Dr.

Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 1








Dr. Strangelove II or:
How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb
A Policy Proposal
Nicholas DeLissio
Pennsylvania State University










Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 2
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb
A Policy Proposal
In the waking hours of July 28, 2012, at a highly secured government facility
in Oakridge, Tennessee, an 83-year-old nun and two fellow protesters made their
way past three chain-linked fences and proceeded to vandalize the facility, as
miscommunications and failures to adhere to protocols delayed a proper security
response (U.S. Energy Department, 2012, p. 2). The nun and the protesters were
eventually apprehended, taken to a detention center, and pressed with federal
charges. At first appearance, this was a minor security incident, to be corrected with
updated protocols, early retirements, and a large stack of paperwork, all slowly
processed through a large and slow moving bureaucratic system. However, the
horrifying reality is that this highly guarded government facility was the Y-12
National Security facility, where Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is processed and
stored for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, and it would take much more than a
bureaucratic process to solve the new global security issue at hand. Y-12, up until
that point, maintained a reputation for its top-tier security measures and was
considered to be on par with the Gold Depository at Ft. Knox (Escobedo, 2013). A
security breach there meant an immediate danger and threat to not just U.S. nuclear
weapons, but nuclear stockpiles around the world, and an 83-year-old nun pulled it
off nearly single-handedly.
The Cold War has been over for nearly two decades, nuclear deterrents are
no longer the center and focus of U.S. defense strategy, and Mutually Assured
Destruction is no longer a modern term in international relations. However, the
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 3
ever-persisting threat of terrorism presents a new fear to the international
community: the acquisition and use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction by a terrorist
organization against a large population. Today, the vigilant security of nuclear
weapons and materials is an absolutely essential part of U.S. and global security and
its strategy to defend against the threats of terrorism.
Multiple terrorist organizations have revealed desires to acquire a nuclear
weapon or WMD, the most concerning of which include Al-Qaeda, Chechnya-based
separatists, the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Japanese based
Aun Shinrikyo (Nuclear Terrorism, 2010, p. 4). Of these four, Al-Qaeda has proven
numerous times that they are the closest and most likely organization to accomplish
their goal. Reports include repeated attempts to purchase nuclear materials, as
(falsely) claimed a success on one occasion by Osama bin-Laden in 2001; repeated
attempts to recruit nuclear expertise; indication that there is a focused nuclear
program within the organization that reports directly to its current leader, Ayman
al-Zawahiri; indication of crude explosives tests in the Afghan desert; and an
authorized fatwa issued by Osama bin-Laden in 1998, expressing direct intent and
instructions to use WMDs against civilians (Bunn & Tobey, 2013, p. 7).
Al-Qaeda, and other threatening terrorist and militant organizations, need
not simply acquire a nuclear bomb or missile to accomplish their goal of mass panic
and destruction. There are three mains ways in which they could unleash havoc via
nuclear explosion: Either steal a ready-made nuclear weapon, create an improvised
dirty bomb from stolen HEU or separated plutonium, or directly attack a nuclear
facility which would result in an event similar to Chernobyl or Fukushima. (Bunn &
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 4
Tobey, 2013, p. 4). All three of these options are equally potential for disaster;
however some are easier pull off than others. Of the 1.6-mil kg of HEU kept in
stockpiles in the world, terrorists would only need 25 kg to make an elementary
nuclear bomb within the year (Nuclear Terrorism, 2010, p. 7). It is evident that
although the concept of unleashing a nuclear weapon upon millions of civilians is
theoretically very difficult, terrorists are closer and more able to accomplish this
than the public knows.
While an event like Y-12 proves that security gaps in our nuclear facilities
exist and must be addressed, recent direct attacks by terrorists on nuclear facilities
have proven that they are willing and very able to exploit these vulnerabilities. In
Moldova in 2011, there was a report that smugglers were able to seize and possibly
fence at least 1 kg of HEU. In another case, in South Africa in 2007, two armed teams
were able to attack and penetrate a HEU facility, bypassing all of its security systems
with ease (Bunn & Tobey, 2013, p. 11). Terrorist and militant organizations must no
longer be able to potentially acquire nuclear weapons or materials, or else we risk
the social, political, and economic consequences. As Former UN Secretary General
and Noble Peace Prize winner Kofi Annan made clear in a statement, Were a
nuclear attack to occur, it would cause not only widespread death and destruction,
but would stagger the world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire
poverty [Creating] a second death toll throughout the developing world. (Bunn,
M. & Tobey, W., 2013)
For the past two decades, global political leaders have acknowledged the
threat of wavering nuclear security and the potential dangers of a terrorist-acquired
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 5
nuclear weapon and yet have made minimal strides to defend against it. Nuclear
talks between Russia and the US have existed since the fall of the Berlin Wall to
slowly decrease the size (and therefore risk of unaccountability) of their nuclear
stockpiles. The Bush and Clinton administrations implemented the START treaty as
a first step to address this concern, which lasted up until 2009 (Treaty between
[]). At the dawn of the Obama era, new initiatives were made in the Oval Office and
the U.N. general assembly to increase these efforts, as the terrorist threat to nuclear
weapons had substantially grown by this point in time. In 2009, the Obama
administration voiced its efforts to re-enforce the START treaty, create a series of
new Nuclear Security summits, and decrease the risk of nuclear security
vulnerabilities.
By the end of 2013, we will seek to complete a focused international effort to
secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world through enhanced
protection and accounting practices, expanded cooperation with and through
international institutions, and new partnerships to lock down these sensitive
materials [...] to ensure the continued improvements necessary to protect
nuclear materials from evolving threats. (National Security Strategy, 2010)
While the White House has made significant progress in achieving these
goals, there has been a failure to meet the deadline to meet its underlying objective:
secure all nuclear materials by 2013.
Since the beginning of this initiative in 2009, the NEW-START treaty has been
signed, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887 was drafted, and Nuclear Security
Summits have been held in Washington D.C. in 2010 and the Hague, Netherlands as
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 6
of this recent March 2014. As a result of these summits, the obligations of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 were reinforced, and the support for the increased
activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency was expressed. Furthermore, a
total of thirteen countries have eliminated all HEU stockpiles within their borders
(Bunn, Roth, Malin, & Tobey, 2014, p. ii).
Falling in line with the Obama administrations statement, UNSCR 1887 is a
non-binding resolution that does nothing more than call for enhanced security
measures and protocols in all countries and encourages HEU disarmament (UNSCR
1887, 2009). Its predecessor, UNSCR 1540, proposed in 2004, maintains three vague
obligations for those countries that have ratified it: to prohibit support to non-state
actors seeking WMDs; adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting activities
involving the proliferation of a WMD; and have and enforce measures to reduce the
vulnerability of many legitimate activities to misuse in ways that would foster the
proliferation of a WMD (UNSCR 1540, 2004)
While this seems like major progress in turning the attention of global
security towards the nuclear non-proliferation issue, the Obama administration has
yet to meet its goal of providing effective security for all the worlds vulnerable
nuclear materials, and the danger of nuclear theft and terrorism still exists.
According to former U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Kenneth Brill, there are no current international standards for the security
protocols of nuclear facilities and materials, there is no obligation to follow any such
standards, and there is no authority or institution to properly enforce these
standards at the given time (Brill, K. & Luongo, K., 2012). Events like Y-12, Moldova,
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 7
and South Africa have well established the concern for the nuclear security gaps that
still exist around the world, and the immediate need to address them.
A policy must be created to establish globally agreed upon security standards
and protocols, an obligation and incentive to meet them, establish or grant authority
to an institution that will enforce said standards, and effectively accomplish the
Obama Administrations goal of completely and totally securing the worlds nuclear
weapons, so that they do not fall into the hands of those willing to do evil.
I present a proposal that a new United Nations Security Council Resolution
be drafted and ratified by all member nation-states who maintain any weapons-
grade nuclear material or nuclear stockpile. The over-arching purpose of this
resolution would be to address the three concerns and needs for nuclear security: A
set of clear standards, a means of inducement, and a means of enforcement. Along
with these main three purposes, the resolution would also encourage diplomatic
dialogue between partnering nations (i.e. U.S.-Russia, Pakistan-India) to help
address individual issues and concerns that may hinder diplomatic progress (i.e.
Crimea crisis, conflicts along the Kashmir region).
The reasoned logic for such a proposal is based on timing. Now is the most
opportune moment for this resolution. The first reason is based on the evidence that
the major UNSC nuclear security resolutions have taken on a pattern of being
ratified every five years (2004 and 2009). It has been five years since UNSCR 1887,
ergo a new Nuclear Security resolution should be passed this year. Second, the
second of the three proposed Nuclear Security Summits has recently taken place in
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 8
the Hague, Netherlands and its Communique supports the need for a resolution of
this nature, stating
We recognize the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international
nuclear security architecture, consisting of legal instruments, international
organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance and good
practices. (The Hague, 2014)
With the support of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, and the advice it
recommends, a resolution passed at this point in time would be more effective and
better represent the concerns and needs that have been agreed upon by world
leaders. Third, the current international political climate makes this a time when
nuclear security is of utmost top priority and should not be delayed any further.
While the aforementioned occurrences of nuclear security breaches have all
occurred within the past seven years, current incidents like the crisis in Crimea
could break down U.S.-Russian relations and render Ukraine nuclear capabilities
vulnerable (Bunn, Roth, Malin, & Tobey, 2014, p. iii). Drafting a resolution for this
matter would be a pre-emptive move to ensure that these recent events do not take
us any steps backwards from our goal.
As a fully presented solution, with as much detail as possible without legal
council or expertise knowledge, I present the language of the new UN Security
Council resolution to read as such:
1. Acknowledging the fact that although the 2009 Obama Administration
proposal, 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and UNSCR 1887 have all helped
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 9
drastically reduce nuclear stockpiles, serious gaps in nuclear material and facility
security still exist.
2. Gravely concerned with the fact that while the power and strength of
terrorist groups have significantly dwindled in the past five years, serious threats
remain from these groups and their goals to obtain a WMD.
3. Recognizing the recommendations made by the 2014 Nuclear Security
Summit in The Hague.
4. Reaffirming the obligations designated to member-states in UNSCR
1540.
5. Affirming the creation of a new set of base-line security standards and
protocols for nuclear facilities to be amended or added within the IAEA Code of
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. These new measures will
be designed, enforced, and inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency via
its newly granted authority per this resolution. These standards must be able to
protect against a well-placed insider, a group of well-armed outsiders working
together, or both together. Certifications will also be required for personnel,
operating procedures, and technological measures.
6. Affirming the amendment to The Statute of the IAEA that expands its
powers from an advisory role to that of an enforcing authority. This is done so that
the IAEA may set in place specific and rigorous security requirements for all nuclear
facilities that process or store Highly Enriched Uranium or separated plutonium.
This amendment also grants the power to the IAEA to inspect for compliance with
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 10
these standards on a set and frequent basis and to instill penalties if the standards
are not met.
7. Decides that all states, under ratification of this resolution, shall
attempt to adopt a policy that adheres to any new requirements set by the IAEA and
further approved by the General Assembly, as an obligation in accordance with
UNSCR 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
8. Encourages nations to establish and amend treaties to be in
accordance with the newly required security standards; to continue to conduct
third-party inspections routinely; to establish communication between intelligence
and police forces to prevent and recover theft and/or sabotage of nuclear stockpiles;
to share analysis of incidents to better understand threats and security mistakes;
and to conduct joint security and recovery exercises.
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
With the implementation of this resolution, we can expect to see a drop in the
occurrences of security breaches and theft; we can hope that this will finally seal off
any chances a terrorist organization has of obtaining a nuclear weapon; and will no
longer have to worry about the havoc and range of consequences for allowing them
to do so. This is a peaceful solution that does not require an invasion, or seizure or
destruction of assets. No one should be harmed, no economies should be damaged,
and the world should continue spinning as it normally does.
No other course of action would have as much influence to accomplish such
goals than a UN Security Council Resolution, which maintains obligations that states
are held to. Legislation and executive orders may be drafted and passed within
Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 11
individual nations, however nothing will be accomplished without globally agreed-
upon action, as the threat of nuclear terrorism is most definitely a global concern.
Not all states will ratify such a resolution, and not all states may have the same
ambition of keeping nuclear materials out of terrorist hands. However, if diplomacy
is to be had on the matter between discerning states, than it is best done through the
peaceful dialogue of the United Nations. Here is our best chance to secure the
worlds most dangerous materials from those who wish to use them for death and
destruction.












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Dr. Strangelove II or: How Well Stop Terrorists from Getting the Bomb 12
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