G. W. F.

Translated by A. V. Miller
Michael George and Andrew Vincent
Basil Blackwell
© Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986
First published 1986
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
The philosophical propaedeutic.
I. Title II. George, Michael
III. Vincent, Andrew IV. Philosophische
Propadeutik. English
193 B2931
ISBN 0-631-15013-7
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831.
The philosophical propaedeutic Hegel.
Translation of: Philosophische propadeutik.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Philosophy-Introductions. I. George, Michael.
II. Vincent, Andrew. III. Title.
B2931.E5M54 1986 193 86-1033
ISBN 0-631-15013-7
Typeset by Oxford Publishing Services, Oxford
Printed in Great Britain by Page Bros (Norwich) Ltd
Hegel' smaturesysteminoutline ¸! 8JO)
JLepartsoltLePropaedeutic inrelationtotLe! 8JOsystem
JLepartsoltLePropaedeutic inrelationtotLelatervorks XXXIV
! JLeScienceolLavs, NoralsandReligion¸FortLeLoverClass]!
Rechts, Pflicht und Religionslehrefur die Unter
klasse ¸ !8!O)
2 PLenomenology¸FortLeNiddleClass] 55
Bewussteinslehrefur die Mittelklasse ¸! 8O9)
J Logic¸FortLeLoverClass] ô5
kfur die Unter
klasse ¸ ! 8O9-! O)
Logic¸FortLeNiddleClass] 74
ur die Mittelklasse ¸ !8!O-! ! )
JLeScienceol tLeConcept¸FortLeHigLerClass] ! O5
Begriflehrefur die Ober
klasse ¸! 8O9)
4 JLePLilosopLical£ncyclopaedia¸FortLeHigLerClass] ! 24
Philosophische Encyclopaediafur die Ober
klasse ¸! 8O8)
! 7O
! 7J
JLe translation Las made relerence to, and emLodies in part, tLe
translation ol tLe Propaedeutic Ly W. J. Harris in tLe Journal of
Speculative Philosophy during tLe! 8ôOs . RelerenceLas also Leenmade
TLomas Hill Creen vLilst incumLent at Ialliol College, Òxlord
duringtLe! 85Osandearly! 8ôOs. JLismanuscriptisLousedamongst
tLe J. H. Creen papers in Ialliol College liLrary. Its true identity
came to ligLt only in ! 982 vLen, at tLe centenary conlerence on
J. H. Creen at Ialliol, NicLael Ceorge and Andrev Vincent
recognized it amongst some ol Creen' s papers on display in tLe
library. MeitLer W. J. Harris nor J. H. Creen made a complete
translation oltLe text. Harris completed approximately tvo-tLirds
and Creen approximately tLree-quarters oltLe Rosenkranz volume
oltLePropaedeutic inHegel' s Wer
e. A. V. NillerLas completed tLe
translation, Las added sections since puLlisLed in tLe SuLrkamp
Verlag edition olHegel' s vorks and Las lully revised tLe Harris
translation utilizing tLe Rosenkranz, Hollmeister and SuLrkamp
texts. JLevorkistLerelorepresentedinasuLstantivelynevlorm. It
Las Leen ordered in tLe interest olpreserving Hegel' s pedagogical
intentions ratLer tLan cLronologically. Itis tLe editors' intention to
makeoltLetextanintroductoryLooklor students olHegel.
Iold type Las Leen used lor lor tLe purpose olindicating tLose
conceptsvLicLarecentraltoHegel' sexpositionandvLicLLevisLes
to deEne. Ce rmanequivalentterms areaddedinsquareLrackets and
initalicsvheretLeusual, oronly availaLle, £nglisLvordemployed
in tLe translation is not deemed to lully or adequately render tLe
meaningHegelintended. JLeCermanpracticeolcapitalizingtLel¡rst
Hegel' spLilosopLyasavLole. ÒtLerconceptsLaveLeencapitalized
intLosesectionsvLicLaredeEnitiveoltLem. Wordsinitalicsrellect
tLe empLasis to Leloundin tLe various Cerman editions olHegel' s
text. JLe translatorandeditors Lave not, Lovever, lelt tLemselves
Vlll The Philosophical Propaedeutic
ovn empLasis vLere tLis vas deemed appropriate. Certain sections
Lave Leen amended in tLe manner olprinting so as to list points
vLicL appear in tLe manuscript as continuous text. Itis Loped tLat
tLese practices vill Lelp tLe student nev to Hegel to grasp more
clearlytLattLevorkisprimarilyanexercisein conceptdeEnitionat
successivelyLigLerlevelsoldevelopment. SquareLracketsindicatea
translator's addition and round Lrackets enclose Hegel' s ovn
ItsLould also LerememLeredtLattLetextoltLePropaedeutic vas
neverrevisedlorpuLlicationLyHegel and tLerelorecontainsmany
incompletesentences andaides-memoire vLicLHegelincludedinorder
presumaLlytolormaLasislorextemporizationinclass. ItsLouldalso
Le noted tLat some oltLe sections oltLe vork, particularly tLose
intended Ly Hegel lor instruction in tLe lover class, may appear
simpletotLepointolLeinguninlormative. SucLaviev,Lovever, is
dangerouspreciselyLecauseoltLeintricateveL olconceptsHegelis
trying to construct.
Michael George
Andrew Vincent
JLe editors visL to tLank SuLrkamp Verlag, Franklurt-am-Nain,
West Cermany lor tLeir kind permission to translate LitLerto
unpuLlisLed sections oltLe Propaedeutic lrom tLeir !97O reprint ol
Hegel' s vorksin Wer
e vol. 4, Nurnberger und Heidelberger Schri
1808-1817. JLey vould also like to tLanktLe editors olEducational
Theory lor tLeir kind permission to use in tLe introduction to tLis
vork parts ol an article Erst puLlisLed as ' Ievelopment an� sell
identity. Hegel' sconcept oleducation' ¸A. W. Vincent andNicLael
Ceorge, Educational Theory, vol. J2 nos J and 4, pp. !J!-4! ,
SummerlFall ! 982) .
JLe editors vould also like to acknovledge tLe vork olW. J.
Harris, vLosepartialtranslation oltLePropaedeutic vaspuLlisLedin
tLeJoural of Speculative Philosophy intLe ! 8ôOs . JLougLextensively
modiEed it nevertLeless lorms tLe Lasis oltLe Erst sections oltLe
present translation. Also tLe editors visL to tLank tLe LiLrary ol
availaLletoustLemanuscriptolanunpuLlisLed, partialtranslationol
tLePropaedeutic undertakenLyJ. H. Creenaround! 8ôO. Mopartol
Creen' stranslationLasLeenutilizedintLepresentvork.
JLe manuscript oltLe Philosophische Propaedeutic vas discovered in
tLe autumn ol ! 8J8 Ly Karl Rosenkranz. Rosenkranz, Hegel' s
LiograpLer, vas at tLe time editing tLecollected edition olHegel' s
vorks . JLePropaedeutic turnedupamongstsomestraypapersLevas
consulting. ItvasaverypatcLytextElledvitLHegel' semendations
andrevritings . RosenkranzorderedtLevariousparagrapLsaccording
to Lis ovn understanding olHegel' s purpose and puLlisLed it as a
separate volume ¸volume XVIII) ol tLe collected vorks ol ! 84O.
InevitaLly, Rosenkranz vas selective in Lis structuring oltLe text.
His ordering ol tLe various sections presumaLly reßected Lis
knovledge ol Hegel' s mature system and Lis acquaintance vitL
Hegel' s letters, specil¡cally tLose to MietLammer, tLe Lead oí tLe
ProtestanteducationdepartmentinIavaria. Hollmeister, vLo took
over editorsLip oltLe FelixNeiner edition olHegel' s vorks lrom
Ceorg Lasson, sligLtly restructured tLe sections oltLe Propaedeutic
and added more material lrom Hegel' s papers. In tLe ! 97Os
text oltLe Propaedeutic in a cLronologicalordervitL lurtLer added
tLesuLstantive curriculumorderingoltLeRosenkranztext, moving
as it does lrom tLelover classes oltLe scLoolto tLe LigLer classes,
andinsteadstructuredtLe text ontLecLronologicalLasisoltLeyears
in vLicL Hegel vrote eacL particular section. JLis cLronological
ordering, tLougL giving tLe text a more scLolarly veneer, does not
reallycontriLuteinanyvaytoitscompreLension. Inlactitpositively
hinders it. It is certainly tLe case tLat Hegel lelt no deEnitive
instructions as totLelorminvLicLhevisLedtLevholetoLe read.
JLe lorm ol tLe vLole is tLerelore open, tLe content Leing a
compilationolHegel' sovnvritings, notes,j ottings andlairstudent
copies . Rosenkranz vassolelyresponsiLlelormakingaLookoutol
tLe various vritings at Lis disposal. It is unlikely tLat Rosenkranz
suLstantively altered tLe text, apart lrom making a lev minor
xii The Philosophical Propaedeutic
corrections, LecauseRosenkranzvasacloselriendolLotLHegeland
tLe puLlication ol Hegel`s collected vorks in tLe ! 8JOs . WLat
Rosenkranz did Lovever vas to try, as an editor must, to clarily,
simplily and unily tLe diverse material Lelore Lim. Il tLere is
tLerelore any criticism to Le made aLout tLe manner in vLicL
RosenkranzundertookLis task it must Le Lased upon a sympatLetic
to tLe readers olLis day.
Hegel structured tLe Propaedeutic in order to Etit into tLe various
yearsoltLescLoolcurriculum. ÒnereasonvLyitisnovsodilEcult
to ordertLe sections is tLatHegel constantly cLanged Lisn¡indas to
tLe Lest means ol introducing Lis pupils to pLilosopLy. Initially,
under pressure lromMietLammer, HegelLad LegunvitLtLeLogic,
as Le vas later to do in Lis Philosophical Encyclopaedia. Hovever,
around ! 8! 2 Le seems to Lave altered Lis vievs somevLat. JLe
introductory course Legan nov vitL vLat Le sav as tLe more
practical suLj ects, social, legal, moral andreligious studies . JLel¡nal
year in vLicL Le taugLt Lis £ncyclopaedia vas used as a résumé ol
tLe vLole system, altLougL Hegel also included some material on
aestLeticslorlourtL-yearstudents. JLepresenteditorsLavetLerelore
LeenlacedvitLaproLlemolLovLesttopresenttLePropaedeutic asa
Look. ItisLopedtLat inseekingto make anintroductory text out ol
tLe vLole tLe editors are in accord vitL Hegel`s ovn spirit and
intentions. JLe purpose ol making tLis vork availaLle to £nglish
readers is to enaLle tLem to Lave access to Hegel`s system ol
pLilosopLy, in its various parts, vitLout immersing tLemselves
immediatelyin tLeluller, more complexvritings. JLe editors Lave
tLereloreadopted anorderingvLicLrellects, as LestastLeyareaLle,
tLematuresysteminmicrocosm. FortLisreasontLepartsLaveLeen
orderedaccordingtosuLjectLeadings, suLdividedLyrelerencetothe
classlevelsinvLicLeacLsectionvasdelivered. JLeErstyearvaslor
tLe lover class ( Unter
lasse) vith an age range ol !4-!5 years, tLe
secondyear vas lor tLe middle class (Mittel
lasse) vitLan age range
ol ! 5-! 8years, andtLetLirdyearvaslortLeLigLerclass(Ober
vitLanage range ol! 7-2Oyears . Iy structuringtLetextupon tLese
principles it is Loped to make it possiLle lor readers unacquainted
vitLHegeltoLegineacLsectionattLe mostelementarylevelandto
advance gradually lromtLere to tLe luller exposition.
Introduction xiii
JLePropaedeutic vas vritten Letveen ! 8O8 and ! 8! ! , vLilst Hegel
vas Rector at tLe MuremLerg Cymnasium. He Lad already Lad
several years experience olteacLing atvariou

levels. From !�95 to
! 8O! LeLadacted as aprivatetutorlor tLecLildren oltLeSteiggers
von JscLugg lamily in Ierne and tLe Cogels in Franklurt. He lelt
Franklurtlor]ena in ! 8O!to take up tLe postolprivat-docent at tLe
Iniversity. WLile at]ena Le completed Lis Erst maj or vork, t�e
Phenomenology of Spirit. JLe stay in]ena came to an aLrupt end in
! 8O7vitLtLeentryolMapoleon`sarmyintotLecity. Hegelvaslora
year tLerealter employed as tLe editor ol� CatLoli

nevspaper, tLe
Bamberger Zeitung, a positionLe quite oLviouslyen¡ oyed. Hovev

LesougLt greaterjoL security, andin ! 8O8 MietLammer lou

d Lim
tLepostolRectorandProlessorolPLilosopLyattLeCymnasium, or
classical scLool lor Loys, at MuremLerg. MietLammer vas keen to
introduce elementary courses in pLilosopLy and religion to scL�ol
cLildren anentLusiasmnotsLaredvLole-LeartedlyLyHegel.WLilst
at Mure¬Lerg Hegel vrote one oltLe ricLest vorks
lLis lile th
Science of Logic, tLe so-called larger Logic, puLlisLed
in ! 8! �. JLis
vork andtLePhenomenology LrougLtsulEcientacademicstandinglor
Lim to Le ollered tLree cLairs in pLilosopLy, at Ierlin, Heidelberg
and£rlangen. ÒvingtotLeuncertainty aLouttLcIerlinoller�eg
accepted tLe cLair at HeidelLerg. Hovever, Le mo
ed t


! 8! 8 vLere Le continued to vrite and pursue Lis pLilosopLical
interestsuntilLis deatLin ! 8J! .
It is necessary to correct tLe popular image olHegel as a 'Leavy
Cermanicuniversity pLilosopLer`. Hegel vas tLirty-eigLt years old
vLenappointedtotLeMuremLergpost. Hevas lorty-l¡v




HeidelLerg. IlveincludetLeperiodsol Lis

ps, Hegel
Ladspentapproximatelylourteenyears, quitesuccesslullyitappears,
as alouse and scLool teacLerinstructing cLildren and young adults
LetveentLeagesollourteenandnineteen. JLisneitLerdampenedLis
pLilosopLicalinterest nor restrictedLis
riting. Nany ol


olteacLing, speciEcally in tLe Cymnasium, vere spent instructing
tLe lourteen- to tventy-year-old age groups in philosopLy. JLe
Propaedeutic lormed tLe Lasis oltLis instruction.
£acL class at tLe Cymnasiumentailed teacLing lor approximatcly
lourLours perveek. SincealltLeyearsveretaugLtconcurrently, tLe
total vas some tvelve Lours per veek. Hegel prepared Lis lessons
utilizinglairlysLortparagrapLsloreacLsectionvLicLLevould read
XIV The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe structure oleacL lesson vas standard and required pupils to
recapitulate, systematically, vLatLadLeenlearnedfromtLeprevious
veek' s lesson. Hegel encouraged questions and discussion ol tLe
topic, sometimes, it appears, spending tLe vLole Lour covering
dill¡culties, olvLicL no douLt tLere vere many. He tLen dictated
noteslromtLetextoltLePropaedeutic, vLicLnotesLeexpectedtoLe
great Leliever.
InandoutolclassHegelvasnotedasadisciplinarian. HeLelieved
in oLedienceLytLe cLild, tLougL tLereis no suggestionolpLysical
punisLmentLeingused. LessonsquiteolteninvolvedlearningLyrote
Lelorediscussion. HegelLada deEnitepLilosopLicalreasonlortLis .
JLe individual mind must Lave sonetLing to vork vitL. Ir cannot
tLinkin a void. Òriginality and uniqueness in tLougLt do not arise
lrom an intellectual vacuum. Inventiveness derives lron tLe
assimilationoltLesuLstanceoltLougLt. HegelsavLislunctionas a
teacLer as ' dinning' tLe suLstance olthougLt into tLe pupils so that
tLe loundations oltLougLt processes couldLelaid.
JLepurposeoltLePropaedeutic istLreeloldandcanLelairlysimply
stated. Primarilyitvasdesignedasanelementaryintroductiontothe
study olpLilosopLy, speciEcally lor tLose going on to university
study. It Lardly needs to Le said tLat Hegel' sidea oltLe scope and
nature olpLilosopLy is dillerent lromtoday' s. Secondly, and more
tLevarious disciplinesintLescLool curriculum. JLecLildrenvould
see tLe overall point ol studying tLe various suLjects and could
appreLend tLe interconnections Letveen tLem. JLe Enal aim oltLe
actual teacLing oltLe Propaedeutic vas moral instruction, althougL
tLis pointLas to Lecarelully examined.
JLelattertvopoints, vLicLelucidatetLegeneralintentionsoltLe
Propaedeutic, require expansion. Òn tLe question ol tLe scLool
encapsulating tLe essence olreality. JLe system, overall, sLovs the
tLrougL tLe natural vorld olvLicL it is so mucL a part. Politics,
morality, religion, Listory, tLenatural sciences andsolorthprovide
n+anilold illustrations ol tLis tLeme. JLe pupils in studying tLe
perspective. We must rememLer tLat in Hegel' s time it vas still
possiLle to claim an encyclopaedic mentality. As one Hegel scLolar
Introduction xv
Las put it. ' It vas still possiLle to read, and to Lave read, all tLe
masterpieces oltLe Creeks and Romans, and ol£uropeanliterature
and pLilosopLy, and to try at tLe same time to keep up vitL tLe
sciences. Hegel' spLilosopLyconlrontsus astLevorkolamanvLo
LasnotsLunnedtListremendousellort.,2 IntracingtLemovementol
tLougLt Ly vLicL tLe vorld is developing, Hegel Lelieved tLat Le
vasuncovering tLeprocess LyvLicLtLeindividualunloldsvLatis
vitLinLimself JLepurposeoltLepLilosopLicalsciencesistLesame
as education, namelymakingNindknovntoitsellormaking itsell
its ovn oLj ect. JLe educated individual is one vLo Las assimilated
tLe vorld conceptually and realizes Lis identity vitL Nind ¸Spirit) .
SucLanindividualis' atLomeintLevorld' . JLeparticularindividual
must, necessarily, pass tLrougL tLe prelormed stages ol Spirit. He
must traverse in microcosm, as it vere, tLe macrocosm olLuman
ListoryandtLeknovledgevLicLLumanityLasaccruedtoitself JLis
istLepreconditionLotLoltLe development olSpirititsellandoltLe
individual. It Lecomes ' transparent' as it is recapitulated in tLe
understanding oleacLnev generation. JLis is tLerelore tLe essence
oltLeeducationalprocess emLodied, inemLryo, in tLePropaedeutic,
and in maturity, in tLe Encyclopaedia.
JLe content oleducationin respect oltLe scLool curriculumis to
LederivedlromtLelormativestagesolSpirit. JLevariousstructural
or material element vLicL it is tLe purpose oltLe curriculum to
communicate to tLe cLild. Hegelputs it so in Lis Phenomenology of
Spirit: ' JLus as lar as lactual inlormationis concerned, ve l¡nd tLat
vLatin lormer ages engagedtLeattentionolmen olmature minds,
Las Leenreduced to tLelevel ollacts, exercises andeven gameslor
cLildren, and, in tLe cLild' s progress tLrougL tLe scLool, ve sLall
asitvere, inasilLouette.,3 JLe acquisitionoltLisknovledgeisnot
merelyaprocessolpassiveaLsorption, tLougLlearningLyroteLasa
deEnite place, italso entails anactive'enteringinto' tLeveryprocess
Ly vLicL Spirit Las attained its sell-realization. In Lis second
MuremLergSchool Address HegelsaystLat'illearninglimiteditsellto
merereceiving, tLeellectvouldnotLemucLLettertLanilvevrote
sentences on vater. loritis nottLereceivingLuttLesell-activity ol
compreLension and tLe pover to use it again, tLat Erst makes
knovledge our possession' .4 JLe Propaedeutic represents Hegel' s
attempt to make Lis system, Lased upon tLe lormative stages ol
Spirit, tLe Lasis ol tLe scLool curriculum. It vas designed to
introduce tLe cLild in an active vay to tLe acquisition ol tLe
xvi The Philosophical Propaedeutic
previously accumulated totality olLuman knovledge, vLat Hegel
terms 'Spirit' .
Hegeldid, at times, speculatetLattLeclassicsougLtt oLeaccorded
a more prominent place tLan pLilosopLy in tLe Cymnasium' s
curriculum. JLereason lor tLis vas tLattLe classics olCreece and
RomeallovtLecLild, inHegel' sviev, to ' distanceLimselllromLis
ovn immediate interests and particular Listorical situation. JLis is
sometLing tLat pLilosopLy does more aLstractly. JLe virtue oltLe
classics resides, tLerelore, in tLe lact tLat tLey are, lor tLe cLild, an
alienvorldandonetovLicLLecanreadilyrelate unencumLered Ly
anyprejudices derivedlromLisovnsituation. YettLeyprovideLim
vitL a means to acquire tLe Lasic structures oltLougLt vLicL, at a
later stage, vill Lecome tLe loundation ol Lis understanding and
appreciationolLisovnpresentvorld. ÒltLeancientvritingsHegel
says . ' JLeperlectionandgrandeuroltLesemasterpiecesmustLetLe
intellectual LatL, tLe secular Laptism, vLicL gives tLe mindits Erst
and indeliLle tone and tincture in respect ol good taste and
knovledge. '
As Cadamer comments on tLis tLeme, in Hegel ' ve
recognize tLe classicists' prej udice tLat itis particularly tLe vorld ol
classicalantiquityin vLicL tLeuniversalnatureolSpiritcan Le most
easilylound. Joseekone' sovnintLealien, toLecomeatLomeinit,
istLemostLasiciiiovementolSpirit, vLoseLeingisareturntoitsell
lrom vLat is otLer.
In order tLat tLe cLild may derive tLe lullest
LeneEtlromtLese vritings, itisnecessary tLat LeLecomes lamiliar
vitL tLe essence oltLe Creek vorld. JLe cLild must Le taugLt to
appreciate tLe ancient cultures lrom aninternal perspective. Such a
perspective is only to Le attained tLrougL a compreLension of tLe
classical languages tLemselves . JLe cLild must not study tLese
in tLe languages invLicL tLey vereoriginallyvritten. JLeirstudy
provides tLe cLild vitL tLe capacitytounderstand tLe ' grammar' ol

Creek tLougLt, and tLrougL a tLorougL grounding in tLe nature ol
tLe language Le Lecomes avare oltLe deptL and prolundity oftLe
� ������� ����
� �



n tLeE


language and age. Hegel, interestingly, sav little value in
translations, as Le says: ' Jranslations give us, to some extent tLe
meaning, LutnottLelorm, notinits inneretLerealsoul. JLeyarelike
artiEcialroses vLicL may resemLlenatureinsLape, colour, perLaps
even i smell, Lut tLe cLarm, tenderness and delicacy oflile is not
tLeirs. Language is tLe musical element, tLe element olintimacy
Introduction xvii
vLicLdisappearsintranslation, tLeEnelragranceLymeansolvLicL
tLe soul' s sympatLy may Le enj oyed Lut vitLout vLicL a classic
vork tasteslikeRLinevine tLatLas lost its ßavour.
' Òne suspects
tLis vas a peculiarly meaninglul analogy lor Hegel.
in Lelping to develop tLe moral sensitivities ol tLe cLild, and in
avakeningLis mindtoLeauty, tLey alsopossessalunctionalvalueas
a prerequisite to university study. JLis Lovever is ol secondary
signiEcance, tLeir primary importance Leing to estaLlisL tLe
preconditions necessary lor tLe development oltLe cLild' s capacity
lorparticipationintLelileolLissocietyas alullcitizen. JLeclassics
empLasizedtLeduties oltLecitizen. JLis tLemevasstrengtLenedin
tLe scLool curriculum Ly military exercises. ]ust as tLe Creeks Lad
LeenpreparedtodelendtLeirnation, civilizationandculturevLenit
vastLreatened Lyexternal enemies, soougLttLemoderncitizen to
LetaugLttLemeansLyvLicLtodelendLisovnsocietyandstate. In
tLeenj oymentolcitizensLip. Nilitaryservice, andtLevillingnessto
risk one' s lile lor tLe state, served to strengtLen tLe individual' s
identiEcation vitLtLepoliticalstructuresandtLelile olLis state. In
tLemodernvorld, Lovever,tLeoLligationtocontriLutetovardstLe
delence olsociety Lad, lor Hegel , Leen greatly diminisLed Ly tLe
creation olstanding armies.
In placing tLe primary empLasis upon tLe classics as a means ol
educationinscLools, HegeldidnotmeantodevaluetLestudyoltLe
natural sciences and matLematics . JLesesuLjects, Lovever, vereol
secondary importance, lor tLeir content did not lend itsellto tLe
communicationolideas, orto tLeinstilling oletLical concepts. JLe
natural sciences and matLematics are tLe means LyvLicL man may
attaintotLeendsvLicLLeLassetLimsell, LuttLeyplaynopartlor
Hegel in tLe determination oltLose ends. JLis is tLeprerogative ol
tLeliLeralsciences, olvLicL, so lar as tLeeducationoltLeyoungis
concerned, classicsis accreditedaplaceolLigL eminenceilnot quite
Hegel' sinterestintLeclassicsstilldidnotstopLimspeculating on
tLe precise role ol tLe teacLer, specil¡cally in tLe teacLing ol
pLilosopLy ontLecurriculum. His generaluneaseis reßectedin Lis
letters to MietLammer. Jvo letters ol2J ÒctoLer ! 8! 2 provide a
lairly detailed reviev ol Lis tLougLt.
Hegel conlessed tLat Lis
tLougLts vere incomplete and tLat Le vas not settled in Lis ovn
mindasregardstLenaturcolpLilosopLicalinstruction. HeraisedtLe
X V 111 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
ol tLe Cymnasial youtL - altLougL Le conlessed, vitL tongue in
cLeek, tLat Le sLould not lay too mucL stress on tLis otLervise Le
vould Le putting Limsell out ol a j oL. His remarks on tLe
introductory classes inpLilosopLyaredividedintotvoparts, l¡rstly,
tLose concerned vitL tLe topics taugLt, and secondly, tLose on tLe
metLods olteacLing.
JLe programme tLat Hegel Lere outlines is very similar to tLe
general structure adopted Ly Rosenkranz in Lis Erst edition oltLe
Propaedeutic, altLougL tLe second year includes Cosmology and
Matural JLeology. Logic is reserved lor tLe intermediate class vitL
PsycLology. PsycLology, in tLe Rosenkranzedition, is dealtvitLin
tLesectiononPLenomenology. HegelLadinlactdealtvitLtLetopic
ol PsycLology in Lis Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet in Lis later
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part JLree, tLe PLilosopLy
olNind, PsycLologyvasalateadditiontotLesectiononSuLjective
Nind. Itis dealtvitLasa dialectical mediationolAntLropologyand
PLenomenology. It is an odd addition even in tLe mature system
since itrepeatsandoverlaps mucL oltLe PLenomenology section.
Hegel maintained tLat tLe suLj ects olReligion, Lav and £tLics
contain material vLicL is more directly practical and consequently
easier lor tLe cLildren to grasp. JLe concepts vitLin Lav and
Norality are more immediate and del¡nite lor tLe cLild. Logical
lormsareonlysLadovsoltLerealandtLereloreLardertograsp. JLe
second stage oltLe course vouldinclude logical, psycLological and
metapLysical ideas . Hegel contended tLat logic is simpler tLan
psycLology, since tLe lormer deals vitL aLstractions vLereas tLe
latter deals vitL tLe LigLly complex and concrete. He divideJ
PsycLologyintotvoparts. ¸a) PLenomenalNindorSpirit, ¸L) Spirit
in-and-lor-itself JLe Erst part deals, as it does in tLe mature
£ncyclopaedia, vitL tLe pLases covered in tLe PLenomenology,
namely, Consciousness, Sell-Consciousness and Reason. In tLe
second part, Feeling, Conception and Imagination are discussed.
WitLin tLe discussion on Logic, Hegel Lelieved tLat tLe Kantian
Antinomies and Matural JLeology sLould Lediscussedin dialectical
terms. JLeAntinomies introduce tLe arguments lor tLeexistenceol
Cod and can Le dialectically criticized, tLereLy leading to Hegel' s
ovn perspective onlogic.
JLe l¡nal year vas to Le a reviev oltLe Ceneral £ncyclopaedia,
emLracing tLe entire content olpLilosopLy, tLe main suLdivisions
vereLogic, tLePLilosopLyolMatureand tLePLilosopLy olSpirit.
Conscious oltLe lact tLat Le Lad covered mucL oltLe material in
previous years, Hegel maintained tLat Lis treatment vould only Le
I ntrodu ction XIX
cursory. He also admitted tLat tLere vould Le some proLlems in
dealing vitL tLe PLilosopLy olMature, partly Lecause many oltLe
cLildren regarded it as Loring andirrelevant. JLe Nind also Lad to
' grasp vLat is opposed to tLe Concept, into tLe Concept' , in otLer
vords, it Lad to translorm natural oLjects and processes into
conceptual lorm. CLildren lack LotL tLe intellectualvigour and tLe
knovledge to pursue sucL an enterprise successlully. JLus eacL
suLj ect in tLe £ncyclopaedia vould Le taugLt vitLin tLe various
years oltLe Cymnasium. JLe only suLjects vLicL vould not Le
accorded detailed treatment vere tLe PLilosopLy ol Mature, tLe
PLilosopLy olHistory and AestLetics .
Hegel vent onintLeletterolÒctoLer! 8!2toreviev tLemetLods
olteacLing. Itis common, Hegelmaintained, to tLinktLat one can
separate pLilosopLical tLougLt lrom tLe content aLout vLicL one
pLilosopLizes . Hegel Lelieved tLat tLe tvo cannot Le separated so
easily.ItisinrevievingtLecontenttLatonelearnstopLilosopLize. It
is tLrougL tLe carelul, systematic study ol tLe content ol lav,
pLilosopLy. PLilosopLyis a systematiccomplexol' Sciences' lull ol
content. ALsolute knovledge is possiLle tLrougL a grasp ol tLe
totality olall tLe sciences . PLilosopLy devoid olLotL a content and
systematic structure is LapLazard, empty andlragmentary. Crasping
tLe content oltLe sciencesis grasping tLe essenceolpLilosopLy. Jo
tLink tLrougL detailed material in class and in Lomevork is to
re-enact tLe principle oltLougLtitself JLe matLematical proLlem
anditssolution, tLeproolaLouttLeexistenceolCodanditscritique,
tLe tLeory aLout tLe nature olligLt, all, vLen tLougLt tLrougL,
Lecome part ol my tLougLt process. A teacLer must possess tLe
knovledgeLimsellandtLinkittLrougLinlrontoltLecLildren. 1Le
pupil must tLen take on tLe Lard 'laLour oltLe Motion' , i.e. tLink
tLougL tLeproLlem Limselland ' possess' it.
In tLis process olteacLing, content is given to tLepupil' s minds,
vLicLcontentreplacesmereopinion. JLescLoolisnotaplacelortLe
advancementolknovledge, ratLeritis concernedvitLtLeEllingol
emptyLeadsvitLtLericLexistingLodyoltLougLt. ItovercomestLe
cLild' snaturaltendency to caprice. Hegel, quite oLviously, Lasl¡ttle
time Lere lor tLe Rousseauist ideals ol education as expressed in
mile. JLe aim overall inpLilosopLyis tLereloreto ' gettLetLougLt
oltLeuniverse into tLeLeads oltLe cLildren' .
We vill conclude tLis section vitL some remarks on moral
instructionin tLe scLool. Hegel is notinterestedprimarily in giving
tLe pupils direct instruction, ratLer Le tLinks tLat morality vill Le
xx The Philosophical Propaedeutic
inculcated gradually tLrougL tLe systematic study ol tLe various
suLj ects comprising tLe curriculum, most speciEcally tLe liLeral
sciences, vitLtLe classics andpLilosopLyLeing accreditedkeyroles.
WLat is Lere Leing suggested Ly Hegel is an indirect lorm ol
intellectualsocialization. Hovever, as empLasizedearlier, tLisisnot
simply a passive receptivity Lut ratLer involves tLe critical sell-
activity oltLe pupil' s mind assimilating tLeknovledge. JLis vLole
process may Le descriLed as anintellectual ' Iildung' .
JLeideaolIildung originated vitL tLepoet C. N. Wieland and
gained consideraLle popularity vitL tLe Bildungsroman tradition in
eigLteentL-centuryCermanliterature, reacLingitszenitLinCoetLe' s
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and ScLiller' s Wilhelm Tell. JLis tradition
vas concerned to trace out, in detail, tLe total, Larmonious devel-
opmentolanindividual tLrougLa diverse range olsocialandmoral
experiences. Iildung is tLe process ol sucL a development. JLe
development oltLe cLild lrom a natural and instinctive vill to a
tLe idea to explain tLe development ol Nind or Spirit in tLe
individual, in cultures and in vorld Listory. It also explains tLe
intellectual and moral development oltLe cLild tLrougL tLe scLool
curriculum. JLepupilislorcedtosacrihceLisimmediateinterestsor
idiosyncrasies to tLe experience ol tLe systematic demands ol
tLougLt, asemLodiedintLecurriculum. £acLsuLjectorscience, eacL
lorm olconsciousness, must Le tLougLt tLrougL, assimilated and
me as this educated and socialized individual. For Hegel tLis is tLe
process oltLe gradual development ollreedom vitLin eacL man,
vitLin Lis society and state andl¡nallyvitLin Lis Listory. As Hegel
puts it ' tLe Enal purpose ol education . . . is liLeration and tLe
strugglelorLigLerliLerationstill, educationistLeaLsolutetransition
lroman etLical suLstantialityvLicLisimmediate andnaturaltoone
vLicL is intellectual and so botL inEnitely suLjective and lolty
enougL to Lave attained universality ollorm.,9 £ducation and tLus
Iildungare regarded asanintellectualadvance. JLeyLeginvitLtLe
cLild at tLe level olinstinct. Freedomis Lere simply lolloving out
immediate desires vitLout oLstruction. JLe guidance oltLe cLild
tovards intellectual concerns is descriLed Ly Hegel as a ' second
LirtL' . 10 JLe individual in tLe scLool is no longer identiEed LyLis
idiosyncrasies . JLe single, individual, consciousness is an empty

Lusk. Individualityis not uniqueness . IndividualityismanilestintLe
'IildungolSpirit ' . As Hegel put it. 'JLisresLapingoltLe soul, tLis
aloneisvLat educationmeans. JLemoreeducateda man is, tLeless
is tLere apparent in Lis LeLaviour anytLing peculiar only to Lim,
anytLing tLat is merely contingent.,11 Freedom or liLeration is an

olknovledge) into tLe suLj ective vill oltLe individual. Rational
tLougLt Lecomes LaLitual and overcomes all capriciousness. JLe
result, lor Hegel, is tLeetLicalcitizen.
JLe Propaedeutic, as tLe loundation ol tLe scLool curriculum
ensures tLerelore tLe ' mediation` olLuman cLaracter and vill- it�
aLsorptioninto tLe vidersocialetLosolvLicLitisitsellaconstituent
part. £ducation olcourse does not Legin Lere. In tLe lamily, lor


le, m

cL oltLe normative oretLical contentis unconsciously
assimilatedvialove, trustandnaturalleeling. IntLescLoolnormsare
more systematically and tLeoretically inculcated. JLis process is

tinued to a mucL LigLerlevel in tLe university. Finally, in civil
society, alterlormalscLoolingis completed, tLe individual comes to
recognize Lis dependence on Lis lellov citizens and to sLare in tLe
pursuit olLis common interests via tLe state. JLus tLe educational

s olIildung goes onin societyitself £ducationgenerally, Ly
retracing tLe patL ol Spirit' s sell-realization, rases tLe individual' s


institutions olhis society. JLe individual vLo Las undergone tLis



tionLasLadLissuLj ectivityLrougLtintoconlormity
vitL tLe Listorical progress olmankind as manilested in tLe social
institutions, c

stoms and etLical precepts ol Lis age. Iy tLinking
ugL tLe Listory ol ' JLougLt' and tLe ideals olLumanity, tLe
pupils slovly assimilate tLe content olmorality into tLeir tLougLt
processes . JLe Propaedeutic tLerelore, encapsulates lor Hegel tLe
lorm and content ol tLe course ol instruction necessary, so Le
Lelieved, to Lring tLe cLild oltLe modern vorldinto tLat state ol


as an active, rational, inlormed, and concernedcitizenolLis society
and age.
The Propaedeutic and the System of Philosophy
JLe Philosophical Propaedeutic is ol signiEcance lor a numLer ol
reasons . WitL perLaps tLe exception olparts oltLe]ena lectures it



vorkisHegel' sonlyrealattempttoencompass
tLetotaLtyolLispLilosopLyvitLinonetext. AdmittedlytLedetailed
ordering oltLe text is not alvays tLat oltLe mature vritings and

oltLe categories onlyLriel¡yLroacLedLereLyHegelundergo
consideraLlelurtLerdevelopmentintLeEncyclopaedia. MonetLeless
XXll The Philosophical Propaedeutic
tLe Lasic ideas and structure ol tLe mature system is Lere in
Il tLe present student ol tLis translation Erst reads JLe
PLnosopLical£ncyclopaedia ¸For tLe HigLer Class] Le vnl encounter,
in tLis sLortened version olthe system, tLe greater part olHegel`s
ideas and concepts. JLougL tLe text cannot Le said to make
Hegel easy as an introduction, it presents tLe Leginning student ol
HegelvitLlarless sLeerverLiagetLanis loundintLelatervritings.
As sucL it is tLe editors ' Lope tLat tLis Look vill enaLle tLose
unlamiliarvitLHegel' ssystemtoLegintoplumLtLedeptLtLerein.
Hovever it is recoinmended tLat tLis vork Le readnot in isolation
LutratLer as a guidelor a viderstudyinvLicLrelerenceis madeto
otLer autLorities on Hegel and to tLe lull Hegelian system in tLe
maturevorks . WLilstitLasnotprovenpossiLletoprovideadetailed
commentary lor tLe text, tLis general introduction Las Leen added
vitL a viev to providing a degree olelucidation in respect oltLe
more complex parts oltLe vork.
JLe Propaedeutic may Le divided into tLree principal parts. JLe
Logic, Noral and Social PLilosopLy, and JLe £ncyclopaedia. Òl
tLesetLelirstandtLetLirdaretLemostcloselylinked. AsintLelater
vorks, tLe £ncyclopaedia contains tLePLilosopLyolMaturevLicL,
as tLe oLjectiEcation oltLe Idea or Spirit, represents tLe concrete
expression olHegel' s pLilosopLy ratLer tLan tLe purely conceptual
lormulationolitintLeLogicitself JLePLilosopLyolNindmayLe
said to encompass tLe elementary PLenomenology olSpirit and tLe
Noral and Social PLilosopLy. JLe Noral and Social PLilosopLy is
alsousedasanintroductoryeleinentlortLeloverclass. WLatlollovs
may Le read as applying also to tLe mature lormulation olHegel' s
JLeLogicisconcernedvitLtLelormoltLougLt, vitLpuretLougLt
considered as lounded upon concepts vLicL are at once individual
and interconnected one vitL anotLer. It is tLe realm ol ' aLstract
tLougLt' , namely tLat realm vLicL is Lased upon tLe capacity for
terms tLe Concept or Motion. Itis also pre-eminently tLe realm ol
dialecticalreasoning. ItisnotavorkintLemodernsenseoltLevord
'logic' , norisitsloundationeventLatolAristotleandtLesyllogistic
style tLat Hegel vas lamiliar vitL. JLe dialectical logic olHegelis
lounded upon a sense olnecessity quite distinct lrom any lormal
Intruduction XXll1
logical system. It is perLaps Lest understood as a necessary
interconnection and dependency olconcepts one upon anotLer. For
example, tLe Erst triadic movement in tLe Logic, tLat ol Ieing,
MotLing,Iecoming,i scLaracteristicoltLevLolesystemoltLougLt.
JLis triadis explained in somedetail Lelov.
WLereas in tLe logic Hegel is dealing vitL ideas or tLougLt, in tLe
pLilosopLy olnatureLeis examiningvLatis apparently an external
existence. As Le states repeatedly - tLougLt provides universal
aLstract categories , LuttLecontentorsuLstanceolrepresentationsor
perceptions is taken lrom experience ol sometLing apparently
external. In tLis sense nature appears as ' outside' tLougLt. Hegel
relers to it as ' otLer-Leing' or spirit as otLer. JLe existent Idea is
nature. JLepLilosopLyolnaturetLereloredealsvitLtLevarietiesol
existencevLicLcorrespondtoourideas . MatureortLenaturalvorld
istLecradleoutolvLicLLumanconsciousnessandspiritdevelop. It
is tLus, lorHegel, an essentialpreliminary to anyaccountolLuman
consciousnessorsocialdevelopment. YettLeapparentexternalaspect
consciousness. In tLe pLilosopLy olnature tLe Luman mind treats
nature as an external oLj ect. Alter a detailed reviev olnotions ol
matter, motion, spaceandtime, andtLedevelopmentolorganiclile
in plants and animals, tLe pLilosopLy ol nature arrives at
consciousness. Hegel' sreviev oltLesestagesisLasedontLesciences
olLisovntime. SucLsciencesarereliantontLenotionolexternality.
YetintLemomentolconsciousness mind orspiritrealizes tLat it Lad
created or presupposed tLe separate existence ol nature. Mature
ultimately Las no existence independent lrom mind. Its apparent
externalityis reallya pLase in tLe developmentoltLeLumanmind.
JLerelore tLere is notLing intrinsically vrong lor Hegel vitL a
tLeoryolanexternalvorldas long as onerealizes tLat sucLatLeory
is mind-dependent.
Spirit [Mind]
JLis is lor Hegel tLe most central term in Lis pLilosopLy. JLe
Cerman vord Geist vLicL Hegel employs can Le translated vitL
equal validity as Nind or Spirit. JLe tendency Las Leen lor RigLt
Hegelians to employ tLe latter term in order to give to Hegel' s
pLilosopLy a religious tone and to empLasize its supposed
compatiLility vitL CLristianity. Òn tLeotLer Land, Lelt Hegelians
LavetendedtoseeGeist intermsolMindandtLusasquintessentially
XX1V The Philosophical Propaedeutic
antLropomorpLic and pantLeistic in its implications . JLe political
dimension ol tLe translation aside, tLe term is ol consideraLle
importance in Hegel' s pLilosopLy Lecause it represents the active
principle LeLind tLe vLole olcreation. As sucL it is a ' suLject' as
opposedtoalileless ' suLstance' qua Spinozaanditrenders tLevLole
olHegel' s system olpLilosopLy as essentially dynamic ratLer tLan
ontologically static. It is Geist vLicL realizes or actualizes itsell
variouslyin man, in Luman society andin Listory. It permeates not
only tLe natural vorld, Lut also tLe vorld ol man or SuLjective
Spirit. Spirit presents itsell in tLe vorld as a dicLotomy Letveen
Mature and Nan, Letveen tLe oLj ective andtLe suLjective elements
in perception and tLus olcourse in tLe epistemological proLlem ol
Lov man ' cones to knov tLe vorld' . JLe dicLotomy Letveen
suLject andoLjectis also tLeLasis olman' ssenseol' alienation' , tLe
sense ol not 'Leing at Lome in tLe vorld' , vLicL is tLe Luman
condition and vLicL mankind Las sougLt to Leal via pLilosopLical
enquiry lor more tLan tvo tLousand year
egel' s system ol
pLilosopLy, as tLe exposition in rational terms oltLe progress ol
Geist, is tLe 'intellectual' meansolLealing_tLis senseolestrangement
lrom tLe vorld. Iecause LotL t
uman mind and tLe oLjective
vorld are tLe product olone and tLe same process, in Geist it is
possiLlelortLesuLject,man, toLaveknovledgeoltLeoLjective, tLe
pLysicalvorld. JLisknovledgeisoltvokinds.l¡rstly,tLesumtotal
oltLelogical' Conc

pts' vLicLdescriLetLcvorld,andsecondly, tLe
'logical' means Ly vLicL tLese Concepts interconnect one vitL
anotLer andare mutually related and dependent. JLisistLepurpose
ol tLe Logic in Hegel' s pLilosopLy. It provides tLe Lare skeletal
outline ol LotL tLe pLysical and Luman vorld. It should not,
vorld and Luman understanding and knovledge. JLe scLema ol
are ' concreteuniversals' vLicL areintLeverystulloltLevorldand
are tLere to Le distilled lrom it. Nankind and tLe natural vorld
partake oltLe same lundamental ' ground' and tLe same ' Reason'
governs LotL. As sucL tLe Logic is tLe rational exposition oltLe
underlying Reason ol existence, a Reason vLicL lor Hegel is
everyvLere manilest andpresent.
principle in Hegel' s system vLicL develops in tLe vorld in and
tLrougL Reason, and as tLe creation ol tLat reality vLicL is
'understood' and explicated via tLe dialectic in tLe Logic and tLe
vLole Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences .
Some philosophical terms in the Propaedeutic
Being in-itself and for-itself
Actu andpotentia: A Concept ola tLing 'in-itsell is vLatitis in its
is' lor-itsellisvLatinitLasLecomerealizedoractualized, i . e. vLat
in its Concept Las developed lrom potentiality into reality. JLe
vLole olcreation is tLe process oltLe development olReason via
Spirit to tLe complete explicit presentation olvLat is implicit and
_ 'in-itself.i. e. a movementlromtLe'in-itselftotLe' lor-itself. JLis
movementis complete vLentLetLing isvLatitis 'in-and-loritsell
and Las Lecome ' actual' . JLe lamous pLrase attriLuted to Hege;-­
' vLatisrealisrationalandvLatisrationalisreal' ,isanexpressionol
tLisidea. WLat Las Lecome' real' or' actual'islullyrationalLecauseit
corresponds toa Concept or Motion (Begrif) and tLus to Reasonas
sucL. Conversely only tLat vLicL is rational, i. e. tLat vLicL is
containedintLeConceptolatLing, canLecomeactualor'realized' .
Immediate and mediated relations
IlI engage in social intercourse vitL someone I am in a state ol
'immediate relation' lor Hegel. Il Lovever I sell sometLing to
someone else I cannot Le said tLen to stand in sucL an immediate
relation, rather my relationsLip to anotLer is ' mediated' Lecause a
entails lav, tLe agencies ol enlorcement, etc. JLe lormal duties
not Ly mysellLut Ly tLe state. JLe tvo contracting parties may
determinetLe 'content' olacontract, LuttLattLecontractisenlorced,
is dravnup in accordance vitLlegal norms, is sometLing vLicL I
undertake' mediatedly'tovardsanotLer. Anyrelation, logical, social,
political, etc. , vLicL entails a relerence to and a dependency upon
sometLingexternaltotLeimmediatecondition,issaidtoLyHegel to
Le ' mediated' .
Sublation, moment and the frst dialectical triad
JLe Cerman verL aujeben is central to Hegel' s entire pLilosopLical
systemLecauseit is tLe operative term oltLe dialectic. IntLeLogic
eacLconceptorsetolconceptsissaidtoLe' suLlated' ataLigLerstage
oltLougLt and conceptualization and tLis process is tLedialectic at
vork. JLe Cerman term Las tLe dual and contradictory senses ol
' aLolition' and ' preservation' . JLus vLat ¡s ' suLlated' is at once
acorn vLicL Lecomes tLe migLty oak tree may Le said to Lave
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Lecome negated Ly tLe oak vLicL it Lecomes andyet to Lave Leen
oakLasactuallyLecome. JLeprocessoldevelopment, intLis casein
tLe pLysical ratLer tLan tLe logical realm, is a series ol' moments'
vitLinoneßuid, dynamicvLole. JLe acornistLus onemomentola
process vLicL ends vitL tLe oak, it itsell Leing a moment oltLe
vLole process olits grovtL, existence and deatL.
Hegel means Ly vay olan elucidation oltLe Ersttriadicrelationin
tLeLogic- arelationvLicLLasperplexednotonlytLosenevtotLe
study olHegelLut some scLolars vLo areverylamiliarindeedvitL
Lis vork.
JLe Erst logical transition is tLat oltLe moments olIeing and
MotLing andtLeir suLlationin tLe concept olIecoming.
HegelclaimstLatIeingcannotLe' tLougLt' , lorasaconceptitLas
noqualities, no ' determinations' , andtLus isungraspaLleas anidea.
FollovingKant, and rejectingParmenides, Hegel Ends nopredicates
atallintLeconceptolIeinganddeniestLatitisapredicateatall. Òn
tLecontraryitistLeconditionolallpredicates, tLecopulaintLeErst
part olanyproposition oltLekind'JLisis' . IeingtLenis tLemost
common olall ideas, as it is tLe condition oland is sLared Ly all
existent entities . Yet ve cannot, ilve attempt to tLink vLat pure
Ieing is 'in itsell, arrive at a deEnite speciEc quality. Indeed ve
arrive at tLe opposite conclusion and are lorced to accept tLat pure
Ieing is tLe same as pure MotLing, lor it is vitLout any quality,
quantity, dillerentiation, etc. Ilvenov attempttotLinkvLatµure
MotLingis and to arrive ata similar quality veare again lrustrated.
Yet in tLis instance our lrustration is not unexpected, because
l¡ndadeEnitequality. Hovever, vLenvetryto' tLink' tLeconcept
qualitytoit, tLatoltLelackoraLsence olall qualities . Logicallyve
are tLus in a strange vorld. JLe concept ol Ieing produces tLe
deEnition 'a completeindeterminacy' or 'a lack olany content' . JLe
result negates not only tLe endeavour Lut also vhat ve have Leen
logicallyexpecting, lorsurelyIeingissometLingandassucLsLould
LedeEnaLleinpositiveandnotmerelynegativeterms. MotLingasa
concept, ontLeotLerLand, is also perplexing. WeareoLligedtotry
to ' tLink' MotLing, to derive some concept ol it, and yet tLis is
contrarytovLatvesLouldlogicallyexpect. £ven tLoughourresult
produces a negative deEnition, namely tLe aLsence ol all
determinations, veLaveatleast somedel¡nitionlortLeidea, namely
Introduction xxvii
tLisveryideaoltLenegationolallpredicates. JLetvodeEnitionslor
Ieing andMotLingaretLusloundtoLetLesameand,assucL, aretLe
tLe same. MevertLeless, as Hegelvellrecognizes, itis nottLe same
tLing to say tLat sometLing 'is' and 'is not ' . We are lorced to Lold
tLese concepts as distinct even il our logical enquiry seems to
lrustratetLis. WLatConcept, asksHegel,LoldstLeseideasasdistinct
is nevertLeless a Concept olvLicL sometLing deEnite can Le said?
JLe ansveris tLe Concept olIecoming.
JLe verL werden in Cerman cannotstrictly Lerenderedin£nglisL
Ly tLe vord Iecoming Lecause Erstly, unlike in £nglisL, it is tLe
Cerman means ol lorming tLe luture tense, and secondly it is
somevLat less precise in its connotation tLan tLe £nglisL term
Iecoming. InlactlorHegeltLetermwerden means' Lecoming' intLe
senseol 'coming-to-Le'andalsoitsopposite 'ceasing-to-Le' . JLeidea
ol anytLing ' coming-to-Le' or ' ceasing-to-Le' requires tvo
determinate states ol allairs, tLe idea ol Ieing as sucL and ol
MotLing, lor vLat ' comes-to-Le' comes out olnotLing into Leing
and vLat ' ceases-to-Le' reverses tLe process. JLe concept ol
Iecoming, as Hegel deEnes it, tLerelore is dependent upon tLe
concepts olIeing and MotLing and tLerelore preserves tLem, Lut
also transcends tLem and negates tLe continuous passing Lack and
lortLLetveen tLemin searcLolsome dillerencevLicLlrustratedus
attLepreviouslevel. JLeprocessis tLus oneol'Luilding' asitvere
system ol categories ol tLougLt. £acL concept Las its inLerent
limitation or' Loundary' , i.e. tLat vLicLit cannot resolve, andlrom
tLis 'internal'sell-negationolanyconceptisgeneratedLotLtLeneed
togoLeyonditandtLemeansolutilizingtLatconceptatsomeLigLer I
stageoltLougLt. JLeentireLogicistLerelorenot merely ' logical' , in
tLe sense olexemplilyingsomelormolimplicative order, Lutisalso
an exposition oltLe ' necessary' transitions in our logical categories
vLicL tLeperplexities oltLevorldlorceuponus in ourendeavour
todescriLeit. £acLsuccessiveconceptsLouldtLereloreLetLougLtol
intellectualtools to accomplisL its task.
Determinate being
WLat Las Lere Leçn translated as Ieterminate Ieing is tLe Cerman
vordDasein andistLeconceptvLicLlollovsIecomingintLeLogic.
ItLas LeenrenderedintListranslationLytLeadmittedlyinadequate
XXVlI The Philosophical Propaedeutic
term' IeterminateIeing' . JLisispartlyLecausetLetermLasLecome
tLe most common means amongst £nglisL translators olrendering
Dasein into£nglisL, andinpartLecauseHegelLimselldeEnesDasein
as ' determinate Ieing' orin tLe Cerman bestimmte Sein. Hovever, a
note ol caution ougLt to Le added Lere. JLe £nglisL vord
' determinate' is a strong one in a vay tLat tLe Cerm+nbestimmte is
not. HegelmeansLyDasein notaExed, deEnite, deEnaLleIeingora
Ieing vLicL Las Lecome sometLing discernaLly specil¡c. RatLer Le
visLes to convey tLe idea ol a state olIeing vLicL Las Lecome
sometLingpermanent,sometLingvLicL, insomemannerorotLeras
yet undeEned' , canLesaidto possess ' staLility' or' presence' . Hegel
unaLle to say olIeterminate Ieing tLat it possesses any particular
Quality or Nagnitude. JLe idea ol ' Iecoming' as a constant
cLangingstateolallairs, astLecontinualarisingandpassingavayol
tLings, must Le a ' Iecoming' vLicL is located in sometLing
permanent. WereitnotsotLenvLatLasarisenvoulddecayandpass
Lack into notLingness and tLe process ol' Iecoming' vould Lave
aLolisLed itself Jo Lave an idea ola constant alternation Letveen
arising and passing avay it is necessary tLat tLat vLicL arises arises
into some conditionvLicL itsellis not governedLytLis process Lut
vLicL is permanent Lyvirtue oltLe lact tLat at any one moment
sometLing is arising as sometLing elseis passing avay. JLe ideaol
tLe' permanent' LackgroundLeLind' Iecoming' isvLatismeantLy
Human will, rational will and particular win
JLis Erst set oldeEnitions lorms tLe Leginning oltLe Science tLe
Lavs, Norals andReligion. Hegel' sterminologyisLis ovnLuttLe
ideas upon vLicL Le is vorking Lave Leen derived directly lrom
essayOn Radical Evil. JLisessayvaslaterrepuLlisLedastLeErstpart
olKant' scritiqueolreligion, Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason
Lis previous vorks sullered lrom one maj or delect. JLe Will Lad
LeendeEnedasa 'WillolCLoice' , vLatKanttermed Will
ur. IftLe
Willvas to LelocatedvitLin tLe ' pLenomenal' sellandthus vitLin
tLedomainolcause andellect, itvouldrequirea miracletoraiseany
mantotLelevelatvLicLLecouldLecomemorallyresponsiLle. £ven
il Le vere still lree to recognize and assent to tLe ' categorical
imperative' , tLe Noral Lav, Levould not Le lree to act upon tLe
Introduction XXIX
universalmaximsLeLadassentedtoasarationalLeing. MotLing, Lar
tLeinterventionolaLigLerpover, couldpossiLlylreeLisWilllrom
tLedominance olpLysicalcauseand ellectrelations . AssucLitvas
essential, ilman vere to Lave tLe possiLility olLecoming actually
moral, topostulate aWillvLicLvas ' lree' insolarasitvasaLle to
decidevLetLertoLe governed LytLe ' appetites' ¸Hume' s' passions')
orLytLeNoralLavolreason. JLisclementarylevelollreedom- to
Le directed Ly a desire, to decide vLicL desire to lollov, or to
renounce eacL and every desire in lavour ola moral ougLt, places
manandLisWill, asPopeputsitintLeEssay on Man, 'ontLisistLmus
olamiddlestate, ALeingdarklyvise, andrudelygreat. . . . HeLangs
Letveen, in douLtto actorrest, In douLt todeemLimsella god, or
Least, In douLtLis mindorLody to preler. '
Hovever, tLe implications oltLis early tLeory ellectively denied
actions. IltLe individual raised Limsellto tLe moral realm Le vas
Lound to act morally, lor tLe Noral Lav itsellalone vould Le Lis
motivation and guide. JLe man vLo remained at tLe level oltLe
' Lover Appetites' vas ' unlree' and could tLerelore only LeLlamed
lor not Laving developed, as yet, a sulEcient strengtL olWill to
advanceto tLerealmolreasonandprelertLelaculty oltLe'HigLer
Appetite' . In tLeessayRadical Evil Kant proposed tLeideatLateven
tLerationalmancouldLeimmoral. MolongerdirectedLytLe' Lover
Appetites'LenevertLelessmigLtsay, asNiltonputitinParadise Lost,
'£vil Le tLou my Cood. ' As a ' lree' agent Le Las lreely cLosen to
renounce tLe Noral Lav and to adopt, as a rational act, its very
opposite. SucLlorKantis£vilasopposedtomereIad. Hegelretains
tLeseconcepts andtermstLeNoralLavtLeIniversalLavandgives
toit a signiEcance vLicL transcends eventLatvitLvLicLKantLad
imLued tLe idea. JLe IJniversal Lav olReason is, lor Hegel, tLe
' real'WilloleacLindividual, tLatHigLerWillvLicLitisLisdutyto
' actualize'inLissocialandpersonallile. HetLusspeaksolrecalcitrant
individuals LeingLrougLttoa recognition oltLeirtruenature, tLeir
' LigLer'purpose. ItistLepurposeolpunisLmenttoLringcriminalsto
tLerecognition oltLeirovn inner lailings as vell as to redress tLe
imLalanceproducedLytLe originalevildeed.
InlikeKant, Lovever, HegeldoesnotremainattLelevelolmere
' aLstract' morality and moral tLeorizing. He seeks to advance to a
' practical' morality vLicL is lounded in tLe active lives olordinary
citizens ola state. He tLus goes on to expound Lis conception ol
eit ora ' situated' etLic, as socialetLicality, as opposedto tLe
mere lormalism ol Kant' s categorical imperative. In tLis ' LigLer'
xxx The Philosophical Propaedeutic
lorm olmoral tLinking tLe lormal element olKant' s imperative is
emLracedandattLesametimetranscended. WLereas KantvisLed to
makeoletLicsarigidandpre-eminentlyrationalscience, Hegelgoes
on to discuss tLeidea ola moral ' disposition' , orvLatitis tolive a
practicallile in Larmony vitL one' s lellov man lroman innate Lut
notnecessarily rationallyarticulatedsense olmorality.
JLe later parts oltLe Science olLavs, Norals and Religion are
concerned to deEne tLe institutions olsocial lile as actually existent
and to demonstrate tLeir place in a scLeme as mutually dependent
elementsolonepolitical, socialandetLicaleducationalprocess. £acL
element, Leit tLelamily, oroneoltLeorgansoltLe State, ispartol
vLat it is lor a society to exist as a series olindividuals in a social
context. £acL element perlorms its unique lunctions LotL in tLe
creation oltLis order and in its preservation. And eacL element at
once constitutes and also reßects tLe prevailing moral etLos oltLat
society. It is olcourse Hegel� s purpose tLrougLout to demonstrate
LovvLatis ' given' , i . e. vLatLasLeenproducedLymanduringLis
Listory,LeitontLesocial, politicalorconceptuallevel,istLeresultol
a Lidden process ol' Reason' and tLe product olGeist vorking its
purposeoutin tLe realms olspace, time andLuman allairs .
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke volume 1 8, ed. K. Rosenkranz (Berlin: Duncker
and Humblot, 1840) .
2 W. Kaufmann, Hegel: a Reinterpretation (Anchor Books, Doubleday and
Company, 1966) , p. 44.
3 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) , p. 16.
4 G. W. F. Hegel, ' Second School Address' , i n M. Mackenzie, HegePs
Educational Theory and Practice (London: Swan Sonneschein, 1909) ,
p. 167.
5 Ibid. , p. 1 59.
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. W. Glen-Doepel
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1975) , p. 15.
7 G. W. F. Hegel, 'The First School Address' , i n Mackenzie, Hegel 's
Educational Theory and Practice, p. 162.
8 Hegel, Werke, volume 17, ed. Rosenkranz, pp. 333-48.
9 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford:
 � Oxford University Press, 1971) , p. 125.
Ibid, addition, p. 260.
1 1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy- of Mind, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971) , addition, p. 52.
SuLj ectiveConcept¸Motion)
Conceµt ¸Motion) JLeÒLj ect
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
PLR, PLH, £PLS ¸PartJLree,
Introduction, Section2)
LPLR, £PLS ¸Part tLree, Section J,
SuLsectionI) , PS
PS, £PLS ¸PartJLree,
Introduction, Section!
SuLsectionsI andC)
PS, £PLS¸PartÒne) , SL
ScienceoltLeI dea
SL ¸Enal section) , £PLS ¸PartÒne,
HigLerClass] .FirstPart
HigLerClass] . SecondPart
PLenomenology ¸For tLe Niddle Class]
HigherClass] .JLirdPart,FirstSection
JLeScienceolLavs, NoralsandReligion¸For
tLeLoverClass] . Introduction
HigLerClass] .JLirdPart,SecondSection,
HigLerClass] .JLirdPart,JLirdSection
PLenomenology¸FortLeNiddleClass] .
tLeLoverClass] .JLirdPart
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
£PLS ¸PartJvo)
ScienceolSpirit £PLS ¸PartJLree) , PLR,PS, LA,
£PLS Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
LA Hegel
s Aesthetics
LPLR Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
PLH Lectures on the Philosophy of History
PLR The Philosophy of Right
PS The Phenomenology of Spirit
SL The Science of Logic
[For the Lower Class]
JLe oLj ect oltLis scienceis tLe Human Will in its relations as tLe
Particular Will totLeUniversal Will: totLeWillvLicLisLavlul
and]ust orinaccordancevitLReason. AsWilltLeNindstands ina
practical relation to itself JLe practical vay ol acting [ Verhalten] ,
tLrougL vLicL i t Lrings determination into its determinateness or
existing init vitLoutits cooperation, is toLedistinguisLedlromits
theoretical vayolacting.
Consciousness, as sucL, is tLe relation oltLe£gotoan oLject, tLis
oLject may Le internal or external. Òur Knoving contains oLj ects,
some ol vLicL ve oLtain a knovledge ol tLrougL Sensuous
Perception,otLers, Lovever, LavetLeiroriginintLeNinditsell. JLe
lormer, taken togetLer, constitute tLe Sensuous World; tLe latter,
tLe Intelligible World. ]udicial [rechtlichen = legal] , etLical and
religiousconceptionsLelong to tLelatter.
In tLe relation ol tLe £go and oLj ect to eacL otLer tLe £go is ¸a)
passive; in vLicL case tLe oLj ect is regarded as tLe cause ol tLe
determinations in tLe £go and tLe particular ideas [ Vorstellungen]
vLicLtLe£goLasareattriLutedto tLeimpressionmadeuponitLy
theimmediateoLj ectsLeloreit. JLisistLeTheoretical Conscious­
ness. WLetLeritLeintLelormol perception orolimagination oroltLe
tLinkingactivityitscontentisalvaysagivenandextantsometLing, a
2 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Òn tLe contrary, ¸L) tLe £go manilests itsell as Practical
Consciousness vLen its determinations are not mere 'iJeas' and
tLougLts, Lutissue lortLinto externalexistence. IntLis process tLe
£go determines tLe given tLings or oLj ects, so tLat tLe lormer is
active andtLelatterarepassive, i.e. tLe£goistLecauseolcLangesin
tLe given oLj ects.
Practical ALility [ Vermogen] as sucL determines itselllrom vitLin,
i.e. tLrougLitsell JLecontentolitsdeterminations Lelongstoitand
it recognizes tLat content lor its ovn. JLese determinations,
Lovever, areatErstonlyinternaland, lortLisreason, separatedlrom
tLeexternal reality, LuttLeyaretoLecomeexternalandLerealized.
JLis is done tLrougL tLe ¸conscious] Act. Iy sucL an Act internal
practical determinations receive externality: i . e. external Ieing.
Conversely, tLis process may Le regarded as tLe cancelling olan
internal determination.
JLe internal determination oltLe Practical Consciousness is eitLer
Impulse [ Trieb] or Will Proper [eigentlicher Wille] . Impulse is a
natural sell-determination vLicL rests upon circumscriLed leelings
and Las a limited Enite end in viev vLicL it cannot transcend. In
otLer vords, it is tLe unlree, immediately determined, Lower
Appetite [niedere Begehrungsvermogen] according to vh¡cL man ranks
as a creature olnature. JLrougL Refection Le transcends Impulse
and its limitations, and not only compares it vitL tLe means olits
impulsesonevitLanotLer, andLotLoltLesevitLtLeoLjectandend
olLisovnexistence. HetLenyieldstotLedecisionofRellectionand
gratiEes tLeImpulse orelserepresses it and renounces it.
JLe Will Proper, ortLe Higher Appetite, is ¸a) pure indeterminate­
ness oltLe£go, vLicLassucLLasnolimitationoracontentvLicLis
every determinateness . ¸L) JLe£go can, attLesametime, passover
toadeterminateness andmakea cLoiceolsomeoneorotLerandtLen
actualize it.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion
JLeAbstract Freedom oltLe Will consists in tLis very indetermi-
nateness, oridentity oltLe £go vitLitsell, vLereina determination
occurs only in so lar as tLe £go makes itits ovn ¸assimilates it] or
posits itvitLinitsell. AndyetintLis actitremains sell-identicaland
retains tLe pover to aLstract again lrom eacL and every determina-
tion. JLeremayLepresentedtotLeWill,from without, agreatvariety
olincitements, motives and lavs Lut man, in lolloving tLe same,
does tLis only in so lar as tLe Will itsell makes tLese its ovn
determinations andresolvesto actualize tLem. JLis, too, is tLecase
vitL tLe determinations ol tLe Lover Appetites, or vitL vLat
proceedslromnaturalImpulses andInclinations.
JLe Will Las Moral Responsibility [Schuld] in so lar as ¸a) its
determination is made its ovn solely lrom its ovn sell, or Ly its
resolve:i. e. ¸insolaras]tLe£govillsit, and¸L)itisconsciousoltLe
determinations vLicL are produced tLrougL its act as tLeyliein its
resolveor are necessarily andimmediately involvedin its consequ-
ADeed [ Tat] is, assucL, tLeproducedcLangeanddeterminationola
Ieing. JoanAct [Handlung] , Lovever, Lelongsonly vLatlayintLe
resolve or vas in tLe consciousness ¸and] Lence vLat tLe Will
acknovledges as its ovn.
! O
JLelreeWill, as lree,i s moreovernotlimitedt otLedeterminateness
anotLerLuti sIniversalWillandtLeindividualis, asregardsLisPure
Will, a Iniversal Ieing.
! !
JLe Will can, in various vays, take up into itsellexternal content,
tLat is, a content vLicL does not proceed lromits ovn nature and
maketLiscontentitsovn. IntListLeVillremainssell-identicalonly
in lorm. Itis, namely, conscious olits pover to aLstractlromeacL
andeverycontentandrecoverits pure lorm Lutit does notremain
sell-identicalasregardsitscontentandessence. InsolarasitissucLa
Will it is really only tLe Will-of-Choice [ Will
iir] ¸or Arbitrari­
ness] .
4 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
! 2
IuttLat tLe Will mayLetruly and aLsolutely lreei t i s requisite tLat
vLatitvills, oritscontent, LenaugLtelsetLantLeWillitsell.i.e. tLe
puresell-determination, ortLeacttLatisinLarmonyvitLitself Itis
requisite tLat it vills onlyin-itselland Lasitselllor its oLject. JLe
Pure Will, tLerelore, does notvillsomespecialcontentorotLeron
accountolitsspecialityLutinorder tLat tLeWill assucLmayinits
deed be free and Le lreely actualized, in otLer vords, tLat tLe
sal maxims oltLe ¸rational] Will Lelong to tLe Science of Laws,
Morals ' and Religion.
Elucidation of the Introduction
ÒLjects are particular sometLings tLrougL tLeir determinations as
sensuous oLj ects, lor example, tLrougL tLeir sLape, size, veigLt,
colour, tLrougL tLe more or less Erm comLination ol its parts,
tLrougL tLe purpose lor vLicL tLey are used, etc. Ilone, in Lis
conception olit, takes avay tLe determinations olan oLj ect, tLis
processis called Abstraction. JLere remains altertLe process a less
determined oLj ect.i. e. an Abstract Object. Il, Lovever, I conceive
ol only one ol tLese determinations, tLis is called an Abstract
Representation ¸orAbstract Idea] . JLeoLjectleltinitscomplete-
ness oldeterminationis called a Concrete Object. WLenI aLstract
Abstract Object. WLen one says ' JLing' , tLougL Le may mean
sometLing quite deEnite, Le says only sometLing quite indeEnite
since ourtLougLt reduces an actual sometLing totLis aLstraction ol
mere 'JLing' .
Sensuous Perception isinpartexternal, inpartinternal. JLrough
external ¸SensuousPerception] ve perceivetLings vLicL are outside
us in time and space, tLings vLicL ve distinguisL lrom ourselves.
JLrougL tLe internal Sensuous Perceptionve take note oltLestates
souls. ÒnepartoltLeSensuousWorldcontainssucLoLjectsandtheir
determinations, as, lor example, colours, tLatis, oLj ects tLatLavea
sensuousLasisandLavereceivedamentallorm. IlIsay, 'JListableis
Llack' , I speak in tLe Erst place oltLis single concrete oLj ect Lut,
secondly, tLe predicate ' Llack' vLicL I alErm ol it is a general
¸quality]vLicLLelongsnotmerelytotLissingleoLj ectLuttoseveral
oLjects. ' Ilack' is a simple idea. We cognize a real concrete object
immediately. JLisactolimmediateappreLensioniscalledIntuition.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 5
A general ALstract Idea is tLerelore a mediated Idea lor tLe reason
tLatIknovitLymeansolanotLer,i. e. LymeansolaLstractionortLe
omission ol otLer determinations vLicL are lound united in tLe
Concrete ÒLj ect. A Concrete Idea is said to Le analysed vLen tLe
determinations vLicLareunited in it as concrete are separated. JLe
intelligiLle vorld receives its content lrom Spirit ¸i.e. lrom tLe
activityoltLeNind] , andtLiscontentconsistsolpureuniversalIdeas
sucL, lor example, as Ieing, MotLing, AttriLute, £ssence, etc.
JLe Erst source ol our knovledge is called Experience. Jo
£xperience Lelongs tLis important leature. tLat ve ourselves Lave
perceived it. A distinction must Lovever, Le dravn Letveen
Perception and Experience. Perception Las lor its oLj ect only a
anotLervay tLe next moment. IlI repeat tLePerception, andintLe
repeated perceptions take note olvLat remains tLesameand Loldit
last, tLis operation is properly termed £xperience. £xperience
contains, lortLe mostpart, lavs. i.e. gust] sucLa connectionoltvo
pLenomenatLatiloneis extant, tLeotLeronemustresultlromitin
allcases . JLe£xperiencecontains, Lovever, onlytLemeregenerality
ol sucL a pLenomenon and not tLe necessity ol tLe connection.
tLereasons, nottLe ' vLy' tLereof
Since tLere are a multitude oloLjects concerning vLicL ve can
Lave no £xperience, lor example tLe past, ve are oLliged to Lave
recourse totLeAuthority olotLers . Noreover, tLeseoLjectsvLicL
ve Lold lor true upon tLe AutLority ol otLers are oLjects ol
£xperi�nce ¸i. e. empirical oLj ects) . We believe tLem upon tLe
AutLorityolotLersvLicLisproLaLle. WeoltenLoldasproLaLlethat
Le tLe trutL. ¸An event receives its conErmation cLielly tLrougL its
results and tLrougL tLe manilold circumstances connectedvitL our
experience ol it. JLose vLo narrate to us an event must Le
trustworthy, tLat is, tLey must Lave Leen in a positionvLereitvas
possiLlelortLemtoLaveknovledgeolit. Wedravconclusionslrom
tLetoneandmanneri nvLicLtLeyrelatetLeevent,i nregardtotLeir
degree olearnestness or tLe selEsL purpose suLserved Ly it. WLen
vriters, under tLe reign ola tyrant, are lavisL inLis praises, ve at
once pronounce tLem to Le ßatterers. Iut il one makes special
mention ola good quality or deed olLis enemy ve are tLe more
readytoLelieveLis statements. )
ô The Philosophical Propaedeutic
£xperience, tLerelore, teacLesonlyLovoLjectsare constitutedand
notLovtLeymust LeorLovtLeyought toLe. JLislatterknovledge
comes only lrom a concept oltLe £ssence or Idea oltLe oLject, a
knovledge olit�s a vLole. And tLis latterknovledge alone is true
knovledge. Since ve must learn tLe grounds olan oLject lrom its
Concept, aknovledgeolitinits entire compass, sotoo, ilvevould
learntLecLaracteroltLeLavlul, NoralandReligious, vemustLave
recourseto tLe Concepts tLereof
In determining vLat is rigLt and good ve may at Erst Lold to
£xperienceandtLat too oltLe most externalkind, namely, tLe vay
oltLevorld. WecanseetLerevLatpasseslorrigLtandgoodorvLat
proves itsell to Le rigLt and good. Ipon tLis pLase it is to Le
remarked¸a) tLatinordertoknovvLatdeedsarerigLtorgoodand
vLat are vrong or vicked, one presupposes Limsell to Le in
possessionoltLeConceptoltLeRight ¸Lawful] and Good and ¸L)
All vould depend upon tLe viev vitL vLicL Le undertook tLe
investigation. IntLecourseoltLevorld, vLereintLereoccurs sucLa
variety olevents, eacL one can End Lis ovn particularvievjustiEed
Leitever so peculiar.
IuttLereis, secondly, an internal experience concerning tLeRigLt
¸Legal] , CoodandReligious . WejudgeuponourSentiment ¸Gemat]
or Feeling ¸ Giihl] tLat a deed oltLis or tLat cLaracter is good or
Lad. Noreover, ve Lave a Feeling ol Religion, ve are allected
religiously. VLat Feeling says oltLe deed Ly vay olapproval or
disapproval contains merely tLe immediate expression, or tLe mere
assurance, tLat sometLing issoorisnotso. Feelinggivesnoreasons
lor its decision, nor does it decide vitL relerence to reasons . WLat
kind olFeelingve Lave, olapproval or oldisapproval,is tLe mere
experience ol a Sentiment. Feeling is, Lovever, inconstant and
cLangeaLle. ItisatonetimeinonestateandatanotLerina dillerent
one. Feelingis, insLort, sometLingsubjective. AnoLj ectolFeelingis
myoLjectasaparticularindividual. IlIsay. 'IleeltLusaLoutit'or' It
is mysentiment tovardit' , I tLen say only vLat Lelongs to measan
individual. I leave undecided vLetLer it is also tLe same in otLer
persons. WLenI, uponany occasion, appealsimply tomyFeeling, I
do not desire to enter upon tLe reasons ¸and] consequently uµon
universalrelations . IvitLdravmysellvitLinmysellandexpressonly
vLat concerns me and not vLat is in-and-lor-itself oLjective and
universal. JLeObjective, ortLeuniversal, istLeIntelligible, ortLe
Concept [Notion] .
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 7
Ilanyone visLes toknov truly vLat aroseorapinkoran oak is,
tLatis, ilLevisLes to graspitinitsConcept¸orIdea] , LemustErst
grasptLeLigLerConceptvLicLlies atitsLase, namelytLatolPlant;
and lurtLer, in order to grasp tLe Concept oltLe 'plant' , one must
againgrasptLeLigLerConceptvLereupontLeConceptoltLe' plant'
depends, andtLisistLeConceptolan Organic Body. InordertoLave
tLe representation ¸idea] olLodies, surlaces, lines , and points , one
mustLaverecoursetotLeConceptolSpace, sinceSpaceistLegeneric
tLereol,LenceLodies, surlaces, etc. areonlyparticulardeterminations

olSpace. IntLesamemannertLepresent, pastandluturepresuppo�e
Jime as tLeir generic ground. And so it is vitL Lavs , Iuties and
vLicLis tLeir generic ground.
IntLe Erst stageolConsciousnessveareusually avare oltLeoLject
Lelore us, tLatis, ve are avareonly oltLe oLj ect not olourselves .
IutitisessentiallyintLesetLings tLat tLe' I' ¸£go]exists. Insolaras
ve tLink simply olan oLject ve Lave a Consciousness, tLat is, a
consciousnessoltLeoLject. InsolarasvetLinkolConsciousnessve
are conscious olConsciousness, tLat is, ve Lave a consciousness ol
Consciousness. InourordinarylileveLaveconsciousnessLutveare
notconscioustLatveareaConsciousness, tLereismucLinuse tLatis
even corporeal olvLicL ve are unconscious; lor example, tLe vital
Leing conscious oltLeir precise constitution, tLis ve only acquire
tLrougL Science. Also, lrom a spiritual standpoint, ve are much
more tLan ve knov. JLe external oLj ects olour Consciousness are
tLosevLicLvedistinguisL lromourselves and tovLicLve ascriLe
an independent existence. JLe inner oLjects, on tLe otLer Land, are
determinations or laculties, ¸i. e. ] povers oltLe £go. JLey do not
suLsist in separation lrom one anotLer Lut only in tLe £go.
Consciousness lunctions theoretically orpractically.
JLeoretical Consciousness considers tLat vLicL is and leaves it as it
is . Practical ¸Consciousness] , on tLe otLer Land, is tLe active
consciousness vLicL does not leave vLat is as it is Lut produces
cLangestLereinandproduceslromitselldeterminations andoLjects.
In Consciousness, tLerelore, tvo tLings are present. myselland tLe
oLject, I amdeterminedLy tLeoLj ectortLeoLj ectis determined Ly
me. IntLelormercasemyrelationsLip is theoretical ¸andin tLelatter
8 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
casepractical] . ¸InJLeoreticalConsciousness]ItakeuptLedetermina-
tions oltLe oLj ect as they are. I leave tLe oLject as it is and seek to
makemyideas conlormtoit. ILavedeterminationsinmysellandtLe
oLjectalsoLasdeterminationsvitLinit. JLecontentoltLeIdeaaLout
tLeoLjectsLouldconlormtovLattLeoLj ectis . JLedeterminations
oltLeoLj ectin-itsellareruleslor me. JLetrutLolmyIdeas consists
ol tLe oLject. JLe lav lor our Consciousness, in so lar as it is
theoretical, is tLatitmust notLecompletelypassiveLut must directits
activity to receiving tLe oLj ect. SometLing can Le an oLj ect lor our
perceptionvitLout ourLaving on tLat accounta consciousness olit
vLenvedonotdirectouractivityto it. JLis activityinreceptionis
called Attention.
tLrougLtLepoverolImagination, vLose activity consistsin tLis.
tLatitcallsupinconnectionvitLtLeintuitionoloneoLj ecttLeimage
olanotLerinsomevayorotLerlinkedvitLit. ItisnotnecessarytLat
tLe oLject, to vLicL tLe Imaginationlinks tLe image olanotLer, Le
present, itmay Lepresent onlyin an idea olit. JLe mostextensive
vorkoltLeImaginationisLanguage. Languageconsistsinexternal
signs and sounds tLrougL vLicL one makes knovn vLatLe tLinks,
leels orsenses . Language consists inWords, vLicL arenotLing else
tLan signs oltLougLts . For tLese signs tLere are again lound in
vriting otLer signs called letters . JLey make knovn our tLougLts
vitLout our Laving to speak tLem. Hieroglyphic vriting is disting-
uisLedlrom tLeAlphabetic Lyits directpresentation olentire thoughts. *
InSpeech a certainsoundissensuouslypresent and tLereinveLave
tLe intuition ola sound. Iut ve do not stop at tLis Lecause our
ImaginationlinkstoittLeideaolanaLsentoLj ect. HeretLenveLave
tvo dillerent oLjects, a sensuous determination and anotLer idea
linked to it. Here tLe idea counts solely as tLe essence and as tLe
meaningolvLatissensuouslypresentvLicListLusameresign. JLe
given content conlronts a content vLicL veLaveproduced.
Inordinarylile, tLeexpressionsto have an Idea and to Thin
as opposed to den
en] are used interchangeably and ve tLus dignily
*Translator's Note: Though this passage was written before the Rosetta Stone was
discovered and is therefore no longer valid in respect of Egyptian hieroglyphs,
Hegel's comments are still valid for other Asiatic forms of hieroglyphic writing.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 9
vitLtLenameoltLougLtvLatisonlytLeproductolimagination. In
' Ideas' oltLis sort ve Lave an oLj ect Lelore us in its external and
unessential existence. In Thinking, on tLe contrary, ve separate
lromtLeoLj ectitsexternal,merelyunessentialside, andconsidertLe
oLjectmerelyinitsessence. JLinkingpenetratestLrougLtLeexternal
pLenomenon to tLe internal nature ol tLe tLing and makes it its
oLject. ItleavestLe contingentsideoltLetLingoutolconsideration.
Ittakes up a suLj ect not as itis inimmediateappearance, Lut severs
tLe unessential lrom tLe essential and tLus aLstracts lrom it: In
Intuition ve Lave single oLjects Lelore us . JLinking Lrings tLem
into relation vitL eacL otLer or compares tLem. In Comparison it
Ly vLicL tLey diller and tLus it retains only universal ideas . JLe
universal Idea contains less determinateness tLan tLe single oLj ect
vLicLLelongs undertLis universal, sinceonearrives attLeuniversal
only Ly leaving out sometLing lrom tLe single tLing, on tLe otLer
Land, tLe universal includes more under it or Las a mucL greater
extension. In so lar as JLinking produces a universal oLject, tLe
activity olaLstractingLelongs toitandLenceitLas tLeFormoltLe
universal ¸as, lor example, in tLe universal oLject ' Nan' . ) Iut tLe
content oltLeuniversal oLj ect doesnotLelongtoitasanactivity ol
aLstracting Lut is given to JLinking and is independent olit and
present onits ovn account.
JoJLinkingtLereLelongmanilolddeterminations vLicLexpress
a connection Letveen tLe manilold pLenomena tLat is universal and
necessary. JLe connection as it exists in Sensuous Intuitionis merely
an external or contingent one, vLicL may or may not Le in any
particularlorm. Astone, lorexample, makesLyitslallanimpression
uponayieldingmass. IntLe SensuousIntuitionis containedtLelact
oltLe lalling oltLe stone and tLe lact olanimpression madein tLe
yieldingmassvLeretLestonetoucLedit. JLesetvopLenomena, tLe
lalling oltLe stone and tLeimpression on tLe yielding mass, Lave a
successionintime. Iut tLis connectioncontains, asyet, nonecessity.
ontLecontraryitispossiLle, loralltLatistLereinstated, tLattLeone
migLt Lave Lappened under tLe same conditions vitLout tLe otLer
lolloving it. WLen, on tLe contrary, tLe relation ol tLese tvo
pLenomena to eacLotLeris determinedas causeandellect, orastLe
relation olCausality, tLen tLis connection is a necessary one or a
connection ol tLe Inderstanding. JLis entails tLat under tLe same
conditions, iloneLappens, tLe otLeris containedinit.
JLesedeterminationsaretLelormsolJLinking. JLeNindposits
tLem solely tLrougL its own activity Lut tLey are at tLe same time
!O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
determinations of existing things [zugleich Bestimmungen des Seienden] . We
come l¡rst Ly Reßection to distinguisL vLat is Cround and
Consequent, Internal and £xternal, £ssential and Inessential. JLe
ovn lree vill, Lut tLinks tLat it ¸Nind] expresses in tLem ¸tLese
determinations] sometLing vLicL is present vitLoutits assistance.
WLeneverve speakoltLe £goortLe Nind as receiving determina-
tions ve presupposeits previous indeterminateness. JLe determina-
tions oltLe Nind alvays Lelong to tLe Nind even tLougL it Las
receivedtLemlromotLeroLj ects . AltLougLsometLingmayLeintLe
NindvLicLcamelromvitLoutasa contentnotdependentupontLe
Nind, yettLelormalvays Lelongs totLelatter, e.g. altLougLintLe
Imagination tLe material may Le derived lrom Sensuous Intuition,
tLe form consistsintLemetLodinvLicLtLismaterialiscomLinedina
dillerentmannerlromtLat presentintLeoriginalintuition. Inapure
Concept, e.g. tLat ol animal, tLe specil¡c content Lelongs to
£xperienceLut tLe universal element in it is tLe lormvLicL comes
lromtLe Nind.
JLis lorm is tLus oltLe Nind' s ovn determining. JLe essential
dillerence Letveen tLe theoretical and tLe practical lunctions ol tLe
Nind consists in tLis. tLat in tLe tLeoretical tLe lorn alone is
determined Ly tLe Nind vLile, on tLe otLer Land, in tLe practicçl
lunction tLe content also proceeds lrom tLe Nind. In RigLt, lor
example, tLecontentispersonallreedom. JLis LelongstotLeNind.
JLepracticallunctionrecognizesdeterminationsas its ovninsolar
asitvills tLem. £ven iltLey arealiendeterminations, orgivenlrom
vitLout, tLeymustceasetoLealieninsolarasI villtLem. I cLange
tLe content into mine and positit tLrougL myself
Theoretical Activity starts lromsometLing externallypresentand
convertsitintoanIdea. Practical Activity, ontLeotLerLand, starts
lrom an internal determination. JLis is calledresolve, intention, or
direction and makes tLe internal actually external and gives to it
existence. JListransitionlromaninternaldeterminationtoexternal-
ityis called Act.
JLe Act is, ingeneralterms, a union oltLe internal and external. JLe
internaldetermination, lromvLicLitLegins, Las toLecancelledand
The Science of Laws
Morals and Religion ! !
madeexternalaslarasitslormis concerned, vLicLlormis tLatola
mere internal. JLe content ol tLis determination is still to remain
¸alter negation oltLe lorm] , e. g. tLeintention toLuilda Louseis an
internal determinationvLoselormconsistsin tLis. tLat itis only an
intention at Erst, tLe content includes tLe plan oltLe Louse. IltLe
lormnov is Lere cancelled, tLe contentvill still remain. JLeLouse
vLicLis toLeLuiltaccordingto tLeintentionandtLatvLicLisLuilt
according to tLe plan are tLe same Louse.
Conversely, tLe Act is likevise a suLlation olexternality as it is
immediately present, e. g. tLe Luilding ol a Louse necessitates a
cLangein a variety olvays, oltLe ground, tLe Luilding-stone, tLe
vood, and tLe otLer materials. JLesLapeoltLeexternalis cLanged,
itisLrougLtintoquiteotLercomLinationstLanexistedLelore. JLese
cLangesLappen in conlormity to a purpose, to vit, tLeplanoltLe
Louse vitL vLicL internal sometLing tLe external is to Le made to
! O
Animals, too, standinapracticalrelationt otLatvLicLi s externalto
tLem. JLey actlrominstinct, vitL designs and purposes to realize,
and tLus rationally. Since tLey do tLis unconsciously, Lovever, ve
cannot properly speak oltLem as autLors olVoluntary Acts. JLey
Lave Iesires and Impulses, Lut no Rational Will. In speaking ol
man' simpulsesanddesires,itisusualtoincludetLeWill. Iut, more
accuratelyspeaking, tLeWillistoLedistinguisLedlromIesire. JLe
Will,indistinctionlromIesire,iscalledtLeHigher Appetite. WitL
animals evenInstinct is toLe distinguisLed lromtLeirimpulses and
desires, lor tLougL Instinct is anacting lromImpulse andIesire it,
Lovever, does notterminate vitL its immediate externalization Lut
Las a lurtLer, and lor tLe animal likevise necessary, result. It is an
acting in vLicL tLere is involved also a relation to sometLing else,
e. g. tLeLoardingup olgrainLymanyanimals. JLisisnotyet quite
properly to Le called an Act, Lut it contains a designinit, namely,
provisionlor tLeluture.
Impulse is, intLeErstplace, sometLinginternal, sometLingvLicL
Legins a movement lrom itsell, or produces a cLange Ly its ovn
pover. Impulseproceedslromitself AltLougLitmayLeavakened
Ly external circumstances, yet it existed already vitLout regard to
tLem, it is not producedLytLem. MecLanical causes produce mere
external or mecLanical ellects vLicL are completelydetermined Ly
tLeir causes, in vLicL tLerelore notLing is contained vLicL is not
already present in tLe cause, e. g. ilI give motion to a Lody, tLe
! 2 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
motion imparted to it is all tLat it Las, or ilI paint a Lody, it Las
notLing elsetLantLecolourimparted:oit. ÒntLe contrary, ilI act
dillerentlromvLatitvasinme. JLeactivityoltLelivingcreatureis
aroused Ly my act and it exLiLits its ovn peculiarity in reacting
IntLesecondplace, Impulseis ¸a) limited inrespecttocontent¸and]
¸L) is contingent as regards tLe aspect olits gratiEcation, since it is
dependent uponexternaIcircumstances. Impulse does not transcend
itspurpose ¸end] andistLerelorespokenolasLlind. ItgratiEesitsell,
let tLe consequences Le vLat tLey may.
Nandoesnot makeLisovnImpulses, LesimplyLastLem,i

vords, tLeyLelongtoLisnature. Matureis, Lovever, undertLerule
olnecessityLecauseeverytLinginMatureislimited, relativeorexists
onlyinrelationto sometLingelse. IutvLatexistsonlyinrelationto
sometLingelseis not lor-itsellLutdependent upon otLers . ItLasits
groundintLat¸sometLingelse] andisanecessitated Leing. Insolaras
manLasimmediately determinedImpulsesLeissuLj ectedtoMature,
and conductsLimsellas a necessitated andunlree Leing.
! !
Iut man can, as a tLinking Leing, r
ect upon Lis impulses vLicL
Lave in tLemselves necessity lor Lim. Refection signiEes, in
general, tLe cutting oll lrom or reduction [Abk
urzung] ol tLe
immediate. Reßection ¸in respect olligLt) consists in tLis, tLat tLe
rays ¸olligLt] vLicL, in-tLemselves, Leam lortLin straigLt lines are
LentLacklromtLis direction. NindLas!eßection. ItisnotconEned
e.g. lromtLe event Lelore it, it mayproceed to lormanidea olits
consequences or ola similar event or also olits causes. WLen tLe
itself It Las rellected itsellinto itself It has gone into itself It Las
recognizedtLeimmediateas aconditioned, orlimited, inasmucLasit
opposestoitanotLer. Itis, tLerelore, averygreatdillerencevLetLer
oneis orhas sometLingandvLetLerLe
nows tLatLeisorLasit, lor
example, ignoranceorrudenessoltLesentimentsorolLeLaviourare
limitations vLicL one mayLavevitLoutknovingit. In so larasone
upontLemis already a Erst step Leyond tLem.
Impulses, as natural determinations, are limitations. JLrougL
reßection upori tLem man Legins to transcend tLem. JLe Erst
ReßectionconcernstLemeans, vLetLertLey arecommensuratevitL
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion ! J
tLcimpulse, vLetLertLeimpulsevillLegratiEedtLrougLtLemeans,
vLetLer, intLe secondplace, tLemeans arenottooimportanttoLe
sacriEcedlortLisimpulse. ReßectioncomparestLedillerentimpulses
and tLeir purposes vitL tLelundamentalend and purpose olIeing.
JLepurposes oltLespecialimpulsesarelimitedLuttLeycontriLute,
eacLinits ovnvay, to tLe attainment oltLe lundamentalpurpose.
Òne, Lovever, is Letter adapted lor tLis tLan anotLer. Hence
Reßection Las to compare impulses and ascertain vLicL are more
closely allied to tLelundamentalpurposeandare Lest adapted to aid
itsrealizationLytLeirgratiEcation. InRel¡ectionLeginstLetransition
lromIoverlormsolappetitetotLeLigLer. Nanis, inReßection, no
longer a mere natural Leing and stands no longer in tLe spLere ol
necessity. SometLingis necessary vLenonly tLis andnotsometLing
else can Lappen. ReßectionLasLeloreitnotonlytLeoneimmediate
oLjectLutalso anotLer orits opposite.
JLis Rel¡ectionjust descriLed is, Lovever, a merely relative allair.
AltLougL it transcends tLe Enite, yet it alvays arrives again at tLe
Enite, e.g. vLenveexceedtLelimitsoloneplaceinspacetLererises
Lelore us anotLer portion olspace, greater tLan Lelore, Lut it is
alvays only a Enite space tLat tLus arises, ad infinitum. Likevise,
vLen ve go Lack in time Leyond tLe present into tLe past ve can
imagine a period olten tLousand or tLirty tLousand years. JLougL
anotLer, yetitnevergetsLeyondspaceortime. SucLisalsotLecase
intLeReûectionvLicLisLotLpracticalandrelational. Itleavessome
oneimmediateinclination, desireorimpulseandproceedstoanotLer
one, andintLeendaLandons tLis onealso. Insolarasitisrelativeit
only lalls againinto anotLerimpulse, moves roundand roundin a
circle ol appetites and does not elevate itsell aLove tLe spLere ol
impulses asa vLole.
JLe practical Absolute Refection, Lovever, does elevate itsell
aLovetLisentirespLereoltLel¡nite,inotLervords, itaLandons tLe
spLereoltLeloverappetites, invLicLmanis determinedLynature
and dependent on tLe outside vorld. Finitude consists, on tLe
vLole, intLis. tLatsometLingLasalimit, i . e. , tLathere its non-being is
positedortLatLereitstops, tLat tLrougL tLislimititisrelatedtoan
' otLer' . InEniteReßection, Lovever, consists, intLis. tLattLe£gois
nolongerrelatedtoanotLer, Lutisrelatedtoitsell, inotLervordsis
itsovnoLj ect. JLispure
elationtomysell istLeEgo, tLerootoftLe
Inl¡niteIeingitself ItistLeperlectaLstractionlromalltLatisEnite.
!4 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe £go as sucLLasno contentvLicLisimmediate, i. e. given to it
Ly nature, Lut its sole contentis itself This pure Form !s, at the s�
time, its content: ¸a) every content given Ly nature is sometLing
limited. Lut tLe £go is unlimited, ¸L) tLe content given Ly natureis
immediate.tLepure£go, Lovever, LasnoimmediatecontentlortLe
reasontLattLepure£go onlyisLymeansoltLecompleteaLstraction
In tLe Erst place tLe £go is tLe purely indeterminate. It is aLle,
Lovever,Lymeansolrellection, topassoverlromindetern+inateness
to determinateness, e.g. to seeing, Learing, etc. IntLis determinate-
ness it Las Lecome non-se
lf-identical, Lut it Las still remained in its
indeterminateness,i . e. itisaLle, atvill, tovitLdravintoitsellagain.
AttLis placeenters tLe Act of Resolving ¸Volition] lor Rellection
precedes it and consists in tLis, tLat tLe £go Las Lelore it several
inoneoltvopredicaments. itnecessarilyis orisnotadetermination
oltLe sometLingunderconsideration. JLeActolResolutioncancels
tLat olRellection, tLeprocess to andlro lromone to tLe otLer, and
Exes on a determinateness and makes it its ovn. JLe lundamental
conditionnecessarytotLeActolResolving, tLepossiLilityolma
up one's mind to dosometLingorevenolreßecting prior totLeact, is
tLeaLsoluteindeterminateness oltLe £go.
JLe Freedom of the Will i s lreedom i n general, and all otLer
freedoms are mere species tLereof WLen tLe expression '�reedo

tLe Will' is used, it is not meanttLat apart lromtLe Will tLere is a
lorce or property or laculty vLicL possesses lreedom. ]ust as vLen
tLe omnipotence olCod is spokenolitis not understoodtLattLere
arestillotLerLeings LesidesLimvLopossessomnipotence. JLereis
also civil lreedom, lreedom ol tLe press, political and religious
lreedom. JLesespeciesollreedomLclongtotLeuniversalconceptol
Freedon1insolarasitappliesto specialoLjects . Religious Freedom
consists in tLis. tLat religious ideas, religious deeds, are not lorced
uponme, tLatis, tLattLereareintLemonlysu�L


recognizeas my ovn and make myovn. A reLgion vLicL islorced
uponme, orinrelationtovLicLIcannotactasalreeLeing, isnotmy
ovn, Lut remains alien to me. JLe Political Freedom ofa people
consists in tLis . tLat tLey lorm lor tLemselves tLeir ovn State and
decide vLat is to Levalid as the nationalvill, andtLat tLis Ledone
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion
people, and vLo, since every otLer citizen Las tLe same rigLts as
tLemselves, canLeacknovledgedLytLepeopleastLeirovn ¸i.e. as
tLeir representatives] .
SucL expressions as tLese are olten used. ' Ny vill Las Leen
determinedLytLesemotives, circumstances, incitements, orinduce-
ments . ' JLis expression implies tLat I Lave stood in a passive
relation ¸totLesemotives, etc. ] . In trutL, Lovever, tLe£godidnot
standin a merely passive relation Lut vas essentially active tLerein.
JLe Will, tLat is, accepted tLese circumstances as motives and
allovedtLemvalidityas motives . JLe causal relation Lere does not
apply. JLecircumstancesdonotstandintLerelationolcausenormy
Will in tLat ol ellect. In tLe causal relation tLe ellect lollovs
necessarily vLen tLe cause is given. As reûection, Lovever, I can
transcend eacL and every determination vLicL is posited Ly tLe
circui¬stances. InsolarasamanpleadsinLisdelencetLatLevasled
astray tLrougL circumstances, incitements , etc. and, Ly tLis plea,
¸Lopes] to rid Limsellol tLe consequences olLis deed, Le lovers
Limsellto tLe state olan unlree, natural Leing, vLile, in trutL, Lis
deed is alvays Lis ovn and not tLat ol anotLer or tLe ellect ol
sometLing outsideLimself Circumstances or motives Laveonlyso
mucL controlovermanas LeLimsellgives to tLem.
JLedeterminations oltLeLoverAppetitesarenaturaldetermina-
tions. Insolar, itseems toLeneitLernecessarynorpossiLlelor man
tomaketLemLisovn. Simply asnaturaldeterminationstLeydo not
LelongtoLisWillortoLislreedom, lortLeessenceolLisWillis tLat
notLingLeinitvLicLLeLasnotmadeLisovn. He, tLerelore,isaLle
to regard vLat Lelongs to Lis nature as sometLing alien, so tLat,
consequently, it is only in Lim, only Lelongs to Limin so lar as Le
makes itLis ovn orlollovs vitL Lis volitionLis naturalimpulses .
! ô
JoLoldamanresponsiLleloranActmeanst oimputeorattriLuteto
Lim guilt or innocence. CLildren vLo are still in a state olnature
cannot Le Leld responsiLle lor tLeir deeds, nor can crazy people or
idiots .
! 7
I n tLe distinction olDeed lrom Act [ Tat and Handlung] lies tLe
distinction Letveen tLe ideas ol moral responsiLility as tLey are
! ô The Philosophical Propaedeutic
time. In tLe lormer, among tLe ancients, Ieed vas attriLutedin its
entireextenttoman. HeLad to dopenancelortLeentire compass ol
Lis actions and no distinction vas madeilLe vas conscious olonly
one aspect ol Lis act and unconscious ol tLe otLers . He vas
considered as Laving an aLsolute knovledge and not ¸merely] a
relative and contingent knovledge, ¸in tLat] vLatever Le did vas
considered as Lis own Ieed. Part olLim vas relerred to anotLer
Ieing,e. g. Aj ax,vLenLeslevtLeoxenandsLeepoltLeCreeksina
state olinsanity and rage caused Ly Lis not receiving tLe arms ol
AcLilles, did not attriLute Lis crime to Lis madness, as tLougL Le
vere anotLerLeing vLile insane, Lut Letook tLe vLole deed upon
Limsellas its autLorandslevLimselllromsLame.
! 8
I ltLe Will vere not universal tLere could Le, properly speaking, no
actual statutes and notLing vLicL could Le imposed as oLligatory
uponall. £acLonecouldactaccordingtoLisovnpleasureandvould
not respect tLe pleasure olotLers. JLat tLe Will is universal ûovs
lromtLe conceptolits lreedom. Nen, consideredas tLey arein tLe
vorld, sLov tLemselves very dillerent in cLaracter, customs,
inclinations andparticularsentiments tLatis, tLeydillerintLeirWill.
JLey are Ly tLis di  erent individuals and diller Lynature lromeacL
otLer. £acLoneLasnaturalaLilitiesanddeterminationsvLicLotLers
lack. JLese dillerences Letveenindividuals donotconcern tLeWill
initsell, loritislree. FreedomconsistspreciselyintLeindeterminate-
ness oltLe Will orin tLe lact tLat itLas no determined natureinit.
JLe Will Ly itsell is tLus a Iniversal Will. JLe particularity or
tLeWill Lutis suLordinated to it. An ActvLicL is goodlegally or
morally, altLougLdoneLysomeoneindividual, isassentedtoLyall
otLers . JLeytLus recognizetLemselves, ortLeirovn vills, init. Itis
tLesamecaseLereasvitLvorksolart. £ventLosevLocouldnever
produce sucL a vork End expressed in it tLeir ovn nature. SucL a
vorksLovsitsell, tLerelore, astrulyuniversal. ItreceivestLegreater
applause tLe less it exLiLits tLe idiosyncrasy olits autLor.
ItcanLe tLe casetLat oneisunconsciousolLis IniversalWill. He
may Lelieve, indeed, tLat it is directly opposed to Lis Will, even
tLougLitisLis ¸true] Vill. JLecriminalvLois punisLed mayvisL,
olcourse, tLattLe punisLment Levarded ollLut tLeIniversalWill
Lrings vitLit tLedecree tLat tLe criminal sLallLepunisLed. Itmust
Le assumed tLat tLe ALsolute Will oltLe criminal demands tLat Le
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion ! 7
sLallLepunisLed. I ns olaras Lei s punisLedtLedemandi s madetLat
LesLallseetLatLeispunisLedj ustlyand, ilLeseestLis, altLougLLe
may visL to Le lreed lrom tLe punisLment as an external sullering
yet, in so larasLeconcedes tLat LeisjustlypunisLed, Lis Iniversal
Villapproves oltLe punisLment.
JLe Will-of-Choice [Arbitrariness] i s lreedom, Lut onlyformal
lreedom or lreedom in so lar as one' s Will relates to sometLing
limited. Jvo aspects must LereLe distinguisLed. ¸a) in Lov lar tLe
Will does not remain identical vitL itsellin it and ¸L) in Lov lar it
does remain so.
¸a) Inso lar as tLeWill vills something itLas a determined, limited
content. Itis, insolar, non-identicalvitLitsellLecauseitisLere
actually determined, altLougL in-and-lor-itsell it is undeter-
mined. JLe limited content vLicL it Las taken up is tLerelore
sometLingelsetLanititsell, e. g. ilIvilltogoortosee, ILecome
a going or a seeing one. I tLus enter a relation not identical to
mysell, since tLe going andseeing is sometLing limited and not
identicalvitL tLe£go.
¸L) Iut inrelationtotLeFormIstandinidentityvitLmyselloram
lree still, since I, all tLe vLile, distinguisL tLis state ol
determination lrom mysellas sometLing alien, lor tLe acts ol
my ovn vill. In so lar as tLis is tLe case it is evidently no alien
allair Lecauseitis made my ovn and I Lave myovnvill init.
JLis lreedom is only lormal lreedom Lecause, togetLer vitL my
ity, tLereis presentalso, attLe sametime, non-identity vitL
mysellor, inotLervords, tLereisalimitedcontentintLe£go. WLen
i commonlilevespeakollreedom, veordinarilyunderstand, under
tLe expression caprice or relative lreedom, tLe liLerty to do or to
relrain lrom doing sometLing or otLer. In tLe limited Will ve can
olourWilllromourselves orreßectuponit, tLatis, in solaras ve
are also Leyond and aLove it. Ilve are in a passion or ilve act
tLrougL a natural impulse ve Lave no lormal lreedom. Since our
£go, in tLis emotion, gives itsellup vLolly it seems to us to Le
sometLingunlimited ¸orinEnite] . Òur£goisnotout¸ side] olitand
! 8 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe Absolute Free Will distinguisLes itsell lrom tLe Relatively
Free Will or Win-of-Choice ¸Arbitrariness] tLrougL tLis. tLe
ALsolute Will Las only itselllor oLj ect, vLile tLe RelativeWillLas
sometLing limited. WitL tLe Relative Will, vitL, lor example, tLe
appetite, tLeoLjectoltLatWill¸itscontent]isalltLat concernsit. Iut
tLeALsolute ¸Will] mustLecarelully distinguisLedlromWilfulness.
itsell not merely vitL tLe oLj ect Lut also vitL tLe vill as Will,
insistingtLatitsvillassucLsLallLerespected. AdistinctionisLereto
Lemade. JLestuLLorn¸villul]maninsistsonLisvillsimplyLecause
it is Lis vill, vitLout ollering a rational ground lor it, i. e. vitLout
sLoving Lis vill to Lave general validity. WLile strengtL olvill is
necessary, sucL asLoldsunvaveringly Ly a rational purpose, ontLe
otLerLandmerestuLLornness, sucLasariseslromidiosyncrasyandis
repulsivetovardotLers, is toLedctested. JLetrue FreeWillLasno
contingent content. It alone is not contingent.
JLe Pure Will Las notLing to do vitL particularity. In so lar as
particularity comes into tLeWillitis ArLitrariness, lorArLitrariness
Las a limited interest and takes its determinations lrom natural
impulses and inclinations . SucL a content is a given one and is not
positedaLsolutelytLrougLtLevill. JLelundamentalprincipleoltLe
Will is, tLerelore, tLat its lreedom Le estsLlisLed and preserved.
Iesides tLis itLasindeedmanydillerent kinds ofdeterminations. it
Las a variety oldeEnite purposes, regulations, conditions, etc. , Lut
tLese are not purposes oltLe Will in-and-lor-itself Still tLey are
purposes lor tLe reason tLat tLey are means and conditions lor tLe
realization oltLe lreedom oltLe Will, vLicL ¸realiza
ion] demands
regulations and lavs lor tLe purpose ol restraining caprice and
inclination or mere ' good pleasure' . In a vord, tLe impulses and
appetitesvLicLrelateto merenaturalends, e. g. Education, Laslor
its endtLeelevation olman to anindependentstateolexistence.i.e.
to tLat existence vLerein Le is a Free Will. Òn tLis viev many
restraints areimposedupontLedesires andlikings olcLildren. JLey
particular vills and, moreover, ¸to annul also] to tLis end tLeir
sensuous inclinations and appetites tLat, Ly tLis means, tLeir Vill
may Lecome lree.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion !9
Firstly, Nan is a lree Leing. JLis constitutes tLe lundamental
cLaracteristic olLis nature. MevertLeless, Lesides lreedom Le Las
tLer necessary vants, special purposes and impulses, e. g. tLe
impulselorknovledge, lortLepreservationolLislile, LealtL, etc. In
tLesespecialdeterminationsLavLasnotmanassucLloritsoLject. It
Las not tLe design to lurtLer Lim in tLe pursuit oltLe same or to
Secondly, Lav does not depend upon one' s motives. Òne may do
sometLingvitLtLeLestolintentions andyettLedeedLenotlavlul

loralltLis Lutvrong. ÒntLeotLerLand anact, lorexample
tLe maintenance olmy property, may Le perlectly lavlul and yet I
Lave a Lad motive since I may Lave sougLt not vLat vasjust and
lavlul Lut tLeinj ury olanotLer. Lpon Lav as sucL tLeintentionor
motiveLasno inlluence.
JLirdly, itisnotamatterolconvictionastovLetLertLátvLicLI
perrorm is rigLt or vrong. JLis Lolds particularly vitL regard to
punisLment. AltLougLanellortismade toconvincetLecriminaltLat
no inûuence ontLejusticetLatis metedout to Lim.
Finally, Lav pays no regard to tLe disposition or sentiment under
vLoseinßuenceanytLingisdone. ItveryoltenLappenstL+tonedoes
consequences, sucL, lor instance, as tLe loss olreputation orcredit.
revarded in anotLer lile. Lav, Lovever, as sucL, is independent ol
tLesesentiments and convictions.
Law mustLe distinguisLedlromMorality. SometLing may Levell
enougL lrom a legal point olviev vLicL is not allovaLle lrom a
moral poin
t ol viev. JLe Lav grants me tLe disposition ol my



erminingLov I sLall disposeolit, Lut Norality
contains determinations vLicL restrain me in tLis respect. It may
not, Lut Norality demands not merely tLe oLservance ol]ustice
tovardsotLersLutrequires alsotLattLedispositionto dorigLtsLall
Lepresent, tLattLelavsLallLerespectedasLav. Norality demands
Erst tLat tLe legal rigLt sLall Le oLeyed and vLere it ceases enters
moral determination.
InordertLatan act mayLavemoralvalue insight is necessaryinto
itsnature¸asto]vLetLeritLerigLtorvrong, goodorevil. WLatone
2O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
terms tLe innocence olcLildren or oluncivilized nations is not yet
Norality. CLildrenorsucLuncivilizednationsescapetLecommission
ola multitude olLad acts Lecause tLey Lave no ideas oltLem: i. e.
Lecause tLe essential relations are not yetextantundervLicLalone
sucLdeedsarepossiLle. SucLnon-committalolevilactsLasnomoral
value. Iut tLey do perlorm acts vLicL are not in accordance vitL
Noralityandyet, lortLereasontLatnoinsigLtexistsintotLeirnature
¸asto]vLetLertLeyaregoodorLad, tLeyarenotstrictlyNoralacts .
PrivateconvictionstandsopposedtotLe mere laitLintLeauthority
of another. Ilmyact istoLave moralvalue myconvictionmustenter
into tLe act. JLe act must Le mine in a vLole sense. IlI act ontLe
autLority olanother my act is not lully my ovn, it is tLe act olan
alien convictionin me.
JLere are, Lovever, relations in vLicLtLemoralaspect consists
precisely in Leing obedient and acting according to tLe autLority ol
anotLer. Òriginally man lolloved Lis natural inclinations vitLout
reßectionorelsevitLrel¡ectionstLatvereone-sided, vrong, unjust
andundertLedominionoltLesenses . IntLisconditiontLeLesttLing
rationalone. JLrougLtLis oLediencetLenegativeadvantageisgained
tLat Le learns to renounce Lis s�nsuous appetites and only tLrougL
sucLoLediencecanNanattaintoindependenceandlreedom. IntLis
spLere Le alvays lollovs anotLer, vLetLer it Le Lis ovn vill, still
immersed in tLe senses, or vLetLer it Le tLe vill olanotLer. As a

ndertLedominionolexternaltLings and
orsometLing alien to Lis true vill. JLe one vLo is oLedient to tLe
Lav olReason is oLedient lromtLe point olviev olLis unessential
nature only, vLicLstandsundertLe dominion oltLatvLicLis alien
toLim. Òn tLe otLer Land Leis independentsell-determination, lor
tLis Lav Las its rootin Lis essence.
JLeDisposition [ Gesinnung] istLusintLemoralrealmanessential
element. ItconsistsintLis. tLatonedoesLisdutyloritsovnsake. It
is, tLerelore, an immoral motive to do anytLing out ol lear ol
punisLmentorinordertopreserveanotLer' sgood opinion. JLisisa
Leterogeneousmotive, loritisnotlromtLenatureoftLe tLingitself
In sucL a case one does not consider tLe Lav as sometLing
in-and-lor-itsellLut as dependent upon external determinations .
Yet tLe consideration vLetLer an action is to Le punisLed or
revarded, altLougLtLe consequencesdonot constitutetLe value ola
deed, is ol importance. JLe consequences ol a good act may
sometimesinvolvemucLtLatiseviland, ontLecontrary, anevilact
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 2!
involvemucLgood. JLetLinkingupontLeconsequencesolanactis
important, lor tLereason tLat one does not remain standing Ly an
immediate point ol viev Lut proceeds Leyond it. JLrougL its
manilold consideration oneis ledto tLenature olActs.
According to tLe standpoint olLav man is Lis ovn oLject as an
aLsolutely lree existence, according to tLe moral standpoint on tLe
contrary Le is sell-oLj ect, an individual in Lis special existence, a
memLer oltLe lamily, a lriend, a particular cLaracter, etc. Il tLe
externalcircumstancesinvLicL onemanstandsvitLanotLerare so
situated tLat Le lulEls Lis vocation, tLat is Lis Fortune. JLis
vell-Leing depends partly onLis ovnvillandpartly uponexternal
circumstances and otLer men. Norality Las, also, tLe particular
existence orvell-Leing olman lorits oLject and demands not only
tLat man Le lelt in Lis aLstract lreedom Lut tLat Lis Lappiness Le
promoted. Well-Leing, as tLe adaptation ol tLe external to our
internalLeing, vecallPleasure. Happiness isnotamereindividual
pleasure Lut an enduring condition ¸vLicL is] in part tLe actual
Pleasure itsell ¸and] , in part also, tLe circumstances and means
tLrougLvLicLonealvays Las, atvill, tLeaLilitytocreateastateol
comlort and pleasure lor Limself JLe latter lorm is tLe pleasure ol
tLemind. InHappiness, Lovever,asinPleasure, tLereliestLeideaol
goodlortune¸goodluck] .tLatitisanaccidentalmattervLetLerorno
tLeexternal circumstances agreevitLtLeinternal determinations ol
tLe desires. Blessedness, on tLe contrary, consists in tLis. tLat no
lortune¸luck]pertainstoit. i. e. tLatinittLeagreementoltLeexternal
existencevitLtLeinternaldesireisnotaccidental. IlessednesscanLe
predicatedonlyolCod, invLomvillingandaccomplisLmentolLis
aLsolute pover is tLe same. For man, Lovever, tLe Larmony oltLe
external vitL Lis internal is limited and contingent. In tLis Le is
JLe Moral Win, in regard to its disposition and conviction, is
imperIect. ItisaWillvLicLaims at pe
ection Lut¸a)isdriventovards
individuality and ¸L) LasnottLeadequatemeansinitspoverandis,
tLerelore, limited to Lringing aLout tLe goodolotLers .
In Religion, on tLe contrary, ve consider tLe Iivine Ieing tLe
perlection oltLeWill, according to its tvo aspects, namely ¸a] tLe

tion of the disposition vLicL no longer Las any alien impulses
vitLin and ¸L] tLe pe
ection of the power to attain Loly ends ¸or
purposes] .
22 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Law must Le considered.
¸!) in its£ssence,
¸2) in its Actual£xistenceinPoliticalSociety.
Accordingto Lav tLe IniversalWillsLouldLave lull svay vitLout
Lav applies to man only in solar asLeis a vLollylreeLeing.
Lav consistsintLis . tLat eacL individualLe respected and treatedLy
theotLer as a lree Leing, lor only under tLis condition cantLelree
WillLaveitsellas oLj ect and content in tLeotLer.
Explanatory: JLelreedomoltLeindividualliesattLeLas¡solLavand
tLeLav consistsintLis. tLatI treattLeotLerasalreeLeing. Reason
demands lavlul LeLaviour. £ssentially, every man is a lree Leing.
NendillerlromeacLotLeri ntLeirspecialconditionsandpeculiarities
LuttLisdillerencedoesnotconcerntLeAbstract Will assucL. IntLe
ALstract Will all are tLe same and vLen a man respects another Le
respects Limsell. Itlollovs tLatLytLe violationoltLerigLts oFone
individualtLerigLtsolall areviolated. JLissympatLyvitLotLersis
quiteadillerenttLinglromtLesympatLyvLicLoneleelsatanotLer' s
ortune. For, altLougL tLe injury or loss vLicL a man sullers in
gilts oflortune ¸vLicL gilts tLougL desiraLle are not in tLemselves
Lavehappened. SucLmislortunesLelongtotLeparticularityofman.
upon tLem as sometLing apart lrom us . Òn tLe otLer Land, at tLe
The Science of Laws
Morals and Religion 2J
inlringement ol anotLer' s rigLts eacL one leels Limsell attacked,
Lecause Lav is sometLing universal. Hence a violation oltLe Lav
cannotLelookeduponas sometLingloreign [remdes] . Weourselves
leel sucL aninlringement all tLe more, lor tLe Lavis necessary.
Inso laraseacL manisrecognizedandacknovledgedasalreeLeing,
Le is a Person. JLe proposition ol tLe Lav is tLerelore to Le
expressedtLus . £acLsLouldLetreatedLytLeotLeras a Person.
Explanatory: JLeconceptolPersonalityincludesinitsellsellLoodor
individuality vLicL is lree or universal. People Lave Personality
tLrougLtLeirspiritual nature.
Itlollovs, Lence, tLat no man canj ustlyLe compelledexceptlortLe
Explanatory: JLere arelimitations ollreedom and lav vLicL permit
peopletoLetreatednotaspersonsLutascLattels, e.g. tLelavsvLicL
permit slavery. JLese are, Lovever, only positive lavs or rigLts,
vLicL are opposedto Reason orALsoluteRigLt.
JLat action vLicL limits tLe lreedom ol anotLer or does not
acknovledge andtreatLim as a lree vill is illegal.
Explanatory: InanaLsolutesensenoconstraintispossiLleagainstman
can give up alltLat Lelongs to Lis existence. Constrainttakes place
vLensome conditionis attacLedtoa man' sexistencein sucLa vay
tLat, il Le vould maintain Lis existence, Le must suLmit to tLe
condition. Sinceman' sexistenceisdependentuponexternaloLjects,
in tLat respect, Le is liaLle to alien interlerences. Nan is externally
constrainedonlyvLenLevillssometLingvLicLinvolves anotLer, it
depends uponLisvillvLetLerLevillLave one andvitLitthe other or
neither of them. JLe external constraint, olcourse, depends upon Lis
vill, tLatis, inLovlarLeplaces Limsellunderit. HencetLeexternal
constraintisonlyrelative. Itislegal constraintvLenitisexercisedlor
tLepurposeolenlorcingj usticeagainst tLeindividual. JLis speciesol
constraintLasanaspectaccordingtovLicLitisnota constraintand
doesnotcontradicttLedignityolalreeLeing, lortLereasontLattLe
Will in-and-lor-itsellis also tLe ALsolute Will oleacL individual.
Freedom is not lound vLere tLe arLitrary vill or caprice ol tLe
individual jdominates] Lut vLereLav prevails.
24 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Permitted, Lut notlor tLis reasoncommanded, is tLelegalaspectolall
actions tLat do not limit tLe lreedom olanotLer or annul anotLer' s
Explanatory: JLe Lav contains properly only proLiLitions and no
commandments. WLat is not expressly lorLidden is alloved. Òl
courselegalproLiLitionscanLepositivelyexpressedascommands, as
lor instance. ' JLou sLalt keep tLy contract. ' JLe general legal
principle, olvLicLallotLersareonlyspecialapplications, readstLus.
' JLousLaltleaveundisturLedtLepropertyolanotLer. 'JLisdoesnot
requireanytLingpositivetoLedoneora cLangeolcircumstancesto
Le produced Lut requires only tLe abstention from the violation ol
property. WLen, tLerelore, tLe Lav is expressed as a positive
command, tLisis only alormolexpression, tLecontentolvLicLis
alvays Lasedona proLiLition.
JLe Will, vLen it suLsumes a tLing under itsell, makes it its ovn.
Possession is tLe suLsumption ola tLingundermyvilI.
Explanatory: Jo tLe suLsumption ol sometLing tLere Lelong tvo
parts. one universal and tLe otLer individual. I suLsume sometLing
individual vLen I attriLute to it a universal determination. JLis
suLsumptionoccursintLeAct of Judgement. IntLe]udgementtLat
vLicL suLsumesis tLe Predicate andtLatvLicLis suLsumedis tLe
Subject. JLe ' act ol taking possession' is tLe expression ol tLe
]udgement tLat a tLing Lecomes mine. Here my vill is tLat vh¡cL
suLsumes. I givetotLetLingtLepredicatetLatitismine. JLevillis
tLe suLsuming activity lor all external tLings, since itis in itselltLe
universalessence. AlltLings vLicL areLovever, not sell-relatedare
only necessitated andnot lree. JLis lact gives man tLe rigLt to take
possession olall external tlings and to make oltLem sometLing
dillerent lrom vLat tLey are. In doing so Le treats tLem only in
conlormityvitL tLeir essence.
¸ !) JLetLing vhicL one takes possessionollortLeErsttimemustLe
res nullius, i . e. notalreadysuLsumedunderanotLervill.
Explanatory: A tLing vLicL already Lelongs to anotLer cannot Le
takenpossessionolLyme, notLecauseitisacLattel, LutLecauseitis
his cLattel. For vereI to take possessionoltLe cLattel I vouldtLen
annulits predicateto Lehis andtLereLynegateLis vill. JLeWillis
sometLing aLsolute and I cannot makeitsometLing ncgative.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 25
! O
(2) Property mustLeopenly takenpossessionol[erg
en] , tLat is, it
must Le made knovn to otLers tLat I vill to suLsume tLis oLject
undermyvill,LeittLrougLphysical seizure [
orperliche Ergreif
ung] or
tLrougL transf
ormation [Formierung] or at least Ly designation oltLe
Explanatory: JLeexternalseizuremustLeprecededLytLeinternalact
oltLevillvLicLexpressestLattLetLingistoLemine.JLeE rstkind
olappropriation is tLat olPhysical Seizure. ItLas tLis delect, tLat
tLeoLj ectstoLeseizedmustLesoconstitutedtLatI cantakeLoldol
tLemvitLtLeLandorcovertLemvitLmyLody and, lurtLermore,
tLattLe appropriationis not ¸a]pernanent¸one] . JLe second, more
complete kind ol appropriation, is tLat ol Transforming [For­
mierung] atLing, aslorexamplecultivatingaEeld¸and] making gold
intoa cup. IntLiscasetLeform olvLatismineisdirectly connected
vitL tLe oLject and is, tLerelore, in and lor itsell a sign tLat tLe
material also Lelongs to me. Jo tLis kind ¸ol taking possession]
Lelongs, among otLertLings, tLeplanting oltrees ¸and tLe] taming
andleedingolanimals . AnimperlectlormolpropertyinlandistLe
useolaterritoryvitLoutitscultivation.e. g. vLennomadicpeoples
use territory lor pasturage, Lunters lor Lunting grounds ¸and]
EsLermen tLe sea coast or river Lank lor tLeir purposes. SucL an
appropriation is still superEcial Lecause tLe actual use is only a
temporary one ¸and] not a permanent lorm olpossession closely
attacLed totLeoLject. AppropriationLymerelyDesignation oltLe
oLj ect is imperlect. JLat designation vLicL does not, as in an
improvement, constitute tLe essential nature oltLe tLing is a mere
essenceLutitalsoLas, asvell, ameaningpeculiarlyitovnvLicLis
not connected vitL the nature ol tLe tLing designated. TLe
designation is tLus arLitrary. It is more or less a matter ol
convenience vLat tLe designation ola tLing sLallLe.
! !
A PossessionLecomesProperty or aLegal [Possession] vLenitis
acknovledged Ly everyone else tLat tLe tLing vLicL I Lave made
mineis mine,justasI acknovledgetLePropertyolotLers astLeirs.
nowledged lortLereasontLatitisanactoltLelree
vill, vLicL is sometLing aLsolute in itsell ¸and] in vLicL lies tLe
universal ¸condition] tLat I regard tLe vill olotLers as sometLing
Explanatory: Possession and Property are tvo dillerent determina-
26 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
tions. It is not necessary tLat Possession and Property Le alvays
connected. It is possiLle lor me to Lave Property vitLout Leing in
Possessionolit. WLen, lorexample, IlendsometLingtoanotLertLe
property still remains mine tLougL I part vitL tLepossession olit.
Possession and Property are implied in tLe concept tLat I Lave
Dominium ¸i. e. control ordominion] oversometLing. Propertyis
tLe legal side oltLe Iominium and Possession is only tLe external
side, namely tLat sometLing is in my pover. JLe legal rigLt is tLe
side olmy aLsolute lree vill vLicL Las declared sometLing to Le
someoneelse' s. JLisvillmustLeacknovledgedLyotLersLecauseit
isin-and-lor-itselland, insolarastLealreadystatedconditionsLave
Leen oLserved, PropertyLas, tLerelore, an internal and an external
side. JLe latter, Ly itsell, is tLe Appropriation, tLe lormer is tLe
Act of Will vLicL must Le acknovledged as sucL. It seems
contingent or arLitrary vLetLer tLe acknovledgement ol otLers
sLould Le added to tLe lact oltaking possession. JLisis necessary,
Lovever, lor itlies in tLe nature oltLe transaction. Acknovledge-
ment is not Lased on reciprocity. I do not acknovledge your rigLt
Lecauseyouacknovledgemine,norviceversa, LuttLegroundoltLis
reciprocal acknovledgement is tLe nature oltLe transaction itsell I
I can Dispose ol¸or Alienate] [enta·ussern] my property, andi t can
Lecome tLe property olanotLer, tLrougL an act olmylreevill.
Explanatory: Ny Povers and Skills are my property in tLe most
peculiar sense, Lut tLey Lave also an external aspect. ALstractly
considered tLey are external, ¸tLat is] in so lar as I can distinguisL
tLem lrom mysell, tLe simple £go. Iut also in tLemsclves Povers
and Skills are single and limited and tLey do not constitute my
essence. Ny essence, tLe intrinsic universal, is distinct lrom tLese
particulardeterminations . Finally, tLeyareexternalintLeiruse. IntLe
very act olusing tLem I convert tLem to an external lorm and tLe
productissomeexternalexistence. Pover, assucL, doesnotlieintLe
andtLattLis,itsexternalization, Lasmadeitaseparateexistence. TLis
expressionolPover is also anexternalityinsolarasitissometLing
limited and Enite. In so lar as sometLing is my property I Lave
connecteditvitLmyvillLuttLisconnectionisnotaLsolute. Forilit
veremyvillvouldnecessarilyLeinvolved. IutI Lave, intLiscase,
onlyparticularizedmyvilland, Lecauseitis lree, canovercometLis
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 27
1 3
JLosepossessionsareinalienable vLicLarenotsomucLmyproperty
as tLey areconstituentelementsolmyinnermostpersonoressence,
sucL, lor example, as tLe lreedomoltLevill, etLicallav, religion,
Explanatory: Ònly tLose possessions are alienaLle vLicL already, Ly
tLeir nature, are olan external cLaracter. Personality, lor example,
Lis personality Le Las reduced Limsell to a tLing. But sucL an
alienationvouldLenullandvoid. Forinstance, amanvouldalienate
Lis etLical nature [ Sittlichk
eit] vere Le to Lind Limsellto anotLer to
perlorm all manner olacts, crimes as vell as ¸morally] indillerent
acts. Iut sucL a Lond vould Lave no Linding lorce Lecause it
alienates tLe lreedom oltLe vill and, in tLe latter, eacL one must
standlorLimsell RigLtorvrongacts LelongtoLimvho commits
tLem and, Lecause tLey are so constituted, I cannot alienate tLem.
MorcanI alienate my religion. Ila religious community, oreven an
individual, leaves it lor a tLird party to determine vLat sLall
constitute its laitL, sucL an oLligation could Le set aside Ly eitLer
party. Movrongatleast couldLedoneto tLepartyvitLvLomtLe
agreement Lad Leen made Lecause vLat I Lave given over to Lim
could never become his property.
1 4
ÒntLe otLer Land, I can alienate tLe speciEc use olmymental and
Lodily energies as vell as tLe cLattel vLicL I maypossess.
Explanatory: Ònecanalienate only a limited useolLis povers, since
tLisuse, ortLecircumscriLedellect, isdistinctlromtLePoveritself
Iut tLe permanent use, or tLe ellect in its entire extent, cannot Le
distinguisLed lrom tLe Pover in-itsell JLe Pover is tLe inner or
universal, as opposed to its expression. JLe expressions are an
existence in time and space. JLe Poverin-itsellis notexLaustedin
sucL a single existence and is, moreover, not tied to one ol its
contingent ellects . Iut, secondly, tLe Pover must act and express
itsell, otLervise it is not a pover. JLirdly, tLe entire extent olits
ellects is again, itsell, tLe universal vLicL tLe Pover is . For tLis
reasonmancannotalienatetLeentireuseolLispovers, Levould, in
so doing, alienate Lis personality.
1 5
AnalienationtoanotLerinvolvesmy consenttoresigntLepropertyto
Lim, andhis consenttoacceptit. JListvololdconsent,insolarasit
28 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
is reciprocally declared and expressed as valid, is called Contract
(Pactum) .
Explanatory: Contract is a special mode Ly vLicL one Lecomes tLe
ovner olproperty vLicL already Lelongs to anotLer. JLe mode,
already explained, olLecoming an ovner vas tLat olimmediate
appropriation olsome tLing tLatvasres nullius.
( 1) JLe simplestlormolcontractis tLe Gift-Contract: intLis only
oneoltLeparties gives andanotLerreceives, noequivalentLeing
returned. Avaliddonationisa ContractLecausetLevillsolLotL
partiesmustLeinvolved. tLeonevillingtoresigntLepropertyto
tLe otLer vitLout receiving an equivalent tLereoland tLe otLer
Leing villing toreceive tLeproperty.
¸2) JLe Exchange-Contract, ¸or| Barter, consists in tLis. I give
something to anotLer on condition tLat Le gives sometLing ol
equivalentvalue¸to me] . JotLis Lelongs tLetvololdconsenton
tLe part oleacL. to givesometLing to and to receive sometLing
lromtLe otLer.
(3) Buying and Selling is a particular kind olexcLange, tLat ol
goodslormoney. Money istLeuniversallormolgoods, Lence,
as aLstract value, it cannot itsell Le used lor tLe purpose ol
satislying a particular vant. It is only tLe universal means Ly
vLicL to satisly particular needs. JLe use olmoney is only a
mediated one. A materialis not in-and-lor-itsellNoneyLecause
general agreement.
(4) Rent consists in tLis. tLat I grant to someone mypossession or
tLeuseolmyproperty vLileI reservetLeovnersLip tomysell.
JLere are tvo cases. itmayLappentLat tLe oneto vLomI Lave
leased sometLing is Lound to return tLe sameidenticaltLing or
tLat I LavereservedtLe rigLt to property tLe sameinkindand
1 6
JLe declarationolvill contained in tLe contracti s notsulEcient to
complete tLe transler ol my property or laLour to anotLer. JLis
transler, ontLeLasis oltLe contract, is Performance.
Explanatory: Ny promise in tLe contract contains tLe acknovledge-
mentonmyparttLatI LavepartedvitLtLetitletotLepropertyand
tLat tLe otLer party Las acquired title to tLe same. JLe piece ol
property Lecomes immediately tLeproperty olanotLertLrougLtLe
contractinsolarasitLaditsgroundinmyvill. Iut, ilI donotalso
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 29
placetLeotLerpartyinpossessioninaccordancevitLtLecontract, to
tLatextentI despoilLimolLisproperty. IamtLereloreLoundLytLe
contracttogivepossession. ¸JreatLereolacquisitionLyJestament. )
1 7
An Encroachment ¸Jrespass] upon tLe spLere olmy lreedom ly
anotLer may occur ¸a) tLrougL Lis Laving my property in Lis
possessionas his own; i.e. tLrougLLis claimingitontLe ground tLat
LeLas tLerigLt toitandacknovledging, attLe same time, tLatilI,
insteadolLimsell, LadtLerigLttoitLevouldsurrenderittome. In
onLis side. ¸L)His actionmayimplytLatLedoesnotrecognizemy
vill at allandconsequently violatestLelavas Lav.
Explanatory: JLe ideas vLicL ve Lave Leen considering contain tLe
nature ollegality, itslavs, anditsnecessity. IutLavisnot' necessary'
intLe sensetLatnecessityis usedvLen speaking olpLysicalnature,
e. g. tLe necessity vLicL Lolds tLe sun in its place. A llover must
vLollyconlormtoitsnature. Ilit, lorexample, does notcompleteits
grovtLtLiscomes lromtLeinterventionolsomeexternalinûuence,
notlromitself Spirit, ontLecontrary, Lyreason olitslreedom, can
actincontraventionoltLelavs. JLus tLerecanLecontraventionol
Lav itself A distinction mustLereLemadeLetveen ¸a) Universal
Law, Lavqua Lav, and¸L)Particular Law asitrelatestotLerigLts
olan individualpersonina particularmatter.
JLe Iniversal Lav is tLat ¸concept] tLrougL vLicL everyLody,
independentolLisorLerproperty, isalegalperson. Acontravention
oltLe lav may take tLe sLape ola mere relusalto concede to an
individualsomeparticularrigLt, orsomeparticularpieceolproperty.
IntLis case, tLeIniversalLavisnotviolated. Òne standsinrelation
toLisopponentasalegalperson. SucLa'judgement'canLeregarded
as a merely negative one in vLicL tLe particular is denied in tLe
predicate, as lor example, vLen I assert 'JLis stove is not green' , I
negate merely tLe predicate ol greenness Lut not tLereLy all
predicates. IntLesecondcaseolacontraventionoltLelavIassertnot
onlytLataparticulartLingistLepropertyolanotLerLutI denyalso
tLatLeis alegalperson. I donottreatLimas a person. I donotlay
claimtosometLing ontLegroundtLatILavearigLttoitorLelieve
tLatI Lave,IviolatetLelavas Lav. SucLajudgementLelongstotLe
kind olj udgement called 'inEnite' . JLe inEnitej udgement negates
not only tLe particular Lut also tLe universal oltLe predicate, e. g.
'JLis stovei s nota vLale' or' iti s notmemory. ' Sincenotonly tLe
particularLut also tLeuniversal oltLe predicateis negatednotLing
30 The Philosrphical Propaedeutic
remains lor tLe suLj ect. SucL j udgements are tLerelore aLsurd,
tLougLcorrectin lorm. So, likevise, tLeviolation ollav as Lavis
sometLing possiLle, and indeed also Lappens, Lut it is aLsurd and
sell-contradictory. Cases oltLeErstkindcomeundertLeCivilLav,
tLose oltLe second kind under tLe Criminal Lav.
1 8
IntLel¡rstcase[Civil Law] tLemereexplicationol tLelegalgrounds
Lelongs. IutlortLedecisionoltLecaseLetveentLetvocontending
parties a tLirdpartyisnecessary, onevLo islreelromallinterestin
tLe matter, in orderto see tLat tLe Lav as sucL is carried out.
Explanatory: Inder tLe Erst case come, tLerelore, civil disputes. In
tLese tLe rigLt olanotLer is called into question Lut on tLe Lasis ol
Lav. JLe tvo contending parties agree in tLis, tLat tLey recognize
tLelavasLav. JLepossessionistoLegivenonlytoLimvLoLastLe
lavlulrigLtandnottotLeonevLoLasinßuence, pover, orismore
deserving. JLepartiesdilleronlyinregardtotLesuLsumptionoltLe
particular or ol tLe universal. Hence it lollovs tLat tLere is no
personalill-vill Letveen tLej udge and tLe parties in dispute, eitLer
tovardstLej udgeLytLedissatisl¡edpartyorontLepartoltLej udge
tovardstLeparty vLoselegalrigLtLeLasdenied. Sincenoattackis
Lere made against tLe person, it lollovs tLat tLe party vLo Las
illegally seized tLeproperty oltLeotLeris notpunisLed.
1 9
JLe second case [Criminal Law] , ontLe otLer Land, concerns tLe
violation olmy personal external lreedom, olmy lile and limL or
even olmyproperty, Lyviolence.
Explanatory: JLe second case concerns tLeillegal deprivation olmy
lreedom Ly imprisonment or slavery. I am deprived ol natural
external lreedom vLen I cannot go vLere I vant to go and ¸Ly]
similar restrictions. ¸JLis case] also includes inj ury to my lile and
limL. JLisismucLmoreimportanttLanroLLingmeolmyproperty.
AltLougL lile and limL, like property, is sometLing external, my
personalityisalsoinjured, sinceinmyLodyismyimmediateleeling
JLe constraint vLicL is ellected Ly sucL an act must not only Le
removed, i . e. tLe internal nugatoriness olsucL an act Le exLiLited
onlynegatively, LuttLere mustLea positiverestitution made. ¸JLe
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 31
lorm ol rationality in general must Le made valid against it, tLe
universality or equality restored. ) Since tLe perpetrator is a rational
LeingLisactionimpliestLatitissometLinguniversal. 'Ilyoudespoil
anotLer, youdespoilyoursellilyoukillanyonetLenyoukillalland
yourself JLeactionisalavvLicLyousetupand,inyourdeed, you
Lave lully recognized its validity. ' JLe perpetrator may tLerelore
LimsellLesuLjected to tLe same lormoltreatment as tLatvLicLLe
Las meted out and, in so lar, tLe equality tLatLe Las violated may
againLerestored (us talionis) .
Explanatory: Retaliation is Lased on tLe rational nature ol tLe
vrong-doer ¸and] it consists in tLis . tLat tLe unlavlul act must Le
converted into a lavlul one. JLe unlavlul actionisindeed a single
irrational action. Iut, sinceit is perlormedLya rationalLeing, itis,
according to lorm tLougL not according to content, rational and
universal. FurtLermore, itistoLeconsideredasaprincipleorasLav.
Iut, assucL, itisvalidonlylortLeonevLocommitteditLecauseLe
alone recognizes it Ly Lis action and no one else. He Limsell,
tLerelore, is essentially suLj ecttotLis principle or'Lav' andit must
Le carried out upon Lim. JLeinjustice vLicL Le Las doneislavlul
vLen visited ¸Lack] upon Lim Lecause tLrougL tLis second action,
vLicLLeLas recognized, equalityis restored. JLis is merelyformal
JLeRetaliation, Lovever, ougLtnottoLemetedoutLytLeinjured
party or Ly Lis relatives, Lecause vitLtLem tLe general regard lor
Lav is Lound up at tLe same time vitL tLe contingency ol tLe
passions . Retaliation mustLelavlully adn+inisteredLy a tLirdparty
vLo merely makes valid and executes tLe universal. In so lar it is
Explanatory: JLe dillerence Letveen Revenge and Punishment is
tLatRevengeisRetaliationinsolarasitis carriedoutLytLeinjured
party, PunisLmentis administeredLytLejudge. RetaliationmustLe
carriedoutintLelormolPunisLmentLecause, intLecaseolrevenge,
passionLasaninßuenceandjusticeisspoiltLyit. Noreover, revenge
LastLelormnotolLavLutolcaprice, sincetLeinjuredpartyalvays
acts under tLe impulse olleeling or olsuLj ective motives. Òn tLis
accountj ustice, administered as revenge, constitutes a nev ollence
and is lelt only as an individual deed and perpetuates itsell
unreconciled ad inf
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe conceptol Lav, as tLepovervLicLLoldssvayindependently
oltLemotivesoltLeindividual, LasitsactualizationonlyinPolitical
JLeFamily istLenatural societyvLosememLersareunitedtLrougL
love, trustandnatural oLedience (ietas) .
Explanatory: JLeFamilyisanaturalsociety, l¡rstly, Lecauseonedoes
notLelongtotLelamilytLrougLLislreeactLuttLrougLnature, and
lamily tovard eacL otLer rest not so mucL upon reßection and
deliLerate cLoice Lut upon leeling and impulse. JLe relations are
necessary and rational Lut tLere is lacking tLe lorm ol conscious
deliLeration. Itismoreakintoinstinct. JLeloveoltLelamilycircle
rests upon tLe lact tLat eacL £go constitutes a unity vitL tLe otLer
£gos . JLeydonotregardeacLotLerasindependentindividuals. JLe
lamily is an organic vLole. JLe parts are, properly speaking, not
vLicL lack independence vLen separated lrom tLe vLole. JLe
otLer consists in tLis: tLat eacL does not seek Lis ovninterest apart
lromtLerestLutonlytLecommoninterestoltLevLole. JLenatural
oLediencevitLintLelamily rests upontLecircumstancetLatin tLis
vLole tLereis onlyonevill: tLat, namely, oltLeLead oltLelamily.
Insolar tLelamily constitutes only one person. ¸Mation)
JLe State is Luman societygovernedLylegalrelationsLipsinvLicL
vLicLariselromnaturalinclinationsandleelings. JLepersonalityol
eacLisrespectedasamatterolcourse. IlalamilyLasexpandedintoa
nation, and tLe State and tLe nation coincide, tLis is a great good
Explanatory: ApeopleisknittogetLerLylanguage, manners, customs
and culture. JLis connection, Lovever, is not sulEcient to lorm a
State. Iesides tLese tLe morality, religion, prosperity and vealtL ol
allits citizensareveryimportanttLingslortLeState. Itmustcarelor
tLepromotionoltLeseconditionsLut even tLeydonotconstitutelor
The Science of Laws
Morals and Religion 33
it tLe immediate oLject ol its existence, vLicL is to secure tLe
actualization olLav.
JLenatural condition is tLe condition olLarLarism, olviolence and
injustice. Nan must issue lortL lrom sucL condition into tLat ol
political society Lecause in tLe latter alone tLe legal relation Las
Explanatory: JLe State of Nature is lrequently depicted as tLe
perlectstateolmanLotLastoLappinessandetLicaldevelopment. In
tLe Erst place it is to Le remarked tLat innocence, as sucL, Las no
moralvalue, in so lar as it consistsinmereunconsciousness olevil
and rests upontLeaLsenceoltLoseneeds andvants vLicLpromote
tLe existence olevil. Secondly, tLis state olnatureis ratLerone ol
violenceandinjustice, lortLeprecisereasontLatmenintLisstateact
tovards eacL otLer according to tLeir natures. Iut in tLis tLey are
unequal, LotLinregardtoLodilypoverandinmentalendovments,
and tLey make tLese dillerences lelt, one against tLe otLer, tLrougL
Lrute violence and cunning. AltLougL reason exists in tLe state ol
nature it is tLere suLordinate to nature. Nan must, tLerelore, pass
overlromtLis stateto onein vLicL tLe rational vill Las svay.
Law is tLe aLstract expression ol tLe Iniversal Will tLat exists
Explanatory: Lav is tLe Ceneral Will in so lar as it accords vitL
Reason. JLisdoesnotmeantLateacLindividualsLallLaveloundtLis
villinLimsellorLeconsciousolit. Noreover, itisnotnecessarytLat
eacLindividual sLallLave declaredLisvillandlromtLis a universal
result Las Leen oLtained. JLat is vLy in actual Listory it Las not
LappenedtLateacLindividual citizenolapeopleLasproposedalav
andtLentLatallLaveagreedtoitLy acommonvote. Lavcontains
tLe necessity olmutual legal relationsLips . JLe legislators Lave not
given arLitrary prescriptions . JLey Lave prescriLed not tLe product
oltLeir particular likes and dislikes Lut vLat tLeyLave recognized
tLrougLtLeirincisive minds as tLetrutL andessence olvLatisj ust
Government is tLe individuality olWill tLat is rationally deter-
mined. ItistLepovertomaketLelavsandtoadministerorexecute
34 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Explanatory: JLe State Las lavs. JLese are tLe Will in its general
aLstract essence vLicL is, as sucL, inactive, just as principles and
and not an actual vill. JotLese generalities only tLe Covernmentis
tLe active and actualizing vill. Lav Las indeed an existence as
manners and customs Lut Covernment is tLe conscious pover ol
unconscious custom.
JLe general pover oltLe State contains sundry particular povers
1 JLe Legislative as sucL,
2 JLe Administrative and Financial, tLe pover olcreating tLe
means lor tLe actualization olits lreedom,
3 JLe¸independent]Judiciary andPolice ¸ortLePublic Author­
ity] ;
4 JLeMilitary, and tLe poverto Wage War and Make Peace.
Explanatory: JLe lorm oltLe constitution is determined principally
Ly tLe central government and, moreover, vLetLer several oltLem
are united in one autLority or are separated. i. e. vLetLer tLe prince
orregentLimselladministers tLelavs orvLetLer particular, special
courts are estaLlisLed lor tLis purposeandvLetLer tLe regency also
exercises tLe ecclesiastical pover, etc. It is also an important
ol tLe government Las tLe Enancial pover in its Lands vitLout
restriction, sotLatit canlevy taxes and spend tLem quite arLitrarily
andvLetLerseveralautLoritiesarecomLinedinone,e. g. vLetLertLe
judicialandtLemilitarypoverareunitedinoneolEcial. JLelormol
a constitution is, lurtLermore, essentially determined tLrougL tLe
circumstancevLetLerornotallcitizens, insolarastLeyarecitizens,
Lave a part in tLe government. SucL a constitution as permits tLis
generalparticipationis calledaDemocracy. JLedegeneratelormol
a Iemocracy is called an Ochlocracy or moL rule, vLen, namely,
dealj ustlyprevent, Lyviolent means, tLelav-aLiding citizens lrom
carrying out tLe Lusiness oltLe State. Ònlyin tLecase olsimple,
uncorruptedetLicalprinciples, andinstatesolsmallterritorialextent,
cana Iemocracyexist andûourisL. Aristocracy is tLe constitution
in vLicL only certain privileged lamilies Lave tLe exclusive rigLt to
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion
rule. JLe degenerate lorm tLereolis an Oligarchy, vLen, namely,
tLe numLer ollamilies vLo Lelong to tLe governing class is small.
SucL a condition olallairs is dangerous Lecause in an ÒligarcLy all
particular povers are directly exercised Ly a council. Monarchy is
tLe constitution in vLicL tLe government is in tLe Lands olone
individual and remains Lereditary in Lis lamily. In a Hereditary
NonarcLy conßicts and civilvars, sucL as areliaLletoLappeninan
place, vanisLLecausetLeamLitionolpoverlulindividuals cannot, in
tLat case, lead tLem to aspire to tLe tLrone. Noreover, tLe entire
poveroltLe governmentis not vestedimmediatelyintLeNonarcL
Lut a portion ol it is vested in tLe special Ninistries ¸Iureaus)
¸andl]oralsointLe£statesvLicL, in tLenameoltLekingandunder
Lis supervision and direction, exercise tLe pover entrusted to tLem
Lylav. InaNonarcLycivillreedomisprotectedtoa greaterdegree
tLanunderotLer constitutions . JLe degeneratelormolaNonarcLy
isDespotism, vLerein,namely, tLerulerdirectlygovernsaccording
toLis caprice. ItisessentialinaNonarcLytLattLegovernmentLave
appropriate povers to Lold in cLeck tLe private interests ol tLe
individualLut, ontLe otLerLand, tLe rigLts oltLecitizensmust Le
protectedLylav. AIespoticgovernmentLasindeedaLsolutepover
LutinsucLa constitutiontLerigLtsoltLe citizen aresacriEced. JLe
arLitrarily,Lereinlies tLe greatest danger. JLe lorm olgovernment
ola people is not merely an external allair. A people can Lave one
lormjustasvellasanotLer. ItdependsessentiallyupontLecLaracter,
manners and customs, degree olculture, its vay ollile, and tLe
territorialextent ¸oltLe nation] .
JLe citizens, as individuals, are suLordinated to tLe pover oltLe
StateandmustoLeytLesame. JLecontentandoLjectoltLepolitical
poveristLeactualizationoltLenatural, tLatis, aLsolute, rigLtsoltLe
citizens. Mone oltLese rigLts is renounced orgiven up to tLe State
Lut tLey are ratLer only enj oyed in tLeir lull employment and
cultivationin tLe State.
JLeconstitutionoltLeStatedeEnedastLeInternal Political Law is
tLe relationsLip ol tLe particular povers not only to tLe central
administration, tLeir LigLest unity, Lutto eacL otLer, as vell as tLe
relation oltLe citizens totLem ortLeir participationtLerein.
36 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
International Law concerns tLe relationolindependent peoples to
eacL otLer tLrougL tLeir governments and rests principally upon
specialJreaties Uus Gentium) .
Explanatory: StatesareloundratLerinanaturaltLaninalegalrelati
tovards eacL otLer. JLere is, tLerelore, a continual state olstrile
Letveen tLem until tLey conclude Jreaties vitL eacL otLer and
tLereLyenterinto a legal relationtovards eacL otLer. ÒntLe otLer
Land, Lovever, tLey are quite aLsolute and independent ol eacL
otLer. JLe lav is, tLerelore, not actually in lorce Letveen tLem.
JLeycan, tLerelore, LreaktreatiesinanarLitrarymanner and, ontLis
account, tLere alvays remains a certain degree oldistrust Letveen
tLem. Asnaturalentities tLeyLeLave tovards eacLotLerasexternal
lorces and, inordertomaintaintLeirrigLts, must, ilneeds Le, vage
varlor tLe purpose.
WLatever can Le demanded on tLe ground ol Lav is a Civil
Obligation [ Schuldig
eit] Lut, in so lar as moral grounds are to ¡e
oLserved, it is a Duty [Plicht] .
Explanatory: JLevordIutyislrequentlyusedollegalrelationsLips .
Legal Iuties are deEned as pe
ect and Noral Iuties as impe
Lecause tLe lormer must Le done, and Lave an external necessity,
vLile tLe Iatter depend on a suLj ective vill. Iut one migLt, vitL
goodreason, inverttLisclassiEcationinasmucLastLeLegalIuty

sucL demands only anexternalnecessity, in vLicL tLe dispositionis
not taken into account, orin vLicL I may even Lave a Ladmotive.
asregardsits contentand,likeviseaccordingtolorm, tLesuLj ective
side, tLe CoodIntention.
Law, in general, leaves tLe disposition out ol consideration.
Norality, on tLe otLer Land, is concerned essentially vit� tLe

intention and demands tLat tLe deed sLould Le done out olsimple
regard [Achtung] lorIuty. SotootLelegallyrigLtconductismoralin
solar asits movingprincipleis tLe regard lor tLe rigLt.
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 37
JLeDisposition is tLe suLjectivesideoltLe moraldeed ortLefor

oltLesame. JLere isinitasyetnocontentpresentLuttLecontentis
as essential as tLe actualperlormance.
Explanatory: WitL legally rigLt conduct tLe moral aspect sLo

alsoLeessentially connected. Itmay, Lovever, LetLecasetLatvitL
legally rigLt action tLereis no sentimen


tLatanimmoralintentmayaccompanyit. JLelegallyrigLtact, mso
lar asitisdoneoutolregardlortLeLav, is, attLesametime, also
moral. JLe legally rigLt action, associated attLe same time vitL a
moral disposition, is to Le carried out unconditionally Lelore tLere
tLat is, legal oLligation. Nen are very ready to act
lrom a mer

moral ground, lor example, to give ava
vitL an air olg

ratLer tLan pay tLeir Lonest deLts, lor m a genero

s actio� tLey
congratulatetLemselvesonaccountol� specia�perlection, vLile, on
tLe contrary, in tLe perlormance oljust action tLey vould o

perlorm tLe completely univeral act vLicL makes tLem equal vitL
£verytLing Actual contains tvo aspects . tLe true Concept an
d tLe
Reality oltLis Concept. lor example, tLe concept oltLe State is t�e
guaranteeandactualizationol justice. JotLereality

regulationsoltLeconstitution, tLerelationoltLemdividual povers
toeacLotLer, etc. JotLeactual manLelongalso, evenonLispractical
side, tLe concept and tLe reality ol tLe concept. Jo tLe lormer
Lelongs pure personality, or aLstract lreed

om, to
tLe latter, tLe
particular determination olexistence

and ex


e itself AltLougL
tLereisin tLis sometLing moretLanis containedintLe co
ncept, y
tLis must alsoLeinconlormitytotLe concept anddeterminedLyit.
JLepureconceptolpracticalexistence,tLe£go, istLeoLj ectolLav.
tLeuniversalandnecessarydeterminationsolLisparticular determi

existence [Daseins] . JLe moral code tLerelore is not merely proLiLi-
tory, asvitLtLelegal code, vLicL only ordains tLat

�elreedom ol
anotLer must Le lelt inviolate, Lut it ordains a positive course ol
action tovards anotLer. JLe prescriptions ol Norality reler to
individual actuality ¸i. e. to tLe concrete situations in vLicL tLe
individual may Leplaced] .
38 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Humanimpulsein respect olman' sparticular determinate existence
as considered Ly morality is directed tovards tLe Larmony oltLe
outer vorld vitL Lis internal determinations, to tLe production ol
Pleasure andHappiness.
Explanatory: NanLasimpulses, i. e. LeLasinternaldeterminationsin
m�natureorintLatrespectaccordingtovLicLLeis simplyanactual
Leing. JLese determinations are tLereloredelective ¸imperlect] inas

astLeyaremerelyinternal. JLeyareimpulsesinsolarastLey
are directed to tLe overcoming ol tLis delect or vant. i. e. tLey
demand tLeir realization, vLicL is tLe Larmony oltLe outer and

JLis Larmon
is Pleasure. It is preceded, tLerelore, Ly a
rel¡ection. a comparson Letveen tLe inner and tLe outer vLetLer
tLis proceeds lrommeorlromgoodluck. Pleasuremaysp�inglrom
tLe most varied sources . It does not depend upon tLe content Lut
concernsonlytLelorm. InotLervords, itistLeleelingolsometLing
merely lormal, namely, oltLe given Larmony. JLe doctrine vLicL
makes Pleasure, or ratLer Happiness, its aim, Las Leen called
Eudaemonism. Iut tLat doctrine does not decidein vLat Pleasure
or Happiness consists. Hence, there can Le a coarse, crude
£udaemonism and a reEned one, tLat is, LotL goodand Lad actions
can LeLased on tLis principle.

is, as Pl


a subjective leeling and sometLing


vLicLcanLelinkedvitLtLisortLatimpulseanditsoLj ect
and in vLicL I regard mysellonly as a natural Leing and aman end
only as a single individual.
Explanatory: Pleasure is sometLing suLj ective andrelates to me as a
particularindividual. JLereisinitnotLingolanoLjective, universal,
intelligiLle nature. Òn tLis account it is not a standard or rule
atLingistoLedecidedorjudged. IlIsay tLatatLingpleases
me, orilI appeal to my pleasure, I only express tLe relation oltLe
tLing to me and tLereLy ignore tLe relation I Lave to otLers as a
rational Leing. Itis contingent as regards its contentLecauseit may
attacLtotLisortLatoLj ectand, sinceitdoesnotconcerntLecontent
it �s sometLing purely lormal. Noreover, according to its externa|
Leing, Pleasure is contingent, dependent upon circumstances. JLe
means vLicL I use to attain it are external and do not depend upon
me.IuttLetLingtLatILaveoLtainedtLrougLtLeuseolmeans, inso
larasitis to addto mypleasure, mustLecomelor me, cometo me.
Iut tLis is a contingent alfair. JLe consequences ol vLat I do,
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 39
tLcrelore, donotreturntome. ILavenottLeenj oymentoltLemasa
necessaryconsequence. Pleasure tLus ariseslromtvo dillerentkinds
olcircumstances. Erstly, lrom an existence vLicL must Le sougLt
alter andvLicL depends entirely upon good lortune, and secondly,
upon a condition olLeing vLicL I mysell produce. JLougL tLis
only tLe act as sucL Lelongs to me, Lence tLe result does not
necessarilyreturntomeand, accordingly, theenj oymentoltLeactis
contingent. InsucLanactastLatolIeciusNuslorLisnativecountry
tLe ellect oltLe same could not come Lack to Lim as enjoyment.
Results cannot Le made tLe principle ol action. JLe results olan
depends upon otLer circumstances ormayLe annulled altogetLer.
Pleasureis a secondaryallairmerelyconcomitantolan act. WLen
suLstantialpurposesarerealized, pleasureaccompaniestLeminsolar
as one recognizes in Lis vork Lis ovn suLjective self WLosoever
seeks Pleasure merely seeks Lis ovn sellaccording to its accidental
side. WLosoeverisLusiedvitLgreatvorksandinterestsstrivesonly
to Lring aLout tLe realization ol tLe oLject itself He directs Lis
attentiontotLesubstantial and does not thin
of himsel
f but forgets himself
in the object. Nen vLo perlorm great services, and Lave cLarge ol
great interests, are olten commiserated vitL Ly people lor Laving
little pleasure, tLat is, lor living only in tLe oLj ect and not in tLeir
ovn accidentality.
Reason annuls tLat indeterminateness vLicL leels pleasure in mere
oLjects, puriEes tLe content ol our propensities lrom vLat is
suLjective and contingent, and teacLes Lov to recognize vLat is
universal and essentially the solely desirable and ratLer inculcates tLe
disposition to do worthy actions for their own sa
Explanatory: JLeIntellect orRefection transcendsinitsactivityall
immediatepleasuresLut does not, LytLis, cLangeitsaimor guiding
principle. It transcends single pleasures only in so lar as to compare
tLeimpulsesonevitLanotLerandtopreleroneoveranotLer. Sinceit
aims not at pleasure in detail, Lut only on tLe vLole, it aims at
Lappiness. JLisreßectionLoldslasttotLespLereolsuLjectivityand
Las pleasure lor its end and aim, tLougL in a larger, more
compreLensive sense. Since it makes distinctions in pleasures and
seeks tLeagreeaLleonallits dillerent sides, it reEnes tLe grossness,
tLeuntamed andmerely animal element olpleasure andsoltens tLe
customs and dispositions . In so lar tLerelore as tLe understanding
40 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Lusies itsell vitL satislying tLe means, tLe needs generally ol
gratil¡cation, it lacilitates tLisgratiEcationandattains tLepossiLility
oldevoting itselltoLigLer ends. ÒntLeotLer Land, tLis reEnement
ens maninasmucLasLedissipates Lispoversupon
somanytLingsand givesLimsellsomany dillerent aims, andtLese
discriminated. JLus Lis pover is veakened and Le Lecomes less
capaLle oltLe concentration olLis mind vLolly upon one oLj ect.
WLenmanmakespleasureLisoLj ectLeannulsvitLsucLaresolution
Lis impulse to transcend pleasure and do sometLing LigLer.
Pleasureisindel¡nitein regard tocontentlor tLereasontLatitcan
Le lound in tLe pursuit ol all sorts ol oLjects . JLerelore, tLe
dillerence Letveen pleasures is no oLjective one, Lut only a
quantitative one. JLe Inderstanding, vLicL takes account olresults
only, prelers tLe greatertotLeless.
Reason, on tLe contrary, makes a qualitative distinction, i. e. a
distinction in regard to content. It prelers tLe vortLy oLj ect ol
pleasuretotLeunvortLyone. IttLereloreenters upona comparison of
the nature of objects. Inso laritdoesnot regardtLesuLjectiveas sucL,
i. e. tLepleasantleeling, LutratLertLeoLjective. ItteacLes, tLerelore,
vLat kind ol oLjects men sLould desiderate lor tLemselves. Òn
account oltLe universality olLis nature man Las sucL an inEnite
variety olsources olpleasure open Lelore Lim tLat tLe patL to the
agreeaLle is Leset vitL illusions and Le may Le easily led astray
tLrougLtLisinEnitevarietyitsell. i.e. divertedlromapurposevLicL
Le ougLt to make Lis special oLject.
The urge for what is agreeable may harmonize with Reason, i . e. LotL
may Lave tLe same content ¸and] reason may legitimate tLe content.
JLe lorm olimpulse is tLat ola suLj ective leeling or it Las lor its
oLject tLe oLtaining olvLat is pleasant lor tLe suLj ect. In dealing
vitL a universal oLj ect tLe oLj ect itsellis tLe end and aim. Òn tLe
otLerLandtLe desire lor pleasure is alvays selEsL.
Impulses and Inclinations are, considered Ly tLemselves, neitLer
good nor Lad, i.e. man Las tLem directly lrom nature. ' Cood' and
' Lad' are moral predicates and pertain to tLe vill. JLe Coodis tLat
vLicL corresponds to Reason. Iut Impulses andInclinations cannot
contingent one and man is no indillerent tvololdLeing.
Explanatory: NoralityLasloritsoLj ectmaninhisparticularity. JLis
seems at Erst to contain only a multiplicityolpeculiarities vLerein
cience of Laws} Morals and Religion 41
men are unlike and diller lrom eacL otLer. Nen diller lrom eacL
otLer in vLat is contingent or dependent on nature and external
circumstances. In tLe particular, Lovever, tLere also dvells some-
tLinguniversal. JLeparticularity ola manconsistsinLisreIationto
otLers. In tLis relation tLere are also essential and necessary
determinations. JLese constitute tLe content olDuty.
JLe Erst essential determination ol man is Lis Individuality,
¸secondly] , LeLelongstoanaturaltotality, tLeFamily,¸tLirdly] , Leis
amemLeroltLeState, ¸lourtLly]
in Ceneral.
Consequently Lis duties are lourlold.
(1) Duties to Himself;
(2) Duties to his Family;
(3) Duties to the State;
(4) Duties towards Other Men in General.
Duties of the Individual to Himse
Nan, as an individual, stands in relation to Limself He Las tvo
aspects. Lis individuality and Lis universal essence. His Duty to
Himself consistspartlyinLisdutytocarelorLisphysical preservation,
partly in Lis duty to educate Limsell, to elevate Lis Leing as an
individualintoconlormityvitLLis universal nature.
Explanatory: Nan is, on tLe one Land, a natural Leing. As sucL Le
LeLavesaccordingtocapriceandaccidentasaninconstant, suLjective
Leing. He does not distinguisL tLe essential lrom tLe unessential.
Secondly,Leisaspiritual, rationalLeingandassucLLeisnot by nature
what he ought to be. JLeanimalstandsinnoneedoleducation,loritis
LynaturevLatitougLttoLe. ItisonlyanaturalLeing.IutmanLas
tLe task ol Lringing into Larmony Lis tvo sides, ol making Lis
individuality conlorm to Lis rational s)de or olmaking tLe latter
LecomeLis guidingprinciple. Forinstance, vLenmangives vayto
importanceandseekstomaketLings evenLyinj uringtLetransgres-
sorinunduemeasure. ItisalackoleducationtoattacLoneselltoan
interest vLicL does not concern Lim or in vLicL he cannot
accomplisL anytLing tLrougL Lis activity. For it is reasonaLle to
engageone' spovers uponsucLaninterest asis vitLin tLescopeol
42 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
one' s activity. Noreover, il a man Lecomes impatient under tLe
regular course ol events [ Schic
sals] and reluses to suLmit to tLe
inevitaLle Le elevates Lis particular interest to a LigLer degree ol
importance tLan Lis relation to otLer men and tLe circumstances
Jo Theoretic Education tLere Lelong variety and deEniteness ol
knovledge and tLe aLility to see oLj ects lrom points olviev lrom
vLicLtLingsaretoLej udged. InadditiononesLouldLaveasenselor
Ljects in tLeir lree independence vitLout introducing a suLj ective
Explanatory: Variety of k
nowledge in-and-lor-itsell Lelongs to edu-
cation lor tLe reason tLat man, tLrougL tLis, elevates LimsellaLove
auniversalknovledgetLrougLvLicLLeattains toa greatersLarein
tLe possession oluniversally interesting oLjects. WLen man goes out
tLatLis ovnarenotnecessarily tLe only ones . He separates Limsell
lrom Limsell and comes to distinguisL tLe essential lrom tLe
unessential. Accuracy of information relates to essential distinctions,
tLosedistinctionsvLicLappertaintooLj ectsunderallcircumstances.

oL¡ects oltLe actual vorld. For tLis it is requisite tLat one knovs
to otLer tLings. JLese points olviev are not immediately gained
tLrougLsensuousintuitionLuttLrougL attentive studyoltLe tLing,
tLrougL reßection on its purpose and essence, and olvLetLer tLe
means ol realizing tLe same are adequate. JLe uneducated man
remainsintLestateolsimplesensuousintuition, Liseyesarenotopen
and Le does not see vLat lies at Lis very leet. WitL Lim it is all
suLj ective seeing and appreLension. He does not see tLe essential
tLing. He knovs only tLe nature oltLings approximately and tLis
never accurately, lor it is only tLe knovledge olgeneral points ol
iev tLat enaLles one to decide vLat is essential. JLeypresentthe
importantaspectsoltLings andcontaintLeprincipalcategoriesunder
vLicL external existences are classil¡ed, and tLus tLe vork ol
appreLendingtLemis renderedeasierand more accurate.
JLe opposite ol not knoving Lov to judge is to make rash
j udgementsaLouteverytLingvitLoutunderstandingtLem. SucLrasL
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 43
tLeotLersoverlooked, sotL+ttLetrueconceptoltLetLingismissed.
AneducatedmanknovsatoncetLelimits of his capacity for judgement.
Noreover, tLereLelongsto culturetLesenselortLeobjective in its
freedom. ItconsistsintLis. tLat Idonot seekmyspecialsuLjectivityin
tLe oLject Lut consider and treat tLe oLjects as tLey are in-and-lor-
tLemselves in tLeir lree idiosyncrasy. tLat I interest mysellin tLem
vitLoutseekinganygain lormyself SucLanunselEsLinterestliesin
tLe study oltLe sciences vLen one cultivates tLem lor tLemselves.
JLe desire to make use olnaturaloLj ectsinvolves tLe destructionol
tLoseoLjects .JLeinterestlortLel¡neartsisalsoanunselEsLone. Art
exLiLits tLings in tLeir living independence and leaves out tLe
imperlect and ill lormed and vLat Las sullered lrom external
circumstances. JLeoLjective treatment consists intLis . tLatitLas tLe
form of
the universal vitLout caprice, vLims or arLitrariness and is
lreed lrom vLat is strange or peculiar, etc. and, ilone' s aim is tLe
genuineobject itself andnotasell¡sLinterest, itmustLegraspedintLe
inner essential nature.
Practical Education [Bildung] entails tLat man, in tLe gratiEcation
olLis natural vants and impulses, sLall exLiLit tLat prudence and
temperance vLicL lie in tLe limits ol Lis necessity, namely,
sell-preservation. Hemust ¸a)standavaylromandLelreelromtLe
natural¸L) ontLeotLerLand, Leabsorbed inLis avocation, invLatis
essential and tLerelore, ¸c) Le aLle to conl¡ne Lis gratil¡cation oltLe
natural vants not only vitLin tLe limits olnecessity Lut also to
ce tLesame lor LigLer duties.
Explanatory: JLe lreedom ol man, as regards natural impulses,
consists not in Lis being rid olsucL impulses altogetLer and tLus
striving toescapelromLisnatureLutinLisrecognitionoltLemasa
necessityandassometLingrational,andinrealizing tLemaccordingly
tLrougL Lis vill, Le Ends Limsellconstrained only in so lar as Le
inoppositionto tLeIniversal. JLespecil¡c, accuratemeasure, toLe
lollovedintLegratil¡cationolvants, andintLeuseolpLysicaland
spiritual povers , cannot Le accurately given Lut eacL can learn lor
LimsellvLat is uselul or detrimental to Lim. Temperance in tLe
gratiEcationolnaturalimpulsesandintLeuseolLodilypoversis, as
sucL, necessary to health. HealtLis an essential condition lor tLeuse
olmentalpoversinlull¡llingtLeLigLervocationolman. IltLeLody
isnotpreservedinitspropercondition,ilitisinjuredinany oneolits
44 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
lunctions, tLenitoLligesitspossessortomakeolitaspecialoLj ectol
Lis care and, Ly tLis means, it Lecomes sometLing dangerous,
absorbing more than its due share of the attention of the mind. FurtLermore,
dullness and debility.
Finally, moderation is closely connected vitL Prudence. JLe
latter consists in reßecting on vLat one is doing, so tLat in Lis
enj oyment or vork Le is not vLolly given up to tLis or tLat
individual state, Lutremains open to considersometLing elsevLicL
may also Le necessary. A prudent µerson distinguisLes Limsell
mentallylromLiscondition,Lisleeling,Lisoccupation. JLisattitude
olnotLeing completelyaLsorLedin one' s conditionis ontLevLole
not essential. Òn tLe otLer Land, in tLe case ola genuine aim or
occupation, one' smind must Lepresentinallits earnestness and not
attLe same time Lealoollromit. Hence Prudence consistsin Leing
avare olall tLe details and aspects oltLe vork.
AstovLatconcernsone' sspeciEccalling, vLicLappearsasFate, tLis
sLouldnotLetLougLtolintLelormolanexternalnecessity. Itis to
Letaken up lreely, and lreely endured and pursued.
Explanatory: WitLregardto tLeexternal circumstances olLislotand
alltLatLeimmediately is, amanmustsoconductLimsellastomakeit
Lis ovn, Lemust deprive tLem oltLe lormolexternalexistence. It
makes no dillerence in vLat external condition man Ends Limsell
tLrougL good or Lad lortune, provided tLat Le isj ust and rigLt in
vLat Le is and does, i . e. tLat Le lulEls all sides olLis calling. JLe
Vocation ol a man, vLatever Lis condition in lile may Le, is a
maniloldsuLstance. Itis, asitvere, amaterialorstullvLicLLemust
elaLorate in every direction until it Las notLing alien, Lrittle and
relractoryvitLinit. Insolar asLeLas madeitperlectlyLis ovnlor
Limsell, Le is lree tLerein. A man Lecomes tLe prey oldiscontent-
ment cLieûy tLrougL tLe circumstance tLat Le does not lulEl Lis
calling. He enters into a relation vLicL Le lails to assimilate
tLorougLly, attLesametimeLeLelongstotLiscalling:Lecannotlree
Limselllromit. Helivesandacts, tLerelore, inanadversereIationto
JoLeFaithful andObedient inLisvocationasvellassubmissive to
his fate andself-denying inLis acts, tLesevirtues LavetLeirgroundin
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 45
tLe giving up ol vanity, sell-conceit, and selEsLness in regard to
tLings tLat arein and lor tLemselves necessary.
Explanatory: JLeVocationissometLinguniversalandnecessary, and
constitutesasideoltLesociallileolLumanity. Itis, tLerelore, oneol
tLe divisions of human labour. WLen a man Las a Vocation, le enters
into cooperation andparticipationvitL tLe WLole. JLrougL tLis Le
LecomesoLjective. JLeVocationisaparticular,limitedspLere, yetit
constitutesanecessarypartoltLevLole,and, LesidestLis, isin-itsel a
whole. Ila manisto become something he must
now how to limit himsel,
tLatis, make some speciality Lis Vocation. JLenLis vork ceases to
Le an irksome restraint to Lim. He tLen comes to Le at unity vitL
Limsell, vitL Lis externality, vitL Lis spLere. He is a universal, a
vLole. WLenevera manmakessometLingtriûing, i.e. unessentialor
nugatory, Lis oLj ect and aim, tLentLeinterestliesnot inanoLj ectas
sucL, LutinitasLisoLj ect. JLetrillingoLjectisolnoimportanceLy
itsell, LutLasimportanceonlytotLepersonvLoLusiesLimsellvitL
it. ÒneseesinatriûingoLj ectonlyonesell,tLerecanLe,lorexample,
a moral vanity, vLenamantLinksontLeexcellenceolLis acts andis
moreinterestedinLimselltLanintLetLing. JLemanvLodoessmall
tLings laitLlully sLovs LimsellcapaLle olgreater ones, Lecause Le
Las sLovnLisobedience, Lissell-sacriEceinregardtoLisovnvisLes,
inclinations and lan
illing duties toward others, vLicLdutiesmayLecalledrealduties
sincetLedutiesvLicLrelatetoLisovneducationare, incomparison,
ola moreformal nature.
In so lar as tLe perlormance olduties appears more as a suLj ective
attriLute ol tLe individual, and to pertain cLieûy to Lis natural
cLaracter, itis properly calledVirtue.
asapeculiarspeciesolmoralityandolgreatervitalityandintensity. It
dutyas is Norality proper.
46 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Duties to the Family
WLenamanisdevelopedLyeducationLe Las attainedacapacitylor
practicalaction. Inso larasLedoes act Leisnec�ssarilyLrougLtinto
relationtootLers . JLeErstnecessaryrelationiI vLicLìLeindividual
stands to otLers is tLat oltLe Family-relation. JLis indeed Las a
legal side LutitissuLordinatedtotLeside olmoralsentiment, tLat ol
love and conEdence.
Explanatory: JLe Family constitutes essentially only one suLstance,
only one person. JLe memLers oltLe lamily are notpersons in tLeir
relationto eacL otLer. JLeyenter sucL arelationErstvLenLysome
calamity tLe moral Lond is destroyed. Among tLe ancients, tLe
sentiment ollamily love and action Lased tLereon vas calledpietas.
' Piety'LasvitLus tLesenseoldevoutnessorgodliness, vLicLitLas
in common vitL tLe ancient meaning ol tLe vord in tLat botL
presuppose an absolute Lond, tLe sell-existent unity in a spiritual
suLstance, a Lond vLicLis notlormedtLrougLparticular capriceor
JLissentiment, preciselystated,consistsintLis.tLateacLmemLerol
tLe Family Las Lis essence not in Lis ovn person, Lut tLat only tLe
vLole oltLe Family constitutes Lis personality.
JLe union olpersons olopposite sex vLicL Marriage is, i s not
merelyanatural, animalunion, nor, attLeotLerextreme,isitamere
civil contract, ratLer it is essentially a moral union ol sentiment
[ Gesinnung] in reciprocalloveandconEdencevLicL constitutes tLem
one person.
JLe duty olparents towards children is to care lor tLeir support and
education, tLat oltLechildren toobey tLeirparentsuntiltLey grov up
andLecomeindependent andtohonour and respect tLemtLrougLlile,
tLat ol LrotLers and sisters, to treat eacL otLer vitL tLe utmost
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 47
Duties to the State
JLe natural vLole, vLicL constitutes tLe lamily, expands into a
vLole ola People and a State in vLicL tLe individuals Lave lor
tLemseIves anindependent vill.
Explanatory: JLe State, in one respect, is aLle to dispense vitL tLe
goodvill and consent ol citizens, i.e. in so lar as it must Le
independent oltLevilloltLe individual. ItprescriLes, tLerelore, to
tLe individual Lis oLligations, namely, tLe part vLicL Le must
perlormlortLevLole. ItcannotleavetListoLisgoodvillLecauseLe
In tLis vay tLe State Lecomes a machine, a system ol external
dependencies. Iut, on tLe otLer Land, it cannot dispense vitL tLe
[ood] disposition olits citizens. JLe order issued Ly tLe government
can contain only vLat is general. JLe actual deed, tLe lulElment ol
tLe State' s aim, requires a special lorm olactivity. JLis can come
a true, LigLer, moral commonvealtL, tLe union in customs,
education and general lorm oltLinking and acting, since eacL one
vievs and recognizes in tLe otLer Lis universality in a spiritual
In tLe Spirit of a People eacL individual citizen Las Lis spiritual
suLstance. Mot only does tLe preservation oltLe individual depend
ontLe preservation oltLis living vLole, LuttLis living vLole is t�e
universalspiritualnatureor tLeessenceoleacL one asopposedtoLis
individuality. The preservation of the whole ta
es precedence, theriore,
over the preservation of the individual andallcitizens sLouldactontLis
Considered according to tLemerelylegal side, in so lar as tLe State
protects tLe private rigLts oltLeindividualand t�eindividual loo�s
alterLisovnrigLts, tLereisindeedpossiLleasacrEceola partolLis
property lor tLe preservation oltLe rest. Patriotism, Lovever, is
not lounded on tLis calculation, Lut on tLe consciousness oltLe
48 The Philasophical Propaedeutic
absoluteness of the State. JLis dispositionto ollerup propertyandlile
lor tLe vLole is tLe greaterin a peopletLe more tLeindividuals can
actlortLe vLole lromtLeir own will and sell-activityand tLegreater
tLe conEdence tLey Lave in tLe vLole. ¸Speak Lere oltLe Leautilul
patriotismoltLeCreeks, alsooltLedistinctionLetveenbourgeois and
citoyen. )
JLedispositionto obey tLecommandsoltLegovernment, attacLment
to princes andtLe constitutionallormolgovernment, tLeleeling ol
national honour, all tLese are virtues oltLe citizen in every vell-
ordered State.
vitL one or Letveen tLe individual and tLe government. JLe
Iniversal Will oltLe vLole is not simply tLe expressed vill oltLe
individual Lut is tLe ALsolute Iniversal Will vLicL is in-and-lor-
itsellLinding ontLeindividual.
Duties toward Others
JLe duties tovard otLers are, Erst, tLelegalduties vLicL mustLe
linkedvitLtLedispositiontodotLelavlullortLesakeolLav. JLe
merely as aLstract persons Lut also, in tLeir particularity, as
possessingequal rigLts andto regardtLeirvellare orLadlortune as
one' sovnconcernand to manilesttLisleeling LyactiveLelp.
JLis moral mode ol tLinking and acting goes lurtLer tLan is
demandedLytLemerelegalrigLt. IutIntegrity, tLeoLservanceol
tLestrictdutiestovardotLers, istLeErstdutyandliesattLeLasisol
all otLers. JLere may Le noLle and generous actions vLich lack
integrity. In tLat case tLeyLave tLeir groundin sell-love andin tLe
consciousness olLavingdonesometLing special, vLereas tLatvLicL
integrity demands is validlor all andis no arLitrary duty.
Among tLe special duties to otLers, tLe Erst is Truthfulness in
speecL and action. Itconsists in tLeidentity oltLatvLicLis and ol
vLicLoneisconscious, vitLvLatLeexpressesandsLovstootLers .
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 49
Untruthfulness istLe disagreementand contradictionLetveenvLat
one is in Lis ovn consciousness and vLat Le is lor otLers, Lence
LetveenLisinnerLeingandLisactuality, andistLereloreanullityin
It is especially untrutLlul vLen vLat one imagines to Le a good
intention or disnosition is in lact Lad and Larmlul. ¸JLis disagree-
ment Letveen t
e disposition and tLe action could atleastLe called
clumsiness Lut, insolarastLedoeris responsiLle, ilLedoesvLatis
LadLemustLeregarded as also meaning Lis action to LeLad. )
It implies tLe existence ola special relation Letveen individuals to
give one oltLem tLe rigLt to speak trutLlully regarding tLe otLer' s
LeLaviour. WLen oneundertakes to do tLis vitLout tLerigLt Le is
Limsell, in so lar, untrue, since Le assumes a relation to anotLer
vLicL Las no existence.
Explanatory: Itis oltLel¡rstimportancetospea
the truth insolar as
oneknovstLatitistLetrutL. ItismeannottospeaktLetrutLvLenit
is one's duty to speak it, LecausetLereLy one is demeanedin one' s
ovneyesandintLeeyes oltLeotLer. IutalsoonesLouldnotspeak
tLetrutLvLereLeisnot called upon to do soordoes notevenLave
tLerigLtto doso. WLen onespeaks tLetrutLmerelylortLesakeol
LavingLissayandvitLoutlollovingitup, tLisisatleastsupe
LandsLouldLeacLieved. Speakingisnotyet tLedeedoract,tLelatter
is superior. JLe trutL tLen is spoken in tLe rigLt place at tLe rigLt
time vLen it serves to Lring aLout tLe matterinLand. SpeecLis an
astonisLingly great means Lut to use it correctly demands great
Malicious Gossip is akin to Slander vLicL is an actual lie. JLe
lormeris tLeretailingolmattersvLicLcompromisetLeLonourola
tLird party and vLicL are not aLsolutely evident to tLe narrator. It
usually Lappens out ol a zealous disapproval ol immoral actions,
usually vitL tLe comment tLat tLe narrator cannot voucL lor tLe
trutLoltLe stories andvisLesLeLadnotsaidanytLing aLout tLem,
Lut in tLis case tLere is associated tLe dishonesty olalleging tLat Le
does not vanttospreadtLestories andyetLyLisactionactuallydoes
so. Heis guilty olhypocrisy in pretending to speakin tLeinterest ol
50 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
morality and attLe same timeLeLaving Ladly.
Explanatory: Hypocrisy consists in LeLaving Ladly vLile assuming
tLe appearance ol Laving a good intention, ol vanting to do
sometLing good. JLe external deedis, Lovever, notdillerent lrom
tLe internal one. In tLe case ola Lad deed tLe intention vas also
essentially Lad and not good. It may Le tLe case tLat a man Las
accomplisLed sometLing good oratleast notimproper Lutitis not
vLicLto acLieve a goodend. JLeend ortLe intention does not sanctify
the means. Noral principle concerns cLielly tLe disposition or tLe
intention. Itis, Lovever,j ustas essential tLat not only tLeintention
Lutalso the action be good. Noreover, amanmustnotpersuadeLimsell
tLatLeLas excellent andimportantpurposes in tLe common acts ol
Lis individual lile. In tLat case it lrequently Lappens tLat vLile Le
Lases Lis ovn deeds on good intentions and seeks to make Lis
unimportant deeds great Ly Lis rellections Le is apt, on tLe otLer
Land, toattriLuteaselEsLorLadmotivetotLegreatoratleastgood
deeds olotLers.
JLe disposition to inj ure otLers, knovingly andvillingly, is £vil.
JLe disposition vLicL permits itsellto violate duties to otLers and
also to itsell, and lromveakness to resistits inclinations , is Iad.
Explanatory: Good stands opposed to Evil [bose] as also to Bad
[schlecht] . Jo Le £vil involves an act oltLe vill, it presupposes a
strength of will vLicLisalso aconditionoltLe Cood, Lut tLeIad, on
tLecontrary,issometLingdevoidolvill. JLeIadindividuallollovs
Lisinclinationsandneglects dutics. ItvouldLeperlectlysatislactory
not tLevillto masterLisinclinations orLaLits.
JLe Services ve are aLle to perlorm lor otLers depend upon tLe
contingent relations in vLicL ve Lappen to stand vitL tLem and
upontLespecialcircumstancesinvLicLvearesituated. WLenveare
in a position to do anotLer a Service ve Lave only to consider tvo
tLings . tLat Leis a human being and Las a need.
Explanatory: JLeErstconditionprecedenttorenderingLelptootLers
consistsintLis: tLatveLavearigLttoregardtLemasinneedandto
act tovard tLem as sullerers . Help must not Le given, tLerelore,
without their willingness toreceiveit. JLispresupposesacertaindegree
olacquaintanceorconEdence. JLcneedyareassucLnotontLesame
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 51
looting as regardsequalityvitLtLosenotin need. Itis a matterlor
Lim to decide vLetLer or not Le vants to appear as one in need. He
consents totLisvLenLeis convinced tLatI regardLimas my equal,
and treat Lim as sucLin spite oltLisinequality olcondition. In tLe
secondplace, ImustLaveinLandtLemeansvitLvLicLtoLelpLim.
Finally, tLere may Lappen cases vLere Lis vant is olso evident a
cLaracter as to render unnecessary an express consent onLis part to
receive assistance.
JLe duty oltLeUniversal Love of Humanity also includes tLose
cases vLerein ve love tLose vitL vLom ve stand in relations ol
acquaintance andlriendsLip. JLeoriginalunity olmankindmustLe
tLeLasislrom vLicL arise voluntarily, mucLcloser, connections as
involve more particular duties. (Friendship rests on likeness ol
cLaracterandespecially olinterest, engagementinacommonvork,
ratLer tLan inliking lor tLe person olanotLer as sucL. Òne sLould
causeLislriendsaslittletrouLleaspossiLle. Jorequirenoservicesol
lriendsistLemostdelicatevay. ÒnesLouldsparenopainsto avoid
laying otLers underoLligations to Lim. )
JLedutyolPrudence ¸Policy]appears, atErst,insolarastLeendis
aselEsLone, asadutytovardonesellinLisrelationstootLers. Jrue
sell¡sLness is, Lovever, essentially attained tLrougL moral conduct
andtLis, consequently, istLetruePrudence. Itisaprincipleolmoral
conduct tLat private gain may Le a result Lut mustnever constitute
tLe motive.
In as mucL as private gain does not constitute tLe direct result ol
moral conduct Lut depends ratLer upon tLe particular and, on tLe
vLole, accidental goodvill olotLers, tLereis toLeloundtLespLere
olmereinclination orlavour, LutPrudence consistsin tLis. tLat one
does not interlere vitL tLe inclinations olotLers Lut acts in tLeir
interest. Iut also, in tLis respect, tLat vLicL proves politic is really
tLat vLicL recommends itsell lor its ovn sake, namely, to leave
tLrougL our correct conduct, to vin tLeirlavour.
52 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Courtesy ¸Politeness] is tLe mark ola vell-visLing dispositionand
also ola readiness to do a service to otLers, especially to tLosevitL
vLomvestandinanearerrelationolacquaintanceorlriendsLip. Itis
lalse vLen it is connected vitL tLe opposite disposition. Jrue
Courtesy is, Lovever, to Le regarded as a duty Lecause ve ougLt to
LaveLenevolent intentions tovard eacL otLerin generalin order to
open Ly means olpolite actions1Le vay to closerunion. Jo do a
service, an act olpoliteness, sometLing pleasant to a stranger, is
Courtesy. JLe same tLing sLould, Lovever, Le done to an
acquaintance orlriend. Jovard strangers and tLosevitL vLom ve
standin no nearer relations tLere is tLeappearance olgoodvill and
tLisisalltLatisrequired. Refnement andDelicacy consisti doingor
sayingnomoretLanis allovedLytLerelationinvLicLonestandsto
otLerparties . ¸CreekHumanityandIrLanityintLetimeolSocrates
and Plato)
JLeMoral Law vitLinusistLeEternal Law of Reason vLicLve
mustrespectvitLoutreserve andLyvLicLve mustleelindissoluLly
Lound. We see, Lovever, tLe immediate incommensurateness olour
individuality vitL it and recognize it as LigLer tLan ourselves, as a
Ieingindependent lromus, sell-existent and aLsolute.
Himselltous tLerein. JLeknoving olHimis, as mediated througL
ourpure consciousness, lor us immediate and called Faith.
JLeelevation aLovetLe sensuous and Enite constitutesin anegative
lorm tLe mediation oltLis knoving, Lut only in so lar as Laving
originated lroma sensuous and Enite. JLelatteris at tLe same time
aLandoned and recognized in its nullity. Iut tLis
nowing of the
Absolute isitsellanabsolute and immediateknoving and cannotLave
anytLing Enite as its positive ground or Le mediated tLrough
anytLing tLatis notitsella prool
The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion 53
JLisknoving must determineitsellmore closely and not remain a
mere inner leeling, a laitL in an undeEned Ieing in general, Lut
Lecomeacognitionolit. JLecognitionolCodisnotaLoveReason,
lor Reason is only Cod' simageandreûection andis essentially tLe
knovledge ol tLe ALsolute. Iut sucL cognition is aLove tLe
Lnderstanding, tLeknovledge olvLatis Enite andrelative.
Religion itsellconsistsintLeemploymentorexerciseolleeling and
tLougLtin lorminganideaorrepresentationoltLeALsoluteIeing,
vLerevitL is necessarily connected
ulness ol one' s ovn
particularity andactionslromtLisdisposition[Sinn] in regardto tLe
God is tLe Absolute Spirit, i. e. Le is tLepure Ieing tLat makes
LimsellLisovnoLj ectandintLiscontemplatesonlyLimsell, orvLo
is, in Lis otLer-Leing, aLsolutely returned into Limsell and sell-
Cod is, according to tLe moments olLis Ieing. (1) Absolutely
Holy, in as mucL as Leis inLimselltLepurelyuniversal Ieing, (2)
Absolute Power, in as mucL as Le actualizes tLe universal and
preservestLeindividual in tLeuniversal oris tLe£ternalCreatorol
tLeIniverse,(3) Wisdom, insolarasLispoverisonlyLolypover,
(4) Goodness, in so lar as Le allovs tLe individual in Lis actual
existenceto Lea lree agent, and (5) Justice, in solar asLeeternally
Lrings tLe individual Lack to tLeuniversal.
Evil isalienationlromCodinsolarastLeindividual, inLislreedom,
lromittoLecomeaLsolutelorLimself Insolarasitis tLenatureol
tLeEnitelreeLeingtoreßectitsellintotLisindividuality, tLisnature
is toLeregarded as £vil.
or in-itsell, an identity oltLe divine Ieing vitL Limsell or it is,
in-itsell, oldivine nature. JLis knovledge, tLat Lumannatureisnot
54 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
trulyaliento tLedivinenature, is assured tomanLyDivine Grace;
vLicL Crace allovs Lim to lay Lold oltLis knovledge vLereLy
tLrougL it tLe reconciliation olCod vitL tLe vorld is achieved or
man' salienationlromCoddisappears .
JLe Divine Service is tLe speciEc occupation ol tLe tLougLt
Lis union vitL Cod and to Lecome conscious and assured oltLis
union. JLe Larmony ol Lis vill vitL tLe divine vill sLould Le
demonstrated Ly tLe spirit in vLicL Le acts inLis daily lile.
[For the Middle Class]
¸ !]
Òur ordinary Knowing Las Lelore itsell only tLe object vLicL it
knovs, LutdoesnotattLesametimemakeanoLjectolitsell, i. e. ol
tLeKnoving. IuttLevLolevLicLispresentintLeactolknovingis
nottLeoLj ectaloneLutalsotLe' I' ¸£go] tLatknovsandtLerelation
oltLe £go and tLeoLject to eacL otLer, i. e. Consciousness .
In PLilosopLy tLe determinations ol Knoving are not considered
one-sidedlyonlyasdeterminationsoltLingsLutas, attLesametime,
determinations oltLeKnoving tovLicLtLeyLelong incommonat
least vitL tLe tLings. In otLer vords tLey are not taken merely as
objective Lutalsoassubjective determinationsorratLerasspeciEckinds
oftLerelation oftLe oLj ect and suLj ect to eacL otLer.
Since tLings and tLeir determinations are in tLe Knoving it is
possiLle, on tLe oneLand, totLinkoltLem asin-and-lor-tLemselves
outsideolConsciousness, as given totLelatterin tLe sLapeolalien
and already existing material lor it. Òn tLe otLer hand, since
Consciousnessisequallyessential to tLeKnovingoltLese ¸material
its vorld, and produces or modiEes, eitLer vLolly orin part, tLe
determinations oltLe same tLrougL its LeLaviour and ¡ts activity.
JLelormerpointolvieviscalledRealism tLelatterIdealism. Here
ve are to consider the universal determinations oltLings simply as
tLespeciEcrelation oltLe oLj ecttotLesuLject.
56 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe suLj ect, tLougLt olmore speciEcally, is Nind ¸or Spirit] . It is
phenomenal [erscheinend] vLenessentiallyrelatingtoanexistentoLj ect.
i . e. in so lar it is Consciousness. JLe Science olConsciousness is,
tLerelore, called The Phenomenology of Mind ¸or Spirit] .
IutNind as spontaneouslyactive vitLin itselland assell-relerential
[Beziehung auf sich] and independent ol all relerence to otLers is
considered in tLeIoctrine olNind orPsychology.
Consciousness is, in general, tLe knoving olan oLject, vLetLer
external or internal, vitLout regard to vLetLer it presents itsell
vitLouttLeLelpolNindorvLetLeritLeproducedLyit. Nindisto
Le considered in its activities in so lar as tLe determinations olits
Consciousness are ascriLed to itself
ConsciousnessistLespecil¡crelationoltLe£gotoanoLj ect. Insolar
as one starts lrom tLe oLject, consciousness can Le said to vary
according to tLediversity of the objects vLicL itLas .
At tLesametime, Lovever, tLeoLj ectisessentiallydeterminedinits
relationtoConsciousness . Itsdiversityis, tLerelore, toLeconsidered
conversely as dependent upon tLefurther development olConscious-
ness. JLis reciprocity proceeds in tLe pLenomenal spLere ol Con-
sciousness itsell and leaves tLe matters in paragrapL 3 aLove
Consciousness Las, in general, tLree stages [ Stufen] according to tLe
diversity oltLe oLject. It ¸tLe oLj ect] is namely ¸a] eitLer tLe oLj ect
standing opposed to tLe £go or ¸L] tLe £go itsellor ¸c] sometLing
oLjectivevLicLLelongslikeviseequallytotLe£go, ¸e.g. ]JLougLt.
JLesedeterminations arenotempiricallytakenuplromvitLoutLut
are moments olConsciousnessitself HenceConsciousnessis.
¸ !) Consciousness in General;
(2) Self-Consciousness;
(3) Reason.
Consciousnessin Ceneral is .
¸a) Sensuous;
¸L) Perceiving;
¸c) Understanding.
The Sensuous Consciousness
! O
! !
JLe simple Sensuous Consciousness is tLeimmediate certainty ol
an external oLject. JLe expression lor tLe immediacy olsucL an
oLjectistLatitis, andindeedis this oLj ect, aNow accordingto time
andaHere according tospace, ¸andis] completelydillerentlromall
otLer oLj ects and completely determinedin-itself
! 2
IotL tLis MovandtLisHerearevanisLing determinatenesses. Mov
isnomoreevenvLileitisandanotLerMovLastakenitsplace, and
tLis latter Mov Las likevise immediately vanisLed. Iut tLe Mov
aLidesalltLesame. JLisaLidingMovistLeuniversalMovvLicLis
LotL tLis and tLe otLer Mov, and also neitLer oltLem. JLis Here
vLicL I mean, and point out Las a rigLt and lelt, an aLove and a
Lelov, a LeLind and a Lelore, etc. ad inf
nitum, i . e. tLe Here pointed
out, is not a simple and Lence speciEc Here Lut a totality olmany
Heres. JLerelore vLat in trutL is Lelore us is not tLe aLstract,
sensuous determinateness LuttLeuniversal.
! J
Perception Lasnolongerlor¸its]oLj ecttLesensuousi nsolaras i t is
immediate Lut, in so lar as it is also universal, it is a mingling ol
sensuous determinations vitLtLose olRellection.
! 4
JLe oLj ect oltLis Consciousness is, tLerelore, tLe Thing vitL its
Properties. JLesensuousproperties ¸a) arelor-tLemselvesnotonly
tLerelationto otLers andmediated, ¸L) belong to a Thing and, intLis
respect, ontLeoneLand areincludedintLeindividua
ity oltLesame,
58 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
¸and] on tLe otLer Land Lav

universality in accordancevitL vLicL
tLey transcend tLis individual tLing and are at tLe same time
independent olone anotLer.
1 5
In s o lar as Properties are essentially mediated they Lave tLeir
suLsistence in an ÒtLer and are alterable. JLey are only Accidents.
JLings, Lovever, sincetLeysuLsistintLeirproperties, lortLereason
tLat tLey are distinguisLed Ly means oltLese, perisL tLrougL tLe
alterationoltLosepropertiesandareanalternationolcoming-to-be and
1 6
In tLis alternation it is not merely tLe sometLing tLat suLlates itsell
andLecomesanÒtLerLuttLeÒtLeralsoceasestoLe. IuttLe ÒtLer
oltLe ÒtLer, ortLe alteration oltLe alteraLle, is tLeBecoming of the
endlring [ Werden des Bleibenden] , ol tLat vLicL suLsists´n-and-lor-
itsel�andis inner.
The Understanding
1 7
JLe oLj ecthas novtLis determination. i t Las ¸a) a purely accidental
sideLut ¸L) also an essential and permanent side. Consciousness, in
tLat tLe oLj ect Las lor it tLis cLaracter, is tLe Understanding in
vLicL tLe tLe JLings olperception pass lor merephenomena and it
¸tLe Inderstanding] contemplates tLeInner olJLings.
1 8
ÒntLe one Land, tLe InnerolJLings is thatin tLem vLicLi s lree
lrom tLeir appearances, namely, tLeir Manifldness vLicL consti-
tutes an outer in opposition to tLe inner, ¸and] on tLe otLer Land,
Lovever, tLe inner is tLat vLicL is related to tLem tLrougL its
concept . Itis tLerelore.
(1) simple Force, vLicL passes over in Ieterminate Ieing into its
Expression ¸orNanilestation] .
1 9
(2) Force remains vitL tLis dillerence tLe same in all tLe sensuous
variety ol Appearance. JLe law ol Appearance is its quiescent,
universalimage. It is a relation oluniversal aLiding determinations
vLose distinctions are external to tLe lav. JLe universality and
persistence ol tLis relation does indeed lead to its necessity Lut
vitLout tLe diflerence Leing one determined in-and-lor-itsell or
inner, in vLicL one oltLe determinations lies immediately in tLe
concept oltLe otLer.
JLis concept, applied to Consciousness itsell, gives anotLer stage
tLereol HitLertoitvasinrelationtoitsoLj ectassometLingalienand
indillerent. Since nov tLe dillerence in general Las Lecome a
dillerencevLicL attLesametimeisnodillerence, tLepreviousmode
oltLedillerenceolConsciousnesslromits oLj ectlallsavay. ItLas an
oLjectandisrelatedtoanÒtLer, vLicL, Lovever,isattLesametime
no ' ÒtLer' , in f
ne, itLasitselllor oLj ect.
 n otLer vords, tLe Inner olJLings is tLe Thought or Concept
tLem. �LileConscious
ess Las tLe Inner asoLj ectitLas JLougLtor
I \ equally its ovn Reßection or Form and, ¸consequently], simply Las
\ itselllor oLject.
As Self-Consciousness tLe £gointuits itsell, and tLe expressionol
tLisinitspurity is£go = £go, or. I amI.
JLis proposition olSell-Consciousness is devoid olall conten

urgeolSell-Consciousness consistsin tLis. torealizeits concep�

ineverytLingtoLecomeconsciousolitsell. Itis, tLerelore, active¸a)
in overcoming tLe otheress oloLj ects and in positing tLem as tLe
sameasitsell¸and] ¸L)inexternalizingitsellandtLereLygivingitsell
oLjectivity and determinate Leing. JLese tvo are one and tLe same
activity. Sell-Consciousness in Lecoming determinedis at tLe same
timea sell-determining and, conversely, itproducesitsellas oLject.
Sell-Consciousness Las, inits lormative development or movement,
tLree stages.
/ /-----�\
7(-  ÒlDesire in so lar as it is directed t�otLer s,
(2) ÒltLerelationolMaster and Slave i

r asitis directed to
60 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
anotLer Sell-Consciousnessunlikeitsell,
(3) ÒltLeUniversal Self-Conscioqsness vLicLrecognizesitsellin
otLer Sell-Consciousnesses and ,identical vitL tLem as tLey are
identical vitL it.
IotLsides olSell-Consciousness, tLepositing andtLesuLlating, are
tLus united vitL eacL otLer immediately. Sell-Consciousness posits
itselltLrougLnegationolotLernessandispractical Consciousness . Il,
tLerelore, in Consciousness proper, vLicL also is called theoretical
¸Consciousness] , tLe determinations olit and oltLe oLject altered
tLemselves in-tLemselves , tLis nov Lappens tLrougL tLe activity ol
Consciousness itsellandfor it. Itis avare tLattLis suLlatingactivity
Lelongstoit. IntLeconceptolSell-ConsciousnessliestLedetermina-
tionoltLeasyetunrealizeddillerence. InsolarastLisdillerencedoes
make its appearance in it tLere arises a leeling ol an otheress in
consciousnessitsell, aleelingolanegationolitsellortLeleelingola
lack, a need.
JLis leeling olits otLerness contradicts itsidentity vitL itself JLe
leltnecessity to overcome tLis opposition¡s Impulse, Negation or
Otherness, ¸and] presentsitselltoconsciousnessasanexternaltLing
dillerentlromit, LutvLicLis determinedLySell-Consciousness, ¸a)
as a sometLing suited to gratily tLe Impulse and ¸L) as sometLing
in-itsellnegative vLos) suLsistenceis to Le suLlated LytLe Selland
positedinidentity vitL it.
JLeactivityofDesire tLusovercomestLeotherness oltLeoLj ectand
itssuLsistenceandunitesitvithtLesuLject, vLereupontLeIesireis
satisEed. JLis is accordingly conditioned, ¸a) Ly ari oLj ect existing
externally orindillerent toit, or tLrougL Consciousness, and ¸L) Ly
its activityproducing tLegratil¡cationonlytLrougLovercomingtLe
oIject. Sell-ConsciousnesscomestLereloreonlytoitsleelingolSell.
InIesire, Consciousnessstandsinrelationtoitsellasanindividual.It

aselllessoLj ectvLicLis, in-and-lor-itsell, anothertLan
tLeSell-Consciousness. JLelattertLereloreonlyattainssell-identity
as regards tLe oLj ect Ly overcoming tLe latter. Iesire is in general
destructive¸and] ,initsgratiEcationtLerelore,itonlygetsaslarastLe
sell-leelingoltLesuLject' sLeing-lor-sellasanindividual. ¸i. e. ] totLe
indeterminateconceptoltLe suLj ectinits connectionvitLoLj ectiv-
The Relation o
Master and Slave
JLe concept olSell-Consciousness as a SuLject vLicLis attLesame
time oLjective, yields tLe relation tLat another Sell-Consciousness
exists lor Sell-Consciousness.
A Sell-ConsciousnessvLicLisloranotLerisnotlorita mereoLj ect
LutisitsotLer self JLe£gois noaLstractuniversalityin vLicL, as
sucL,tLereisnodistinctionordetermination.Since£gois, tLerelore,
oLject lor tLe £go tLe oLject is, in tLis relation, tLe same as tLat
vLicLtLe£gois. ItLeLolds in tLe otLerits ovn self
JLis LeLolding ol onesell in anotLer is tLe aLstract moment ol
sell-sameness. IuteacLLasalsotLedeterminati�ppearingtotLe
otLer as anexternaloLj ectand, insolar, as animmediate, sensuous
andconcrete existence.£acLexistsaLsolutelylor-itsellasanindividual
opposedtotLeotLerand demands toLeregardedandtreatedassucL
Ly tLe otLer and to LeLold in tLe otLer its ovn lreedom as an
independent Leing orto Le ac
nowledged Lyit.
Iutindependenceis lreedom notsomucLoutside of and [apart] from
sensuous immediate existence, as ratLer a lreedom in it. JLe one
moment is as necessary as tLe otLer Lut tLey are not oltLe same
ô2 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
value, since inequality enters, namely, tLat to one ol tLe tvo
Sell-Consciousness¸es] lreedompasses lor tLeessentialinopposition
tosensuousexistence,vLilevitLtLeotLertLeoppositeoccurs. WitL
tLe reciprocal demand lor recognition tLere enters into determinate
actualitytLerelationolmasterandslaveLetveentLemor, ingeneral
terms, tLat ol service and oLedience, so lar as tLis diversity ol
independence is present tLrougL tLeimmediateagencyolnature.
Since oltLe tvo Sell-Consciousness¸es] opposed to eacL otLer eacL
must strivetoproveand maintainitsellas anaLsoluteLeing-lor-sell
againstandlor tLe otLer, tLatoneenters into a condition olSlavery
ordertoacLieve Lis independence.
JLispurelynegativelreedom, vLicLconsistsintLeaLstractionlrom
natural existence, doesnot, Lovever, correspond to tLe concept ol
Freedom, lor tLis latteris sell-samenessinotLerness, tLatis, inpart
tLeLeLoldingolonesellin anotLersellandinpartlreedomnotfrom
existence Lut in existence, a lreedom vLicL itsellLas an existence.
JLe one vLo serves lacks a selland Las anotLer sellin place olLis
individual £go and nov vievs anotLer as Lis essential sell. JLe
Naster, ontLecontrary, seesintLeServant tLeotLer£goasannulled
and Lis ovn individual vill as preserved. ¸History ol RoLinson
Crusoe and Friday. )

JLe Servant' s ovn individual vill, considered more closely, is
suppressedin tLelear oltLeNaster, in tLeinner leeling olits ovti
negativity. Its laLour lor tLeserviceolanotLeris an alienationolits
ovn vill, partly in principle, partly at tLe same time, vitL tLe
negation olits ovn desire, tLe positive translormation olexternal
tLings tLrougL laLour, since tLrougL laLour tLe sellmakes its ovn
an oLj ective self JLe renunciation oltLe unessential arLitrary vill
constitutes tLe moment ol true oLedience. ¸Pisistratus taugLt tLe
AtLenianstooLey. JLrougLtLisLemadetLeCodeolSolonanactual
pover and, alter tLe AtLenians Lad learned tLis, tLe dominion ola
Ruler over tLem vas superlluous. )
Phenomenology ôJ
JLis renunciation olIndividuality as Sellis tLe moment Ly vLicL
Sell-Consciousnessmakes tLetransitiontoLeingtLeIniversalWill.
¸i. e. ] tLe transition to Positive Freedom.
Universality of SelConsciousness
JLeUniversal Self-Consciousness is tLeintuitionolitsellnotas a
particularexistence distinctlromotLers Lut as tLeimplicituniversal
sell. JLus it recognizes itsell and tLe otLer Sell-Consciousnesses
vitLin it and is, in turn, recognizedLy tLem.
Sell-Consciousnessis, accordingtotLisitsessentialuniversality, only
realtoitsellinsolar asitknovsitsrellectioninotLers. ¸IknovtLat
otLersknovmeastLemselves . ) Andaspurespiritualuniversality, as
LelongingtotLelamily, one' snativeland, etc. , ¸it]knovsitsellasan
essential self JLis Sell-ConsciousnessistLeLasisoleveryvirtue, ol
love, Lonour, lriendsLip, Lravery, all sell-sacriEce, alllame, etc.
Reason is tLeLigLest union olconsciousness and sell-consciousness
oroltLeknoving olanoLj ectandoltLeknovingolitself Itis tLe
certainty tLat its determinations are just as mucL oLjective, i. e.
ItisequallytLecertaintyolitsell, suLjectivity, asLeing oroLjectivity
in oneand tLe same tLinking activity.
ÒrvLatveseetLrougLtLeinsigLtolReasonis ¸a) acontentvLicL
does not consist in our mere suLjectiveideas ortLougLtsvLicLve
makelorourselvesLutvLicLcontainstLeaLsoluteessenceoloLj ects
and possesses oLj ective reality, and ¸L) a content vLich is, lor tLe
£go, notLing alien, notLing given lrom vitLout Lut is tLrougLout
penetrated and assimilated Ly tLe £go and tLerelore, to allintents,
producedLy tLe £go.
64 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLeknovingolReasonistLerelorenotmeresuLj ectivecertaintyLut
alsoTruth, LecauseJrutLconsistsintLeagreement, orratLerunity,
olcertainty andLeing orolcertainty and oLj ectivity.
[For the Lower Class]
A Sensation is tLe mode in vLicL ve are allected Ly an external
oLject [ Gegenstand] .
A Representation, generally, is tLis determination, insolaras itis
attriLutedtotLeoLject,adeterminationvLicLtLeoLj ectLasvLetLer
veare allectedLyit ornot.
A Sensuous Representation is tLe determination vLicL an oLj ect
LasinsolarasverelateitonlytLrougLtLesenses, orimmediately.
Intellectual Representation.
PLilosopLy is tLe science oltLe aLsolute ground oftLings, tLat is,
tLeir ground not in tLeir Individuality or Particularity Lut in tLeir
Thinking considers tLe \niversal oltLings. Logicis tle Science ol
SensationistLemodeinvLicL, andinsolaras, veareallectedLyan
oLj ect.
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
InRepresentative Thinking [ Vorstellen] veseparateourselveslrom
tLeoLjectandattriLutetoittLedeterminationsvLicLitLas, vitLout
regard tovLetLer ve are allectedbytLem ornot.
A sensuous external oLjectis directly perceivedLyus andis a single
oLj ectolvarioussensuousdeterminationsorpropertiesvLicLLelong
to Sensation and vLicL Lecome sometLing oLjective in Represen-
AdeterminationoltLis kind taken LyitsellandseparatedlromtLe
otLers vitL vLicL it vas connected in tLe oLject is an Abstract
Sensuous Representation.
AdeterminationoltLiskinddoesnotLelongtoanysingleoLj ectLut
toseveraloriscommontotLemandtLereloreaUniversal Sensuous
At tLe same time it is no longer vLolly immediate, as it vas in
Sensation, Lutisalso amediateddeterminationsinceitLas originated
single oLj ect.

ÒnesideoltLedeterminationLelongstoSensation, namelySensuous
Individuality. IutitalsoLasasidevLicLis constitutedLySensuous
Iniversality andistLelormolSensuousness . JLis lormis tLeduaI
oneolspace andtime.
[ 1 0]
JLe tvo are inseparaLle continua in vLicL tLe dillerences and
a quantitative one.
[ 1 1 ]
Space is tLe connection ol tLe quiescent asunderness and side-Ly-
sideness ol tLings, Time is tLe connection ol tLeir vanisLing or
Logic [For the Lower Class] 67
[ 1 2]
Jhe externaloLj ectcontains lurtLerdeterminations vLicL Lelong to
tLe intellect and are universal non-sensuous lorms and are called
[ 1 3]
ALove tLe Category again stands tLe Concept vLicL is not only a
universal tLougLt determination Lut vLicL expresses tLe speciEc
natureolan oLject and togetLervitL]udgeinents and Syllogisms is
treatedin tLe ordinary so-called Logic. Itis dividedinto.
[ 1 ] The Doctrine of Concepts,
[2] [The Doctrine of Judgements and
[3] [The Doctrine of Syllogisms.
[ 14]
JLeConcept doesnotcontaintLemaniloldandsensuousdetermina-
tions ol an external oLject Lut tLose vLicL accord ¸a) vitL its
Iniversal £ssence and ¸L) vitL its £ssential Particularity. JLe
Ieterminate Ieing ol tLe Concept constitutes tLe moment ol
[ 1 5]
JLe Universal Essence and tLe Particularity ol an oLject, Ly
Iniversal, Lelong to tLe conceptual cLaracteristics ol an external
[ 16]
an alteration, tLecaseis similar vitL tLerestriction oltLe Particular
LytLeIniversal, tLougL, conversely, tLeIndividualtLatisexpanded
to tLeParticularis expandedto tLe Iniversal.
[ 17]
JLe Iniversal includes tLe Particular and tLe Individual and tLe
Particularincludes tLeIndividual. JLeParticularandtLeIndividualare
subsumed undertLeIniversalandtLeIndividualundertLeParticular.
WLatLolds goodoltLe Iniversal also Lolds good oltLeParticular
and tLe Individual and vLatLolds good oltLeParticular also Lolds
goodoltLe Individual LuttLeconverseis nottrue.
68 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
[ 1 8]
Judgement is tLe relation to one anotLer oltvo determinations ol
tLe Concept, one olvLicL is related as Individual to tLe otLer as
Particular or Iniversal or is relatedas Particular to tLe Iniversal.
[ 1 9]
Òl tvo determinations related to one anotLer, tLe less inclusive
narrover one is tLe Subject, tLe otLer is tLe Predicate, and tLe
connection Letveen tLem, tLe 'is ' , is tLe Copula.
Logic aLstracts lrom all empirical content and considers only tLat
tLe Logical ]udgement means, strictly, tLat an Individual is a
Particular ora Iniversal or tLat tLe Particularis a Iniversal.
[21 ]
Mot every propositionis a]udgement Lut ratLer only in so lar asits
contentLas tLat relationsLip.
FurtLermore, since in tLe ]udgement tLe determinations ol tLe
Conceptlall apart, onlytLatpropositionisa]udgementinvLicLtLe
Predicate is presented onits ovn account andis connected vitL tLe
SuLjectLy comparison.
JLePredicateoltLe]udgementconsideredmoreclosely ¸a)issimply
LaslromtLissideacontent, ¸L)isunequaltotLeSuLj ect, asIniversal
in relation to tLe Individual as ¸c) connected vitL tLe SuLj ect, it is
tLe SuLject.
JLeSuLject¸a)islikevisedistinctlromotLerSuLj ects , ¸L)islikevise
distinct lrom tLe Predicate as one tLat is suLsumed under it, ¸c) is
equaltotLePredicatevLicLexpressesits contentsotLat, strictly, in
tLe]udgementnotLing isexpressedoltLeSuLjectotLer tLanvLatis
containedintLe Predicate.
Logic [For the Lower Class] 69
A Judgement of Inherence or Quality
JLe Predicate in tLe]udgement is in tLe Erst place a quality, any
simpleimmediate determinateness orpropertyvLicLinLeres in tLe
SuLject, several olvLicL tLe SuLject containsvitLinitself
SinceintLeQualitative Judgement tLePredicateisalErmedoltLe
SuLjectitis a Positive Judgement.
JLe principle is olvider scope tLan tLe SuLject. Il, tLerelore, tLe
Positive]udgement vere immediately converted, i. e. tLe Predicate
vere made tLe SuLject and tLe SuLj ect tLe Predicate, tLe Predicate
vouldtLenLemorerestrictedtLantLeSuLject, vLicLis contraryto
tLePredicateis expressed as takeninits restriction to tLe SuLject.
A Negative Judgement is one in vLicL a Predicate ola SuLjectis
simply negated.
JLePredicate, consideredmoreclosely, Lasinittvo mon¡ents. tLat
spLere. In tLe Megative]udgement only tLe Predicate as a determi-
nateness is negatedLut not tLeIniversal spLereoltLe Predicate.
[31 ]
Òr, intLeMegative]udgementtLeSuLj ecti s negativelyrelatedt otLe
Predicate. WitL negation tLereloretLereis, attLesametime, present
A Megative]udgement canLeconverteddirectly.
7O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
AnInfnite Judgement isoneinvLicLnotonlytLedeterminateness
oltLe PredicateLutalso tLe Iniversal spLereis negated.
JLe InEnite ]udgement includes tLe lurtLer meaning tLat vLat a
SuLjectis is not exLausted in a Predicate vLicL expresses one olits
qualities, or in so lar as tLis quality expresses a closely related
determinateness, stilllessinsolarasitcontainsalurtLerdeterminate-
ness vLicL Lelongs to tLe Iniversal spLere.
B Judgements of Quantity or Rilection
Jo Refect means to move onLeyondsometLing and to grasp tLe
resultant unity.



its qualities is similartoordillerentlromit, partlyagraspolitsovn
determinations, a grasp vLicL, Lovever, expresses only an external
Iniversality and commonnature oronly a mere completeness.

Individual J
dgement expresses tLat Predicate ola SuLj ect
vLicL Lelongs to it alone or vLereLy tLe SuLj ect is distinguisLed
lromall otLers, tLe SuLj ectis in so lar, likevise, an Individual.
An Individual]udgement can, in a vidersense, also Le called sucL

rted olit, LutvLicLatleast serves todistinguisLit lromotLers
vLicL come into consideration.
A Particular Judgement Las lor its SuLj ect several Individuals . In

Lniversal]udgement tLe SuLj ect is a taking togetLer olall tLe
Individuals ol a kind, tLis taking togetLer is tLe 'allness' or


likevisetLeIniversaloltLeseIndividuals, namely, astLeircommon
Logic [For the Lower Class]
C Judgements of Relation or Necessity
SuLject and Predicate olnecessity ¸Lelong] togetLer tLrougL tLeir
¸4! ]
Categorical Judgements: tLe Predicate expresses tLe nature or tLe
genuine Iniversal oltLe SuLject and LotL Lave tLe same essential
content and tLe SuLject is only a Particularity oltLe Predicate. JLe
lurtLerdetermination¸s]vLicLtLeSuLj ectstillLasLesidesvLatsucL
a Predicate contains are unessential properties or onlylimitations ol
In tLe Hypothetical Judgement tLe necessity does not lie in tLe
samenessoltLecontentvLicLratLerisdillerent, andvLatisdeclared
connection as ground and consequent.
In tLe Disjunctive Judgement tLe SuLject is considered as a
Iniversal spLere vLicL in so lar could Lave various determinations
Lut, Lecause tLese mutually exclude one anotLer, must necessarily
Lave only one oltLemexcluding tLe otLers.
D Modality [of Judgement]
Jo consider ]udgements according to tLeir Modality means to
inquire vLetLer tLe Predicate expresses tLe appropriateness oltLe
determinate Leing oltLe SuLj ect to tLe Concept.
InAssertoric Judgements tLe speciEcnatureoltLe SuLjectis not
yet developed.
]udgement tLe opposite assurance can Le asserted vitL tLe same
lormal rigLt. 1Le Consequencein tLatvLicLis presentis onlytLe
possiLilitytLatonePredicate, oritsopposite, LelongstotLeSuLj ect.
JLus tLe]udgementis Problematic.
72 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe SuLject is, tLerelore, to Leposited vitL a determinationvLicL
expresses its speciEc nature, in vLicL lies tLe appropriateness or
inappropriatenessoltLeexistencevitLtLeConcept. JLis]udgement
is Apodictic.
vitLeacL otLer, tLe Syllogism contains tLeirmediationorground.
I ni t tvodeterminations arelinkedtogetLerLyatLirdvLicLi stLeir
JLetvolinkeddeterminationsaretLeExtremes (termini extremi) ; tLe
determinationlinkingtLemis tLeirMiddle Term (terminus medius
JLe Niddle Jerm suLsumes Individuality and is suLsumed under
¸5! ]
Since tLe Iniversal suLsumes under it tLe Particular, Lut tLe
ParticularsuLsumesunderittLeIndividual, sotoodoestLeIniversal
latter. Òr, conversely, sincetLe IndividualcontainsvitLinitselltLe
determination oltLe Particular Lut tLe Particular contains vitLin
itsell tLe determination oltLe Iniversal, tLe Individual tLus also
containsvitLinitselltLe Iniversal.
connections expressed as propositions or ]udgements are called
Premisses of the Syllogism, tLat vLicL contains tLe £xtreme ol
Iniversality (terminus major) , tLe maj or proposition, tLat vLicL
contains tLe£xtremeolIndividuality, tLe minorproposition.
JLe connection oltLe tvo £xtremes is mediated and is called tLe
Conclusion (conclusio) .
Logic [For the Lower Class] 7J
JLeminorpremiss cannot Lenegative.
Proposition notParticular.
JLe medius terminus in tLe maj or premiss ¸is] notParticular.
[For the Middle Class]
JLe Science of Logic Las lor its oLj ect tLe JLinking Activity and
tLe entire compass olits determinations . ' Matural Logic' is a name
given to tLe natural understanding vLicL man possesses Ly nature
and tLe immediate use vLicL Lemakes olit. JLe Science olLogic,
Lovever, is tLeKnoving olJLinking inits trutL.
Explanatory: Logic considers tLe province olThought in general.
JLinkingisitspeculiarspLere. ItisavLoleonitsovnaccount. Logic
itsellvLicLLavenootLergroundtLantLeJLinking. JLeheteronom­
ical toitisvLatissimplygiven to it tLrougLRepresentation. Logicis,
tLerelore, a great science. A distinction must, olcourse, Le made
LetveenpureJLougLtandReality, LutJLougLttooLasrealityinso
lar as genuine actuality is understood Ly tLis term. In so lar,
Lovever, as only sensuous external existence is meant Ly Reality,
JLougLt Las even a lar LigLer reality. JLinking Las tLerelore
tLrougLitsautonomyacontent, namelyitsell JLrougLtLestudyol
Logic ve also learn to tLink more correctly, lor, since ve thin
ing of Thin
ing, tLemindtLereLycreatesloritsellitspover. We
LecomeacquaintedvitLtLenatureolJLinkingand tLusvecantrace
outtLecourseinvLicLitisliaLletoLeledintoerror. Itis asvellto
knov Lov to give an account olone' s deed. JLereLy one gams
staLility andisnotliaLletoLeled astray LyotLers .
JLinking is, in general, tLe appreLension and Lringing togetLer ol
tLemaniold into unity. JLe maniloldassucLLelongstoexternalityin
general, to Feeling and Sensuous Intuition.
Explanatory: JLinking consists in Lringing tLe manilold into unity.
WLen tLe mind tLinks upontLings itLrings tLem into simplelorms
Logic [For the Middle Class] 75
vLicL are pure determinations olSpirit. JLe manilold is, at l¡rst,
external to JLinking. In so lar as ve merely grasp tLe sensuous
maniloldvedonotyet' tLink' , LutitistLerelating oltLesametLatis
properlycalledJLinking. JLe immediate seizingoltLemaniloldve
callFeeling or Sensation. WLen I Feel, I merelyknov sometLing.
InIntuition, Lovever, I lookupon sometLing as externalto mein
space and time. Feeling Lecomes Intuition vLen it is determinedin
space and time.
JLinking is Abstraction in so lar as intelligence, starting lrom
concrete intuitions, neglects one ol tLe manilold determinations,
sekcts anotLer, and gives to it tLe simple lorm olJLougLt.
Explanatory: IlI neglect all tLe determinations olan oLject nothing
remains. Il, on tLe contrary, I neglect one and select anotLer, tLe
latter is tLen ALstract. JLe I ¸£go] , lor example, is an aLstract
determination. I knov oltLe £go only in so lar as I exclude all
determinations lrom mysell JLis is, Lovever, only a negative
means. I negate tLe determinations olmyselland leave mysell as
sucL. JLe actolALstractionis tLenegative side olJLinking.
TLe Content olRepresentations are taken lrom£xperience Lut tLe
form of unity itsell, and its lurtLer determinations, do not Lave tLeir
source intLe Immediate as sucLLutinJLinking.
Explanatory: JLe I ¸£go] signiEes, generally, Thin
ing. I lI say. ' I
tLink' , tLis i s sometLing tautological. JLe £go i s perlectly simple.
JLe £go is a JLinking ¸activity] and tLat alvays . We cannot say,
Lovever, ' IamalvaystLinking. ' Inprincipleyes,LutvLatveJLink
is not alvays a JLougLt. Iut ve could say, intLe sense tLatveare
£gos, ' We are alvays tLinking' , lor tLe £go is alvays tLe simple
identityvitLitsellandtLissimpleidentityvitLitsellisJLinking. As
£gos ve are tLe ground olall our determinations . In so lar as tLe
externality ¸oLject] [Gegenstand] is tLougLt it receives tLe lorm ol
JLougLtandLecomes a thought externality ¸orobject] [einem g

Gegenstand] . Itis made identical to tLe£go, i. e. itisJLougL

JLis mustnot Le understoodastLougLtLis unity vas Erst addedto
tLemaniloldolexternaloLjectsLyJLinking andtLelinkingvas only
introducedexternally. Òn tLe contrary tLe unity Lelongs equally to
tLe ÒLject [Obje
t] and, vitL its determinations, constitutes tLe
proper nature tLereol
76 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLougLts are oltLree kinds.
(1) The Categories;
(2) Determinations of Refection;
(3) Concepts.
JLe Ioctrine ol tLe Erst tvo constitutes Objective Logic or
NetapLysics,tLeIoctrineolConceptsconstitutesSubjective Logic
orLogic proper.
Explanatory: LogiccontainstLesystemolpureJLinking,Being is(1)
tLe Immediate, (2) tLe Inner, tLe tLougLt determinations go Lack
again into tLemselves . JLe oLjects ol tLe common system ol
metapLysics are tLe JLing, tLeWoud, Nind, and Cod, vLicL give
rise to tLe dillerent metapLysical sciences. Òntology, Cosmology,
Pneumatology, andJLeology.
(3) WLattLe Concept presents us vitL is an immediate being ¸or
immediate existent] rein Seiendes] LutattLesametimeisessential. Ieing
standsinrelationto£ssenceastLeImmediatetotLeNediate. JLings
simply are, Lut tLeir Ieing consists in tLis. tLat tLey manilest tLeir
£ssence. Ieinggoesoverinto£ssence,onecanexpressittLus. Ieing
presupposes £ssence. Iut altLougL £ssence, in comparison vitL
Ieing, appears as tLat vLicL is mediated, yet, notvitLstanding,
£ssenceistLetrueOrigin. In£ssence, Ieingreturnsintoits Cround,
Ieing suLlates itsellin £ssence. Ieing' s essence Las, in tLis vay,
Become orLeenbrought forth ¸orproduced] Lut vLat appears asLaving
Iecome is ratLer tLe Òrigin. JLePerisLaLleLas itsLasis in£ssence
andbecomes outol£ssence.
WelormConcepts . JLesearesometLingposited [Gesetztes] Lyus,
Lut Concepts also contain tLe tLing in its ovn propernature. As
comparedvitLtLeConcept, £ssenceinitsturnistLepositedLuttLe

in tLis relation sttands

lor tLe true.¸Le Conceptis partly
subjective, partly objectiv:The Idea is tLe union olsuLj ective and
oLjective. WLen ve say� 'It is a mere Concept' , ve mean tLat itis
vitLout reality. Nere ÒLj ectivity on tLe otLer Land lacks tLe
Concept. Iut

tLe Idea states Lov

�reality is determined Ly tLe
Concept. actualisanIdea.¸
SciencepresupposestLat tLeseparationolitselllromJrutLisalready
overcomeortLatSpiritisnolongerinaPLenomenalstage, asitvas
intLe ScienceolConsciousness . Sell-certaintyemLracesalltLatisan
Logic [For the Middle Class] 77
oLjectolconsciousness vLetLerit Le an external tLing ora tLougLt
produced in tLe mind, in so lar as Consciousness does not contain
vitLin itsellalltLe moments oltLeBeing-in-and-for-itself; ¸a) to
Le in-itse
or ¸Lave] simple equality vitL itsell, ¸L) to Lave
Determinate Being or determinateness, a Being10r-other, and ¸c) to Le
i. e. m� ���

��_¸|µ  p_)�turn�¤(nto¸isclIand yitL

Science does not see
JrutL Lut is in tLe JrutL and is tLe JrutL
Quality is tLe immediate determinateness vLose alteration is tLe
transitioninto an opposite.
Being, Nothing, Becoming
Being is tLesimpleemptyimmediacyvLicL Las its oppositeinpure
Nothing andtLeirunionisBecoming: astransitionlromMotLing
into Ieing, it is coming-to-be [Entstehen] ; tLe converse is ceasing-to-be
[ Vergehen] .
¸ ' Soundcommonsense' , asone-sidedaLstractionolten calls itsell,
villnotadmittLeunionolIeingandMotLing. '£itLerIeingis, orit
is not. JLereisnotLird. ' ' WLatis, doesnotIegin,vLatisnot,alsois
not. ' Itasserts, tLerelore, tLeimpossiLility ola Ieginning. )
Determinate Being
1 0
Determinate Being i s aIeingtLatLasaspecil¡c[bestimmtes] Ieing,
aIeingvLicLattLesame timeLas a rierence [Beziehung] to an other
¸and]Lence to its Mot-Ieing.
1 1
¸a) IeterminateIeingis, consequently, dividedvitLinitsell. Erstly,
it is in-itself
secondly, it is relation to an other. Ieterminate Ieing,
tLougLtvitL tLesetvo determinations, isReality.
78 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 2
¸L) SometLing Las a relerence t o an otLer. JLe ' otLer' i s a
IeterminateIeingastLenon-LeingoltLesometLing. JLusitLas , in
tLe Erst place, a Boundary orLimit andisf
nite. WLat sometLing
ougLt to Lein-itsellis calledits Determination.
1 3
JLevay invLicL sometLingi s loranotLeror i s connectedvitLan
otLer, andLence in-itsellis also immediately positedLyan otLer, is
calledits Constitution.
1 4
JLe vay in vLicL sometLing i s LotL an in-itsell, as vell as a
Leing-lor-otLer, is its Determinateness or Quality. JLe limit is not
oltLe sometLing.
¸c) JLrougLitsQuality, tLrougLwhat itis, tLesometLingis suLject
to Alteration. It alters in so lar as its determinateness comes into
connectionvitL anotLer and tLereLy Lecomes a Constitution.
1 6
I n as mucL as tLe Constitution i s cancelled tLrougL Alteration,
Alteration itsell also is cancelled. Ieing, consequently, vitL tLis
process, LasretreatedintoitsellandexcludesotLernesslromitself It
1 7
I t i s a One, vLicL i s related only t oitsell, and stands i na repellent
relation tovards otLers. [Repulsion]
1 8
an Attraction. MoRepulsionvitLout Attraction andvice versa.
Òr, vitLtLeActol RepulsionontLepartoltLeÒne, many Ònesare
immediately posited. Iut tLe many Ònes are not distinct lrom one
anotLer. £acLÒneisvLattLeotLeris. HencetLeirsuLlation, tLatis,
tLeir attraction, is equally posited.
Logic [For the Middle Class] 79
JLe Òne is tLe Ieing-lor-itsellvLicL is aLsolutely dillerent lrom
otLers . IutsincetLisdillerence, Repulsion, issuLlatedLyAttraction,
tLe dillerenceis posited as suLlatedand tLerevitLitLaspassed over
into anotLerdetermination. Quantity.
¸' SometLing'vitLoutitslimitLasnomeaning. IlIaltertLelimitol
itstillremainsal¡eldasLeloretLougLsometLinglargerorsmaller. In
tLis caseI Lave altereditslimit notas a EeldLutas a ' quantum' . Jo
alter its qualitative limit as a Eeldmeans lor example to makeit a
lorest . )
JLrougL Quality sometLing is vLatit is. JLrougL an alteration ol
tLe Finite Lut tLe Finite itsell Quantity, on tLe contrary, is tLe
determination vLicL does not constitute tLe nature ol tLe oLj ect
itsell, itisratLeranindiferent distinctionvLicLmayLealteredvLile
tLe oLject remains tLe same.
Quantity istLesuLla tedIeing-lor-itsellortLeÒne. ItistLerelorean
unLrokenContinuity vitLinitsell Iutsinceitequally containstLe
Òneitpossesses also tLemomentolDiscreteness.
¸a) Magnitude is eitLer Continuous or Iiscrete. Iut eacL oltLese
inds olNagnitudecontainsIiscretenessasvellasContinuityin
it and tLeir dillerence is only tLis. tLat in Iiscrete Nagnitude it is
Iiscreteness vLicL constitutes tLe n+in principle vLile in tLe
Continuous itis Continuity.
¸L)NagnitudeorQuantityis , aslimitedquantity, aQuantum. Since
increased ordecreased.
8O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLelimitoltLeQuantum, intLelormolIeing-vitLin-itsell, gives
Intensive Magnitude and in tLe lorm ol externality, gives
Extensive Magnitude. Iut there is no Intensive £xistence vLicL

¸c) Quantum Las no intrinsically determined limit. JLere is,
Lence, no QuantumLeyond vLicL a larger orsmaller could not Le
posited. JLe Quantum vLicL is supposedtoLe tLe last one, tLe one
Leyond vLicL tLere is supposed to Le no greater or no smaller, IS
usually called tLe Infnitely Great ortLe Infnitely Small.
IutintLis sLapeitceasestoLea QuantumatallandisLyitsellequal
tonaugLt. IttLenLas signil¡canceonlyas determinationolaRatio in
vLicL it no longer possesses any magnitude Ly itsell Lut only a
determination in relation to anotLer. JLis is tLe more accurate
concept oltLeMathematical Infnite.
JLe Infnite, in general, vLen grasped in tLe lorm olan inEnite
progress, is tLe process ol cancelling tLe limit, vLetLer it Le
qualitative or quantitative, so tLat tLis limit counts as sometLing
positiveandcontinually arises alteritsnegation, LuttLelimit, Leing
graspedas a negation, is tLe Genuine Infnite, is tLe Negation of
the Negation. In it tLe progress Leyond tLe Finite does not posit
again a lresL limit Lut, tLrougL tLe suLlating ol tLe limit, tLe
existenceis restoredto equality vitL itsell
JLesuLlatingolQuantum in tLe InEnite means tLat tLe indillerent
external determination vLicL constitutes Quantum is suLlated and
Lecomes an 'inner' Qualitativedetermination.
Measure is a speciEc Quantum in so lar as it is not external Lut is
determinedLy tLe nature oltLeoLj ect, Ly Quality.
Logic [For the Middle Class]
IntLealterationsolaQuantum,i nitsincreaseordecreasevLicLlalls
vitLin its Neasure, tLere enters likevise a specilying process in
vLicLtLeindillerent, externalmovementolmagnitudeupanddovn
tLescaleis, attLesametime, determinedandmodil¡edLytLenature
toLetLrougLtLepassingLeyonditsmeasure, ¸Leyond]tLeparticular
sometLingtLatitvas, tLatis, increasing ordecreasing Leyondit.
Essence is IeingvLicLLasreturnedintoitselllromitsimmediacy
andvLose determinations are suLlatedinto a simpleInity.
£ssencesLines ¸orisrellectedintoitsell] anddeterminesitsell Iutits
determinationsareinunity. JLeyareonlypositedIeing, tLatis, tLey
arenotimmediatelylor-tLemselves LutonlysucL asremainin tLeir
unity. JLey are tLerelore Relations. JLey are Ieterminations ol
Ieterminations, insolaras tLeyLelongtoimmediateIeingand are
notcontainedin aninnerunity, Lecome dillerentiated asinessentials
lrom tLe £ssence.
tLeir Ieterminate Ieing is a posited being i. e. in tLeir Ieterminate
Ieing tLey are not immediate and independent Lut are mediated.
JLeyaretLereloretLougLtdeterminationsi ntLelormol Rel¡ections .
82 The Philosophical Propaedeutic

¸!)JLeE rstdeterminationistLeessentialunityvitLitsel�. I�ent


£xpressedasaproposition, namely, asauniversaldetermination
tLepropositionA = A, ' everytLingisidenticalvitLitsell,negatively
¸expressed, itis] tLepropositionolcontradiction. ' A cannotLeattLe
same time A andnot-A. '
¸2) JLe ¸second] determination is Difference, oltLings vLicL

indillerentto one anotLerLut distinguisLedtLrougLsomedetermm-
ate Leing or otLer

JLe proposition vLicL it expresses is vritten.
'JLere are no tvo tLings vLicL are perlectly alike

¸J) AstLedeterminationolOpposition, aspositive and negative, in
vLicL tLe determination ol one is posited only Ly means ol tLe
determinateness olanotLer, and eacL oltLese determinatenesses is


is not tLe otLer. JLe proposition tLrougL vLicL tLis is expressed
reads . ' A iseitLerA ornot-A andtLereisnotLird. ' ¸JLeproposition
exclusii tertii . )
¸4)JLetLird¸de:ermination] , invLicLtLepositeddeterminationsin
general are suLlated, is £ssence, vLicL is, in so lar, Ground. JLe
proposition olCround reads, '£verytLing Las its suficient ground. '
¸Croundis tLat Ly vLicL sometLingisposited and tL
ere�y con:es
into existence, tLis isnotransitioninto opposeddeterminations,
Iecomingin Ieing, Lut inCround tLere is unity ol
AltLougL tLe posited £xistence can at tLe same

time Le a s�ape
dillerentlromits Cround, yetitmustat tLesametimeLecontained
init. )
In so lar as immediate £xistence is regarded as sometLing merely
posited, it Las returned into£ssenceorinto its Cround. JLe l

¸i. e. £ssence]isLere tLe Erst, tLat lromvLicL vestarted, LutintLis
Erst and essential.
JLe Cround contains tLat vLicL is grounded Ly it according to its
essential determinations . Iut tLe relation ol tLe Cround to tLe
grounded isa ¸unity] andnota transition into opposites, tLougL tLe
Logic [For the Middle Class] 8J
grounded existence Las a dillerent sLape lromits Cround, vLicL is
likevise an existence, and tLe cLieldetermination is tLeir common
Croundis, intLel¡rstplace, tLesimpleunity oldillerent determina-
anotLer. In it tLey Lave tLe lorm olsuLlated ¸moments] and tLeir
suLsistence is constituted Ly tLe Cround. JLis existing vLole is a
Thing olmany Properties.
JLeJLingemergeslromtLe Cround intoIeterminateIeing, ¸into]
£xistence, in so lar as tLis is tLe positing tLat Las Lecome
sell-identical and tLus tLe restoredimmediacy, aLeingvLicLis not
itsellimmediateLutcanLe calledExistence [Existenz] .
£xistenceis mediated Ly tLe suLlated mediation, tLe Cround lalls
to tLe ground [eht zu Grunde] in its £xistence, ve tLink ol tLe
Cround as not Leing lostLecause, as regardsits content, itremains .
Lave an indillerent dillerence lrom one anotLer and, equally, tLe
JLingis, assimpleidentityvitLitsell, undeterminedandindillerent
tovards tLem as determinations .
JLe indillerence oltLe enduring is tLe JLing, also expressed as.
JLeJLing is presented [vorher] , Lelore [ehe] it exists.
Apart lrom its Properties, JLingLood Las no trutL ¸validity] . JLe
JLing is tLereLy dissolved into its Properties as sell-suLsistent
Since, Lovever, tLeNattersareunited in tLeunity ola JLing, tLey
interpenetrateeacbotLerreciprocally, areaLsolutelyporous, andare
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
dissolvedineacLotLer. JLeJLingis consequentlytLiscontradiction
vitLinitselloritispositedasmerelysell-dissolving, asAppearance.
(1) JLe sell-identity oltLe JLing and oltLe matter is dissolved.
Consequently tLe determinations Lave no Leing in-tLemselves Lut
only in an otLer,tLeyareonlyposited ortLeyareAppearance.
(2) Sell-identityinAppearanceisindeterminateandmerelycapaLleol
Leing determined, it is passive Matter. JLe identity ol tLe
determinations in tLcir connection vitL one anotLer constitutes tLe
active side olAppearance, orForm.
£ssencemustappear, ontLeoneLand, LecauseIeterminateIeingis
dissolved in its ovn sell and retreats into its Cround. i.e. ¸into]
negativeAppearance,ontLeotLerLand, Lecause£ssence, asCround,
is a simpleimmediacy and tLerelore Ieing-in-Ceneral,
Òn account oltLe identity olCround and tLe £xistent tLere is
notLing in tLe Appearance vLicL is not in tLe £ssence and,
conversely, notLingin£ssencevLicLis not in tLeAppearance.
Since Natter is determined Ly Form LotL are presupposed as
sell-suLsistentandindependentoloneanotLer. Iut tLereisnoForm
atallvitLoutNatterandnoNattervitLoutForm. ¸NatterandForm
generateeacLotLerreciprocally. )
Since tLe determinations manilest tLemselves also in tLe lorm ol
Independent £xistence tLerelation oltLe same, asLeingdetermined
tLrougL eacL otLer, constitutes tLe Mutual Relation [ Verhiltniss] .
£ternity olNatter.
Form determines Natter. Itis active tovards Natter as tovards an
otLer. JLisactivityisareßectingoltLedeterminationsintvovays .
( 1) Form posits determinations in Natter and tLese determinations
oLtain a suLsistence in Natter or tLey constitute tLe suLsistence ol
Natteritsell IutintLisexternality ¸LelongingtoForm]tLeyremain
connectedvitLtLeirunity orarereßectedandFormsimplyremains
intLeirunity vitLitsell
Logic [For the Middle Class] 85
(2) Forminrelatingitsellt oNatter, at tLesametime, relatesitsellto
itas to an otLer. Iut NatterisidenticalvitLitsell Form tLerelore
inits relation to tLesell-identity, determines it orreßects
and tLis identity is only tLrougL tLis reßection. Natter is thus
generatedLytLedeterminingactivity olForm. Natter, therelore, is
presupposed Ly tLis activity Lut it is a presupposition vLicL is
suLlated LytLeactivityolForm andis made a result.
Formis l¡nite inso lar as it is opposedto Force andinitLas its
limit. Similarly Natter, outside olvLicL is Form, is Enite Natter.
FormisrelatedpositivelyandnegativelytoNatterandtoitsel( ¸a) to
Natter ¸a a) positively, posits its ovn determinations, ¸L L)
negatively, suLlates tLe indeterminateness olNatter, ¸L) to itsell¸a
a) positively, posits its ovn determinations, reßection into itsell,
¸L L) negatively, suLlates its negative identity vitL itsell, gives its
determinations suLsistence, materiality.
In tLis essential unity olForm and Natter, Form, as tLe necessary
connectionoltLeirdeterminations, istLelaw [Gesetz] olAppearance.
tLe JLing itsell, lromtLeirunity.
WLat appears as posited under tLe determination olForm, as tLe
Formed, constitutes tLe Content vLicL is distinguisLed lrom tLe
FormitsellsincetLis appears inrelation toit asanexternalrelation.
Since, moreover, tLe determinations posited Ly Form are identical
vitL tLemselves, or are material, tLey appear as an independent
Here FormandNatterare distinguisLed notlromoneanotLerLut
lromtLeir unity.
Relation isaconnectionoltvosidesvLicLpartlyLaveanindillerent
vLicL determines LotL.
JLe determinations are posited Erstly in tLe lorm ol a Relation.
Secondly, tLey are only implicitly tLese determinations oltLe Form
andappearasanindependent, Immediate£xistence. JLeyareintLis
8ô The Philosophical Propaedeutic
respect a presupposed existence vLicL internally in its ovn sell
alreadycontainstLetotalityolForm, vLicLcanLave£xistenceonly
tLrougL tLat presupposed Ieterminate Ieing, or tLey are in so lar
conditions, and tLeir relationis a Conditioned Relation.

IntLe conditionsandintLeconditionedrelation, AppearanceLegins
toreturninto£ssenceandIeing-in-itsell, LuttLerestillexiststLerein
tLe dillerence olAppearance as sucL and olitsellin so lar as it is
(1) JLeimmediateConditionedRelationistLerelationolWhole and
Parts. JLe Parts, as existing on tLeir ovn account outside oltLe
Relation, aremereNatterand, insolar,notParts . AsPartstLeyLave
tLeirdeterminationonlyintLeWLoleand, inordertoLeParts, tLey
must also Le capaLle on tLeir ovn account ol entering into tLis
relation to tLe WLole, only tLen do tLe Parts constitute tLe WLole.
¸2) JLe WLole, as tLeinneractive Form, is Force ¸Kraf] . ItLas no
externalNatterasitsconditionLutisinNatteritsell Itsconditionis
only an external impetus vLicL solicits it. JLe latter is itsell tLe
expression ol a Force and requires to Le solicited in order to Le
manilested. WLatveLavetLenisareciprocalconditioningandLeing
conditioned vLicLin tLe WLoleis tLereloreunconditioned.
Asregardscontent, ForceinitsexpressionexLiLitsvLatitisin-itsell
since asFormit contains vitLin itsellits determinations andtLereis
notLing inits expression vLicLis not in its Inner.
JLe content vLicLis tLus unconditionedis related toitsellasInner
only ¸as] to itsell as Outer; Inner and Òuter are tLe same, only
considered lrom dillerent sides . JLe Inner is tLe totality of tLe
determinations oltLe content as conditions vLicL tLemselves Lave
existence, tLeir Lecoming Òuter is itsell tLeir reßection into
tLemselves, tLe taking oltLem togetLer into tLe unity ola WLole
vLicLLereLy acquires existence.
Logic [For the Middle Class J
Substance is tLe unconditioned content ol Òuter and Inner,
aLsolutely sell-suLsistent £ssence, unconditioned as regards tLe
determinations olits content, sinceitisnot conditionedLyanotLer,
inits ovninvardness.
All determinations and conditioned existences are appearing deter-
ate Ieing, tLey are Accidents. In tLeir totality tLey constitute
AccidentsexLiLit, intLeirmaniloldvariety, tLedeterminationsoltLe
contentolSuLstanceintLeiressentialnatureinsucL avaytLattLey
run tLrougLtLespLereolinessentialcircumstances, eacLolvLicLis
suLlated in anotLer, and vLat is preserved is only tLe simple
suLstantial determination. SuLstance is tLe pover vLicL dominates
tLeAccidentsin solarastLeysuLlatetLemselvesin tLemselvesLut,
at tLe same time, in tLus suLlating tLemselves tLey reveal vLatis

Accidents, in so lar as tLey are implicitly containedin tLe SuLstance,
are possiLle. SuLstanceitselfis notpossiLleLutis PossiLilityitsell
AnytLing tLat is tLougLt or simply imagined in tLe lorm ol
Ieing-in-itscllor as not sell-contradictory is called Possible; it is a
Ieing-in-itsellvLicLissometLingonlyposited¸and] notin-and-lor-
itsell A single determination Las sucL a PossiLility separated lrom
Potentiating. MumLer suLlates Accidentality ¸its immediate con-
tingentLeingvLicLcanLeequally4or5, etc. ) , and,intLissuLlating,
tLis altering, it manilests itsellandLecomes Power [Macht] . Itis in
tLe nrst place only contingent andimmediateLut tLe squareand tLe
88 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
cuLe are identical vitL tLemselves, tLeir Ieing Las Lecome a
Ieing-in-itsell JLey alter Lut tLey tLemselves determine tLeir
alteration ¸i. e. are] sell-determination, Reßection-into-sell, actu and
potentia. IillerenceLetveenPover andPossiLility. I may not.
SometLing is truly PossiLle only as a totality ol its implicit
determinations. WLateverpossessestLisinnercompletePossiLilityis
notmerelya positedLeing Lut aLsolutely andimmediately Actual.
JLePossiLilityolsuLstanceis, tLerelore, itsActuality. ¸Cod, e. g. , is
not only generally Lut truly possiLle. His ' possiLility' is a necessary
one. Heis aLsolutely Actual . )

JLeconnectionolAccidentsintLeSuLstanceistLeirNecessity. ¸Itis
tLeunityolPossiLility andActuality. ) Mecessityis Llindinsolar as
tLeconnectionis merelyaninneroneorinsolarastLeActualisnot
alreadypresent asanimplicitunityolitsdeterminations, as£nd, Lut
resultsonlylromtLeir relation.
God is tLe Absolute Idea of Reason, not a positedorimagined
Ieing, not sometLing merelypossiLle, He is tLe necessary Ideanot
JLe knovledge olCodi simmediate and mediated, ¸a) ¸immedi-
ate, ] as Reason' s knoving olits ALsolute, ¸L) mediated, as ascent
lrom tLe Enite vLicL is merely contingent, possiLle, sometLing
merelyposited, reßectedinanotLer,HisrellectionintoHimsellisLis
' actuality' . ¸Wemustnot]speakolCod' spossiLilityasground, astLe
true Erst, oras tLepositive. JLis possiLilityis tLecontingent vorld
vLicL is suLlated in its ovn sell, is rellected into itsellout oltLe
reßectionin an otLer, actually is and manilests Actuality.
AsPover, SuLstanceis tLemanilestationolitsellin tLe coming-to-be
and ceasing-to-be olAccidents ¸arising and vanisLing] . Active SuL-
stance, as original andprimary, is turned against tLe Contingent as
againstanotLerandis Cause vLicLacts ontLisotLer.
JLe activity olSuLstanceconsistsinmakingits originalcontentinto
an Effect, into a positivity vLicL is in an alien existence. JLere is
notLing in tLe £llect vLicLis not in tLe Cause and Cause is cause
Logic [For the Middle Class]
only intLe£llect.
AlallingLrickistLecauseolaman' sdeatL, tLemiasmaolaregion
istLecauseollevers,tLeErstisprimarilyonlycauseolapressure, tLe
secondonlyolexcessivedampness . IuttLeellectinsometLingactual
vLicL Las otLer determinations Lesides, leads to anotLer result.
JLe£llect is ¸a) Lymeans olan otLer oltLeCause, tLis as activity
£llectis posited, is in tLe otLer.
InrespectolFormtLeCausei sdistinguisLedlromtLe£llecti nsucLa
vay tLat Cause is tLe actuality vLicL originally is spontaneously
active, LuttLe£llectispositedandinanotLer, asadeterminationin
anotLer,insometLingActual. ItentersintoarelationvitLtLerestol
tLe otLer' s determinations and tLereLy receives a sLape vLicL no
longer Lelongs toit as ellect.
JLe Cause passes over into tLe £llcct Lut, conversely, ve go lrom
tLe £llect to tLe Cause, tLis regress Lelongs i n tLe Erst place to
external reßection. Since tLe Cause itsellLas a speciEc content, is
contingentandistoLepositedas£llect, veoLtainaninEniteregress
ola series olcauses and ellects. Conversely, in solar astLatvLicL
sullerstLeellectisitselloriginalitisa Causeandproducesitsellectin
anotLer, tLesame series in aninEnite progress .
¸£xternalreßection. tLeCausei s sometLing otLertLantLe£llect,
is dillerenceoltLesometLing, aLsolutereßection, tLesamecontent,
tLesametLing, ¸e.g. ] rainandmoisture, isonlyidentityoltLetLing,
intLeellectisvLatisintLecause, verecognizeonelromtLeotLer,
external identity, Form and Content or tLe tLing excLange tLem-
selves, Causeand£llectareadillerenceolForm, CausecountsastLe
tLing itselland tLen again only as Form. Itis only in comLination
vitL tLatinvLicLitis positedtLattLeellectLas actuality. )
In so lar as sometLing receivesinto itselltLe ellect Lut at tLe same
as sometLing external toit, it reacts and tLe reactionisequalto tLe
ellect ¸i.e. Reciprocity] .
9O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Causality Las extinguisLed vLat is primary, tLe Cause, vLich,
Lovever, is transient. JLerelore it does not necessarily give rise to
anotLer 'cause' andso on.
JLe£llectpositedinanotLeractualityLecomesaCauseagain, tLis
is a negative action, i.e. tLe £llectis suLlated.
JLe reaction takes place againsttLe ßrst Cause, vLicLconsequently
ispositedas£llectoris madeintosometLingpositedtLrougLvLicL
notLing else Lappens except tLat it is nov posited as vLat it is
in-itsell, namely, as not truly primary Lut transient.
Reciprocity tLen consists in tLis . tLat £llect Lecomes Cause and
CauseLecomes£llect. IntLis tLereis present agenuineprimariness,
i n tLat, altLougL tLe Cause does pass over into tLe £llect, into a
positivity, yet, asregards tLe content, tLe tLing itsell, itremains tLe
same and, also, as regards Form, it restores itsellinits positivity.

In other vords Reciprocity is tLe sell-mediation in vLicL vLat is
primarydeterminesitsellormakesitsellinto apositivity,intLisitis
reßected into itsell and only as tLis reßection-into-self is genuine
primariness .
JLe categories are simple determinations LuttLey donotconstitute
tLe Erst elements ol tLe determination, unless , as antitLetical
moments, tLey are reduced to simplicity. VLeneversucha category
is predicated ol a suLject, and tLose antitLetical moments are
developedLyanalysis, tLetvo arepredicableoftLesuLjectandtLis
gives rise to antinomial propositions, eacL olvLicLLas equal trutL.
KantespeciallyLasdravnattentiontotLeAntinomies. Hovever, Le
Las not exLausted tLe antinomial cLaracter olReason since Le Las
expoundedonlya lev olits lorms. JhesearetLelolloving.
Logic [For the Middle Class J .
First Antinomy
(A) The Antinomy of the Finitude or Infnitude of the
world in regard to Space and Time.
(1) The antinomy of the f
nitude or infinitude of the world in respect of
Thesis: JLe vorldLas a Leginningi nJime.
Let one assumetLat tLe vorldLas noLeginningi nrespect to
Jime, tLen, up to any given point olJime, an eternity Las elapsed
andconsequentlyaninEniteseries olsuccessiveconditionsoltLings
intLevorld. JLeinl¡nitudeolaseriesconsists, Lovever,intLis.tLat
it can never Le completed Ly successive syntLesis. JLerelore an
inEnitevorld series isimpossiLle,LenceaLeginning oltLevorldin
Jimeis necessary.
Antithesis: JLe vorld Las no Leginning in Jime and is inEnite in
respect to Jime.
Letone suppose tLat tLe vorld Lad a Leginning, tLen tLere
vouldLe assumedanemptyJimeLelorethat Leginning, aJimein
vLicL tLe vorld vas not. Inan empty Jime, Lovever, notLing can
originate lor in it tLere is no condition lor existence, since one
existencealvays LasanotLerexistenceasitsconditionorislimitedLy
anotLer existence. Jherelore tLe vorld can Lave no Leginning Lut
everyexistence presupposes anotner and soonad infinitum.
JLeprools oltLisAntinomy,vLenreduc

edtoaLriellorm, Lecome
tLelolloving directantitLesis .
¸ !) JLe vorld is Enite in respect to Jime, i.e. it Las a limit. In tLe
proololtLetLesis sucL alimit is assumed, namcly, tLe Mov or
some onegivenpointolJimeinvLicL tLeinEniteLadcometo
anend, tLatis, vas Enite.
¸2) £xistence Las a limit not in non-existence, in empty time, Lut
only in an existence. JLe sell-limiting somctLings are also
positively related to eacL otLer and the one Las tLe same
determination as tLe otLer. Since, therelore, eacL existence is
limitedLyanotLeroreacLis, attLesameJime, aEniteone, tLat
is, sucLaoneasmustLetranscended, itlollovstLattLeprogress
toinEnity is posited.
92 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLetruesolutionoltLis Antinomyi s tLis. MeitLertLelimitnortLe
inEniteis trueLyitsell, lortLelimitisolsucLakindtLatitmustLe
transcended and tLe inEnite is merely tLat in vLicL tLe limit
continually arises and vLicL, Leyond tLe limit, is only an empty
negative. JLe true inl¡nitude is tLe R
and Reason
(?) The Antinomy of the
nitude or in
nitude of the world i n respect of
Thesis: JLevorldislimitedin respect to Space.
LetoneassumetLatitisunlimited, tLenitis aninEnite given
WLole olcoexistent tLings and also, in general, an oLject. SucL a
WLolecanLe vievedascompleted only tLrougLtLesyntLesis oltLe
parts tLerein contained. For tLis completion, Lovever, inEnite time
is required vLicL must Le assumed as already elapsed vLicL is
impossiLle. JLereloreaninEnite aggregateolexisting tLings cannot
LevievedasacoexistentgivenWLole. JLevorldisaccordinglynot
inEnitein SpaceLutenclosedvitLinlimits.
Antithesis: JLevorldisunlimitedin respect to Space.
itsellinanemptyunlimitedSpace,itvould, tLerelore,Lavearelation
to tLis empty Space, i. e. a relation tono oLject, Lut sucLa relation,
tLevorldis spatially inEnite.
JLe prools oltLese antinomialpropositions really rest likevise on
direct assertions.
¸ !) JLe prool ol tLe tLesis traces Lack tLe completion ol tLe
coexistent totality oltLespatial vorld to tLe successionolJime
in vLicL tLe syntLesis must Lappen and tLis is partly incorrect
andpartlysuperû uous, lorintLespatialvorldtLequestionisnot
olsuccession but ol coexistence. FurtLermore, vLen an already
elapsed inEnite Jimeis assumed a Mov is assumed. Likevisein
spaceaHereistoLeassumed, tLatis, alimitolSpaceingeneral.
Logic [For the Mi
dle Class] 9J
¸2) Since tLelimitin Spacein generalis toLe transcended itlollovs
tLattLeoppositeolprogresstoinEnity, tLenegativeoltLelimit,
ispositedand, sincetLisisessentiallyonlyanegativeoltLelimit,
itisconditionedLyit. HencetLeinl¡niteprogressispositedintLe
samevay as in tLe previous Antinomy.
Second Antinomy
(B) The Antinomy concerning the simplicity or
composite nature of substances
Thesis: £very composite suLstance consists olsimple parts.
Let one assume tLat composite suLstances do not consist ol
simpleparts. Il, nov, all compositionorcomLinationveretLougLt
avay tLentLerevouldLenocompositepart and, sincetLereis also
nosimplepart,notLingvLatever, noranysuLstance, vouldremain.
ConsequentlyitisimpossiLletotLinkavayallcomposition. IuttLe
composite again does not consist olsuLstances, lor composition is
mustsuLsistasenduringentitiesontLeirovnaccount. JLereloretLe
compositesuLstance must consist olsimpleparts .
Antithesis: Mo composite tLing in tLe vorld consists ol simple
parts, and tLere does notexist anyvLereanytLing simple.
Letone assumetLatacompositetLingconsistsolsimpleparts .
InasmucL as all external relation, consequently all composition ol
suLstance, is possiLle only inspace, tLen tLespace vLicL itoccupies
must consist olas many parts as tLe composite consists ol Mov
Spaceconsistsnotolsimpleparts Lutofspaces, tLereloreeverypart
oltLe composite must occupy a space. Iut tLe aLsolutely primary
parts ol everytLing composite are simple, tLerelore tLe simple
occupies Space. Mov since everytLing real vLicL occupies Space
contains a manilold vLose parts are external to eacL otLer and is
consequently composite, it lollovs tLat tLe simple vould Le a
composite suLstance, vLicL is sell-contradictory.

JLeproololtLe tLesis containstLedirectassertiontLat composition
is an externalrelationor sometLing contingent, Lence tLe Simple is
94 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
assertion tLatsuLstances areessentially spatialand Lence composite.
InitselltLis Antinomy is tLe sameas tLe previous one, namely, tLe
positing ola limit and tLen tLe transcending oltLe same, a process
vLicLisinvolvedin tLe concept ol£xistence.
Third Antinomy
(C) [The Antinomy concerning the antithesis of
Causality according to natural laws and freedom]
Thesis: Causality according tonaturallavsisnottLeonlycausality
lrom vLicL tLe pLenomena oltLe vorld can Le derived. For an
Proof Letoneassume tLat tLereis no otLercausality tLan according
to tLe lavs ol nature, it lollovs tLat everytLing vLicL Lappens
presupposes a previous conditionlromvLicLitproceeds, according
to aninvariaLlerule. ìov tLat previous condition itsellmust Lave
Lappened since, ilit alvays Lad existed, its ellect must alvays Lave
existed. JLerelore tLe causality tLrougLvLicLsometLing comes to
pass is itsella sometLing vLicL Las come to pass, and vLicL again
presupposes a previous condition and its causality and so on ad
nitum. JLereistLerelore, atany giventime, only arelativeandno
hrstLeginningandLence,ingeneral,nocompletenessolseries ontLe
part oltLe connected causes . JLe lav olnature consists, Lovever,
precisely in tLis. tLat notLing Lappens vitLout an elE cient a priori
cause. Jherelore tLe proposition tLat all causality is possiLle only
according to natural lavs relutes itselland natural lavs cannot Le
assumed as tLeonlyones .
Antithesis: JLereisnolreedom, LuteverytLingintLevorldcomes
to passsolelyaccording to tLe lavs olnature.
Proof Let one assume tLat tLereis lreedom, to vit, a pover vLicL
olresults tLereol, tLen not only tLe series is originated tLrougL tLe
spontaneity Lut tLe determination oltLis spontaneity itsellis tLus
originatedin sucL a manner tLat notLing can precede Ly vLicL tLis
actionvouldLedeterminedaccordingtohxedlavs. £acLorigination
olan act, Lovever, presupposes a state or condition oltLe cause
vLicL is not as yet active and a sLeer l¡rst Leginning oltLe act
Logic [For the Mi
dle Class 1 95
preceding state oltLe cause, i. e. vLicL in no vay results lrom it.
JLerelore aLsolutelreedomis opposedto tLe lav olcausality.
JLisAntinomy, ingeneral, restsupontLeantitLesisvLicLtLecausal
relationLasinitsell, namely, tLecause¸a)isanoriginalcause, aE rst,
acts andtLenits activity passes overinto tLeellect. Henceitis to Le
vievedasnotLingtrulyoriginalLutasaposited. Il¸a) isLeldlastan
aLsolute causality is assumed, a causality ollreedom, Lut according
to ¸L) tLecauseitsellLecomessometLingtLatLasLappenedvLereLy
it gives rise to tLe progress to inhnity.
JLe true solution oltLis antinomy is Reciprocity; tLe cause vLicL
passes overinto an ellectLasin tLis againa causalreaction vLereLy
tLel¡rstcauseisreduced,inturn, toanellectortosometLingposited.
In tLisreciprocity, consequently, is involved tLe lact tLatneitLer ol
itis onlytLeclosed circle oltLetotality tLatis in-and-lor-itsell
Thesis: An aLsolutely necessary Ieing Lelongs to tLe vorld.
Proof JLe sensuous vorld, as tLe sum total ol all pLenomena,
contains, at tLe same time, a series olalterations. £very alteration
stands under its condition, under vLicL it is necessary. lov every
conditioned, inrespect olitsexistence, presupposesacompleteseries
ol conditions up to tLe aLsolutely unconditioned, vLicL alone is
aLsolutelynecessary. JLereloresometLingaLsolutelynecessarymust
existilalterationexists as itsresult. JLisnecessarysometLingitsell,
Lovever, Lelongs to tLe sensuous vorld, lor assume tLat it exists
outsideolit tLen tLeseries olalterationsintLevorldvouldderive
tLeir origin
lrom it and yet tLis necessary cause itsell vould not
Lelong to tLe sensuous vorld. Mov tLis is impossiLle since tLe
Leginning ola series in time can Le determined only tLrougL tLat
vLicLprecedesitintime. JLeultimateconditionoltLeLeginningol
a series olalterations mustexistinatimevLentLisseries didnotas
yet exist, Lence tLis ultimate condition Lelongs to time and
tLere is in tLevorld itsellsometLing aLsolutelynecessary.
Antithesis: JLereexistsnoaLsolutelynecessaryIeing, eitLerinthe
vorldoroutsidetLevorld, as its cause.
Proof Let one assume tLat tLevorlditsell, or sometLing in it, is a
9ô The Philosophical Propaedeutic
a Leginning vLicL vas unconditionally necessary and consequently
vitLout a cause, and tLis contradicts tLe dynamical lav ol tLe
determination olall pLenomena. Òr else tLe series itsellvould Le
vitLout a Leginning and tLougL in all its parts contingent and
conditioned yet on tLe vLole aLsolutely necessary and uncon-
ol an aggregate cannot Le a necessary one il no single part olit
possessesnecessaryexistence. FurtLermore, letoneassumetLattLere
is an aLsolutely necessary cause oltLe vorld outside oltLe vorld,
tLen it vouldinitiate tLe existence oltLe cLanges in tLe vorld and
tLeirseries . InLeginningtoactitscausalityvouldLelongtotimeand
LencetotLesumtotalolall pLenomena andLencenotLeoutside ol
tLevorld. JLereloretLereisneitLerintLevorldnoroutsideolitany
aLsolutely necessary Ieing.
JLis antinomy contains, on tLe vLole, tLe same antitLesis as tLe
previous one. WitLtLeconditioneda conditionispositedandindeed
an aLsolute condition, i.e. one vLicL does not Lave its necessity in
sometLingelse Lut is in its ovn sellnecessary. Since, Lovever, itis
connectedvitL tLe conditioneditLelongs itsellto tLe spLere oltLe
conditioned, totLevorld. AccordingtotLelormersideanaLsolutely
necessary Ieing is positedLut according to tLe latteronly a relative
necessity andLence contingency.
IutsincetLeconditionLelongstotLespLereoltLeconditioned, or
ratLer is itselltLisvLolespLere, itisitsellonlya conditioned. JLe
conditioned Las a condition, contains tLe condition in its concept
aLsolutely separate. JLe condition ¸vLicL] contains tLeconditioned
inits conceptisitsellconditioned. JLeconditionedhas aconditionor
is conditioned.
Subjective Logic
Subjective Logic nolongerLas lor its oLject tLecategoryandtLe
determinationolreßectionLutConcepts. JLecategoryisIeingina
determinateness, aslimit vLicL ismediatedLy tLepresuppositionol
an otLer. JLe Concept, on tLe otLer Land, is primary and original
Logic [For the Middle Class] 97
sinceitsdeterminationisitsreßectionintoitsell, inotLervordsitisa
simple vLole vLicL contains its determinations vitLin itsell and
lromvLicLallits determinationsl¡ov.
SuLjective Logic treats oltLree main oLjects,
¸!) The Concept,
¸2) The End,
¸J) The Idea;
¸!) tLe lormal Concept or tLe Concept as sucL,
¸2) tLe £nd, or tLe Concept in relation to its realization or its
¸J) tLe Idea, tLe Real or ÒLjective Concept.
Formal Logic contains.
¸!) The Concept,
¸2) The Judgement,
¸J) The Syllogism.
¸ !) JLe Concept contains tLe moments olIndividuality, Particular-
ity, and Lniversality, it contains tLem as essential and distinct
determinations. At tLe same time tLey are suLlated in it and it is
simple equality vitLitsell
Individuality is tLenegative reßection oltLeConceptintoitsellin
vLicLtLedeterminationsinLereassuLlated, asmoments, andvLicL
itsell, as determined, excludes otLer determinations lromitselloris
aLsolutely determined.
98 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Universality is t
e positive reßection oltLe Concept into itsel�in
vLicLtLeopposed mo·ents do notexcludeoneanotLerLutvLicL
containstLeminitsellsotLattLeyare, attLesametime, indillerentto
it and remain undetermined init.

Particularity is tLe relation to one a

otLer ol Individuality and
Iniversality, itis tLeIniversalpositedin a deternination.
]ust as tLese determinations, as moments ol tLe Concept, are
distinguisLed lrom one anotLer, so too Concepts vitL a dillerent
content are distinguisLed as Concepts ol tLe Iniversal, ol tLe
Particular andoltLe Individual.
underit,justas tLeParticularalso suLsumes tLe Individualunderit.
tLeParticularincludesvitLinit tLe Iniversal.
JLe Individual Las tLe same or still otLer determinations tLan tLe
Particular and tLe Iniversal. JLe same is true ol tLe Particular in
relationto tLe Iniversal. WLattLereloreLoldsgoodoltLe Iniversal
also Lolds good oltLe Particular and tLe Individual andvLat Lolds
good oltLe Particular also Lolds good oltLe Individual, Lut not
Iut tLe Iniversal is more extensive tLan tLe ParticuIar and tLe
Individual and tLe Particular is more extensive tLan tLe Individual.
JLeIniversaltranscendstLeIndividualandtLeParticular. JLatisto
say tLe L

iversal Lelongs not only to tLis Particular and tLis
Individual Lut also to otLers and tLe Particular equally to several
! OO
JLe Particular determinations vLicL are suLsumed under tLe same
Iniversalarecoordinated toeacLotLer. JLesametLingappliesalso to
tLosevLicLLelongtotLesameIndividual. Iut tLosedeterminations
vLicL are coordinated in a Iniversal cannot Le coordinated in an
Individual, it is exclusive.
Logic [For the Middle Class 1 99
JLedeterminationscoordinatedi ntLeIniversalarecontradictory inso
larasoneLastLeessentialmeaningolLeingvLattLeotLerisnot, or
tLeyareopposedaspositiveandnegative. JLeyarecontrari
s ·nsolar
astLeyarepositedasonly dillerentlromoneanotLer, oronestillLas
a positive determinationvLicLis not directly opposedto tLe otLer.
Hovever, tLe contradictorydeterminations necessarily also Lave tLe
\ moment ol indillerence tovards tLe otLers and` tLe contrary
determinations also Lavein tLem tLe moment olÒpposition.
' Contradictory' does not mean merely opposed as sucL, like
positiveandnegative, Lut tLatacontent, animmediacy,is, at th
e same
time, positive andnegativc.
An Òpposite is tLe relerence to an otLer, tLe entire content, tLe
entire determination. ' Relerence' [Beziehung] is Lere at one and tLe
sametimeaLsolute Rel¡ectioninto itsell
! O2
¸2) In tLeJudgement tLe aLsolute unity in vLicL tLe moments are
graspedtogetLerin tLe ConceptissuLlated. It ¸tLe]udgement]is tLe
relation oltLe determinations oltLe Conceptin so lar as eacL at tLe
same time is valid Ly itsellas sell-suLsistent and independent oltLe
otLers .
IntLe[udgement' otLerness' comesinto tLeConcept. ]udgementis
a suLj ective allair, SuLjectandPreoicate appear asindillerent, apart,
externalandareErstLrougLttogetLerLyusexternally. We LaveLere
a SuLjectandLereaPredicatevLicLwe attriLutetotLe SuLject. JLe
]udgementmustLecome objective. In]udgementtLereis a separation
olSuLject and Prcdicate, oltLe matter in Land and reû ection. JLe
]udgement destroys [tatet] tLe Concept.
! OJ
JLe]udgement contains.
¸ !) JLeSuLj ect astLesideolIndividuality orParticularity,
¸2) JLe Predicate as tLe side olIniversality, vLicL is, at tLe same
time, a determinate Iniversality, oralso a Particularityinsolar
as it contains only one ol tLe several determinations ol tLe
¸J) JLe simple con tentless relation vLicL tLe Predicate Las to tLe
SuLject is tLe Copula.
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe kinds ol]udgement indicate tLe dillerent stages in vLicL

olSuLject and Predicate Lecomes an inner relation oltLe �oncept.
¸JLe SuLjectis, Erstly, inimmediateidentityvitLtLePredicate, tLe
tvoareoneandtLesamedeterminatenessolcontent, secondly, tLey
aredistinguisLed onelromtLe otLer. JLeSuLjectisamorecomplex
content tLan tLe aLstract Predicate and is, in regard to lorm,
! O5
In tLe]udgement tLe Predicate¡s immediately a property, namely,
any one oltLe several determinatenesses oltLe SuLject Laving only
tLe immediate lorm olIniversality. Qualitative Judgement.
! Oô
¸ !) Firstve Lave tLePositive Judgement vLensucLaPredicateis
attacLedtotLeSuLject. JLisPredicate contains inrespectolContent
tLe moment oldeterminateness andin respect olFormtLe moment
olIniversality, and tLe]udgement, as regards Content, as


ts. t�e
IndividualisdeterminedtLus, and, asregardsForm.tLeIndividualis
! O7
¸2) JLe ]udgement must also Le negatively expressed in LotL
¸a) JLeIndividualis also notso determined Lut di�lerently,
¸L) JLe Individual is not a Iniversal Lut a Particular. NegatIve
! O8
InLotLrespects tLis]udgementis stillpositive,intLeErst, only one
determinatenessisnegatedLytLeSuLj ect, LutitmayLave anotLerol
tLis Iniversal spLere, in tLe otLer respect tLe negation is only tLe
restriction olIniversality to Particularity.
! O9
JLe Megative, like tLe Identical]udgement, can Le converted.
! ! O
¸c) Hovever, tLeIndividualis a�so not aParticularLut tLeIndividu

is also only an Individual, consequently, not only any one determi-
Logic [For the Middle Class 1 !O!
nateness ola Iniversal spLere Lut every sucL determinateness is
suLlated, and so generallytLe spLereitsell. Infnite Judgement; in
tLe positive lorm as identical, in tLe negative lorm as an aLsurd
! ! !
]udgements olQuantity contain a comparison olseveral SuLjects in
relation to a Predicate. JLe Quantitative Judgement is a singular
vLose SuLject is this tLingand sLould Lave as a Predicate a quality
vLicL Lelongs only to this SuLj ect.
! ! 2
JLe Particular Judgement Las some Predicates lor tLe determi-
nationoltLeSuLj ect, lorvLicLreasonitisstrictlyindeterminateand
vLatLolds goodloranysucLpositive]udgementequallyLoldsgood
! ! J
JLe U ni versal Judgement Las ' allness' lor tLe determinationolits
SuLjectvLicLis consequently a specil¡c Particular SuLject.
Mecessity Legins in tLeIniversal]udgement. Ilall SuLjects Lave
one qualitytLenveLaveMecessity.
Relation o
Judgements or Judgements of Necessity .
! !4
Judgements of Relation express an inner necessary relerence ottLe
PredicatetotLe SuLj ect.
JLe Categorical Judgement Las lor Predicate tLe essence and
generalnature oltLe SuLject.
! ! 5
JLe Hypothetical Judgement contains, along vitL complete
diversity ol tLe content ol SuLject and Predicate, tLeir necessary
relerence to oneanotLer.
! ! ô
Jhe Disjunctive Judgement Las lor its SuLject sometLing as a
IniversalspLere vLicL is expressedin tLe Predicatein its complete
particuIarizationorinitsvariousdeterminations, vLicLtogetLerj ust
as mucL Lelong to tLe Iniversal as tLeyare mutually exclusive in
respectoltLeSuLj ect.
!O2 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Modality of Judgements
! ! 7
JheModality of] udgement consistsinthePredicateexpressingthe
appropriateness or inappropriateness ola SuLject to its Concept or
general nature.
! ! 8
JheAssertoric Judgement containsamereassertion,ins olarasthe
constitutionoltheSuLjectvhichiscomparedvithitsessence, orthis
essence itsell, is not expressed. Hence the]udgement has a merely
suLjective validity.
! ! 9
can equally Le maintained, the ]udgement therelore Lecomes pro
lematic and expresses only the possiLility that a SuLject may ormay
not conlorm to the Concept. [Problematic ] udgement]
! 2O
As a Iniversal, therelore, the SuLj ect is to Le posited vith a
determination vhich contains the constitution in vhich lies the
appropriateness or inappropriateness ol the SuLject to its general
nature. In this vay the SuLject itsell contains this relation olthe
Concept to existence expressed Ly the Predicate. - Apodictic
¸J) Inthe]udgementtvodeterminations olthe Concept are related
immediatelytoeachother. JheSyllogism isthe]udgementvithits
Cround. Jhe tvodeterminationsare connectedinthe SyllogismLy
meansolathirdvhichistheirunity. JheSyllogismis, therelore, the
completepositedness olthe Concept.
! 22
According to the determined lorm, the tvo extremes ol the
Syllogism are the Individual and the Iniversal, and the Particular,
sinceinitthesetvo determinations areunited, istheirmiddleterm.
¸Il a determination A Lelongs to a determination B, Lut the
determination B Lelongs to a determination C, then the determi-
nation A Lelongs to C. )
Logic [For the Middle Class]
Jherelationolthetvoextremes (termini extremi) olthe Syllogism to
the Niddle Jerm is an immediate relation and is a tvolold one. It
lorms tvo ]udgements (propositiones praemissae) , each ol vhich
contains the moment ol Particularity, the Niddle Jerm (terminus
medius) . Jhe one premiss contains, moreover, thc extrersre ol
Iniversality (terminus major) as Predicate (propositio major) ; theother
contains the extreme ol Individuality (terminus minor) as SuLject
(propositio minor) ; the relation olthe tvo extremes, the Conclusion
(conclusio) , is Nediated.
Jhe Nediation in the Syllogism presupposes an immediate relation
and, oLversely, the immediate relation is grounded therein and
mediated, itis consequently presentin the Concept as an indetermi-
nateness , vhich in itsellis Nediation.
In the End that vhich is mediated or the result, is at the same time
an immediate Erst orground. What is produced, orposited through
mediation, hastheactolproducinganditsimmediatedetermination
lorpresupposition, and, conversely, theactolproducinghappenson
accountoltheresultvhichistheground, andhenceisitselltheErst
determination olthe activity.
Jhe Teleological Act is a syllogism in vhich the same vhole in
suLjective lorm is Lrought into unity vith its oLjective lorm, the
Concept vith its reality, through the mediation ol Jeleological
Activity, orthe concept is ground ola reality determinedLy it.
£xternal Purposiveness exists in so lar as something possesses its
concept, not initsell, Lut is linked toitLyanother, Lyan end, asits
Jhere is Internal Purposiveness vhen an existence has its concept
vithinitsellandatthesametimeisend, meansandsell-realizingand
realized £ndinits ovn sell
! O4 The Phi losophical Propaedeutic
! 29
JLeIdea istLe unity oltLeConcept andReality, tLeConceptinso
lar as it determines its ovn Reality or Actuality vLicL is vLat it
ougLt toLeand vLicL itsellcontains its Concept.
! JO
¸a) JLe Idea, in so lar as tLe Conceptis immediately united vitL its
Reality and does not, attLe sametime, distinguisLitselllromit and
raiseitsellout olit, isLife. JLe sameexLiLitedasliLeratedlromall
tLe conditions and limitations olcontingent existenceis tLeBeauti­
ful .
¸L)I ntLeIdeaolCognitionandPracticalActivitytLeConceptstands
opposedtoReality, ortLesuLj ectivetotLeoLjective, andtLeirunion
isLrougLtaLout. InCognition, RealityliesattLeLasisastLefirst and
as£ssence, tovLicLtLeConceptistomakeitsellconlorminorderto
LeJrutL, PracticalActivity, on tLe otLerLand, Las tLe Concept, as
good may LeLrougLt aLout.
! J2
¸c) JLe aLsolute Idea is tLe content ol Science, namely, tLe
consideration ol tLe universe as in aLsolute conlormity vitL tLe
Concept, ortLeConceptolReason, asitisin-and-lor-itsellandasit
is in tLe oLjective orreal vorld.
, I
[For the Higher Class]
Objective Logic istLeScienceoltLeConceptin itself ortLeScience
oltLe Categories . Subjective Logic, olvLicLve treatLere, is tLe
ScienceoltLeConceptasConceptoroltLeConceptolsometLing. It
is dividedintotLreeparts.
(1) The Science of the Concept
¸2) The Science of its Realization
¸J) The Science of the Idea.
JLeConcept istLeIniversalvLicLisattLesametimedeterminate,
tLat vLicL remains in its determination is tLe same WLole or
Iniversal orit is tLe determinateness vLicL grasps togetLer vitLin
itselltLe dillerent determinations olan oLject as a unity.
JLe moments ol tLe Concept are Iniversality, Particularity and
Individuality. JLe Concept is tLeirunity.
JLe Universal is tLis unity as a positive, sell-equal indeterminate
unity, tLeParticular is tLe determinationoltLeIniversalLut sucL
tLat it is suLlated in tLe Iniversal, i. e. tLe Iniversal remains in it
vLatit is, Individuality is tLenegativeunity ortLedetermination
vLicL gatLers itsellup into a unityLydeterminingitsell
!Oô The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Jhe Iniversal includes under it the Particular and Individual, so
likevise the Particularincludes underit the Individual, on tLe other
handtheIndividualincludesin it theParticularandtheIniversaland
the Particular includes in it the Iniversal. Jhe Iniversal is more
extensive than the Particular or Individual Lut the latter are more
comprehensive than the Iniversal, vhich lor the reason that it is
includedin theIndividual, is againa determinateness. JheIniversal
inheres in the Particular and Individual vhile the latter are subsumed
underthe Iniversal.
Since the Concept contains in itsellthe moments olIndividuality,
ParticularityandIniversality, itis variouslydeterminedvithregard
to its content and is the comprehension olsomething Individual,
Particular or Iniversal.
Jhe particularization ol the Iniversal, i. e. determinations vhich
have one and the same common sphere, these, and likevise the
Individuals vhich are suLsumed under the same Particular or
Iniversal, aresaidtoLecoordinate. WhatissuLsumedisalsosaidtoLe
subordinate tothat under vhichitissuLsumed.
Jhe coordinated Particular determinations ol the Iniversal are
opposedtooneanotherand, vhenoneistakenas thenegativeolthe
other, they are contradictory, Lut vhen the other also has positivity,
and through this lalls vithin the same general sphere as the lormer,
theyare opposedmerelyas contraries. Suchdeterminations, coordin-
ated in the Iniversal, cannot coexist in the Individual, Lut those
erent, i. e. they
do nothave in their dillerence the same general sphere, and in their
harmony vith the Individual are in accord.
Jhe coordinate determinations olthe Iniversal considered in more
detail are ¸a) the one is thenegativeolthe otherin general, vithout
not, and, insolar as they have the same spherein common andthe
one determination is positive the other negative, so that this
negativity tovard each other constitutes their nature, they are ¸L)
The Science of the Concept !O7
properlytermedContradictories; insolarastheystandinoppositionin
thesamecommonsphereor the oneis alsopositiveinthe samesense
as the other, and each consequently canLecalledpositive as vellas
negative in relation to the other, they are ¸c) Contraries.
! O
Withthedeterminationol Contrariety,vhichisindillerentas regards
theantithesisolpositiveandnegative, theyareno longer determined by
an other Lut are determined in-andlor-themselves vhereLy the mutual
participation ol the same sphere has vanished and individuality
imposed, vhose determinations diller lrom each other vithout a
common sphere and are thereLy determinedin-and-lor-themselves .
! !
JheJudgement is thepresentationol anoLjectas unloldedinto the
threemoments oltheConcept. Itcontainsit ¸a) inthedetermination
olIndividualityasSubject; ¸L)initsdeterminationolIniversalityor
its Predicate, vhereLy the suLj ect can also standin relation to the
Predicateitsellas Individuality toParticularity andasParticularityto
Iniversality, ¸c) inthesimplecontentless relationolthePreuicateto
the SuLj ect, the is, the Copula.
Jhe]udgementi stoLe distinguished lromthe Proposition: i nthe
latter something quite individual, an occurrence, is allirmed ol a
SuLj ect or also, asin generalpropositions, somethingis allirmed ol
the SuLj ect as having a necessary connection vith it and vhich it
Lecomes orto vhichit essentially standsinopposition. Sinceinthe
Concept the moments are grasped as in a unity so too in the
]udgement as in the presentation olthe Concept, although there is
determination, there is no Lecoming or antithesis . Jhe inlerior
determination, the SuLj ect, rises to the Iniversality vhich dillers
lromit, i. e. to the Predicate, oris itimmediately.
! J
I n Logic the ]udgement i s considered according t o its pure lorm
vithout regard to any speciEc empirical content. ]udgements are
classiEedLytherclationinvhichthe SuLj ectandPredicatestandto
isarelationoloLj ectivitytotheConcept. Lponthecharacterolthis
!O8 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
relation depends the higher or aLsolute Jruth ol the ]udgement.
Truth is the agreement olthe Concept vith its oLjectivity. In the
]udgement there Legins this presentation ol the Concept and its
oLjectivity and vith it the sphere olJruth.
I nasmuch asthe]udgementi sthe presentation olanoLjecti nthe
dillerent moments olthe Concept so, conversely, it is the presen-
tationolthe Conceptinits existence, notsomuchonaccountolthe
speciEc content vhichthemoments olthe ConcepthaveasLecause,
inthe]udgement, theselatterissuelorthlromtheirunity.]ustasthe
vhole ]udgement presents the Concept in its existence so this
dillerence Lecomes again the lorm ol the ]udgement itsell Jhe
SuLjectistheoLj ectandthePredicateistheIniversalityolthesame
vhichis to express it as Coucept. Jhe movement olthe]udgcment
throughits dillerent kinds raises thisIniversalityto a higher stage,
loritin solar as itis simply a Predicate.
A Quality of Judgements, or the Judgement of Inherence
! 5
Jhe Predicate i n the most elementary [unmittelbar] lorm ol the
]udgement is a property vhich Lelongs to the SuLject in such a
manner thatalthoughitstandsinrelationtoitasIniversalingeneral
yet, atthe same time, itis only a Particular existence olit vhich, as
such, has several determinatenesses. Iniversality, thePredicate, has
herethemeaning onlyolan immediate ¸orsensuous) Iniversality, a
mere possessionin common vith others.

In the Qualitative Judgement the Predicate is just as vell
something Iniversal, vhich side constitutes the lorm ol the
]udgement, as a specil¡c quality ol the suLject, vhich appears as
content. Accordingtothelormersidethe]udgementtakesasitspure
Form: ' theIndividualisaIniversal' , accordingtothelatter, andthe
Content: ' theIndividualisdeterminedthus' , andthisisthePositive
Judgement in general. ¸ ' Jhis is good' , 'Jhis is Lad' , 'Jhis rose is
red' , ' Jhis roseis vhite' , etc. )
Forthereasonthat ¸a) theIndividuali sequallynotIniversaland¸L)
the SuLjecthas otherdeterminationsLesides this one, the Qualitative
The Science of the Concept ! O9
]udgementmustalsoLe expressednegativelyinLothrespects, hence
arises the Negative Judgement. ¸' Jhis is not good' , 'Jhis is not
Lad' , 'Jhis roseis not red Lut vhite ¸or] yellov, etc. ' , 'Jhis roseis
notvhite Lutred' , etc. )
! 8
Accordingt oForm, therelore, this]udgementis . The Individual is not
a Universal but a Particular; accordingtoContent: The Individual is not
thus but otherwise determined. InLothrespectsthisMegative]udgement
is at the same time also Positive. In the Erst respect the negation is
only the limitation olthe Iniversality to Particularity, in the other
respect only some one determinateness is negated and through this
negationtheIniversality, oritshighersphere, makesitsappearance.
Finally, according toForm, the Individuali snot a mere Particular,
lor Particularity is more extensive than Individuality, Lut the
Individual is only the Individual and this is the Identical J udge­
Conversely, according to Contentthe SuLj ectis notonlynot this
Particular determinateness, Lut also not merely any other determi-
nateness. Sucha contentis toonarrovlorthe SuLject. Jhroughthis
negationolthedeterminatenesstheentiresphereolthePredicate and
the positive relation vhich suLsisted in the preceding Megative
]udgementis suLlated and this gives theInfnite Judgement.
Jhat Identical as vell as the InEnite ]udgements are no longer
]udgements. Morepreciselythismeans thattherelationvhichexists
Letveen the SuLj ect and Predicate in the Qualitative]udgement is
one oltheimmediatedetcrminatenesses olits Ieing, a determinate-
ness to vhich Lelonged onI y a superEcial generality. In the InEnite
]udgement a Iniversality is demanded vhich is not only a single
determinateness. Jhe alore-mentioned Identical ]udgement states
that the SuLject is determined in-and-lor-itselland in its determi-
nationhas returned into itsell.
IntheIdenticalandInEnite]udgementsthemutualrelationolSuLj ect
andPredicateis suLlated. Jhisis to LctakenErst as thatsideolthe
]udgement according to vhich SuLjectandPredicate, Leing aLstracted
! !O The Philosophical Propaedeutic
lromtLeirdillerenceLytLeCopula, canLeregardedasstandingina
relation ol identity. In tLis respect tLe Positive ]udgement can
Lecomeinverted in so lar as tLe Predicate is taken only in tLe same
extent olmeaning as tLe SuLjectis.
lrom its SuLj ect in sucL a manner tLat tle SuLject is still related
positivelytotLeIniversal, tLougLnotexpresslystated, spLereoltLe
determinateness. WLeretLenegatedPredicateismadetLesuLjecttLat
Iniversal spLere lalls avay andleaves only tLenon-identity oltvo
determinationsingeneralanditisindillerentvLicLoltLemis made
SuLject or vLicL Predicate. JLe Megative]udgement, and also tLe
Identical]udgement, can tLereloreLe inverted vitLout altering it.
B Quantity of Judgements, or Judgements of Relection
VLere judgements can Le inverted tLc distinction ol SuLj ect and
Predicate is ignored. JLis distinction, Lovever, since it is nov
suLlated as qualitative, is toLetaken Quartitatively.
Since tLe single determinatenesses vLicL tLe Predicate contained
cancel tLemselves tLe Predicate Las to include tLe manilold deter-
minations oftLe SuLject taken togetLer. JLrougL tLis circumstance
tLeuniversality ceasestoLeamerecommunity [eine blosse Gemeil1schajt­
eit] vitL otLers . Itis tLe SuLj ect's own universality, vLicL tLus
implies tLat tLe SuLject Las returned into itsellin its predicate.
SucLajudgementisconsequentlyaJudgement of Refection, since
Reûection generally implies advancing to several determinations ol
anoLj ectandgraspingtLemtogetLerin a unity.

In so lar as tLeidentityoltLe SuLject vitL tLe Predicate makcs its
appearancetLe SuLjectis a Iniversal vLicLis SuLject tLrougLl¡rst
conEningittoIndividuality JLeQualitative]udgementistLerelorea
singular vLicL Las in tLe determination ol tLe SuLj ect complete
Individuality andis this Iniversal.
The Science of the Concept ! ! !
AThis isdeterminedininl¡nitelymaniloldvays,i . e. itisindeEnitely
determinaLle. JLe Predicate ol Reßection, since it is a complex,
expresses not only tLe generaldeterminationolone JLis Lut also ol
other JLis' s, tLatis to say, tLe Singular]udgement passes overinto
tLe Particular gudgement] .
JLe Particular ]udgement, in vLicL tLe SuLj ect is determined as
some, is only a Ieterminate ]udgement vLicL can Le expressed
immediatelyj ustas vellpositively as negatively.
JLe SuLjectreceivesits completedetermination, accordingtoextent
ollorm, tLrougLAll-ness intLeIniversal]udgement. SinceAll-ness
entersinplaceolParticularity, andLasattLesametimetLeextentol
tLe latter, tLe extent oltLe content oltLe SuLject must Le limited
JLe SuLject Lecomes tLrougL tLis partly a Particular as regards its
Predicate, partly tLere enters a relation olnecessityLetveen SuLject
C Relation of Judgements, or Judgements of Necessity
tionstLeunity of the content olSuLjectandPredicateisposited, vLicL
latter tLereloredif
er only through their form, sotLattLesameoLjectis
posited at one time merely as SuLject, at anotLer as Predicate.
converselytLe Subject is now, in contradistinctionto tLe Qualitative
]udgement, a determinateness o
f the Predicate and immediately suL-
sumed under ¸it] . JLe Iniversality ol tLe Predicate expresses ,
tLerelore, not merely acomplexoldeterminatenesses oltLeSuLj ect,
liketLePredicateolReßection, LuttLeIniversalinnernatureoltLe
suLject, and tLis is tLe Categorical Judgement. ¸' JLe Lody is
Leavy. ' ' Cold is a n+etal. ' ' Nindis rational. ' )
! ! 2 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
In so lar as SuLj ect and Predicate are also distinguisLed tLeir unity
mustalsoLeexpressedasunity of contraries, i . e. asanecessary relation,
and tLis is tLe Hypothetical Judgement.
JLeIdentityolcontent, vLicLisloundintLeCategorical]udgement
and tLe Relation ol contraries to otLers in tLe HypotLetical
]udgement, is united in tLe Disjunctive Judgement, in vLicL tLe
SuLjectisa IniversalspLere oris considered in regard tosucLaone
and tLis ¸Iniversal spLere] constitutes tLe Predicate, and tLe
Particularization or various determinations oltLe Predicate express
tLis . ÒltLese tLe one as vell as tLe otLerLelongs to tLe Iniversal.
According to tLeir Particularization and in respect to tLe suLj ect,
Lovever, tLeyexclude each other.
D Modality of Judgements, or Judgements of the Relation of the Concept
to Existence
In tLeIisjunctive]udgement an existenceispositedin tLe complete
momentsoltLeConcept. Modality of Judgements consistsintLis.
tLat an existent tLing is related to its Concept as sucL and tLe
Predicateexpresses tLe appropriatenes or inappropriateness oltLe tvo.

JLe l¡rst]udgement olNodality is tLe Assertorical I udgement]
vLicL contains a mere assurance in as mucL as only tLe constitution or
nature oltLe SuLj ect vLicL is to Le compared vitL tLe Concept is
expressedand nottLeConceptitsell, Lence tLisjudgementLas atErst
only a suLjective conErmation. ¸' JLis deed is Lad' , 'JLis remark is
AgainsttLe assurance oltLe Assertorical]udgement, tLerelore, tLe
opposite proposition may j ust as vell Le asserted, tLe Predicate
expresses only one oltLose opposite determinatenesses olvLicL tLe
suLject, considered as a Iniversal spLere, contains Loth. Jhis
judgement, tLerelore, passes over into tLe Problematical Iudge­
ment] , vhicL expresses merely tLepossibility olthe conlormity or
non-conlormity oltLegivenexistence to tLeConcept.
The Science of the Concept ! ! J
JLe Lniversality ol tLe SuLject is, tLerelore, posited vitL a
conlormity or non-conlormity ol tLe given existence vitL tLe
Concept. JLe Predicate expresses noìLing else tLan tLis identity or
non-identity oltLe constitution or nature and tLe Concept oltLe
oLject. JLisis tLeApodictic Judgement.
JLe Syllogism is tLe complete exLiLition ol tLe Concept. It
contains, assucL,The Judgement with its Ground. JLereareinit
tvo determinations vLicL are united Ly means ola tLirdvLicL is
tLeirunity. Itis a Conceptpresentasaunity¸tLemiddletermoltLe
Syllogism) andin its diremption ¸tLe extremes oltLe Syllogism) .
JLerelationoltLe tvo extremesoltLe SyllogismtotLemiddle term
is an immediate one, tLeir relation to eacL otLer, Lovever, is
mediatedtLrougL tLemiddle term. JLelormer, tLetvoimmediate
relations, are tLe j udgements vLicL are called Premisses. JLe
relationvLicLis mediatedis called tLe Conclusion.
In tLe Erst place tLe Syllogism expresses its moments tLrough tLe
mereform in sucL a manner tLat tLe middle term is a peculiar
determinatenessas opposedto tLeextremes andtLegroundorunity
oltLe moments is still a merelysubjective one. JLat vLicLis really
primary is intLis case deduced andLas tLe signiEcation ola result.
A Syllogisms of Quality or of Inherence
JLe lorm ol tLis Syllogism I-P-U ¸Individual-Particular÷
Iniversal) , tLattLeIndividual isconnectedvitL tLe Universal tLrougL
tLeParticular, istLegeneralruleoltLeSyllogismassucL. IntLeErst,
immediate, Syllogism,tLeParticularorthemiJdletermisaquality or
determinateness oltLe Individual and likevise tLe Iniversal is a
determinateness oltLePartic
lar. JLereloreatransitioncanLemade
lrom tLe Individual tLrougL another one olits determinations, ol
vLicLithasseveral, to anotLer Iniversal and solikevise lrom tLe
Particular to anotLer Iniversal, since tLe Particular also contains
! !4 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
vitLin itsell dillerent determinations . Accordingly tLis Syllogism
doesappeartoLecorrectsolarasitsform is concernedLutaccording
toits content isarLitraryandcontingent. ¸' Creenis apleasantcolour,
tLislealis green, Lenceitis pleasant. ' ' JLesensuous isneitLergood
norLad, Lut manis a sensuous Leing, Lence Le is neitLer goodnor
Lad. ' ' Iraveryisavirtue,AlexanderpossessedLravery,LenceLevas
virtuous. ' ' Irunkenness is a vice, Alexander vas addicted to
drunkenness, Lence Le vas vicious . ' etc. )
According to lorm tLe tvo premisses are immediate connections .
JLelormoltLe Syllogismcontains, Lovever, tLedemand tLat tLey
sLould also be mediated or, according to tLe common expression, tLe
premisses sLould Leproved. Iut tLe prooltLrougL tLis lorm oltLe
Syllogism vouldLeonly a repetition oltLatlormand tLus tLe same
demand vould recur again ad inf
JLe mediation, tLat is ol Particularity and Iniversality, must
tLerelore Le LrougLt aLout tLrougL tLe moment olIndividuality.
JLisgivestLesecondlormoltLeSyllogism. U-I-P. JLis Syllogism
is correct in tLe l¡rst place only in so lar as tLejudgement U-I Las
validity. InordertLattLismayLetLe case U mustLeParticular. In
tLis vaytLeIndividualisnotreallytLemiddleterm. JLeSyllogism
is LrougLt Lack to tLe lorm ol tLe Erst Lut tLe conclusion is
Particular. JLis SyllogismLasLovever, ingeneral, tLesigniEcation,
in contradistinction to tLe otLer, tLat immediate determinations or
JLeIndividual connected vitL tLeParticular tLrougLtLe Universal
gives tLetLirdlormoltLeSyllogism. P-U-I. JLe Iniversal is Lere
tLemediatingdeterminationandinLotLpremissestLePredicate. Iut
inLere in tLe same Individual, it lollovs ratLer tLat tLe tvo
determinations aresuLsumedundertLe sameIniversalandnottLat
tLey can Le linked as SuLj ect and Predicate. Ònly in so lar as tLe
maj or premiss is negative, and tLerelore can Le inverted, does tLis
correct lorm. ¸' Mo Enite Leing is Loly, Cod is no Enite Leing,
tLerelore Cod is Loly. ' )
The Science of the , Concept ! ! 5
JLe oLjective signiEcation ol tLis Syllogism is tLat tLe union ol
Particularity vitL Individuality Las its ground onlyin tLe identical
nature oltLe tvo.
IntLeseries oltLese Syllogisms eacL oltLetLreedetern+inations Las
in succession constituted tLe middle term. JLe reduction ol tLe
second andtLirdsyllogisticlorms is tLesublating oltLc Qualitative.
AltLougL eacL immediate relation ol tLe Erst Syllogism is
mediated Ly tLesucceeding ones, yeteacLoltLelatter presupposes
tLeprecedingone, i. e. tLemediatedunitypresupposestLeimmediate
B Syllogisms of Quantity or Reflection
JLe immediate non-qualitative Syllogism is tLe Mathematical
Syllogism. JLemiddle term oltLis Syllogismisonlya termtLatis
equal to tLe tvo otLers. As a propositionitis expressedtLus. Iltvo
magnitudes are equal to a tLird, tLey are equal to eacL otLer.
Secondly, in tLe Quantitative Syllogism, Individuality, notas one
IndividualLutasall Individuals, constitutestLemiddleterm. Insolar
as some one qualityLelongs toall tLis qualityisexpressedas quality
oltLatIniversalspLereoroltLegenus itselftovLicLtLeIndividuals
Lelong. JLis is tLe Syllogism of Induction.
JLe Syllogism in vLicL tLe Universal is tLe middle term inlers
tLrougL analogy tLat, in tLe case oltvo suLjects vLicL aretLe same
according to tLeir general determinations, aParticulardetermination
vLicL Lelongs to onealso Lelongs to tLe otLer.
¸a) Several Individuals Lave a common nature,
¸L) One of the Individuals has a certain quality;
¸c) JLerelore tLe otLer Individuals tooLavetLis quality. )
¸In tLe case olInduction tLe question arises vLat ougLt t oLe tLe
SuLject orPredicatein tLe conclusion, e.g. 'WLat moves itsellvitL
lreedom is an animal` , or 'An animal is vLat moves itsell vitL
lreedom. ' ' JLelionisamammal' , or' WLatamammalis, isalion. 'In
1 1 6 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
tLe case olAnalogy, on tLe contrary, tLe mediation lies in tLe lact
tLat anotLerIndividualLas tLe same common nature. WLile in tLe
case ol Induction tLe Particular determinateness ol tLe common
nature is grounded in tLe Individual, Analogy inlers lrom tLe
commonnaturetLeParticulardeterminatenessoltLeIndividual, e.g.
' JLeeartLLasmotion, tLemooni saneartL, tLerelore1LemoonLas
motion. ' ']upiterandtLe£artLareplanets, tLe£artLLasinLaLitants,
tLerelore]upiter LasinLaLitants .')
C Syllogisms of Relation
JLeCategorical Syllogism LaslormiddletermtLeIniversalityor
tLe nature oltLe Individual suLject, olvLicL as sucL an essential
property is expressed andis linked vitL tLis suLject.
JLe Hypothetical Syllogism expresses as tLe ground ol an
existenceanotLerexistence. IlA is, tLenB is. LutA is,thereloreB is .
JLedeterminationsarenolongerinrelationasIndividual, Particular
andIniversal, Luta determination, B, vLicLintLel¡rstplaceisonly
implicit, orpossiLle,isconnectedvitLexistencetLrougLA asmiddle
term vLicLis existent as vell as ground.
In tLe Disjunctive Syllogism tLe ground tLat a determination is
connected vitL a SuLj ect consists in tLis. tLat one part ol tLe
Particular determinations ola Iniversal �pLere do not Lelong to it
andconsequentlytLerest doLelongtoitor, vLentLedetermination
isseparatedlromtLesuLject, converselyA is eitLe:B, C, orD Lutit
is notB or C; tLereloreitis D.
' .
JLemiddletermis tLereloretLe SuLj ectas a IniversalspLereinits
complete Particularization and contains, at tLe same time, tLe
excluding or positing ol a part ol tLese its determinations . JLe
SuLjectasa IniversalisinitselltLepossiLilityolseveraldetermina-
tions . From its Iniversality orpossiLility a transition is made to its
determinateness or actuality.
From a survey oltLe lorms oltLe Syllogism ve see tLat.
( 1) In tLe Qualitative Syllogisms tLe moments Lavevalidityin tLeir
The Science of the Concept 1 1 7
qualitative dillerence. JLey need tLerelore a mediating link
vLicL is tLeir immediate unity Lut tLis lalls outside oltLem.
(2) In tLe Quantitative Syllogisms tLe qualitative dillerence oltLe
moments is suppressed and vitL it tLe mutual relation and tLe
dillerence olmediated andimmediate are oLliterated.
(3) IntLe Syllogisms olRelation tLe mediation contains attLe same
timeimmediacy. FromtListLereloreLasemergedtLeConceptol
anImmediacyolnatureorolqualitativedillerencevLicL, attLe
sametime, is aLsolutemediation, end andprocess .
In ]udgement, as in tLe Syllogism, tLe Concept is in immediate
reality,intLeindillerentexistenceoltLeSuLjectandpredicate, ortLe
extremes ol tLe Syllogism are opposed to eacL otLer and to tLe
middle term. JLe Objective consists in tLis. tLat tLese moments
LecomeintLemselvestLeWLole, sotLattLeirImmediacyisprecisely
tLis, toLetLe WLole.
IntLeEnd tLatvLicLis outcome andresultis attLesame time tLe
immediately active ground. Itis, as sometLing suLjective, separated
lromtLeexternalexistencevLicLispresentandtLeactivity consists
in tLe translation ol tLe suLj ective lorm into oLjectivity. In tLis
transition tLe £nd returnsinto its Concept.
JLe Syllogism ol tLe purposive act Las tLree moments. ( 1) tLe
suLjective£nd, (2) mediationand(3) tLerealized£nd. £acL oltLese
momentsis tLe totality oltLe determinations oltLe Syllogism.
( 1) JLesubjective £ndcontains. ¸a)tLeindeterminatefree activity ola
SuLject in general, vLicL ¸L) determines itsellor Particularizes its
Iniversality and gives itsell a specihc content, and ¸c) it Las tLe
moment olIndividuality, in accordance vitL vLicL it is negative
tovarditsell, sublates tLesubjective andproduces anexteral existence
independent oltLe suLj ect.
1 1 8 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
(2) Mediation ortLetransitionintooLj ectivityLastvosidesinit. ¸a)
tLatolObjectivity; tLisisanexternaltLingasmeans, vLicL, putunder
externalexistence, ¸L) tLesideolSubjectivity istLemediatingactivity
vLicL,ontLeoneLand, LringstLemeansintorelationtotLe£ndand
suLordinates it tLereto and, on tLe otLer Land, turns it against tLe
ÒtLer and Ly cancelling tLe determinations oltLe externality gives
tLe£nd a real existence.
(3) JLerealized £ndis. ¸a) existenceoltLeoLjectivityingeneral, ¸L)
not, Lovever, only an immediate £xistence Lut a posited and
mediatedone and ¸c) oltLe samecontent as tLe £nd.
JLe delect oltLis teleologicalrelation is tLe immediate existence ol
eacL oltLe tLree moments vLicL enter into relation, lor vLicL,
tLerelore, tLerelation andtLe determinationsvLicL tLose moments
receiveinitareexternallyLrougLttogetLer. JLeentiremovementol
tLisrealizationoltLeConceptis tLerelorealtogetLerasubjective Act.
As objective Act, tLerealization is tLeProcess as inner relation oltLe
moments ol tLe Syllogism according to tLeir peculiar nature. In
Process actual oLjects stand in relation as independent extremes,
vLose inner determination Lovever is tLat it is tLrougL tLe
mediation olotLers andis linked vitL tLem.
( 1) In tLe Sphere of Mechanism oLj ects areunitedoralteredLy a
tLird lorce so tLat tLis union oralterationdoesnot lieintLeirnature
LeloreLandLutisexternalorcontingenttotLemand, consequently,
tLey remaininitindependent oleacL otLer.
(2) IntLeChemical spLereeacLoltLetvoexremesis. ¸a) adetermi-
nate existence [Dasein] vLicL, at tLe same time, is essentially opposed
to tLe otLer, ¸L) asin opposition in itse
a relationto tLe otLer. Itis
not only itsellLut it is determined as sometLing vLicL exists only in
unionvitLtLeotLer, oritsnatureistensedvitLinitsellandactivated
againsttLeotLer. ¸c) JLeunityoltLeextremesistLeneutral Product
vLicLconstitutestLe groundoltLeirrelationandoltLeirentryinto
tLe process Lut tLis unity is present in tLem only as an implicit
The Science of the Concept 1 1 9
relation. Itdoesnot existlreelyloritsellanteriortotLeprocess. JLis
is tLe case in Jeleology.
(3) JLeLigLer unity is tLerelore tLattLeactivity maintains its�l�in
tLeProduct, ortLatthe Product is se
-producing, LencetLeneutralizing
oltLe moments is equally tLeir diremption, ortLeextinguisLing ol
tLe process in tLe union oltLe extremes is at tLe same time tLe
rekindling ol it. JLe activity ol tLis productive Product is con-
sequently Self-Maintenance. It produces only itsell and yet it
already exists .
JLe Idea is tLe oLj ectively Jrue or tLe adequate Concept in vLicL
existence is determined Ly its Immanent Concept and in vLicL
£xistence, as sell-producingproduct, is in an externalunityvitL its
£nd. JLeIdeaisnotanactualityvLicLcorrespondstosomeexternal
notion or otLer Lut one vLicL corresponds to its ovn Concept,
vLicL, tLerelore, isinsucLalormasitougLttoLein-and-lor-itsell
andcontains tLis its Concept. JLeIdeal istLeIdeaconsideredlrom
tLe side ol£xistence Lut as an existence vLicL conlorms to tLe
Concept. Itis, tLerelore, tLe Actual in its LigLest trutL. In contra-
consideredlromtLe side oltLe Concept.
JLerearetLree Ideas.
( 1) The Idea of Life;
(2) The Idea of Cognition and of the Good, and
(3) The Idea of Science orolTruth itsell.
Life istLeIdeainitsimmediateexistencevLereLyitenterstLeEeld
olAppearance or olIeing vLicL is cLangeaLle and variously and
externally determined and conlronts aninorganic Mature.
120 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
andintLeWLoleandequallytLeWLoleis tLrougLtLeParts. Itisan
organic System.
In tLis IdeatLeConceptandActuality lall asunder. JLelormer, on
tLe one Land, empty Ly itsell, is to receive its determination and
EllinglromActuality,ontLeotLerLand, ActualitysLouldreceiveits
determination lromtLeindependent determination oltLeConcept.
A Cognition
Cognition i s tLe relation ol tLe Concept and Actuality. JLe
JLinking, vLicL in-itsellis Elled only vitL itselland is in so lar
empty, Lecomes, tLrougL Cognition, replete vitL a particular
content andtLis is raisedlrom¸mere] £xistenceto a moreuniversal
Defnition expresses, olanoLjectvLicLstandsinrelationtoitasan
individual or a particular, its genus as its universal £ssence and tLe
particular determinateness tLereoltLrougL vLicLit is this oLject.
Classifcation expresses olagenus oruniversalingeneral, arace, or
an order, etc. , tLeparticulars invLicLitexistsas a maniloldness ol
species . JLeseparticularizationsvLicLarecontainedinaunitymust
llovlroma common groundoldivision.
Cognition is partly Analytical, partly SyntLetical.
Analytical Cognition proceeds lrom a Concept, or a concrete
determination, anddevelopsonlytLemaniloldnessoltLeimmediate
oridentical simpledeterminations vLicL aretLerein contained.
The Science of the Concept 1 21
Synthetical Cognition, on tLe contrary, develops tLe determina-
llovlromitinanidentityLutLavetLelormol' dillerence' tovards
eacL otLer and it ¸syntLesis] sLovs tLe necessity ol tLeir speciEc
relationto eacL otLer.
JLis Lappens tLrougL Construction and Proof Construction
exLiLitstLeConceptorproposition, partlyinitsrealdeterminations,
partly onLeLalloltLeprool, itexLiLits tLisitsrealityinitsdivision
ProoltakesuptLedissolvedPartsandproduces, tLrougLcomparison
oltLeir relations to one anotLer, tLat union oltLem vLicL in tLe
JLeoremconstitutestLeexpressedrelationoltLeWLole. ÒritsLovs
in tLeir reciprocal relation tLe Conceptinits totality.
In tLis Cognition, vLicL in its strictest lorm is tLe geometrical, ¸a)
tLe construction does not proceed lrom tLe Concept Lut is a
contrivancetLat Las LeendiscoveredvLicLsLovsitselltoLeadopted
vitL special relerence to tLe prool, in otLer cases it is only an
empirical description. ¸L) In tLe Prool, instead olanalytical deter-
minations otLervise vellknovn orsettled, syntLetical propositions
are LrougLt in lrom outside and tLe suLj ect matter under consider-
ationsuLsumedorunitedundertLem. JLeProoltLereLyreceivestLe
appearance ol contingency since it presents lor insigLt only a
necessity ¸and] not tLe oLj ect' s ovn process and innernecessity.
B The Ought or the Good
In tLe Idea olCognition tLe Concept is sougLt and it ougLt to Le
adequate to tLe oLject. Conversely in tLe Idea ol tLe Cood tLe
Conceptcountsasprimaryandas tLeimplicit£ndvLicLought toLe
realizedin Actuality.
1 22 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe Implicit Good, since i t Las yet t o Le realized, stands in
opposition to a vorldand a Mature vLicL does not correspondtoit
andvLicLLasitsovnlavs olnecessityandis, tLerelore, indi
erent to
tLelavs ollreedom.
JLeIntrinsically Good isanaLsolute£ndin-itselltoLecarriedout
vitLout any regard to consequences since it Las committed to its
At tLe same time, Lovever, it is implied tLat in-itsell Actuality
harmonizes vitLtLeCood, ortLattLereislaitLinamoralorderoltLe
Absolute Knowing is tLe Concept vLicL Las itselllor oLject and
content and consequently is its ovnreality.
JLeProcessortLeMethod oltLeALsoluteKnovingisLotLanalytical
and syntLetical. JLe development ol vLat is contained in tLe
Concept, Analysis, istLeevolutionoldillerentdeterminationsvLicL
arecontainedintLeConceptLutarenot as sucLimmediately given,
andlortLisreasontLeprocedureisattLesametimcsyntLetical. JLe
exposition oltLe Concept in its real determinations Lereproceeds
lrom tLe Concept itsell, and vLat constitutes tLe proolin ordinary
outoltLediversityinto vLicL tLey Lave gone,tLisresultistLerelore
Totality: tLe Concept vLicL Las Lecome lulElled and is its ovn
JLis mediation oltLe Concept vitL itsellis not only a Process of
Subjective Cognition Lut equally the own inner movement of the subject
matter itself In ALsolute Cognition tLe Concept is equally tLe
beginning andis also tLe result.
The Science of the Concept
1 23
JLe progress to lurtLer Concepts, or to a nev spLere, is likevise
guided and necessary Ly vLat Las preceded. JLe Concept vLicL
Lecame reality is at tLe same time again a unity vLicL must exLiLit
tLemovement oltLerealizationinitsell IuttLe developmentoltLe
antitLesis containedinitis nota mere dissolutioninto tLe moments
lromvLicLitLasoriginated, tLesemomentsnovLaveanotLerlorm
tLrougLtLelact tLattLeyLave gonetLrougLtLeunity. In tLenev
development tLey are nov posited as tLatvLicLtLey are tLrougL
tLeir relation to one anotLer. JLey Lave received, consequently, a
nev determination.
[For the Higher Class]
AnEncyclopaedia Las to consider tLe vLole range oltLe sciences
according to tLe suLject matter andlundamental concepts oleacL.
JLe multiplicity olexperiences ola universal oLj ect summarizedin
tLe unity ol general conceptions and tLe tLougLts generated in
considering its essence, constitute in tLeir connection a particular
WLen an empirical material lorms tLe Lasis oltLis connection, a
material olvLicL tLe connection constitutes a merely summarizing
universality, tLe science is ol a more historical kind. Iut il tLe
Iniversal in tLe lorm ollundamental determinations and concepts
it, tLen tLe science is ola more strictlyscienti
ic kind.
JLerc are no aLsolute Loundaries to tLe range oltLe knovn lacts
vLicLaretolormtLespecialelementolascience, loreacLuniversal
orconcretesuLj ectmattercanLedividedintoitsspeciesorparts and
eacLsucLspecies canin turnLeconsideredastLesuLj ectmatterola
special science.
IntLeusual £ncyclopaediatLesciencesaretakenupempiricallyj ustas
ve End tLem. InsucLan£ncyclopaediatLe sciencesaresupposedto
Le presentedin tLeir completeness and, moreover, insodoing to Le
LrougLtinto anorderinvLicLsimilarsandtLingsvLicL aregrouped

, I
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia ! 25
Iut a Philosophical Encyclopaedia is tLe science oltLe necessary
connection, onedeterminedLytLeConcept, andoltLepLilosopLical
origination ol tLe lundamental concepts and principles ol tLe
sciences .
Itisproperly tLeexpositionoltLegeneralcontentolpLilosopLy, lor
vLat is Lased onreason in tLe sciences depends onpLilosopLy. Òn
tLe otLer Land vLat in tLem rests on arLitrary and external
determinations or, asitis called, ispositiveandisprescriLed, asvell
as tLe merely empirical, lies outside pLilosopLy.
According to tLe vay in vLicL tLey are cognized tLe sciences are
eitLer empirical or purely rational. From an aLsolute point olviev
LotL kinds ougLt to Lave tLe same content. ScientiEc ellort aims at
raising vLatis merely empiricallyknovn to vLatis alvays true to
tLe Concept, to make it rational and incorporate it into rational
JLe sciences are expandedpartlyinanempiricaldirectionand partly
intLeirrationalaspect. JLelatterLappensvLenprominenceisgiven
more and more to tLe essential element vLicL is grasped under
general points olviev, and tLe merely empirical elementis grasped
conceptually. JLe rationalexpansion oltLe sciences is at tLe same
timeanexpansion olpLilosopLyitsell
JLevLoleolsciencei sdividedinto tLree mainparts .
¸ !) Logic;
¸2) The Science of Nature;
(3) The Science of the Spirit.
Logic is tLe science oltLe pure Concept and oltLe aLstract Idea.
Matureand Spirit constitute tLe reality oltLe Idea, tLelormer as an
external existence, tLe latter as se
nowing. ¸Òr, tLe logical is tLe
eternally simple essence vitLin itsell, Nature is tLis essence as
externalized, Spirit is tLe return oltLe essence into itselllrom its
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 1
JLesciencesol MatureandSpiritcanLe consideredasapplied science,
as tLe system oltLe real or special sciences in distinctionlrompur�
scienceorLogic, Lecause tLey are tLe system olpuresciencein tLe
sLapeolMatureand Spirit.
1 2
Logici s tLe scienceoltLe pure Understanding [ Verstand] andpure
Reason [ Vernunft] oltLeirparticulardeterminations andlavs . Logic
accordingly Las tLree aspects .
( 1) JLe aLstract ornon-dialectical ¸Inderstanding] [verstcndige] ;
(2) JLe dialectical ornegatively rationaI,
(3) JLespeculative or positively rational.
JLeInderstandingstopssLortatconceptsintLeirE xeddeterminate-
ness anddillerencelromoneanotLer, dialecticexLiLits tLemintLeir
transitionanddissolution, speculationorReason grasps tLeirunityin
tLeir oppositionortLe positivein tLeir dissolution and transition.
1 3
Inderstanding andReasonareLereinusuallytakeni ntLesuLj ective
senseinsolarastLeyLelong, astLinking, toasell-consciousness, so
tLatlogicis a merelyformal science vLicL requires anotLer content,
anexternalmatter, ilsometLing really trueis toresult.
1 4
LogicconsiderstLecontentol InderstandingandReasonin-and-lor-
tLemselvesandtLeaLsoluteconcepts astLeaLsolutelytruegroundol
everytLing, ortLeintellectualandrationalinsolarasitisnotmerely
a suLj ective [bewusstes] compreLension. Consequently logic is in its
ovnsellspeculativepLilosopLy, lortLespeculativevayolconsider-
ingtLingsisnotLingelseLuta considerationoltLeessenceoltLings
vLicL isj ust as mucL tLe pure concept peculiar to Reason as tLe
nature andtLe lav oltLings.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia
Logic divides into tLree parts.
(1) Ontological Logic;
(2) Subjective Logic;
(3) The Doctrine of the Idea.
1 27
JLe l¡rstistLesystemoltLe pure conceptsol¸immediate] Ieing ¸or
extant tLings] [des Seienden] ; tLe second is tLe system oltLe pure
concepts oltLeIniversal, tLetLirdcontains tLeconceptolScience.
A Quality
1 6
( 1 ) JLe Leginning oltLe science i s tLe immediate, vLolly indeter-
minate concept ol Being. (2) JLis, in its contentlessness, is
equivalent to Nothing. ' MotLing' as tLetLougLt olemptiness tLus
inverts [umge
ehrt] itsellinto a Leing and, onaccountolits purity, is
tLe sameas Ieing. (3) Ieing and MotLing containno dillerence Lut
vLat is, is only tLe positing ol them as dillerentiated and tLe
vanisLing oleacLinits opposite, tLatis, pureBecoming.
Determinate Being
Iut Lecause i n Iecoming tLose previously posited only vanish,
Iecoming is tLeir collapseinto a quiescentsinglenessinvLicLtLey
are not nothing Lut also are not s
ll-suLsistent, ratLer tLey are
suLlated ormoments. JLis unity is Determinate Being.
1 8
Ieterninate Ieing is.
( 1) a Ieing in tLe concept olvLicL tLere lies at tLe same time tLe
non-Leing ol itsell as a relerence to otLer or Being-for­
128 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
¸2) LutinacordancevitLtLemomentolIeingitLastLesideolnot
Leing tLe relerence to anotLer, Lut olLeing in-itsell As tLe
conceptvLicLemLracesLotLtLesedeterminationsitisReality . .
JLeReal[Reelle] , orSometLing,asdistinctlromotLerRealsi s, i ntLe
Erstinstance,indillerenttoitsinceinits ÒtLer-LeingitisattLesame
timeinitsell JLedillerenceoltLeRealisl¡rstexplicitinLimit astLe
middle Letveen tLemin vLicL tLey as mucL are as are not.
JLeyare( 1) distinctlromtLeLimitorlromtLeirdillerencevLicLis
tLeirmiddle, outsideolvLicLtLeyaresometLing. Iut¸2) tLeLimit
Lelongs to tLem Lecauseit is their limit.
JLe Iillerence is tLus ( 1) tLe Real's ovn Iillerence or its
Determinateness. JLisimplicitIeterminatenessisLoveveralso¸2)
an external Ieterminate Ieing or Constitution. Ieterminateness
vLicLis as mucL external as internal constitutes Quality.
Constitution, or external Ieterminate Ieing, Lelongs as mucL to
SometLing as it is alien to it or is its ÒtLer-Leing, Lence its ovn
Mot-Leing. It is tLus tLe inequality olitsell vitL itsell, vLereby
Alteration is posited.
it, andgivesrisetoBeing-for-Self InotLervordsIeterminateness
as tLeinternal dillerence vLicL sometLingLasinits ovnsell, is tLe
relerenceolsometLinginitsdillerenceonlytoitsell, oritislor-itsell
B Quantity
Being10r-Self (Ideality)
Being-for-Self is ( 1) dillerence, Lut only lrom itsell, or tLe
relerencenottoanotLerLuttoitsell ¸2) IutinsolarastLedillerence
containsvitLinitsellÒtLer-Leing andtLerelerencetoitisnegative,
tLe otLerisfor it Lutas excluded.
The Philosophical
ncyclopaedia ! 29
Ieing-lor-SellistLenumericalOne. Itissimple, relatedonlytoitsell
and its otLeris excluded. Its ÒtLer-Leing is Plurality.

JLeMany areeacLtLesame. JLeyaretLereloreOne. IuttLeÒneis
justasmucLaPlurality. Foritsexclusion ¸olotLers]istLepositingol
its opposite or its posits itselltLereLy as a Plurality. JLe lormer,
Iecoming, is Attraction, tLe latteris Repulsion.
tLeirLeing at rest, vLicLis noless tLesell-externality oltLeÒneor
tLepositingolitsellasPlurality, Discreteness, as tLerelationoltLe
Nany as sell-equalis tLeir Continuity, pure Quantity.
Quantity Las tLe negativity oltLe Òne in it only as suLlated, or
Lecause in tLe sell-sameness ol Ieing-lor-Sell ÒtLer-Leing is
immediatelynotan ÒtLer, as anexternallimit oris alimitvLicLis
no limit. Quantity vitL tLis indillerentlimitis Quantum.
Quantum is extensive Quantum and in so lar is tLe limit to tLe
momentolpluralityolquantity, oritisintensive Quantuminsolaras
SincenegativityisanindillerentlimittoQuantum, Ieing-lor-Sellor
tLeaLsolutedeterminationis a beyond lorit. £veryQuantumcanLe
exceeded and anotLer limit posited, vLicL equally is not an
immanentlimit. JLisgivesrisetotLeprogress to infinity ortLespurious
JLe aLsolute determination vLicL vas posited as a Leyond, is
Lovever as Ieing-lor-Sell Quantity' s ovn moment. Òr tLe limit
vLicL is no limit is none otLer tLan tLe ÒtLer-Leing suLlated in
Ieing-lor-Sell It is tLe determinateness, tLe positing olvLicL is a
sell-determination. qualitative Magnitude [Grosse] .
130 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
C Infnity
Qualitative Nagnitude as a simple determination is in tLe Erst
instance speci
c Nagnitude Lut as a sell-dillerentiating Sell-
Ietermining it is a specilying olNagnitudes vLicL are at tLe same
timespeciEcally related to eacL otLer, Lavinga qualitative relation-
sLip, or vLose Quotient is tLeir Ratio and vLicL stand in a
qualitative relation to eacL otLer. Since Lere not only are tLe
Nagnitudes suLlated as Enite, Lut tLeir suLlation itsellis posited as
tLeir qualitativelav, tLis is tLeir true, ¸actually] present inl¡nitude.
A Concept of Essence
JLe simple penetration oltLe quantitative orexternal determination
and oltLe inner sell-determining is Essence. As penetration oltLe
sell-determinationandtLeindillerentdeterminateness, itLasin itsell
tLe moments olEssentiality and Inessentiality. JLe £ssential is
vLat Lelongs to tLe sell-determination Lut tLe Inessential is tLe
moment olindillerent Ieterminate Ieing [Daseins] .
Iecoming, as tLe Iecoming ol£ssence is, in tLe Erst instance, tLe
Ioing[ Tun] , atransitionol£ssenceinto tLelreedomolIeterminate
IeingvLicLLoveverremains vitLinitsell
In so lar as tLe Ioing is a dillerence ol£ssence lrom itsell and
Ieterminate Ieing or Ieterminateness tLereLy results, it is tLe
positing olIoing.
B Proposition
JLe Proposition contains tLe moments ol Remaining-within­
itself [Insichbliebens] or Self-Sameness and olpure Iillerentiation.
JLelormer vouldLepure.Matter, tLe otLerpure Form. Iut pure
Form is tLe doing vLicL remains vitLin its
lland tLerelore is that
sell-sameness vLicL vas called pure Natter and so conversely pure
Natter is tLe dillerenceless Asunderness [Aussereinander] and not
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 131
Iut Iillerence must no less Le posited and tLe unity olForm and
Sell-Sameness, incontrastto tLe Ieing-vitLin-Sell, isin tLe lorm ol
externalIeterminateIeing, vLatisusuallycalledNatter. Insolaras
itis in tLe lorm olaninternalLeing itis a Content Lut tLe Formis
eacL oltLese determinations oldillerence.
( 1) JLesimplePropositionis tLeMaxim of Identity, A = A. Itis
indillerent to its Natter. Its content Las no determinationorLas no
l¡lling, Lence tLe Form is a dillerenceless Sell-Sameness .
(2) JLe Maxim of Indifferent Diversity posits indeterminate
Iistinctiveness and asserts tLat tLere are no tvo tLings vLicL are
completely alike.
(3) JLe Maxim of Opposition runs. A is eitLer B or-B, Positivity
andNegativity. ÒltLeopposedpredicates only oneLelongsto tLings
and tLereis no tLirdLetveen tLem.
(4) JLeMaxim of the Ground expresses tLeaccomplisLed return
into itsellolvLat vas posited or tLe positing itsellas tLe tLird in
vLicL tLe opposed determinations are suLlated, and vLicL, as tLe
Simple, is tLe opposite determination to tLe grounded as tLe
manilold Ieterminate Ieing.
C Ground and Grounded
Wole and Parts
£ssence, as Cround olIeterminate Ieing vitLout vLicL £ssence
itsellis not, is in tLel¡rstplaceWhole andParts. JLeWLoleis tLe
positing olitsParts and conversely consists oltLem. JLetvo sides
constitute one and tLe same tLing. JLe WLole is equal to tLe Parts
onlyastLeirtogetLerness, i. e. totLeWLole, andtLePartsareequalto
tLeWLoleasadividedvLole,i. e. asParts,inotLervords, LotLsides
areindilferent to one anotLer and tLe activity oltLeWLoleas Form
Las Natterlor its Condition.
1 32 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Force and its Expression
Iut tLe Parts are parts only as posited Ly tLe WLole. JLis tLeir
connection is determinateness tLrougL tLe unity oltLe Cround. Òr
tLe Quality olIeterminate Ieing is posited Ly tLe activity oltLe
Croundas Form, andtLe matter olappearanceis tLe Cround' s ovn
content. Hence itis Force vLicL expresses itsell
Force is tLe sell-positing ol its Ieterminate Ieing as a speciEc
Çuality. According to tLe side tLat Ieterminate Ieing is still a
Ieing-lor-ÒtLeroran£xternalityitis, attLe same time, lreelromit
and does not cease to Le vLen tLis its appearance vanisLes . In
accordance vitL tLis aspect Force, it is true, no longer Las Natter,
vLicL is its content and to vLicL it immanently Lelongs, lor
condition Lut it still Las a soliciting activity tovards it.
JLe soliciting activity is itsellForce and Lelore it can solicit must
itsell Le solicited. Since tLe relation ol tLe tvo activities is tLis
reciprocalexcLangeoltLeirdeterminations, eacListLeCroundoltLe
activity, ortLe£xpressionoltLe otLer. WitL tLis arises tLe concept
olCroundvLicLis tLe Croundolits ovnactivityandoltLe otLer
vLich activates it.
Inner and Outer
£ssenceis tLe Cround olIeterminate Ieing as spontaneous activity
andinitsexistencetLereisnotLingalien ornotLing atallvLicLLas
not Leen posited Ly tLe Cround itsell Hence £ssence and its
IeterminateIeingaretLesame. £acLrelatesitsellasInnertoitsellas
Òuter, vLicLexLiLits only vLatis Inner.
As tLis relationsLip Cround is tLe Inconditioned, tLe Inner, tLe
InityolNatter asa quiescent sell-samenessandolFormasunityol
tLe antitLesis. Cround exLiLits itsell in its Ietcrminate Ieing as
spontaneous and reciprocally active lorces. £ssence Las LerevitL
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 33
Actuality is tLe sell-suLsistent relation. It Las tLe moments ol its
Appearance orits £xistence vLicL is its relation to itsell, and olits
PossiLility, as tLe in-itse
or£ssence olits Ieterminate Ieing. JLe
Actualitsellis tLeunity olits possiLility and its existence.
JLe Actual is Substance. It is £ssence vLicL contains vitLin itsell
tLe determinations olits Ieterminate Ieingas simple attriLutes and
lavs and posits tLese as an existent play or as its Accidents, tLe
suLlationolvLicLisnotavanisLing olSuLstanceLutitsreturninto
SuLstance is tLe necessity olits Accidents. JLese Lave in tLeir lree
Ieterminate Ieing tLerelationoltLeirnaturetoanotLerasaninner
relation concealed in tLem and tLey appear to lose tLeir sell-
suLsistence tLrougL external Accidents and an alien pover. Iut in
trutLtLis is only tLe restorationoltLeWLole vLicL takesLackagain
into itselltLe separation ellected on tLem.
SuLstance enters into tLe relationsLip olCausality, i n so lar as it
exLiLitsitsellintLeantitLesisolMecessity. JLelreelyactingaLsolute
Cause is SuLstance not only as tLe initiator olmovement vLose
contentvLicLit produces andvLicLas £llectoLtainsIeterminate
vLatis£llectisatransitionintoÒpposites, LutasregardsContentis
anidentical transition.
SuLstanceis, tLerelore, asCauseactiveonlyon-and-vitLin-itselland
standsonlyin aReciprocal relationvitLitsell. it is tLe Iniversal.
! J4 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLeConcept istLetotality oldeterminations gatLeredupintotLeir
simple unity.
ItLas tLe moments olUniversality, Particularity and Individu­

Lniversality is tLeConcept' simmanent unityintLedetermination.
Particularity is tLe negative as a simple determination vLicL is
pervadedLyLniversality, oritisadistinguisLingmark. Individuality
is tLe negative as pure sell-relating negativity.
Individuality, asasell-relatingandindeterminatenegativity, contains
determination as a property as an indillerent tLougL not sell-
suLsistent Lut suLlated Ieterminate Ieing and is Subject.
Judgement istLeseparationoltLeSuLj ectlromitsdeterminationor
particularity and tLe relerence oltLe SuLj ect to tLe determination
vLicLisitsPredicate. SuLj ectandPredicatearerelatedtooneanotLer
as Individual and Particular or Lniversal or also as Particular and
]udgementexpandstLeSuLjecttoLniversalityand, attLesametime,
posits its Lounds . JLe Predicate goes LerevitL Leyond tLe SuLject
and, at tLe same time, is contained in it, or tLe Predicate is, at tLe
same time, Particular and Lniversal.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia ! J5
Quality of the Judgement o Determination of the Predicate
content and expression is in tLe Erst instance tLis . tLe Individual is
Lniversal, ¸ !) Positive Judgement. ¸2) Iut tLe Individual is not
Lniversal, Negative Judgement, Lut a Particular. ¸J) JLe Indi-
vidualis nota Particular, Infnite Judgement. JLeoutcomeis tLat
every determination, tLe Lniversal spLere too and Lence tLe
Predicate generally, is suLlated.
Quantity of the Judgement or Determination of the Subject
JLe InEnite ]udgement contains tLe Individual as Individual or as
this, and ve Lave. ¸ !) tLe ]udgement. 'JLis is so constituted' ,
Singular Judgement. Since tLe Predicate at tLe same time also
expresses sometLing Lniversal aLout tLe SuLject, tLe ]udgement
must read. ¸2) ' Some are so constituted' , Particular Judgement,
vLicL directly implies tLe opposite ]udgement, ' Some are not so
constituted. ' ¸J) JLis indel¡niteness is suLlated Ly tLe ]udgement,
'Everything is so constituted' , Universal Judgement.
Relation of the Judgement or Determination of the Relation
JLrougL tLe Qualitative and Quantitative]udgement tLe SuLject as
vell as tLe Predicate Las Leen positedin every determination oltLe
Concept. JLeConceptis tLus in-itself orimplicitlyLeloreus andtLe
]udgement nov contains a relerence olvLat is to Lej udged to tLe
Concept. JLis]udgement proper is Categorical. Iut Lecause tLat
relerence oltLe Concept to vLat isjudged is at Erst only an inner
connection tLe Categorical ]udgement is at tLe same time only
JLeHypothetical Judgement: ' il ¨A¨is , tLen"B" is ' , simplystates
tLe connection vitLout assertion olIeterminate Ieing. JLus tLe
JLeDisjunctive Judgement: ''A¨ is eitLer "B" or "C" or "D' ' ' ,
contains in tLe Predicate Lniversality and its Particularization. JLe
136 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
thesealsoexcludeoneanotherandonlyoneolthemcanLelongtothe ¯
SuLj ect Jhis]udgementis apodictic.
Jhe Syllogism is the exhiLition olthe Concept in its terms . In it
Individuality, Particularity and Iniversality are not only disting-
uishedas terms Lut also the extremes are unitedLythe middle term
vhichis theirunity.
(1) Jhe Syllogism is, in the l¡rstplace, the uniting olIndividuality
andIniversalityLyParticularityasthemiddleterm. Jhemeaningol
this syllogism is .
¸a) Jhe Individualis through its determinateness a Iniversal or has
existencein general,
¸L) Jhe Individual has through its immediate determinateness still
anotherdeterminateness vhich thelormerincludes vithinitsell
JhelormolthisSyllogismI-P-U isthegeneralruleolsuLsumption
olaspecil¡ccontentunderauniversaldetermination.Il, asinidentical
propositions, this is not more Iniversalas regards contentthanthat
olvhichitisdirectlypredicated, yetithasthelormolIniversalityas
predicatedin relation to the other as SuLj ect.
In quantitative determinations the terms olthe Syllogism have no
relation ol lorm to one another except that ol equality. Jhe
mathematical Syllogism thereloreruns. 'Jhingsvhichareequalto a
Jhird are equal to one another. '
Syllogisms, vhateverpositiontheterms containedinthemmayhave
aretoLeLroughtLack totheaLove statedlormvhichis thegeneral
rule olall Syllogisms.
IntheSyllogism, consideredvithregardtoitsdeterminatemoments,
the middle term is Particularity, a determinateness, the plurality ol
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 37
vhichemLracestheIndividualas aconcretevhichtherelorecanalso
limit and even annul one another. Sirnilarly the Particular is on its
ovn account releraLleto otheruniversaldeterminations. Conversely
the Iniversal emLraces other determinatenesses and therelore also
other Individualities . Consequently theIndividualand theIniversal
vhich areunited here are a contingent content lor one another.
Inregardtotherelation oltheterms therearein theSyllogism tvo
immediate relations orjudgements, namely that olthe Individual to
the Particular and that ol the Particular to the Iniversal, and a
mediated relation, the Conclusion. Iecause only the mediated
relationcontainstheunityolthetermsunitedandthereLy, asregards
lorm, the necessity oltheir relation, the tvo immediate relations
must likevise LeexhiLited as mediations . Iut ilthis is done Ly the
samekind olSyllogismve have the progress to thespurious iri
since each olsuch interpolated syllogisms has the same delect.
JheirnmediaterelationsoltheIndividualtotheParticular andolthe
Particular to the Iniversal must therelore hrst Le mediated in
accordance vith the general lorm olthe Syllogism Lut Ly another
detern¡inateness olthe middle term.
(2) AccordinglythesecondgeneralSyllogismisthattheParticularis
united vith the Iniversal Ly Individuality. Iut the Individual as
determinate existent must, in so lar as itis to Le a middle term, be
Allness: Syllogism Ly Induction. Mov Lecause the existent
Individual Lelongs to lree contingency Induction cannot Lecome
complete and this Syllogism consequently remains to that extent
imperlectand also contains noinnernecessity.
Iut Individuality, as the middle term, in so lar as itis the universal
moment olthe Concept unites the Particular and the Iniversal in a
genuinemanner. Itisthenegativeunityinvhich, asaprocessandan
activity, Particularity, as a dillerentiatedmaniloldnessandcondition
olIeterminate Ieing, has Leenunited into a Òne and raisedinto a
simple universal Inity or, conversely, the Iniversal has Leen
Particularized andhas enteredinto the maniloldness olIetern¡inate
1 38 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
(3) Finally, the relation ol Individuality to Particularity must Le
mediated and lor this the Iniversal is to hand. Syllogism ol
Analogy. In this Syllogism the middle term, in its relation to the
extremeolParticularity, has the determination olIndividuality and
lalls apartintoan Individual andaIniversalsincevhat counts only
lor the Individual is taken universally. Jhis Syllogism therelore
contains strictly speaking lour determinations (quaterni terminorum)
and accordingly is delective.
IutIniversality, as thegenuinemiddleterm, istheinnernature ¸ol
SuLjectivityasvellastheÒLjectivity, thecontentandtheParticular-
ity olIeterminate Ieing interpenetrate and vhich is the aLsolute
Cround and Connection ol Ieing-vithin-Sell and Ietern+inate
Jhe Erst Syllogism, I-P-U, olthe mediation olIndividuality and
ghParticularity,presupposes thetvololloving, Ly
vhichbotholitsimmediaterelationsaremediated. Iut, conversely,
LotholthesereciprocallypresupposeeachotherandtheE rstasvell.
Jheimmediate callslormediationandproceedsonlylromit,justas,
conversely, mediationproceedslromtheimmediate. £achsyllogism


tes a ci

cle olreciprocal presupposition vhich, as a totality,
Linds itsellto itselland in the simple mediation vhich equally is
immediate gathers itselltogether in the middle point.
Jhis totality ol reciprocally sell-presupposing mediation vlich
ein is a simple Immediacy Lrings lorth a Ieterminate Ieing
vhich has that cause and its activity lor its presupposition Lut,
conversely, vhat is Lrought lorth is just as much ground ol the
activity and olthe Lringing lorth itsell Jhis mediation is therelore
neither a transition like the Iecoming olIeing generally, in vhich
vhat passes over is lost in+ts opposite, nor a bringing forth like the
appearing olthe groundvhicL onlyiminediately is, orthe expression
otForce vhose activity is conditioned, nor an activity like that ol
Cause vhose activity vanishes in the £llect.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 139
¸A) End, closely considered, is the real and sell-realizing Concept,
LothasaWholeandinitsPartstheentiresyllogism. Itis, intheErst
instance as SuLjectivity, the vhole syllogism, namely. (1) the
immediate in-itsell existing [seiende] Iniversal, that is ¸2) sell-
determining orparticularizingitselland (3) impellingitsellto goout
olitsellintoIeterminate Ieing.
¸I) Jherealization olthe£nd is equally the vhole syllogism. Jhis
mediationis . ( 1) theactive£ndasellectivecause, Lut¸2) Lyameans
vh�ch Lelongs partly to the suLjective element Ly the activity ol

to existence or oLjectivity and Ly the activity is Lrought into
connection vith this oLjectivity, (3) the activity acts on the
immediate existence and Ly its suLlation gives itsell a mediated,
produced oLjectivity.
Jhis, the Realization olthe £nd, exhiLits n+ediation through the
Iniversal. Itisanexternalityvhich, ononeside,isaProductand, on
the other side, is Cround olthe productive activity. Jhus in the
Realized £nd vhat ellects theresult hasjust as much come out ol
lrom its mediating activityand in its Òther-Leing has lounJ only
¸ C) Inso lar as the£ndas active Cause lets means and product lall
apart in existence, so that the means does not have the £nd, or the
productthe activity, in-themselves, Purposivenessis merely exteral
anditisaltogetherrelative, insolarasthe£nditsellisolasuLordinate
content and vhat is a means lor the £nd has this relation only
according to some one orotherolits sides .
Jhe £nd olsomething is vhat it is in-itselland in truth, or is its
Concept, relative Purposiveness vhich has regard to only one or
other determinateness olson+ething does not therelore exlaust its
1 40 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Inner Purposiveness is vLere sometLing is in its ovn sell
reciprocally as mucL £nd as Neans, i.e. is its ovnproduct, and tLis
product is tLe productive agent itsell SucL a Òne is Own-End
] .
JLe Idea is tLe adequate Concept in vLicL ÒLjectivity and
tLe Concept as sucL. It emLraces tLe genuine Lile of tLe Sell
[Selbstleben] . JLeIdeaispartlyLile, partlyCognition, partlyScience.
The Idea of Life
Life is tLe Idea in tLe element olIeterminate Ieing. JLrougL tLe
unity oltLeConceptand ÒLjectivitytLe living ÒrganismisaWLole
in vLicL tLe parts exist not lor tLemselves Lut only tLrougL andin
tLeWLole. organic Parts invLicLNatterandFormareaninseparaLle
Lile Las in it tLe universal momentsvLicL constitutejust as many
universal organic systems. ( 1) its universalsin¡pleIeing-vitLin-Sell
in its externality, Sensibility; (2) stimulation lrom outside and
immediate reaction to it, Irritability; (3) return into itsellolthis
action outvards, Reproduction.
Asasell-realizingspontaneousmovementLileisatLreeloldprocess .
( 1) JLeOrganization ¸orFormation] [Gestaltung] oltLeIndividual
(2) Its Self-Preservation in lace olits inorganicnature,
(3) JLePreservation of the Species.
JLeprocessolOrganization istLerelationoltLeÒrganismtoits
and consists in all tLe organic parts reciprocally and continuously
producing tLemselves, tLemaintenanceolonepartdependingonthe
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 41
maintenance ol tLe otLers. JLis production is partly only a
development [Evolution] oltLe implicitly already existing organiz-
ation, partly tLe perpetual alteration ol it. Nere Growth or
quantitative alteration is Lovever a process ol increase Ly In­
tussusception not Lyjuxtaposition, i.e. not a mecLanicalincrease.
JLeprocess olorganic Alteration isj ustaslittlea cLemicalprocess.
In CLemism tvo related materials are indeed oppositionally
expressed [aufeinander bezogen] tLrougL tLeir Concept ¸cLemical
alEnity)andtLerelorecontainin princip
e [an sich] tLeirProductvLicL
isnotalreadyproducedLyvLatispreviously toLandandequivalent
to it. Iut its production is not a Sell-Preservation olitsell It is
tLereloreonlyaneutralproduct,i. e. oneinvLicLtLeactivityvLicL
Lelongs only to tLe separate matters is extinguisLed, is not
sell-productive, andis separaLle againinto its constituents inregard
to quality and quantity.
JLe organic Nutritive Process is, on tLe otLer Land, a complete
determination oltLe material increase Ly tLe inner already existing
Form vLicL as tLe SuLjective, or as tLe simple Form olall Parts,
relates itsellto itsell, eacL part Learing itselltovards tLe otLers as
tovards sometLing ÒLj ective, and is only vitLitsellin tLe process.
JLe Self-Preservation Process ol tLe Òrganism opposed to its
inorganic nature. - JLe lree opposition olLile into SuLj ective and
ÒLjective presents itsellas an organic and an inorganicnature. JLe
latter is Lile vitLout Individuality in vLicL tLe Individual exists
lor-itsell, possessing its concept only as a lav olMature' s necessity
¸and] not in a suLjective lorm and its meaning lalling only in tLe
WLole. JLis WLole, as SuLj ect, istLeÒrganismtovLicLinorganic
Mature is essentially related, constituting tLerein tLe Òrganism' s
JLeinorganicCondition is relatedto tLeÒrganismnotas cause or
as a cLemical moment, Lut on tLe contrary, vLat is posited in tLe
Òrganism Ly tLe action on it ol tLe inorganic is essentially
determined Ly tLe Òrganism itselland acts only as a stimulus. JLe
Òrganismis tLe douLle movement oltLe perpetualstrugglevLicL,
!42 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
on tLe one Land, cLecks tLe process ol tLe elements and tLeir
transition into opposites, annuls its condition and Individualizes tLe
oLjective universality, Lut, ontLeotLerLand, discLarges lromitsell
vLat is Individual or SuLj ective and deposes it to an inorganic
JLeprocessoltLePreservation of the Species is. ¸!) tLerealization
oltLe species generally vLicL, as a universal Lile, passes over into
Individuality Ly particularizing tLe species to an actuality in tLe
Individual, ¸2) tLe relation oltLe Òrganism to a similar Òrganism
vLereLyitproducesitsellas anotLerIndividualoltLe samespecies.
JLe preservation ol tLe species is e×LiLited in tLis excLange ol
Individuals andin tLereturn olIndividuality to Iniversality.
The Idea of Cognition
Cognition is tLe exLiLition olan oLj ect according to its existent
yielded Lyit, or conversely, in so lar as tLe Concept' sovn activity
gives it its determinations. JLese determinations, posited as con-
tainedintLeConcept, areCognition, ortLeIdearealizingitsellintLe
element olJLougLt.
The Idea of Knowing
Knowing Las ¸!) loritsoLj ectnotLingexternal,notLinginanyvay
givenLutitsellalone. Itis tLe Concept existing as Concept. ¸2) JLe
Conceptconstruesitselllromitsellin tLatitisaprocessandexLiLits
tLe opposition contained in itin tLe lorm olvarious sell-suLsistent
realdeterminationsordeterminationsoltLeInderstanding. ¸J)Since
tions oltLeInderstanding, tLeir dialecticexLiLits tLemnotonly as
into tLeir unity. Òut oltLis tLeir negative movement tLere results
tLeirpositiveunityvLicL constitutes tLe Conceptinitsresltotality.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia

! 4J
Mature is tLe aLsolute Idea in tLe sLape olÒtLer-Leing as sucL, ol
indillerent, external ÒLjectivity and ol tLe conc
actualization olits moments, or it is aLsolute Ieingin tLe determi-
nation ol immediacy as sucL in contrast to its mediation. JLe
Iecoming olMature is tLe Iecoming olSpirit.
Mature is to Le regarded as a system olgrades olvLic� one arises

e isgenerated
Ly tLe otLer naturallyLut ratLer in tLe inner Idea lyin

at tLe �ase
olMature. JLemovementoltLeIdeaolMatureis tovitLdravinto
itselllromitsimmediacy, tosuLlateitsellandtoLecome Spirit.
JLe Science olMature considers ¸!) tLe ideal existence [Dasein] ol
Matureas SpaceandJimegenerally, ¸2) as InorganicMature,
¸J) ¸as] ÒrganicMature andis accordingly,
¸ !) Mathematics;
¸2) Physics of the Inorganic;
¸J) Science of Organic Nature.
Space andTime aretLeexistentaLstractions, ortLepureFor

, pure
Intuition ol Mature. Space is tLe existent tLougLt ol universal
indillerent diversity in general, Jime is tLe e×istent tLought ol
negativeunity orolpureIecoming.
! OO
Space and Jime are InEnite, i.e in tLe aLstract co


uity oltLeir
sell-externality, boundless. Iut as Ideas, tLeyha

tLe determinations vLicL exLiLit tLe concept in its moments. tLe
144 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
( 1) JLe Dimensions of Space are its moments, vLicL are not
asunder LutvLereone is, eacL oltLe otLersis also. JLey are also
indeedlormaldillerences. tLeone, tLeotLerandtLetLirdasunityol
tLem. Iut oving to tLe qualityless unity ol Space tLey are not
determined in opposition to one anotLer Lut are empty dillerences
vLicL only acquire an alien determinateness in respect ola lurtLer
1 02
(2) JLe Iimensions olJime are.
¸a) JLe Past, existence as suLlated, as non-existent,
¸L) JLe Future, tLe non-existent Lutdestined to exist,
¸c) JLe Present, as tLeimmediateIecoming andunion olLotL.
1 03
existence real Lounds appear init andits dimensions, vLicL at Erst
are only mereDirections as sucL constituting tLeforms oltLis its
1 04
JotLelimitationolSpaceLelongs only tLeindillerentdetermination
olquantity. Continuous Nagnitude, vLicL at Erst is tLe kind olits
quantity as sucL, is itsellan indeterminate determination. ALsolute
determinateness lies in discrete Nagnitude, tLe principle olvLicL is
1 05
Space is tLe oLj ect ol a ¸syntLetic) science, Geometry. JLis is
LecauseinCeometryas sucLtLe continuous quantumcanLe visiLly
representedandLecauseinit, asintLeclementolindillerentsundered
maniloldnessvLicL, Lovever, is, attLesame time, continuous, the
conceptolan oLj ectexpresses itsellina real sLapeinvLicL moreis
contained tLan tLe essential determination oltLe Concept .
1 06
Jime, Lovever, as sucLis incapaLle olbeing a complete scLema or
Figure of Quantum. AsarestlessIecomingitisnotanelementola
syntLetic vLole. In Lecoming a quantity it passes over into the
negative determination ol Quantity, into tLe unit, vLich is the
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 45
principleloran ¸analytical] scienceofQuantity, Arithmetic. JLisis
LecausetLe units are not comLinedinaccordancevitLanelementary
1 07
In AritLmetic and Ceometry quanta are compared vitL eacL otLer
Lovever arLitrary and general tLeir magnitudes may Le, yet in
accordancevitLtLis determination, Lelongingtotlenisolaras tLey
are not in relation, tLey count as complete or independently
determined quanta, asfinite Magnitudes. JLe analysis oltLe InEnite,
Lut cLießy tLe dillerential and integral calculus, treat ol inf
Magnitudes, i . e. sucL as no longer Lave tLe signiEcance olEnite or
independently and completely determined magnitudes Lut are
nal Ratio
orat their Limit, i. e. solely in tLeRatio.
1 08
JLeDifferential Calculus Ends loralormulatLeexpressionoltLe
Enal ratio olits variaLle Enite magnitudes. Conversely tLe Integral
Calculus seekstLeEniteexpressionlorlormulaevLicLcontainEnal
1 09
Applied Mathematics appliespure NatLematics to tLe quantitative
relationsLips olMature vLicLit takes lromexperience.
1 10
Pure Intuition vLicL Las passed over lrom its immediacy into
Leing-in-and-lor-itsell, orintoElledspace andtime, isMatter. JLe
asunderness ol space and tLe Eeing-vitLin-sell ol time posited
aLsolutely in one, yield tLe concept olNatterin general.
1 1 1
According to tLe moment ol Leing-vitLin-sellNatter vould Le a
single isolated point, according to tLe moment olsell-externality it
vouldLeintLeErstplaceaLostolmutuallyexcludingAtoms. Iut
sincetLese, inexcludingoneanotLer, arenoless mutuallyrelatedtLe
146 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Atom Las no actuality and tLe Atom, like aLsolute continuity or
inFmitedivisiLility, is only a possiLilityinMatter.
1 1 2
Matter, as existing on its ovn account, Las tLe moment ol
only anessentialcontinuity, Heaviness. JLis constitutes tLeuniver-
sal predicateola LodyvLicL isMatterin tLe lormolSuLject.
1 13
Body contains tLe connections ol tLe ideal moments olspace and
time, vLicL connection appears as Motion and Heaviness as tLeir
1 1 4
Free motion Lelongs to Lodies vLicL possess tLeir ovn centre ol
Leaviness. JLrougLtLerelationolsucLcentresarisestLelreesystem
oltLe circular motion oltLe celestial Lodies, vLereas on tLe otLer
Land, otLer Lodies lacking a centre oltLeir ovn lack centrilugal
lorceandare suLj ect to centripetal lorcevLereLytLeyfall.
1 1 5
In tLe magnitude olMotion Lesides space and time mass i s a
moment, andjustasspaceand time also passoverintoForcetLeyare,
likeMass, moments olForce.
Physics of the Inorganic
1 1 6
Heaviness, vLicL is individualized Ly ligLt and opened up into
qualitative dillerences, is concrete or pLysical Mature andtLe oLject
olPLysics generally.
1 1 7
Heaviness is tLe opposite t o tLe Leing-vitLin-sell tovards vhicL
sell-externality only strives. Matter is tLis existence ol tLe ellort
vLose oppositionexpresses itsellonly in tLe moments olspace and
time, in a merely ideal centre. JLat process ol sell-externality
tovards a Leing-vitLin-sell, tLeintensive simpleunity olLeaviness,
LigLt as a selI-equal Leing-vitLin-sclI is tLe principle of tLe
individualizing and particularity oImatters. Its relation to vhat is
merely negativeto it, to darkness,itconstitutes Colour.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 147
1 1 8
JLe l¡rst moment oltLe particular existence olpLysical Mature is
Magnetism, tLe diremption oltLe individual point ofunity into
opposition vLicL, Lovever, remains still enclosed vitLin tLe
1 1 9
JLe second moment is tLe realization, tLat is, tLe liLerating and
seIl-constituting oltLe sides oltLe opposition (1) as Electricity,
vLicL is tLe still unemLodied lleeting manilestation oltLe oppo-
sition, tLe sides ol vLicL are Leld in aLsolute tension against eacL
otLer, (2) ¸as] tLe Chemical Elemental Matters. Jhey are tLe
qualitative dillerences olcorporeity in tLe sLape olspecial matters
vLicLLoveverarestill aLstract andvitLoutanactualindividuality.
(3) JLePhysical Bodies, invLicL tLequalitativedeterminationsare
inaconcretecorporeity, vLicL tLougLcontainingvitLintLemselves
alltLemomentsolcorporeity, LutundertLedeterminationoloneol
tLese moments or qualities, assume tLe sLape ol an indillerent
suLsistence tovards one anotLer.
¸a) As tLePhysical Elements, air, vater, E re, eartL.
¸L) As aLsoluteorCelestial Bodies, and
¸c) As Terrestrial Bodies vLicL Lave passed on into a lurtLer
distriLution andparticularization.
1 20
JLethirdmomentistLeChemical Process. JLeparticularizationol
Lodies and tLeir ovn indillerentindependentexistenceisattLesame
timea relationoltLemtooneanotLer, notonlya reciprocaltension
Lut also an opposition vLereLy tLeir indillerent suLsistence is
annulled and LrougLt Eack into tLe unity ol totality. Iut tLis
returning process coincides in living Mature vitL tLe process ol
constructionvLereLy tLeunionattLesametimelromanotLerside
Lecomesa secretion and precipitation olanindillerent existence.
1 21
Geology treats ol tLe lormations ol tLe eartL as tLe result oltLe
extinct process oltLe lormation oltLe earth-Individual. Ceognosy
considers tLese lormations in tLeir generality as rocks according to
tLeir constitution and stratiEcation, and togetLer vitL Oryctog-
148 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
nosy, vLicL treats principally oltLe separate lormations as consti-
tuentpartsoltLosegenerallormationsandveinsorlodes, constitutes
1 22
Vegetable Nature is tLe Leginning ol tLe incipieni individual or
suLj ectiveprocessolsell-preservationortLeorganicprocessproper.
JLis,Lovever, doesnotyetpossesstLecompletelorceolindividual
unityintLattLeplantvLicLisasingle IndividualpossessesonlysucL
parts vLicL can in turn Le regarded as independent individuals.
Iecause tLe plant lacks tLis inner unity it does not develop leeling.
Plant Physiology considers tLe general nature ol plant lile Lut
Botany treats oltLe system oltLe plant and Lases its classiEcation
mainly upon tLe dillerences Letveen tLe organs ol lertilization,
vLicLlatterlorms tLeapexolplantlileLyvLicLplantsLorderona
LigLer stage oltLe organism.
1 23
Animal Nature possesses tLat suLjectivc unity vLereLy every
organic part is suLordinated to a vLole vLicL is a Òne. JLe
Physiology oltLe animal organism treats oltLe lunctions oltLe
parts vLicL cooperatein tLe perpetualproduction oltLe vLole and
vLicLtLrougL tLis process are tLemselves produced andpreserved.
Comparative Anatomy considers tLe generaltypes oltLe animal in
tLe dillerent lorms ol tLe universal species, partly Lov tLe type
LeginstosLovitsellin tLesimplestanimalorganismsandgradually
appears in a more developed lorm, andpartlyLovitis modiEedin
Zoology classiEestLeseintLeErstplaceaccordingtotLeircommon
distinct cLaracteristics and lor tLispurposetakestLedeterminations
lromtLe main stages oltLe development oltLe animal types, lrom
tLe element ¸in vLicL it lives] , and l¡nally lrom its veapons in
relationtootLerorganisms. IutinalltLisMatureellacestLespeciEc
Lounds vLicL Lere oller tLemselves, Ly tLe transitions vLicL unite
oneprinciplevitL anotLer.
1 24
generally in a relationvitL its inorganic nature. JLis disunion is at
Erst suLj ectively present in it as a leeling ollack, as a need. JLis
suLj ective disunion is reßected outvards in tLe opposition Letveen
Òrganic and Inorganic Þature. JLe inorganic powers [Potenzen]
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 149
LeLaveasa stimulustotLeÒrganismvLoseactivityistLeperpetual
struggle to take tLem up into itsellaccording to its receptivity and
tLercin to Le victorious, tLereLy restoring tLe unity vitLin itsell,
vLicL unityisitsellasimilarprocessoltLeoppositionoltLeinternal
systems to one anotLer and a restorationoltLem.
JLeorganismisintLestateolDisease vLenitcannotovercomeone
oltLe povers [Potenzen] posited in it, tLe pover l¡xing itsellin a
system vLicL isolates itsell, perseveres in its ovn activity and no
longer passes over into tLe lIuid activity oltLe vLole. JLe organic
processis tLus convertedinto onetLatisinterrupted. JLescienceol
Iisease andits cureis Medicine.
1 26
JLe animal Lasfeeling in so lar as its organic moments Lave tLeir
determination andmeaningonlyandsolelyintLeunityollile, Lutat
tLe same time tLey still Lave an external asunderness . JLe Enal
oneness] , vLicL alone constitutes tLe complete suLsistence ol tLe
moments, is tLe elevationinto Spirit.
1 27
Spirit only Legins lrom tLe outer vorld, determines tLis, and
LencelortLisrelatedonly toitsellandtoits ovn determinations.
1 28
JLe PLilosopLy olSpirit contains tLree sections. It considers.
( 1) Spirit in its Concept, PsycLologyin general,
(2) The Realization of Spirit;
(3) The Consummation of Spirit in Art, Religion and Science
¸or Philosophy] .
1 29
Spirit considered onits ovn is to Le compreLended.
1 50 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
(1) In its natural existence [natirlichen Dasein] and in its direct
connectionvitLtLe organicLodyandits consequentdependence
ontLe Lody' s allections andstates . Anthropology;
(2) Asmanilested, tLatis, i solarasitis relatedas suLjecttoanotLer
asoLject, Spiritis consciousness and tLeoLjectoltLePhenomen­
ology of Spirit;
(3) As Spirit in accordance vitL tLe determinations olits activity
vitLinitsellitis tLe oLj ect olPsychology.
1 30
Intelligence Legins lrom externality as


on L
t not

as its

ciple. Itis( 1) imme�iateas
Feeling, tLe content olvLicL (2) it raises to Representation or
Pictorial Thinking vitLin itselland (3) as Thinking itpuriEes tLe
contentoltLecontingencyandparticularityolits determinationsand
raises tLem tonecessity anduniversality.
1 31
Feeling is tLe simple Lut none tLe less speciEc allection ol tLe
individual suLj ect in vLicL no dillerence ol tLe suLject lrom tLe
oLjectLasLeenposited, oritisa determinationpositedintLesuLject
vLicLis notyet separatedlromtLe oLj ect.
Feeling is partly inner, partly outer and is immediate, still vitLout
any reßection andas a Nood is eitLer pleasant orunpleasant.
1 33
Feeling is tLe original stull still sell-envrapped vLic

L intelligence
raisestoRepresentation Ly setting asidetLelor


vLicL leeling Las and dividing itintoan oLj ective, and a suL¡ ective
vLicLseparatesitselllromit, tLusmakingFeelingintosomethingfelt.
1 34
It is Erst in Representation tLat ve Lave an Object. JLe stages in
lorming Representations are tLat Intelligence.
( 1) Inwardizes ¸recollects] itsell, in tLat it completely separates itsell
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 151
lrom tLe content olFeeling,
(2) Imagines tLis content, retainsitvitLoutitsoLj ect, lreelyevokesit
lromitselland connects itsellvitL it,
(3) Jakes avay tLe immediate meaning oltLe content and gives it
anotLer meaning and associationin Memory.
A Recollection
1 . Intuition is immediate Representation in vLicL tLe determina-
tions olFeeling are maJe into an oLject separated lrom tLe suLj ect
andvLicLislreelromtLeindividualsuLjectand, attLesametime,is
lorit. Iutitisjustas mucLnotfor tLe suLject as a singleindividual
Lutfor everyone
JLeObject tLus positedasoutside tLe suLject and inits ovnsellas
anexternalityispartlytLequiescentside-Ly-sidenessolspace, partly
a restless Lecoming in tLe successive moments oltime. Space and
time are aLstractintuitions or Universal Forms of Intuition.
In tLese universal oLj ective elements tLe oLj ect, Lesides Laving tLe
content oltLe determinations olleeling, is at tLesame time a single
oLject completc
ly determinedin space andtime and connected vitL
otLeroLj ectsbiore, alongside andafter. ¸JLrougLtLis determinateness
in space and time and tLrougL one anotLer according to their
determinations, tLings are caugLt and in tLeuniversal prison. )
1 38
2. Representation. Feeling Lecomes oLjective in Intuition. Jhe
suLj ect is in immediate relation to Intuition and submergedin it so
tLat in Intuition it Las strictly speaking no otLer Leing tLan tLat
oLjective, spatial and temporal being. JLe voluntary activity ol
intelligence consistsLerein Attention to tLemanilold existence ol
vLatis presentandintheArbitrariness [ Will
ir] olstayingvith a
content orpassing on to anotLer. Perceptive Faculty.
Iut Intuition, asÒLject, is at tLesametimefor the subject. JLislatter
as Leing-in-and-lor-itsellvitLdravs itselllrom its sell-externality,
rel¡ectsitsellintoitsell, andseparates itselllromoLjectivityintLatit
makes tLeintuition suLjectively into anImage [Bild] .
1 52 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 40
Intuitiontransposedinto tLeI [Ego] , is not onlyImageLut Lecomes
Representationgenerally. JLeegodoesnotstopsLortattLeintuition
vLicL Las Leen internalized corresponding completely to tLe
immediate intuitionLut tLeintuitionis liLerated lromandtaken out
olits context in space and time. It is sublated, i. e. just as mucL a
non-existent as apreserved existence.
1 41
Intuition as Representation is tLe suLject' s own time and space,
transported into Jime and Space as universal
orms. JLrougL tLe
suLlation ol tLe particular time ol Intuition it Lecomes enduring;
tLrougLitsovnparticular space it is everywhere.
1 42
FurtLermore concrete Intuition is preserved in its manilold deter-
minations or in tLeir unity Lut equally it is also liLerated lrom tLe
LondoltLeirsingularity. JLedeterminations oltLepartslallasunder
and Lecome aLstractions vLicL are represented as subsisting
themselves vitLout tLe sensuous context in vLicL tLey at Erst
appearedto tLe suLj ect.
1 43
3. Recollection: Recollection as tLe invardized Intuition or tLe
Intuition made universal is related to immediate Intuition as a
permanentanduniversaltotLesingular. Recollectioninnot so mucL
comparisonoltLe singleintuition as tLe suLsumptionoltLepresent
singleintuition under tLe already madeuniversal or representation.
JLesameness vLicL I recognize is, on tLe one Land, tLe identity ol
tLeir content and, on tLe otLer, I recognize in tLe pr
sent intuition
my ovnidentity vitL mysellorI rememLer myse
in it.
1 44
JLeImageorRepresentationis not madeauniversalLy tLelacttLat
tLe same intuition vould Le olten repeated and tLe numerous
intuitions vould collapse into a single image eitLer consciously, or
ourrememLeringvitLeacLsingleintuitiontLepreviousone, ontLe
contrary, tLeintuition acquires immediately tLelormoluniversality
Lymyacceptanceolit. ItistLereloreasubsumption. InRecollectionit
is Lya presentintuitionorrepresentation tLat tLe image ola
oneisevokedvLicLvasidenticalvitLtLepresent one. JLeprevious
one is tLe permanent and universal under vLicL I suLsume tLe
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 53
B Imagination

collection tLe lormer and tLe present intuitions directly
coincide. I am not laced Ly tvo dillerent tLings, Intuition and
Representation. It is only tLat I Lave Lad tLem and tLat tLey are
already mine. In so lar as I nov also Lave Lelore me tLe
Representation as di  erent lrom tLe Intuition, tLis is Imagination.
Forin tLe Imagination Intuition and Representation can Le entirely
( 1) Repr

duction ol Representation generally. Imagination as
reproduction o�a Representation generally evokes again tLeimages
and representations without tLe present intuition corresponding to
tLemandletstLementerinto consciousness on their own account.
1 47
,�,a�active, ImaginationLringstLepreservedimagesandrepresenta-
tLatvLicL tLey Ladasintuitions.
JLis connection can take place according to tLe various deterniina-
tions vLicL tLe representations contain. JLe various modes ol

onnectionLavevery inappropriately Leencalledlaws o
the association o
JLe determination ol tLe comLination can Le a more or less
superEcialorlundamentalconnection. mere contemporaneityortLe
sameplace oltvo representations, orany kind olSImilarityor also
Contrast oltLem, relations ol Wole and Parts, Cause and Efect,
Ground andConsequent, etc. , generallyanykindolsensuousormental
connection. JLe connection is dominated Ly an interest ol tLe
leeling, ola passion, oroltLe mental cLaracter generally.
1 50
JLe dist�nction Letveen Images and Intuitions Las already Leen
stated. ItismadeLytLeordinaryconsciousnessdirectlyintLevaking

d LealtLy state. Iut in sleep, in unusual states, in illness, tLis
and superior mentalpovers.
1 54
The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 51
¸a) Dreaming: I n Ireaming sleep ve experience a range ol
representations indistinguisLaLle lrom intuitions vLicL are occa-
sioned Ly memories or even Ly present sensations Lut Lesides are
mixedupvitLandlastenedonto tLe most contingentandarLitrary
tLings. It is true tLat prolounder interest or lorces tLan mere
in+agination underliepremonitions, visions, reveries, etc. , Lut tLey are
linked vitL a particular LeigLtening oltLeimagination vLicL turns
inner, oLscurer leelings into pictures andgives tLem tLeintensity ol
intuitions .
¸SympatLy vitL Mature. So-calledPrevision. JLeluture sleeps in
tLeactualpresent. JLeactualpresentis attLesametimepossiLilityol
vLatistocome. Òracles, propLesyinglromtLefligLtolLirds, lrom
tLeentrailsolanimals. IniversalmoodstemminglromMature, like
animalsLavingpresentimentsoleartLquakes . RacesvLolivemorein
torn ourselves loose lrom Mature. Inner ligLt, dealing vitL LigLer
spirits, vitcLes ointment olLyoscyamus, vitcLes stupehed tLem-
selves and lell into a lrigLtlul lantasy vLicL Lecame epidemic.
JLousandsoltLemvereLurnt. CLosts, oltenoccasionedLyexternal
pLenomena invLicL lantasy takes Lold. JLe Lad conscience racked
Ly tLe torment ol crime oLj ectif¡es itsell Ly gLostly sLapes .
Appointments to appear in lile alter deatL. Irrational entLusiasum,
Fanaticism, esteeming religious ideas [ Vorstellungen] LigLer tLan
everytLingetLicalinlile, andtLantLerelationsLipdeterminedLytLe
Concept. Irrational entLusiasm lalls into tLe error olregarding an
unimaged appearance as inlerior to tLe tangiLle outer vorld. JLe
supposedtoLepresentintLeoutervorld. ÒnevantstoseeCodina
tLing, vitLouttLemediumolart, oronevantstoLring tLe aLsolute
Ieingtoone' sinnerintuition, Leloreone' simagination, one wants to
ring God down into the world of time and sense. Cenuineascendancyol
representation overintuition Ly tLevill, e. g. Nucius Scavola) .
1 52
¸L) A LigLer stage oltLe lile vLicL surrounds itsellvitL lantasy is
Somnambulism, sleep-valking proper, or otLer similar states, in
vLicL tLe mind, vitL a veaker or stronger outer perception, Las a
and proceeds to a vLoleseries olexternal arrangements as one
does in tLevaking state.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 155
¸SomnamLulismis .
¸i) JLe usual kind in sleep: Learing music, reading, letter vriting,
going to dangerous places, LatL-tuL in lront oltLe Led, intense
¸ii) JLe epilectic kind. reading Ly tLe hngerontLe stomacL, etc. ,
¸iii) JLe magnetic ¸Lypnotic] sort, tLepatient ansvers only Lim vLo
is en rapport vitL Lim. )
1 53
¸c) ApartlromtLelacttLatRaving i n Delirium i s astatesimilarto
anddependentonillness, insanityLasvarious modihcations, sucLas
madnessproper, mania, raving, etc. andisingeneraladominationol
lantasies in tLe vaking state over intuitions and intellectual ideas.
Madness proper Las somesinglehxedcrazyideavhicLiscorrectlyLound
up vitL tLe rest olideas in tLe hxedidea. Mania is a generalLreak-
dovn oltLe mentallaculties. JLis madness in tLelorm ol frenzy or
raving isassociatedvitLamaliciousspitelulvillandoutLreaksolrage.
¸Imagining tLatoneis aking, a cardinal, a personintLegodLead.
NelancLoly arising lrom an idea olmoraIvortLlessness. Someone
LelievestLatvLen LeurinatesLeßoods a vLole tovn, anotLertLat
Leis a grain olLarley andtLe cLickensvilleatLim, a tLirdtLatLis
leetaremadeolglassandLeLasalittleLellinLisstomacL, andsoon.
JLecauses are.
¸i) Physical; olten a naturalinLerited disposition, impressions at tLe
timeolpregnancy, deLaucLery, poisonousLerLs, rabies, diseased
mattervLicL acts ontLe nerves, Lrain etc. ,
¸ii) Mental; an extremely vivid idea, e.g. people Lave not only died
lromj oy Lut Lave Lecome insane, derangement tLrougL pas-
sions, love, pride, Lope, vanity, disappointment, distrust de-
stroystLeconnectionvitLtLeoutervorld. JLelileoltLelunatic
is Luried vitLin Limsell, in Lis individuality, and so on.
Accordingly tLe mode olcure olpsycLological disturLances is
LotLpLysicalandmental. )
[Productive Imagination]
1 54
JLe superior imagination, tLe poetic lantasy, does not serve
trutL ol spirit generally. It strips oll tLe contingent and arLitrary
156 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
circumstances olexistence, dravs out vLatisinnerandessentialin
tLem, sLapes tLem andrepresents tLem inanimageorsymLol. JLis
lorm ol pLenomenal existence vLicL it gives to it is Lorne,
dominated, permeated and Lound into a unityonly Ly its essential
core. JLe symLolizing activity ol tLe imagination consists in
inserting LeneatL sensuous pLenomena or images, conceptions or
tLougLtsoladi  erent kindlromtLoseimmediatelyexpressed,vLicL
nevertLeless Lave an analagous rclation to tLem and exLiLit tLose
imagesas tLeexpression oltLem.
¸Poetryis not an imitating olMature. Itis trueina LigLer sense,
tLan ordinary actuality. JLe poet is a prolound spirit vLose
penetrating vision sees in suLstance¯vLat anotLer person also
possessesinLimsellLutdoesnotLecomeconsciousol Itistruealso
LeretLatnomanisaLerotoLisvalet. WLattLismeansistLat, ' YesI
too Lave knovn Lim LutLavenotseen anytLingLeroicinLim' , or' I
tooLaveknovnloveLutLavenot loundanytLingi ni t tLattLepoet
talks aLout' . JLe poetis lor tLis reason a seer. JLe poet unites tLe
splendour ol Mature into a vLole as tLe attriLutes ol sometLing
LigLer, celestial Llue is its garment, Llossoms its messenger, and so
on, Ceres and Proserpine. Iasis oltLe Idea, Summer. Forget-me-
nots, Sunrise. ' JLus spranglortL tLe sun, as rest springs lortL lrom
virtue, ' Sunset. ' JLus dies a Lero. ' SymLolismolLreadandvinein
tLe £leusinian mysteries and in CLristianity. A deep disposition
Mature. )
C Memory
( 1) JLe Sign, i ngeneral. Representation, LeingliLeratedlrom
existence and made suLj ective, tLe outer existence and tLe inner
representationstandopposedtoeacLotLeras dillerent. JLearbitrary
ation olan outer existence vitL a representation tLat does not
correspond to it Lut, as regardscontent, is also dillerent lromit so
tLat tLe outer existence ¸ vLicL] is to Le tLe Representation, or tLe
meaning oltLeRepresentation, makestLeouterexistenceintoaSign.
1 56
Productive Memory, tLerelore, produces tLe association olIntui-
tionandRepresentation, Lutafree associationinvLicLtLepreceding
relation, in vLicL Intuition lorms tLe Lasis olRepresentation, is
reversed. In tLe association ol Reproductive Nemory sensuous
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 57
existenceLas no value onits

vnaccountLut onlytLevalue givento
itLy Spirit.
1 57
JLrougLits determinationssensuousexistenceisgenerallyconnected
vitLanotLerexistence. Iutsinceitsdeterminationisarepresentation
made Ly Reproductive Nemory or Mnemosyne it Lecomes, to tLat
extent, a connection olrepresentations to otLertLinking Leings and
tLerein Legins tLe tLeoretical communication ol tLese vitL one
(2) Language. JLe LigLest vork oltLe Reproductive Nemory i s
Language, vLicL i s partly vocal and partly vritten. Iut, since
Reproductive Nemoryis its source, ve can talk ola lurtLer source
only vitL regardto tLeinvention olspecil¡c Signs.
1 59
Sound istLe ßeeting manipulationolsometLing inner vLicL intLis
suLjectivc and inner vLicL essentially Las a meaning. It is ol
particular importance tLat Ly tLe articulation of sounds not only can
pictures ¸and] images Le indicated Lut even abstract ideas [ Vorstel­
. JLe ConcreteIdea is, in general, convertedLytLe word-sign
intosometLing unpictured tLatisidentil¡edvitLtLesign.
isalion,the name passesfor the thing. Logos,Codspake,etc. , Language
istLeLigLestpoverpossessedLymankind. Adam, itissaid, gaveto
everytLing¸animals) its name. LanguageistLedestruction[Ertotung
oltLe sensuous vorldin its immediateexistence, tLe suLlating olit
into an existence vLicL is a summons tLat ecLoesin every tLinking
Leing. )
1 60
WitL regard to tLe invention olspeciEc signs itis natural lor sound
phenomena ¸lor example] rustling, Lumming, Luzzing, etc. , tLat
direct imitations oltLem are made. For otLer sensuous oLjects or
cLanges tLe sign is on tLe vLole arLitrary. For designating more
aLstract relationsLips and determinations symLols are used. JLe
lurtLer development ollanguageLelongs to tLe pover olunivers-
ality, to tLe Inderstanding.
1 58 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 61
Written Language is hieroglyphic or alpha
etic. JLe lormer is a
designationoloLj ects vLicL Las norelationto tLeir soundsign. JLe
idea olauniversalpLilosopLicalvrittenlanguageproposedLy some
is impracticaLle Lecause ol tLe innumeraLle Lost ol signs vLicL
vould Le necessary and, especially, to invent and to learn tLem.
etical vritten language dissolves tLe vord-signs into tLeir
simple sounds and designates tLem.
1 62
Reproductive Memory. JLis is tLeretentionolindividualsignsin
relation to vLat tLey designate, and principally tLe retention olan
unimaged series oltLemvLicLarenotlinked togetLerLyimaged or
intellectualconnectionLutareina completelyarLitraryorcontingent
sequence and are Leld togetLer in tLis vay Ly a purely inner,
independent lorce.
1 63
Thinking is Spirit' s activity in its independent sell-same simplicity
vLicL positsfrom and within itse
determinations vLicL Lave tLe
cLaracter olsell-sameness anduniversality.
1 Understanding
1 64
JLe Understanding is principally a tLinking determination ¸ol
oLjects] and a Lolding last to tLe tLougLt determinations . As
Objective Understanding it contains tLe Categories, tLe tLougLt
determinations ol Ieing vLicL constitute tLe inner unity ol the
manilold ol intuitions and representations . It distinguisLes the
essentiallromtLeinessentialandappreLendstLenecessityandlaws of
2 Judgement
1 65
Judgement isarelating olanIndividualtotLeConcept. Itdetermines
tLeIndividualinageneralvay, orsu
sumes itundertLe Iniversal. It
Las tLelolloving stages.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 159
-1 66
¸a) It is tLe Iniversal as ¸tLat Ly] vLicL tLe Individual is deter-
mined, Lut is itsell only some one quality olit, ol vLicL it Las
1 67
¸L) Refection istogo Leyondasingledetermination, tocompareit
vitL otLers and to comLine tLem in a speciEc determination. JLe
IniversalconstitutestLeinnernatureandessenceoltLeoLject. JLis
Iniversalityisnotmerelyacommonproperty oltLedeterminations
Lut a Iniversality Lelonging to tLe oLject itsellin contrast to tLe
determinations olits ovn Particularity orIndividuality.
1 68
¸c) JLe]udgingolanoLjectisstrictlyspeakingtLecomparisonolits
nature or true Iniversality vitL its Individuality, or vitL tLe
is supposedto Le.

¸In tLis ]udging lies tLe dialectic tLat vLat is Lad does not
correspondtoitsconceptLutis, attLesametime,alsoappropriate

it. A Lad Louse Las an existence vLicL does not conlorm to its
concept. IutilitdidnotconlormtoitatallitvouldnotLeaLouse.
JLeconcept muststill Le recognisaLle intLe existence. JLus ilan
action isj udged to Le Lad, its un-Reason Las all tLe same a side on
vLicLitisin agreement vitL Reason and so on. )
1 69
Nention can Le madeLere olPerspicacity vLicL relers more to tLe
natureolone' s]udgement tLanitis anactual stage ol ]udgement. It
consists mainly in grasping distinctions vLicL do not lie on tLe
surlace and Ly reflection to notice Enerordeeperconnections. Wit
linksideasvhicL, lookedatsuperEcially, arealientooneanotLerLut
lrom anotLer aspect present an unexpected similarity. Ingenuity,
Cleverness, is an analogue to rationality and mainly expresses a
determination or relationsLip vLicL, in its immediaterepresentation
orin its ovn sell, is opposedtoitsell
3 Rational Thin
1 70
¸a) Reason is negative or dialectical vLen it points out tLe transition
into its opposite ola determination olIeing LytLeInderstanding.
Cenerally, dialectic appears vLen tvo opposite predicates are
1 60 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
asserted ola single suLj ect. JLe purer lorm oldialectic consists in
sLoving tLat a determinationolapredicateLytLeInderstandingis
in its own self j ust as mucL tLe opposite of itself tLat it, tLerelore,
suLlatesitsellvitLin itsell
¸L) Ratiocinative Reason seeks tLegrounds oltLings, i. e. oltLeir
Leing posited Ly and in an otLer vLicL is tLeir essence. Iut tLis
essence, vLicL ren+ains enclosed vitLin itsell, is, at tLe same time,
only relatively unconditioned, sincevLatisgroundedorisaconsequent
Las a content otLer tLan tLe ground.
1 72
¸c) Syllogistic Reason contains tLe mediation ol a content vLicL
stands in tLe relationsLip oltLe determinations oltLe Concept, as
Individual, Particular, andIniversal. JLeParticularisrelatedto tLe
IndividualasaIniversaland,inrelationtotLeIniversal, isaspecil¡c
¸Particular] , it is tLe middle term vLicL contains vitLin itselltLe
extremes ol Individuality and Iniversality and tLus links tLem
Syllogisticreasonis .
¸i) Formal Reason in so lar as tLe Syllogism is suLjective. WLat
appears in it as mediated or as a consequent is in itsell tLe
immediate. It Las tLe relationsLip olsometLing mediated only
lor cognition.
¸ii) Teleological Reason considers and posits ends, a relationsLip
invLicLvLatis mediatedorLrougLtlortLLastLesamecontent
as tLeimmediate, tLepresupposedConcept, andinvLicLvLat
is mediated, tLe consequent, isj ustas mucL ground.
¸iii) The Idea of Reason is tLe Concept in tLat its externality or
reality is completely determined Ly it and exists only in its
Concept, in otLervords, tLeexistent ¸tLing] vLicLLasinitits
ovn Conceptis tLe means olitsell, tLe means, tLerelore, isj ust
as mucL end.
1 73
Practical Spirit not only has Ideas Lut is tLe living Ideaitsell It is
Spirit tLat determines itsell lrom its ovn resources and gives its
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 161
determinations an external reality. A distinction i s to Le made
orreally makes itsellinto an oLj ect, into an oLjectivity.
1 74
PracticalSpiritmeansespeciallyfree will insolarastLe' I' canaLstract
lrom every determinateness in vLicL it is placed and remains
undetermined and sell-equalinevery determinateness.
1 75
JLe Will, as tLe sell-determining Concept, is essentially activity
andaction. Ittranslatesitsinnerdeterminationsintoouterexistencein
ordertoexLiLit itsellas Idea.
1 76
JotLeDeed tLere Lelongs tLevLolerangeoldeterminationsvLicL
are immediately connected vitL tLe resultant alteration ol an
existence. JotLeAction tLereLelongsintLel¡rstplaceonlytLatpart
olitvLicLvasintLeResolve orinconsciousness . Itisconsciousness
alone tLat acknovledges Will as its ovn and tLat Lears tLe Llame
vLicLcanproperlyLeimputedtoit. Iut, inavidersense, Llamecan
also Le imputed in respect oltLose determinations oltLe action ol
vLicL tLedoervas notconscious Lutcould LaveLeen conscious.
1 77
¸a) Practical Feeling does include tLe practical legal and moral
determinations and lavs, Lut only immediately, so tLat tLey are
undeveloped and not tLougLt out and on tLe vLole are impure
tLrougLtLe admixture ola suLj ectiveindividuality. Itis essential to
notice tLat Practical Feeling Las no otLer genuine content tLan tLe
rigLts, dutiesandlavsvLicLarespeciEcallyknovn,tLat, ontLeone
Land,itisoLscureanddeterminedLyindividualityand, ontLeotLer
Land, can Le given precedence over tLe speciEc consciousness ol
tLemonlyinsolarastLeyareadLeredtoseparately andconsciousness
can oppose itselltotLem as a totality.
1 78
¸L) JLeleelingolapracticaldeterminationassociatedvitLtLeleeling
olits contradiction, olLeing only inner and unrealized, lor vLicL
Lovever, reality is at tLe same time essential, tLis is Impulse. It
Lelongs to tLe suLj ective nature and is directed only to its
determinateness. Appetite is a single determination olImpulse, and
1 62 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
existence is conlormaLle to it or not. In Impulse and Appetite,
PracticalSpiritis, in its naturalexistence, a dependentunlree Leing.
1 79
¸c) Spirit must raise itsell out ol its suLmergence in Impulse to
Iniversality so tLat Impulses, in tLeir separateness, do not possess
aLsolute validity, on tLe contrary tLeir determinations receive tLeir
placeandcorrectvalueonlyasmoments of the totality vLereLytLeyare
purged olsuLjective contingency.
1 80
JLe determinations olSpirit constitute its lavs . Hovever, tLey are
notexternalornaturaldeterminationsolit. JLesole determinationin
vLicL all are contained is its Freedom, vLicL is LotL tLe lorm and
content olits lavvLicL canLeLegal, Moral orPractical.
1 81
Spirit as a lree sell-conscious Leing i s tLe sell-equal ' I ' vLicL in its
aLsolutely negative relation is in tLe Erst place an exclusive ' 1 ' , an
individuallree Leing orPerson.
1 82
Law is tLerelationsLip Letveenpeopleinsolar as tLey are aLstract
Persons . An actionis illegal LyvLicL someoneis not respectedas a
Person or vLicL encroacLes on tLe spLere ol Lis lreedom. Jhis
relationsLipistLerelore, inaccordancevitLitslundamentaldetermi-
nation, olanegative natureanddoesnot strictlydemandtLeproolto
tLeotLer person olanytLingpositiveLutonlytLatLeLimsellLelelt
alone as a Person.
1 83
JLe external spLere ol Lav and Freedom constitutes Property,
tLe suLsumption olsometLing unovned under my pover and my
vill. Possession istLesideolarLitrarilyta
ing possession. JLeaspect
olPropertyassucLaPossessionistLeuniversalside, tLatPossession
is anexpression olmy vill, vLicLas sometLing ALsolute, mustLe
respected Ly otLers.
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 63
1 84
I canDispose olmyProperty, olvLat¡sin lactProperty, i. e. vLat
partlyismine, partlyLasvitLinitselltLemomentolexterality. WLat
isinalienaLlelrommeismyreason, mylreedom, mypersonalityand
altogetLervLatessentially containsvitLinit my entire lreedom.
1 85
� canalienatemyPropertytoanotLerandcanacquirePropertyvLicL
IS not mine. JLis acquisitiontakesplaceonlyLyContract: tLemutual
consent oltvo persons to alienate a property and to let it pass to
anotLer andtLe consentoltLe otLer to acceptit.
JLe spLereolmylreedom contains myPersonality and tLe relation
olsometLingtotLis. WLentLis spLereisviolatedLyanotLertLis can
LappeneitLerintLesensetLatonlytLis tLingdoesnotLelongtome,
so tLat my Personality itsellis recognized, or in tLe sense tLat my
personalityitscllis notrecognized, vLicListLe casevLenmyLody
and lile suller inj ury.
1 87
IninjuringmyPersonalitytLeotLerdirectlyinjuresLisovn. WLatLe
does to me is not sometLing merely individual Lut sometLing
universal. WLat, according to tLe concept, Le Las done to Limsell,
mustLe madeanactuality. WLentLisisdoneLytLeinjuredpartyitis
Revenge; vLen it is carried out Ly tLe Iniversal Will, and in its
name, itis Punishment.
Lavi nrelationtoPropertyconstitutestLeoLjectolCivil Law. Lav
in relation to tLe Personality is tLe oLj ect olPenal or Criminal
Law. JLescienceoltLelundamentalconceptsolLavLasbeencalled
Natural Law, asiltLereverealavvLicLLelongedtomanLynature
and a dillerent Lav vLicL originated in society in tLe sense tLat in
tLis Lav tLe Matural Lav, as tLe true one, must to some extent Le
sacrifced. In lact society gives rise to particular lavs vLicb are not
contained in tLe Lav Lased on tLe individual personality. Society
Lovever, isattLesametimetLeremovaloltLeone-sidedness oltLe
principleoltLeindividualpersonality andits true realization.
1 64 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
1 89
Morality contains tLeproposition. Inyouractionregardyoursellas
a lree Leing, in otLer vords it adds tLe moment olsuLjectivity to
action, namely, ¸a) tLat tLe suLjective element in tLe lorm ol a
Iisposition and Intention sLall correspond to vLat is in itsell a
commandment, and tLat vLatisaIutysLall Leperlormednotlrom
inclination or lor tLesake olsome alien duty, or out olconceit ol
Leinggood, Lutbecause it is Duty; ¸L) LenceNorality concerns man
as a particular individual and is not merely negative like Lav. Òne
can only let a lree individual go Lis ovn vay Lut to tLe particular
individual sometLing must Ledemonstrated.
1 90
JLe Good is tLe content ol duties, namely, tLe lundamental
determinations vLicL contain tLe necessary Luman relationsLips or
tLe rational element in tLem. Evil is vLat villully aims at tLe
destruction ol sucL relationsLips. JLe Bad is vLen duties are
neglected, notvitLadirectintention, Lutknovingly, lromveakness
tovards tLe sensuous impulse, or ¸Ly] aninclinationoltLe Leart.
( 1) JLenecessaryLumanrelationsLip oleacLonet oLimsellconsists
¸a) in self-preservation, tLe individual suLjecting external pLysical
nature to Limsell and adj usting Limsell to it. ¸L) From Lis ovn
PLysicalnaturetLeindividualmustcreatetLeindependence olLisovn
Spiritualnature. ¸c)JLeindividualmustsuLjectLimsellto, andmake
LimsellconlormaLle to, Lis Universal Spiritual Essence: Education.
(2) JLeFamily Relationship istLenaturalunionolindividuals. JLe
Lond oltLis natural society is love and trust, tLe knovledge oltLis
originalunionandolactioninaccordancevitLit. AccordingtotLeir
particularrelationsLip tLeindividuals composingtLis societypossess
particular rigLts, iltLese rigLts vere asserted in tLe lorm ollegal
rigLts tLemoralLondoltLis society vouldLe destroyed, tLatLond
in vLicL eacL receives vLatintrinsically Lelongs to Lim out oftLe
sentiment ollove.
1 93
(3) JLe moral relationsLip to others generally is Lasedon tLe original
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 65
identityolLumannature. JLe duties oltLeuniversallove olallmen
consistinaLenevolentdisposition andintLeperlormanceolgeneral
duties according to tLe accidental nature oltLe relationsLip. Noral
oLligations to closer and permanent perlormance olservices arise
lroma relationsLiplreely Lasedonacquaintance and lriendsLip.
The State (Real Spirit)
JLenaturalsocietyoltLelamilyexpandsinto tLeuniversalsocietyol
tLe State Society [Staatsgesellschct] , vLicL isjustas mucL Lased on
nature as itis on associationlreely enteredinto. It rests as mucL on
Lav as on Norality Lut, in general, appears essentially not as a
society consisting ol individuals as ¸ratLer] an invardly united,
individualSpirit of the People.
JLe State Economy [Staatswissenschaft] exLiLits tLe organization
possessedLyPeople [ Vol
] as initsella living organicWLole.
JLe State, as tLe universal, lorms tLe antitLesis to individuals . It is
more tLe individuals are one vitL tLe Spirit ol tLe vLole. JLe
essentialsentimentol tLecitizens [Burger] tovardstLeStateisneitLer
one olblind obedience to its commands, nortLat eacL Lad to give Lis
individual consent to its arrangements and regulations, Lut ratLer
conEdencein tLem andintelligentoLedience.
JLeStatecontainsvariousPowers vLicL constitutetLemomentsol
general areitsabstract moments. JLereal povers aretLoseconstitut-
ing tLe vLole in eacL olvLicL tLose aLstract moments properly
appear. tLe]udicialandPolice, FinancialandAdministrative,Nilitary
and Political povers . JLe supreme activating centre ol all is tLe
JLe various Estates [Stcnde] ol a State are in general concrete
dillerences according to vLicL individuals are divided into classes
vLicL rest principally on inequality ol vealtL, ol connection and
education ¸culture] . JLese again rest in part on inequality olLirtL
166 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
vLereLy some individuals are more E tted lor one activity in tLe
serviceoltLe State tLan otLers .
JLeConstitution estaLlisLes tLe divisionand relationoltLevarious
StatepoversandtLespLereolactionoleacL, especialIytLerigLtsol
individuals in relation to tLe State andtLeirsLareolparticipation in
tLosepovers vLicL tLey ougLttoLave, notmerelyin tLe cLoice ol
Covernment, Lutalso in solar as tLeyare simply citizens.
Customs, Lavs and Constitution constitute tLe organizedinner lile
ola national Spirit. JLe principle, or tLe kind and speciEc cLaracter
olitsessence, isexpressedin tLem. InadditionitLasarelationtotLe
outside vorld and external destinies.
JLis, sotospeak, Factual History treatsoltLeconcreteexistenceol
apeople, tLedevelopmentolitsµrincipleinitsconstitutionandlavs
and in its destinies, in an external lasLion in accordance vitL
perceived events and tLeir immediate causes as tLey seem to lie in
contingent circumstances andindividual cLaracters.
Philosophical History not onlyappreLendstLeprincipleolanation
lromits institutions and destinies and develops tLe events lromtLat
principle, Lutconsiders especially tLeuniversal World-Spirit, Lov, in
an inner context, tLrougL tLe Listory ol nations in tLeir separate
appearances and tLeir destinies, it Las passed tLrougL tLe various
stagesolitslormation. ItexLiLitstLeIniversalSpiritin¡tsaccidents
so tLat tLis sLape orexternality is notdevelopedconlormaLly to its
essence. Its LigLer representation is its sLaping in a simple spiritual
¸£verynationdoes not countin vorldListory. £acL Las its point,
itsmoment, according to itsprinciple. JLen, as it seems, it departs
lor good. Its turndoes notcome Ly cLance. )
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 67
 Art exLiLits Spiritin individuality and, attLe sametime, purged ol
contingent existence and its cLanges and olexternal conditions, and
¸J|attooobjectively lorintuitionandrepresentation. JLeBeautiful in
its ovn essential nature is tLe oLject olArt, not tLe intuition ol
�+¡e vLicL itsellis only a temporal

�d tinµeci¡

¸Idea.Aesthetics treats oltLe more precise lorms oltLis Leautilul
¸ArtdependsonvLicLsuLstantialconsciousnessspiritis. Westudy
tLeCreekvorksolartandarenottLereloreCreeks . ItisnotdoneLy
¸mere] representation LutLytLeinnerproductivelile. JLeimagina-
tive products ola people are nota superstitious Lelielin sometLing
LuttLenation' sovnSpirit, tLeso-calledmiraculousisaridiculousLit
olmacLinery, tLe angels and tLe Mordic gods olKlopstock are a
misconception. It is tLe living mytLology ol a people, tLerelore,
vLicL constitutes tLe ground and suLstantial content olitsArt . )
Tvomainlormsolstyles olart aretoLe distinguisLed, tLeAntique
andtLeModern. JLecLaracteroltLel¡rstisplastic, oLj ective, tLatol
tLe otLer, romantic, suLj ective. Antique art exLiLits individuality at
tLat account an aLstraction and an allegory Lut remains a living
totality. In its oLj ective clarity and attitude it dissolves out tLe
contingent and arLitrary element olsuLj ectivity.
JLeArts are distinguisLed Ly tLe element invLicLtLey portray tLe
Leautilul, vLereLy tLe oLj ect and spirit oltLis portrayal is more
preciselydeüned. Forexternal intuitionpainting givesacolouredsLape
on a surlace, sculpture a colourless sLape in Lodily lorm. JLe inner
intuition music employs tLe medium olunimagedsounds, poetry tLe
¸Òratory, arcLitecture, tLe making olgardens, etc. are not pure
ünearts, LecausetLeyLaveanotLeraimtLantoexLiLittLeLeautilul. )
1 68 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
JLe cLielkinds olPoetry are tLe epic, lyric and dramatic. JLe Erst
depictstLeoLj ectasanexternalevent, tLesecond, asinglesentiment
ora suLjective movementintLeLeart, tLetLird, actionproper as an
ellectoltLe vill.
Religion gives tLe exposition ol ALsolute Spirit not merely lor
intuitionandpictorialtLinkingLutalsolortLougLtandcognition. Its
main lunction is to raise tLe individual to tLe tLougLt olCod, to
Lring Liminto union vitL Cod and to assure tLeindividual oltLat
¸Religion is tLe trutL as it is lor all men. JLe essence ol true
Religion is Love. It is essentially disposition as a knovledge oltLe
trutL ol tLe Luman vill. Religious Love is not merely a natural
sacriEce. ' Love one anotLer as I Lave loved you. ' goLn XV, 1 2)
inite power over all tLatis EniteinSpirit, over
vLatisLad, evil, criminal, evenpositivelavs, etc. CLristallovedLis
disciples to pluck tLe ears ol corn on tLe saLLatL and Lealed a
vitLered Land. Iivine Love
orgives sins and makes lor Spirit vLat
Las Lappened as il it Lad never Leen. NucL is lorgiven Nary
NagdaleneLecausesLelovedmucL ¸Luke VII, 47) . Iovetranscends
even moral considerations. Nary anoints CLristinstead olgivingto
tLe poor, and CLrist approves tLis. JLe suLstantial relationsLip ol
man to Cod is tLe lorgiveness ol sins. JLe Lasis ol Love is the
consciousness o
God and his essential nature as Love andLovetLereloreis
tLesupremeLumility. Itis not I vLo am toLetLeoLjectiveeIement
in Love Lut Cod, in knoving Lim I am to lorget myself JLe
lorgiveness olsinsis nota temporalevent, isnottLe consequence ol
anexternalpunisLment, Lutisanexteral, innerallairintLespiritand
tLe Leart. JLe nullilying olits nullity is tLe maj esty olLove. JLe
suLstantialrelationsLipolmantoCodseems toLeinitstrutLabeyond,
Lut tLe love ol Cod to man and ol man to Cod overcomes tLe
separationoltLe'Here' andtLe' Mov'lromvLatisrepresentedasa
Ieyond and is eternal lie.
JLisidentityisintuited in Christ. AstLeSonol Nan, Leis tLeSonol
Cod. For tLe

Cod-man tLere is no Leyond. He counts not as tLis
single individual Lut as universal man, as true man. JLe external side
olLis Listory must LedistinguisLedlromtLereligious side. He Las
The Philosophical Encyclopaedia 1 69
passed tLrougL tLe actual vorld, tLrougL lovliness, ignominy, Las
died. Hispain vas tLe deptL olunity oltLe divine and tLe Luman
nature in living sullering. JLe Llessed gods oltLe LeatLens vere
representedasinavorldLeyond,tLrougLCLrist, tLeordinaryactual
vorld, tLis lowliness vLicLis not contemptiLle, is itsel
f hallowed. His
resurrection andascensionare lorlaitL alone. StepLenlookedonLis
lace-ndsavLimstandingontLerigLtLandolCod. Cod' seternallile
is tLis, tLe return into Limself Jo let circumstantial details give rise
to douLt asiltLis verean externalrealityispitilul, cLildisL. FaitLis
not at all concerned vitL sensuous Listory Lut vitL vLat eternally
Lappens . History of God.
JLereconciliation olCodvitLman- as aLsoluteLappening, notas
contingent, as a caprice olCod- isknovnintLecLurcL. Jo knov
tLis is tLe Holy SpiritoltLe community. JLeKingdom of God is
primarily tLe invisible church, vLicL emLraces all regions and tLe
various religions, tLen it is tLe cLurcL in the world. In tLe Roman
CatLoliccLurcL tLe communityis divided vitLin itsellinto priests
and laity. JLe lormer possess autLority and exercise pover.
Reconciliation vitL Cod is in part ellected in external lasLion, in
general religion is a less spiritual reality among Roman CatLolics .
WitLProtestants, priestsareonly teacLers. AllintLecommunityare
equal Lelore Cod as tLe present Spirit oltLe community. Works as
sucL are poverless. It is laitL, disposition, tLat isimportant. £vilis
knovnassometLing aLsolutelynull. JLispainmustpierceman. He
must lreely take Lold olCod' s grace, uniting vitL Lim, in spite ol
evil, ilLesurrendersitanddravsavaylromit. ÒnlyintLeLeartcan
tLereLeanactualcommunityvitLCod. IntLeLearttootLesensuous
lorm oltLe sacraments is transf¡gured. )
Science is tLe compreLensive knovledge ol tLe ALsolute Spirit.
Since it is grasped in tLe
orm ol tLe Concept, everytLing alien in
vitL itself It is tLe Concept vLicL Las itsell lor content and
compreLends itself
C. W. F. Hegel, Wer
e, vol. 18, cd. K. Rosenkranz, Ierlin 1 840.
C. W. F. Hegel, Nurnberger SchriJten, ed. ]. Hollmeister, Leipzig
C. W. F. Hegel, Niirnberger und Heidelberger Schriten 1 808-181 7,
e, vol. 4, ed. £va Noldenhauer and Karl Narkus Nichel,
Suhrkamp Verlag, Franklurt-am-Nain 1970.
Early Theological Writings, trans . J. N. Knox, introduction Ly
RicLard Kroner, Chicago 1948.
Hegel 's Political Writings, trans . J. N. Knox, introduction Ly Z. A.
Pelczynski, Òxlord 1964.
On the Di
erence between Fichte's and Schelling's System ofPhilosophy,
trans. anded. W. CerlandH. S. Harris, AlLany, M. Y. 1977.
The System ofEthical Lie and First Philosophy ofSpirit, trans . anded.
Ly H. S. Harris and J. N. Knox, AlLany, M. Y. 1979.
Faith and Knowledge, trans. and ed. Ly W. Cerland H. S. Harris,
AlLany, M. Y. 1 977.
Natural Law, trans. J. N. Knox, introduction Ly H. I. Acton,
Philadelphia, 1 975
The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Niller, introduction Ly
]. M. Findlay, Òxlord1 977.
The Science ofLogic, trans. A. V. Niller, London 1969.
The Philosophy ofRight, trans. J. N. Knox, Òxlord 1 942.
Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia ofthe Philosophical Sciences, trans.
W. Wallace, Òxlord 1 975.
Philosophy ofNature: Part Two ofthe Encyclopaedia ofthe Philosophical
Sciences, trans. A. V. Niller, Òxlord1 970.
Philosophy ofMind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia ofthe Philosophical
Sciences, trans. W. Wallace and A. V. Niller, Òxlord 1 971 .
Lectures on t he Philosophy ofHistory , trans .]. SiLree, MevYork, M. Y.
1 956. Also see Lectures on the Philosophy of World History:
Introduction: Reason in History, trans . H. I. MisLet, CamLridge
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. £. S. Haldane and F. H.
Simpson, in three volumes, London 1 955.
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. £. I. Spiers and]. I.
Sanderson, inthree volumes, London 1968.
's Aesthetics, trans . J. N. Knox,intvovolumes, Òxlord 1975.
Avineri, S. Hegel 's Theory ofthe Modern State, CamLridge 1972.
Caird, £. Hegel , £dinLurgh and London 1 883.
Cullen, I. Hegel 's Social and Political Thought: An Introduction, IuLlin
Fackenheim, £. The Religious Dimension in Hegel 's Thought,
Iloomington, Ind. and London 1967.
Findlay,]. M. Hegel: A Re-Examination, London 1958.
Cadamer, H. C. Hegel 's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans . P.
Christopher Smith, London 1976.
Harris, H. S. Hegel 's Development: Towards the Sunlight 1 770-1801,
Òxlord 1972.
-Hegel 's Development: Night Thoughts Uena 1 801-06), Òxlord
Hyppolite, ]. Genesis and Structure of Hegel 's 'Phenomenology ol
Spirit' , trans . S. Cherniak and]. Heckman, £vanston 1974.
Invood, N. Hegel, Òxlord 1983.
Kaulmann, W. Hegel : Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary, London
-Hegel 's Political Philosophy, MevYork, M. Y. 1970.
Kelley, C. A. Hegel 's Retreat from Eleusis: Studies in Hegel 's Political
Thought, Princeton, 1978.
Kojève, A. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel : Lectures on the
'Phenomenology of Spirit', trans . ]. H. Michols, ed. Ly A. Iloom,
MevYork, M. Y. 1 969.
Lauer, Q. A Reading ofHegel 's (Phenomenology ofSpirit', MevYork,
M. Y. 1 976.
NacIntyre, A. ¸ed. ) Hegel: A Collection ofCritical Essays, MevYork,
M. Y. 1 972.
Nure, C. R. C. The Philosophy ofHegel, Òxlord 1 965.
172 The Philosophical Propaedeutic
Morman, R. Hegel 's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction,
IrigLton 1 976.
Pelczynski, Z. A. ¸ed. ) Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and
Perspectives, CamLridge 1971 .
-¸ed. ) The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political
Philosophy, CamLridge 1 984.
Plant, R. Hegel, London 1973, reviseded. Òxlord 1983.
Reardon, I. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, London 1977.
ReyLurn, H. A. The Ethical Theory o
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Reidel, N. Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Traniorm­
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Singer, P. Hegel, Òxlord 1 983.
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abstract object, 4
idea, 4
representation, 4
will, 22
abstraction, 4, 75
act, 2, 3, 10-1 1 , 1 5
actuality, 87-90, 133
aesthetics, xix, 167
antinomies, xviii, 90-6
appearance, 83-6
and content, 85
and form, 84
and inner and outer, 86
and matter, 84
and mutual relation, 84
and things and properties, 83
and wholes and parts, 83
higher, 2, 1 1
lower, 2
arbitrariness, 3, 1 7
art, 1 67-8
attention, 8
, authority, 5
being, 76-7, 1 27
determinate, xxvii-xxviii, 77-8,
1 27-8
nothing and becoming, xxvi, 77,
Bildung, xx
blessedness, 21
categories, 67
causality, 9
cause, 133
chemical sphere, 1 1 8
citizen, xxi
classics, xv-xvii
cognition of the good, 120-2
concept, 6, 76, 105-17, 134
doctrine of, 67
and reality, 104
realization of, 1 1 7-19
consciousness, xviii, 56-9
perceiving, 57
practical, 2, 7-8
and reason, 63-4
and self-consciousness, 59-63
sensuous, 57
theoretical, 1, 7-8
and understanding, 57
constitutions, 34-5, 166
contract, 28
curriculum, xiv, xxi
deed, 1 5
desire, 59, 60
discipline, xiv
disposition, 20, 37
dreams, 1 54
duties, 41-52
education, xiii-xxi, 1 8, 164
practical, 43-4
theoretic, 42-3
encyclopaedia, xviii, 124-5
end, 103, 1 17, 139-40
essence, 81-3, 130-2
estates, 166-7
evil, 50, 53, 164
experience, 5
1 74
family, 32, 46, 164
fate, 44
feeling, 6, 150, 161
fnitude, 13
fortune, 21
freedom, xxi, 14, 1 7-9
abstract, 3
political, 14-5
see also will
friendship, 51
good, 6, 50, 164
government, 33, 165
ground, 131-2
happiness, 38
history, 166
Idea, 76, 1 04, 127, 140-2
Idealism, 55
imagination, 8, 153
impulse, 2, 1 1 , 40, 60
instinct, 1 1
intuition, 9 , 151
Judgement, 24, 68-73, 99-103,
1 07-1 7, 134-6
apodictic, 72, 102, 1 13
assertoric, 71, 101 , 102, 1 12
categorical, 71, 101, 1 1 1 , 135
and copula, 68, 1 07
disjunctive, 71, 101 , 1 12, 135
hypothetical, 71 , 101, 1 12, 135
identical, 109
individual, 70
infnite, 70, 101 , 109, 135
modality of, 102-3, 1 1 2
negative, 69, 100, 108, 109, 135
particular, 70, 101 , 135
positive, 69, 100, 108, 135
and predicate, 68, 107
problematic, 102, 1 12
and proposition, 107
qualitative, 69, 100, 108, 135
of refection, 1 10
of relation, 101
singular, 135
and subject, 68, 107
universal, 101 , 135
knowing, 55, 122-3, 142
language, 8, 157-8
law, 19, 22-31 , 33, 35-6, 162, 163
life, 104, 1 19-20, 140-2
logic, xviii, xxii-xxiii, 65-123, 125
formal, 97
objective, 76, 105-23
ontological, 127-33
subjective, 76, 96, 127, 134-40
love, 168
marriage, 46
master-slave, 59-63
mathematics, 143-5
measure, 80-1
mechanism, 1 1 8
mediation, 1 1 8
memory, 156-7
moral action, 37, 40-1
moral will, 21
morality and law, 19, 164
nature, xviii-xix, xxiii, 125, 143-9
see also logic; spirit
object, 4
obligation, 36, 41-52
organic nature, 147-9
particularity, 67, 98
patriotism, 47
people, spirit of, 47
perception, 4, 5, 57
person, 23
phenomenology, xviii, 55-64
physics, 1 45-47
pleasure, 21 , 38-9
political society, 32
possession, 24, 162
powers (of the state) , 34
practical spirit, 160-6
properties (and accidents), 58
property, 24-8, 162-3
proposition, 107, 130-1
prudence, 44, 51
psychology, xviii, 56
punishment, 31, 163
quality, 78, 127-8
quantity, 79-80, 128-9
quantum, 129
realism, 55
reason, 39-40, 56, 63-4, 1 59-60
and truth, 64
and the understanding, 58
reciprocity, 133
recollection, 151, 152
reflection, 2, 12, 13, 39
religion, 21 , 52-4, 168-9
representation, 65-6, 75, 1 50-1
right (lawful) , 6
and absolute idea, 104, 169
of the concept, 105-17
and the idea, 1 1 9-23
and philosophy, xix
and realization, 1 1 7-23
self-consciousness, 59-63
sensation, 65
space and time, 66, 143
speech, 8
spirit, xx-xxi, xxiii-xxiv, 125,
see also logic; nature
state, 32, 47-52, 165
of nature, 33
syllogism, 72-3, 102-3, 1 13-17,
teleological concept, 103
temperance, 43
thing, 57, 83
thought (thinking) , 8-10, 65-6,
74-5, 1 58-60
truth, 64, 77, 108, 122-3
understanding, 58, 126
universal, 67, 105, 134
virtue, 45
will, xxviii-xxx, 16-8, 23, 24
abstract, 22
of choice, 3, 17
and freedom, 14-15, 16, 18
particular, 1
pure, 4, 18
universal, 1 , 16, 22
world, 1
writing, 8
1 75