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in her official capacity as Boone County
Clerk, et al.,


Case No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB


Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), Defendants Greg Zoeller, William C.
VanNess II, M.D., Penny Bogan, Michael A. Brown, and Peggy Beaver respectfully move this
Court to stay the enforcement of the Preliminary Injunction entered on May 8, 2014, pending
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Defendants-Appellants
have this day filed their Notice of Appeal concerning that preliminary injunction as well as a
docketing statement.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) provides that [w]hile an appeal is pending from an
interlocutory order or final judgment that grants . . . an injunction, the court may suspend [that]
injunction . . . . The purpose of a stay is to maintain the status quo pending appeal, thereby
preserving the ability of the reviewing court to offer a remedy and holding at bay the reliance
interests in the judgment that otherwise militate against reversal[.] In re CGI Indus., Inc., 27
F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994). If a stay is not granted and action is taken in reliance on the
judgment, the positions of the interested parties have changed, and even if it may yet be
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possible to undo the transaction, the court is faced with the unwelcome prospect of
unscrambl[ing] an egg. Id. (citation omitted).
In considering whether to issue a stay, the Court must consider the relative hardships to
the parties of the relief sought, in light of the probable outcome of the appeal, and should grant
the stay if the party seeking it both has a good chance of winning the appeal and would be hurt
more by the injunction than the [opposing party] would be hurt by a stay of the injunction
pending appeal. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733 F.2d 484, 486
(7th Cir. 1984).
The nature of the showing required to justify a stay pending appeal varies with the facts
of each case. The [p]robability of success is inversely proportional to the degree of irreparable
injury evidenced. A stay may be granted with either a high probability of success and some
injury, or vice versa. Cuomo v. NRC, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also FTC v.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (granting stay of
injunction against federal do-not-call law and holding that if the moving party can establish that
the three harm factors tip decidedly in its favor, the probability of success requirement is
somewhat relaxed).
With respect to success on the merits, the Supreme Court has held that there must be a
strong showing of likely success, not necessarily a definitive likelihood of success as in the
preliminary injunction context. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Indeed, the
movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is
involved and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.
Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
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I. The Injunction Issued by This Court Should, Like All Other Contested Same-Sex
Marriage Injunctions to Date, Be Stayed

To date, in light of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, in no case does a fully
contested preliminary or final permanent injunctive decree precluding enforcement of traditional
marriage definitions remain in effect. The thrust of these cases is hard to miss: The traditional
definition of marriage has been around a long time. Its validity is hotly contested, but the
outcome of these legal disputes is uncertain, such that the status quo should remain until the
Supreme Court squarely addresses the issue.
On J anuary 6, 2014, the Supreme Court stayed a permanent injunction issued by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(D. Utah 2013), pending final disposition of an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Herbert v. Kitchen,
134 S. Ct. 893 (J an. 6, 2014). In that case, three same-sex couples challenged Utahs
constitutional amendment and statutes upholding the traditional definition of marriage. Kitchen,
961 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. The district court entered a permanent injunction, now fully stayed by
the Supreme Court, that required officials to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to
recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other States. Id. at 1215.
Federal courts across the country have fallen into line by staying injunctions involving
traditional marriage definitions, both with respect to licensure of same-sex marriages within a
State and recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions. See Bishop v.
United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (licensure); Bostic v.
Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014) (licensure and
recognition); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741, at * 28 (W.D.
Texas Feb. 26, 2014) (licensure and recognition); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014
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WL 556729, at * 14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2014) (recognition); DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341,
Doc. 22-1 at 3 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (licensure).
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district courts denial of a stay of its
injunction in Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
20, 2014), that barred defendants from enforcing Tennessees anti-recognition statute and
constitutional amendment against the six named plaintiffs in that case. Order, Tanco v. Haslam,
No. 14-5297, Docket No. 29, at 2 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014) (per curiam). The court found
persuasive the district courts grant of stay of its own injunction in Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-
CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2014), explaining that [r]ecognition of
same-sex marriages is a hotly contested issue in the contemporary legal landscape, and, if [the
states] appeal is ultimately successful, the absence of a stay as to [the district courts] ruling of
facial unconstitutionality is likely to lead to confusion, potential inequity, and high costs. Id.
The court ruled that, [b]ecause the law in this area is so unsettled, in our judgment the public
interest and the interests of the parties would be best served by this Court imposing a stay on the
district courts order until this case is reviewed on appeal. Id. With this order in Tanco, every
contested injunction issued post-Windsor in favor of same-sex plaintiffs by district courts has
been stayed.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have argued that the unanimous stays of permanent injunctions
under facial challenges are not persuasive because [p]reliminarily enjoining enforcement of
[Indianas traditional marriage definition] does not cause similar concerns. Pls. Reply Br. at 33
[Doc. 62]. Similarly, this Court stated in its preliminary injunction ruling that it does not agree
that a stay by the Supreme Court of such a broad injunction conclusively determines that the
Plaintiffs here are not entitled to the narrow form of injunctive relief they seek. Entry on Pls.
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Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6 [Doc. 65] (hereinafter, PI Entry). Yet in all such cases, it is the legal
limbo due to lack of final appellate resolution on a nationally important, unsettled question of
law that militates for a stay. If a permanent injunction must be stayed in this context, it follows
that temporary or preliminary relief is equally inappropriate.
This Court also stated in its preliminary injunction ruling that despite these stays, no
court has found that preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate simply because a stay may be
issued. Id. Yet, as Defendants advised the Court at the hearing on Plaintiffs motion for
temporary restraining order, and as they alluded to once again in their combined brief, see Defs.
Combined Br. at 10 [Doc. 56], in Wolf v. Walker, No. 3:14-cv-00064-bbc, Doc. 53 (W.D. Wisc.
Mar. 4, 2014), J udge Crabb invited plaintiffs to withdraw their motion for preliminary injunction
because any such an injunction would likely be stayed, stating that [i]f a preliminary injunction
must be stayed as soon as it is entered, it is not clear what purpose it serves. Id. at 3.
The Supreme Court sent a strong message with its unusual intervention in Kitchen v.
Herbert that stayed a final, permanent injunction against enforcement of traditional marriage
definitions. Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *14. This Court should heed that message and stay
enforcement of the Preliminary Injunction pending appeal.
II. The Injury to Defendants, Public Policy, and Balance of Hardships Weigh in Favor
of a Stay

A. Absent a stay, the legitimacy of Quasney and Sandlers marriage would
remain in doubt, the preliminary injunction would risk public confusion over
the meaning of marriage in Indiana, and officials would not be certain of
their responsibilities

The preliminary injunction requires Defendant Van Ness to issue a death certificate for
Quasney that lists her as married and lists Sandler as her surviving spouse, but also includes the
following broad directive and statement: Defendants and all those acting in concert are
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ENJOINED from enforcing Indiana statute 31-11-1-1(b) against recognition of Plaintiffs,
Niki Quasneys and Amy Sandlers, valid out-of-state marriage; the State of Indiana must
recognize their marriage. PI Entry at 13. This injunction threatens irreparable harm to
Defendants because it proposes to alter the meaning of marriage in Indiana for one couple, but
potentially only temporarily; because it creates confusion over the meaning of marriage in
Indiana, and because it leaves Defendants wondering what, exactly, is required of them.
1. Without a stay, in the absence of a final appellate determination of their rights,
any recognition of the Quasney-Sandler marriage would come under a cloud of doubt.
Plaintiffs have discussed at length their desire for societal recognition and acceptance. See, e.g.,
Pls. Prelim. Inj. Mem. at 25 [Doc. 36]; Pls. Summ. J . Mem. at 1, 4, 8, 18-19 [Doc. 39]. Yet the
Preliminary Injunction issued by this Court cannot ensure those aims, and it will unavoidably
leave a bitter taste because it cannot conclusively resolve the legality of same-sex marriages.
The best course of action would be to allow for full and fair appellate review before building up
the expectations of these Plaintiffs or any other same-sex couples interested in recognition of
their out-of-state marriages.
2. Furthermore, the public interest in the continuity of Indianas marriage lawsi.e.,
the interest in avoiding the potential for public confusion over a series of judicial injunctions that
keep re-setting a states authority to define marriagefavors a stay. Plaintiffs claim that no
harm [exists] if the injunction is granted in error, Pls. Reply Br. at 35 [Doc. 62], and the Court
stated in its preliminary injunction order that while it recognizes the States concern that
injunctions of this sort will cause confusion with the administration of Indianas marriage laws
and to the public in general, that concern does not apply here. PI Entry at 12-13. Yet the Court
should not turn a blind eye to the impact of widespread publication of its ruling. It is not as if
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only these Plaintiffs are likely to know about the injunction. Widespread attention to this case
raises the risk exponentially that preliminary injunctive relief without full appellate review will
disrupt public understanding of the meaning and purpose of marriage in Indiana, raise
expectations that any number of Indiana laws pertaining to marriage are suddenly suspended or
modified, and generally create unnecessary confusion among the public. This would be
especially damaging with respect to any public acts that cannot be undone, even if only as to
Quasney and Sandler.
3. If the response is that the recognition required by the preliminary injunction
cannot harm Defendants because it requires no official or public acts (apart from duties
pertaining to the Quasney death certificate), that only underscores the lack of connection
between the Defendants and any harm to Quasney and Sandler. See Part II.B., infra. It also
demonstrates that the preliminary injunction is harmful because, beyond actions pertinent to the
Quasney death certificate, it fails to specify what, exactly, it means for defendants to recognize
the Quasney-Sandler marriage, and what import that statement the State of Indiana must
recognize their marriage is meant to convey.
As the Supreme Court has held with respect to Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a federal court [must] frame its [preliminary injunctions] so that those who must
obey them will know what the court intends to require and what it means to forbid . . . is
absolutely vital in a case where a federal court is asked to nullify a law duly enacted by a
sovereign State. Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970). An
injunction must state precisely how those enjoined are to be bound, Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S.
473, 476 (1974) (per curiam) (Since an injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of
judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of
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precisely what conduct is outlawed.). The Courts preliminary injunction injures Defendants by
targeting all of them without specifying (apart from duties related to Quasneys death certificate)
what they must do to recognize the Quasney-Sandler marriage.
Furthermore, when the Court says that the State of Indiana must recognize their
marriage, it is not clear if that statement is intended to apply to parties not before the Court,
such as (potentially) probate judges, tax officials, or any other state or local officials with whom
Quasney and Sandler may have incidental contact. One principal rule of equity is that a court
may not bind parties not before it by way of injunctive decrees. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42
F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ([N]o court can make a decree which will bind any one but a
party[.] (opinion of Hand, J .)). After final judgment, if Quasney and Sandler prevail, the
precise breadth of the injunction likely would not matter as much because all same-sex couples
in all circumstances would be able to invoke whatever rights of recognition may arise without
constantly resorting to a judicial decree for guidance. But with limited preliminary relief,
officials need to know exactly who is expected to do what. Here, that need is satisfied with
respect to the Quasney death certificate, but not with respect to the broader directive for the
State of Indiana to recognize the Quasney-Sandler marriage.
That said, it seems unlikely that situations other than the death certificate will arise where
a state or local official is confronted with the validity vel non of the Quasney-Sandler marriage.
If so, rather than undertake the unnecessary task of identifying and disaggregating all potential
recognition scenarios, the better course is to stay the injunction pending appeal.
B. Any potential harm to Plaintiffs is reparable on final judgment, speculative,
vague, or non-justiciable

This Court based its preliminary injunction in part on its view that Indianas non-
recognition statute harms the Plaintiffs in numerous tangible and intangible ways, including
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causing Niki to drive to Illinois where her marriage will be recognized in order to receive
medical care and the dignity of marital status. PI Entry at 5. But there is no reason to believe
that an injunction pending appeal would benefit Quasney. Quasney has not asserted that, with
the TRO in hand, she sought treatment locally rather than by driving to Illinois, so there is no
reason to believe the preliminary injunction will have any such effect. Furthermore, there is
nothing any Defendant can do to make Quasneys ability or willingness to seek treatment in
Indiana any easier. Defendants do not control Indiana hospitals and cannot require personnel at
those hospitals to accord recognition to Quasney and Sandler as a married couple. There is
simply no connection between an injunction in this case against these defendants and Quasneys
medical treatment.
The Court also stated in its preliminary injunction order that a preliminary injunction
enjoining Defendants from enforcing the non-recognition statute against Plaintiffs will . . .
redress their claimed injury. PI Entry at 5. But there is no way in which any Defendant has
ever enforced the non-recognition statute against any Plaintiffs in this case. The statutes
cited by the CourtInd. Code 4-6-1-6; Ind. Code 31-11-4-2; Ind. Code 16-37-1-3; and Ind.
Code 16-37-1-3.1in support of this point have nothing to do with Quasney. Section 4-6-1-6
pertains to the Attorney Generals general duties to attend to litigation, but that has nothing to do
with Quasney (or any Plaintiff for that matter). See Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of
Wheeling Twp., 980 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting lawsuit against a state Attorney
General based only on his general duty to enforce the laws of the State). Section 31-11-4-2
precludes clerks from issuing marriage licenses in contravention of Section 31-11-1-1, but
Quasney and Sandler do not seek a marriage license. In short, enjoining Defendants from doing
that which they have never done cannot plausibly redress any injury to Quasney or Sandler.
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The Court also cited Indiana Code Section 16-37-1-3 and Indiana Code Section 16-37-1-
3.1, which govern the Health Commissioners duties with respect to vital records. Quasneys
central claim has been that, absent an injunction, she stands to suffer immediate harm if she
passes away before conclusion of the litigation and her death certificate lists her as unmarried.
As the declaration of Hilari A. Sautbine, a staff attorney for the Indiana State Department of
Health, makes clear, however, a certificate of death can be amended at the request of any
interested person. Sautbine Decl. 10-11 [Doc. 56-1]. Any refusal to honor such a request is
subject to legal action in state court. Id. at 12. If the Court later determines on the merits that
Quasneys out-of-state same-sex marriage is entitled to recognition in Indiana, her certificate of
deathwhich is an electronic recordcould easily be corrected to reflect that fact.
Accordingly, there is no likely irreparable harm with respect to the accuracy of the certificate of
death itself.
In its preliminary injunction order, the Court alluded to permitting the Plaintiffs to
receive . . . the dignity of marital status, PI Entry at 5, and specifically ruled that pass[ing]
away without enjoying the dignity that official marriage status confers constitutes concrete,
tangible injuries that are fairly traceable to Defendants and can be remedied by a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 11-12. Perception of slight to ones dignity, however, is a type of
psychological harm not cognizable under Article III. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982);
Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th Cir. 1993); Harris v. City of Zion,
927 F.2d 1401, 1405 (7th Cir. 1991).
And ongoing violations of constitutional rights can constitute irreparable harm justifying
an injunction only where the defendants are actually responsible for such ongoing violations.
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See Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding preliminary injunction
requiring prison officials to provide two showers a week to all inmates and a daily hour of yard
recreation to certain other inmates in order to remedy due process violation); Does v. City of
Indianapolis, No. 1:06-cv-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2927598, at *1-*10 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5,
2006) (granting preliminary injunction against sheriff and other local officials charged with
enforcing a city ordinance prohibiting offenders from being within a certain distance of public
facilities); Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 754 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (granting motion for
preliminary injunction preventing officials from participating in a commission where such
participation would give effect to statutory racial and gender quotas in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause); Hodgkins v. Peterson, No. 1:04-cv-569-J DT-TAB, 2004 WL 1854194, *5
(S.D. Ind. J ul. 23, 2004) (granting preliminary injunction against local officials charged with
arresting and prosecuting violators of Indianas juvenile curfew law).
Here, there is zero evidence that any slights to dignity suffered by Quasney and Sandler
are traceable to any Defendants. Nothing that Defendants have said or done has caused Quasney
to seek treatment in Illinois rather than Indiana, or caused any of the other tangible or
intangible harms that Quasney and Sandler allege. Nor can any of the Defendants take or
forego any action that can restore that dignity. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1018
(D. Nev. 2012) (explaining that [a]ny stigma arising out of the States refusal to recognize
same-sex relationships as marriages simply cannot be removed by judicial decree).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate sufficiently cognizable harm to justify denial
of a stay. An injunction against these Defendants seeking to assuage Plaintiffs dignity harms,
without any connection to actions or duties of the Defendants, is likely to be reversed on appeal.

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III. Defendants Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 180 (1972), was a ruling on the merits that upheld Minnesotas
traditional definition of marriage. Baker was not overruled by United States v. Windsor, 133
S.Ct. 2675 (2013), or any other Supreme Court case and therefore precludes these challenges.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a
decision stating that the constitutional right to marry encompasses forcing States to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages. Furthermore, other federal district courts that have considered
the issue have concluded that traditional marriage laws limiting marriage to the legal union of a
man and woman do not violate the Constitution. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d
1065 (D. Hawaii 2012); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012). To date, the
only federal appellate court to squarely address the issue since Baker has upheld the
constitutionality of the traditional marriage. See Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455
F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Courts decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), did
not undermine the legal underpinnings of these decisions. The Court struck down Section 3 of
DOMA, which had the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity[,] as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment principally because it was an unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage . . . . Id. at 2693, 2696 (emphases added). It was
critical to the Courts analysis that New York had previously granted marital interests that
federal DOMA then threatened. Id. at 2689.
While the Constitution plainly gives its blessing to New York to recognize out-of-
jurisdiction same-sex marriages, id. at 2692 (explaining that New Yorks actions were without
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doubt a proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our federal system, [which] allow[s] the
formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other
in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other), it is a considerable leap from
this to the conclusion that Windsor established a singular vision of a fundamental right to
marriage that must be respected by all States. Traditional state marriage definitions are, as
Windsor amply affirms, the usual course of business. Id. at 2691. In no uncertain terms, the
majority forcefully states that [t]his opinion and its holding are confined to [New Yorks] lawful
marriages. Id. at 2696. It is therefore improper to extrapolate from this opinion any rule that
affects any other states marriage laws.
As Defendants have previously explained, there is no constitutional rightwhether
sounding in full faith and credit, due process, or equal protectionto have ones out-of-state
same-sex marriage or civil union recognized in Indiana. See Defs. Combined Mem. at 24-32.
First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires recognition of judgments of other States and does
not extend to a States acts or statutes. Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 232 (1998) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate. (quotation and citation omitted)). If the Full Faith and Credit Clause
cannot compel one State to recognize marriages from another, the Fourteenth Amendment has no
greater role to play.
Second, there is no federal due process right to have a license issued in one State
whether for professional, weapons, driving, or marriage purposestreated as valid by
government and courts in another. See Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1176 (4th Cir. 1974)
([L]icenses to practice law granted by . . . one state, have no extraterritorial effect or value and
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can vest no right in the holder to practice law in another state.). Marriage-recognition principles
are rooted in the common law of comity. The common law choice-of-law starting point is
usually the lex loci rule, which says a marriage valid in the State of licensure is valid in other
States as well. But that is not, and never has been, the end of the matter. The Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws 283(2) (1971) states that even if a marriage satisfies the
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted, that marriage will not be
recognized as valid if it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. This
public policy exception comports with the Nations history, legal traditions, and practices,
and indeed dates back before the Fourteenth Amendment. See J oseph Story, Commentaries on
the Conflict of Laws 113a, at 168 (Little Brown, & Co. 6th ed. 1865). See Defs. Combined
Mem. at 27 (listing examples). In the only Indiana Supreme Court decision that Defendants are
aware of that addresses an out-of-jurisdiction marriage that could not have been entered into in
Indiana, the Court refused to recognize the marriage on public policy grounds. Sclamberg v.
Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801, 802-03 (Ind. 1942) (treating as void a marriage between uncle and
Finally, Indianas traditional marriage definition does not violate equal protection. At the
outset, it is not clear Quasney and Sandler have standing to assert this claim. They were married
in Massachusetts, but were not at the time residents of Massachusetts. They were residents of
Indiana. Knowing that they could not be married in Indiana, they decided to get married
elsewhere, which runs afoul of Indiana Code Section 31-11-8-6, which prohibits recognition of
marriages entered out-of-state to evade Indianas marriage laws. See Defs. Combined Mem. at
27-28. This statute is neutral with respect to whether the marriage is same-sex or opposite-sex,
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so Quasney and Sandler are being treated exactly the same as a similarly situated opposite-sex
couple would be treated.
Regardless, the proper level of scrutiny here is rational basis, see id. at 35-48, and to the
extent out-of-state opposite-sex marriages are generally treated as valid under Indiana law but
same-sex marriages are not, that differential treatment is fully justifiable. For Indiana, marriage
is about encouraging responsible procreation so as to ameliorate the consequences of unplanned
pregnancies. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Defs. Combined
Mem. at 50-55. For States recognizing same-sex marriages, the purpose of marriage is obviously
something elsesomething that cannot be reconciled with Indianas marriage philosophy.
Notably, the same is not true with respect to other variations in state marriage laws, which may
reflect marginal differences about the proper age of majority or the proper distance of
consanguinity, but which do not call into question the fundamental purpose of the entire
enterprise. Indiana has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of its fundamental
rationale for civil marriage rather than letting it be redefined by other States.
Fundamentally, the constitutional validity of Indianas decision not to recognize out-of-
state same-sex marriages turns on the constitutional validity of its traditional marriage definition.
Because Indiana can constitutionally adhere to that definition and thereby refuse to provide for
same-sex marriages, Defs. Combined Mem. at 32-60, it can also refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages from other States.
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For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court stay enforcement
of its Preliminary Injunction pending disposition of this appeal.

s/ Nancy Moore Tiller (with permission)
Nancy Moore Tiller
Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates
11035 Broadway, Suite A
Crown Point, IN 46307
Tel: (219) 662-2300
Fax: (219) 662-8739
Counsel for Michael A. Brown

s/ Robert V. Clutter (with permission)
Robert V. Clutter
Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd & Minnette, P.C.
117 W. Main Street
Lebanon, IN 46052
Tel: (765) 483-8549
Fax: (765) 483-9521
Counsel for Penny Bogan

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney General of Indiana
s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
IGC South, Fifth Floor
302 W. Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 232-6255
Fax: (317) 232-7979
Counsel for Greg Zoeller and William C.
VanNess II, M.D.

s/ Darren J. Murphy (with permission)
Darren J . Murphy
Assistant Hamilton County Attorney
694 Logan St.
Noblesville, IN 46060
Tel: (317) 773-4212
Fax: (317) 776-2369
Counsel for Peggy Beaver

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I hereby certify that on May 8, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
the Court using the CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the following:
Barbara J . Baird
The Law Office Of Barbara J Baird

Paul D. Castillo
Camilla B. Taylor
Christopher R. Clark
Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.

Robert V. Clutter
Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd & Minnette, P.C.

Darren J . Murphy
Assistant Hamilton County Attorney

J ordan Heinz
Brent Phillip Ray
Kirkland & Ellis LLP

Nancy Moore Tiller
Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates

Elizabeth A. Knight
Porter County Administrative Center

s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General
Indiana Government Center South 5th Floor
302 W. Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
Phone: (317) 232-6255
Fax: (317) 232-7979

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