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(AHMCSO), Petitioner
Megaworld (Private respondent) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Addition Hills, Mandaluyong
City, covered by a TCT Title issued by the Register of Deeds on which it conceptualized the construction of a residential
condominium complex called as the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium.
Megaworld secured the necessary clearances, licenses and permits for the project, including:
1. Certificate of Locational Viability and Development permit issued by HLRUB
2. Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by DENR
3. Building Permit issued by the office of the Building Official of Mandaluyong City
4. Barangay Clearance issued by the Chairman of Barangay Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City.
Pending construction, plaintiff filed a complaint before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 158 for:
1. Annulment of the Building Permit, CLV, ECC and Development Permit;
2. Prohibit the issuance to Megaworld of Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium units and;
3. Permanently enjoin Local and National Building Officials from issuing licenses and permits.
Megaworld filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction over the case was with
HLRUB and not with the regular courts, however the RTC denied the motion, which lead to Megaworld filing its Answer to the
complaint, and the trial on the merits ensued, rendering decision in favour to the petitioner.
Aggrieved with the RTCs decision, respondent appealed the rendered decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside such lower courts decision finding petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention
from courts.
As expected, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which however the CA denied.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

Whether or Not the CA erred in its finding about the petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial intervention?

The court finds the petition without merit. At the outset, the parties discusses issues, although ostensibly legal, actually
require the court to make findings of facts. It is long settled by law and jurisprudence that the court is not a trier of facts. Therefore,
the only relevant issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy sought by the petitioner in the trial court is in
violation of the legal principle of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Citing the case of Republic vs. Lacap, the court
expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
1. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency
the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
2. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
3. Nonetheless, the doctrines enunciated which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as:
A. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
B. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
C. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
D. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
E. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
F. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
G. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
H. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
I. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
J. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
K. When strong public interest is involved;
L. In quo warranto proceedings. XXX

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that none of the aforementioned exceptions exist in the case at bar. Hence, the
court concludes that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court decision and dismissing said
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.