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Doctrine provides guidance for the conduct of military affairs, both at the service and
joint level. Understanding its fundamental intent both at the service and joint level is
essential to comprehending military operations.

The US Air Force is the nations decisive air combat force. It is capable of a wide array
of missions across the air, space and cyberspace realms. To understand the Air Force
it is essential to explore its organization, capabilities and limitations, and unique force
presentation structure.

1. Comprehend the role of doctrine and how each service organizes it.

2. Comprehend Air Force missions, capabilities and limitations.

3. Comprehend how the Air Force presents forces for joint operations.

4. Comprehend how the Air Force is organized to support joint operations.


This lesson introduces the course as a whole and presents specific information
regarding the US Air Force. To inform the introduction, material is presented that
describes what joint operations are and explains why the US places such a high value
on them. The course then presents information regarding concepts that will be used
throughout the course. These include the role of doctrine both service and joint and
organizing concepts. Finally, the lesson introduces the first of the services the
building blocks of joint forces the US Air Force. The focus here, as with the other
services in following lessons, is on organization, capabilities and limitations and force

US military forces exist for the purpose of fulfilling national security objectives, and they
do this by operating together as joint forces. In fact, today it is considered intuitive that
military operations and joint operations are virtually synonymous, although this was not
always the case. Through experience both successful and not so successful the US
military and its civilian leadership grew to understand the benefits of truly joint

Readings and videos will be listed in the appropriate section.


Murray, The Evoluti on of Joint Warfare (2002). Read the entire article.
This reading provides a broad overview of the evolution of joint operations. It
points out how failure to consider and apply joint operating concepts can be costly, and
describes how the US military increasingly valued jointness.

Goldwater-Nichols Act: Time for Reform (2000). Read pages 1 through 4.
This reading provides an overview of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act changed
the DODs role in national security. In doing so it reviews the national security system
from the NSA of 1947 through the GNA of 1986.


Doctrine beliefs about the best ways to conduct affairs forms the foundation for how
the military carries out operations, but it is more than that. It both synchronizes
understanding within and across organizations, and provides friction points that drive
the future best ways to conduct affairs. Accordingly, doctrine is not set in stone and it
is not even prescriptive. It is an authoritative guide to action that can, and does, change
when required. For the military, it occupies an important niche below strategy and
above tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Airpower Journal 1992

The services and the joint community develop doctrine and this is important for two
reasons. First, what the services believe about how best to conduct operations
influences their budgets, training and operational constructs, and this is no small matter.
Second, the joint community must consider what each service brings to the fight and
then develop how best to integrate those capabilities and limitations. This is
accomplished through doctrine. It is here that doctrinal clashes can occur when two
services have different beliefs about how best to approach a problem. In addition,
doctrine both service and joint will be presented throughout this course.


Drew and Snow, Military Doctrine (1988). Read the entire article.
This reading defines the purpose and scope of doctrine as it pertains to the

Ai r Force Doctrine, Volume 1, Basic Doctrine. Read selected text.
This reading provides a broad overview of the Air Forces view on the relation of
policy, strategy, and doctrine, as well as the uses, source, levels, and types of doctrine.


Each of the services approach doctrine differently and while the reasons for this are
beyond the scope of this course, it is interesting to note the number of doctrinal
publications produced and the specificity with which the different services draft doctrine.
Some publications are very broad and accordingly long enduring, while others are quite
specific requiring shorter reproduction times.

For each service below, a link to their doctrine site is provided as well as a listing of their
primary doctrinal publications.

An Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account is required to access
the Army doctrine site.

Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army (2012). Scan. This
capstone doctrinal publication describes the purpose, roles and
functions of the Army, and links it to the joint environment.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (2012)
This capstone doctrinal publication describes how the Army
conducts operations.

The Air Force The LeMay Center provides links to Air Force
Air Force Doctrine website. Scan Volume 1, Basic Doctrine
and Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning. Thes documents
codify and describe what the Air Force believes about warfighting,
organizing, and operations.

Click on the patches below to hyperlink to each services doctrine site. In addition,
click on the primary doctrinal publications provided for each service and scan the
contents to gain familiarity with their beliefs.


The Marine Corps Doctrine website provides links to Marine Corps
doctrine. (CAC required)

MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997) This document describes what
distinguishes the Marine Corps perception of warfighting from the
other services.

MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2011) This document
explains the Marine Corps expeditionary approach to maneuver

The Navy Doctrine website provides links to Navy doctrine. (CAC

NDP 1, Naval Warfare (2010) This document describes what the Navy
believes about the distinctiveness of military operations in the maritime

This Coast Guard doctrine site provides links to key Coast Guard
doctrine publications.

Pub 1, US Coast Guard: Americas maritime Guardian (2009)
This document describes what the Coast Guard believes about
itself and the operations it conducts.


J oint doctrine is different from service doctrine because it must integrate the capabilities
and limitations inherent in disparate services. This amalgamation of service skills,
traditions and expertise should result in new approaches to warfare that rise above
simply working together, and result in true integration. The goal, as with all military
doctrine, is enhanced operational effectiveness. Born out of service doctrine, joint
doctrine incorporates many considerations such as lessons learned from joint
operations, changing force structures and shifting mission requirements.

Joint Doctrine Hierarchy - Jun 2012 (JEL)

Click on the links below and scan these primary joint publications to gain familiarity with
these primary joint publications.

J P 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 March 2013). This
document describes basic doctrine for the joint community.

J P 3-0, J oint Operations (11 Aug 2011) This document describes fundamental
operational considerations for the conduct of joint operations.

CJCSI 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development System (30 Nov 2004). Read
Enclosure A.
This reading describes the role of joint doctrine and its relationship to service

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, (25
March 2013). Read Chapter VI, Section 4.
This reading describes many aspects of doctrine including its purpose, elements
and application.

Equally as important to how the military believes it should conduct operations is the
notion of how it organizes itself to do so. This important concept goes well beyond
understanding a simple organization chart. Many factors influence organization and
these include internal elements, external environments, rate of change, etc. Accounting
for these is an important consideration when striving for operational effectiveness the
very purpose of military operations.

From an organizational standpoint the military fundamentally organizes for two
purposes. First, it does so to promote institutional efficiency, and this is evident in the
positions of the services with the Department of Defense (DOD) or the major commands
within the services. The focus here is on hierarchical organizations, function, internal
controls and chains-of-command institutional efficiency. Second, the military
organizes for operational effectiveness, and this is evident when service assets are
brought together as joint forces.

The difference between these two approaches is relevant to this course in two ways.
First, it brings into focus the two chains-of-command operating within the DOD the
operational and other-than-operational chains-of-command. Second, the concepts
explored here are of paramount concern when evaluating how the services transition
from their legacy organizational structures into operationalized joint forces via force

DOD Organization (JP 1)

An important issue to consider, given the external environment and rates of change
experienced by the military, is the efficacy of these organizational structures. Are there
better ways to organize todays military at either the macro or micro level? Other
organizational structures flattened structures, matrixed organizations with dual chains-
of-command and horizontal linkages, etc exist and may offer opportunities to improve
operational effectiveness.


Understanding and Designing Military Organizations for a Complex Dynamic
Environment (2008). Read pages 10 through 16.
This reading describes basic organization theory and relates it to organizations
within the Department of Defense. It is relevant here and throughout the remainder of
the course.

DODM 8260.03 Vol 2, 14 Jun 2011. Read pages 11 through 13 and page 19.
This reading describes DOD precepts for leadership and command and how they
relate to organizing the force.


The Air Force fulfills certain functions which are listed below. Within this framework,
and under the other than operational chain-of-command, it organizes, trains and
equips in preparation for use in joint operations.

DOD Chain-of-Command (JP 1)

Service Functions (JP 1)


While this context is common to all of the services, each is unique in how they approach
their responsibilities. For the Air Force, this means preparation for warfare through the
exploitation of airpower air, space and cyberspace with a focus on theater-wide and
national objectives versus linear force-on-force engagements. This is an important
distinction that drives how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips itself.


Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, (25
March 2013). Read I-11 through I-16 and II-11 through II-13.
These readings provides context for the presentation of the services. They
describe the instruments of national power, the chains-of-command relevant to the DoD,
the missions of the services and the roles and functions of the military departments.
The concepts presented here apply to all the services.

Manpower and Organization, AFI 38-101 (16 Mar 2011). Read 1.2 through 1.2.5 and
2.2 through
This reading describes why the Air Force organizes the way it does, and then
explains the purpose of core Air Force organizational units.

NWC Learning Module Air Force Review the following sections.
Major Commands
Organization-Typical Structure
Fighter/Bomber Wing
Mobility Wing
Network Warfare Wing


The Air Force organizes, trains and equips its forces for the expressed purpose of
meeting national security objectives. This overwhelmingly means by supporting joint
operations where capabilities, limitations and interdependencies are critically important

Capabilities abilities of service forces may seem to be a simple concept, but it is
actually nuanced and can be viewed in several ways. Fundamentally, capabilities like
doctrine center on the notion of effects. Accordingly, desired outcomes should inform
the discussion, not the assets that provide them. For example, a desired outcome may
be for 24 hours of sustained air refueling over a specific region, and this should be
expressed this way versus a platform-based discussion focused on the KC-135 or KC-
10. On a similar note, capabilities are often expressed at different levels such as
functions or missions.

Limitations shortfalls in abilities or vulnerabilities inherent in the application of service
abilities are rarely mentioned directly in service publications. Instead, their
identification is more intuitive. For example, to carry the above example a bit further,
the capability to provide 24 hours of sustained air refueling may be accompanied by the
limitation of asset vulnerability to enemy air attack. Consideration of limitations is just
as important as that of capabilities, and they must be mitigated in some way
technological advances, changes in intended use, effective joint integration, etc.

Interdependencies relationships across capabilities and limitations that generate
mutual benefit occur within and across services. Not surprisingly, for military
operations the intent is improved operational effectiveness. To continue with the above
example, if the capability of 24 hours of sustained air refueling, limited by air-to-air

threats, was supported with a friendly air-to-air capability, the interdependencies
inherent in the matching of these capabilities and limitations would enhance operational
effectiveness. The goal is finding these interdependencies and exploiting them.

For the Air Force, capabilities are considered across the domains of air, space and
cyberspace, and at several levels. The two key levels considered here are at the
function and mission level, and these are supplemented by presentations that link
assets to capabilities.

Air Force Doctrine categorizes the services capability into eighteen operations:


NWC Air Force Review the following sections. (Click on Additional Resources in
the upper right corner of the module screen, then Aircraft.)

A-10 B-2 C-5
AC-130H/U B-52 CV-22
AC-130W C-130 E-3
B-1B C-17 EC-130J
F-15 HH-60G MQ-1B
F-15E KC-10 MQ-9
F-16 KC-135 F-22


Ai r Force Doctrine, Volume 4, Operations. Read selected text.
This reading provides an overview of the eighteen Air Force operations.


Force presentation how a service presents forces for use in a joint environment is a
critically important concept. It is how service forces transition to the operational chain-
of-command, and it involves much more than assets and their capabilities and
limitations. It also includes their organization, garrison-to-deployment issues, command
and control considerations, and deployment timelines. The Air Force concept of force
presentation has evolved over the years but its two central elements remain the same
the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) and the Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF).

The AEF constitutes a management mechanism to schedule, train and deploy Air Force
assets for expeditionary use in joint operations. Accordingly, central elements include
rotation cycles, personnel management and available capabilities. Within this construct,
Air Force capabilities (personnel and assets) are assigned to AEF buckets that flow
through training and vulnerability for deployment windows. It is important to understand
that the AEF concept is evolutionary in that it is updated continuously. On the short
horizon is the next iteration AEF Next.


The AETF constitutes the war-fighting presentation of Air Force forces for use by joint
force commanders. Pulled from AEF elements, the AETF is a specifically tailored force
designed explicitly to meet operational requirements. One important point is that Air
Force forces presented for joint use will always fall under a Commander of Air Force
Forces (COMAFFOR). This point will be reemphasized with each service and explained
in detail in Lesson 4.


AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning and Execution (7 Dec 2006, IC 3 21
Jul 2010) Read 2.1 through 2.11.
This reading describes the methodology supporting the Air Forces AEF
construct, the AEF structure and the AETF concept.

NWC Air Force Review the following sections.
How We are Organized
Organization-Total Force
How We Fight
Providing Forces For J oint Operations
Air And Space Expeditionary Forces
AEF Combat Support
J FACC Responsibilities

J FACC Internal to J oint Task Force
J FACC External to J oint Task Force

Ai r Force Doctrine, Volume 1, Basic Doctrine. Read selected text.
This reading provides an overview of the Air Expeditionary Task Force, its
organization, several examples, and its command and control mechanisms.

AEF Next Brief (2011) Review entire brief.
This AEF Online brief outline the next evolution in the AEF construct.

This lesson introduced the course and presented important elements doctrine and
organizing considerations that will be used throughout the course. It then explored
the organization, capabilities and limitation, and force presentation schema used by the
Air Force. The next two lessons will explore the other services using this same


30 JFQ / Summer 2002


the use of military capabilities in con-
cert. That is a complex process, not
because of obstacles posed by individ-
ual service cultures alone, but because
the evolution of joint warfare poses
intractable problems. Moreover, such
capabi l i ti es can requi re l evel s of
spending that cannot be allocated to
the military in peacetime.
The Continental Powers
Of the emerging states in the early
1700s, England had the greatest tradi-
tion of cooperation between land and
oint warfare is largely a phe-
nomenon of the last century.
Yet ever since the 17
as Western militaries developed
into professional, disciplined institu-
tions responsive to their rulers, many
states have sought to project power
abroad. Technology has increasingly
shaped the conduct of war, forcing
The Evolution of
Joint Warfare
By W I L L I A M S O N M U R R A Y
Williamson Murray is coauthor of A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War
and coeditor of The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 13002050.
British landing in
Egypt, 1801.
Courtesy Special Collections, NDU Library
sea forces. That nation originated with
the invasion of William the Conqueror
which brought the Normans to power.
His descendants, particularly Edward
III and Henry V, used domination of
the English Channel and adjacent wa-
ters to invade the Continent, which
came close to destroying France. While
impressive, one cannot speak of those
campaigns as joint warfighting because
military institutions of the day were
not professional or permanent. Per-
haps one exception was the Battle of
Sluys in 1340, when Edward III
launched a fleet with archers bearing
longbows to slaughter the French,
leading to an era in which Edward
was lord of the sea.
Nevertheless, it was only with the
end of the 16
century that Europeans
began thinking in terms of joint coop-
eration. The destruction of the Spanish
Armada in 1588 underlined the perils in
coordinating forces on land and at sea.
Planning an expedition in Madrid and
moving a fleet in the Channel with
armies in the Low Countries proved
overwhelming. Such a combination had
worked against tribal levies of American
Indians, who had stone-age weapons
and no knowledge of firearms, while
diseases spread by the Spaniards killed
those natives who survived combat. But
Spain was unprepared for the complex-
ity of land and sea warfare against a Eu-
ropean power. Such difficulties were ex-
acerbated by the skillful leadership of
British maritime forces, and unfamiliar-
ity with the Channel inevitably turned
the great expedition launched by Philip
II into a failure.
By the mid-17
century a num-
ber of European states, led by Holland
and Sweden, created recognizable
armies and navies that were respon-
sive to war ministries and admiralties.
The major ingredient in the rise of
these institutions was intense compe-
tition for hegemony on the Conti-
nent, a struggle in which growing and
disciplined armies grappled for domi-
nation. But as the century unfolded
Europeans found themselves vying for
empire. At first the competition in-
volved navies contending for mar-
itime supremacy, but at the end of the
century more significant colonies like
the Sugar Islands in the Caribbean
boasted grand fortifications and gar-
risons. France and England emerged
as great powers competing for empire
by the dawn of the 18
century. At
the same time the army of Louis XIV
threatened the balance of power. The
War of Spanish Succession broke out
in 1702 and was the first world war.
On the Continent, the Duke of Marl-
borough, with Dutch and Hapsburg
allies, won a number of victories that
rocked the French monarchy. London
waged war at sea for supremacy over
the Atlantic and Mediterranean while
contesting control over North Amer-
ica, the Caribbean, and India. English
colonists in North America called this
conflict Queen Annes War after the
sovereign. Neither nation could proj-
ect ample power beyond Europe to
win decisively, but the war was the
opening round in a struggle that
lasted the rest of the century.
The New World
The Seven Years Warknown as
the French and Indian Wars in North
Americadecided which nation was
the dominant power outside Europe. It
also resolved that English would be-
come the dominant world language.
Moreover, it was the first instance in
which naval power projected land
forces over great distances, supported
them, and prevented an enemy from
being reinforced. From an American
point of view, the decisive campaign
occurred in 1756 when the British
under James Wolfe besieged Quebec.
Historians argue that the fate of North
America was decided on the Plains of
Abraham when Wolfe defeated Mont-
calm. In fact, British forces occupying
Quebec City spent a winter near star-
vation and under threat of attack from
the French in the province. Yet when
the spring thaw melted the ice on the
river, the Royal Navy, with substantial
reinforcements, sailed into the Gulf of
St. Lawrence before the French, and
the fate of North America was sealed.
The capacity to employ land and
naval forces together over great
oceanic distances allowed the British
empire to survive the strategic and po-
litical ineptitude demonstrated in its
war against the American colonists in
the 1770s. Control of the sea and the
ability to extend power almost at will
could not overcome errors made by
Lord Frederick North. Despite project-
ing great armies across the Atlantic,
the British could not stifle the inde-
pendence movement. The capture of
New York in 1776by means of a real
Summer 2002 / JFQ 31
M u r r a y

Storming Badajos
Castle, 1812.
Courtesy Special Collections, NDU Library
32 JFQ / Summer 2002

the projection of Army forces by the
Navy. Grant secured access to the
southern heartland in one brilliant
move. The victories at Forts Donelson
and Henry gave the North an advan-
tage in the West from which the South
never recovered. It took close coopera-
tion between Navy officers who ran
the gunboat fleet and Army command-
ers to use this edge to the fullest. The
importance of that cooperation was
underlined in April 1862 when Union
vessels reinforced Grant with troops
under General Don Carlos Buell at
Shiloh. Joint cooperation developed in
1862 was crucial to the campaign
against Vicksburg in spring 1863. Ad-
miral David Porter dashed past the de-
fenses at Vicksburg in April, which al-
lowed Grant to cross the Mississippi to
the south and begin the most impres-
sive campaign of the Civil War, which
resulted not only in the capture of
Vicksburg but of an entire Confederate
army in the field.
The Great War
Joint warfare existed primitively
and under specialized conditions be-
fore 1900. It became increasingly cru-
cial with a fitful start in World War I.
The Dardanelles campaign, which
Winston Churchill launched over
strong opposition from Admiral Sir
John (Jackie) Fisher, failed largely be-
cause the British army and navy could
not cooperate. This dismal example of
jointness on the tactical and opera-
tional levels resulted in the collapse of
the one strategic alternative to slug-
ging out the war on the Western Front
with an enormous cost in men and
One area of joint cooperation on
the tactical level did enjoy significant
success. By 1918 both the Allies and
Germany were using aircraft to support
ground attacks. The Germans actually
designated close air support squadrons,
specially equipped and trained for the
Michael Offensive in March 1918. Sim-
ilarly, the British supported tanks and
infantry with air in the successful at-
tack of August 1918which General
Eric Ludendorff described as the black-
est day in the war, especially because
joint operationand the offensive
across New Jersey almost destroyed the
revolutionary army. Nevertheless, Gen-
eral George Washington and his forces
survived, and the campaign in the
next year that launched the British
under Sir William Howe against
Philadelphia also left the invasion of
upper New York by General John Bur-
goyne in the lurch, leading to defeat at
Saratoga. The die was cast when other
powers intervened. Nevertheless, the
union of land and seapower extended
British control from the Caribbean to
India against a great coalition.
Basil Liddell Hart characterized the
approach by London in this period as
the British way of war. But as Sir
Michael Howard pointed out, Britain
was only successful when its opponents
in Europe fought a continental and
overseas war, which demanded the
commitment of substantial land forces.
France failed throughout the 18
tury because its leaders were unclear on
which war was being fought. In at-
tempting to fight both, they lost both.
French revolutionaries in 1789 and
Napoleon had clear goals, largely in-
volving conquest on the Continent.
British amphibious expeditions against
French-controlled territory were dismal
failures, at least until the war in Spain.
Joint warfare only worked in distant
places in efforts to grab French posses-
sions or areas removed from French
power. Joint, in this context, meant
landing troops at some distance from
an enemy and then supplying them by
sea. But when Britain committed forces
and a first class general to the Conti-
nent, it had a major impact on the
strategic position of France. The Penin-
sula War against the French in Spain
was one of the few instances of joint-
ness in the Napoleonic era.
North and South
The Civil War saw the first gen-
uine joint operationsan approach
that developed because of the geo-
graphic situation, namely, the river-
ways of the west. At the outset, the
Union dominated the maritime bal-
ance, which allowed Lincoln to impose
a blockade on the Confederacy and
control offshore forts. In the spring of
1862, General George McClellan
launched a seaborne attack on the
Yorktown Peninsula. The Navy landed
troops and supported the Fed-
eral advance on Richmond. At
that point a series of blows
launched by General Robert E.
Lee drove Union forces back
down the Yorktown Peninsula.
U.S. gunboats rendered signal service
by stopping an enemy assault on
Malvern Hill, inflicting horrendous
Confederate losses. Nevertheless, there
was only rudimentary jointness during
these engagements.
The western theater was the scene
of real jointness on the Mississippi,
Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee
Rivers which offered deep avenues for
Union forces. The fall of Forts Donel-
son and Henry to General Ulysses S.
Grant in winter 1862 opened Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, and northern Missis-
sippi to Muscle Shoals in Alabama to
Admiral David Porter.
the Civil War saw the first genuine
joint operations because of the
riverways of the west
of the increased confusion and great
disturbance air attacks caused the
ground troops.
However, only the
Germans learned from such experi-
ences in the joint arena.
There was more movement to-
ward creating joint capabilities in the
interwar period, though there were
major differences among nations. In
Germany, the Luftwaffe became a sepa-
rate service in 1935. Its leaders showed
considerable interest in strategic
bombing from the outset, but they also
supported other missions. As a result,
they devoted substantial resources to
capabilities to assist the army in com-
bined-arms mechanized warfare. At the
same time the navy and air force ex-
hibited virtually no interest in working
together, the results of which were evi-
dent in World War II.
The British organized the only
joint higher command during the in-
terwar years, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-
committee. On the other hand, the
military proved unwilling to develop
joint doctrine and capabilities. The
Royal Air Force, fearing that joint co-
operation would end its independence
as a separate service, wrote such exclu-
sionary basic doctrine on strategic
bombing that real teamwork among
services hardly existed. When war
came in 1939, the air force proved
quickly that it could support neither
land forces with interdiction attacks
nor maritime forces in protecting sea
lines of communication in the
Atlantic. In addition, the air force pro-
vided the navy with carrier aircraft
that were obsolete in comparison to
American and Japanese planes.
But the other services were hardly
more forthcoming than the Royal Air
Force. In 1938 the commandant of the
Royal Navy Staff College raised the
possibility of joint amphibious opera-
tions, which met with total rejection.
The attitudes of senior officers ranged
from a smug belief that such opera-
tions had been successful in the last
war to plain confidence that they
would not be needed again. The
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff argued
that Gallipoli revealed that nothing
was really wrong with amphibious
techniques except communications.
The navy was just as unenthusiastic.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Admi-
ral Andrew Cunningham, who eventu-
ally commanded naval forces in the
Mediterranean, reported that the Ad-
miralty at the present time could not
visualize any particular [joint] opera-
tion taking place and they were, there-
fore, not prepared to devote any con-
siderable sum of money to equipment
for [joint] training.
Finally, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, Lord
John Gort, declared that the railroad
enabled landpower to be concentrated
more rapidly than seapower. Thus the
strategic mobility conferred by
seapower, while politically attractive,
would no longer work in favor of
seapower. Such attitudes go far in ex-
plaining the disastrous conduct of the
Norwegian campaign.
The American record is much bet-
ter in several respects. The nascent air
service, which was a branch of the
Army administratively (first as the
Army Air Corps, then as the Army Air
Forces), displayed much the same dis-
regard for past experience as did the
Royal Air Force in Britain; it was unin-
terested in cooperating with land or
naval forces. In the sphere of joint am-
phibious doctrine, however, the
United States was ahead of other na-
tions, undoubtedly because of the pe-
culiarities of its military organization.
The Department of the Navy had its
own land force, the Marine Corps, and
because no unified air component had
been created, both the Navy and
Marines had air assets. Maritime strate-
gists considered joint amphibious op-
erations by the realities of distance in
the Pacific. It was clear that amphibi-
ous capabilities would be needed to
seize logistic bases in the region.
The Marines led the effort on am-
phibious warfare throughout this pe-
riod. By the outbreak of World War II,
the Corps developed doctrine and pro-
cedures with considerable cooperation
from the Navy and some help from the
Army. Although the equipment re-
quired for such operations had not
been fielded, the services had estab-
lished a conceptual basis for joint am-
phibious operations.
Summer 2002 / JFQ 33
M u r r a y

German maneuvers in
Bavaria, 1931.
34 JFQ / Summer 2002

military problems that the British had
created before World War II played a
major role. The system was not so im-
pressive in the early years, but that was
largely due to overwhelming Axis
strength. But Britain was able to set the
conditions for the recovery of Western
fortunes once the United States en-
tered the war. The analytic
power of the system persuaded
America to embark on major op-
erations in the Mediterranean, a
commitment that was funda-
mentally counter to Washingtons view
of the war. The success of this ap-
proach by London to a joint articula-
tion of strategy, particularly at the
Casablanca Conference, led to the es-
tablishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and an organizational approach that
emphasized jointness on the opera-
tional level.
U.S. joint operations reached their
high point in the Pacific. The tyranny
of distance meant that the services had
to work together to project military
power. In the Southwest Pacific, Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur advanced up
the coastline of New Guinea with the
superb support of Fifth and Thirteenth
World War II
It is almost as difficult to extol
joint warfare conducted by the Axis as
combined warfare. Germany, with its
ability to cooperate on the tactical level,
achieved stunning results at the start of
World War II. But the invasion of Nor-
way, Operation Weserbung, was in large
part the result of British bungling. The
Germans lacked joint strategy or, for
that matter, joint operational concepts.
Planning for Operation Sealion in sum-
mer 1940the proposed invasion of
Britaindisplayed no common concept
of operations or even common lan-
guage. Matters never improved. There
was no joint high commandthe
Armed Forces High Command,
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, was little
more than an administrative staff that
supported Hitler. General Walter War-
limont, one of its members, noted: In
fact the advice of the British Chiefs of
Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs was the
deciding factor in Allied strategy. At the
comparable level in Germany, there was
nothing but a disastrous vacuum.
situation was as much due to interser-
vice rivalry as to der Fhrer.
The same was true for the other
Axis forces. In the case of Italy, the so-
called Commando Supremo exercised no
real power over the services, which
waged three separate efforts. The result
was that the Italian military never pro-
posed sound strategic or operational al-
ternatives to a regime which in its ideo-
logical fog did not balance available
means with attainable ends. Things
were no better in Japan which had no
joint high command. Without higher
direction, the Imperial army and navy
waged two separate wars until their
misfortunes in early 1944. Thereafter,
the preponderance of American
strength was such that it mattered little
what Japan did or did not do.
The conduct of joint warfare by
the Allies was on a different plane. On
the strategic level, the organizational
structure for analyzing strategic and
U.S. joint operations reached their
highpoint in the Pacific

conference, 1943.
Air Forces under General George Ken-
ney as well as naval components. By
conducting joint operations, MacArthur
kept the Japanese permanently off
guard. Similarly, after the losses at
Tarawa alerted Admiral Chester Nimitz
and his commanders to the problems of
opposed landings, the Central Pacific is-
land-hopping campaign emerged as one
of the most impressive operational-level
campaigns of the war, especially the co-
operation displayed by soldiers, sailors,
and marines. The result was seizure of
bases in spring 1944 which Army Air
Force strategic bombers used for their
attacks against the Japanese homeland.
The situation in Europe was simi-
lar. By spring 1944 the Allies developed
the capabilities to enable the most
complex joint operation of the waran
opposed landing on the coast of
France. Cooperation was not always
willingly given. The American and
British strategic bomber communities
struggled in March 1944 to escape
being placed under the operational
command of General Dwight Eisen-
hower. They lost because Eisenhower
was willing to appeal to Roosevelt and
Churchill. Eisenhower and his deputy,
Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, then used
air forces, including strategic bombers,
to attack transportation across France.
By June 1944 the transport system was
wrecked; in effect the Germans had lost
the battle of the buildup before the first
Allied troops landed.
Joint operations were less success-
ful on Omaha Beach, where U.S. casu-
alties were three times heavier than
those suffered at Tarawa six months
earlier. General George Marshall had
been impressed by landings in the Pa-
cific. Consequently, he detailed the
commander of 7
Division at Kwa-
jalein, Major General Pete Corlett, to
pass along lessons learned. However,
when he arrived in Europe, Corlett dis-
covered that Army commanders re-
sponsible for Overlord had no interest
in learning from a bush league the-
The result was that soldiers who
went ashore at Omaha received twenty
minutes of naval gunfire support from
one battleship (whereas the enemy gar-
rison at Kwajalein had been bom-
barded by no less than seven battle-
ships). The landing at Omaha came
perilously close to defeat, which might
have led to the failure of Overlord.
Postwar Period
When World War II ended, Allied
forces were poised to launch the largest
joint operation in historyOlympic,
the invasion of Japanwhich would
have dwarfed even Overlord. By then
jointness had peaked. Unfortunately,
such cooperation would not be
equaled until Desert Storm in 1991.
Many factors were at work. The first
was the advent of nuclear weapons,
which changed war to such an extent
that many leaders, particularly airmen,
believed the lessons of World War II
were no longer valid. Secondly, those
who had conducted the war in Europe
came to dominate the postwar mili-
tary, and that theater had seen less
joint cooperation than the Pacific.
Finally, while joint cooperation had
reached significant levels, it was largely
the result of operational and tactical
requirements. The peacetime culture of
the prewar military returned. Thus
General Omar Bradley, who became
Chairman in the late 1940s, in an ef-
fort to eviscerate the Marine Corps in
the name of jointness, announced that
there would never be another major
amphibious operation.
The Key West Agreements, which
were the result of interservice bicker-
ing, determined the course of joint op-
erations until the Goldwater Nichols
Act. They represented a weak compro-
mise between the Army belief in a
strong joint community and the Navy
and Marine Corps desire for service
communities. But to a certain extent
the Army undermined its own position
by attempting to eliminate the Marine
Corps from the equation. Moreover,
the establishment of the Air Force,
with a corporate culture that deni-
grated all roles and missions except
strategic bombing, a concept which
was reinforced by nuclear weapons,
did little to advance cooperation.
Jointness after Key West was unim-
pressive. The Air Force resisted support-
ing land forces throughout the Korean
War. The Army and Marine Corps coop-
erated when necessary, but hardly
waged what could be termed joint opera-
tions on the ground. Part of this
predicament can be traced to the nature
of the conflict during its final two years,
Summer 2002 / JFQ 35
M u r r a y





Recon platoon,
Vietnam, 1967.
36 JFQ / Summer 2002

powers to the unified commanders. It
also made joint assignments an essen-
tial step in promotion to general and
flag rank.
Where Do We Go from Here?
The Armed Forces are facing rapid
change. Some contend that technolog-
ical advances are revolutionary and
will allow the military to detect ene-
mies from afar and destroy everything
that moves. Some even contend that
technology can remove the fog of war.
But such possibilities are unlikely be-
cause they defy modern science and
what science suggests about the world.
Nevertheless, technologists do
have a point: modern information sys-
tems may significantly decrease the
friction that U.S. and allied forces
might encounter while increasing
those of enemy forces. And it is in the
realm of joint command and control
that such technologies might make
the greatest contribution. As Eisen-
hower wrote in 1946: Separate
ground, sea, and air warfare is gone
forever. If we ever again should be in-
volved in war, we will fight with all el-
ements, with all services, as one single
concentrated effort.
Yet impediments
to jointness remain today.
One problem is that the services
still control budgeting. Thus unified
commands have put capabilities on
their wish lists such as unmanned aerial
vehicles, electronic countermeasure air-
craft, and other platforms dealing with
intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance. The services have under-
funded programs to the point that the
Pentagon describes such capabilities as
high demand, low density. Unwilling-
ness to fund such items that could con-
tribute to joint operations is only the
symptom of systemic problems within
the Armed Forces. Bluntly, joint culture
does not form the outlook of general
and flag officers. Without that perspec-
tive, those serving in joint assignments
find it difficult to develop realistic con-
cepts of how one might actually use
emerging technologies to fight future
wars. Joint culture depends on complex
factorseducation, operational experi-
ence, and deep understanding of indi-
vidual service capabilities.
as Washington was willing to accept
stalemate. Nevertheless, the services
very often put American lives at risk in
pursuit of parochial goals.
Vietnam was no better. A key fac-
tor in the mistaken assumptions which
the United States entertained in sum-
mer 1965 were service perspectives
that prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff
from speaking coherently or giving
joint strategic and operational advice.
Two tactical air forces waged inde-
pendent campaigns. Air Force fighter
bombers, flying mostly from Thailand,
attacked in and around Hanoi. Naval
aircraft from carriers in the Gulf of
Tonkin limited themselves to targets
near Haiphong and the North Viet-
namese coast. But there was minimal
joint cooperation, which resulted in
mounting losses in an air campaign
which had minimal focus.
Jointness in the ground war was
also problematic. The nominal theater
commander, General William West-
moreland, deployed Marine units in
central Vietnam instead of using them
in the Delta where amphibious capa-
bilities would have been more effec-
tive. The Air Force dropped tons of
ordnance across South Vietnam but
paid relatively little attention to the re-
quirements of land forces. While close
air support often proved crucial to sol-
diers and marines, the Air Force con-
sidered it in terms of what was most
convenient to a mechanistic view of
war and measures of effectiveness
rather than what would be most help-
ful to land forces under attack.
When the war ended in early 1973,
the U.S. military was in shambles.
Poorly disciplined, riven by racial strife,
disheartened by defeat, and reviled by
civilian society, each service had to put
its own house in order during a period
of downsizing, fiscal constraints, and
changing missions. It is not surprising
that redressing weaknesses in jointness
was not a high priority, especially in
light of other problems. In spring 1980
the United States launched a raid to res-
cue embassy personnel held hostage in
Iran. Luckily for most of the partici-
pants, the raid failed before it really
began with the disaster at Desert One.
But whatever the outcome, the plan-
ning and execution of the operation
underscored a lack of cooperation
among the services, weak command
that was anything but joint, and a serv-
ice focus that was inexcusable to most
The presidency of Ronald Reagan
saw increased defense budgets and
military capabilities. But the perform-
ance of joint operations left much to
be desired. In autumn 1983 the
United States intervened in
Grenada, ostensibly to lib-
erate American medical
students, but in fact to pre-
vent Cuba from helping a
revolutionary regime solid-
ify its hold on the island. Given the
power brought to bear on that small
locale, there was never any question
of failure. However, the services once
again appeared to focus on parochial
interests rather than the larger joint
The Constitution gives Congress
responsibility for every aspect of na-
tional defense except command, yet
that body rarely involves itself on a
theoretical or organizational level. For
the most part it is content to bicker
with defense witnesses and divvy up
military spending among districts and
states. Nevertheless, Congress some-
times intervenes, usually when the ex-
ecutive branch does not resolve a na-
tional security matter. Pressure from
Capitol Hill that resulted in Army and
Navy reforms at the turn of the century
and the Morrow Board in the mid-
1920s are both cases in point. The lat-
ter resolved that there would be no in-
dependent air service and that airpower
would remain divided between the two
services. This was the situation in the
1980s as Congress, upset by the lack of
progress in enhancing jointness, passed
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That legis-
lation would change the relationship
between the Chairman and service
chiefs, providing the former with
greater authority, and granting wider
the Goldwater-Nichols Act made joint
assignments an essential step in
promotion to general and flag rank
One suggested way to create a
more pervasive joint culture would be
to destroy service cultures. But that
would throw the baby out with the
bath water. The basis of a joint ap-
proach to operations is understanding
warfare in a given medium: land, sea,
or air. Until officers master a dimen-
sion of war, they can only be amateurs.
Thus service cultures must develop
warriors completely attuned to their
own milieus, because if they are not,
they cannot significantly contribute to
the conduct of joint operations.
At the heart of the problem beset-
ting joint culture is a military person-
nel system established in the 1940s.
Subsequent changes have addressed
only the symptoms of the problem.
One purpose of this system was pre-
venting atrophy in the officer corps
during the interwar period. An up-or-
out mentality captured rigid timelines
for promotion. That system remains in
place today with inducements to en-
courage officers to retire between the
ages of 41 and 45. Moreover, Congress
as well as the services have added re-
quirements for advancement. The lat-
est was a prerequisite for joint duty in
consideration for promotion to general
officer. This stipulation in Goldwater-
Nichols aimed to solve the problem of
the services refusing to send their best
officers to the Joint Staff.
Officers face many requirements
for promotion, including joint duty.
Personnel systems in the 1940s did not
take into account todays complexities
of education and technology. Yet a sys-
tem designed for the military in the in-
dustrial age is still in effect. The result
has generally been to deprive officers
of flexibility in professional develop-
ment outside of narrow career tracks.
Although Goldwater-Nichols
heightened the prestige of joint billets,
the services must push a maximum
number of officers through a finite
number of positions to qualify an ade-
quate pool for promotion. This means
that most aspiring eligibles serve only
the minimum time in the joint world,
barely enough to learn their jobs,
much less a broader perspective on
joint operations. The obstacles that the
personnel system present to joint cul-
ture are exacerbated by a general fail-
ure to take professional military educa-
tion seriously.
U.S. Joint Forces Command
should fill the gap. Unfortunately, it
has real world missions as the successor
to U.S. Atlantic Command. Accord-
ingly, it has tended to place its best of-
ficers in jobs that do not involve exper-
imentation or concept development.
The Joint Staff, which supports the
Chairman and Secretary of Defense, is
also partially responsible for joint con-
cept development. But it is so con-
sumed by day-to-day actions that long-
range (beyond the in-box) thinking is
almost impossible. This dilemma con-
tributes to a weak joint community
largely inhabited by officers who serve
two-year tours with virtually no chance
to do anything but learn their jobs. The
prospects for changing this situation do
not appear favorable because no senior
officer in either the joint world or the
services has been willing take on per-
sonnel systems that are deeply and
happily entrenched.
The past three centuries have seen
the evolution in joint warfighting,
often at considerable cost on the battle-
field. Yet military history since the out-
break of World War II has underscored
the critical role of joint warfare. If the
Armed Forces are to utilize new tech-
nologies to the fullest, they must foster
authentic jointness based on profes-
sional thinking and education. As
Michael Howard has suggested, war is
not only the most demanding profes-
sion physically, but also intellectually. It
is that latter aspect that military profes-
sionals must cultivate. Joint warfighting
must be grounded in concepts that can
provide the flexibility of mind and
habit the future demands. JFQ
Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp,
English Strategy under Edward III, 13271360
(Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 2000),
p. 198.
For a discussion of close air support in
World War I, see Richard Muller, Close Air
Support, in Military Innovation in the Inter-
war Period, edited by Williamson Murray
and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 2001).
PRO CAB 54/2, DCOS/30
15.11.38., DCOS Subcommittee, p. 4.
Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitlers Head-
quarters (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 54.
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Mil-
lett, A War To Be Won (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 2001), p. 419.
Dwight D. Eisenhower in memoran-
dum to Chester W. Nimitz, April 17, 1946.
Summer 2002 / JFQ 37
M u r r a y



F100D over Vietnam.
Goldwater-Nichols Act: Time for Reform
LTC Kenneth M. Crowe
U.S. Army
Dr. Jerome J. Cormello
Project Advisor
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
U.S. Army War College
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereto referred to as
GNA) is a continuum of congressional interests, proposals and acts dating as far back as 1921.
Proposals to combine or unify military departments under a single executive agency were considered as
early as 1921, with some fifty proposals to reorganize occurring between 1921 and 1945.
However, due
largely to opposition from the War Department and Department of the Navy, legislative initiatives did not
Both departments, supported by Congress, preferred independence instead of unification. The
United States' involvement in WWII brought to light the need for unification of the military departments.
Even before formally entering the war, the weakness of the decentralized American military system was
demonstrated when coordinating with the British in 1941.
Military departments (Army and Navy) basically
went their own directions without integration and with little guidance and oversight from above. In short,
the integration and oversight of the departments did not exist in a manner to efficiently plan for and
employ nationalmilitary assets. As a result, the executive branch established the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) in 1941. This body, consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Army Chief of Staff for Air, the
Commander of Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and in 1942, it added the Chief of
Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, who chaired the committee and served as liaison to the president. The
committee functioned as an ad hoc organization lacking statutory authority and an institutional foundation.
The JCS reported directly to the President usurping the role of the Service Secretaries.
The campaigns in WWII included numerous amphibious operations and sea based invasions
involving Army and Navy forces. The further evolution of air support to both Army and Navy operations
further increased interoperability among the services. The pursuit of strategic, operational and tactical
objectives in WWII demanded the establishment and operation of unified commands-components of one
service working under the direction of anotherto ensure unity of command in winning the war. General
George C. Marshall recognized a unified approach to the pursuit of war as early as 1943 and
subsequently proposed a unified defense establishment. In 1945 President Harry S. Truman sent to
Congress a message outlining his observations during the war, noting the United States military had
achieved unity of command but:
"...we never had comparable unified direction in Washington. And even in the field our
unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in
communications systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the
division of leadership in Washington... it is now time to take stock, to discard obsolete
organizational focus...We cannot have the sea, land and air members of our defense
team working at what may turn out to be cross-purposes, planning their programs on
different assumptions as to the nature of the military establishment we need, and
engaging in an open competition for funds."
Following two years of debate, the National Security Act of 1947was enacted. The Act created a
Secretary of Defense, without department, and three military departments consisting of the Army, Navy
and Air Force. All departments carried cabinet status, were members of the NSC and were allowed to
appeal any matter directly to the President or the Director of the Budget. Additionally, along with this
enactment came the National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National
Security Council. The establishment of the Department of Defense is commonly associated with the
National Security Act of 1947 (NSA). However, because the NSA did not create a unified military
department with a strong central authority, a decade of further reforms occurred. The NSA did not clearly
define the lines of command, authority and responsibility between the uniformed military, the military
departments, the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Congress's concern in crafting the NSA of
1947was fear of yielding much of its control over the military establishment to the executive branchit
wanted to keep tight rein on the military and not allow it to become controlled by the President. Colleen
Getz notes, "In sum, the composition of the JCS reflected a Navy victory over the Army's desire for a
single Chief of Staff. It also demonstrated Congress's will that centralization of military authority remain
The first Secretary of Defense, former Naval Secretary James Forrestal, was confronted with a
fundamental problem. He lacked the power to resolve service rivalries over funds, roles, missions and
coordination. Forrestal worked closely with the service Chiefs to resolve these problems but to no avail.
Subsequently, Forrestal sought Congressional support. Congress in turn amended the NSA of 1947 in
1949, creating the Department of Defense and increasing the authority of the SECDEF over the military
departments. This amendment provided the SECDEF "direct" authority as opposed to the previous
"general" authority over the military departments inclusive of administrative and budgetary authority. The
Secretary's staff was increased to include a Deputy Secretary and three assistant secretaries. Probably
the most important aspect of this amendment was that the SECDEF became the principal assistant to the
President for all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense. The military departments' cabinet and
NSC status were abolished. The departments also were designated as "military departments" from the
previous "executive departments", reducing their power.
The JCS benefited from the creation of a non-
voting Chairman and doubling the size of the joint staff. Congress rejected any ideas of a single Chief of
Staff (with authority over all services) thus sustaining congressional influence over the military
establishment through traditional means of decentralization, the ability to hear from each of the service
Each military department remained separately administered and permitted the department
Secretaries and the JCS members to present separate views and recommendations to the Congress after
first informing the SECDEF.
Upon assuming the Presidency in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower sought further reforms drawing
upon his extensive military experience. During the period between 1953-1958, the Department of
Defense underwent further reform. The most notable of these reforms were:
1. An increase in the centralization of authority in the office of the SECDEF by authorizing additional
assistant secretary positions.
2. The Chairman, JCS was given authority to select and direct the Joint Staff.
3. The Chairman, JCS was subordinated to the President, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
and subject to congressional oversight.
4. Civilian control of the military departments was maintained by replacing as executive agents the
individual service Chiefs with service secretaries of the military departments (Secretary of the Army,
Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of the Air Force). Thereby the chain of command ran from the
President, to the SECDEF through the Joint Chiefs to the commanders of the unified and specified
5. The SECDEF was provided the power to reorganize the DOD.
6. The requirement that the military departments be "separately administered" was changed to
"separately organized".
President Eisenhower stated, "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever.
If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight all elements, with all services, as one single
concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact."
During the next three decades, although there were multiple studies by blue ribbon panels that
assessed military organization, DOD reorganization was ignored even in the face of Vietnam. Several
conflicts occurred in the late 1970's and 1980's highlighting what was deemed a need for additional
reform in defense organization. Major concerns centered on the command of military forces and the
organization, training and employment of these forces.
Conflicts calling for further defense reform.
The failure of Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw (1979) to rescue the U.S. hostages being held
by Iranian militants at the U.S. embassy in Tehran raised questions concerning unified command, unified
action and joint training of forces.
The loss of 241 U.S. military personnel and wounding of over 100 others in a suicide bomb attack
on the U.S. Marines headquarters building in Beirut, Lebanon (1983) highlighted recurring deficiencies
from Desert One, most notably unified action. A subsequent investigation also noted problems with the
military reporting system to the civilian chain of command and the failure of the civilian leadership to heed
the advice of senior military leaders.
Although Operation Urgent Fury (1983), intended to evacuate approximately 1000 U.S. citizens
from the island of Grenada and defeat Grenadian and Cuban forces, was deemed a success, problems
once again occurred in unified action and training which further fueled the debate for reform.
U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia confirmed this call for reform. The failed Iranian hostage
rescue mission "Desert One", and the flawed victory in Grenada confirmed and reinforced Nunn's view
that it was time to pursue further defense reform. According to Senator Nunn, these events along with the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) defense reform project convinced him that the time
to pursue reform had arrived.
Subsequently, in January 1985 following an 18 month study in the form of
hearings, interviews and research, Senators Nunn and Goldwater directed a more formal and vigorous
study be conducted.
Goldwater-Nichols came to fruition in law as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act on October 1,1986. GNA came as a final product of debate, compromise and
concession driven by two major studiesthe Locher Report and the Packard Commission. Senator Barry
Goldwater and Representative William Nichols championed the passage of the law. The scope and
grounds for the subsequent legislation can be summarized as follows:
'The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional dissatisfaction with the lack
of unified direction and action of the United States armed forces. Congress believed the
problems derived from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense,
Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and service components and the service
A summary of the purposes of GNA in layman's terms is:
1. To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian control.
2. To improve military advice to the NCA.
3. To place responsibility clearly on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant
commanders for accomplishment of assigned missions.
4. To ensure CINCs have the authority commensurate with responsibility.
5. To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
6. To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
7. To improve joint officer management policies.
8. Otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and
Absent prior to the GNA were specific relationships and authority of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense in regard to the Service Secretaries. Desiring to clarify the authority of the SECDEF, Congress
stated, 'The Secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on
which the Secretary chooses to act."
The GNA has strengthened civilian authority and has empowered the SECDEF to efficiently
influence, lead and manage DOD. Dick Chaney, former SECDEF, found that the act "significantly
improved the way the place functions."
In designing GNA, the intent of the Congress was to end claims
by defense officials to jurisdictions that were independent of the Secretary's authority. An explanation of
Military Doctrine
Dennis Drew and Don Snow
INFLUENCES on the strategy process are both numerous and important. Most are relatively
well known and understood because they are similar to the influences that affect almost any
political decision. This chapter, however, deals with an influence peculiar to national security
strategy decisionsmilitary doctrine. A detailed examination of doctrine is in order for at least
two reasons. Doctrine has, or should have, an extraordinary impact on the strategy process, and
doctrine is an ill-defined, poorly understood, and often confusing subject in spite of its
considerable importance.
What Is Doctrine?
One can readily find a number of definitions for doctrinesome official, some unofficialthat
often differ by country or military service of origin. Most fail to capture the significance of
doctrine. Official definitions written in legalese even obscure doctrines importance. Perhaps the
best definition, one that is accurate, concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting doctrines
importance, is also one of the simplest. Military doctrine is what we believe about the best way
to conduct military affairs. Even more briefly, doctrine is what we believe about the best way to
do things.
Two words are particularly important in the definition. The use of the word believe suggests that
doctrine is the result of an examination and interpretation of the available evidence. In addition,
it implies that the interpretation is subject to change should new evidence be introduced.
Doctrinal beliefs are not immutable physical laws but are interpretations of changing evidence
(e.g., new technology and new circumstances). The word best connotes a standarda guide for
those who conduct military affairs.
The principal source of doctrine is experience. In a sense, doctrine is a compilation of those
things that have generally been successful in the past. The repeated success or failure of actions
over time can be generalized into beliefs that, we hope, will be relevant to the present and the
future. Unfortunately, not all past experience is relevant to the present (not to mention the
future), and there is no guarantee that what is relevant today will remain relevant in the future.
Thus, doctrine is a constantly maturing and evolving thing. Those lessons from the past that
seem to have proved themselves over an extensive period of time, however, can be, and have
been, not only generalized into doctrinal beliefs but have also been raised to higher levels of
abstraction to become the so-called principles of wardoctrinal beliefs that are axiomatic.
Of course, doctrine is not just the result of experience. Experience by itself has limited utility. As
Frederick the Great pointed out, if experiences were all-important, he had several pack mules
who had seen enough of war to be field marshals. The real key is the accurate analysis and
interpretation of history (experience)and therein lies the rub. Each individual looks at history
through different lenses, lenses shaped by a variety of factors, lenses that interpret history in very
different ways. The results are differing views among nations and among military services within
nations about the lessons of history and their applicability to the present and future. This problem
is best illustrated by the disparate views concerning an enemys center of gravity.
Moreover, experience and the analysis of experience are not exclusive sources of doctrine
because there are subjects for which there is no empirical evidence on which to base beliefs. This
is particularly true of nuclear issueshow to deter nuclear war, how to wage nuclear war, and so
on. Even though two nuclear weapons were used during World War II, by no stretch of the
imagination could one consider that experience illustrative of what might transpire in a full-scale
nuclear war. No one has any real experience to draw on, or any history of the best way to deter or
conduct a nuclear conflict. For example, we assume that US nuclear retaliatory forces have
deterred attack for four decades, but we have no solid evidence that this is the case.
In such evidential voids as that found in the nuclear arena, we are forced to rely on extrapolations
of experience from other areas. We hope that such extrapolations are pertinent, but our standards
for judgment can only be logic, intuition, and gut feelings. This is, obviously, a risky but
unavoidable situation. Even worse is the fact that in the nuclear realm we cannot afford to be
Development Problems
We have already alluded to several significant problems in the development of doctrine. The lack
of concrete evidence in the nuclear area should be placed at the top of the problem list because of
the consequences should we make an error. What nonnuclear evidence is pertinent to nuclear
issues? Does any nonnuclear doctrine really apply to weapons of mass destruction? Does
conventional logic apply when the consequences of nuclear war might include the death of
civilization? Would anyone but a madman actually initiate a nuclear war? What would deter a
madman? Can there be a winner (in some rational sense) in a full-scale nuclear war? These are
all doctrinal questions of the utmost importance that frustrate nearly everyone who has to deal
with them.
Problematic nuclear issues are not the only difficulties encountered in the area of doctrine.
Objective analysis of experience can be especially difficult. This fact is best illustrated by the US
experience in attempting to deal with the legacy of the Vietnam War. The passions of the
Southeast Asian experience have died hard and have colored nearly every attempt to analyze the
conflict. To some, the lesson of that war is a simplistic plea for no more Vietnams, a rather ill-
defined lesson at best. Others have attempted to identify scapegoatsfinger pointing among
some military professionals, civilian leaders, and antiwar activiststhe lesson apparently being
that if the scapegoats had been controlled or eliminated, everything would have worked out for
the best. Still others have passionately criticized how the war was conducted and earnestly
proposed fanciful remedies and reforms. In short, objective analysis has been in short supply. In
such a situation, it is unlikely that sound doctrine will result. In the case of Vietnam, almost no
doctrine has resulted.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous doctrinal problem is the tendency to let doctrine stagnate. Changing
circumstances (for example, technological developments) must be constantly evaluated because
they can modify beliefs about the important lessons of experience. If current and projected
circumstances do not affect the analysis of historys lessons, doctrine rapidly becomes irrelevant.
The French experience after World War I exemplifies the problem. Based on the demonstrated
superiority of the defense when ensconced in strong trench works during the war, the French
constructed the worlds most elaborate and sophisticated fortifications along the Franco-German
border. Unfortunately, the Maginot Lines static fortifications were irrelevant to the mobile
warfare conducted by the Germans in World War II. The French analysis of historys lessons
was not tempered by technological change, particularly the advent of motorized ground warfare
supported by air power.
Finally, doctrine can become irrelevant if the assumptions that support it are not frequently
reexamined for their continuing validity. The development of US air power doctrine provides a
pertinent example. Based on the ideas of Gen William Billy Mitchell and further developed at
the Air Corps Tactical School by Mitchells protgs, the Army Air Forces went into World War
II with a doctrine based on the belief that strategic bombing would (and should) be decisive in
war. The World War II experience and the availability of nuclear weapons and long-range
aircraft in the postwar era further ingrained this notion. Military budgets, force structures,
equipment procurement, and training were all based on the central doctrinal belief in the
deterrent and warfighting decisiveness of strategic bombardment. Even the tactical air forces
became ministrategic forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The crisis came in 1965 when the
United States entered the Vietnam War and the bombing of North Vietnam began. American air
power doctrine was found to be bankrupt in Vietnam because its underlying assumptions were
untrue in that situation. Strategic bombing doctrine assumed that all US wars would be unlimited
wars fought to destroy the enemy and that Americas enemies would be modern, industrialized
states. Both assumptions were crucial to strategic bombing doctrine. They were reasonable and
valid assumptions in the 1920s and 1930s, but invalid in the 1960s in the age of limited warfare
in the third world. The results were frustration, ineffective bombing, wasted blood and treasure,
and eventually the renaming of Saigon to Ho Chi Minh City.
Types of Doctrine
For many years there has been considerable confusion regarding the subject of doctrine. Some of
this confusion has resulted from ill-considered doctrinal publications in the wake of the Vietnam
War. In some cases these publications reflected the confusion and consternation caused by the
American failure in Southeast Asia, and they certainly reflected an inability to analyze the war
dispassionately. Part of the confusion about doctrine also stems from the fact that there are three
distinct types of doctrine. A brief survey of these types should help resolve some of the
Fundamental doctrine forms the foundation for all other types of doctrine. Its scope is broad and
its concepts are abstract. Essentially, fundamental doctrine defines the nature of war, the purpose
of military forces, the relationship of military force to other instruments of power, and similar
subject matter on which less abstract beliefs are founded. The following examples are typical
statements of fundamental doctrine:
War is policy carried on by other means.
War is the failure of policy.
The object of war is to overcome an enemys hostile will.
The object of war is a better state of peace.
An examination of these statements reveals two significant characteristics of fundamental
doctrine. The first is the almost timeless nature of fundamental doctrine. It seldom changes
because it deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary techniques. The second
characteristic, which is really the basis of the first, is that fundamental doctrine is relatively
insensitive to political philosophy or technological change. The statements, if accepted, seem
applicable in democratic or authoritarian states and cogent whether discussing Napoleons
campaigns or recent conflicts.
As technological innovations allowed man to put to sea and take to the air, mans proclivity for
war quickly followed. Quite naturally, beliefs also developed about how best to use sea power
and air power. Thus, environmental doctrine (the rubric for sea power, air power, land power,
and space power doctrine) is a compilation of beliefs about the employment of military forces
within a particular operating medium.
Environmental doctrine has several distinctive characteristics. It is narrower in scope than
fundamental doctrine because it deals with the exercise of military power in a particular medium.
Environmental doctrine is significantly influenced by such factors as geography and technology.
Sea power doctrine, for example, is obviously influenced by geography (there are many places
one cannot take a naval vessel) and by technology, particularly since the advent of naval aviation
and submarine warfare. Air power doctrine, on the other hand, is less influenced by geography
but depends totally on technology for its very existence.
Organizational doctrine is best defined as basic beliefs about the operation of a particular
military organization or group of closely linked military organizations. It attempts to bring the
abstractions of fundamental and environmental doctrine into sharper (yet still somewhat abstract)
focus by leavening them with current political realities, capabilities, and cultural values.
Typically, organizational doctrine discusses roles and missions of an organization, current
objectives, administrative organization, force employment principles as they are influenced by
the current situation, and, in some cases, tactics.
Organizational doctrine has several salient characteristics that distinguish it from fundamental or
environmental doctrine. Organizational doctrine is very narrow in scope. Organizational doctrine
concerns the use of a particular force (e.g., US or Soviet) in a particular environment (e.g., US
Air Force or Soviet Air Force) at a particular timetoday. In addition, organizational doctrine is
current and must change to stay current. This tendency to change contrasts sharply with the
almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine and the considerable staying power of
environmental doctrine.
In the United States, organizational doctrine comprises the bulk of doctrinal publications. It has
been further subdivided and specialized into doctrine for specific types of forces, types of
conflicts, and other subcategories. As the content of these publications increasingly narrows in
scope, it assumes the characteristics of regulations or standard operating procedures. The
distinction between beliefs about how to do things at this level of detail and directives on the
same subject is a matter of conjecture.
How do these complex puzzle pieces fit together? Clearly, fundamental doctrine is the basis for
all other types of doctrine, and environmental doctrine is at least part of the basis for
organizational doctrine. One way to understand these relationships is to visualize them as parts
of a tree (fig. 4). The trunk of the tree is fundamental doctrine and, of course, has its roots in
historythe primary source of doctrine. The tree branches represent environmental doctrine
each springing from the same trunk, each individual, and yet all related. The leaves represent
organizational doctrinedependent on both the trunk and the branches and changing from
season to season.

The analogy of the tree can be carried even further. For example, what would happen if the
lessons of history cannot be accurately interpreted? The results would be analogous to cutting the
roots and therefore killing the tree (i.e., defeat). What would happen if there was no valid
fundamental or environmental doctrine? This is analogous to a diseased trunk or branch that
could kill the tree, including the leaves (again, defeat). The analogy of the doctrine tree illustrates
that doctrine must be a coherent whole to be valuable, shows the dependencies involved, and
emphasizes the often ignored importance of fundamental and environmental doctrine.
Relationship of Doctrine and Strategy
Doctrine has many functions. Its first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience
and a determination of beliefs. Its second function is to teach those beliefs to each succeeding
generation. Its third function is to provide a common basis of knowledge and understanding that
can provide guidance for actions. All three of these functions come to fruition in doctrines
relationship to strategy decisions.
Doctrine provides, in essence, a knowledge base for making strategy decisions. Doctrine is
always somewhat abstract and thus provides the foundation from which to begin thinking when
facing a concrete and specific decision. Without doctrine, strategists would have to make
decisions without points of reference or guidance. They would continually be faced with the
prospect of reinventing the wheel and repeating past mistakes. Superior doctrine should be the
storehouse of analyzed experience and military wisdom and should be the strategists
fundamental guide in decisionmaking. The importance of this function was succinctly put by T.
E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) when he commented that with 2,000 years of examples there
is no excuse for not fighting a war well.*

*Quoted in J. A. English, "Kindergarten Soldier: The Military Thought of Lawrence of Arabia,"
Military Affairs, January 1987, 10.

As important as doctrine should be at nearly every level of strategy, it often does not control
strategy or even have a significant influence on strategy decisions, a source of great frustration
for the military professional. This tendency has been most notable since World War II as
traditional military doctrine has often clashed with political decisions in conducting limited
warfare. In both Korea and Vietnam, military leaders chafed under the close control of civilians
whose decisions about the conduct of the wars often ran counter to military advice. Many
military leaders contend such decisions played a major role in preventing a clear-cut victory in
Korea and in causing a clear-cut failure in Vietnam. Civilian leaders, on the other hand, contend
that traditional military doctrine is incompatible with limited warfare. They believe that either or
both of those wars could have escalated to a superpower confrontation if the military had been
allowed to implement its doctrine.
The frustrations of Korea and Vietnam highlight the fact that military doctrine is only one of a
host of factors influencing strategy decisions. The influence of doctrine is inversely proportional
to the importance attached to other factors. In Korea and Vietnam, the threats of escalation and
confrontation were of overwhelming importance and negated the influence of military doctrine.
These same kinds of phenomena can also occur in peacetime. Military advice and requests
concerning force structures, weapon system procurement and force deployment (all of which
areor should be based on military doctrine) are often ignored, overruled, or modified
because of economic and political factors that assume overwhelming importance. In both peace
and war, the influence of military doctrine can be negated, modified, or limited by any of the
host of other factors that influence strategy decisions. The degree to which doctrine influences
strategy depends on the relative importance of doctrine in the eyes of the decisionmaker.
Thus in an imperfect world, doctrine is not always accorded its proper influence, which suggests
yet another important function of doctrine. As the best way to conduct military affairs, doctrine
provides a standard against which to measure our efforts. Many factors prevent the military from
doing things in the best manner, but doctrine can still provide a yardstickan indicator of
success and a tool for analyzing both success and failure. Doctrine can measure not only its own
impact on the decisiomnaking process but also its own relevance. If military doctrine were
followed to a substantial degree and success were not achieved, this would indicate that changes
to doctrine were in order; that is, experience of failure would feed the development of new
doctrine. If, under the influence of doctrine, the strategy decisions led to success, the experience
of success would also add to the experience that feeds the development of doctrine. This brings
the strategy and doctrine relationship full circle. Doctrine influences strategy (or it should) and
the results of strategy become the experiences that are the basis for doctrine.

Reprinted from Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems,
Chapter 11, August 1988, pp. 163174.
Published 1988 by Air University Press.

Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
Doctrine is defined as fundamental principles by which the military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgment in application (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). This definition is
explained in more detail below.
fundamental principles
Doctrine is a body of carefully developed, sanctioned ideas which has been officially
approved or ratified corporately, and not dictated by any one individual. Doctrine
establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that commanders
use to solve military problems. It is what we believe to be true about the best way to do
things based on the evidence to date.
There is no end to the number of people who will
line up to make flippant remarks that the doctrine is
too long, too short, has too many pictures, is too
academic, is not academic enough. The acid test
is do we read it, do we understand it, and do we use
it, and DOES IT WORK? all else is rubbish to
borrow from Baron von Richthofen. Our doctrine
does not mirror the Navys, nor the Marines, nor the
Armys it is aerospace doctrine our best
practices and we should not be bashful about how
we write it or what it says.
From briefing notes by then-Brigadier
General Ronald Keys to a doctrine
symposium, 1997
We have identified
danger, physical exertion,
intelligence, and friction as
the elements that coalesce
to form the atmosphere of
war, and turn it into a
medium that impedes
activity. In their restrictive
effects they can be grouped
into a single concept of
general friction. Is there any
lubricant that will reduce
this abrasion? Only one:
combat experience.
Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
military forces
For the purposes of Air Force doctrine, this includes all Airmen, both uniformed and
Department of the Air Force civilians. These constitute the uniformed warfighters, their
commanders, and the capabilities and support that they employ. They operate across
the range of military operations (ROMO) and can be task-organized into the right force
for any particular joint contingency.
in support of national objectives
Military forces should always conduct operations in order to support objectives
that create continuing advantage for our nation.
guide their actions authoritative judgment
Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed rules; it recommends, but does not
mandate, particular courses of action.
Air Force doctrine describes and guides the
proper use of airpower in military
operations. It is what we have come to
understand, based on our experience to
date. The Air Force promulgates and
teaches its doctrine as a common frame of
reference on the best way to prepare and
employ Air Force forces. Subsequently,
doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air
Force organizes, trains, equips, and
sustains its forces. Doctrine prepares us for
future uncertainties and provides a common
set of understandings on which Airmen
base their decisions. Doctrine consists of
the fundamental principles by which military
forces guide their actions in support of
national objectives; it is the linchpin of
successful military operations. It also
provides us with common terminology,
conveying precision in expressing our ideas. In
application, doctrine should be used with judgment. It should never be dismissed out of
hand or through ignorance of its principles, nor should it be employed blindly without
due regard for the mission and situation at hand. On the other hand, following doctrine
to the letter is not the fundamental intent. Rather, good doctrine is somewhat akin to
a good commanders intent: it provides sufficient information on what to do,
but does not specifically say how to do it. Airmen should strive above all else to be
doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound.
In the current turbulent environment of expeditionary operations and the arena of
homeland security, doctrine provides an informed starting point for the many
decisions Airmen make in what seems to be a continuous series of deployments.
Airmen no longer face the challenge of starting with a blank sheet of paper; with
doctrine, Airmen now have a good outline that helps answer several basic
What is my mission? How should I approach it?
What should my organization look like, and why?
What are my lines of authority within my organization and within the joint force?
What degrees of control do I have over my forces?
How am I supported? Who do I call for more support?
How should I articulate what the Air Force provides to the joint force?
From one operation to the next, many things are actually constant. Doctrine,
properly applied, often can provide a 70-, 80-, or even 90-percent solution to most
questions, allowing leaders to focus on the remainder, which usually involves
tailoring for the specific operation. Good doctrine informs, provides a sound
departure point, and allows flexibility.
A study of airpower doctrine should draw a distinction between theory and practice.
Theory is less constrained by limited empirical context, and designed to encourage
debate and introspection with an eye towards improving military advantage. It is part of
a vital, iterative investigation of what works under particular circumstances, and why.
Theoretical discussion is critical to a successful military. To date, however, a truly
enduring, all-encompassing theory of airpowerone that is not merely a point in time
has yet to be developed. Thus, this publication does not present a comprehensive
theory for airpower. Instead, it focuses on those ideas and validated concepts,
grounded in experience and Service consensus. This is the heart of doctrine.
Finally, a study of airpower doctrine should also distinguish between doctrine and public
relations-like pronouncements concerning the Air Forces role. There have been many
of the latter since the Air Forces inception. Some have been developed with an eye
towards influencing public and congressional perception of the Air Forces role and
value. Others have been made in a strategic planning context (e.g., a vision-mission-
goals development process) that are a normal part of formal, long range corporate
planning. Such statements are not enduring and not doctrine; they should be viewed in
the context in which they were created. .
Although air officers have
not been prolific writers, they
have expressed their beliefs
freely. In fact, one may
almost say that the Air Force
has developed an oral rather
than a written tradition.
Frank Futrell, Ideas,
Concepts, Doctrine: Basic
Thinking in the United States
Air Force, 1907 - 1960
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
The term doctrine is frequently (and incorrectly) used when referring to policy or
strategy. These terms are not interchangeable; they are fundamentally different.
Because policy and strategy may impact each other, it is important to first understand
their differences before delving into a discussion of doctrine.
Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be
accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues and not
others. Thus, while doctrine is held to be relatively enduring, policy is more mutable
and also directive. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership,
political considerations, or for fiscal
reasons. At the national level, policy
may be expressed in such broad
vehicles as the National Security
Strategy or Presidential Executive
Orders. Within military operations,
policy may be expressed not only in
terms of objectives, but also in rules
of engagement (ROE)what we may
or may not strike, or under what
circumstances we may strike
particular targets.
Strategy defines how operations
should be conducted to
accomplish national policy
objectives. Strategy is the
continuous process of matching ends,
ways, and means to accomplish
desired goals within acceptable levels
of risk. Strategy originates in policy
and addresses broad objectives,
along with the designs and plans for
achieving them.
Doctrine presents considerations
on how to accomplish military
goals and objectives. It is a
storehouse of analyzed experience and
wisdom. Military doctrine is authoritative, but unlike policy, is not directive.
In practice, as leaders develop strategies for particular contingencies, political,
economic, or social considerations may dictate strategic and operational approaches
that modify or depart from accepted doctrine. As an example, doctrine may support
long-range, air-to-air engagements beyond visual range, or high altitude interdiction of
surface targets, both using long-range sensors; ROE, however, may require visual
identification of all targets before firing due to political concerns over fratricide or
collateral damage. If policy seriously affects the application of doctrine, military
commanders should describe for political leaders the military consequences of those
adaptations. However, because war is an instrument of policy, military commanders
should ensure that policy governs the employment of military power and thus tailor their
operations accordingly.
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
One way to explore good doctrine is to use a compare and contrast model to walk
through some key issues. This technique also amplifies the point that doctrine should
be written broadly, allowing decision makers latitude in interpretation and flexibility in
application, yet be specific enough to provide informed guidance. This technique also
illustrates the use of doctrine in explaining contentious issues and how doctrine can be
used to think more effectively about the best means to integrate various aspects of
military power and organization. In the following discussion, there may be overlap
among some of the principles expressed; this is desirable in that often there are
different aspects or nuances to a particular issue. In doctrine, language is important.
Finally, the following discussion presents an Air Force perspective; not all Services may
entirely agree with these points.
Doctrine is about warfighting, not physics. This principle specifically addresses the
perceived differences between operations in air, space, and cyberspace. Air, space,
and cyberspace are separate domains requiring exploitation of different sets of physical
laws to operate in, but are linked by the effects they can produce together. To achieve
a common purpose, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities need to be integrated.
Therefore, Air Force doctrine focuses on the best means to obtain warfighting effects
regardless of the medium in which a platform operates. As an example, Airmen should
be concerned with the best means of employing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, not whether a particular ISR platform is airborne or in
orbit. This is requisite to achieving true integration across any given collection of forces.
Doctrine is about effects, not platforms. This focuses on the desired outcome of a
particular action, not on the system or weapon itself that provides the effect. For
example, doctrine states that Airmen should seek to achieve air superiority, but doctrine
does not focus on which platforms should be used to achieve that effect. A parallel
example of this is seen in the recognition that bombers are not strategic, nor are
fighters tactical. Similarly, it does not matter if an F-16 or a B-52 accomplishes a given
task, or whether a particular platform is manned or unmanned, or whether a C-17 or a
C-130 delivers a certain load; the outcome of the mission, the effect achieved, is whats
important. Thus, Air Force doctrine does not explicitly tie specific weapon systems to
specific tasks or effects.
Doctrine is about using mediums, not owning mediums. This illustrates the
importance of properly using a medium to obtain the best warfighting effects, not of
carving up the battlespace based on Service or functional parochialism. Focusing on
using a medium is a vital first step to integration of efforts. Ownership arguments
eventually lead to suboptimal (and usually at best tactical) application of efforts at the
expense of the larger, total effort.
Doctrine is about organization, not organizations. Modern warfare demands that
disparate parts of different Services, different nations, and even differing functions
within a single Service be brought together intelligently to achieve unity of effort and
unity of command. However, merely placing different organizations together in an area
of operations is insufficient to meet these demands. A single, cohesive organization is
required with clearly defined lines of command and commanders with requisite
authorities at appropriate levels. Doctrine explains why certain organizational structures
are preferred over others and describes effective command relationships and command
authorities; this facilitates the rapid standup of joint and Service organizations during
rapidly evolving situations. Ultimately, doctrine is not about whether one particular
element of a joint force is more decisive than another, nor about positing that element
as the centerpiece of joint operations; its the total, tailored joint force thats decisive.
Getting to that effective joint force requires smart organization and a thorough
understanding of Service and joint doctrine.
Doctrine is about synergy, not segregation. True integration of effort cannot be
achieved by merely carving up the operational environment. While segregation may
have some benefit and may appear the simplest way, from a command and control
viewpoint, to manage elements of a diverse joint force, it may actually suboptimize the
overall effort. It guarantees that the whole will never be greater than the sum of its
parts. For example, Airmen should have access to the entire theater of operations to
maximize their ability to achieve joint force commander (JFC) objectives; they should
not be restricted from any area due to unnecessarily restrictive fire control measures.
Also, segregating the battlespace into smaller areas of operation may create
competition for scarce, high-demand, low-density capabilities and reduce combat
Doctrine is about integration, not just synchronization. Synchronization is the
arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02). Integration, by
comparison, is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force
that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1-02). Synchronization is, in essence,
deconfliction in time and space between different units. It is a useful means to plan and
execute operations and to prevent fratricide. However, it doesnt scale up to the
operational level and hence is not the best means for achieving the maximum potential
of a joint force. Synchronization emphasizes timing, while integration considers priority
and effect to be both efficient and effective with scarce resources. Synchronization is
bottom-up; integration, on the other hand, starts at the top with a single cohesive plan
and works downward. Synchronization is an additive sum of the parts model, while
integration may produce geometric results.
Doctrine is about the right force, not just equal shares of the force. This addresses
the proper mix of Service components within a joint force. Some believe that a joint
force requires equal parts of all the Services. This is an incorrect view. As one senior
Air Force officer said, joint warfighting is not like Little League baseball, where
everybody gets a chance to play. Any given joint force should be tailored appropriately
for the task at hand. Some operations will be land-centric, others air-centric, others
maritime-, cyberspace-, or information-centric. The composition of the joint force and
the tasks assigned its various elements should reflect the needs of the situation.
[Doctrine] reflects an
official recognition of what
has usually worked best from
observation of numerous
trials. These may be reports
of actual combat operations,
or they may be limited to
tests, exercises, and
maneuvers. Only when
necessary will doctrine
consist of extrapolations
beyond actual experience of
some sort, for example, in
the use of nuclear weapons
where the nature of the
weapon normally precludes
the gathering of experience
in any but the most limited
Maj Gen I.B. Holley,
Technology and
Military Doctrine
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
Doctrine should be based in critical analysis
and the lessons of warfare rather than driven
by rapidly changing policies, promising
technologies, individual personalities, budget
battles, and politically trendy catch-phrases.
Doctrine should not be written to
backwards-justify a policy position or
codify a uniquely-tailored organization.
As such, doctrine reflects what has worked
best with full consideration of what has
worked poorly. In those less frequent
instances in which experience is lacking or
difficult to acquire, doctrine may be
developed through analysis of exercises,
wargames, and experiments. The military
experience of other nations should also be
It should be emphasized that doctrine
development is never complete. Any given
doctrine document is a snapshot in timea
reflection of the thinking at the time of its
creation. Innovation has always been a key
part of sound doctrinal development and
continues to play a central role. Doctrine
should evolve as new experiences and
advances in technology point the way to the
operations of the future.
Three constantly evolving variables affect
doctrine: theory, experience, and technology.
Sound doctrine strikes a balance among all
Theory may be an excellent starting point,
but doctrine based solely on theory may
not survive contact with reality. An
example of this is the Army Air Corps advocacy of daylight precision bombing;
bombers initially had neither the necessary precision nor the survivability required to
implement the theory. On the other hand, theory can support technological
investment and experimentation, as in the German Wehrmachts decision in the
interwar years to pursue air-ground integration. A good grasp of operational art can
provide the flexibility to adapt new theories within real-world situations, and prevent
doctrine from becoming dogma.
While experience plays a major role in doctrine formulation, too great a reliance on
past experience leaves one open to always fighting the last war. Experience must
be tempered with current realities to develop future plans. New technology can
provide solutions to long-standing problems, as the advent of mobile, mechanized
forces and aviation overcame the stalemate of trench warfare. Theories of war,
sufficiently taught, should be open to reinterpretation in light of current circumstance.
The US military experienced this in its recent formulation of doctrine for irregular
Technology constantly evolves, but by itself is not a panacea. While technology
alone may be good at providing single-point solutions, technology should be
acquired with due consideration for operational art and design, taking into
consideration theory and experience; sound reasoning must accompany realistic
projections of what capabilities will actually be available to warfighters. Discussion
in the 1990s of the Revolution in Military Affairs pointed to a similar interplay of
ideas involving technology, organization, and doctrine. Thinking at that time held
that all three were necessary to achieve a revolution. Thus, technology should not
be acquired in isolation.
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
As implemented in the Air Force, doctrine affects operations at three levels: basic,
operational, and tactical. These levels speak to the intellectual content of the doctrinal
concepts, not to the architectural structure of doctrine publications.
Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and
guide the proper use, presentation, and organization of forces in military action. It
describes the elemental properties of airpower and provides the Airmans
perspective. Because of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine
provides broad and continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized,
employed, equipped, and sustained. Because it expresses broad, enduring
fundamentals, basic doctrine changes relatively slowly compared to the other levels
of doctrine. As the foundation of all doctrine, basic doctrine also sets the tone and
vision for doctrine development for the future. Air Force Doctrine Volume 1 is the Air
Forces basic doctrine publication.
Operational doctrine contained in doctrine annexes describe more detailed
organization of forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to military actions.
Operational doctrine guides the proper organization and employment of air, space,
and cyberspace forces in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad
functional areas, and operational environments. Operational doctrine provides the
focus for developing the missions and tasks to be executed through tactical doctrine.
Doctrine at this level changes a bit more rapidly than basic doctrine, but usually only
after deliberate internal Service debate.
Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific Air Force assets,
individually or in concert with other assets, to accomplish detailed objectives.
Tactical doctrine considers particular objectives (stopping the advance of an
armored column) and conditions (threats, weather, and terrain) and describes how
Air Force assets are employed to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1 bombers
dropping anti-armor cluster munitions). Air Force tactical doctrine is codified as
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in Air Force TTP (AFTTP) -3 series
manuals. Because tactical doctrine is closely associated with the employment of
technology and emerging tactics, change will likely occur more rapidly than other
levels of doctrine. Also, due to their sensitive nature, many TTPs are classified.
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
There are three types of doctrine: Service, joint, and multinational.
Service doctrine outlines Service capabilities and guides the application of
Service forces.
Joint doctrine, as it applies to airpower in joint operations, describes the best
way to integrate and employ air, space, and cyberspace capabilities with land,
maritime, and special operations forces in military action.
Multinational doctrine, as it applies to airpower, describes the best way to
integrate and employ US air forces with the forces of allies in coalition warfare. It
establishes principles, organization, and fundamental procedures agreed upon
between or among allied forces. When developed as a result of a treaty, as in
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, multinational doctrine is
A hiatus exists
between inventors who
know what they could
invent, if they only knew
what was wanted, and
the soldiers who know,
or ought to know, what
they want, and would
ask for it if they only
knew how much science
could do for them.
Winston Churchill,
The Great War
Last Updated: 14 Oct 2011
The doctrinal maxims of this document are based on experience, hard-won with the
blood of Airmen, and tempered by advances in technology. If properly employed,
doctrine can lead to great success, and if ignored, can lead (and has led) to disaster.
Therein lies the challenge: doctrine should convey the lessons of the past to guide
current operations, but should still be flexible enough to adapt to change. Yet while
forming that baseline for current operations, doctrine also provides a baseline for future
thinking. One way to put this relationship into perspective is to understand the different
uses of vision, operating concepts, and doctrine.
If placed along a continuum, doctrine, operating concepts, and vision provide a model
for thinking about future technology, operating constructs, and doctrine in a coherent
temporal framework.
Doctrine is focused on near-term operational issues and describes the proper
employment of current capabilities and current organizations. Doctrine
addresses how best to employ, how to organize, and how to command todays
capabilities. Doctrine is examined and validated
during training, exercises, contingency operations,
and times of war. Exercises, wargaming, and
experiments allow us to test emerging doctrinal
concepts and better align predicted capabilities
with sound operational practices. Experience
during conflict refines doctrine in real time.
Encounters with unpredictable adversaries often
highlight doctrinal gaps and provide fresh
perspectives on historic and future challenges.
Operating concepts generally look out from
five to fifteen years, and postulate reasonable
operating scenarios that, through a
combination of analysis and the use of
descriptive examples, examine a range of
issues such as employment, operating
environment, command and control, support,
organization, and planning considerations. As
new technologies mature to the point where their performance can be reasonably
bounded as a new, separate system or part of another system, they can be
examined within the framework of an operating concept. Depending on their
purpose, operating concepts can speak to the present, near future, or distant future.
Operating concepts define the parameters of envisioned capabilities. Experiments,
wargames, and historical study, when honestly and rigorously conducted, are useful
methods for evaluating new operating concepts and providing a basis for doctrinal
Vision statements describe key operating constructs and desired operational
capabilities well in the future, usually fifteen years out and beyond. Vision serves
to focus technology investments toward achieving these capabilities. Emerging
concepts and technologies are best investigated through experimentation and
wargaming techniques. As future concepts are envisioned, it is important to also
examine doctrine to support these potential capabilities. Vision provides the basis
for wargaming, and the results of wargaming may point to doctrinal considerations
requiring further examination.
Using doctrine, operating concepts, and vision, the Air Force can look toward the future
and consider the long-term impacts of advanced technologies such as directed energy
weapons, new unmanned systems, new space capabilities, and conceptual
advancements. As this framework builds from the general (long term) to the specific
(near term), Airmen can investigate a wide range of doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities issues at the appropriate point during
technology development, concept exploration, and systems acquisition.
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
doctrine. Throughout the instruction, references to using Defense Messaging
System (DMS) messages as part of the joint doctrine development system have
been deleted.

8. Releasability. This instruction is approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited. DOD components (to include the combatant commands), other
Federal agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this instruction through
the Internet from the CJCS Directives Home Page--

9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff


A -- General
B -- Responsibilities
C -- Joint Doctrine Development Process
Appendix A -- Sample Project Proposal Format
Appendix B -- Sample Program Directive Format
Appendix C -- Joint Doctrine Research Sources (By Type)
Appendix D -- Sample Doctrine Tasker E-mail
Appendix E -- Sample Comment Matrix and Line-Out/Line-In Format
Appendix F -- Procedures to Comment on Adjudicated Comment Matrix
Appendix G -- Sample Evaluation Directive
D -- Joint Publication Organization Framework
E -- Formatting and Distributing Joint Publications
Appendix A -- Sample Joint Publication Organization and Format
F -- Staffing Allied Joint Publications
G -- References
GL -- Glossary
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-1 Enclosure A



1. Joint Doctrine in Perspective

a. Joint doctrine consists of fundamental principles that guide the
employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common
objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications (JPs) also includes
terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. Joint doctrine represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as
what is right (i.e., what works best). Joint doctrine is written for those who:

(1) Provide strategic direction to joint forces (the Chairman and
combatant commanders).

(2) Employ joint forces (combatant commanders, subordinate unified
commanders, or joint task force (JTF) commanders).

(3) Support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands,
subunified commands, JTFs, component commands, the Services, and combat
support agencies (CSAs)).

(4) Prepare forces for employment by combatant commander,
subordinate unified commanders, and JTF commanders.

(5) Train and educate those who will conduct joint operations.

c. The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness
of U.S. forces. With the exception of JP 1, joint doctrine will not establish
policy. Joint policy will be reflected in other CJCS instructions (CJCSIs) or
CJCS manuals (CJCSMs). These instructions and manuals contain CJCS
policy and guidance that do not involve the employment of forces. Although
joint doctrine is neither policy nor strategy, it serves to make U.S. policy and
strategy effective in the application of U.S. military power.

d. Only those doctrine publications approved by CJCS will be referred to as
joint publications. They are developed in coordination with the Services,
combatant commands, CSAs, and the Joint Staff. Documents involving the
operations of two or more Services that are approved by the relevant chiefs of
Service (or their designated agent) will be referred to as multi-Service and will
identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine; Army,
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-2 Enclosure A

Navy, and Air Force procedures). These documents are not JPs, but they must
be consistent with approved JPs.

e. Joint doctrine is based on extant capabilities, i.e., current force
structures and materiel. It incorporates time-tested principles; e.g., the
principles of war, operational art, and elements of operational design for
successful military action, as well as contemporary lessons that exploit U.S.
advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Use of joint doctrine
standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and
processes among all U.S. forces to free joint force commanders (JFCs) and their
staffs to focus their efforts on solving the strategic, operational, and tactical
problems confronting them.

f. Joint doctrine is authoritative guidance and will be followed except when,
in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise. That means doctrine does not replace or alter a commanders
authority and obligation to determine the proper course of action (COA) under
the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision; such judgments are the
responsibility of the commander, and doctrine cannot be a substitute for good
judgment. Joint doctrine is not dogmatic -- the focus is on how to think about
operations, not what to think about operations. Its purpose is to aid thinking,
not to replace it. Yet it must be definitive enough to guide operations, while
versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations. Joint doctrine
should foster initiative, creativity, and conditions that allow commanders the
freedom to adapt to varying circumstances.

g. Joint doctrine applies to the combatant commanders, subordinate
unified commanders, JTF commanders, subordinate component commanders
of these commands, as well as forces assigned or attached to these commands.
In developing joint doctrine, existing Service and multinational doctrine will be
considered; however, joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service
doctrines, which must be consistent with joint doctrine. Joint doctrine should
not include detail that is more appropriate in regulations and instructions,
Service doctrine, standing operating procedures, plans, or other publications.
If conflicts arise between the contents of a JP and the contents of Service
publications, the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless
CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

h. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational
operations, U.S. commanders should follow multinational doctrine and
procedures that have been ratified by the United States. For multinational
doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should
evaluate and follow the multinational commands doctrine and procedures,
where applicable and consistent with U.S. law, policy, and doctrine.

CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-3 Enclosure A

i. In addition to guidance discussed above, joint doctrine provides:

(1) The U.S. national position for multinational doctrine consistent with
existing security procedures. Every effort will be made to ensure any proposed
doctrine is not introduced directly into Allied joint publications (AJPs) without
having been introduced and established in joint doctrine. Exceptions to this
policy require Joint Staff/J-7 approval.

(2) A basis for multinational or interagency coordination during joint

(3) The foundation for building a joint culture and a basis for joint

(4) Instructional material for joint professional military education

(5) A basis for the development of joint models and simulations.

(6) Information for U.S. Government agencies concerning the
employment of U.S. joint forces.

2. Influence of Joint Doctrine

a. Doctrine and Policy. Policy and doctrine are closely related, but they
fundamentally fill separate requirements. Policy can direct, assign tasks,
prescribe desired capabilities, and provide guidance for ensuring the Armed
Forces of the United States are prepared to perform their assigned roles;
implicitly policy can therefore create new roles and a requirement for new
capabilities. Conversely, doctrine enhances the operational effectiveness of the
Armed Forces by providing authoritative guidance and standardized
terminology on topics relevant to the employment of military forces.

(1) Most often, policy drives doctrine; however, on occasion, an extant
capability will require policy to be created. Policy makers and doctrine
developers should work interactively and in full understanding of the other
arena, striving to issue harmonized policy and doctrine. It is not always clear
when a void is identified whether filling it will require new (or revised) doctrine
or policy (or perhaps both). As a general rule, if the need can only be
adequately addressed by using such prescriptive words as shall and must
then the void is in policy and policy development should precede doctrine

(2) Of particular note, terminology developed within the two arenas
serves different purposes. The terminology required to support the
employment of forces (doctrinal terms) may not be optimal within the policy
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-4 Enclosure A

lane, whose purpose may be, for instance, to illuminate resource or
requirement documents. Development of terminology to support policy is not
limited by the constraints imposed on the development of doctrinal terms. The
terminology development policy and guidance contained in this instruction
amplifies that found in references c and d.

b. Doctrine and Strategy. A primary role of joint doctrine is to provide
guidance for unified action in the employment of U.S. military power. As such,
joint doctrine is closely linked to the development of national military strategy.
In general terms, joint doctrine establishes a link between the ends (what
must be accomplished) and the means (capabilities) by providing the ways
(how) for joint forces to accomplish military strategic and operational objectives
in support of national strategic objectives. Joint doctrine also provides
information to senior civilian leaders responsible for the development of
national security strategy as to the core competencies, capabilities, and
limitations of military forces. In addition, it provides other government
agencies and nongovernmental organizations an opportunity to understand
better the roles, capabilities, and operating procedures used by the Armed
Forces of the United States, thus facilitating coordination.

c. Joint Doctrine and Operation Planning

(1) Use of approved joint doctrine during contingency and crisis action
planning facilitates both planning for and the execution of operations.
Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military
operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive
processes -- the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and
the joint operation planning process (JOPP). JOPES and JOPP share the same
basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and
COA development. Joint doctrine provides a basis for analysis of the mission,
its objectives and tasks, and developing the commanders intent and associated
planning guidance. The development of the COA using decision-making
processes is also based on joint doctrinal principles. JOPP provides a detailed
and orderly way of translating task assignments into an operation plan or an
operation order in crisis action planning. However, the COA development
phase in JOPP involves both art and science and has its foundation in joint
doctrine. Joint doctrine provides fundamental guidance on how operations are
best conducted to accomplish the mission.

(2) Joint operation plans are developed in conformance with the criteria of
adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint
doctrine. In accordance with (IAW) reference e, the Joint Staff/J-7 is responsible
for reviewing the combatant commanders strategic concept for compliance with
approved joint doctrine.

CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-5 Enclosure A

d. Doctrine and Training

(1) Joint doctrine establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and
provides the guidance on how best to employ national military power to achieve
strategic ends. Since it is axiomatic that we train as we fight, it follows that
joint doctrine logically provides the foundation for joint training. To that end,
reference f mandates that joint training will be accomplished IAW approved
joint doctrine. Joint doctrinal publications, which are not intended to be
textbooks or stand-alone documents, describe common procedures and
establish uniform operational methods from a common baseline, using
common terminology. This baseline assists commanders and their staffs in
developing standards for joint training, exercises, and operations.

(2) Reference g contains a list of tasks that identifies what can be
performed by the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and components,
activities, joint organizations, and agencies responsive to CJCS in terms
common to the Armed Forces. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task
description does not address how or why a task is performed (found in joint
doctrine or other governing criteria), or who performs the task (found in the
commanders concept of operations and joint doctrine). UJTL language and
terminology must be consistent and compliant with existing joint doctrine
language and terminology in accordance with reference h.

(3) Approved joint doctrine is the basis for joint training, but when it is
necessary to introduce experimentation events into joint training exercises,
JFCs will use care to ensure that exercise participants understand that
doctrinal deviations are solely for experimentation purposes, and may not
indicate that promulgated JPs are dated or that changes to doctrine and
procedures are required.

e. Joint Doctrine and Military Education

(1) Joint doctrine provides the foundation for JPME at all five military
educational levels. Reference i and reference j, based on the Goldwater-Nichols
Act of 1986, outline the five military educational levels, and provide specific
JPME requirements for each. Each JPME level has standards, career-
appropriate learning areas, and objectives that may be taught within the
context of the Service roles and functions. Although the standards are
primarily described in qualitative terms, the JPME requirements are designed
to prepare officer and enlisted personnel to operate in a joint environment and
to bring a joint perspective to their planning and decision-making processes.
JPME supports the sequential and progressive nature of Service career paths
while systematically increasing the exposure to joint doctrine at every
educational level.
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-6 Enclosure A

(2) The Services are assigned responsibility to provide an introduction
to joint doctrine at the precommissioning and the primary professional military
education levels. CJCS certifies or accredits JPME programs at the
intermediate and the senior levels, whether at a Service- or a CJCS-sponsored
school. All curricula must be joint doctrine-based. National Defense
University (NDU) ensures that the CAPSTONE program is thoroughly and
inherently joint, and that participants understand joint doctrine and joint
operational art.

(3) The Officer Professional Military Education Policy provides the
mechanism for periodic review and revision of all five JPME levels to ensure
that the standards and learning areas maintain linkage to joint doctrine. In
addition, at the Intermediate and the Senior Levels, the CJCS tasks
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) to provide
a representative to assist in reviewing joint doctrine references in curricula
during Process for Accreditation of Joint Education visits. The JPME process
promotes a career-long, doctrinally based educational framework for all

f. Doctrine and Lessons Learned

(1) A major influence on doctrine is lessons and observations from
operations, exercises, and training. This review provides a standard from
which to judge what works and what does not work. As a military institution,
these lessons also consider changes in the threat and operational environment.
This ensures JPs remain current and relevant.

(2) Relevant lessons learned are normally adopted during the routine
development or maintenance of a JP; however, if urgent or significant change is
required, a recommendation may be used.

g. Doctrine and Concepts. There is a close and complementary
relationship between concepts and doctrine. In general terms, a concept
contains a notion or statement that expresses how something might be done.
In military application, a joint concept describes how a joint force commander
(JFC) may plan, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy a joint force
within the range of military operations; guides the further development and
integration of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (reference k) and
subordinate Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint
Integrating Concepts and Service concepts into a joint capability; and
articulates the measurable detail needed for experimentation, assessment, and
decision making. From a ways, means, and ends perspective, concepts and
doctrine both describe how (the ways) a joint force uses given capabilities
(means) in a generic set of circumstances to achieve a stated purpose (ends).
There also is an important distinction between the two. Approved joint
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-7 Enclosure A

doctrine is authoritative, describes operations with extant capabilities, and is
subject to policy, treaty, and legal constraints, while joint concepts -- whether
near-term or futuristic in nature -- can explore new operational methods,
organizational structures, and systems employment without the same
restrictions. Joint concepts provide the basis for joint experimentation and
assessment. These concepts are refined and validated during experiments,
modeling and simulation, selected training events and exercises, and
capabilities-based assessment. Joint doctrine provides the basis for education,
training, and execution of current joint operations.

(1) Concepts may be conceived for a variety of reasons, such as to
respond to inadequacies in current joint capabilities, test new capabilities, or
propose innovative solutions to military problems. Whatever the reason,
concepts should embrace the overarching goal of improving joint force
effectiveness. Concepts provide a venue to explore solutions to problems and
emerging missions for which no doctrine exists. They also may enable
consideration of alternatives to methods described in approved doctrine, based
either on lessons learned from recent operations or on emerging capabilities
whose military application has not yet been exploited. Futuristic concepts
typically focus on new ways and means with which the joint force can meet
expected future operational challenges using advanced technologies and
capabilities, many of which are not yet developed. This requires concept
developers to project the nature of the operating environment 8-20 years in the
future and describe new approaches and advanced capabilities required to
operate successfully in that environment. However, this process of forecasting
the future and evaluating concepts may uncover ideas that could improve how
joint forces operate today and could have an immediate impact on established

(2) Transformation efforts put a premium on exploring and validating
concepts through joint experimentation and assessment. Validated, value-
added concepts can impact favorably on doctrine, training, and education. The
results of experimentation are not sufficient to require doctrinal change. The
concept must clearly demonstrate value-added to current joint doctrine and
represent an extant capability. In other words, approved joint doctrine is the
authoritative, generic baseline against which concepts and experimentation
results will be compared to assess their transformational value. In addition,
current combatant command operation plans provide situation-specific
application of current doctrine, which can be useful in evaluating a concept.
Concepts typically are not copied directly into joint doctrine, but their central
themes and essential constructs may be incorporated in a number of ways.

(a) Most commonly, new ideas will be considered during the routine
process of developing, assessing, and revising existing JPs. Any authorized
organization can recommend such changes during this process per procedures in
CJCSI 5120.02B
4 December 2009
A-8 Enclosure A

this instruction. These proposals will be evaluated on merit during the normal
joint doctrine development process.

(b) While most concept-based changes to JPs will be incremental in
nature, a validated concept might provide a substantially new and beneficial
way of accomplishing a particular function or task, thereby affecting a
significant part of an existing JP or requiring a new JP. In such cases, the joint
doctrine development community (JDDC) might use a joint test publication
(JTP) and associated evaluation to field test the concept. It is important to
note the difference between the process of a field-tested, concepts-based JTP
versus the experimental testing of an emergent concept. JTP field-testing is
limited to the use of extant forces and capabilities. Concepts that remain
dependent upon simulated forces, capabilities, or processes are not appropriate
for field-testing as JTPs. The JTP evaluation directive (ED) would establish the
authority and applicability of the publication. (See Enclosure C for more

(c) Concepts can form the basis of recommended changes to
doctrine that are submitted in accordance with reference l and reference m.
These documents provide the policy and process for translating the results of
concept development and joint experimentation into joint warfighting
capabilities in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). With Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) endorsement of DOTMLPF change recommendations
(DCRs) and approval by CJCS (or designated representative), conditions are
met for the introduction of these doctrine recommendations to the JDDC. (See
Enclosure C for more details.)

h. Doctrine and Joint Capabilities Areas (JCAs). JCAs are an integral part
of the evolving capabilities-based planning process. JCAs are intended to
provide a common capabilities language for use across many related DOD
activities and processes. Processes identified for incorporation of JCAs include
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process; Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System; and joint force development.
Many JCAs are being described using joint doctrine and joint terminology and
are already covered by joint doctrine. As capabilities described in the JCAs
that affect the employment of the joint force are fielded and validated, they will
be incorporated through the joint doctrine development process.
25 March 2013
Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States
Joint Publication 1
J oint Force Development
4. Joint Doctrine
J oint doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of US
military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. It also provides
authoritative guidance from which joint operations are planned and executed.
a. Joint Doctrine Fundamentals
(1) J oint doctrine is based on extant capabilities (i.e., current force structures and
materiel). It incorporates time-tested principles of joint operations, operational art, and
elements of operational design. J oint doctrine standardizes terminology, relationships,
responsibilities, and processes among all US forces to free J FCs and their staffs to focus
efforts on solving the complex problems confronting them.
For more discussion of the principles of joint operations, see JP 3-0, J oint Operations. For
more discussion of operational art and operational design, see JP 5-0, J oint Operation
(2) Joint doctrine is authoritative guidance and will be followed except when,
in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
Doctrine does not replace or alter a commanders authority and obligation to determine the
proper COA under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision; such judgments are
the responsibility of the commander. J oint doctrine is not dogmaticthe focus is on how to
think about operations, not what to think about operations. It is definitive enough to guide
operations while versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations. J oint
doctrine should foster initiative, creativity, and conditions that allow commanders the
freedom to adapt to varying circumstances. The judgment of the commander based upon
the situation is always paramount.
(3) J oint doctrine applies to the J oint Staff, CCDRs, subordinate unified
commanders, J TF commanders, and subordinate component commanders of these
commands, the Services, and CSAs. In developing joint doctrine, existing Service, multi-
Service, and multinational doctrine is considered. However, joint doctrine takes
precedence over individual Services doctrine, which must be consistent with joint
doctrine. J oint doctrine should not include detail that is more appropriate in Service
doctrine, standing operating procedures, plans, and other publications. If conflicts arise
between the contents of joint doctrine and the contents of Service or multi-Service doctrine,
joint doctrine takes precedence for the activities of joint forces unless CJ CS has provided
more current and specific guidance.
(4) Joint doctrine is not policy. Policy and doctrine are closely related, but they
fundamentally fill separate requirements. Policy can direct, assign tasks, prescribe desired
capabilities, and provide guidance for ensuring the Armed Forces of the United States are
prepared to perform their assigned roles; implicitly policy can create new roles and a
requirement for new capabilities. Most often, policy drives doctrine; however, on occasion,
an extant capability will require policy to be created. As doctrine reflects extant capabilities,
Chapter VI
VI-4 J P 1
policy must first be implemented and/or new capabilities fielded before they can be written
into doctrine.
(5) When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational
operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that were
ratified by the US. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational commands doctrine and
procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, and doctrine.
(6) J oint doctrine is developed under the aegis of the CJ CS in coordination and
consultation with the Services, CCMDs, and CSAs. The J oint Staff leads the joint doctrine
development community and is responsible for all aspects of the joint doctrine process, to
include promulgation.
For further guidance on the development of joint doctrine, refer to CJCSI 5120.02C, J oint
Doctrine Development System.
b. Purpose of Joint Doctrine
J oint doctrine is written for those who:
(1) Provide strategic direction to joint forces (the CJ CS and CCDRs).
(2) Employ joint forces (CCDRs, subordinate unified commanders, or J TF
(3) Support or are supported by joint forces (CCMDs, subunified commands, JTFs,
component commands, the Services, and CSAs).
(4) Prepare forces for employment by CCDRs, subordinate unified commanders,
and J TF commanders.
(5) Train and educate those who will conduct joint operations.
5. Joint Education
a. Education is a key aspect of the joint force development process.
(1) Professional military education (PME) conveys the broad body of knowledge
and develops the cognitive skills essential to the military professionals expertise in the art
and science of war. Additionally, affective or attitudinal learning is paired with education to
better inculcate the values of joint service as discussed in Chapter I, Theory and
(2) Service delivery of PME, taught in a joint context, instills basic Service core
competency within topics associated with joint matters. J oint education is the aspect of PME
that focuses on imparting joint knowledge and attitudes.



Commander Christopher E. Hicks
United States Navy

Dr. Sandra Martinez
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on
Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher
Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of
Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College

Organizational Designs
Military professionals typically understand their chain-of-command and the internal
processes of their organization but unfortunately it is often these same leaders who do
not understand or recognize the type of organization they work within. The design or
structure of an organization not only denotes vertical and horizontal reporting chains, it
also describes organizational culture which in turn influences organizational behavior.
Having the ability to recognize and understand organizational structures allows leaders
to comprehend and potentially influence behaviors.
Rational theorists have been espousing optimal structural designs for many years
and their recommendations and theories have changed and evolved over time. In the
latest (as of this writing) Organizational Dynamics journal, Bahrat N. Anand and
Richard L. Daft describe current thinking and analysis of the right design for todays
organizations. The two authors provide a historic rational approach consisting of three
organizational design eras.

Era 1: Self-Contained Organizational Designs
Era 1 began in the mid-1800s, lasted until the late 1970s, and was dominated by
self-contained hierarchical structures with clear but steep chains of command.
organizations have been described as Functional, Divisional, and Matrix.
the era is said to have lasted until the late 70s, these types of structures still exist in
abundance today. Era 1 organizations were created for internal control and efficiencies
in producing an enduring output or, in other words, building the same widget or service
for the same market over time. These structures work well in a simple-stable
environment but began to suffer as the environment progresses to a complex-dynamic
Anand and Daft write: In a functional structure, activities are grouped together by
common function from the bottom to the top of the organization.
This is commonly
referred to as Stove Pipes and it is well understood they exist within DoD. As a matter
of fact, each branch of the armed services can be labeled a functional component of
DoD. Choosing the US Navy and drilling down further, one can identify three more
functional components; aviation, submarine warfare and surface warfare.
According to Anand and Daft, The divisional structure occurs when departments
are grouped together based on organizational outputs. In the business world, most
large corporations have divisions that encompass numerous functions. The people
within these divisions focus on a common product and the functional boundaries are
more transparent.
Taco Bell is, for example, a division of PepsiCo. The divisional
structure is still pyramid in nature but is supposedly suited for a slightly more complex-
dynamic environment than the functional organization.
Divisional structure exists in DoD; at least in design. A J oint Task Force (J TF)
created by a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) is designed to be a divisional
entity of the GCC but in reality is a series of functional component commanders that
tend to operate within their domains. The organization becomes divisional when
planning and efforts are combined to achieve a common goal with understood
responsibilities. However, as seen in a great deal of literature, defining supported and
supporting commands is considered an important function for the J TF commander. But
this is indicative of stove-piped elements concerned more with self-relevance and
internal desires than the overarching purpose of why they were put together as an
organization. In other words, it is an organization designed to be divisional but behaves
As the environment has become more complex and dynamic over the last three
decades, structures have evolved. Anand and Daft state, once again, Few
organizations can be successful today with a pure functional structure. Functional or
divisional silos inhibit the amount of coordination needed in a changing environment.

Horizontal coordination is needed between functional components and organizations
have used inter-department liaisons, networked information sharing, and other means to
achieve this. However, organizations that needed even stronger horizontal cooperation
evolved into matrix organizations.
The matrix organization contains a traditional
vertical hierarchy but overlays an equally strong horizontal coordinating chain of
command. The DoD is itself, a matrix organization. Each service provides functional
components that report to operational or combatant commanders. These same
components are organized, trained, equipped, and maintained by the service chiefs
two different chains. Matrix organizations do allow for greater flexibility and divided
responsibilities but can also create confusion for lesser organizations or commands.
Confusion based on whom to report or answer to.
Matrix organizations exist within specific services as well. Naval Aviation is a
perfect example. Carrier based squadrons report operationally to a Carrier Air Wing
Commander (06) but are resourced through a shore-based commodore (06). The two
chains continue upward. The Air Wing Commanders chain continues up through the
operational hierarchy while commodores report directly to Commander Naval Air Forces
(CNAF) a three star resource provider. The functions and responsibilities of the two
chains are completely different but allow for the commanders to concentrate efforts
within their lanes while coordinating their work.
Era 1 organizational structures have been referred to as Industrial Age structures
indicative of their period of creation. This connotation is descriptive of old or outdated
relative to the views of those analyzing organizations within the context of the
information age. These organizational structures are common within DoD and its
important to recognize what they are, how they evolved, and the behaviors they display.
Era 2: Horizontal Organization Design with Team and Process Based Emphasis
Era 2 began in the 1980s as the global market place began to become more
complex. The internal structures of traditional designs began to hinder the ability of
organizations to respond readily to rapid changes in the environment.
To cope, layers
of hierarchies were removed and cross-functional teams created to break down
stovepipes. A flattened organization reacted faster by eliminating vertical control
measures and teams of various functionaries provided for greater innovation through
close coordination of the various stove-piped departments. The teams effectively
managed organizational processes instead of hierarchies.
Examples of Flat organizations are plentiful in the tech sector of industry as that
market is known to change rapidly with ever newly introduced or improved products.
While not as wide spread, organizations within DoD have also flattened to better
respond to internal and external requirements. CNAF (mentioned earlier) eliminated
several internal structural levels during the early 1990s creating a vertical chain that
went from 3-star flag level directly to the 06 level. Relative to traditional military
structure, CNAF is a flat organization and it uses cross-functional teams to manage
resource allotment, repairable manufacturing, personnel distribution, planning, and
Flat organizations tend to react and adapt better to dynamic environments. It is
the behavior of the organization that allows for adaptability and flattened organizations
produce cultures conducive to adaptive behavior. Somewhat unique to the military are
organizations structured traditionally that behave adaptively or flatten out when
operating. As discussed, environmental conditions change for organizations, especially
military units that may be either in garrison or conducting combat operations. As such,
some military organizations have evolved cultures that allow behavioral change based
on current environmental conditions. Special Forces teams are great examples, they
are administratively steep in rank and hierarchy, like most military units, yet allow and
push decision allocation to near equal levels during operations. This is an evolved and
desired organizational behavior realized through environmental influence - A concept
beyond scope here but deserving more study.
Era 2 organizations are not as prevalent in the DoD but the behaviors are desired.
Decentralized operation is a trait of the flattened organization; a trait derived from the
culture a flattened organization creates. This organizational trait derived from structural
design and controlling processes is necessary for complex dynamic environments.
Era 3: Organizational Boundaries Open Up
Era 3, as described by Anand and Daft, began in the late 1990s as a result of
improvements in communication technology and emerging economies that produced
pools of skilled expertise around the world. This era produced managers less reluctant
to go outside the organization for processes traditionally kept in-house resulting in
Hollow and Modular organizations.

The hollow organization is more a method than design centered on outsourcing to
organizations that can provide a desired process better or cheaper than the parent
organization. The modular organization is the same with the only difference being
outsourcing portions of a product instead of process.
Outsourcing is profuse in the DoD and Anand and Daft use DoD and Halliburton
as an example of a hollow organization outsourcing to another business.

Cost reduction is the primary reason for outsourcing and is relevant to
competiveness in the external environment. Cost reduction is important in DoD as
reductions in one sector provides resources to another and abundant resources reduce
uncertainty. However, leaders within DoD must tackle the difficult problem of balancing
feasible outsourcing with actual cost reductions, risk, and benefits of resources gained.
Era 1 and Era 2 organizational designs are both great historical descriptions of
industrial age organizations and define most current DoD structures. However, the Era
3 design seems to be indicative of the rational theory loosing steam in the Information
Age. Describing cost saving methods as a modern organizational design is
overreaching and illustrates the limits of the rational approach and Industrial Age
The corporate realm has pursued aggressive structural transformation in keeping
pace with global change but DoD has been more reluctant to do so. Traditional military
leaders have and will have a disinclination to abandon current Napoleonic structures
but, at the same time, desire behaviors found in modern organizations. As such, it will
be imperative to incorporate processes and controls that provide for agile organizational
behavior in the Information Age.
Edge Organizations
The edge organization is a conceptual framework for organizational design
relevant to the Information Age. A concept promoted by the Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP), it is an agile organization centered on information sharing,
decentralization and self-synchronization. While Industrial Age organizations are still
considered complex-adaptive systems, they are slow to adapt and far from agile. The
concept of Edge Organization is a product of complexity theory that is not only highly
adaptive but very agile.
In the book, The Agile Organization, Simon Atkinson and J ames Moffat write:
Agility is the gold standard for Information Age militaries. Facing uncertain futures and
new sets of threats in a complex, dynamic, and challenging security environment,
militaries around the world are transforming themselves, becoming more information-
enabled and network-centric.
The CCRP, in a series of books, outlines processes and
concepts required for organizational agility in the Information Age. The premise is based
on networked edge organizations managed and led through flexible command and
control structures orchestrated around thoroughly understood commanders intent.


Understanding, acceptance, and corporate-wide implementation of these concepts
will enable the DoD to maintain global superiority among conventional and asymmetrical

Department of Defense

NUMBER 8260.03, Volume 2
J une 14, 2011


SUBJ ECT: Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI) Implementation:
The Organizational and Force Structure Construct (OFSC)

References: See Enclosure 1


a. Manual. Pursuant to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8260.03 (Reference (a)), the authority in
DoD Directive (DoDD) 5124.02 (Reference (b)), and in accordance with DoDD 8320.03
(Reference (c)), this Manual implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures
and rules for the electronic documentation of force structure data across the DoD.

b. Volume. This Volume sets forth responsibilities and procedures for implementation of the
OFSC for authorized force structure in GFM DI Organization Servers (OSs) and for task
organized force structure in systems that consume OS data.

2. APPLICABILITY. This Volume applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the
Chairman of the J oint Chiefs of Staff and the J oint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office
of the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all
other organizational entities within the DoD (hereafter referred to collectively as the DoD

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. In accordance with Reference (a), this Volume implements DoD policy to:

a. Electronically document and maintain currency of authorized force structure in a suite of
authoritative data sources (ADSs), known as GFM DI OSs, hereafter referenced to as OSs, in a
comprehensive and hierarchical format usable by systems across the DoD as a common
reference for data integration, and to ensure that force structure data is visible, accessible,
understandable, and trusted across the DoD, as required by DoDD 8320.02 (Reference (d)).

DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

b. Implement the electronic documentation of DoD force structure elements and
relationships in accordance with Reference (a).

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

6. PROCEDURES. See Enclosure 3.

7. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Volume is approved for public release and is
available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at

8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Volume is effective immediately upon its publication to the DoD
Issuances Website.

Clifford L. Stanley
Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness

1. References
2. Responsibilities
3. The Organizational and Force Structure Construct

DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011


ENCLOSURE 1: REFERENCES ...................................................................................................6

ENCLOSURE 2: RESPONSIBILITIES .........................................................................................8

(USD(P&R)) ........................................................................................................................8
LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)) ................................................................................................8
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS ........................................................9
CHAIRMAN OF THE J OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .................................................................9
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS .....................................................9


INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................10
Purpose ...............................................................................................................................10
Aggregation Based upon Leadership and Command .........................................................11
Enhancing the DoD Levels of Authority ...........................................................................12
Authorization Data as a Fundamental Building Block ......................................................14
FORMALISM TO REPRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE ......................................................15
Graph Theory .....................................................................................................................15
The Tree Property and Time-Based Trees .........................................................................17
DEFAULT OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION ...................................................................19
Stable Nodes and Dynamic Links ......................................................................................19
Authorization Inventory and Related Terms......................................................................19
Five Conditions that Induce an Organizational Element ...................................................20
Associations .......................................................................................................................21
Equivalence of Command Structures and Chains of Command ........................................22
Relations versus Associations ............................................................................................25
ASSOCIATIONS ...............................................................................................................26
Interpreting DoD Levels of Authority ...............................................................................26
Unity of Command ............................................................................................................27
Deriving Relations from Associations ...............................................................................28
ADCON AND THE ADMIN RELATION .............................................................................30
ADCON .............................................................................................................................30
ADMIN ..............................................................................................................................30
THE C2DEF RELATION........................................................................................................31
ROLES AND REPRESENTING REQUIREMENTS .............................................................32
DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

ASSIGNMENT AND THE COCOM RELATION .................................................................39
The Process and Properties of Assignment ........................................................................39
The COCOM Relation .......................................................................................................40
Interacting Assignment and COCOM Propagation ...........................................................41
ALLOCATION AND THE OPCON RELATION ..................................................................44
The Process and Properties of Allocation ..........................................................................44
The OPCON Relation ........................................................................................................45
Consistent Implementation of Assignment and Allocation ...............................................45
TACON COMMAND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................47
SUPPORT COMMAND AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................48
Review of Direct and General Support Relationships .......................................................48
General Support and the COCOM Relation ......................................................................50
SPECIAL AND SPECIFIC CASES: CREWS ........................................................................50
Introduction to Crews ........................................................................................................50
Placement of Crews within Command Structures .............................................................55
Crews with Separate Transportation and Mobility Requirements .....................................58
Reserve Stock, Floaters, Pre-Positioned Stocks ................................................................60
SPECIAL AND SPECIFIC CASES: BILLETS .....................................................................61
Civilian Billets or Willets ..................................................................................................61
Reserve Component Billets................................................................................................61
Billets for Temporary Status Personnel .............................................................................63
Individual Augmentees (IAs) .............................................................................................63
SPECIAL AND SPECIFIC CASES: MULTI-HATTED POSITIONS .................................68
Introduction to Multi-Hatted Positions ..............................................................................68
Simple Case-Service Chief Leadership .............................................................................69
More Complicated Cases in Multi-Hatted Leadership ......................................................71
REPRESENTING THE UPPER ECHELONS ........................................................................75
THE TOP OF THE WORLD ...................................................................................................80

1. OFSC BUSINESS RULES ...........................................................................................82

GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................89

PART I: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................89
PART II: DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................92


1. OFSC Relations and Associations .....................................................................................27
2. OFSC Relation Characteristics ...........................................................................................30
3. Example of Habitual and Non-Habitual Relationships .......................................................53
4. Examples of Upper DoD Echelon OEs ...............................................................................77
DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

force structure data so that it can be manipulated in a consistent manner by computer programs to
the benefit of decision makers. Both the OFSC and the GFM XSD are required to accomplish
this objective. Without the OFSC, the GFM XSD can be used and interpreted incorrectly.

(4) Pursuant to Reference (a), the OFSC is to be implemented in the GFM Component
OSs and in all automated systems that utilize a force structure representation. The OSs are the
ADSs for the default force structure authorized for procurement by Congress. The initial suites
of OSs exist in unclassified and classified domains, under the management of OSD, the J oint
Staff, Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and the Military Services. External applications integrate
OS data with instance data and manipulate the default force structure to represent ad hoc
organizations while maintaining linkages through unique identification back to the original
authorizations. Appendix 2 to this enclosure provides implementation guidance for GFM DI OS.

b. Aggregation Based upon Leadership and Command

(1) The first OFSC rule is the fundamental military concept that every organization has a
leader. This statement requires elaboration, however, and the challenge of defining principal
terms with the necessary precision to support automated information exchange must be
approached carefully. Conceptually, an OFSC organization is an aggregation point with a leader,
to which arbitrary entities can be associated, and that may be used to unite other organizations.
The OFSC delineates these aggregation points using the criteria of leadership, defined as the
authority (both military and civilian) exercised over subordinates by virtue of grade or
assignment within the DoD.

(2) A primary subtype of leadership is command. Command is the core theme of
military leadership and drives many related concepts and terms, to include command
relationships and command authority. The objective of GFM DI is to provide the basis, and to
satisfy force structure requirements, for all DoD users at any DoD echelon or function where
leadership is involved. The OFSC must not limit aggregation based only on military command.
Any recognized level of leadership in either the military or civilian hierarchies, and through
operational and administrative relationships, must be available to justify the creation of an OFSC
organization. This requires that the OFSC formalism for some (but not all) military command
relationships be expanded to allow the electronic documentation of OSD civilian organizational
structures. To this end, the term command relationship will be expanded to refer to the exercise
of authority in either civilian or military hierarchies. In the OFSC, command relationships are
synonymous with leadership relationships.

(3) The OFSC distinguishes between the exercise of command relationships through a
sequence of individuals, routinely referred to as a chain of command, and the full organizational
hierarchy through which leadership and command is exercised, coined a command structure.
This distinction is explained in section 3 of this enclosure. As with command relationships,
these terms are expanded to include any leadership authority, military or civilian, and the
resulting operational and administrative hierarchies. Therefore, chain of command is
synonymous with chain of leadership and command structure is synonymous with leadership

DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

(4) The logical expressions for these various leadership concepts and structures are
defined in sections 4 through 12 of this enclosure. Special cases requiring greater explanation on
how the formulism is to be deployed are described in sections 13 through 16 of this enclosure.
Enclosure 3 concludes with an explanation of the challenges presented by digitizing the upper
echelon of the DoD hierarchy, where the command structures of the Services Active and
Reserve Components, the joint community, and OSD agencies are united into a bridge that spans
across the Department to facilitate data integration.

c. Enhancing the DoD Levels of Authority

(1) A command structure and its corresponding chain of command must demonstrate
equivalence (see Rule 2 and section 3.e). In accordance with J oint Publication (J P) 1 (Reference
(e)), the military establishment recognizes two basic branches of the chain of command.
Although not named by Reference (e), they have been traditionally referred to as the operational
chain of command and the administrative chain of command. The OFSC incorporates these
notions as fundamental concepts and characterizes relationships in both branches to harmonize
the interactions between them.

(2) To further define various command relationships and resulting aggregations based
upon them, the OFSC incorporates the terms and concepts defined in Reference (e) as the DoD
levels of authority. A basic taxonomy of these authorities or relationships derived from
Reference (e) is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The DoD Levels of Authority Taxonomy

I. Command Relationships (or Command Authority)
A. Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM)
B. Operational Control (OPCON)
C. Tactical Control (TACON)
D. Support
1. General
2. Mutual
3. Direct
4. Close
II. Administrative Control (ADCON)
III. Coordinating Authority
IV. Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH)

(3) To consistently represent the interactions between diverse command and leadership
relationships, the OFSC employs a taxonomy of leadership relationship, shown in Figure 2. This
taxonomy expands the scope of the command relationships to include the administrative and
operational branches of the chain of command and their interaction with the DoD levels of
authority. This allows all leadership and command relationships to be consistently represented
and integrated across the joint community and recognizes that commanders exercising authority
in an administrative chain of command share authority comparable to their operational
DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

counterparts. Using leadership relationships as an umbrella category, a new category of
relationship, called administrative relationships, is introduced to complement the Reference (e)
category called Command Relationships. Since the Command Relationships category is
operational in nature, it has been renamed Operational Relationships in the OFSC. This differs
from Figure 1, which does not consider administrative control (ADCON) to be a command
relationship. The OFSC does not differentiate between command relationships exercised in an
administrative versus operational capacity.

(4) As shown in Figure 2, under the Administrative Relationships category, a new
relationship is introduced called default administrative leadership (ADMIN). ADMIN is a
relationship to build structures based upon the administrative chain of command and represents
default administrative leadership in both the military and civilian hierarchies. The ADMIN
relationship implements, in part, the organizing function identified in sections 3013, 5013, and
8013 (b) of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) ((Reference (f)), and initiates a correlation with
the administrative chain of command. The use of default in the relationship title indicates a
preset option designated by a Service or DoD Component to serve as an initial condition. The
OFSC treatment and implementation of the interactions between the concepts of the
administrative chain of command, the Title 10 function of organizing, the GFM ADMIN default
relationship, and ADCON are covered in section 5 of this enclosure.

Figure 2. OFSC Leadership Relationship Taxonomy

I. Command (Leadership) Relationships
A. Operational Relationships
4. Support
a. General
b. Mutual
c. Direct
d. Close
B. Administrative Relationships
1. Default Administrative Leadership (ADMIN)
II. Coordinating Authority

(5) The OFSC categorizes ADCON as an administrative relationship to acknowledge that
any of the inherent Service functions outlined in Reference (f) may involve command of an
administrative nature. This does not imply that an ADCON function will require command
relationships, but only that it may, and therefore, it is placed under the leadership relationships
umbrella. The set of ADCON functions and associated responsibilities is complex and the
subclasses of ADCON may not be defined, distributed, or interpreted consistently across Service
and joint boundaries. For these reasons, ADCON is defined separately from the ADMIN default
DoDM 8260.03-M-V2, June 14, 2011

relationship that is defined consistently across the Services via Title 10 and is manifested in the
OFSC via the administrative chain of command.

d. Authorization Data as a Fundamental Building Block

(1) Authorization data and force structure data are closely associated. In the GFM DI,
authorization data refers to the permission to procure personnel or equipment. It is not the actual
personnel or equipment, but the congressional permission to obtain it, as described in DoDI
7730.64 (Reference (g)). Manpower is reported in terms of what has been determined necessary
(manpower requirement) and what is authorized for employment (manpower authorization).
Manpower documents describe the qualifications and types of jobs required to operate an
organization. Section 13 of this enclosuredescribes how manpower and selected equipment
authorizations are tightly intertwined with force structure because they contain the primary assets
that constitute an organizations resources.

(2) Authorization data is used as the basis for the OFSC because it is relatively stable.
While the actual people and equipment are transient, the authorization persists and typically
evolves slowly over time at predefined intervals. This allows the authorization data to be treated
as if it were static, for example, to be maintained in a shared reference library, analogous to a
phone book.

(3) The principle of using authorization data as building blocks is illustrated in Figure 3.
Diagram A illustrates people (triangles) and platforms (squares) geographically located within a
set delineated by the Unit Identification Code (UIC), denoted by an octagon, to which they
belong. Generally, UIC resolution is standard for current systems (e.g., command and control,
readiness, logistics). Diagram B illustrates the same UIC set subdivided or decomposed into
smaller and smaller groups denoted by the ellipses, circles, and squares. These groupings can be
based upon any of a number of criteria, but often are based on tactics, training, and doctrine of
employment. Each group can be further decomposed into smaller groups until a group is
comprised of a single person or piece of equipment (platform).

Figure 3. Real Objects versus Authorizations

UIC Resolution Set
LEGEND: Person Vehicle (Platform)
25 March 2013
Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States
Joint Publication 1
Theory and Foundations
warfare may take a variety of forms. It may erupt among or between states or non-state
entities with war-making capabilities. It may manifest as traditional warfare or IW. When
the US commits military forces into conflict, success is expected.
(3) Deter Our Adversaries. Defending national interests requires being able to
prevail in conflict and taking preventive measures to deter potential adversaries who could
threaten the vital interests of the US or its partners. These threats could range from direct
aggression to belligerent actions that nonetheless threaten vital national interests. Deterrence
influences potential adversaries not to take threatening actions. It requires convincing those
adversaries that a contemplated action will not achieve the desired result by fear of the
consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible
threat of unacceptable counteraction. Because of the gravity of potential nuclear aggression
by a growing list of actors, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent capability will remain a
critical national security imperative.
(4) Security Cooperation. Security cooperation encompasses all DOD
interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote
specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-
defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency
access to a host nation (HN). Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation
among our partner nations is important to strengthen the global security framework of the US
and its partners. Security cooperation allows us to proactively take advantage of
opportunities and not just react to threats. Contributing to security cooperation activities is a
large part of what the US military does and will continue to do. Supporting security
cooperation activities is an essential element of the CCDRs day-to-day work to enhance
regional security and thereby advance national interests. Like deterrence, security
cooperation activities can reduce the chances of conflict, but unlike deterrence, it does not
involve the threat of force. Security cooperation and deterrence should be complementary as
both contribute to security and prevent conflict.
(5) Support to Civil Authorities. The US will continue to respond to a variety of
civil crises to relieve human suffering and restore civil functioning, most often in support of
civil authorities. These crises may be foreign or domestic and may occur independently, as
in a natural disaster disrupting an otherwise functioning society, or they may occur within
the context of a conflict, such as widespread suffering in a nation embroiled in an
(6) Adapt to Changing Environment. The strategic security environment and
national security challenges are always changing. The ability to address the changing
environment and meet our security challenges falls to the instruments of national power and
the ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct military operations
9. Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations
a. The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on the
effectiveness of the United States Government (USG) in employing the instruments of
Chapter I
I-12 J P 1
national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The appropriate governmental
officials, often with NSC direction, normally coordinate the employment of instruments of
national power.
(1) Diplomatic. Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other
states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives, and to solicit
foreign support for US military operations. Diplomacy is a principal means of organizing
coalitions and alliances, which may include states and non-state entities, as partners, allies,
surrogates, and/or proxies. The Department of State (DOS) is the USG lead agency for
foreign affairs. The credible threat of force reinforces, and in some cases, enables the
diplomatic process. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are responsible for aligning
military activities with diplomatic activities in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs).
The chief of mission, normally the US ambassador, and the corresponding country team are
normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in a country abroad. In these
circumstances, the chief of mission and the country team or another diplomatic mission team
may have complementary activities (employing the diplomatic instrument) that do not entail
control of military forces, which remain under command authority of the GCC.
(2) Informational. Information remains an important instrument of national power
and a strategic resource critical to national security. Previously considered in the context of
traditional nation-states, the concept of information as an instrument of national power
extends to non-state actorssuch as terrorists and transnational criminal groupsthat are
using information to further their causes and undermine those of the USG and our allies.
DOD operates in a dynamic age of interconnected global networks and evolving social
media platforms. Every DOD action that is planned or executed, word that is written or
spoken, and image that is displayed or relayed, communicates the intent of DOD, and by
extension the USG, with the resulting potential for strategic effects.
(a) DOD makes every effort to synchronize, align, and coordinate
communication activities to facilitate an understanding of how the planning and execution of
DOD strategies, plans, operations, and activities will be received or understood by key
audiences. This effort is undertaken to improve the efficacy of these actions and create,
strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing defense and military objectives.
Communication synchronization entails focused efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve
conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by
understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans,
themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national
power. In support of these efforts, commanders and staffs at all levels should identify and
understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions when planning and executing
operations. This understanding of key audience perceptions and reactions is a vital element
of every theater campaign and contingency plan. Real or perceived differences between
actions and words (the say-do gap) are addressed and actively mitigated as appropriate,
since this divergence can directly contribute to reduced credibility and have a negative
impact on the ability to successfully execute current and future missions. Attention paid to
commanders communication guidance during planning and execution improves the
alignment of multiple lines of operation and lines of effort over time and space, which aligns
the overarching message with our actions and activities.
Theory and Foundations
(b) Commanders communication guidance is a fundamental component of
national strategic direction. It also is essential to our ability to achieve unity of effort
through unified action with our interagency partners and the broader interorganizational
community. Fundamental to this effort is the premise that key audience beliefs, perceptions,
and behavior are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan, and operation. Through
commanders communication synchronization (CCS), public affairs (PA), information
operations (IO), and defense support to public diplomacy are realized as communication
supporting capabilities. Leaders, planners, and operators at all levels need to understand the
desired effects and anticipate potential undesired effects of our actions and words, identify
key audiences, and when appropriate, actively address their perspectives. Inconsistencies
between what US forces say and do can reduce DOD credibility and negatively affect current
and future missions. An effective combination of themes, messages, images, and actions,
consistent with higher-level guidance, is essential to effective DOD operations.
(c) Within DOD, J FCs implement higher-level communication guidance
through the CCS process. J FCs provide guidance and their staffs develop the approach for
achieving information-related objectives and ensuring the integrity and consistency of
themes, messages, images, and actions to the lowest level through the integration and
synchronization of relevant information-related capabilities. Considering the messages our
words, images, and actions communicate is integral to military planning and operations and
should be coordinated and synchronized with DODs interorganizational partners.
See JP 3-0, J oint Operations, and JP 5-0, J oint Operation Planning, for more information on
commanders communication guidance implementation.
(3) Military. The US employs the military instrument of national power at home
and abroad in support of its national security goals. The ultimate purpose of the US Armed
Forces is to fight and win the Nations wars. Fundamentally, the military instrument is
coercive in nature, to include the integral aspect of military capability that opposes external
coercion. Coercion generates effects through the application of force (to include the threat of
force) to compel an adversary or prevent our being compelled. The military has various
capabilities that are useful in non-conflict situations (such as in foreign relief). Regardless of
when or where employed, the Armed Forces of the United States abide by US values,
constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms.
(4) Economic. A strong US economy with free access to global markets and
resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national
defense. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other USG
agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to
encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent
possible, economic and financial crises.
b. The routine interaction of the instruments of national power is fundamental to US
activities in the strategic security environment. The military instruments role increases
relative to the other instruments as the need to compel a potential adversary through force
increases. The USGs ability to achieve its national strategic objectives depends on
Chapter I
I-14 J P 1
employing the instruments of national power discussed herein in effective combinations and
all possible situations from peace to war.
c. At the Presidents direction through the interagency process, military power is
integrated with other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values,
interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the Armed Forces interact with the
other departments and agencies to develop a mutual understanding of the capabilities,
limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in
which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays key
roles in the integration of all instruments of national power, facilitating Presidential
direction, cooperation, and unity of effort (unified action).
d. Political and military leaders must consider the employment of military force in
operations characterized by a complex, interconnected, and global operational environment
that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The
addition of military force to coerce an adversary should be carefully integrated with the other
instruments of national power to achieve our objectives.
e. The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that
vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. These various ways can be understood to
occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from peace to war. Inside this continuum, it is
useful from a strategic perspective to delineate the use of the military instrument of national
power into three broad categories. Mindful that the operational level of warfare connects the
tactical to the strategic, and operations and campaigns are themselves scalable, the US uses
the construct of the ROMO to provide insight into the various broad usages of military
power from a strategic perspective. See Figure I-3 for these three broad categories, noting
that the delineations between the categories are not precise, as each application of military
power has unique contextual elements. Each category will be discussed in turn.
Figure I-3. Range of Military Operations
Range of Military Operations
Major Operations and Campaigns
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations
Range of
Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict
continuum in a wide variety of operations that are commonly characterized in three groups as
this figure depicts.
Peace Conflict Continuum War
Theory and Foundations
(1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These
ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations. Many
of these activities occur across the conflict continuum, and will usually continue in areas
outside the operational areas associated with ongoing limited contingency operations, major
operations, and campaigns.
(a) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between
individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another
nations armed forces, domestic or foreign civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and
confidence, share information, and coordinate mutual activities.
(b) Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. This
includes activities such as security assistance. Security cooperation is a key element of
global and theater shaping operations.
(c) Deterrence helps prevent adversary action through the presentation of a
credible threat of counteraction. As discussed previously, deterrence convinces adversaries
not to take threatening actions by influencing their decision making.
(d) Military actions such as nation assistance (e.g., foreign internal defense,
security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance), counterinsurgency, DOD support to
counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and combating WMD activities are
applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.
(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. A crisis response or
limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a
significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated
general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and prevent surprise
attack or further conflict. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens
and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational
partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., Operation SHINING
EXPRESS in 2003; United States European Command [USEUCOM] launched a joint
operation that rescued US citizens and embassy personnel from Monrovia and supported
African peacekeeping forces during the Liberian civil war). Many such operations involve a
combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with interorganizational
Note: Some specific crisis response or limited contingency operations
may not involve large-scale combat, but could be considered major
operations/campaigns depending on their scale and duration (e.g.,
Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE tsunami and Hurricane Katrina relief
efforts in 2005, Operation TOMODACHI Japanese tsunami and nuclear
relief efforts in 2011).
Chapter I
I-16 J P 1
(3) Major Operations and Campaigns. When required to achieve national
strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to
conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. In such cases, the
general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and
establish conditions favorable to the US and its interorganizational partners. Major
operations and campaigns feature a balance among offensive, defensive, and stability
operations through six phases: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable
civil authority. The immediate goal of stability operations often is to provide the local
populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-
term goal may be to develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential
services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil
society. Major operations and campaigns typically are composed of multiple phases.
10. Joint Operations
a. In the context of the military instrument of national power, operations are military
actions or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or
administrative military missions. Operations include combat when necessary to achieve
objectives at all levels of war. Although individual Services may plan and conduct
operations to accomplish tasks and missions in support of DOD objectives, the primary way
DOD employs two or more Services (from two Military Departments) in a single operation,
particularly in combat, is through joint operations.
b. J oint operations is the general term to describe military actions conducted by joint
forces and those Service forces in specified command relationships with each other. A joint
force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a single J FC.
c. The extensive capabilities available to forces in joint operations enable them to
accomplish tasks and missions across the conflict continuum in operations that can range
from routine military engagement commonly associated with peacetime to large-scale
combat required to fight and win our Nations wars. In conjunction with these two extremes,
military forces can provide security in a wide variety of circumstances and can help other
partners restore essential civil services through relief and reconstruction in the wake of
combat, breakdown of civil order, or natural disaster. These four broad areas, often
integrated and adapted to the commanders requirements in a joint operation, represent the
military instruments contribution to meeting our Nations challenges in the strategic security
(1) The scope and nature of military engagement activities can vary, reflecting
differing strategic relationships between the US and partner nations. Engagement includes
stability operations and other missions, tasks, and actions that improve the capabilities of, or
cooperation with, allies and other partners. It is the primary military contribution to the
national challenge of establishing cooperative security. Military engagement may be
conducted complementary to broader diplomatic or economic activities, to aid a
governments own security activities, and even during war itself. However, commanders
and staff must be aware of myriad laws and regulations governing everything from limits on
Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces
c. The Armed Forces of the United States are most effective when employed as a joint
force. This comprehensive approach involving all participating organizations, both
military and nonmilitary, within an operational area requires the J FC to understand the
capabilities, limitations, and mandates of those organizations involved and to effectively
communicate the mission of the joint force. The basic doctrinal foundations for joint
functions at all levels are outlined in this chapter.
7. Combatant Commands
a. The President, through SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJ CS,
establishes combatant (unified) commands for the performance of military missions and
prescribes the force structure of such commands.
b. The CJ CS assists the President and SecDef in performing their command functions.
The CJ CS transmits to the commanders of the CCMDs the orders given by the President or
SecDef and, as directed by SecDef, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders
issued by the President or SecDef normally are conveyed by the CJ CS under the authority
and direction of SecDef. Reports from CCDRs normally will be submitted through CJ CS,
who forwards them to SecDef and acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the CCMDs.
c. CCDRs exercise COCOM of assigned forces. The CCDR may delegate operational
control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or establish support command relationships of
assigned forces. Unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef, COCOM may not be
delegated. During deliberate planning, generic forces are apportioned to specific plans
according to Global Force Management procedures. This requires supported CCDRs to
coordinate with the supporting CCDRs and Services on required capabilities during planning
and on mission criteria for specific units once they have been allocated.
8. Military Departments, Services, Forces, Combat Support Agencies, and National
Guard Bureau
a. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the
performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President
through SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or
specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component
commanders assigned to the CCDRs and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the
CCDRs. ADCON provides for the preparation of military forces and their administration
and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by SecDef to another DOD
b. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration
and support of Service forces. They fulfill their responsibilities by exercising ADCON
through the Service Chiefs. Service Chiefs have ADCON for all forces of their Service. The
responsibilities and authority exercised by the Secretaries of the Military Departments are
subject by law to the authority provided to the CCDRs in their exercise of COCOM.
c. Each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinating as appropriate with
the other Military Department Secretaries and with the CCDRs, has the responsibility for
Chapter II
II-12 J P 1
organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill specific roles and for
administering and supporting these forces. The Secretaries also perform a role as a force
provider of Service retained forces until they are deployed to CCMDs. When addressing
similar issues regarding National Guard forces, coordination with the National Guard Bureau
(NGB) is essential.
d. Commanders of Service forces are responsible to Secretaries of the Military
Departments through their respective Service Chiefs for the administration, training, and
readiness of their unit(s). Commanders of forces assigned to the CCMDs are under the
authority, direction, and control of (and are responsible to) their CCDR to carry out assigned
operational missions, joint training and exercises, and logistics.
e. The USCG is a military Service and a branch of the US Armed Forces at all times.
However, it is established separately by law as a Service in DHS, except when transferred to
the Department of the Navy (DON) during time of war or when the President so directs.
Authorities vested in the USCG under Title 10, USC, as an armed Service and Title 14, USC,
as a federal maritime safety and law enforcement agency remain in effect at all times,
including when USCG forces are operating within DOD/DON chain of command. USCG
commanders and forces may be attached to J FCs in performance of any activity for which
they are qualified. Coast Guard units routinely serve alongside Navy counterparts operating
within a naval task organization in support of a maritime component commander.
f. The NGB is a joint activity of DOD. The NGB performs certain military Service-
specific functions and unique functions on matters involving non-federalized National Guard
forces. The NGB is responsible for ensuring that units and members of the Army National
Guard and the Air National Guard are trained by the states to provide trained and equipped
units to fulfill assigned missions in federal and non-federal statuses.
g. In addition to the Services above, a number of DOD agencies provide combat support
or combat service support to joint forces and are designated as CSAs. CSAs, established
under SecDef authority under Title 10, USC, Section 193, and Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 3000.06, Combat Support Agencies, are the DIA, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DLA, Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA), DTRA, and National Security Agency (NSA).
These CSAs provide CCDRs specialized support and operate in a supporting role. The CSA
directors are accountable to SecDef.
9. Relationship Among Combatant Commanders, Military Department Secretaries,
Service Chiefs, and Forces
a. Continuous Coordination. The Services and USSOCOM (in areas unique to SO)
share the division of responsibility for developing military capabilities for the CCMDs. All
components of DOD are charged to coordinate on matters of common or overlapping
responsibility. The J oint Staff, Services, and USSOCOM headquarters play a critical role in
ensuring that CCDRs concerns and comments are included or advocated during the
Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces
b. Interoperability. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces,
units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively, in part through
interoperability. This includes joint force development; use of joint doctrine; the
development and use of joint plans and orders; and the development and use of joint and/or
interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint
training and exercises. It concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that
provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services.
A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their
inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use will establish
working groups that fully represent the services and functions affected. CCDRs will ensure
maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the CJ CS, who has overall
responsibility for the joint interoperability program. Other government departments and
agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should be invited to participate in joint training and exercises
whenever possible.
10. Interagency Coordination
a. General
(1) Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs
between departments and agencies of the USG to accomplish an objective. Similarly, in the
context of DOD involvement, coordination refers to coordination between elements of DOD
and IGOs or NGOs to achieve objectives.
(2) CCDRs and subordinate J FCs must consider the potential requirements for
interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination as a part of their activities within and outside of
their operational areas. Military operations must be coordinated, integrated, and deconflicted
with the activities of interorganizational partners, including various HN agencies within and
en route to and from the operational area. Sometimes the J FC draws on the capabilities of
other organizations, provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes the J FC
merely deconflicts activities with those of others. These same organizations may be
involved during all phases of an operation including pre- and post-operation activities. Roles
and relationships among USG departments and agencies, state, tribal, and local governments,
must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the
military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.
Successful interorganizational coordination helps enable the USG to build international and
domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently
achieve shared goals.
For more information on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational
Coordination During J oint Operations.
b. Interagency Unity of Effort
(1) Achieving Unity of Effort. Some of the techniques, procedures, and systems
of military C2 can facilitate unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of
interagency coordination and different organizational cultures. Unity of effort can only be

16 MARCH 2011
Manpower and Organization
ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at for downloading or ordering.
RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

Supersedes: AFI 38-101, 4 April 2006
Certified by: HQ USAF/A1M
(Brig Gen Philip M. Ruhlman)
Pages: 116

This Instruction implements AFPD 38-1, Organization, and AFPD 38-5, Unit Designations. It
describes the objectives and principles of Air Force organization. It prescribes various levels and
standard structures for organizations and it outlines procedures for establishing and modifying
organizations. This publication applies to Air Force Reserve Command and the Air National
Guard to the extent that it has the organizations and functions discussed herein. This AFI may be
supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this Instruction must be
routed to HQ USAF/A1MO for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer
recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary
Responsibility using the AF IMT 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF
IMT 847s from the field through the Major Command (MAJCOM) manpower, organization and
resources division. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this
publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363,
Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition
Schedule (RDS) located at
This change: Updates office names and symbols and references. Clarifies definitions for:
Primary Subordinate Unit, MAJCOM and Consolidate. Clarifies the use of the terms Command
and Agency for MAJCOMs and AF FOAs, respectively. Adds organization size guidance for
wings, groups and squadrons. Adds a new chapter on provisional units, including expeditionary
units. Updates Director of Staff information. Updates Numbered Air Force information. Makes
changes to the Wing Staff to: add Information Protection and change Military Equal
Opportunity to Equal Opportunity. Updates standard structure figures for: Civil Engineer
6 AFI 38-101 16 MARCH 2011
Chapter 1
1.1. Organization Objectives. Air Force organizations are designed to achieve the
characteristics outlined in AFPD 38-1.
1.2. Organization Principles. Air Force organizational structure follows these management
1.2.1. Emphasis on Wartime Tasks. Organizations must be structured to accomplish wartime
tasks without reorganizing.
1.2.2. Functional Grouping. Organizations have these characteristics: a clear-cut purpose,
goal and scope, with one individual in charge; parts that form a logical, separable activity; a
close relationship among the parts, constituting a complete entity; and natural divisions of
work that clearly define where responsibility begins and ends.
1.2.3. Lean Organizational Structures. Organizations must encourage rapid decision making,
so they should be flat structures without intermediate levels, unless mission requirements
cannot otherwise be met. When used, intermediate organizations will consist of tactical
functions only, without a full range of staff functions. Organizational levels that exist only to
review and transmit information or tasking should be eliminated. Both the number of
supervisors and the number of internal subdivisions within organizations should be designed
to minimize layers and maximize worker-to-supervisor ratios.
1.2.4. Skip-Echelon Structure. Major commands (MAJCOM) sit on top of a skip-echelon
staffing structure. MAJCOMs, wings and squadrons possess the full range of staff functions
needed to perform required tasks. Numbered/named air forces (NAF), groups and flights
have no or minimal staff. These tactical echelons are designed to increase operational
effectiveness rather than to review and transmit paperwork. The chain of command and
responsibility for mission accomplishment runs through commanders at all levels. Problems,
however, often are solved by staff communication through the functional chain, bypassing
echelons where the function is not found. (NOTE: Component NAFs (C-NAFs) possess a
broader staff to support the Air Force component commander; see paragraph and
Figure 3.2).
1.2.5. Standard Levels. The Air Force uses the standard levels described in Chapter 2 to
design organizations. Establish organizations at the lowest level required to successfully
accomplish the primary mission. Factors such as scope of responsibility, span of control and
functional grouping of related missions/activities are the predominant factors that determine
organizational type.
10 AFI 38-101 16 MARCH 2011 Operating Location. Part of a unit that is separated geographically from its
parent unit. It is used to account for personnel by location. Personnel remain assigned
to the parent unit. An operating location has none of the administrative attributes of a
unit and does not have nonjudicial punishment authority under the UCMJ. Squadron Section. A function responsible for the administrative control of
all members assigned to a unit. A squadron section is created by appointing a section
commander on special orders in accordance with guidance in AFI 51-604. A
squadron section commander has nonjudicial punishment authority under the UCMJ
unless withheld by superior competent authority. Section commanders at other
organizational levels may use a term reflecting their unit level, e.g., Group Section
Commander, etc. Air Force Element. The nomenclature used to account for manpower
authorizations and to identify Air Force personnel on duty with organizations outside
the Air Force, such as defense agencies, defense field activities and Air National
Guard units not in federal service. Although not a unit for organizational purposes, an
element may function as a unit if so designated by competent authority, an eligible
commissioned officer either assumes command or is appointed to command and Air
Force members are assigned or attached to the element (see paragraph
2.2. Standard Levels of Air Force Organization. The following standard levels of
organization are used in structuring and designating Air Force units:
2.2.1. Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF). The senior headquarters of the Air Force,
consisting of two major entities: the Secretariat (including the Secretary of the Air Force and
the Secretary's principal staff) and the Air Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff.
2.2.2. Major Command (MAJCOM). A major subdivision of the Air Force that is assigned a
major part of the Air Force mission. A MAJCOM is directly subordinate to Headquarters US
Air Force. Most MAJCOMs have the word Command as part of their designation;
Command should not be used in the designation of any unit that is not a MAJCOM.
MAJCOM headquarters are management headquarters and thus have the full range of
functional staff. MAJCOMs, in turn, may be subdivided according to either of the
organizational schemes shown in Figure 2.1. The levels are in descending order and
represent levels of assignment. For example, a group may be assigned to any organization
listed above it, but a group may not be assigned to another group or to a squadron. The terms
below Center represent internal staff structure and are not units as defined in paragraph
AFI 38-101 16 MARCH 2011 11

Figure 2.1. Organizational Schemes.
Unit Oriented Scheme Scheme with Major Non-Unit Organizations

Major Command Major Command
NAF Center
Group Directorate*
Squadron Division
Flight Branch
*Limited Use Lead MAJCOM. A type of MAJCOM that consolidates responsibilities for a
particular function in a single MAJCOM, supporting the entire Air Force as applicable.
For example, Air Education and Training Command is the Lead MAJCOM for education
and training. Component MAJCOM (C-MAJCOM). A type of MAJCOM that is the USAF
component to a Unified Combatant Command. For example, Pacific Air Forces
(PACAF) is a C-MAJCOM that is the USAF component to United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM). A C-MAJCOM is commanded by the Commander of Air
Force Forces (COMAFFOR) and includes supporting staff, one or more CNAFs (through
which it presents its forces to the Combatant Commander (CCDR)), and all assigned and
attached forces. The C-MAJCOM integrates, at the strategic level, component activities
across all phases of conflict. The C-MAJCOM staff should not duplicate the functions of
the C-NAF AFFOR staff or AOC (see Figure 3.2). The C-MAJCOM commander is the
CCDRs theater COMAFFOR and may function as a theater Joint Force Air and Space
Component Commander (JFACC) when required. Refer to AFDD2, Operations and
Organization, for additional information on component relationships and roles. NOTE:
A MAJCOM can be both a C-MAJCOM and a Lead MAJCOM.
2.2.3. Direct Reporting Unit (DRU). A subdivision of the Air Force, directly subordinate to
the Chief of Staff, US Air Force. A DRU performs a mission that does not fit into any of the
MAJCOMs. A DRU has many of the same administrative and organizational responsibilities
as a MAJCOM. Major Command Direct Reporting Unit (MAJCOM DRU). DRU also applies to
a subdivision of a MAJCOM. A MAJCOM DRU reports directly to the MAJCOM
commander and performs a mission that does not fit into any of the MAJCOM's primary
subordinate units.
12 AFI 38-101 16 MARCH 2011
(NOTE: See paragraph 6.2.4. for additional guidance on establishment of DRUs or MAJCOM
2.2.4. Field Operating Agency (FOA). A subdivision of the Air Force, directly subordinate
to a Headquarters US Air Force functional manager. A FOA performs field activities beyond
the scope of any of the major commands. The activities are specialized or associated with an
Air Force-wide mission and do not include functions performed in management
headquarters, unless specifically directed by a DoD authority. Air Force FOAs usually have
the word Agency as part of their designation; Agency should not be used in the designation
of any unit that is not a FOA directly under HQ USAF. NOTE: Organization guidance for
MAJCOMs also applies to the large Air Force FOAs that are structured along MAJCOM
lines, e.g., Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA). Major Command Field Operating Agency (MAJCOM FOA). FOA also applies
to a subdivision of a MAJCOM. A MAJCOM FOA reports directly to a MAJCOM
functional manager and performs specialized field activities beyond the scope of any of
the MAJCOM's primary subordinate units. The activities are specialized and are
associated with MAJCOM or theater-wide missions that transcend the scope of routine
wing functions. FOA activities do not include functions performed in management
headquarters unless specifically directed by DoD authority. (NOTE: See paragraph
6.2.4 for additional guidance on establishment of FOAs or MAJCOM FOAs.)
2.2.5. Numbered/Named Air Force (NAF). A level of command directly under a MAJCOM.
NAFs provide operational leadership and supervision. A NAF is assigned subordinate units,
such as wings, groups and squadrons. They do not have complete functional staffs. They are
not management headquarters (unless specifically directed by a DoD authority). NAFs designated as component NAFs (C-NAF) support the Air Force
component commander (COMAFFOR) at the operational and tactical level. When
designated as the Air Force component to a Unified Combatant Command (UCC), the
component NAF will function at the strategic, operational and tactical level. A C-NAF is
authorized a broader staff as depicted in Figure 3.2. The number of persons assigned to a NAF headquarters varies from case to case,
but, with the exception of C-NAFs, should not exceed 99 manpower authorizations
without an approved waiver from AF/A1M. The size of the C-NAF headquarters staff is
not limited to 99 manpower authorizations.
2.2.6. Wing. A level of command below the NAF or higher headquarters. A wing has a
distinct mission with significant scope. A wing is usually composed of a primary mission
group (e.g., operations, training) and the necessary supporting groups. By pulling together
the mission and support elements, a wing provides a significant capability under a single
commander. It is often responsible for maintaining the installation. A wing has several
squadrons in more than one dependent group. Wings will have a minimum adjusted
population of at least 1000 per paragraph 2.2.13. A wing may be either an operational
wing, an air base wing, or a specialized mission wing. Operational Wing. A wing that has an operations group and related operational
mission activity assigned to it. When an operational wing performs the primary mission
of the base, it usually maintains and operates the base. In addition, an operational wing is
AFI 38-101 16 MARCH 2011 13
capable of self-support in functional areas like maintenance, supply and conventional
munitions, as needed. When an operational wing is a tenant organization, the host
organization provides it with varying degrees of base and logistics support. Air Base Wing. A wing that performs a support rather than an operational
mission. It maintains and operates a base. An air base wing sometimes provides
functional support to a MAJCOM headquarters. Specialized Mission Wing. A wing that performs a specialized mission and
usually does not have aircraft or missiles assigned to it. For example, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance wing; training wing and so on. This wing may be either a
host wing or a tenant wing, depending on whether it maintains and operates the base.
2.2.7. Group. A level of command between wings and squadrons. Groups bring together
multiple squadrons or other lower echelon units to provide a broader capability. For instance,
a mission support group pulls together several squadrons in a variety of areas to provide a
full spectrum mission support capability. A group is generally a tactical echelon without
significant staff support. A group has two or more subordinate units. Groups will have a
minimum adjusted population of at least 400 per paragraph 2.2.13. Dependent Group. A dependent group is a mission, maintenance, mission
support, medical, or large functional unit (e.g., communications) that encompasses a
number of related squadrons to provide the specified capability to a parent wing. Such
groups may possess small supporting staff elements, such as standardization and
evaluation or quality control, that are organized as sections. Independent Group. An independent group has the same functions and
responsibilities as a like-type wing but its scope and size do not warrant wing-level
designation and associated overhead costs.
2.2.8. Squadron. The basic unit in the Air Force. Squadrons are the basic building block
organizations in the Air Force, providing a specific operational or support capability. A
squadron may be either a mission unit, such as an operational flying squadron, or a functional
unit, such as a civil engineer, security forces, or maintenance squadron. A squadron has a
substantive mission of its own that warrants organization as a separate unit based on factors
like unity of command, functional grouping and administrative control, balanced with
efficient use of resources. Squadrons vary in size according to responsibility, but will have a
minimum adjusted population of at least 35 per paragraph 2.2.13. Do not fragment a
capability into multiple squadrons when a single squadron provides a parent wing or group
commander the best approach in terms of a coordinated, focused capability under single
direction. In extreme cases, when squadron population exceeds 700 manpower
authorizations, MAJCOMs, FOAs and DRUs may request establishment of two squadrons.
Functional squadrons will employ the 7-series numbering convention in these instances; i.e.,
XX and 7XX Squadrons.
2.2.9. Flight. If internal subdivision is required, a flight may consist of sections, then
elements. A flight may be either a numbered flight, named flight, alpha flight, or a functional
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
The Air Force supports joint force commanders by conducting specific airpower
operations that provide specific effects using the planning processes previously
The following is a summary of these operations, with links to the doctrine annexes that
describe them in much more detail. Each Air Force doctrine annex contains more
specific discussion on planning, organization, and command and control considerations
of their respective topic areas. The order of presentation should not be interpreted to
imply any degree of relative importance; all Air Force operations are necessary in
varying degrees, depending on the task at hand.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Strategic attack is defined as offensive action that is specifically selected to achieve
national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversarys
ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without
necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Strategic attack
involves the systematic application of force against enemy systems and their centers of
gravity, thereby producing the greatest effect for the least cost in lives, resources, and
time. Vital systems affected may include leadership, critical processes, popular will and
perception, and fielded forces. Strategic attack provides an effective capability that may
drive an early end to conflict or achieve objectives more directly or efficiently than other
applications of military power.
Strategic attack seizes upon the unique capability of airpower to achieve objectives by
striking at the heart of the enemy, disrupting critical leadership functions, infrastructure,
and strategy, while at the same time avoiding a sequential fight through layers of forces.
Click here to go to Annex 3-70, Strategic Attack.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Counterair is a mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and
maintain a desired degree of air superiority.
Counterair operations are conducted across all domains and determine the level or
degree of air control. Air control describes a level of influence in the air domain relative
to that of an adversary, and is categorized as parity, superiority, or supremacy. The
level of air control can range from a parity (or neutral) situation, where neither adversary
can claim control over the other, to local superiority in a specific area, to supremacy
over an entire operational area. Levels of control may vary over time.
Air parity. A condition in the air battle in which one force does not have air
superiority over others. This represents a situation in which both friendly and
adversary land, maritime, and air operations may encounter significant interference
by the opposing air force. Parity is not a standoff, nor does it mean aerial
maneuver has halted. On the contrary, parity is typified by fleeting, intensely
contested battles at critical points during an operation with maximum effort exerted
between combatants in their attempt to achieve some level of favorable control.
Air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over
another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land,
sea, air, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force (JP 1-02). Air superiority may be localized in time and space,
or it may be broad and enduring.
Air supremacy. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over
another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land,
sea, air, and space forces at a given time and place without effective interference by
the opposing force. Air supremacy may be localized in time and space, or it may be
broad and enduring. This is normally the highest level of air control to which air
forces can aspire.
The concept of air superiority hinges on the idea of preventing prohibitive interference to
joint forces from enemy air forces, which would prevent joint forces from creating their
desired effects. Air supremacy prevents effective interference, which does not mean
that no interference exists, but that any attempted interference can be easily countered
or should be so negligible as to have little or no effect on operations. While air
supremacy is most desirable, it may not be operationally feasible. Air superiority, even
local or mission-specific, may provide sufficient freedom of action to create desired
Click here to go to Annex 3-01, Counterair Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Counterland operations are airpower operations against enemy land force capabilities to
create effects that achieve joint force commander objectives. The aim of counterland
operations is to dominate the surface environment using airpower. By dominating the
surface environment, counterland operations can assist friendly land maneuver while
denying the enemy the ability to resist. Although most frequently associated with
support to friendly surface forces, counterland operations may also be conducted
independent of friendly surface force objectives or in operations where no friendly land
forces are present.
The JFC has two distinct means for engaging enemy land forces that support
counterland operations. The first is air interdiction (AI), in which airpower indirectly
supports land forces or directly supports JFC objectives in the absence of friendly land
forces. The second method is close air support (CAS), in which airpower directly
supports land maneuver.
The Air Force defines AI as air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or
destroy the enemys military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively
against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve JFC objectives. AI is conducted at
such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with
the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
CAS is defined as air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft against hostile
targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces(JP 3-0).
Click here to go to Annex 3-03, Counterland Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Countersea operations are defined as those operations conducted to attain and
maintain a desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay,
diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime domain and prevent
opponents from doing the same.
The countersea function entails Air Force operations in the maritime domain to achieve,
or aid in the achievement of, superiority in that medium. This function fulfills
Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for the use of Air Force forces to counter
adversary air, surface, and subsurface threats, ensuring the security of vital sea and
coastal areas, and enhancing the maritime scheme of maneuver. More importantly, it
demonstrates the teamwork required of Service forces working together in a joint
environment. Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime domain through the
integrated employment of airpower. The overarching effect of countersea operations
is maritime superioritydenial of this domain to the adversary while assuring access
and freedom of maneuver for US and allied maritime forces.
From a military perspective, the maritime domain is not limited to the open seas. JP 1-
02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines the
maritime domain as the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the
airspace above these, including the littorals.
The littoral comprises two segments of the operational environment: 1. Seaward: the
area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations
ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and
defended directly from the sea (JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment).
Countersea operations are equally relevant to brown water (navigable rivers, lakes,
bays and their estuaries), green water (coastal waters, ports and harbors) and blue
water (high seas and open oceans) environments. (Naval Doctrine Publication [NDP] 1,
Naval Warfare)
The inclusion of the airspace above these in the domain definition indicates the
decisiveness of air operations within the maritime domain. Although the airspace
above could be considered the air domain, nothing in the definition of that domain
implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or command and control of that
domain. Command and control is established through command relationships within
the various operational areas as described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United States, and is the authority of a joint force commander based upon most
effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions.
With the potential emergence of a credible naval opponent, maritime operations are
once again focusing on defeating enemy naval forces while retaining a focus on the role
of power projection ashore from the littorals. Airpower provides a rapid, maneuverable,
and flexible element in this environment. Air Force capabilities can extend the reach
and increase the flexibility of naval surface, subsurface, and aviation assets,
playing a key role in controlling the maritime domain. Air Force and Navy
capabilities synergistically employed enable the joint force to control the
maritime domain.
Click here to go to Annex 3-04, Countersea Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Airspace control is defined as a process used to increase operational effectiveness by
promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Properly employed, airspace
control maximizes the effectiveness of combat operations while minimally impacting and
without unduly restricting the capabilities of any Service or functional component. Never
static, airspace control operations may begin prior to combat operations, continue after,
and may transition through varying degrees of civil and military authority. The airspace
control procedures within the joint operations area (JOA) are approved by the joint force
commander (JFC) and are derived entirely from the JFCs authority. Airspace control
does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or
deny combat operations.
Airspace control is extremely dynamic and situational, but to optimize airspace use, that
control should accommodate users with varied technical capabilities. In addition to
expected threat levels, the available surveillance, navigation, and communication
technical capabilities of both the airspace users and controlling agencies often
determine the nature of the airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) used. Generally,
limited technical capabilities result in increased ACM requirements with an implied
decrease in airspace management efficiency. Similarly, higher technical capabilities
normally result in decreased ACM requirements and an associated increase in airspace
efficiency. Areas with the greatest air traffic congestion and risk of mid-air collisions
often correspond to heavily accessed points on the ground (e.g., navigation aids,
airports, drop zones, targets, and ground firing systems). Adherence to the JFCs
guidance on ACMs should prevent airspace planners from exceeding the JFCs risk
tolerance. This integration of ACMs into operations deconflicts airspace usage while
decreasing potential fratricide. Planners should acknowledge these issues and allocate
resources accordingly.
Airspace control is essential to accomplishing the JFC's objectives. It allows all users to
access needed airspace while preventing conflicts among those competing users. To
better organize operational airspace three characterizations exist:
Permissive combat airspace: a low risk exists for US and coalition aircraft
operations within the airspace of interest. Operations can expect little to no use of
adversary electronic warfare, communications jamming, anti-aircraft systems, or
aircraft. Air superiority or air supremacy has been achieved.
Contested combat airspace: a medium risk exists to US and coalition aircraft
within the airspace of interest. Expect the enemy to employ fighters, anti-aircraft
systems, and electronic jamming. US and coalition aircraft can achieve localized air
superiority for operations within portions of the airspace. Enemy air defense assets
are neither fully integrated nor attrited.
Denied-access combat airspace: a high risk exists for many, but not all, US and
coalition aircraft from integrated air defense systems, radars, anti-aircraft systems,
electronic warfare, and fighter aircraft. The airspace is characterized by pervasive
enemy activity. Expect operations to result in high losses or denial of sustained
operations until a measure of air superiority can be achieved.
Click here to go to Annex 3-52, Airspace Control.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
The Air Force views space operations as integral to joint force planning and operations.
Space operations involve space superiority and mission assurance. The essence of
space superiority is controlling the ultimate high ground of space. However, space
superiority is focused on mission assurance rather than dominating or owning space.
The ultimate goal of achieving space superiority should be to maintain our own space
capabilities when contested and ensure unhindered mission continuity through any
Joint doctrine defines space superiority as the degree of dominance in space of one
force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related
land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force. The Air Force further describes space
superiority as the ability to maintain freedom of action in, from, and to space, sufficient
to sustain mission assurance. Space superiority may be localized in time and space,
or it may be broad and enduring.
Airmen should understand space capabilities are vital to joint campaign and operational
planning. Integration of space capabilities occurs within Air Force, joint, and combined
operations in uncontested, contested, and denied environments, and throughout the
range of military operations (ROMO). Since space assets like Global Positioning
System (GPS) and Milstar complement existing capabilities (e.g., navigation aids, long-
haul communication), space capabilities are inherently cross-domain integrated. The
synergistic effect of combining space capabilities with land, maritime, air, and
cyberspace capabilities creates an operational advantage for the joint force commander
(JFC). Air Force space operations often rely on partnerships with external organizations
including other military services, allies, national and civil agencies, and commercial and
foreign enterprises. Integration of partner space capabilities requires diligent
establishment of command relationships.
Click here to go to Annex 3-14, Space Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Cyberspace operations are defined as the employment of cyberspace capabilities
where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through
Cyberspace is defined as a global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers.
Cyberspace operations are not synonymous with information operations (IO). IO is a
set of operations that can be performed in cyberspace and other domains. Operations
in cyberspace can directly support IO and non-cyber based IO can affect cyberspace
Cyberspace is a man-made domain, and is therefore unlike the natural domains of air,
land, maritime, and space. It requires continued attention from humans to persist and
encompass the features of specificity, global scope, and emphasis on the
electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberspace nodes physically reside in all domains.
Activities in cyberspace can enable freedom of action for activities in the other domains,
and activities in the other domains can create effects in and through cyberspace.
Click here to go to Annex 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Air mobility operations doctrine represents an accumulation of best practices and
lessons learned from World War II to the most recent conflicts and humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief operations. Air mobility operations support all of the
geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and functional combatant commanders
Joint doctrine defines air mobility as the rapid movement of personnel, materiel, and
forces to and from or within a theater by air.
Mobility air forces (MAF) provide rapid global mobility and conduct air mobility
operations. These forces deliver the global reach and global power necessary to
achieve US national objectives.
The four types of air mobility operations are:
Airlift. Airlift is defined as operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel
through the air in support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Airlift
provides rapid, flexible, and secure transportation. Because airlift is a high demand
asset, it should be used carefully when satisfying warfighter requirements.
Air Refueling. Air refueling (AR) is defined as the refueling of an aircraft in flight by
another aircraft. AR extends presence, increases range, and serves as a force
multiplier. AR significantly expands the options available to a commander by
increasing the range, payload, persistence, and flexibility of receiver aircraft.
Air Mobility Support. Air mobility support provides command and control, aerial
port, and maintenance for mobility air forces (MAF). Air mobility support is part of
the global air mobility support system (GAMSS). The GAMSS consists of a limited
number of permanent en route support locations plus deployable forces that deploy
according to a global reach laydown strategy. Air mobility support forces are divided
between USTRANSCOM and geographic combatant commands.
Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation (AE) provides time-sensitive en
route care of regulated casualties to and between medical treatment facilities using
organic and/or contracted aircraft with medical aircrew trained explicitly for that
mission. AE forces can operate as far forward as aircraft are able to conduct air
operations, and in all operating environments. Specialty medical teams may be
assigned to work with the AE aircrew to support patients requiring more intensive en
route care.
Click here to go to Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Special operations (SO) are operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical
techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time
sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces,
requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.
SO typically differ from conventional operations in the operational techniques and the
small size of the friendly force (compared to the enemy), degree of physical and political
risk, relative independence from friendly support, mode of employment, reliance on
detailed and perishable intelligence, extensive use of indigenous assets, and preference
toward detailed planning and rehearsals.
Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) should complement and not compete with,
nor be a substitute for conventional forces. As an example, an AC-130 gunship should
not be employed when a conventional aircraft would be more appropriate for the target
and the operational conditions. The need for an opportunity to attack or engage
strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special units with
specialized, highly focused capabilities. Although not always decisive on their own,
when properly employed, SO can be designed and conducted to create conditions
favorable to US strategic goals and objectives. Often, these operations may require
clandestine or low visibility capabilities.
AFSOF are composed of special operations aviation units (including unmanned aircraft
systems), battlefield Battlefield Airmen (including combat control teams, pararescue
teams, special operations weather teams, and select tactical air control party units),
dedicated SOF intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) units, aviation foreign
internal defense, and support capabilities such as command and control, information
operations / military information support operations, and combat support functions.
C2 of SOF is normally executed within a SOF chain of command. The C2 structure for
SOF depends on objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment. In
complex environments SOF have found supporting to supported command relationships
are extremely agile and beneficial to both SOF and conventional forces.
Click here to go to Annex 3-05, Special Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
For the Air Force, homeland operations is the umbrella construct through which it
supports homeland defense (HD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and
emergency preparedness ( EP). It incorporates all operations planning and execution
designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full spectrum of
incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or natural. The geographic
homeland boundaries include the 50 states, four territories, and numerous island
possessions. The United States also enjoys exclusive sovereignty 12 miles out to sea
and exercises responsibilities extending 200 miles from the coast.
Homeland Defense. HD is defined as the protection of US sovereignty, territory,
domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression or other threats as directed by the President. For the Air Force, HD
operations involve significant counterair emphasis and may be supported by
preemptive actions through global strike operations against threats to the US
homeland or US forces and installations throughout the world. In addition, special
operations forces operating to locate, characterize, and secure weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) provide another option to defend and respond against WMD
attacks or threats. Cyber defense capabilities are continuing to develop, and may
also be employed to support and defend US assets.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DSCA, often referred to as civil support, is
defined as DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for
designated law enforcement and other activities. It includes military assistance for
civil law enforcement operations in very limited circumstances. For example, DSCA
missions can include support to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in preventing or
defeating terrorist attacks, or aiding local agency response to natural disasters,
among others. In all these missions, various federal, state, or local civilian agencies
are responsible for the management of the particular incident.
Emergency Preparedness. The Air Force includes EP within the homeland
operations umbrella. EP is defined as the measures taken in advance of an
emergency to reduce the loss of life and property, and to protect a nations
institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency
management program of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery.
A key distinction between HD and DSCA is that in HD, DOD is the lead federal agency
(LFA), while in DSCA, another federal organization is the LFA, with DOD acting in
Homeland operations routinely involve a unique collection of federal, state, local, and
tribal agencies, which present a number of challenges. These agencies may have
different resources, levels of experience, and legal considerations.
Click here to go to Annex 3-27, Homeland Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
The Air Force role in nuclear operations is to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces
with the capability to support the national security goals of deterring adversaries from
attacking the United States and its interests with their nuclear arsenals or other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); dissuading competitors from developing WMD;
assuring allies and partners of the US' ability and determination to protect them; and
holding at risk a specific range of targets. The fundamental purpose of the US nuclear
arsenal is to deter an enemys use of its nuclear arsenal or other WMD.
The end of the Cold War has had a major impact on the perceived utility and role of
nuclear weapons in the United States. Force reductions have reduced the specter of a
large-scale, Cold War-type nuclear exchange; however, as long as nuclear weapons
exist, the possibility of their use remains. This risk is aggravated as potential
adversaries seek to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). This continuing proliferation places US forces, allies, and civilians around the
world at greater risk. Thus, while nuclear operations are not as visible a component of
national security as they were during the Cold War, they continue to underpin US
Although nuclear forces are not the only factor in the deterrence equation, our nuclear
capability underpins all other elements of deterrence. The fundamental purpose of the
US nuclear arsenal is to deter adversaries from attacking the United States and its
interests with their nuclear arsenals or other WMD; dissuade competitors from
developing WMD; and assure allies and partners of the US' ability and determination to
protect them. Additionally, our nuclear forces assure allies of our continuing
commitment to their security, dissuade potential adversaries from embarking on
programs or activities that could threaten our vital interests, and defeat threats that are
not deterred.
The physical employment of nuclear weapons at any level requires explicit orders from
the President.
The law of armed conflict does not expressly prohibit the possession or use of nuclear
Click here to go to Annex 3-72, Nuclear Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors
for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other
capacities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.
The United States overwhelming dominance in recent conventional wars has made it
highly unlikely that adversaries, especially those state and non-state actors with less-
robust military capabilities, will choose to challenge the United States in traditional
force-on-force engagements. Irregular forms of warfare have become attractive, if not
the most preferred options for adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, criminal
networks, and non-friendly states to credibly challenge US interests and national
Both IW and traditional warfare seek to resolve conflict by compelling change in
adversarial behavior. However, they differ significantly in both strategy and conduct.
Traditional warfare focuses on dominance over an adversarys ability to sustain its war
fighting capability. IW focuses on population-centric approaches that affect actors,
behaviors, relationships, and stability in the area or region of interest. Therefore, IW
requires a different level of operational thought and threat comprehension.
As an integral part of the IW campaign, the Air Force is prepared to support and
conduct principal IW activities or operations that may be undertaken in sequence, in
parallel, or blended within a coherent campaign to address irregular threats. Five such
principal activities include: foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW),
counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), and stability operations (SO).
Additionally, there is a host of key related activities including security force assistance
(SFA), information operations (IO), civil-military operations (CMO), support to law
enforcement, intelligence, medical, and counterintelligence operations, all of which may
be used to counter irregular threats.
Across the range of IW scenarios a set of overarching concepts provide a foundation for
planning and employing Air Force capabilities. These do not apply to all conceivable
situations. However, they do represent broad concepts that Airmen should consider.
These overarching concepts either reflect a best practice in evolving IW concepts or are
based on significant lessons learned from operations that failed to meet expectations.
Though combat is often present in IW, traditional strategies that seek continuing
advantage through combat alone are seldom appropriate or successful in IW.
In IW, winning the populations support for the strategic objectives and desired end
state is paramount.
The Air Force should be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional
warfare operations.
IW is a different form of warfare and not a lesser form of conflict within traditional
warfare. The struggle for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population is the
primary focus of operations, not the coercion of key political leaders or defeat of their
military capability.
IW is intelligence-intensive.
Unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall strategic
Integrated command and control (C2) structures enable flexibility at all levels and
are vital to successful IW scenarios.
Effective working relationships between people and organizations are key to
success in IW.
Operational effectiveness can be very difficult to measure; thus, feedback through a
strong operations assessment and lessons learned process is essential to strategic
The adversary may be highly complex and adaptive.
In an IW context, non-combat support elements can deliver effects that matter more
than those of kinetic engagement platforms.
IW is about right-tech, not about high- or low-tech.
The desired IW end state is a self-sufficient partner with a supportive population. This
partner is able to sustain its self-defense capabilities and is a trusted partner in regional
security structures which support both partner nation and US national interests.
Click here to go to Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Foreign internal defense (FID) is defined as participation by civilian and military
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The term
FID was devised by the US Army in 1976 as a euphemism for support for
counterinsurgency. In reality, FID is a very large domain encompassing the total
political, economic, informational, and military support the United States provides to
enable other governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD)
programs for counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics. FID is a
component of irregular warfare (IW), defined as a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.
Generally, the preferred methods of helping another country are through education and
developmental assistance programs. Most Air Force FID actions entail working by,
with, and through foreign aviation forces to achieve US strategic and operational
objectives. With Presidential direction, however, FID can entail the use of US combat
units and advisors in coercive roles aimed at stabilizing the security and survival of a
foreign regime and vital institutions under siege by insurgent or terrorist forces. FID
includes military training and equipping, technical assistance, advisory support, and
infrastructure development as well as tactical operations. When feasible, military
assistance should be closely coordinated with diplomatic, economic, and informational
Air Force FID operations fall under the broad category of nation assistance. Nation
assistance is comprised of three separate but complementary programs: humanitarian
and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance (SA), and FID. Security assistance
though having much broader application than FIDcan be integrated with FID
strategies and operations. Security assistance is designed to help select countries
meet their internal defense needs and to promote sustainable development and growth
of responsive institutions.
Click here to go to Annex 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
The Air Force defines Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
as cross-domain synchronization and integration of the planning and operation of ISR
assets; sensors; processing, exploitation and dissemination systems; and, analysis and
production capabilities across the globe to enable current and future operations. This
definition differs from the joint definition of ISR in that the Air Force eliminates
references to in direct support ofoperations. In addition to providing direct support
to operations, ISR operations are also conducted to inform strategy, planning, and
The Air Force conducts global integrated ISR operations through a five-phase process:
planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production;
and dissemination (PCPAD). The process is not linear or cyclical, but rather represents
a network of interrelated, simultaneous operations that can, at any given time, feed and
be fed by other operations. The planning and direction phase begins the process by
shaping decision-making with an integrated and synchronized ISR strategy and
collection plan that links global integrated ISR operations to the joint force commanders
intelligence requirements and integrating them into the air tasking order (ATO). The
collection phase occurs when the mission is executed and the sensors actually gather
raw data on the target set. The collected data in its raw form has relatively limited
intelligence utility.
The processing and exploitation phase increases the utility of the collected data by
converting it into useable information. During the analysis and production phase
analysts apply critical thinking and advanced analytical skills by fusing disparate pieces
of information and draw conclusions resulting in finished intelligence.
Finished intelligence is crucial to facilitating informed decision-making, but only if it is
received in a timely manner. Dissemination, the final phase of PCPAD, ensures the
commander receives the derived intelligence in time to make effective decisions.
Click here to go to Annex 2-0, Global Integrated intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Targeting is defined as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching
the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities. Targeting is a command function requiring commander oversight and
involvement to ensure proper execution. It is not the exclusive province of one type of
specialty or division, such as intelligence or operations, but blends the expertise of
many disciplines.
Targeting helps translate strategy into discrete actions against targets by linking ends,
ways, means, and risks. It is a central component of Air Force operational art and
design in the application of airpower. Strategy allows commanders to choose the best
ways to attain desired outcomes. Strategy forms the plans and guidance that can be
used to task specific airpower assets through the tasking process. The processes of
planning, tasking, targeting, and assessing effects provide a logical progression that
forms the basis of decision-making and ensures consistency with the commanders
objectives and the end state.
A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or other actions.
Examples of entities include areas, complexes, installations, forces, equipment,
capabilities, functions, individuals, groups, systems or behaviors. It is a fundamental
tenet of targeting that no potential target derives its importance or criticality merely by
virtue of the fact that it exists, or even that it is a crucial element within a target system
and other interdependent target systems. Any potential target derives importance, and
thus criticality, only by virtue of the extent to which it enables enemy capabilities and
actions that must be affected in order to achieve the commanders objectives. Possible
actions may be kinetic or non-kinetic, and they may be lethal or non-lethal. Multiple
actions may be taken against a single target, and actions may often be taken against
multiple targets to achieve a single effect.
Click here to go to Annex 3-60, Targeting.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
The purpose of Information Operations (IO) is to affect adversary and potential
adversary decision-making with the intent to ultimately affect their behavior. The
definition of IO is, the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-
related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt,
or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting
our own. The deliberate targeting of the adversarys decision making process is
enabled by understanding the cognitive factors related to their decision-making process,
the information that they use, and how they receive and send their information. As an
integrating staff function, the objective is to incorporate the use (planning, execution,
and assessment) of capabilities that touch (have a relation to) the information used by
an adversary decision-maker with the intent of influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or
usurping that process.
IO is a means to target an adversarys decision-making process. The decision-making
process can be modeled with a cycle of steps referred to as an observe, orient, decide,
act-loop or OODA loop. The steps of this model occur within the information
environment and give three targetable dimensions: 1) informational dimension; 2)
physical dimension; and 3) cognitive dimension. The information dimension represents
the content of the information used by the decision-maker. The physical dimension is
how the decision-maker is connected to the information. The cognitive dimension is the
internal cognitive or mental processing of the decision-maker. While we cant directly
target the cognitive processing of the adversary, with an understanding of the adversary
to include culture, organization, and individual psychology, we can target the information
(or content) and physical (or connectivity) dimensions to affect the adversarys OODA
loop and ultimately their behavior.
IO is fundamental to the overall military objective of influencing an adversary. IO
involves synchronizing effects from all domains during all phases of war through the use
of kinetic and non-kinetic means to produce lethal and non-lethal effects. The planning
and execution processes begin with the commanders design that encompasses the
strategy and operational art that guide planners as they coordinate, integrate, and
synchronize the information-related capabilities and other lines of operation identified
in the definition of IO described above. From a doctrinal standpoint, IO planning should
be integrated into existing planning processes, such as the joint operation planning
process (JOPP). IO planning is not a standalone process.
Additionally, IO is complimentary to the practices, processes, and end goals of an
effects-based approach to operations. IO facilitates targeting development, intelligence
requirements, and matches actions with intended messages. Through planning,
execution, and assessment processes, IO provides the means to employ the right
capabilities (lethal or non-lethal) to achieve the desired effect to meet the combatant
commanders objectives while supporting the commanders communication
synchronization strategy.
Click here to go to Annex 3-13, Information Operations.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Electronic warfare (EW) is defined as military action involving the use of
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to
attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare). The term electromagnetic
spectrum refers to the full range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from near
zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. EW operations
may include friendly force use of the EM spectrum, attacks on adversaries, and denying
enemy exploitation efforts. Coordinating EW operations has historically been an
important element in all operations and takes on an increasingly important role as use of
the EM spectrum grows.
EW is waged to secure and maintain freedom of action in the EM spectrum.
Military forces depend on the EM spectrum for many applications including, but not
limited to, communication, detection, identification, and targeting. Effective application
of EW in support of mission objectives is critical to the ability to find, fix, track, target,
engage, and assess the adversary, while denying that adversary the same ability.
Planners, operators, acquisition specialists, and others involved with Air Force EW
should understand the technological advances and proliferation of threat systems to
enable friendly use of the EM spectrum and protect US forces.
When improperly coordinated, EW can disrupt our own command and control.
Modern military forces rely heavily on a variety of complex electronic offensive and
defensive capabilities. EW is a specialized capability that enhances many air, space,
and cyberspace functions at all levels of conflict. Proper employment of EW enhances
commanders ability to achieve operational superiority over the adversary. Modern
weapons and support systems employ radio, radar, wireless networks and datalinks,
infrared (IR), optical, ultraviolet, electro-optical (EO), and directed energy (DE)
technologies. Commanders should prepare to operate weapons systems in an
intensive and nonpermissive EM environment. This may be aggravated by both
intentional and unintentional emissions from friendly, neutral, and enemy forces.
Unfettered access to selected portions of the EM spectrum can be critical for mission
effectiveness and protection of critical assets.
Click here to go to Annex 3-51, Electronic Warfare.
Last Updated: 5 Jun 2013
Personnel recovery is defined as the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to
effect the recovery and return of US Military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor
personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a US government-
sanctioned military activity or missions in an uncertain or hostile environment, or as
determined by the Secretary of Defense.
The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips personnel to conducts personnel recovery
operations (PRO) using the fastest and most effective means. Air Force PRO forces
deploy to recover personnel or equipment with specially outfitted aircraft/vehicles,
specially trained aircrews and ground recovery teams in response to geographic
combatant commander (CCDR) taskings. Although traditionally PRO assets have
focused on the recovery of downed aircrews, recent experiences suggest that Air Force
PRO forces are responsible for the recovery of any isolated personnel.
The Air Force provides unique PR capabilities to CCDRs. The primary mission of Air
Force PRO is to use a combination of specially trained Airmen and unique equipment to
recover any isolated personnel. By virtue of the inherent capabilities of PRO forces,
they can accomplish other collateral missions. Historically, these collateral missions
have included: casualty evacuation, civil search and rescue, counter-drug operations,
emergency aeromedical evacuation, homeland security, humanitarian relief,
international aid, noncombatant evacuation operations, support for National Aeronautics
and Space Administration flight operations, infiltration and exfiltration of personnel in
support of air component commander missions, and special operations missions,
including PR of special operations forces.
Click here to go to Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery Operations.


Incorporating Through Change 3, 21 July 2010
ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e-
Publishing website at
RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

Supersedes: AFI10-401, 25 April 2005
Certified by: AF/A5X
(Brig Gen Gorenc)
Pages: 358

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-4, Operations Planning: Air
& Space Expeditionary Force Presence Policy (AEFPP). AFI 10-401 prescribes and explains
how the Air Force participates in the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC),
including force presentation and Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segment
(DCAPES), for the planning, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment and
reconstitution of forces. It covers the procedures and standards that govern operations planning
and execution throughout the Air Force. It also carries out the tenets of Executive Order (E.O.)
12861, Elimination of One-Half of Executive Branch Internal Regulations, September 11, 1993;
and E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, September 30, 1993. It applies to all Air
Force, including Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel, who participate in the JPEC,
including the planning, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment and reconstitution
of forces. If this publication is in conflict with DOD or Joint guidance, then the joint publication
will take precedence. Refer recommended changes and conflicts between this and other
publications to AF/A5XW,
1480 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1480, on Air Force (AF) Form 847,
Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF IMT 847s from the field through the
appropriate functionals chain of command. Any organization may supplement this volume.
Major commands (MAJCOM), field operating agencies (FOA), and direct reporting units (DRU)
send one copy of their printed supplement to AF/ A5XW and an electronic copy to; other organizations send one copy of each printed supplement
to the next higher headquarters. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed
in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 37-123, Management of Records
and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 25
Chapter 2
Section 2APurpose
2.1. Purpose. To provide an overview of the Air Forces force presentation and the planning
policies, processes, and systems used to support the joint planning process. This includes the Air
& Space Expeditionary Force (AEF), War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), Deliberate and Crisis
Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES), and the Air & Space Expeditionary Task
Force (AETF) force modules.
Section 2BBackground
2.2. Function of the AEF. The Air Force supports global combatant commander (CCDR)
requirements through a combination of assigned, attached (rotational), and mobility forces that
may be forward deployed, transient, or operating from home station. The AEF is the force
generation construct used to manage the battle rhythm of these forces in order to meet global
CCDR requirements while maintaining the highest possible level of overall readiness. Through
the AEF, the Air Force establishes a predictable, standardized battle rhythm ensuring rotational
forces are properly organized, trained, equipped, and ready to sustain capabilities while rapidly
responding to emerging crises.
Section 2CGuidance
2.3. AEF Force Generation Construct. The Air Forces Total Force is part of the AEF. There
are four major elements of the AEF structure: readily available force, Enabler force, in-place
support, and Institutional Force. The first three elements are components that primarily
constitute the Air Forces warfighting capability and are therefore postured in UTCs (see Chapter
7); the fourth element provides the Air Forces sustainment capability necessary to meet SECAF
statutory functions outlined in 10 USC 8013(b).
2.3.1. Readily Available Force. The readily available force is the primary pool from which
the Air Force fulfills GFM Allocation Plan (GFMAP) rotational requirements. To meet these
requirements, the Air Force aligns its warfighting capabilities into a baseline of 10 AEFs (5
pairs), each intended to contain an equivalent capability from which to provide forces.
During periods of increased requirements, capability areas from these 10 AEFs may be
realigned within the Global AEF construct to a Tempo Band that provides a deeper pool of
capability, deploying that capability at a higher deploy-to-dwell rate (i.e. the ratio of time
deployed in support of a contingency versus the time not deployed in support of a
contingency). The baseline AEF (Band A) is organized to support a one-to-four ratio. The
alternative Tempo Bands are organized to support an increasing deploy-to-dwell ratio with
Bands C, D, and E supporting one-to-three, one-to-two, and one-to-one ratios
respectively. Band B, like Band A, supports a one-to-four ratio but with a 6 month
vulnerability period vice 4 months; the vulnerability periods for Bands C, D, and E are
also 6 months. Two additional Tempo Bands are designed to support Air Reserve
Component (ARC) forces in capability areas that might require mobilization. Tempo Bands
26 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
M and N are designed to support mobilization-to-dwell ratios of one-to-five and one-to-
four respectively. When forces are realigned to a different Tempo Band, each block within
the Tempo Band is intended to contain an equivalent capability. (DELETED) .
2.3.2. Enabler Force. The Enabler force includes common user assets, such as global
mobility forces, special operations (SOF) and personnel recovery forces, space forces, and
other uniquely categorized forces that provide support to authorized organizations within and
outside the Department of Defense (DOD). Most high demand/low supply (HD/LS) assets,
National Air Mobility System, and Theater Air Control System (TACS) elements are
postured as Enabler forces and will rotate as operational requirements dictate. Due to their
unique nature, these forces cannot be easily aligned in one of the Tempo Bands; however,
every effort must be made to develop a sustained plan. Enabler force details are in Chapter 7
(Note: ARC is not required to posture assets as Enablers).
2.3.3. In-place support. There are two types of in-place support -- those forces that almost
exclusively employ in direct support of a Combatant Commander mission, and those that
represent the minimum number of requirements to support critical home station operations.
In-place support forces are also included in the AEF Tempo Bands. Details on in-place
support forces are in Chapter 7.
2.3.4. Institutional Force. The Institutional Force consists of those forces assigned to
organizations responsible to carry out the SECAF Title 10 functions at the Air Force level
(i.e. organize, train, equip, recruit, supply, etc (see Table A8.2. for examples)). These
organizations will not posture UTCs in the AEF Capability Library (unless a waiver is
granted by AF/A3/5 (see paragraph 10.2)). Although these organizations as a whole do not
represent a warfighting capability, the individuals assigned to these organizations are
inherently deployable. Details on AEF association, sourcing, and employment of individuals
in the Institutional Force are in Chapter 14. (DELETED) .
2.3.5. AEF Capability Library. The blocks within the five primary and two ARC Tempo
Bands, plus the Enabler force make up the AEF Capability Library as depicted in Figure 2.1
The AEF Capability Library consists of 100% of the USAFs postured capability and
encompasses one iteration of each of the 41 AEF blocks plus the Enabler force. The AEF
Capability Library contains a finite capability that at any given time identifies forces that
constitute the total force that has been made available or allocated for scheduling and
provides a composite of capabilities from which AETFs are task organized to meet mission
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 27
Figure 2.1. AEF Capability Library.

2.4. AEF Schedule, Battle Rhythm, and Timeline.
2.4.1. AEF Schedule. The AEF Capability Library is the basis for the AEF Schedule (see
Figure 2.2). The AEF Schedule operates on a 24-month life cycle that aligns with two GFM
Cycles and coincides with fiscal years. Prior to the beginning of every GFM cycle,
functional areas will revalidate the Tempo Band alignment of their respective capability areas
and realign forces if necessary. It is the Air Force goal that functional areas align to the least
strenuous band (ideally Band A) to minimize risk to the force. Every 12 months, a new
24-month AEF Schedule will be established. The various actions that lead up to the AEF
Schedule are outlined in paragraph 2.4.3
28 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
Figure 2.2. AEF Schedule.

2.4.2. AEF Battle Rhythm. The AEF operates on a 24-month life cycle. This cycle
includes periods of normal training, preparation, and deployment vulnerability. However,
each Tempo Band within the AEF construct operates under a different battle rhythm (see
Figures 2.3.1 through 2.3.5). For most forces (those other than Band E), the majority of the AEF battle
rhythm is spent in normal training during which forces concentrate on unit missions and
basic proficiency events in accordance with applicable Air Force directives and Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) requirements. This may include Joint, Air Force, or MAJCOM
exercise participation (exercises of less than 30 days duration) such as Red Flag and
Silver Flag. Most contingency and deployment training should take place during this
period. This training and exercise period is also used to fill CCDR requirements with
forces that are employed from home station, filling contingency requirements for 30 days
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 29
or less and crisis response (including HUMRO and OPLAN) needs. For the baseline
AEF (Band A) this period is approximately 14 months. For Bands B through E,
the normal training period is approximately 22, 16, 10, and 4 months, respectively. Post-deployment reconstitution is included in this period. During the
month immediately after deployment, the unit is focused on recovery. PCS/PCA
moves into and out of the unit will be deconflicted to the maximum extent possible to
occur during the 3-month period immediately after the vulnerability period. Prior to a units deployment, a 2to 3-month deployment preparation period
focuses unit activities on specific deployment preparation activities and area of
responsibility (AOR) specific events, if known. Exercises of less than 30 days may be
supported if the training is appropriate to deployment preparation (e.g. Eagle Flag). The 4-month (Band A) or 6-month (Bands B through E) vulnerability
period is the period of time the forces aligned in a specific AEF block are susceptible to
initial deployment. Forces will not initially deploy outside of the vulnerability period
except in cases of reach forward. Only one AEF block from each Tempo Band will be
vulnerable at a time. Individuals and equipment must not participate in any activity that
directly impacts their availability to deploy during their AEF vulnerability period unless
specifically approved by applicable wing commander/equivalent. Exercise estimated tour
lengths (ETLs) of 30 days or more are sourced from forces in their AEF vulnerability
period. Enabler forces do not operate within a 24-month life cycle/battle rhythm. The
Enabler battle rhythm is provided by the HAF/MAJCOM FAM as a part of the Enabler
nomination request package. For forces aligned in the Enabler force, unit commanders
should develop a deployment schedule that provides a measure of predictability to
associated Airmen. However, operational requirements may force deviations from the
applicable battle rhythm. MAJCOM/CVs will ensure appropriate mechanisms are in
place to ensure Airmen postured as an Enabler are provided a measure of
predictability/stability and do not violate CSAFor SecDef-redlines with respect to dwell.
30 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
Figure 2.3. AEF Battle Rhythm (Band A).

AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 31

*Figure 2.4. AEF Battle Rhythm (Band B).
32 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
Figure 2.5. AEF Battle Rhythm (Band C).

AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 33
Figure 2.6. AEF Battle Rhythm (Band D).

34 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
Figure 2.7. AEF Battle Rhythm (Band E).

2.4.3. GFM Cycle and AEF Schedule Timeline. Joint GFM Cycle Actions. Approximately 18-24 months prior to the start of
each GFM cycle, Joint Staff will publish a planning order outlining various milestones
necessary to staff and publish the associated GFMAP. The timing of these actions
directly affects the timeline needed to develop and implement the AEF Schedule. DELETED. DELETED. DELETED. DELETED. DELETED. DELETED.
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 35 AEF Schedule Preparation Timeline. The AEF Schedule timeline is required to
meet the Joint Staff GFM Master Timeline. These milestones will be modified as
necessary to meet the GFM Master Timeline. Prior to each 24-month AEF Schedule, Air
Force leaders, planners, and Functional Area Managers (FAM) at every level review
lessons learned, make assessments of significant force structure changes that have
impacted the Air Force or a particular functional area, and consider initiatives that may
impact the way we posture, schedule, present, or execute combat capability. A
significant increase or decrease in combatant commander requirements will also warrant
adjustment in the rotational battle rhythm of a particular functional area. AF/A3/5 will
publish specific milestones to support the AEF Schedule timeline. As co-chairs of the
AEF Steering Group, AF/A5X and AFPC/CC will monitor the tasks associated with
planning for the upcoming AEF Schedule. Air Force planners and commanders, as well
as HAF, MAJCOM, and component headquarters FAMs must ensure their actions are

Figure 2.8. DELETED
2.5. AEF Vulnerability Period. At any given time, one AEF block/pair from each Tempo
Band is in the AEF vulnerability period. Available forces postured in these AEF blocks/pairs
will be used to meet known rotational expeditionary requirements and emerging operational
requirements across the range of military operations (ROMO). Individuals assigned to
institutional organizations, will also be associated to a specific AEF vulnerability period (see
Chapter 14).
2.5.1. Forces aligned to the AEFs in the vulnerability period but not tasked to deploy will
remain in an on-call status to reinforce forward-deployed forces or provide additional
36 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006
capability for the duration of the AEF vulnerability period (Note: ARC forces do not serve in
an on-call status). If tasked, their deployment commitments may extend outside their
vulnerability period. In such cases, AFPC/DPW will coordinate with supported component
headquarters to synchronize deployments with AEF vulnerability periods (see Chapter 8).
2.5.2. Regardless of AEF vulnerability period, all AEF forces are vulnerable for OPLAN
tasking at all times including the period immediately following redeployment.
2.5.3. All Airmen will be given an AEF Indicator (AEFI) (Note: Reserve components will
determine component-specific AEFI policy). For individuals assigned to warfighting
organizations, the AEFI will correspond to the same AEF block as the units UTCs; for
individuals assigned to the Institutional Force, the AEFI will correspond to an AEF
vulnerability period. Except in cases of reaching forward, individuals will deploy during
their associated AEF blocks vulnerability period. Changing an individuals AEFI will only
be done under extenuating circumstances. See Chapter 14 for details on Airmen and the
2.6. AEF Surge. If requirements exceed forces available within the AEF vulnerability period,
the AEF is designed to surge to meet increased requirements. Various methods of surging
include reaching forward (using forces in the next AEF block/pair), reaching deeper (using
forces in the current AEF block/pair that are not normally available not to exceed the unit's total
deployable capability), rebanding capability area (an out-of-cycle realignment of the functional
area into a different tempo band), and/or mobilization of ARC forces. Once a functional area re-
aligns in a Tempo Band with a lesser dwell period and operates in that band for at least one full
rotation (current rotation plus next), that functionality is not considered in surge. The matrix at
Table 2.1 and paragraph 3.7.5 outline the various trigger points, process, and approval levels
for surge mechanics. Emerging requirements include, but not limited to, JET solutions, JMD-IA,
and/or standard force (blue-on-blue) solutions. Surging may require forces in their normal
training and/or predeployment training periods to be deployed/employed for operational
Table 2.1. Decision Matrix for Emerging Requirements.
area is
in Tempo
And the Decision is to:
Source within
current Block
Reach Forward
1, 4
Next Block Beyond Next



DCS A3/5

A3/5 N/A
Note 1: Reaching forward should be used for initial increase in requirements. If increase will
be enduring, the capability area should re-band during the subsequent AEF Schedule
Note 2: Need to consider mobilization/additional mobilization as a mitigation strategy
Note 3: Assumes moving to more stringent Tempo Band (e.g. from Band C to Band D)
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 37
Note 4: Reaching forward, deeper, or re-band requires HAF FAM coordination with the
applicable MAJCOMs
2.6.1. Through surge operations, the Air Force can make available all AEF blocks plus
available Enablers but will require a sustained period, following this level of effort, to
reconstitute the force during which time Air Force capabilities will be severely curtailed. Surge operations will not be used to support exercises or rotational presence,
unless specifically directed by AF/A3/5. Some capabilities may need to surge at different rates and durations to meet
combatant commander requirements. Enabler assets, except those coded for specific operations, (ref. paragraphs
7.12.8 and 9.9.1), are also used for sourcing.
2.6.2. An active component (AC) employment ratio of one deployment period followed by a
dwell period of twice the deployment period (1:2) for all postured capabilities is considered
the maximum sustainable utilization rate while maintaining total Air Force unit readiness at
C1/C2. This ratio coincides with the SecDef deploy-to-dwell planning objective.
2.6.3. Functional areas aligned in Band D experiencing demand that exceeds postured
capabilities within the AEF vulnerability window should consider involuntary recall of ARC
forces (see paragraph 3.8).
2.7.1. DELETED.
2.7.2. (DELETED) .
2.7.5. DELETED.
2.7.7. DELETED.
2.7.8. Unit and UTC readiness SORTS and ART reporting must be timely and accurate.
2.7.9. Airmen will be ready to immediately deploy during their AEF eligibility period. New
CCDR requirements can be sourced any time during the AEF period.
38 AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 If deployed near the end of the AEF eligibility period, the Airman must be
prepared to remain deployed through the end of the next AEF rotation.
2.7.10. If unable to fill AEF requirements, AEF reclama rule sets apply. See Chapter 10.
Note: Reclamas will only occur under the most extenuating circumstances. Reclamas are
minimized when UTC Availability and ART are properly maintained. Units will ensure UTC
Availability and ART are accurate and up to date.
2.8. AEF Composition. The operations, command and control, and ECS elements required to
task organize an AETF are resident in each AEF vulnerability period. Those capabilities may
include aircraft-oriented and/or non-aircraft-oriented forces. A Numbered Expeditionary Air
Force (NEAF) is the largest AETF and consists of multiple Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW)
with subordinate Air Expeditionary Groups (AEG) and Air Expeditionary Squadrons (AES). An
AEW is structured in accordance with the Air Force combat wing structure and is capable of
establishing and operating an expeditionary base as well as exercising C2 of subordinate units at
geographically separated locations. Normally, only one AEW will be at a single location.
Subordinate units, regardless of size, will be organized as an AEG or AES. When an AETF is
comprised of AEGs at multiple operating locations, each AEG will normally be attached to the
nearest AEW in the same AETF. An AEG does not normally possess the capability to establish
and operate a base; therefore AEGs are typically tenant units at a deployed location.
2.8.1. Each vulnerability period should have sufficient AC and ARC volunteer forces to
support five AEWs and a mixture of eight AEGs. With mobilization, each vulnerability
period should have sufficient forces to support an additional three AEWs and four AEGs. Surging beyond the capability within an AEF vulnerability period will not
necessarily yield an additional 5 AEWs and 8 AEGs (8 and 12 with mobilization) worth
of capability. As capability areas are rebanded in a tempo band with lesser dwell periods,
the flexibility to surge forces from the next AEF vulnerability period may be limited. Determining the exact number of AESs, AEGs, and/or AEWs that can be
generated is dependent on elements such as environment (permissive/non-permissive),
available infrastructure, and duration of the requirement. Each AETF Force Module, in
its entirety, may not be required for each location. Critical enabling capabilities and/or ECS may be exhausted before the full
capability within the AEF vulnerability period has been committed. The resulting residual
capability can either be directed to support an existing location or can be added as a
dependent element to support another operation.
2.9. Presentation and Command & Control (C2) of AEF Forces. The Air Force presents the
full range of Air Force capabilities to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander via an Air & Space
Expeditionary Task Force (AETF). The AETF is presented under the command of a single
Commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).
2.9.1. AETFs are sized and tailored to meet the specific mission requirements. AETFs are
sized as Air Expeditionary Groups (AEG), Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW) or Numbered
Expeditionary Air Forces (NEAF). Reference AFPD 10-4 for further detail.
AFI10-401 7 DECEMBER 2006 39
2.9.2. The AETF commander (COMAFFOR) must be ready to quickly assume the C2
functions necessary to command, control and coordinate air, space and information
operations (IO). The component NAF is organized and trained to support the UCC across the full
range of military operations, with a core C2 capability that can be readily adapted to a
specific theater requirement. The component NAF headquarters with its AOC weapons
system will provide the required operational-level C2 capability, tailored for a specific
AETF. Due to the unique characteristics of air, space and information power (speed,
range, flexibility, etc.), if there are multiple simultaneous JTF operations in a given
theater, the AETF will normally be organized at the theater level, to optimize AF
capabilities across all JTFs.
2.9.3. AETF forces (wings, groups, and/or squadrons) will be under the command of the
COMAFFOR. Administrative control (ADCON) and specified ADCON are Service
responsibilities and will be detailed in the appropriate G-series orders. Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) are combatant
command authorities and will be delegated by the combatant commander (CCDR), as
required, to the JTF commander and then to the COMAFFOR.
2.10. AEF Command and Control (C2). Air Force C2 operates under two central themes: the
principle of unity of command and the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution.
Deployed active duty AEF force packages are operationally and administratively allocated to the
COMAFFOR. Operational control of ARC forces is assigned to the theater command elements;
however, administrative control of ARC forces remains with the National Guard Bureau and
HQ/AFRC. Detailed C2 concepts are contained in the AFPD 10-4; AFDD 2, Operations and
Organizations; and AFDD 2-8, Command and Control.
2.11. AETF Deployment. AETFs may deploy to meet known rotational, crisis response and
combatant commander theater engagement and theater security cooperation (TSC) requirements.
Unit readiness, proper positioning of air mobility assets, TPFDD development, deployment
requirements manning document (DRMD) development, and expeditionary site planning for
reception, beddown, and employment are keys to the process.
2.11.1. CJCS orders provide the mission and authority to task and deploy forces to support
operations. MAJCOM/USAF component/unit supporting plans, installation deployment plans
(IDPs), and expeditionary site plans (ESPs) provide procedural deployment details.
2.11.2. Although CJCS taskings will not always match the requirements established during
the planning process, this prior preparation will enhance time-critical execution of AETF
2.12. (DELETED).
2.12.1. (DELETED) .
2.13. AEF Agile Combat Support. Agile Combat Support (ACS) underpins the ability of the
AEF to provide force capabilities that can rapidly respond by creating, sustaining, and protecting
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
An evolution, not an overhaul, of the current AEF
Presents AF combat power via 117 Air Power Teams
More unit-based emphasizes teaming
Accounts for all Airmen on-line for the COCOMs
Postures the AF on a standardized cycle
A construct, not a conops yet more work to do

Explainable Comprehensive Teams
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
CSAF Vector

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Develop a force presentation methodology that:
Comparable to BCT/CSG/MEF presentation based on existing units
Wing terminology
Teaming concept
Identifiable support of AF forces, core functions & iron assets
Useable in force planning, execution and strategic analysis
Facilitates easy identification of Institutional, CCDR committed, and
CONUS & Forward Stationed rotationally available forces
Easily understood by Public, Congress, Joint/Interagency
communities, AF Senior Leaders and Airmen

CSAF Vectors
CSAF Vectors as of Dec 09
TASK: Provide a definable and quantifiable unit of measure that
captures AF Combatant Commander commitments
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
AEF Next Features
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Heavy Brigade Combat Team
73 BCTs
Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
11 CSGs
3 MEFs
10 AEFs
Tempo Band A
5 AEFs
B thru E
Force Presentation Model Comparison
Current construct fails to communicate AF Force presentation
with same simplicity as other Services
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
AEF NEXT - Force Presentation
How will the AF present forces under AEF Next?
117 Air Power Teams (APTs)

What is an Air Power Team?
Air, Space, & Cyberspace capability-based teams derived from:

Space & Cyberspace
Special Operations
Mission Support
Bridges gap between in garrison forces and those deployed

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e


AF Total Force Team Summary
(~7) Air Superiority (~12) Close Control Strike (~4) Air Electronic Attack
(~2) Nuclear (~1) Long Range Strike (~5) Personnel Recovery
(~31) Strike*
(4) Command & Control (7) Airborne ISR (2) Ground ISR (13) C2ISR
(1) Space Control (1) Space Support (1) Space Force Enhance (1)
Cyber Support (1) Cyber Defense (1) Combat Comm
(6) Space &
(1) Precision Strike (2) Specialized Mobility (1) Nonstd Aviation
(1)ISR (1) MISO (1) AvFID (1) Battlefield Ops
(8) Special Ops
(6) Intertheater (8) Intratheater (1) Light Mobility
(10) Air Refueling (6) Special Mission
(31) Mobility
(~13) Available Rotation (~15) Committed
(~28) Agile
Combat Spt*


(~117) APTs * work in progress
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
APT Component Breakout
APTs Active Component (AC) Reserve Component (RC) AC / RC Mix*
STRIKE 17 9 5
MOBILITY 17 13 1
C2ISR 9 4 0
SPACE 0 0 3
65 27 25
* Non-Total Force Equivalent (TFE)
AF presents forces as APTs to operating locations to meet global requirements
AF total of 117 APTs
31 Strike, 31 Mobility, 13 C2ISR, 8 Special Operations, 3 Space, & 3 Cyberspace
Contains respective operations & maintenance/munitions support
Mission Support Teams provide WG HQ C2 & BOS/ACS
13 Deployable (Each drawn from ~3-4 AC Wings / ~8-9 RC Wings)
15 Committed In-Place (Each drawn from ~3-4 AC Wings)

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Notionally Available / Committed
AF Combat Power 87 of 117 APTs Committed to CCDRs Today
* Partially available and may include OT&E iron assets (if applicable) when directed
** Globally Utilized
Airpower Teams
Strike 10 2 13 6
Mobility 2 0 2** 27**
C2ISR 3 2 0 8
Space-Cyberspace 0 5 0 1
1 0 0 7
Agile Combat
14* 7* 2 5

TOTAL = 117
30* 16* 17 54
August 2011 Snapshot of Total Force APTs / 5-12 August 2011 Snapshot of MOBILITY APTs
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
(12) ST-APT
(7) MO-APT
(5) CI-APT
(5) SC -APT
(1) SO - APT
(21) MS-APT
(8) ST-APT
(1) MS-APT
(5) ST-APT
( 1) MS-APT
(6) ST-APT
(8) CI-APT
(1) SC-APT
(5) SO-APT
(5) MS-APT
82 APTs: Supporting CCDRs
35 APTs: Available for Deployment
Current AF Total Force
APT Global Support
*Globally Utilized
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
New AEF Model
AEF Presents Right Sized Capability-Based Air Power Teams
Heavy Brigade Combat Team
73 BCTs
Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
11 CSGs
3 MEFs










Garrison Units
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Why Force Generation
Must Change
Tempo Banding:
Will not work with Force Presentation model
Iron and ECS not aligned
Precludes Force Development/Assignments integration with AEF
Is difficult to understand
Every deployment is a custom-made wooden shoe

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
18-Month AEF Cycle 24-Month GFM Schedule
6 Months
Force Generation 1:2 Baseline
6 AEFs; 6-month ETLs; 1:2 AC, 1:5 RC mob-to-dwell
6 Months 6 Months 6 Months
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
Institutional Force
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Deploy Prep
Force Generation 1:2 Baseline
18-Month AEF Cycle 24-Month GFM Schedule
6 Months
Deploy Prep

Mtn Home


JB Pearl



Mtn Home


JB Pearl



Institutional Force
(w/ Augmentation Support per AEF Period)

(1) AFMC
(2) AETC
(3) AFDW
(4) Additional Vols


Grand Forks

ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5


Grand Forks

ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
Deploy Prep
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
6 Months 6 Months 6 Months
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
18-Month AEF Cycle 24-Month GFM Schedule
Force Generation 1:1 Max Surge
Max Surge: By functional area, 9-month ETLs;
1:1 AC, 1:4 RC mob-to-dwell; no re-posturing
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4 ARC 1:4
9 Months 9 Months 9 Months
ARC 1:5 ARC 1:5
ARC 1:5
Institutional Force
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
ECS Taskings
FY13 Requirements
Top 9 MS-APT

Tempo Band Taskings

Two hit policy: 60% for
6-mths followed by 40%
AEF Next provides 3-mths
white space every 6-mths
Each Team (Big/Small Hit)
deploys every 18-mths

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
AEF Next vs ECS Taskings
FY13 Requirements
Top 9 MS-APT

Two hit policy: 60%
for 6-mths followed
by 40%
AEF Next provides
3-mths white space
every 6-mths
Each Team
(Big/Small Hit)
deploys every

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Deploy Prep
18-Month AEF Cycle 24-Month GFM Schedule
6 Months

Langley Squadron X
400 Authorizations
280 Rotationally Available; 120 Home Station Support


AEF Next creates white space

60% of rotation available
60% of rotation available
40% of rotation available
6 Months
6 Months 6 Months
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Deploy Committed
Jul Dec 2012 Jan Jun 2013 Jul Dec 2013 Jan Jun 2012
Airman Schwartz
First Duty Assignment
Jul Dec 2014 Jan Jun 2015 Jul Dec 2015 Jan Jun 2014
first basemission training/
career field upgrades
Jul Dec 2016 Jan Jun 2017 Jul Dec 2017
Jan Jun 2016
Deploy Committed
Assignment Consideration
Assignment Consideration
Deploy Committed



Force Development/Assignments Aligned to AEF Battle Rhythm

I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
AEF Next Way Ahead




AEF Next:
Expeditionary AF Forces to meet CCDR Requirements & National Strategies
Simplifies, Codifies, & Generates AF Capability-Based Teams
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Force Presentation:
Preserves the UTC building block
Promotes teaming
Captures all forces committed to CCDR missions
Commanders more in control: at home and deployed
Useable for strategic analysis and risk assessment
Establishes a clear redline for DoD & AF decision making
Force Generation:
Force development/assignments are aligned to AF/AEF battle rhythm
Connects Iron and ECS; Enables teaming
Easy to understand 18-month cycle
Complies with GFM planning guidance
Reacts quickly to adaptive planning and execution