casualty reporting business … we do
not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of that … that‟s done by the
regiment and done by the Army through SOCOM.” Secretary Geren added, “So it was
General Kensinger‟s responsibility.”
However, if you look at Appendix D: “Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification
Process” (p.80, DoD IG report), you‟ll see that McChrystal‟s Chief of Staff was
responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC after learning of
friendly fire.
It‟s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew about
fratricide no later than the 25th and yet did not send a supplementary casualty report as
required by regulations (this finding is not included in the DoD IG Report conclusions).
General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted “reasonably and quickly” when he
alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said
“General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through his
P4 … his chain of command.”
During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly the
right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most secure
channels”
Yet, there was nothing “timely” about McChrystal‟s P4 memo! Secretary Geren implies
that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th, then sent the P4 to alert his
superiors. However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told McChrystal about
probable fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be
considered “quickly”?
“… they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, …”:
General McChrystal approved the Silver Star recommendation package and sent it on to
Secretary of the Army Brownlee without telling him about Tillman‟s fratricide. At
Tillman‟s memorial service, a Navy SEAL friend spoke of Tillman‟s “heroic” death that
using an account that was given to him by the Army.
Secretary Geren was asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being held
accountable in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary
Geren replied that McChrystal “reasonably and appropriately” presumed the Silver Star
packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was
aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he “had no reasonable
basis to call into question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the
commanders in the field …”
But wouldn‟t General McChrystal have a “reasonable basis” to question a Silver Star
package which contains no mention of friendly fire since he had been informed of
confirmed fratricide?
General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman deserved
the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he “did not directly, or clearly, state these four
factors in the award recommendation.” (And if McChrystal only knew what was in the
recommendations, merely signed off on the paperwork, how could he know about these
four factors!)
...
And Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found General McChrystal
“accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award
recommendation package” and “accountable for not notifying the award processing
channels [Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the
recommendation was considered based on accurate information.”
Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of friendly
fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said this was done
“somewhere in the approval chain” but refused to “speculate” who was responsible. It
appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‟s XO, and/or General McChrystal were involved.
The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality and
were carefully and misleading edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without
actually coming out and saying it.
Overall, it doesn‟t appear that Senator Webb and the Armed Services Committee did a thorough
job of reviewing McChrystal‟s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. I don‟t see how
they could confirm General McChrystal given his role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide.
...
But the Senate Armed Services Committee wasn‟t alone in its failure to scrutinize General
McChrystal‟s role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide. It appears that
Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had previously acted to shield General
McChrystal from close scrutiny and protect him from punishment for his actions:
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General William
Wallace‟s review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal received no
reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead, General Wallace singled
out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public believing the Army covered up
the Tillman fratricide.
However, Secretary Geren and General Cody‟s defense of McChrystal actions don‟t hold up
under scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was
scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to “inform the family about friendly
fire,” failed to “inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,” failed “to inform the
acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation,” and
(arguably) made “false official statements.”
And General Wallace‟s review disregarded the Department of Defense Inspector General‟s (DoD
IG) findings that McChrystal was accountable for an “inaccurate” Silver Star recommendation
package (e.g. altered witness statements, misleading and inaccurate assertions in the citation and
narrative) and his failure to inform the Secretary of the Army of Tillman‟s fratricide before the
Secretary approved the award.
...
Over the course of 2007, Congressman Waxman‟s House Oversight & Reform Committee
conducted an investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide.
But the Committee held a half-hearted investigation into the handling of the Tillman fratricide.
The Committee allowed themselves to be stonewalled and didn‟t follow-up on points raised in
the first hearing about McChrystal‟s P4 memo and the fraudulent Silver Star award.
Chairman Waxman‟s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only “look up” the
chain of command seemed designed to exclude important figures like COL Nixon and General
McChrystal.
It‟s particularly puzzling the Committee failed to interview General McChrystal. McChrystal
was the key link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon and General Abizaid, wrote the
misleading P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star, and decided not to notify
Tillman‟s family about his friendly fire death. Yet, the Committee permitted General
McChrystal to “decline” to appear at their hearing.
Chairman Waxman said “much of our focus” will be on the P4 memo that General McChrystal
sent. Yet the Committee never questioned the “timeliness” of General McChrystal‟s P4 memo
sent on the 29th (Although McChrystal was informed of confirmed fratricide on the 24th he
decided not to inform the Tillman family). And the Committee never took a hard look at the
contents of McChrystal‟s P4 memo. If read carefully, the memo was anything but “forthright”.
After raising questions about the Silver Star during their first hearing, the Committee didn‟t look
into McChrystal‟s role in approving the Silver Star package that contained a fraudulent citation,
justification and altered witness statements. The Committee never tried to determine just who
falsified the Silver Star witness statements.
The Committee‟s Final Report says “pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific
information makes it impossible … to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal
Tillman‟s and Private Lynch‟s cases…” Well, I think General McChrystal certainly was
responsible for much of the misinformation in the Tillman case.
...
I‟ve argued that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army acted to shield General
McChrystal from close scrutiny and protect him from punishment for his central role in
orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide.
(Why? Perhaps members of Congress don‟t want to be seen “badgering” military leadership or
they are afraid of being “Ollie Northed” by a decorated senior general? Perhaps the House
leadership put out the word to give General McChrystal a “free pass” because he is considered
indispensable to the War effort? Ultimately, Congress probably just doesn‟t care about the
Tillman family. They just want to bury the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide).
...
I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should delay General McChrystal‟s
confirmation hearing. And the Committee should take a second look at McChrystal‟s conduct
during the aftermath of Tillman‟s fratricide . As Mary Tillman said this past week in an e-mail
to the AP, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be scrutinized carefully during the
Senate hearings."
If the Senate Armed Services Committee‟s confirms General McChrystal on June 2nd, their
action will be the final layer upon the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‟s
fratricide.
Five years ago, Pat Tillman‟s family was handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty of
justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‟s highest rank, and
handed his fourth star.
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE’S
(JUNE 2nd 2009)
“… we have all been betrayed. It isn‟t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they
betray all of us.” … “We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your
heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]
could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him the
way they did …”
“I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely
that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man while
flight could make another man king.”
“They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.” “Yeah, I called my pa
last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did
they teach you how to lie yet?”
-- James Webb, “A Country Such As This”(1983)
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE’S
(JUNE 2nd 2009)
Summary of Newspaper Coverage of Senate Hearing:

Note: This section is largely edited & rearranged quotes from various newspapers articles,
with no specific annotation provided. My following response was written hastily after the
hearing. [Postscript 9-01-09: My response has been updated using the transcript of the
Senate Hearing now available from the Armed Services Committee website.]
...
Unless new information on General McChrystal‟s role in the Tillman episode emerges
between now [5-26-09] and his confirmation hearing, the question is not expected to figure
heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said. Congressional officials said
senators would have to explain why they confirmed him then [May 2008] but were
challenging his qualifications now to receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan
mission absent new disclosures.
In his first public testimony before a congressional committee, McChrystal testified about
his handling of the aftermath of Tillman‟s death. Yesterday's hearing was the first to
address such concerns, because the Senate held a closed executive [secret] session last
spring [5-15-08] to confirm McChrystal in his current position as director of the Pentagon's
Joint Staff
Note: It‟s curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both mentioned this secret
hearing at the beginning of their remarks:
From Chairman Senator Levin‟s opening remarks (p. 3 transcript) “You

[McChrystal] may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening
statement. Both subjects were discussed in executive session of the Armed
Services Committee last year in connection with your nomination to your current
position as director of the Joint Staff.
From General McChrystal‟s opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): “You gave me the
opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in
closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as
Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any
additional questions you may have.”
Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they
were keeping the existence of the hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-09 hearing, I
spoke briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Levin). He implicitly confirmed the
existence of the hearing, but would say nothing further in response to my questions except
“it was in executive session.”
The senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing,
and the Senate is expected to confirm him as early as Thursday. Mary Tillman said, "I
think more effort should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more
about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse
and Pat's situation.”
On PBS‟s NewsHour, David Corn commented:
“And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I
thought seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think,
hot-button issues”. … “You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible
explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that
Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan”
...
Mary Tillman criticized Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the ranking Republican on the
committee, who questioned McChrystal on Tuesday, for "playing dumb" by not following
up on McChrystal's explanations.
She also says she declined a personal invitation from McCain to submit questions to him to
ask at Tuesday's confirmation hearing. Mary Tillman says she was put off by McCain's
public endorsement of McChrystal and did not want her questions used as part of the
confirmation process.
"If the Army chain of command didn't know what happened to Pat, why did it present us
with a false story" at the memorial service? Tillman asked. "That is not an error; that is not
a misstep; that is deliberate deception. "What's very disturbing is that Senator McCain
himself was present at Pat's memorial and I would think he would be outraged that he was
not told ahead of time or that he was lied to like everyone else.” Did he know all along?"
...
Sen. Jim Webb said he had been contacted by members of the Tillman family when
McChrystal's nomination Afghanistan was announced. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia
Democrat who has championed the Tillman‟s family case, returned to the topic late in the
hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the Senator chastised the Army for its initial
incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire
from his own Ranger unit.
Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with
Gordon Peterson (Webb‟s Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous
chapter how Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As
a “gate keeper,” he probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.
Sen. Jim Webb pressed McChrystal, prompting the general to agree that the Army had
failed the Tillman family, "You failed to properly notify the family of the investigation and
the inaccuracies," … "You have not been on the record, and I don't know how you feel
about it."
...
General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more
sinister than "mistakes" made to honor the famous GI. "They were well-intentioned" but
created "doubt and the sense of mistrust.”. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive,"
he said.
McChrystal said the Army's handling of the case "produced confusion at a tragic time, and
I'm very sorry for that." "I was a part of that, and I apologize for it.”. "I would do this
differently if I had the chance again," "There is nothing we can do to automatically restore
the trust which was the second casualty.” "We failed the family. And I was a part of that."
He earlier expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family and fellow rangers.
...
McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but
that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott‟s 4/29/04 15-
6?] before coming forward with that information [sending P4?]. "It was a well-intended
intent to get some level of proof before we went out," he said.
Within days of the incident, McChrystal approved a Silver Star for Tillman, signing off on
a citation praising his valor "in the line of devastating enemy fire. Asked whether he
believed that Tillman earned the Silver Star before his death, “Sir, I absolutely do. I did
then; I do now … I don't believe that the circumstance of death detracts from the courage
and commitment of his contribution.”
“My own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure
that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes. They were well
intentioned, but they created, they added to the doubt and the sense of mistrust. And we
didn't get it right.” McChrystal said the Silver Star citation was "not well written" and
could have left the impression that Tillman was not killed by fratricide.
“What we have learned since is, it is better to take your time, make sure you get
everything right with the award, and not rush it. And I'm very sorry for that, because I
understand that the outcome produced a perception that I don't believe was at all involved,
at least in the forces that were forward.”
...
Mary Tillman says she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology
"McChrystal was lying," she said of his comments Tuesday. "He said he didn't know for
certain Pat was killed by fratricide. That isn't true in and of itself, but the fact is, it doesn't
matter whether he knew it for certain." Army protocol at the time required families to be
told of possible fratricide, whether or not it had been confirmed, she said.
"The whole point was to lie to the public," Tillman's mother Mary told ESPN.
...
My Response to General McChrystal‟s Testimony :
1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation
after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on
about April 23rd:
“Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan from
a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at that
point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that
they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.” (p.18 transcript)
But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told,
about a day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23rd,
but was he in Qatar or Afghanistan?].
During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him
of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no
details and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to
believe McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in
Qatar on the same day! Or, Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]
And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on
about the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been
killed in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told
“no details” or “heroic”?]
But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of
possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the
"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's
"death". [But McChrystal said on Tuesday hearing he was told of fratricide on the
23rd! McChrystal either failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about
not being informed about it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal about
Tillman‟s “death” and/or McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of “death”.]
So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about
“suspected” fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General and
before Congress. A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve
this question [Scott Laidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I haven‟t
seen them].
2.) McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly
fire, but that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott’s
4/29 15-6] before coming forward with that information [sending P4]:
“And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]
before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some
level of truth before we went up.” (p. 18 transcript)
There was never anything speculative or “potential” or "suspected" about Tillman‟s

friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately
what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up “70% sure” by the CSM to
LTC Bailey and on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer
CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (“I‟m certain, I‟m sure”) to LTC Bailey,
who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command).
McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillman‟s death! (If this
isn‟t “some level of proof”, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never told
McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were working together
on the Silver Star package?
McChrystal‟s “outcome of an initial review” refers to CPT Scott‟s “15-6 Final

Report” dated April 29th. Isn‟t it curious the 29th‟s the same date as McChrystal‟s
P4? And further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th as well?
Why? Perhaps, McChrystal could say he just got some “emerging evidence” and
started the investigation after he approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then
CPT Scott‟s April 29th 15-6 report literally disappeared!
3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he
believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service “which in retrospect
looks contradictory.” (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the
Secretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his “timely” P4
memo to alert his superiors on the 29th):
“I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide,
and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial
services.” And “… when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up
my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.’ (p. 18 transcript).
During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6
investigation on the 23rd . Yet he didn‟t send out his P4 until the 29th? How is
waiting six days considered “timely”? [and as I pointed out, he actually had verbal
confirmation of fratricide on the 24th!] Of course, in reality McChrystal told
Abizaid on the 23rd, and then it was passed onward to the Secretary of Defense and
White House.
And notice that McChrystal wasn‟t concerned about Tillman‟s family being
surprised. He wrote in his P4, “I felt it was essential that you received this
information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing
statements by our country‟s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the
circumstances of Corporal Tillman‟s death become public.” (P4 Memo)
Note the “if” not “when” it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th
“as soon as we detected it” when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd?
Further, McChrystal wasn‟t concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he had
just forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had already
been approved.
4.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only “signed
off’ on the Silver Star and “had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation that
came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand
knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.”:
But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the officers (ie Nixon,
Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a whiteboard to satisfy
himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star!:
“I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver Star].
… and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield, and I
queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even
though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly
fire.” (p. 18 transcript)
General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what
happened! McChrystal lead the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn‟t
removed from the process. He didn‟t just sign off on a piece of paper that just
dropped onto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process.
“Potential… friendly fire.” As previously mentioned, all the Ranger officers and
McChrystal had been told of confirmed friendly fire on the 24th!
5.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read
it close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:
“… my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure
that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes.” (p. 48
transcript). “… in retrospect, they [Silver Star and P4 memo] look contradictory,
because we sent out a Silver Star that was not well written – and, although I went through
the process, I will tell you now I didn’t review the citation well enough to capture – or, I
didn’t catch that if you read it, you can imply that it was not friendly fire.” (p.18
transcript)
Absolute bull. The IG report discussion section (Appendix E) on the Silver Star
concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillman was killed by
enemy fire: “… we concluded that an uninformed reader could reasonably infer that
CPL Tillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful review of the
narrative and citation show no direct assertion that he was killed by enemy fire. As
a result, the narrative justification and citation were misleading.” (p.55 IG report)
In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't
mention friendly fire!: “Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared the
narrative to avoid stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly
remembered removing a phrase asserting that CPL Tillman „died by enemy fire.”
(p.51 IG report).
And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e.
Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). “PFC [O‟Neal] stated that he did not sign
the valorous award witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not
write and parts that were not accurate.” … Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts that
were inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillman‟s actions from his
location.” IG Gimble preferred not to “speculate” as to who was responsible while
testifying before the House Oversight Committee in April 2007.! “… we were not
able to identify the specific drafter.” (p.53 IG report).
General McChrystal should not be confirmed as a four star general. First, he's got to learn
how to prevaricate better (or follow General Meyers or Secretary Rumsfeld‟s example
from the April 2007 House hearing of simply saying, “I don‟t recall”). Or, he should‟ve
just stuck to his story. Don't change it, keep it simple. McChrystal's testimony yesterday
at the Senate hearing shows that he and/or General Abiziad lied during their testimony
before Congress.
Yesterday's Senate hearing was just the final layer of fertilizer upon the high mound of
Army and Congressional "investigations" of Tillman's death. The hypocrisy of the
Senators is disgusting. It's a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family were handed a
tarnished Silver Star, while General McChrystal will be confirmed, promoted to the
highest rank in the Army, and handed his fourth star.
And it‟s a further travesty that Thom Shanker, Washington Pentagon Reporter for The
New York Times, had the initial version of this book the week before the hearing and did
nothing with it, especially since he had just written a May 26th article “clearing General
McChrystal of any wrongdoing in the handling of the Tillman case!
[For more information, see my 9-04-09 letter sent to the NYT Public Editor Clark Hoyt,
“Lies, Denials, Dissembling, Distortions … Borne Out by Facts If Not the Truth”]
GENERAL WALLACE’S REVIEW OF
THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE
INVESTIGATIONS
GENERAL WALLACE’S REVIEW
OF TILLMAN FRATRICIDE
On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Peter Geren announced the findings of the
seventh investigation into Pat Tillman‟s friendly fire death. General Wallace had
reviewed the previous investigations and examined the conduct of ten officers.
[I was unable to locate a copy of his findings, entitled “Executive Summary, Army Action
– DoDIG Report Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick D. Tillman” (undated).]
Secretary Geren denied there was a “conspiracy … to deceive the public”. He said, “There
was a perfect storm of mistakes, misjudgements, and a failure of leadership …”
General McChrystal received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman
fratricide. However, General Wallace disregarded the findings of the Department of
Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) review which found General McChrystal
Instead, General Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat responsible for the public
believing the Army covered up Tillman‟s fratricide. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren
said: “General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were a calamity
for the Army …” He “failed in his duty to inform the family about the friendly fire incident
in a timely manner …”, “failed to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of
command] of the fratricide investigation” and “made false official statements.”
...
During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren and
General Cody defended General McChrystal‟s handling of the Tillman fratricide.
However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‟t hold up under examination. In fact,
although Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactly
those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!
1.) General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted “reasonably and quickly” when he
alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said
“General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through his P4
… his chain of command …”:
Response:
There was nothing “timely” about McChrystal‟s P4 memo! Secretary Geren

implies that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th, then sent the
P4 to alert his superiors.
However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told McChrystal about probable
fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be
considered “quickly”? And on the 24th, McCrystal received fratricide confirmation
from Nixon.
A P4 is not the most “timely” or “secure” fashion to send a message. How about
simply picking up the telephone?
I want to emphasize there was nothing “potential” or “suspected‟ about Tillman‟s

fratricide. Confirmation of Tillman‟s fratricide was passed up the chain of
command to McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating
officer!:
The Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide
until they were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it took a “considerable time to
get the truth”. General Abizaid testified before Congress, “But it is clear that all
along fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April, and that on the 28th of May
we conclusively stated it was fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by
the way, that‟s not a slow investigation. That‟s a fast investigation.”
Yet, the day after Tillman‟s death, on the 23rd, CSM Birch was “70% sure” and
LTC Bailey “was certain” it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating
officer, confirmed Tillman‟s fratricide just two days after Tillman‟s death (not five
weeks), and immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC
Bailey who told Col. Nixon:
confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, “Sir,
I want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews” in fact, that was, I
guess, the next day.” … “So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back
to me and said, “Sir, I‟m certain. I‟m sure.” And then I called [Nixon]. … I think
it was the 24th. (p. 53). General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of
command, then Abizaid.
However, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told of
suspected fratricide on the 23rd, then told McChrystal only of Tillman‟s death,
which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in
General Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon “… about a
day [23rd] or two [24th] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th].”
Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).
In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with
confirmation on the 24th. Five weeks later the Army announced Tillman
“probably” died from friendly fire!
2.) When asked why McChrystal couldn‟t have just called Tillman‟s family about
potential fratricide, General Cody replied that “in the casualty reporting business … we do
not encumber the JSOC commander with all of that … that‟s done by the regiment and
done by the Army through SOCOM.” Secretary Geren added, “So it was General
Kensinger‟s responsibility.”
Response:
However, if you look at Appendix D: “Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin

Notification Process” (p.80, DoD IG report), you‟ll see that McChrystal‟s Chief of
Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USAOC after
learning of friendly fire.
It‟s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew
about the fratricide by the 25th and yet did not send the required report as required
by regulations (this finding is not included in the IG Report conclusions).
Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that “there was a conscious
decision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know
all the facts. … I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because
we did not want to give them some half-baked finding.” Shortly afterwards, he
contradicted himself, saying “I did not know there was a decision not to tell the
family. They had another [son] in the firefight.”
3.) Another reporter asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being singled
out in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary Geren
replied that McChrystal “reasonably and appropriately” presumed the Silver Star packet
presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was aware it was
friendly fire when he approved the award and that he “had no reasonable basis to call into
question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field …”
Response:
Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found General McChrystal
Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of
friendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said
this was done “somewhere in the approval chain” (That would be COL Nixon,
General McChrystal, or Nixon‟s XO. The IG did not establish who bore
responsibility for these alterations).
The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality
and were carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without actually
coming out and saying that.
General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he “did not directly, or clearly,
state these four factors in the award recommendation.” And if McChrystal only
knew what was in the recommendations, how could he know about these four
factors!
Wouldn‟t General McChrystal have a “reasonable basis” to question a Silver Star

package which contains no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of
confirmed fratricide?
...
Overall, General Wallace‟s review was merely the final layer of the Army‟s cover-up of
the handling of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide. A cover-up of the cover-up. Although Wallace
singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat, it‟s clear that General McChrystal was
guilty of failing to “inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner”, failing “to
inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide
investigation,” and that he “made false official statements.”
The senior leadership of the Army acted to protect General McChrystal from punishment
and shield from close scrutiny his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s friendly fire
death
HOUSE OVERSIGHT & REFORM COMMITTEE’S
TILLMAN FRATRICIDE HEARINGS
Patrick Sr. and Kevin Tillman – Congressional Hearing, April 2007
Mary Tillman – Congressional Hearing, April 2007

THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT & REFORM COMMITTEE’S
TILLMAN FRATRICIDE HEARINGS
On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Reform Committee held the “Hearing on
Misleading Information from the Battlefield”. During the hearing, questions were raised about
General McChrystal‟s P4 memo and the altered witness statements in Tillman‟s Silver Star
award package.
Pat Tillman‟s brother, Kevin, testified:
“The handling of the situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of
“missteps, inaccuracies and errors in judgment which created the perception of
concealment”…. Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken
is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep.
… Discarding an (15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an
error in judgment. These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of
concealment. This is concealment”
Following the hearing, Chairman Waxman decided to look up the chain of command and
determine what the top officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew about
Tillman‟s fratricide.
On August 1st 2007, the Committee held their second (and last) hearing, “The Tillman
Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew.” Chairman Waxman said
“Much of our focus will be on a “Personal For” [P4] message … that MG McChrystal sent on
April 29th 2004.” Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and three retired generals (Meyers,
Abizaid, and Brown) testified. General Kensinger evaded a subpoena, but was later interviewed.
General McChrystal was invited, but “declined” to appear, and was never interviewed by the
Committee.
Mary Tillman wrote in her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk”:
“General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have great
difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting next to
me whispers, „They have collective amnesia.‟” … “we were not happy with the hearing at
all. We had spent weeks helping getting questions prepared and sending information.
The Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent … Most of the Democrats
disappointed us as well. They were not prepared and they didn‟t think on their feet. We
expected more from Congress.”
During the hearing, General McChrystal received praise from the generals for his handling of the
Tillman fratricide:
General Meyers said, “When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated an investigation
that was good for me. … I knew his integrity … We will learn the truth.”
General Brown said “I have talked to General McChrystal several times and the actions of
Corporal Tillman … certainly would warrant a Silver Star.”
General Abizaid said “General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely
manner. … “… and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely
message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels.”
...
Following their second hearing, the Committee conducted non-transcribed interviews in closed
session with the White House communications staff. These officials said they could not recall
when they learned about the fratricide or when the President learned. In addition, the Committee
reviewed documents from the White House and Department of Defense, and interviewed six
additional general officers.
A year later, on July 14th 2008, the Committee finally issued their report “Misleading
Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes.” Their report concluded:
“The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal
Tillman‟s and Private Lynch‟s cases…”
...
The House Oversight & Reform Committee appeared to hold a half-hearted investigation into the
handling of the Tillman fratricide. After raising questions about the Silver Star award during
their first hearing, they didn‟t probe further into the false narrative of the Silver Star package
and altered witness statements. The Committee never took a hard look at the timing, contents,
and forthrightness of McChrystal‟s P4 memo. It‟s particularly puzzling the Committee failed to
interview General McChrystal and closely scrutinize despite his central role in the handling of
Tillman‟s fratricide:
1. Chairman Waxman decided to look up the chain of command and determine what the top
officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew about Tillman‟s fratricide:
Response:
Why did Congressman Waxman narrow the scope of his investigation to only “look up
the chain of command”? McChrystal was the key link in the chain of command between
Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and General Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote the
controversial P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star citation, and made
the decision not to notify Tillman‟s family about his friendly fire death.
The Committee “invited” McChrystal to testify, but he “declined” to appear shortly

before the hearing. (The Committee didn‟t need to invite an active duty general, they
could compel him to testify!) And if for whatever reason McChrystal wasn‟t able to
appear in August, why didn‟t the Committee follow up and interview him sometime
during the following year until their report was issued?
2. During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly the
right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most secure channels”
and “… it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April, and that on the
28th of May we conclusively stated it was fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by
the way, that‟s not a slow investigation. That‟s a fast investigation.” “…:
Response:
There was nothing “timely” about McChrystal‟s P4 memo supposedly alerting his chain
of command! General Abizaid says that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on
the 29th, then immediately sent his P4 to alert his superiors.
However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told McChrystal about probable
fratricide and the 15-6 investigation (and fratricide was confirmed on the 24th). How was
waiting six days to send a P4 considered “timely” or “quickly”? And, a P4 is not the
most “timely” or “secure” fashion to send a message. How about simply picking up the
telephone to ensure an important message gets through?
And, I‟d like to emphasize there was nothing “potential” or “suspected‟ about Tillman‟s
fratricide. Confirmation of Tillman‟s fratricide was passed up the chain of command to
McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating officer!:
Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide until they
were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it took a “considerable time to get the truth”.
Yet, the day after Tillman‟s death, on the 23rd, CSM Birch was “70% sure” and LTC
Bailey “was certain” it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer,
confirmed Tillman‟s fratricide just two days after Tillman‟s death (not five weeks), and
immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who told
Col. Nixon (General McChrystal was the next link in the chain of command):
confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, “Sir, I
want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews” in fact, that was, I guess,
the next day.” … “So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and
said, “Sir, I‟m certain. I‟m sure.” And then I called [Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th.
(p. 53).
However, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told of suspected
fratricide on the 23rd, then called McChrystal on the 23rd and informed him only of
Tillman‟s death, which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid while they were at a
meeting in Qatar. McChrystal testified in General Jones‟s 15-6 that he was told of
possible fratricide “… about a day [23rd] or two [24th] after the incident. No more than
three days later [25th].”
Someone is lying about what they knew when; Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all).
In actuality, General McChrystal timely notified his chain of command. McChrystal told
General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, then updated Abiziad on the 24th with
confirmation of fratricide. Yet, five weeks later the Army announced that that Tillman
“probably” died from friendly fire!
3. Chairman Waxman said “Much of our focus will be on a “Personal For” message … that MG
McChrystal sent on April 29th 2004.” General Abizaid testified that “General McChrystal
reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion.”
Response:
Chairman Waxman never focused on the content of McChrystal‟s P4 memo. If you

carefully read it, the memo was anything but “forthright”. As Mary Tillman said in an
interview (8-10-07) with Mike Fish:
"That memo is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is writing
fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script the
Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need to
keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the
circumstances of Pat's death should become public … He should be saying 'We're going
to have to put a hold to the silver star and we're going to have to notify the family [of
suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is
trying to find a way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the
fact that he is off the hook is atrocious."
And Mary wrote in her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk”:
“Not only is he [General McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat‟s
death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His statement
[P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat
was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.”
John R. Reed does a hilarious job of tearing apart the P4 memo point-by-point in his
article “Lessons to Be Learned from Pat Tillman‟s Death”. For example,
“McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star, which
normally requires a highly subjective assessment. However, he has to await the outcome
of an investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly fire, which was a
no brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts like awarding dubious medals
require virtually no investigation or thought, but revealing unattractive truth, well, we
gotta do a whole formal “15-16 investigation” before such an unnatural act.”
Here‟s s few of my additional comments on the P4 memo:
“It is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing completion will find that it is highly
possible that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire”:
How is it “nearing completion” when Scott‟s 15-6 was a “Final Report”? (And how was
it “nearing completion” when Nixon “officially” started the 15-6 on the 29th?) Scott‟s
report concluded friendly fire; “highly possible” means “definitely.” Of course, in
reality, General McChrystal was told of probable friendly fire on the 23rd and confirmed
fratricide on the 24th!
If McChrystal is waiting for the completion of the 15-5 investigation, wouldn‟t it make
sense to wait until it is complete to forward the Silver Star package?
“I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order
to preclude any unknowing statements by our country‟s leaders which might cause public
embarrassment if the circumstances of CPL Tillman‟s death becomes public”:
Note the “if”. Not when! And McChrystal‟s concern is for embarrassment of his bosses,
not to ensure his family knows or that the Secretary of the Army knows before approving
the Silver Star!
Why did McChrystal send the P4 memo on the 29th? Well, on the 29th CPT Scott
submitted his 15-6 “Final Report” concluding friendly fire. It‟s interesting to note that
COL Nixon “officially” appointed Scott on the 29th (even though Scott began work on
the 23rd). Perhaps Nixon was creating a paper trail to show friendly fire wasn‟t suspected
and an investigation begun until after he approved the Silver Star package on the 28th?
I believe McChrystal sent the P4 memo to provide a paper trail he could use later, if
necessary, to cover his butt. The P4 provides a paper trail that he told his superiors about
fratricide, it allows him to argue that he thought Tillman deserved the Silver Star even if
it was from friendly fire. And he could argue that he had approved the Silver Star before
he was informed about possible friendly fire.
4. I‟m puzzled that the House Oversight & Reform Committee never followed up to investigate
who falsified the Silver Star witness statements, after raising this question during the April
hearing. And why didn‟t they investigate McChrystal‟s role in approving the Silver Star?
Response:
Wouldn‟t General McChrystal have a “reasonable basis” to question a Silver Star

package containing no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of confirmed
fratricide? The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to
reality and were carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire.
General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman deserved
the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG report states he “did not directly, or clearly, state these
four factors in the award recommendation.”
Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of friendly
fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said this was done
“somewhere in the approval chain” but refused to “speculate” who was responsible. It
appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‟s XO, and/or General McChrystal were involved.
Even if you take the P4 at face value, that McChrystal first learned of suspected fratricide
on the 29th after he had sent up his Silver Star recommendation, why didn‟t he directly
warn the Secretary of the Army who made final approval?
...
Overall, it appears Waxman‟s Oversight & Reform Committee acted to protect McChrystal from
close scrutiny of his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‟s fratricide:
Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

McChrystal, permitted him to refuse to testify at the hearing, and never interviewed McChrystal
despite his central role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide.
Waxman‟s Committee never questioned the “timliness” of General McChrystal‟s P4 memo.

Although McChrystal was informed of confirmed fratricide just two days after Tillman‟s death,
he decided not to inform the Tillman family.
The Committee never took a hard look at the contents, and forthrightness of McChrystal‟s
misleading P4 memo or McChrystal‟s role in approving the Silver Star package containing a
fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements.
...
Why would the House Oversight & Reform Committee protect General McChrystal from
scrutiny? Perhaps the were afraid of being seen as badgering a general or of being “Ollie
Northed” by a prominent general? Perhaps House leadership told them to give McChrystal a
“free pass” because he was considered indispensable to the war effort?
April 3, 2008
Dear Senator James Webb,
Four years ago Pat Tillman was killed by “friendly fire” in Afghanistan. Six
“investigations” and two Congressional hearings later, Pat‟s family is still struggling to
learn the truth about the circumstances of his death and those involved in the cover-up of
his fratricide.
Mary Tillman, Pat‟s mother, has written a memoir, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The
Life and Death of Pat Tillman. Her book will be released on April 29th.
I‟m writing to ask that you consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for Mary
Tillman‟s struggle for the truth. Perhaps you could arrange to meet Mary in May during
the Washington D.C. leg of her national book tour? Mary‟s home phone is (408) 841-
9912. Her editor at Rodale Press is Leigh Haber (212) 808-1340. Her publicist is Beth
Davey (212) 808-1627.
I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. They are
Scots-Irish. Military service was prevalent and respected in their family (e.g. Mary‟s
father was a Marine in the Korean War). Like your own son, Pat did not feel he should
remain privileged during a time of war. After 9/11 he enlisted (with his brother Kevin) and
they fought together in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was driven by honesty,
integrity, and loyalty. He lived his life intensely, was well-read, and was an independent
thinker; “… sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long.”
I‟ve read your books for thirty years, starting before my eight years in the Army and
continued my past seventeen years as a firefighter. After recently re-reading your novels, I
noticed several parallels between Pat Tillman‟s fratricide and your novels:
In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered into a mistaken battle, posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor, and eulogized by the President during a televised memorial
service. The mistaken battle was covered-up. Similarly, a dangerous order resulted in Pat
Tillman‟s fratricide. He was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and eulogized by
Senator McCain during a televised memorial service. Tillman‟s fratricide was covered-up
by Army generals, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the White House.
In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost men after he was ordered to place them into a dangerous
LP. Later, Hodges was shot during a firefight around a disabled tank. Similarly, Lt.
Uthlaut was ordered by his TOC to split his platoon, despite his repeated protests, to both
get “boots on the ground by dusk” and escort a disabled humvee. During the resulting
fratricide Uthlaut and his RO were wounded and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent
friendly fire.
In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval Academy to
protect their superiors from a “hazing scandal.” Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain at
West Point) was offered up as a scapegoat and kicked out of his Ranger Battalion.
In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of
General MacArthur‟s war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita. Just before the
2006 elections, Kevin Tillman railed against recent injustices in “After Pat‟s Birthday.”
Last year, on April 24, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a
hearing entitled “Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield.”
Kevin Tillman, Pat‟s brother, began his testimony with a prepared statement:
“Two days ago marked the third anniversary of the death of my older brother, Pat Tillman,
in Afghanistan. To our family and friends, it was a devastating loss. To the nation, it was
a moment of disorientation. To the military, it was a nightmare. But to others within the
government, it appears to have been an opportunity.”
“Revealing that Pat‟s death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster
... So the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative narrative had to be
constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pat‟s uniform, equipment and
notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report
was falsified. An initial investigation completed … before testimony could be changed …
[and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was
conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings.”
“… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was
never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the
situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of „missteps, inaccuracies and
errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‟”
“Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.
Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an
(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.
These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is
concealment.”
Mary Tillman, Pat‟s mother, also testified at that hearing about the fratricide cover-up:
“We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are
your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or
they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the
way they did.”
[Mary wrote: “… the Army was placed in a position to spin the narrative of Pat‟s death …
(General) Yellen stated it was like, …‟It went up to the 2-star level and the 2-star took it
right to the 4-star level … now all of a sudden, … „Here is the steak dinner, but we‟re
giving it to you on this … garbage can cover.‟ You know, „You got it. You work it.‟”]
“And we shouldn‟t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way,
they (Army CID investigators) dodged. They are dodging us, and the (Department of
Defense) IG condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a grand
job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a
smokescreen. These officers are scapegoats.”
“It is a bit disingenuous to think that the (Bush) Administration did not know about what
was going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed
by friendly fire and no one would tell (Defense Secretary) Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the
idea that they wouldn‟t tell Abizaid (Centcom commander) what was going on if he didn‟t
already know is ridiculous.”
I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:
The Tillman‟s are of Scots-Irish descent. Pat‟s picture is among those of famous
Americans featured on the cover of Parade Magazine‟s October 3, 2004 issue, entitled
“Can You Guess What They All Have in Common?” (adapted from Born Fighting.)
Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‟s uncles
were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the
Korean War. Mary wrote, “From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‟s
pride in being a Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents,
feet digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps
Hymn at the top of my lungs.”
Your own son chose to leave college to enlist with the Marines. Likewise, Pat Tillman
chose to leave a multi-million dollar NFL contract (and new wife) to enlist in the Rangers
with his brother Kevin. Pat didn‟t feel that he ought to remain privileged while others
were sent to fight. As his mother testified, “Pat had high ideals for the country. He did,
and he thought it was imperfect. He certainly didn‟t join for political reasons. He thought
the country was in need. It didn‟t matter who was in office. It didn‟t matter which party
he voted for. That is beside the point. The country was in need.”
(Ironically, Pat and Kevin were later sent to fight in Iraq although they had come to
believe, in Pat‟s words, “This war is so fucking illegal.”)
Similarly, in Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges said, “They were only soldiers. They had never
owned or determined the reasons for a war, and they had not asked for this one. They had
merely yielded to their honor and tradition and agreed to fight it. And they were not
wrong, not wrong.”
Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote, “Pat
was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions taken
in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those weren‟t just adjectives in
Pat Tillman‟s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of loyalty and
commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right by the people
who mattered to him.”
Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, “If nothing ever works out
all the way, and if all things change, what‟s left? Your family and your friends and your
values, that‟s what‟s left. And your duty to them. … They‟re the only important things in
life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or
anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the
judgment of the ages.”
Pat Tillman lived his life intensely, led by example, and went all out every play. He was
well-read and an independent thinker. In school, he earned a 3.84 grade-point average.
Pat had written in his journal since he was sixteen years old (his wartime journal was
“lost” by the Army immediately after his death).
Pat Tillman was a character much like Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty in A Sense of
Honor: “He is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He is,
in fact, myself in a matchbox.”
Over the past thirty years I‟ve read all your books. I started with Fields of Fire as a
teenager, and continued reading your books during my eight years serving in an Airborne
LRRP company [SSGT, 1983 -1991, Co. “F” (Ranger) 425th Infantry MI Army National
Guard] and my past seventeen years as a firefighter with the City of Grand Rapids, MI.
After recently re-reading your books, I noticed several parallels between your novels and
Pat Tillman‟s fratricide:
In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered to place his Marines into a precarious
fight in Eritrea. This mistaken battle was covered-up by the Secretary of Defense and
Fogarty was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the President during a
nationally televised funeral service:
“He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‟s position on the matter was a
cover-up. Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‟t want the
president to look bad.”
“Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he
could be caught in it. …As a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth,
diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called „necessary,
unconfirmable distortions.‟ Nonetheless, they would become the government‟s
official pronouncement on the day‟s action.”
“And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their
allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.”
Similarly, Pat Tillman died as a result of a dangerous order to split his platoon, was
posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and his memorial service was televised with
Senator McCain among the dignitaries offering eulogies. Tillman‟s fratricide was covered-
up by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Army generals and the White House.
…
In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost three of his men because he was ordered by Lt. Kersey
(at the Battalion command post) to put them out into a dangerous LP:
“LPs on the other side of this wire are crazy as hell. … The rule I use is, would I
think it made any sense if I got sent out on it? And I wouldn‟t. So I don‟t like it.”
“Now, if the Lieutenant believes the LP shouldn‟t be out there, I suggest he go talk
with the battalion staff.”
“Hodges did not know how to force his point. “Can‟t ask for more than having the
Big Six consider it, I reckon.”
“Bullshit.” … “He (1st Lt. Kersey) ain‟t gonna talk to the Colonel about this. … As
long as he‟s looking good to the Man, he couldn‟t give a rat‟s ass how many people
are bleeding.”
“He (Lt. Hodges) had met a dozen Kerseys in the Marine Corps already. They
held all ranks, although to him they seemed to be mostly Majors.”
Lt. Uthlaut was Pat‟s platoon leader. His platoon had been held up by a broken
humvee. Maj. Hodne at the TOC wanted “boots on the ground by dusk” in the
village of Manah merely so he could mark that task accomplished on-time on his
checklist. Major Hodne, through Cpt. Saunders, ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his
platoon. Half would go to Manah, and half would escort the humvee to the
highway for pick-up. Lt. Uthlaut thought it was dangerous and unnecessary to split
his platoon. He repeatedly argued the point with Cpt. Saunders in the TOC.
Near the end of Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges is ordered to secure a dangerous perimeter
around a disabled tank. During the ensuing firefight, he is shot in the face and killed:
“Hodges grunted. “Fucking tank.” … Snake shifted his gaze to the treadless tank
that had anchored them in such an indefensible position. It sat like a wounded
mastodon in the middle of the exposed paddy. … The company was digging a
perimeter around it, to protect it.”
Similarly, Tillman‟s platoon was put into danger by a disabled humvee. During the
“friendly fire” that resulted from splitting his platoon Lt. Uthlaut was hit in the face, his
RO shot in the leg, and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent fire by the lead vehicle
of the second section (Tillman was killed by rounds fired from only 35 meters away).
...
In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval
Academy to protect their superiors from a “hazing scandal”:
“Admiral, I‟ve got a man in trouble on a plebe-indoctrination charge. … My man

won‟t stand a chance.”
“Do you realize the implications if this gets out, Captain? You were there when
these violations were going on. … If we sided with Fogarty, we could lose the
whole plebe system. … In fact, we‟ve lost more than Fogarty. I‟m afraid you‟ve
just become a casualty yourself. … You get orders out of here before somebody
decides to investigate you.”
Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain, top of his West Point Class) was offered up as a low-
ranking scapegoat and kicked out of the Ranger Battalion for his “failure” to control his
platoon during the “friendly fire” incident. (Captain Saunders and Major Hodne later
denied they ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his platoon).
...
In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of
General MacArthur‟s war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita:
“… what he‟s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‟re Americans, Captain.

We‟re supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. …
He‟s convened a military commission! It‟s not – a – court.”
“I reminded him that we‟re supposed to be operating under traditional American
concepts of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. … Do you realize what this
trial – if you can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look
like? It‟s going to be nothing but a public circus! ... why are we wasting our
credibility as the United States on this man?”
Kevin Tillman, Pat‟s younger brother, enlisted and fought with Pat in Iraq and
Afghanistan. After Pat‟s death, Kevin refused all interviews and remained silent for 2 ½
years. Just before the November 2006 elections, Kevin finally broke his silence with a
short essay “After Pat‟s Birthday” (excerpted below):
“It is Pat‟s birthday on November 6, and elections are the day after.”
“Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by
setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly
holding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly
torturing them. …Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few
bad apples. Somehow subversion of the Bill of Rights and The Constitution is
tolerated. Somehow suspension of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country
safe.”
“Somehow the most reasonable, trusted and respected country in the world has
become one of the most irrational, belligerent, feared, and distrusted countries in
the world. … Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its
people and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue
and honor of its soldiers on the ground.”
“Luckily this country is still a democracy. People still have a voice. People still
can take action. It can start after Pat‟s birthday.”
...
“Did they teach you how to lie yet?” (Senator Smith‟s dad in A Country Such As This)
Last summer, on August 1, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a
second hearing: “The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew.” The phrase, “I don‟t recall,” was uttered repeatedly by witnesses.
Mary wrote, “General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have
great difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting
next to me whispers, „They have collective amnesia.‟ Rumsfeld was asked several times in
various ways when he learned of Pat‟s death, but he couldn‟t recall.”
Mary complained, “… we were not happy with the hearing at all. We had spent weeks
helping getting questions prepared and sending information. The Republicans on the
committee were at best indifferent … Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well.
They were not prepared and they didn‟t think on their feet. We expected more from
Congress.”
The White House claimed “executive branch confidentiality” when the House Committee
on Oversight and Reform requested information about their handling of the Tillman
fratricide. The White House refused to release e-mails and documents or to allow White
House staff to testify before the committee.
During the April 24, 2007 hearing, Mary said, “… Congress is supposed to take care of
their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a
system that worked. It is not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in
place to allow for it to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.”
In A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith argued: “And no, the military isn‟t just
fine. The point is, it isn‟t corrupt. It‟s a system with human failures.”
But when “human failures” systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-
command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary
of Defense) up to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every
single institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army
leadership, Congress, White House and the mainstream media.
Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:
“How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the
days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees
before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that
cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or
maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.”
...
Your novels over the past thirty years have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty,
and betrayal. I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.
Perhaps you could arrange to meet with Mary Tillman during her May book tour? And
perhaps you would consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for the Tillman family‟s
struggle for the truth?
Sincerely,
P.S.
I was an early supporter of your long-shot ‟06 Senate campaign (from the fall of ‟05
through your election I made six contributions to your campaign). Most satisfying money
I‟ve ever given to a “lost” cause! Perhaps only the “lost” causes are worth fighting for?
Last August, my family and I traveled to Washington D.C. to attend my step-brother‟s wedding. On our
last day in town, we walked around the Capital building and took a snack break next to an old tree.
While walking back to Union Station we stopped by your Senate office. I‟d like to thank your staffer for
a gracious welcome. And your complimentary packets of Virginia peanuts were a hit with my children!
(Nathan‟s “loot” was firmly grasped by both hands).
That night riding the Amtrak train back home, while finishing your novel, “A Country Such as This,” I
was surprised to read the following passage:
“At the corner of south Capital Street and Independence Avenue … he (Senator Judd Smith)
jogged across the avenue, passing through a curtain of shrubbery into a small park. … He found
his favorite tree and removed his coat, folding it carefully inside out, and sat down, leaning
against the tree trunk as though it was a lounging chair. The park was his frequent daytime
hideout. …When it got to be too much, he simply picked up a carry-out lunch and escaped into
the plain view of the park.”
“His public cloister allowed contemplation … Congress was a dog and pony show. He was
doing vital things, at least part of the time, but it would end someday, just like everything else
always had and always would. … And the gnarled base of his favorite old tree was itself a
throne, from which he could peer out on the Capital, a few hundred feet away, and the House
Office Buildings just across the street. … The Capital building was a wonderfully dramatic
background.”
It sure sounds like the same tree to me! (A bit of synchronicity?)

NOTES FROM JAMES WEBB’S NOVELS:
“It went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. Basically
we … came to USASOC when … everything opened up and now all of a sudden, okay, it‟s sort
of like, „Here is the steak dinner, but we‟re giving it to you on this … garbage can cover. You
know, „You got it, you work it.‟”
-- General Yellen, Deputy Commander SOCOM

8-23-06, dwp
SOMETHING TO DIE FOR
James Webb (1991; paperback Avon Books 1992)
Note: Silver Star on the front cover; same medal awarded Pat Tillman
72 “… it‟s going to cost us. And I‟d like to be able to tell my men that the price
they‟re going to pay is worth it. That it‟s important to the country. Vital.
Something to die for.
387 “We are awarding the Medal of Honor to the family of one of our brave
officers,….”
395 “You (President) killed my Dad. Why? Why‟d you send him in? Why?”
383 It was the look of an accuser who was not afraid to die. The boy (Fogarty‟s
son) probably didn‟t even know it yet, but he had become his father‟s avenger.
401 “He knows the administration‟s position on the matter was a cover-up. ..
Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‟t want the president to
look bad.”
...
160 Holcomb liked to say that Lazaretti (his military aide) had a penchant for
playing politics with a small p. The general was unable to comprehend the
duplicity and multiple agendas at the Cabinet level and in the Congress … the
issue behind the issue, the secret agenda that was being explored while the
visible problem was being confronted.
54 Ron Holcomb never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it.
But he was a master dissembler, capable of taking the truth and twisting it into
so many directions that it became fantasy at the same time it was undeniable.
55 Holcomb almost never lied. He would merely package the facts, box them up
and wrap them with a bright, optimistic ribbon. And anyway, his version could
never be challenged.
340 Holcomb‟s prepared speech had been given a “spin” by Hank Eichelberger. As
a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and
what Holcomb had privately called “necessary, unconfirmable distortions.”
Nonetheless, they would become the government‟s official pronouncement on
the day‟s action.
356 And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that
their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.
...
3 But Bill Fogarty wasn‟t so sure anymore. Maybe he had done it too long.
Maybe it was the recent assignment in Washington, three years split between
working the Congress and serving as an action officer on the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The assignment had unsettled him, opening up his eyes to the sometimes
bewildering series of second and third agendas advanced by ambitious top-level
executives whenever military force was debated.
7 And times were not good in Washington. Fogarty could sense it from little
hints on the news that he never would have noticed had he not spent three years
learning the doublespeak of government. The more bellicose members of the
administration seemed especially antsy of late, spoiling for a reason to use
military force.
31 Having spent three years watching the Wizards of Oz in Washington, he stayed

up nights wondering about the uses to which they would be put. His father …
equated uncertainty with disloyalty. He had chided Fogarty for criticizing those
above him, especially Ronald Holcomb, the secretary of defense. … “God save
me from manipulative bureaucrats in polyester-wool suits, button-down collars
and power ties, and the kiss-ass officers who let them get away with it. I don‟t
need to see my men die because somebody cares more about helping the careers
of their fellow madrigal singers over in the White House or the State
Department than they do about the troops the compromise and misuse in places
like Beirut and the Persian Gulf”
50 “Do you know what the troops call him (Secretary of Defense)? Chicken
Hawk. Because he didn‟t have the guts to serve when there was a war on, and
now every time there‟s a crisis he wants to send them in”
...
40 How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution!
Before the days of multimillion-dollar election campaigns that brought
politicians to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before
the time of computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those
oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from
the get-go, myths to feed the public.
dwp, 3-25-08
FIELDS OF FIRE
(1978)
James Webb
2 Hodges grunted. “Fucking tank.” … Snake shifted his gaze to the treadless
tank that had anchored them in such an indefensible position. It sat like a
wounded mastodon in the middle of the exposed paddy. … The company was
digging a perimeter around it, to protect it.
...
126 “The rule I use is, would I think it made any sense if I got sent out on it? And I
wouldn‟t. So I don‟t like it.” … “Now, if the Lieutenant believes the LP
shouldn‟t be out there, I suggest he go talk with the battalion staff.”
127 “LPs on the other side of this wire are crazy as hell.” … Hodges did not know
how to force his point. “Can‟t ask for more than having the Big Six consider it,
I reckon.” … “Bullshit,” said Snake, “He (1LT Kersey) ain‟t gonna talk to the
Colonel about this.”
128 “As long as he‟s looking good to the Man, he couldn‟t give a rat‟s ass how
many people are bleeding.” … He had met a dozen Kerseys in the Marine
Corps already. They held all ranks, although to him they seemed to be mostly
Majors.
...
155 Dangling Bait. Drifting from village to village, … Inviting an enemy attack
much as a worm seeks to attract a fish: mindlessly, at someone else‟s urging,
for someone else‟s reason.
158 No patrol like this was finished until the bodies were found and tabulated. …
He didn‟t want to do it. … feeling that he was offering his body as a sacrifice
in the name of not bagging a superior‟s order. Blind obedience. Here I am,
God of Dumb. Take me quick.
159 Just fuck „em. Fuck everybody who doesn‟t come out here and do this. Let
them go and check that treeline. What do they know?
162 … he pounded the dust some more, making a vow of rage. He would not allow
their blood to have soaked into that unproductive dust merely for some mad
amorphous folly. … waiting to be killed so they can have more bodies on their
tote boards when the react pulls us from where we never should have had to go.
Those Bastards sit somewhere with air conditioners around them and Coca-
Cola inside them while we drink this goddamn wormy water.
...
35 “Sometimes I wish I have never told you those stories, Bobby. I just wanted
you to remember your daddy. Now, you be careful. Hodges never had a lick of
luck at this.” … Ghosts and glory. It stunned him to hear her say it.
25 These people have no sense of country. They don‟t look beyond themselves.
… We‟ve lost a sense of responsibility, at least on the individual level. … And
the common good is defined by who wins at the polls, and the policies they
make. Like it or lump it.
35 He was not anxious to save Vietnam from itself and he did not relish facing
North Vietnamese guns for a year, but he reasoned that, after all, a man cannot
choose his country‟s enemy. … And besides, Vietnam was something to be
done with, a duty. Not for Vietnam. For honor …
26 Man‟s noblest moment is that one spent on the fields of fire. I believe that. My
war is not as simple as yours was, Father. People seem to question their
obligation to serve on other than their own terms. … I fight because we have
always fought. It doesn‟t matter who.
31 It was a continuum, a litany. Pride. Courage. Fear. An inherited right to

violence. And the pride accumulated, even as the reasons themselves grew
more amorphous.
32 It was the fight that mattered, not the cause. … But in any event, he was
serving, offering himself on the altar of his own culture. A litany, an
inheritance of coursing, unreasoned pride. … It became a religion to him. He
believed in God but most of all he believed in his father and the other Ghosts.
8-26-07, dwp
“A COUNTRY SUCH AS THIS”

James Webb, (1983)
554 People. And pride. And proud people are loyal. Think of this, OK? If nothing
ever works out all the way, and if all things change, what‟s left? Your family and
your friends and your values, that‟s what‟s left. And your duty to them. So they
aren‟t the most important things in life … They‟re the only important things in life.
538 … loyalty to people and culture was the key to life. And that the rest of it might
change a million times, be called wrong or right or anything else, but that you must
never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages.
330 He was not a big man but he had a sort of power in him; not the affirmative
directness of the achiever who must win, but the simple tenacity of a man who has
never won and thus does not really even think about winning, but rather sees life as
a daily refusal to be beaten.
...
491 At the corner of south Capital Street and Independence Avenue … he jogged across
the avenue, passing through a curtain of shrubbery into a small park. … He found
his favorite tree and removed his coat, folding it carefully inside out, and sat down,
leaning against the tree trunk as though it was a lounging chair. The park was his
frequent daytime hideout. …When it got to be too much, he simply picked up a
carry-out lunch and escaped into the plain view of the park.
… His public cloister allowed contemplation … Congress was a dog and pony
show. He was doing vital things, at least part of the time, but it would end
someday, just like everything else always had and always would. … And the
gnarled base of his favorite old tree was itself a throne, from which he could peer
out on the Capital, a few hundred feet away, and the House Office Buildings just
across the street. … The Capital building was a wonderfully dramatic background.
...
503 And no, the military isn‟t just fine. The point is, it isn‟t corrupt. It‟s a system with
human failures.
446 Did they teach you how to lie yet?
3 You could foul the world in many ways, he thought, and maybe you were even
supposed to do it. But failing to honor your word was different. You defiled
yourself, not the world, and you did so indelibly.
7 The flotsam that had always kept him from drowning had always been values. …
It was his one great satisfaction, that he had honored them. Not always, but
whenever he could.
348 … the only really important measure of success is here, in your personal life. …
Life happens to you soon enough without planning it and getting disappointed,
either because you planned too low or too high.
...
388 They were only soldiers. They had never owned or determined the reasons for a
war, and they had not asked for this one. They had merely yielded to their honor
and tradition and agreed to fight it. And they were not wrong, not wrong.
501 Little hooks designed to shake the foundations of belief in traditional views of the
country as a wholesome and well-intentioned nation.
272 Did I ever tell you about Johnny Cash? Johnny Cash is from over in Arkansas.
His daddy was a dirt farmer, just like my daddy.
8-23-06, dwp
A SENSE OF HONOR
James Webb
(1981; Bluejacket Press 1995)
233 He is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He
is, in fact, myself in a matchbox.
104 “Poetry will sustain your emotions. It‟s the lightning rod of the soul. Don‟t be
afraid to be sensitive, just because you‟re a hard-ass.”
133 „Nay, whatever comes/One hour was sunlit and the most high gods/May not
make boast of any better thing/Than to have watched that hour as it passed.‟
There‟s a poem for you. Ezra Pound”
...
74 I was stronger then, but I am fiercer now. I was so certain of life, and of my
place in it. I was so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of
those certainties, but at least I can comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager
to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought.
134 I guess that‟s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and
loyalty are traps with no reward.
...
135 At Navy they say only losers turn into philosophers.
27 Ted Lenahan‟s face carried the perpetual look of having just lost a very close
fight. He had defiant, disappointed blue eyes in weary sockets, the soft skin
underneath them too dry and wrinkled for a man of twenty-nine.
11 “Gone soft,sir?” I haven‟t gone soft. I‟ve always been soft. Except when
I‟ve had to be hard.”
...
12 Fogarty chanted as he jogged, in a mindless repetitive whisper. “I can run

all night … I can run all day … I can run all night …”
11-12-06, dwp
“THE EMPEROR’S GENERAL”

James Webb (Hardcover, 1999)
257 … what he‟s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‟re Americans, Captain. We‟re
supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. This is a capital case.
Yamashita‟s life is at stake. I know a lot of people died in this war, and life was cheap, but the
war is over. Tell MacArthur if he wants to kill Yamashita, why hide behind us? [Defense lawyer
Witherspoon] Why doesn‟t he just come down and shoot him in the fucking head?
258 MacArthur‟s not a lawyer, and this isn‟t a court! He‟s convened a military commission!
It‟s not – a – court. It‟s his own little creation. A commission composed of five generals, less
than a month after this war is over. … And none of them are lawyers, either! I don‟t even have
a military judge to object to on points of law, like I would in a regular court-martial, for Christ‟s
sake! … Do you think they want to ruin their careers by pissing off the supreme commander?
He‟s waived traditional rules of evidence. … He didn‟t appoint the defense counsel until three
days ago, … and they expect us to be ready to go to trial within a few weeks!
302 I [Witherspoon] reminded him that we‟re supposed to be operating under traditional
American concepts of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. And do you know what he told
me? “We‟re in a hurry.”
259 Yamashita had already pulled his soldiers out of Manila. He had declared it an open city
and declined to fight there. He‟d issued written orders to his soldiers against any form of
atrocity. Written orders! When all this [rape of Manila] happened, he was hauling his ass
through the mountains of central Luzon, fighting off twelve American divisions.
260 The prosecution has been talking to Yamashita for nearly a month, without a defense
lawyer present. … The prosecution has every single fact in this case. And even they don‟t
dispute what I just said! They know as well as I do that it‟s not going to matter! Do you realize
what this trial – if you can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look like?
It‟s going to be nothing but a public circus! …. What are we doing here, Captain? Of all the
bloodsucking criminals who did grotesque things in the war, why are we wasting our credibility
as the United States on this man? And in God‟s name, what is the hurry?
...
124 If he [General Yamashita] returned alive on Japanese soil, his fiercely simple self-
assurance could provide a visible counterpoint and even a rallying point for those who wished to
oppose the supreme commander‟s powers.
190 … he [Yamashita] has always been too independent … he took issue with our war
planners. … [he opposed Pearl Harbor] He predicted that we would lose. … He could
be a problem again if he returns to Japan and speaks about how the war was fought.
266 Sam Genius [lawyer prosecuting Japanese war crimes] was not wrong – shifting attention
from the rape of Naking, with Sam Genius‟s hit list of royal collaborators, was important, both to
MacArthur and to the emperor. But the possible impact of Tomoyuki Yamashita‟s return to
Japan, where he might state his case before the same international tribunal that General Tojo and
the others would face in a few months, was more than the supreme commander or the emperor
either one could bear. Dead or alive, the stoic, patient Yamashita would survive that forum as a
national hero, one whose vision, dignity, and exploits might overshadow every other figure in the
Pacific war.
Every other figure. The imperial government might never live down Yamashita‟s clear-eyed
predictions that the course they had chosen for the war was doomed from the beginning. And
more important, Douglas MacArthur could never destroy Yamashita‟s reputation as a principled
and brilliant battlefield general. So instead, Yamashita would be kept in the Philippines, to be
tried before a panel of nonlawyer military careerists, whose very purpose would be to destroy his
honor.
...
309 Tomoyuki Yamashita had been hauled into the room to sit hour after hour, day after day,
as the cameras captured the undeniable horror of Manila‟s rape. And then he would be sent out
to die. At the end of the first day, even the American jounalists were grumbling about the
blatantly contrived and totally predictable results.
363 The “trial” was finally over. … It was December 6. MacArthur, with his penchant for
anniversaries, had arranged for the verdict to be read to the world during a live, fifteen-minute
radio address on Pearl Harbor Day. That night the twelve American, British, and Austrailian
journalists who had covered every moment of the trial were polled by the International News
Service in a secret ballot. … all twelve voted Yamashita innocent.
364 ….[from the verdict] “you failed to provide effective control of your troops as was
required by the circumstances” [LT Uthalat parallel]
...
365 [Frank Witherspoon] filed a petition to the Supreme Court. …. “General MacArthur has
taken the law into his own hands, is disregarding the laws of the United States and the
Constitution, and has no authority from Congress or the president.” … [MacArthur] claiming
that the Supreme Court did not have any jurisdiction in this “purely military” affair.
375 On January 7, 1946, the Supreme Court had heard Frank Witherspoon‟s appeal, and on
February 4 it rendered its opinion. Despite a scathing dissent … the Court declined to intervene
in the case. … “not concerned with the guilt or innocence” ... since the war would not be
officially over until formal peace documents were signed, MacArthur still retained the power to
convene a military commission “so long as a state of war exists.” [surrendered 9-02-45!]
375 From the Supreme Court dissenting opinion: “No military necessity or other emergency
demanded suspension of the safeguards of due process. Yet General Yamashita was rushed to
trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate defense, deprived
of the benefits of the most elementary rules of evidence, and summarily sentenced to be hanged.
In all this needless and unseemly haste there was no serious attempt to prove that he committed a
recognized violation of the rules of war. He was not charged with personally participating in the
acts of atrocity, or with ordering or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these
crimes was attributed to him. This indictment in effect permitted the military commission to
make the crime whatever it willed. Such a procedure is unworthy of our people”
...
380 “Respect. For one another. For oneself. Is there anything more important to leave
behind? I don‟t think so. … Because respect is more important than life. … That is why
MacArthur did this. To destroy my respect. Is it not?” [Yamashita]
383 … in the end I lacked what Koichi Kido called majime, the wisdom and courage to
eliminate any distinctions between my actions and my inner thoughts. One was not born with
majime. He gained it through years of thought and struggle.
310 The spoils of a just war, a war fought on behalf of tolerance and human decency, did not
give anyone the right to murder a great man for reasons of political expedience and personal
jealousy.
106 I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was
merely that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one
man while flight could make another man king.
...
309 Who had I become? …. A cute-mouthed monkey boy, neither serene nor engaged, who
had simply become accepting. … Sam Genius and Frank Witherspoon were standing for
something. And I had come to stand for nothing.
399 I knew it was fruitless at this point but still I felt a call for justice, an anger that life does
not always reward the right intentions, that the cycles of days and years and seasons lull us into
thinking that in all things there will be second chances, and even thirds, when in some things we
have only one. And sometimes we never know we had that single chance until it disappears.
400 Waray, waray. You remember, even after all these years! Yes, that is the way of our
people. To the last drop of blood. To the last breath of air. To the last beating of the heart. That
is how we fight. That is how we pray. That is how we love.
APPENDICES
See separate post at feralfirefighter.blogspot.com (coming soon)

"Did They Teach You How To Lie Yet?" (May 27, 2009 Revised 9/09)

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"Did They Teach You How To Lie Yet?" (May 27, 2009 Revised 9/09)

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“DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?

Marie Tillman (wife), Mary Tillman (mother), Rich Tillman (brother),

-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)

-- James Webb, “The Emperor‟s General‟ (1999)

-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)

Memorial Day Letter to Senator James Webb (May 25th 2009) 4

Senate Armed Services Committee’s May 15th 2008 Confirmation Hearing: 10

General Wallace’s Review of Tillman Fratricide (2007): 29

House Oversight & Reform Committee’s Tillman Fratricide Hearings (2007-2008): 35

April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb: 43

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command for Tillman‟s Unit DoDIG 1

B: General McChrystal’s Early Knowledge of Tillman Fratricide Confirmation:

Appendix B: Chronology DoDIG 7

Interview of LTC Bailey & CSM Birch Jones 15-6 33

C: General McChrystal “Declines” to Appear at Waxman Hearing: www.oversight.house.gov 38

D: General McChrystal’s Misleading P4 Memorandum:

P4 Concerning Information on CPL Tillman‟s Death McChrystal 40

E: General McChystal’s Fraudulent Silver Star Citation:

Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process DoD IG 45

F: General McChrystal’s Testimony at June 2 nd 2009 Confirmation Hearing [Postscript, 8-29-09]: 58

Jones 15-6: CPL Tillman AR 15-6 Investigation, BG Gary M. Jones, 12-28-04

Marine and LT Jim Webb – Vietnam 1968

-- James Webb, “A Country Such As This” (1983)

Memorial Day 2009

Senator James Webb,

-- James Webb, “A Time to Fight” (2008)

In her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk,” Mary wrote:

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

“… they did not tell the family,”:

“… they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, …”:

(JUNE 2nd 2009)

-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)

Summary of Newspaper Coverage of Senate Hearing:

From Chairman Senator Levin‟s opening remarks (p. 3 transcript) “You

On PBS‟s NewsHour, David Corn commented:

My Response to General McChrystal‟s Testimony :

There was never anything speculative or “potential” or "suspected" about Tillman‟s

McChrystal‟s “outcome of an initial review” refers to CPT Scott‟s “15-6 Final

There was nothing “timely” about McChrystal‟s P4 memo! Secretary Geren

I want to emphasize there was nothing “potential” or “suspected‟ about Tillman‟s

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

However, if you look at Appendix D: “Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin

General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

Wouldn‟t General McChrystal have a “reasonable basis” to question a Silver Star

Patrick Sr. and Kevin Tillman – Congressional Hearing, April 2007

Mary Tillman – Congressional Hearing, April 2007

Pat Tillman‟s brother, Kevin, testified:

Mary Tillman wrote in her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk”:

“The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

The Committee “invited” McChrystal to testify, but he “declined” to appear shortly

Chairman Waxman never focused on the content of McChrystal‟s P4 memo. If you

And Mary wrote in her book “Boots on the Ground by Dusk”:

Here‟s s few of my additional comments on the P4 memo:

Wouldn‟t General McChrystal have a “reasonable basis” to question a Silver Star

Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

Waxman‟s Committee never questioned the “timliness” of General McChrystal‟s P4 memo.

Dear Senator James Webb,

“Admiral, I‟ve got a man in trouble on a plebe-indoctrination charge. … My man

“… what he‟s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‟re Americans, Captain.

It sure sounds like the same tree to me! (A bit of synchronicity?)

-- General Yellen, Deputy Commander SOCOM