Rudolf Dinu - Romanian Foreign Policy 1878-1914 DRAFT

206
ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BERLIN TO

SARAJEVO, 1878-1914. SOME CARACTERISTICS
*

Rudolf Dinu
The diplomacy
1
of the Old Kingdom as an historical era corresponds to
the period between the War of Independence (1877-1878) and the
disappearance of King Carol I, in October 1914. Somehow bizarre, its
history has never been written without bias, despite its indisputable
performance, the constancy and the credibility it has enjoyed, or the
prudence it has characterized it. What apparently predominates in the
Romanian historiography is a way of seeing and analysing the pre-war
diplomacy not based on its substance and logic, but rather as a simple
premise of what happened afterwards, overlapping successive realities
of a Romania which was in the post-Berlin period significantly different
from the one after the First World War. Its defining elements, in
particular the ones regarding the security strategy built around the
collaboration with the Central Powers, have been constantly viewed
negatively and described with a post-war view of things. However, it is
often forgotten that the objectives of this policy centred on the idea of
security for the Romania territory were significantly others than the
ones promoted by the decision-makers who succeeded the first King of
Modern Romania.
The present study sums up a number of observations which try to
distance themselves from the above mentioned vision, in which the
foreign policy of the Old Kingdom, by comparison with the post 1914
directions, appeared rather as an abnormal intermezzo.
*
One of the aspects that individualize the pre-World War period
refers to the decision making groups and mechanisms characteristic for

*
An early version of this paper (Diplomaia Vechiului Regat, 1878-1914:
management, obiective, evoluie) was published in Gh. Cliveti, Bogdan
Ceobanu, Ionu Nistor (eds.), Cultur, politic i societate n timpul domniei
lui Carol I. 130 de ani de la proclamarea Regatului Romniei, Iai, 2011, p.
121-146.
1
I use the term diplomacy to describe Romanian foreign policy and security
strategy, along with the traditional meaning which refers to the process of
negotiation and deliberation through which the epistemic community of
diplomats and decision makers promotes peace and cooperation among
states.

ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM BERLIN TO SARAJEVO, 1878-1914 207
foreign policy. It particularizes the epoch not just the Romania space,
as the secret and dynastic diplomacy still represented at the end of the
19
th
century the general emblem of the governmental landscape in
Europe: If with regard to domestic policy issues wrote an Italian
journalist in 1906 referring to international politics the Parliament,
the universal suffrage, the public opinion, and the politicians matter for
a long time now, when it comes to foreign affairs, the policy remains in
a necessary way narrow, dark, jealous, esoteric, as was during the time
of Richelieu. Honestly speaking, it does not reach, simultaneously, the
number of 25 personas contributing to the regulation of international
affairs
2
.
The first observation therefore refers to the decision making groups
and mechanisms typical for the Romanian foreign policy. In pre-war
Romania, diplomacy was a domain reserved to King Carol I, the
sovereign being seen, in the context of the parliamentary life and as in
many other European countries, as the only guarantor of the foreign
policys continuity. The way the Romanian sovereign and his ministers,
similar otherwise to the majority of the crowned heads of that era,
managed the foreign affairs, was, at least until the First World War, an
absolutist one, rational, still based on the idea of arcana imperii and
outside of Parliaments control. King Carol I was during his entire reign
a constant presence in the field of foreign affairs, all directions being
defined and set according to his own will. His associates were in
general the president of the Council of Ministers and/or the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. The layout of the Romanian decision-making group
put forward a high degree of mobility, especially from the perspective
of its structure, extremely fluctuant in time. The bipolar unit, mostly in
the formula of King/president of the Council, or even King/Minister of
Foreign Affairs, substituted itself often to a tripolar unit in the formula
of King/president of the Council/Minister of Foreign Affairs. Its
permanently reduced dimensions and, indirectly, its mobility were first
of all due to the express desire of the sovereign, a desire directly connected
to the idea of arcana imperii. The collective nature of decision
unquestionably marked the local decision-making mechanism during
the entire period delimited by the great liberal government (1881-1888)
until Ion C. Brtianus retirement in 1888. Subsequently, until 1914,
the Kings role within the decision-making group became predominant,
rapidly subordinating the other decision-making actors. Such a reality
is broadly attested in the sources of that period, either diplomatic or of
another nature. King Carols tendency after this zero moment point,
somehow unrealistic, was to freeze the composition of the decision-
making group. Certainly, not just the members of the Parliament were

2
Quoted in E. Decleva, Fra raccoglimento e politica attiva. La politica
estera nella stampa liberale italiana, 1870-1914, in Idem, Lincerto alleato.
Ricerche sugli orientamenti internazionali dellItalia unita, Franco Angeli,
Milano, 1987, p. 16.

208 RUDOLF DINU
excluded from the process of managing foreign affairs, but also the
majority of the Governments members
3
.
Due to its elasticity, or rather the confusion of the constitutional
provisions in this area, the Parliaments role of co-partner in elaborating
the countrys foreign policy had atrophied considerably, especially after
1880. The National Representative obviously continued to exert a
certain right to information and control in this area by voting certain
laws, among others the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by
examining the Green Books, by inquiring and hearing the Minister of
Foreign Affairs etc. However, the development of guidelines for the
external strategy, recruitment and organization of the diplomatic
corps, and even the final decision at times of crisis, remained outside of
the Parliaments knowledge. An exception was the time of the Balkan
Wars, when, due to objective reasons, the Parliament was called to give
its endorsement to the Governments foreign policy
4
.
The daily management of Romanian foreign policy was in general
the task of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the specialized personnel
below him. In the period between the Berlin Congress and the crisis of
July 1914, the Foreign Affairs portfolio was monopolized by the experts
in foreign policy of the two ruling parties, liberal and conservative. The
longest of them was, by far, the liberal leader Dimitrie A. Sturdza,
responsible for the fate of the Romanian diplomacy for more than 11
years, between 1882-1885, 1895-1896, 1897-1899, 1901-1902, 1904 and
1907-1908. Although trained since the beginning in a variety of fields
and apparently improvised in their appointment as Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, most holders of this position Vasile Boerescu, D. A.
Sturdza, Mihail Pherekyde, Ion Cmpineanu, Petre P. Carp, Ion
Blceanu, Constantin Esarcu, Titu Maiorescu had prior experience
in the field of international relations, being the outcome of a diplomatic
career rather than of the political environment in which they activated
5
.
Within the decision-making group, starting with the crisis of 1882-
1883 and until the Great War, there was almost always present a
predominantly pro-German structure, and to some extent anti-Russian.
Aside from the sovereign a Hohenzollern, for whom a certain
sentimental connection towards Germany was natural there were
other politicians and diplomats involved in the decision making
process, almost all obviously attracted by this Great Power, whom they
admired its military force and economic dynamics, some of them having a
German educational background (D. A. Sturdza, Petre P. Carp, Titu
Maiorescu) or being even disciples of the German development model

3
Rudolf Dinu, King Charles I and Decision Making Process in the Romanian
Foreign Policy before the First World War, in Idem, Studi italo-romeni.
Diplomazia e societ, 1879-1914, second edition, Bucureti, 2009, p. 185 sqq.
4
Ibidem, p. 189.
5
Idem, Diplomacy in the Old Kingdom (1878-1914), in Dinu C. Giurescu,
Rudolf Dinu, Laureniu Constantiniu, Romanian Diplomacy. An Illustrated
History, 1862-1947, Bucureti, 2010, p. 96-97.

(P. P. Carp). Besides the structure of the international system at that
time, the above remarks explain why this limited decision group, with
the King permanently at the top, had an original way of gathering
information about the evolutions in Europe. In other words, its mental
map was drown based on direct, almost exclusive contacts with
officials from Berlin and Vienna, established and conducted by the
group members, the King, the president of the Council, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs
6
.
Due to the monopole claimed by the sovereign and his ministers in
the field of foreign affairs, the diplomatic elite of the Old Kingdom
retained in general a relatively volatile role in the decision making
process. The technological progress in the fields of communications
(the appearance and generalization of telegraph), gathering and
transmitting information, induced, beginning with the second half of
the 20
th
century, a significant development in the European sphere,
drastically limiting the diplomats room for manoeuvre (temporal and
real) and pushing him away from the deliberative to the consultative
sphere. In the case of the Romanian diplomatic corps, its almost
exclusively implementing and executive function was increased by the
absolutist vision of some of the Kings intimate advisors on the daily
management of foreign policy, adepts of Bismarcks model of
administration, defined by a precise and rigid hierarchy, an absolute
obedience of an official unable to state his opinion, and whose only
duty was to carry into effect as soon as possible and without any
interfering the instructions received
7
.
Therefore in Romania and not only the decision was a political
one, in all key moments, in October 1883, in July 1913, in August 1914,
and again in August 1916, and was influenced by a small group of
actors. It did not belong to the Parliament, called indeed to sanction
the governments decisions, as well as the ones of the Crown Council
(in August 1914/1916). Just as it did not belong to the street, the
public opinion. The street certainly shaped the Romanian pre-war
policy, but the street was to a great extend the creation of the political
sphere, fed with the ideas and the ambitions of the metropolitan
political and intellectual world.
*
The second observation focuses on the substance of the Romanian
foreign policy during the Old Kingdom. The objectives pursued by the
Romanian authorities after 1878 were: maintaining state independence,
creating the necessary conditions for its development in a stable and
secure international environment, and providing security to its citizens.
These objectives were permanently in the centre of the Romanian

6
Ibidem, p. 97.
7
Ibidem, p. 98-99. For the characteristics of the Romanian diplomatic corps see
Ibidem, p. 71 sqq.

210 RUDOLF DINU
foreign strategy and all the other directions of foreign policy evolved in
direct connection with them.
After independence and with the cancellation of the protective
umbrella created by the Peace Congress in Paris the collective
guarantee of the seven Great Powers Romania had to define its own
external strategy. An easy explanation was and still is, that the
possibility itself to opt for an alliance was present in the analysis of the
Romanian government immediately after obtaining the independence
and that the foreseen options, various in theory, were restrained
given the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions of the country, as
well as the balance of power at that moment at the two neighbouring
Empires, Austria-Hungary and Russia. In the end, the balance tipped
in favour of the dualist Monarchy. In reality, Romanias road to an
alliance with the Central Powers was more than a simple choice, and
must be seen from a more nuanced point of view rather than based on
the rudimentary dichotomy of sympathies and aversions towards
the Central Empires or the Western Powers.
Perceiving the threat as coming from Russia explains, for example,
why the Central Powers were the chosen ones. The antagonist
attitude of Russia said Ion I. C. Brtianu in 1919, in a speech in from
of the Parliament has separated the waters! Then we found ourselves
[in 1878 n. R.D.] without possible support in the West. Set between
two powers: a pan-Slavic Russia which did not give up to reach
Constantinople through the Balkan Peninsula, and a Germany, which,
together with Austria-Hungary, formed the core of the Central Powers,
to which Italy associated. [] Do not forget that, actually, Bulgaria at
that time was a Russian province, that its prince was rather a governor,
a nephew of the Emperor, surrounded by three Russian generals: the
Minister of War, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and that, therefore, Russias expansion towards us and
over us was the most considerable threat that modern Romania had
faced even since the time of Nicolae [I] Pavlovici, before the Crimean
War
8
.
However, the fear of Russia, manifested in 1878 and the following
years, does not explain, especially if its interpreted dissociated from
the mind map of the Romanian decision makers, why the alliance
politics became an option only five years later. In my opinion, the
option for an alliance was imposed with enough difficulty in a political
climate still dominated by ideas and principles which had been the
corner stone in the building of the modern state. The Romanian political
elite found itself in the situation of elaborating its foreign policy
strategies in a moment when it was still influenced by the experiences
of circa 25 years of guaranteed neutrality. Therefore, after the Berlin

8
Speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on December 16, 1919, published
in Romnia n timpul Primului Rzboi Mondial. Mrturii documentare, vol.
I, 1914-1916, Bucureti, 1996, p. 26-27.

Congress the guiding line of the Romanian officials continued to be, for
a while, neutrality, the independent policy, while the almost
unanimous consensus existing within the political sphere with regard
to this option prevented any attempt of the decision making group
towards a formal political-military commitment.
The option for an alliance policy as a solution to the security
problems and support for the external strategy of the Romanian state
took shape after more than three years of continued deterioration of its
international position, in the turbulent context created by the direct
and fierce confrontations with the Great Powers on the issue of
navigation on the Lower Danube. The Danube question
9
(1880-1883)
favoured the first major diplomatic action of Romania at the conti-
nental level, meant to safeguard its interests which seamed to be just
according to the international law. The policy of the Romanian
Government was rather visceral, dominated by feelings, bereft of the
diplomatic flexibility given by tradition and experience, but vigorous,
sustained, in accordance with what the entire domestic political
spectrum and public opinion resonated at that time. The Danube
question proved to be an important formative experience for the
diplomacy of the Old Kingdom, hastening its maturation and the
recovery of the conceptual backwardness in relation to the general
European trend. And this because the Danube dispute, initially
considered a regional litigation without much chance to escalate, had
evolved relatively quickly, due to the direct influence on the expansionist
policies of some powers interested in the Lower Danube. The dispute
turned into an issue with broad political and security connotations for
Romania, and upon its resolution may have depended, to a large
extent, the countrys future as an independent state within the
international system.
For the Romanian decision making, the Danube question functioned
on the long term, just like the Tunisian crisis of 1881 worked for Italy.
It was the supreme evidence that highlighted Romanias international
isolation and the impossibility of practicing a policy of neutrality, while
acting as a catalyst in the process of articulating the external strategy,
and choosing a policy of alliance.
*
The security strategy envisioned in this context was translated into
Romanias connection to the Triple Alliance by signing on October 30,

9
erban Rdulescu-Zoner, La souverainet de la Roumanie et le problme du
Danube aprs le Congrs du Berlin, in Revue des tudes sud-est
europennes, IX, no. 1, 1971, p. 152 sqq; Gh. N. Czan, La question du
Danube et les relations roumano-austro-hongroises dans les annes 1878-
1883, in Revue roumaine dhistoire, XVIII, no. 1, 1979, p. 43-61; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, DDR, Rudolf Dinu, Alin
Ciupal, Antal Lukcs (eds.), seria I, vol. 11, 1883, Bucureti, 2006, passim.

212 RUDOLF DINU
1883, a treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany
unconditionally subscribed the same day. Romanian decision makers
wanted, in fact, a direct alliance with Berlin and, just as a last resort
given the policy of sparing Russia promoted by Chancellor von
Bismarck were they forced to settle for an alliance by ricochet
10
.
The alliance was defensive and secret (Art. 6), valid for five years and
automatically extended for another three years if either party did not
give notice one year before the expiring date, or did not require its
revision (Art. 5). Military matters were to be regulated by a special
agreement (Art. 3). Article 4 provided that the parties had the obligation,
in the case of a joint war, not to negotiate and not to conclude a
separate peace. Casus foederis was defined in article 2 and required the
two parties to offer mutual assistance in case of an unprovoked attack
11
.
In the autumn of 1883 the Romanian Kingdom became therefore
associated party to the Triple Alliance, due to direct and indirect
treaties which put it nevertheless in a satellite position in relation to
the three Great Powers. For many political, military, moral, and even
legal reasons, Romania was never accepted as pari passu in this
alliance, despite the fact, that at one point, she formally requested to
become a partner with equal status.
For Austria-Hungary, signing the treaty with the Romanian Kingdom
meant the completion of the alliance system protecting the southern
border, as well as a real win for the Monarchys defence system as a
whole
12
. In the light of the agreement, even though the text had no
express provision in this matter, the government from Vienna had
reasons to hope that the Romanian government will pay the political
cost of the alliance, and will not support or become part to the
irredentist movements in Transylvania. The alliance offered Romania a
way out from the international isolation, brought solid security
guarantees and along with them the opportunity to focus on internal
development. As in the case of Italy, the alliance was also an additional
guarantee to the efforts of preserving the monarchic regime. Finally,
for Germany and for Bismarck, concluding an alliance with Romania
was beyond anything else (e.g. strategic reasons like strengthening the
southern flank of Austria-Hungary, but also pragmatic ones, like the
possibility to offer Austria-Hungary additional security with minimum
political and military costs) in the logic of a comprehensive post-
unification effort to prevent and avoid any changes to the European

10
DDR, I, vol. 11, no. 421, note 350 (Sturdza to Liteanu, Bucureti, October 5,
1883).
11
Ibidem, no. 412; the treaties were ratified by Carol I on November 6, 1883, by
Wilhelm I on November 11 and by Franz Joseph on November 12, see Alfred
F. Pribram, Les traits politiques secrets de lAutriche-Hongrie, 1879-1914,
vol. I, Paris, 1923, p. 40-47.
12
Francis Roy Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo. The Foreign Policy of Austria-
Hungary, 1866-1914, London and Boston, 1972, p. 144.

status quo, especially in regions with a high revolutionary risk, like
France, the Polish areas, Italy, the Balkan states
13
.
*
The system of alliances to which Romania became part in 1883 was
not negotiated in preparation for a war, but as a security arrangement
designed to ensure long-term peace and security. Established 30 years
before the outbreak of the First World War, the Dreibund covers the
era of an entire generation, either actors or decision makers. In all the
relevant critical situations which took place in Europe between 1885
and 1914, the Triple Alliance played a fundamental role, from the
Bulgarian crisis, 1885-1887, till the Moroccan crisis, the Libyan war
and the Balkan wars
14
. The Triple Alliance was, however paradoxical it
may seem at first glance, a reliable and serious tool against war
15
. The
Dreibund, similar to the Franco-Russian alliance or the later Entente,
was defined primarily by security guarantees and not by provisions
related to territorial acquisitions. Certainly the latter were not absent
from the text, but they referred to well defined matters, which did not
require a European war. The availability of the states to follow their
allied in actions meant to enhance ones power or to conquer new
territories was almost zero. The alliance with the Central Powers
tempered therefore the Romanian foreign policy, implicitly increasing
the degree of stability and security in the area. In almost all regional
crises after 1883, from the Rumelian question to the Balkan wars, the

13
Rudolf Dinu, Introducere, in DDR, I, vol. 11, p. XXXII; Idem, Diplomacy in
the Old Kingdom (1878-1914), loc. cit., p. 63-188, 120-125.
14
Holger Afflerbach, La Triplice Alleanza tra politica di Grande Potenza e
politica di alleanza, in Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, anno LXXXVIII,
suplemento al fasc. IV, 2001, p. 161-175, 163.
15
Both power alignments established in Europe at the end of the nineteenth
century had, as Paul Schroeder argued, such a dual function in international
relations. The alliances from the end of the nineteenth century had a
managerial potential in international relations, being, at least in part, the key
to a lasting peace. The alliances of the Bismarck era and the Weltpolitik
period have to be seen suggested the same Paul Schroeder rather as
blocking coalitions which did not necessarily divided the continent into two
antagonistic blocs. The Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian alliance stood
side by side and not face to face, thus decisively contributing to maintain the
balance of power in Europe. Cf. Paul Schroeder, The 19
th
-Century International
System: Changes in the Structure, in World Politics, 39, no. 1, October
1986, p. 1-26, 10; Idem, Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools
of Management, in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National
Security Problems, Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 1976, p.
227-262, 242-249. With a permanent structure (provided by the foreign
diplomatic network), alliances such as the Dreibund and later the Entente,
increased the level of cooperation and consultation between partners and
carried forward, albeit in a different formulation, the consensual mechanism
of the European Concert.

214 RUDOLF DINU
Triple Alliance shaped, constrained and moderated Romanian foreign
policy, transforming the small kingdom based north of the Danube into
a factor of stability in South-Eastern Europe. The obligation to consult
its alliance partners (for whatever related to international action and
security policy), together with an excessive carefulness of King Carol I,
were the key elements of a foreign policy that made Romania a
guarantor of peace in the Balkans. The Alliance placed Romania on a
peaceful path, offered her security, safety, prestige, and thanks to a
protective shield, the possibility to prosper. Under the leadership of
the Prince of Hohenzollern could be read in a memo from 1898, from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , two decades ago Romanian emerged
victorious and full of glory from the dangerous Eastern crisis. It was
the first time in the long history of Russian eastern wars when the
country was not occupied. In an extremely critical time, the Prince
mobilized his young army as an independent and decisive factor in the
Balkan war, and won through struggle the independence of the country
and his crown. During the peaceful period that followed, due to the
steady leadership of its King, Romanias foreign policy operated
successfully in connection with the Triple Alliance, and made
significant contributions to peace in the East, in opposition to the
tumult present in the Balkan states. Hand in hand with this, the
economic and technical development of the country took a significant
momentum, and the Kingdom reached the position and the importance
of today, unexpected 30 years ago
16
.
*
The alliance with the Central Powers, joined by Italy on May 9,
1888
17
, was the underlying element of Romanias foreign and security
policy until the outbreak of the First World War. The initial treaty was
renewed in November 1887. The first Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian
treaty and with it the accession of Germany and Italy expired on
November 1, 1891, the renewal being hindered by the conservative
government, whose leaders ignored the existence of the agreements
with the Central Powers (the Lascr Catargiu government). A second
Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian alliance treaty was signed on July 25,
1892, together with Germanys agreement of unconditional accession.
Italy re-joined as well on November 28, 1892, complying ad literam
with the terms set in 1888. The second treaty, as well as the related
accessions, remained in force until the outbreak of the First World
War, due to the subsequent renewals on September 18/30, 1896 (April

16
BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii
mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed to the
Secretary of State of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. von Blow, by the undersigned
[Alexandru Beldiman] at May 4, 1898).
17
Rudolf Dinu, Italian-Romanian Relationship Inside of the Triple Alliance.
The 1888 Agreement, in Idem, Studi italo-romeni, p. 65-148.

25/May 7, 1899, Germany; June 9, 1899 Italy), April 4/17, 1902 (July
12/25, Germany; December 13, Italy), and January 23/February 5,
1913. The text underwent only minor changes during this period: in
1902, at the request of Austria-Hungary, was introduced a clause for
automatic renewal every three years, as long as no party to the treaty
would ask for its termination; in 1913, at the suggestion of Austria-
Hungary and Germany, there were made provisions so that the validity
of the Austrian-Romanian basic treaty and the German and Italian
accession agreements to coincide with the treaty of the Triple Alliance.
The political agreement was never completed with a formal military
convention. In 1883 this had not been a subject of negotiations, as Austria-
Hungary was primarily interested in Romanias neutrality and not to
involve the five Romanian infantry divisions in a war with Russia. The
question of a possible military cooperation with the Romanian army
became of an immediate interest in the winter of 1887-1888, as relations
between the Central Powers and Russia reached a critical point
18
.
On this occasion, the Romanian government showed its willingness
to support Austria-Hungary and Germany in a possible war against
Russia
19
. In early 1888, Romanian officials expressed their desire to
reach with the allies a clearly defined agreement regarding the alignment
of troops (organized in four army corps, the equivalent of eight divisions,
or 17 brigades, whereby 32 infantry regiments and 12 horsemen
regiments
20
). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs D. A. Sturdza was
sent to Vienna and Berlin to discuss the matter with the chiefs of
general staff of the two great powers. At the same time, Sturdza had to
negotiate with Berlin banks for a loan necessary to build the fortified
line in southern Moldova, which was to defend Romania from a Russian
invasion
21
. Issues related to a possible cooperation of the Romanian
army in the event of a war with Russia were discussed by Sturdza with
General Baron von Beck, in Vienna on January 9, 1888, and
subsequently with Field Marshal von Moltke, in Berlin on January 26,
1888
22
. Similar talks were also held by King Carol I in March the same

18
W. Medlicott, Austria-Hungary and the war danger of 1887, in The Slavonic
Review, year VI, no. 17, December 1927, p. 437-441.
19
On December 21, 1887, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest, Goluchowski,
informed the government in Vienna that Romania was discretely preparing
for war (a reference to the USD 30 million loan voted by the Chamber on
February 7, 1887, to complete the armament and to defense the countrys
neutrality) as Carol I and Prime Minister Ion C. Brtianu were convinced
that Russia was planning to invade the Romanian territory without a
declaration of war.
20
ABNR, fund Koglniceanu, file 759 (Reprezentaiune grafic a Comandamentelor
Armatei 1888).
21
Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 119 (De Launay to Crispi, Berlin,
January 27, 1888).
22
BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 31(2)/DCCCLXXXVI (Klnoky to Sturdza, Vienna,
January 8, 1888); Alfred Graf von Waldersee, Denkwrdigkeiten des
General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. I, auf

216 RUDOLF DINU
year, during a visit to Berlin. The Chief of the Austrian-Hungarian
General Staff, General von Beck, was sceptical of the combat capacity
of the Romanian army, and did not hesitate to point the fact that
Romanias neutrality would be preferable, rather than dangerously
extending a front that Romanians would not be able to defend themselves.
In his operational plans, von Beck was counting on the Austrian-
Hungarian troops from Transylvania to take part in the offensive in
Galicia, and therefore he was not agreeable to the prospect of dispensing
with these troops in order to aid the Romanian army
23
. In the talks had
with the German decision makers, King Carol I clearly indicated that
the Romanian army was not capable to independently lead offensive
campaigns and that it needed the Austrian-Hungarian cooperation to
make a real contribution to the joint effort of war. This opinion was
shared by German officials, but as von Beck refused to change the
operational plans, the discussions opened in January 1888 remained
without any practical result
24
. About a possible Romanian military
offensive in the Crimea, backed up by an Italian expeditionary corps of
at least 100,000 soldiers, was discussed purely theoretical in the winter
of 1887-1888 without involving the Romanian side when Italian
Prime Minister Francesco Crispi proposed to Austrian-Hungarian
government to send an expeditionary army corps on the Eastern front
in Galicia, in exchange for a naval agreement (the concrete result of the
negotiations employed by the Italian side was the countrys accession
to the Austrian-Romanian treaty, on May 9, 1888, and the disorientation
of Russian general staff, which in 1892 was estimating that there were
going to be as many as three Italian army corps on the Romanian
front!)
25
.
The conclusion of the military talks held in late eighties (to be also
found in a study by the German General Staff in mid-January 1888)
indicated therefore that without support, the four Romanian armies
were too weak and ethereal to initiate an offensive in Bessarabia or
towards Odessa
26
. A direct connection of these armies with the right
wing of the Austrian troops in Galicia and Bukovina or a joint
operation were not options to be considered since the Romanian army
would have found itself too far from its logistic bases. She was supposed to
march to southern Moldova to expect a Russian attack on a defensive
alignment including Galai Nmoloasa Focani (with the 4
th
Army
deployed between Focani Tecuci Adjud Brlad). Therefore,
Romanias military value for her allies depended, at least up to 1901, on

Veranlassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearb. und
hrsg. von Heinrich Otto Meisner, Stuttgart, 1922, p. 355.
23
Scott W. Lackey, op. cit., p. 145.
24
Ibidem.
25
Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 141-142.
26
General Feldmareal von Moltke, Promemoria pentru Ministerul german de
Externe, Berlin, January 14, 1888, quoted in Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni,
p. 115-116.

her ability to divert as many Russian troops as possible (even beyond
the 7
th
and 8
th
Army, stationed in Bessarabia and Odessa), to block
them in Bessarabia and thus prevent their movement to the front in
Galicia or even to the border with Germany.
After 1896-1897, in the context of a negative evolution of the
Romanian-Bulgarian relations, the operational plans required a
gradual adjustment in order to enable to defend the country in the
event of a Bulgarian aggression, hitherto unstudied. Part of the
Romanian armed forces was relocated in the military plans so they
could react quickly in the event of a Bulgarian attack in Dobrudja.
According to a memorandum on mobilization written in July 1900, the
1
st
Army Corps was to be stationed in Rmnicul Srat, and according to
the situation, to be deployed either to Moldova or Dobrudja
27
. In fact,
the wish of the Romanian decision makers to reserve one of the four
armies in the event of a Bulgarian aggression manifested much earlier,
since 1897. The decision on the new layout of the Romanian armed
forces became official in April 1900, when King Carol I announced the
allied governments in Vienna, Berlin and Rome, that in the event of
European complications (i.e. a war with Russia and France), the Triple
Alliance had to rely only on three Romanian army corps, as the forth
one was intended to defend the border with Bulgaria regardless of the
situation
28
.
It is unclear whether this provision was subject to change a year
later, in the context of the new military arrangements made by
Romania and Austria-Hungary after talks in Sinaia, in June 1901. What
can be said after analyzing the Austrian-Hungarian military plans is
that, since 1901, the operational plans of the dual monarchy favoured a
joint Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian offensive, which implied the
Romanian troops were to be massed in the Iai area, in order to
connect with the right wing of the Austrian-Hungarian troops and
advance towards east-northeast (Mogilev)
29
. Eight Romanian infantry
divisions, supported by a cavalry division, would have had to attack
and neutralize the 5
th
Russian Army (5 divisions plus one reserve) in
Bessarabia, and then help the Austrian-Hungarians by shrouding and
then engaging the 4
th
Russian Army (which operated in the Kamerica-
Proskurov area) in its southern and rear flank. Such an option was the

27
ANIC, fund Casa Regal, file 29/1900 (Memoriu asupra concentrrii armatei
n Ipoteza A, Bucureti, July 1900).
28
35 anni di relazioni italo-romene, 1879-1914. Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
[35 anni], a cura di Rudolf Dinu, Ion Bulei, Bucureti, 2001, no. 381, p. 415-
416 (Beccaria to Visconti Venosta, Bucharest, April 15, 1900); Rudolf Dinu,
Studi italo-romeni, p. 51.
29
Graydon A. Tunstall Jr., Planning for War against Russia and Serbia. Austro-
Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914, East European
Monographs, no. CCCLXXIV, Boulder Colorado, 1993, p. 51.

218 RUDOLF DINU
basis for discussions between Conrad-Averescu
30
in 1908-1909 and
Conrad-Criniceanu in 1910-1911. Its not less true that all these plans
indicated the maintenance of secondary Romanian units (reserve) on
the Danube, in order to prevent a Serbian or Bulgarian attack
31
. The
R-scenario of a war with Russia in the Austrian-Hungarian military
planning continued to consider the cooperation of Romanian armies
until the winter of 1912
32
.

30
The strategic concept stated in the Conrad-Averescu talks in January 1908 is
to be found in an autographic note addressed to the Operational Office of the
General Staff on January 11, published by Michael Behnen, Rstung
Bndnis Sicherheit. Dreibund und informeller Imperialismus, 1900-1908,
Tubingen, 1985, p. 351, footnote 49: a). Concentration of the bulk of Romanian
army (the 4
th
, 3
rd
and 2
nd
corps, plus the cavalry division) in the Iasi-Roman
area. Aim: vigorous offensive on all lines towards Zmerinka. Joining in the
offensive phase with the 4
th
Austro-Hungarian army. b). Defensive group
below Siret for direct support (Romanian 1
st
corps and Division Dobrogea).
On the plans of military cooperation on the Danube, in event of a conflict with
the Balkan States and Italy, see Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 173-174.
31
Graydon A. Tunstall Jr., op. cit., p. 68-70, 72, 84; Norman Stone, Moltke-
Conrad: Relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General
Staffs, 1909-14, in The Historical Journal, IX, 2, 1966, p. 201-208, 209,
210-212; Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 172-174.
32
Cf. Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf: Architect of the
Apocalypse, Boston Leiden Kln, 2000, p. 119-120. Conrad also asked in
1912 for an arrangement of the Romanian troops in the Iai-Botoani area for
an offensive action towards Chiinu-Kiev. In the absence of the Italian
divisions promised in 1888, or of the Austro-Hungarian ones, meant to
support a possible Romanian offensive, Carol I initially inclined for a
defensive alignment, behind the fortified line of Brlad-Galai-Nmoloasa-
Focani. In the end, the verbal agreements accepted by the two parties (after
the Conrad-Averescu talk), seamed to contain compromise: one army corps
(IV) was to be concentrated in the Roman area, while the other four (I, II, III,
V) were to be located in southern Moldova, in the Brlad-Focani-Tecuci area.
The Romanian armies were to initiate a general offensive towards Chiinu in
cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army from Bucovina. Cf. Franz
Conrad von Htzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918, 5 vol., Vienna-
Berlin-Leipzig-Mnchen, 1921-1925, vol. 2, p. 351-370; Claudiu Lucian Topor,
Romnia, Austro-Ungaria i Rzboiul din Balcani. Vizita la Bucureti a
generalului Conrad von Htzendorf (28-30 noiembrie 1912), in Analele
tiinifice ale Universitii Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iai, Istorie, LI, 2005,
p. 189-200, 194-195. Regarding the Russian pre-war military planning and
the attention paid to the Romanian front, see Bruce W. Menning, War
Planning and Initial Operations in the Russian Context, in Richard F.
Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig, War Planning 1914, 2009, p. 80-142, 88-90,
109-110; David G. Hermann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the
First World War, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, p. 13, 61, 207. The indicative
of the Russian troops meant to stop a Romanian attack differs in the studies
about the Russian and Austrian-Hungarian military planning: Menning refers
to the 7
th
Army in the Odessa-Crimea region (possible confusion with the 7
th

army corps indicated in the German memorandum in 1888), while Tunstall

*
The security instrument created in 1883 was far from perfect.
Without being from the beginning a critical issue in Romanian-
Austrian-Hungarian relations, the situation of the Romanians in
Hungary, the original defect of the alliance, evolved over time to such a
stage that the agreement between the two states finally came to depend
only on the will of an ethereal decision making group, the same that
decided it
33
. The secret character of the treaty, stated in art. 6 and
obstinately assumed with every renewal, was equally a fundamental
flaw, as it made its impact on the public opinion (in Romania and
Hungary) almost zero. Due to this secrecy, the partnership with the
Triple Alliance remained for the real Romania a superficial experience,
as the Romanian society, unlike the Italian one, was not subject to the
consequences derived from this relationship. The arcane character of
the treaty and the political-military elite of the Old Kingdom,
predominantly francophone and gradually contaminated by natio-
nalism, made managing this alliance a nightmare for Romanian decision
makers and fuelled an incompatibility in relation to Austria-Hungary
(envisioned by some even since 1883-1884
34
) which would lead,
through a continuous erosion, to a blockage of the security mechanism.
In particular the national problem, whenever was activated prior to
the First World War, brought tension in relation with the main ally.
And due to the fact that it acted systemically, shaking the entire system
of alliances, this issue tested Romanias relations with the dualist
Monarchy as well as with Germany, and inevitably influenced the
security strategy. At the beginning of the tenth decade, the aggravating
situation of the Romanian population in Transylvania and the
repression of the Memorandum movement (June 9, 1892 May
1894) brought such a critical time in Romanias relations with the
allied empires. The nationalist policy of the Wekerle government in
Hungary towards Romanians and non-Hungarians in general, served
at least partially as a catalyst. On the other side of the Carpathians,
representatives of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party,
motivated by personal interest or by matters of international politics,
took to the streets the debate on the problems faced by the Romanians
from Transylvania, making it a political issue and taking the public
hysteria to a level unseen before. Stimulated mainly by the Liberal
campaign, at that moment the opposition party, but with sufficient
freedom of movement, the national unrest took extremely violent

indicates the 5
th
Army as operating in Bessarabia (which includes the 7
th
army
corps).
33
Keith Hitchins, Romnia, 1866-1947, Bucureti, 1994, p. 158.
34
Carol I, Corespondena privat, Sorin Cristescu (ed.), Bucureti, 2005, p. 172-174
(Carol I to Karl Anton von Hohenzollern, Bucharest, January 24/February 5,
1884).

220 RUDOLF DINU
forms in 1894, thus testing the relations between Romania and
Austria-Hungary
35
.
Thanks to the fervour with which the Romanian political elite
instrumentalized it for electoral purposes, the Transylvanian issue
certainly managed to influence in a larger degree the active and
informed public opinion in Romania. However, the Memorandum
issue of the mid 90s did not structurally change Romanian foreign
policy, nor condition the alliance with the Central Empires. The security
strategy continued to rely also due to the fact that it represented the
product of a small decision group firmly and unilaterally on the
collaboration with the Central Powers. From this point of view,
redefining the foreign policy was rather a matter of nuance, i.e. return
to the old fixed idea of preferential relations with Germany. Otherwise,
the principles remained the same, as they belonged to a generation
primarily preoccupied with preserving the newly created state and not
with territorial acquisitions, a generation that was actually aware of
Romanias fragile geopolitical position and the necessity of a protective
shield.
In fact wrote the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Lahovari, in
December 1894, shortly after the quasi synchronous manifestation of
Romanian irredentism in Transylvania and Italian one in Istria all
these are a ridiculous story. Im not too upset that Hungarians receive a
lesson; but I think these excellent Italians are looking rather to annoy
Crispi and to shatter the Triple Alliance, and less to be useful and
pleasant to us. But the Triple Alliance guarantees our security more
seriously than would Imbrianis policy
36
be able to do. Before taking
Transylvania we should think about keeping Moldova and Dobrudja, as
such a policy would undoubtedly expose them to what happened with
Bessarabia. Neither Mr. Imbriani, nor the morons from here who
applaud, are not the ones able to defend us against such a misfortune,
that no Transylvania, assuming that they would want to give it to us as
a gift, could compensate for
37
.
*
To sum up, in the late decade of the 19
th
century a serious of regional
(the Transylvanian issue) and systemic developments (the Franco-
Russian alliance, the change in the British policy in East Europe etc.)
began to exert increasing pressure on the scaffolding of Romanias

35
Keith Hitchins, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and the Nationality Problem in
Transylvania, 1894-1897, in Rumanian Studies, vol. IV (1976-1979), Leiden,
1979, p. 75-87, 75.
36
Renato Matteo Imbriani (1843-1901), Italian politician, founder of the Italia
irredenta Association (1877), deputy since 1889.
37
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Lahovari, to Romanian Minister in
Rome, Al. Emanuel Lahovari, Bucharest, December 29, 1894, published in
Rudolf Dinu, Studi italo-romeni, p. 60-61.

foreign policy, forcing the government in Bucharest to look for
remedies for saving the mechanism which ensured the Kingdoms long-
term security. The Romanian decision makers and the artisans of the
alliance, King Carol I, D. A. Sturdza, P. P. Carp, Alexandru Beldiman,
seemed to understand that the original defects of the alliance required
being somehow fade away, or even removed. The secrecy of the alliance
remained however. In his excessive carefulness, Carol I tool this decision,
motivated by a possible negative reaction of the elite, predominantly
anti-Hungarian.
The solutions for the problems appeared in the relation with
Austria-Hungary were varied and they were gradually activated as the
whole picture became clear to the Romanian decision makers. On the
short-term, the measure taken by the government with regard to the
deteriorating Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations meant diverting
the public attention with the help of an alternative national program
saving the national identity of Romanians living in the Balkans which
was to be promoted through a vigorous foreign policy.
The long-term remedies were based on two essential elements of
the Romanian foreign policy. The first one focused on maintaining the
alliance with Austria-Hungary and defending the territorial integrity of
the dualist monarchy, seen as a vital and indispensable element of the
security system to which Romania was part. The second one postulated
developing a special partnership with Germany, seen as the only safe
and strong support [s. R. D.]
38
.
To keep Austria-Hungary exist as a Great Power was written in a
memo prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, in
collaboration with the Minister in Berlin, Al. Beldiman is a necessity.
On this essential premise is based Romanias foreign policy; and it will
unconditionally follow it, despite frictions with the neighbouring
empire, which sometimes can not be avoided because of many divergent
national and economic interests
39
. Conceptually therefore, the Romanian
decision making group managed to pass, even after the mid-decade
nationalistic boom, beyond the simple logic of the Romanian-Hungarian
antagonism. The diplomatic action revealed that the stake of changing

38
BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii
mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed to the
Secretary of State of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. von Blow, by the undersigned
[Alexandru Beldiman] at May 4, 1898, after in the previous talk it was
discussed in detail the basic content of the memorandum and was approved
by the Secretary of State). [] In Romanias relations with the Triple Alliance
is a priority to cultivate absolutely extraordinary relations with Germany. It is
not in the interest of Romanians neither of Germans that the center of gravity
of our relations with the Triple Alliance to move from Berlin, where they were
established, to Vienna. Nor is it desirable; rather would be a disadvantage for
Romania to be regarded as belonging to the so-called spheres of influence of
Austria-Hungary.
39
Ibidem.

222 RUDOLF DINU
the Hungarian policy by using German pressure was not the fate of the
Romanian-Austro-Hungarian relations per se, but rather to save the
security system as a whole. According to D. A. Sturdza and Alexandru
Beldiman, Romanias diplomatic discourse, at least in her dialogue
with Berlin (or even with Vienna), should have repeatedly pointed out,
after the old principle of gutta cavat lapidem, that the weak point of
the alliance system was Hungary and that the same Hungary was
responsible for the pressure the Triple Alliance had to face in the East,
risking the collapse of the entire scaffolding
40
. This was of course what
was preached by a small group of His Majestys own advisors, because
otherwise, the fact that Austria-Hungary was an essential part of the
system that protected Romania was a reality which the core of the
Romanian irredentism Ionel Brtianu, Take Ionescu &Co ,
together with most of the Romanian political elite, failed to understand.
At least partially, the reconciliation efforts made by Romania after
1895, given the above mentioned considerations, had as a result at the
end of the nineteenth century the disappearance for a few years of the
Transylvanian issue from the official agenda of the Romanian-Austrian-
Hungarian relations. The structural conditions, which actually caused
the problems faced by Transylvanian Romanians, remained nevertheless
unchanged. They were only shadowed for a short time by other issues.
*
The aversion against Hungarians, however, was deeply rooted
among the Romanian elite, and the future evolution of internal
relations in Austria-Hungary could not be calculated
41
, or foreseen
with certainty. The main task of Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy at
Bucharest seemed to actually resume to a single objective: to prevent a
change of perception that would have made the hate of Romanians
towards Hungarians much stronger than the fear of Russia! For this
matter, Aehrenthal was estimating in 1896, more cynical than Roma-
nian decision-makers, that without a radical change of the Hungarian
policy in Transylvania, the monarchy risked losing its last outpost in
the East
42
. This was the reason why a special partnership with Germany,
together with the systematic Germanization of Romanian military elite
thanks to the acceptance at the Prussian military academies was
supposed to be the alternative solution for the government in Bucharest to
save the link with the Triple Alliance. It was to compensate for what

40
Ibidem, S 19(41)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman,
to the President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza
SP, Berlin, May 2/14, 1898).
41
Ibidem, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra promovrii mai ample
i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed in on May 4, 1898).
42
Solomon Wank, In the Twilight of Empire. Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal
(1854-1912), Imperial Habsburg Patriot and Statesman, vol. I, Wien Kln
Weimar, 2009, p. 156.

was not functioning in the relation with Austria-Hungary and to
maintain Romanias position as a western sentinel on the Lower
Danube
43
.
Restoring the partnership with Germany meant, in fact, its fabrication,
as until then it had been more an ideal than a real one. Just like in the
early 80
s
, such a partnership seemed favoured by the existence of
special dynastic links, similar strategic interests, the lack of antagonism
etc. In other words, it was favoured by a complex of circumstances that
suggested that the centre of gravity for the Romanian foreign policy
should have been on the axis Berlin-Bucharest. The German side
generally ignored Romanias proposals, due to various reasons, from
political-strategic (political complications with Austria-Hungary,
additional material-military responsibilities, managing its relation with
Russia) to personal, dynastic one. In particular the attempt to give
substance to the dynastic alliance already existing between the two
royal houses failed from the beginning. The animosity that prevailed
between the two monarchs, Carol I and Wilhelm II, turned the dynastic
link from a potential advantage for the Romanian-German relations
into a weakness. In May 1898, Romanian Minister in Berlin noted
bitterly that the two sovereigns havent personally meat for the last six
years, too long for the relations that should have been between the two
princes of Hohenzollern. The meetings in 1891 in Potsdam and in
1892 in Sigmaringen were also the last ones, as the second voyage of
Emperor Wilhelm II in the Middle East, in 1898, avoided Romania
again
44
. As with regard to the Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian relations,
the German ally, although correctly assessed the seriousness of the
Transylvanian issue in the over all dynamic of the Triple Alliance, was
inclined, in spite of formal interventions at Vienna and Budapest, to
leave things flow, the business being sensitive and difficult to handle
45
.
The only notable change in the Romanian-German relations was
made by opening the German military Academies to Romanian military
staff. In 1898 Emperor Wilhelm II approved Romanian governments

43
BAR, fund D. A. Sturdza, S 19(42)/DCCCLIX (Memoriu secret asupra
promovrii mai ample i a importanei relaiilor germano-romne, handed
in May 4, 1898). [] In other words, the position occupied by the Romanian
nation, according to its origin and all its cultural endeavors, in the last two
decades, as a western European watchdog at the lower Danube, often in very
difficult conditions, must be maintained even if now, and maybe for much
longer, it seems that the former threatening danger coming from the North no
longer exists. The motto toujours en vedette would be in this regard appropriate to
characterize Romanias position and mission in the East.
44
Idem, S 19(40)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to
President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, SP,
Berlin, May 1/13, 1898).
45
Idem, S 19(34)/DCCCLIX (Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to
President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, SP,
Berlin, October 13/25, 1897).

224 RUDOLF DINU
request for military training of Romanian officer, but this time in a
systematic and recurring manner, and on a much larger scale than was
possible before. A fixed number of aspiring young officials were going
to be seconded to the Royal Prussian Army for several years (a
preparatory year for learning the German language, two years of
specialized military school, and two years of practical field service in
Prussia). Besides military considerations (training the young
generation of Romanian officers in the spirit and discipline that
reigned in the Prussian officer corps), the request of the Romanian
government was based on political reasons, summarized as follows:
Most Romanian officers sent abroad and currently active, were
trained in France. The spirit brought back from there, as well as the
personal relations and sympathies, is not therefore in accordance with
the policies set by Romanias national interests and promoted by the
King. It is a state necessity that the spirit prevailing among the officers
to be consistent with this policy. In our time, this predilection for
France manifested by Romanian officers was essentially restricted and
eventually almost stopped by the fact that the French government
gradually abridged the access of Romanian officers to its educational
institutions. If in time it would be able to shift the trainings centre of
gravity towards Prussia, then a final break in the military and
educational relations with the French Republic would be an essential
benefit and a huge progress
46
.

46
Idem, S 19(46)/DCCCLIX (Copy Memoriu Secret asupra instruirii
ofierilor aspirani romni n armata prusac, edited at the wish of His Exc.
State Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prince. v. Blow and based on
the prior exchange of ideas on this issue. Handed in on January 14/26, 1898).
Chef Cabinet Militaire Gnral H[ahnke] ma communiqu a titre
confidentiel et personnel que en principe Empereur a accueillie favorablement
votre demande relative a linstruction dofficiers roumains dans larme
prussienne dune manire constante et organise. Quant aux dtails pour la
mise en pratique de notre proposition, ils seront rgls sous peu et de
nouveaux soumis lapprobation de lEmpereur, in Ibidem, S 19(45)/DCCCLIX
(Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, to President of the
Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. A. Sturdza, T cifr. 374, Berlin,
June 29, 1898, 12:35 pm). A large proportion of senior officers indeed attended
French military schools up to the mid-nineties, establishing preferential
relations with French military elite. Only in 1896-1897, following a formal
request from Russia, the government in Paris severely limited the access of
Romanian officers. The presence of more and more Romanian officers in the
French military schools was in fact the main reason that led the Prussian
government to block the access of Romanian officers at the German War
Academy, in the eighties. The idea of seconding Romanian officers to the
German regiments, proposed by the military attach in Bucharest, Captain
von Mller, was also dismissed on the same grounds of secrecy on armament
and fighting techniques used. F. C. Stahl, Suveranitatea Romniei i
dezvoltarea armatei, in File de Istorie Militar a Poporului Romn. Studii,
vol. 12, Bucureti, 1984, p. 151-157.

The military elite therefore would have become, thanks to this
German educational background, not just the promoter of the
Romanian-German friendship (increasing the Romanian-German
affinities), but rather a tool to advocate for the Triple Alliance in the
Romanian society, and at the same time the mean of educating the
population with regard to the geopolitical and strategic realities that
Romania had to face.
Since 1898, the year when the agreement became operational
47
, and
until the outbreak of the First World War, aspiring Romanian officers
were seconded annually to the Prussian regiments of infantry, cavalry,
and artillery. After 1900, this action was also extended to the engineering
and transport battalions. The followings were also subsequently approved:
Romanian General Staff officers to take part at the annual German
manoeuvres, access at the military cadet school of the Imperial Navy
for a training program of four years, and seconding Romanian officers
to the Military Technical Academy
48
.
This solution, efficient probably on the long term, was imagined
and implemented too late to be able to outweigh the calling for Paris
of the Romanian society
49
.
*
Setting the Macedo-Romanian issue as a priority for Romanias
foreign policy was, as mentioned, the immediate response of the
government from Bucharest regarding the gradually damaging Romania-
Austria-Hungary relations. The intellectual origin of the idea to adapt
the Romanian foreign policy after 1894-1895 is discussed in the existing
historiography. Some scholars give credit to the Austrian-Hungarian
diplomacy for this voltafaccia of Romanian foreign policy, considering
it a Aehrenthal dictum (which seems to confirm that the Romanian
officials continued listening without any constrains the verbum coming

47
Ibidem, S 3(1)/DCCCXCII (Miu to Sturdza, Bucharest, July 20/ August 1,
1898).
48
F. C. Stahl, op. cit., p. 156.
49
Military historian Petre Otu argues that, less than a decade away from the
signature, in the context of Sturdzas retirement from the political life (1908),
the Romanian government decided to abandon the agreement with Germany
and with it the legal framework that provided Romanian officers training in
German academies. Reason: the doctrinal disunity existing at the level of the
command structures of the Romanian army, due to the fact that young
officers, of a lower grade, had a German or Austrian-Hungarian educational
background, while senior officers, were trained at the French, Belgian or
Italian academies. Cf. Petre Otu, Linfluence de la doctrine militaire franaise
sur lvolution de larme roumaine (1878-1940), in Revue historique des
armes, t. 244, 2006, p. 38-49. Lattach militaire Ambroise Desprs
soulignait en 1912: Elle [la Roumanie] est reste profondment franaise en
ce qui concerne le got et la culture, et les efforts de la rendre allemande
semblent avoir chou face une mentalit trs latine.

226 RUDOLF DINU
from Vienna). The new imperial and royal Minister Plenipotentiary to
Bucharest, Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, was supposedly the one who, in
1896, suggested to the liberal government to focus their attention and
energy to the Balkan region, to the fate of Romanians in Macedonia, in
order to reduce the tension raised by the Transylvanian issue
50
. The
President of the Council, D.A. Sturdza obliged to restore his pro
Austrian policy after the nationalist points of view expressed while in
opposition was the one who presumably embraced the diversion
strategy.
In reality, the idea of transforming the Macedonian issue in an
active foreign policy strategy, as a mean to divert the public attention
from what was happening in Transylvania, took shape in the minds of
Romanian decision makers a bit earlier, while the conservative
government led by Lascr Catargiu was still in office. As evidence
stands the fact that in the spring of 1895, at the express order of the
Sovereign, P. P. Carp requested all authorities part of the Romanian
diplomatic lite to state their opinions on the ways by which the issue
of the Balkan Romanians could be successfully promoted. The immediate
objective of this campaign was going to be the bishop question (la
question de lvque), i.e. the appointment of a Romanian metropolitan
bishop for the Romanians in Macedonia
51
. The idea to defend the
specificity of this population was, it is true, for some time on the
agenda of the Romanian officials, funding schools and churches in
Macedonia being the principle way of action. Since 1895 it became
however a priority of Romanias foreign policy. As proof stands, among
other things, the energy with which D. A. Sturdza embraced the fate of
the Macedonian Romanians after 1896, seeking a spectacular success
in negotiating with the Ottoman Porte for establishing a Romanian
metropolitan bishop for the Balkan Vlachs. As well as the offensive
manner in which Ion. I. C. Brtianu endorsed the same policy after
1902, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. For Romania was going to note
later in his memoirs Prince Dimitrie I. Gr. Ghica, former General
Council of Romania in Thessaloniki, in the early twentieth century
the Macedonian issue was noteworthy for the government due to the
Macedo-Romanians, a population of Romanian race and language
grouped in the Pindus Mountains and in compact communities in the
rest of Macedonia, forming a total of over 200,000 souls and driven by
very nationalistic feelings. Hard workers, especially endowed for trade,
these Romanians from Macedonia, in order to fight the propaganda of
the Balkan states, were seeking aid from the other side of the Danube,
in Bucharest. The Romanian governments, which unlike Turkeys
neighbouring states were not animated by annexation desires,
considered it as their duty derived from race solidarity to take interest

50
Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), Istoria politicii externe romneti n date, Bucureti,
2003, p. 199.
51
ANIC, fund Papiniu, file 116, p. 4.

in the fate of these Romanians. And this issue also gave us a legitimate
reason for a diplomatic intervention, a useful platform for foreign
policy, detached from claims, and which allowed us a neutral role in
the event that Macedonia would have been divided, as the Romanians
there not to be assigned to one or another nation without guarantees
for the protection of their nationality and rights. This policy was highly
favoured by King Carol, eager to see the public attention away from the
persecutions suffered by their brothers from the other side of the
Carpathians under the yoke of the Hungarians. In the same spirit,
Vienna was willing to support our action
52
.
If the idea of adapting Romanias foreign policy was entirely the
product of domestic decision makers or rather it was suggested by the
Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy matters less. But the fact remains that
the Austrian-Hungarian decision makers, inspiring or not such
guidelines, were unable to foresee the negative consequences for the
monarchy that could have derived from turning Romanian policy to a
Balkan objective. Stimulating the Balkan Romanian nationalism and
then the inability to control and lead it in the desired direction
favoured the development of a deep Romanian-Bulgarian antagonism
after 1900. The convergence of the Austrian-Bulgarian interests (in an
anti-Serb way) on the background of deteriorating Austrian-Serbian
relations and an effervescent Serbian nationalism, gave rise, on the
medium term, to an Austrian-Romanian dispute, which turned into
conflict in the context of the Balkan crisis from 1912-1913, exposed the
monarchy to additional risks and de facto undermined the partnership
with Romania, founded in 1883.
Just as certain is the fact that after 1895-1896 Romanian politics
came to be necessarily centred on the Balkans, for national geographical,
strategic and ethnic reasons. The existence of a significant Romanian
population in the peninsula (the Macedo-Romanians) gave the
government in Bucharest the ethnic pretext for a Balkan policy of
status quo. Romanias foreign strategy, reported Italian Minister
Plenipotentiary in Bucharest, baron Fasciotti, in summer 1912, was
closely related to the general problem of balance of power in the
Balkans: It is a canon, in fact, of the Romanian foreign policy that the
three main Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece) should not
increase without Romanian having an analogous increase, in such a
matter as to retain that prevalence of population, territory and wealth
which she currently enjoys
53
. But the origin of the canon should be
searched far back in time, during the Rumelian crisis, Ion C. Brtianu
being the one who first raised the issue of territorial compensations
due to Romania in the event the Balkan states would benefit from
changing the status quo
54
.

52
Dimitrie Ghyka, Memorii, translated by Vasile Savin, Iai, 2004, p. 57-58.
53
35 anni, no. 456, p. 514.
54
Carol I, Jurnal, vol. I (1881-87), Vasile Docea (ed.), Bucureti, 2007, p. 397.

228 RUDOLF DINU
In 1903 Take Ionescu summarized this Balkan policy as follows:
No Romanian politician aspires to annex Macedonia, nor to found
there a Romanian state, but we care that the nationality of the
Romanians from Macedonia be held and they have the guarantee that
they will be free to get educated in their own language
55
. And a great
deal of the Romanian political elite supported without reserve this
policy, at different emotional levels, depending on the circumstances of
the internal political struggle or other interest. Less emotionally
engaged, or simply more pragmatic, the Sovereign viewed this issue
strictly from a strategic perspective, as a subterfuge meant to ensure
Romanias continuous involvement in the Balkans in order to freeze
the status quo.
The policy of supporting the Romanians in Macedonia inevitably
caused a direct collision with the more substantial and aggressive
Balkan Slavic nationalisms, aggravated and damaged the relations with
these countries, evolving from a lethargic neighbourhood to an active
but negative interaction. Romanias main concern in the Balkans was
in all these years, until around the First World War, Bulgaria.
Especially the actions of the Bulgarian Komitadji in Macedonia caused
considerable irritation in Bucharest, where concern for Macedo-
Romanians became very popular. Foreign diplomats believed even
that, in the mind of Romanians, especially after 1905, the fear of Russia
which always dominated their thinking after the Congress of Berlin was
replaced following the results of the Russo-Japanese War by a growing
anxiety about a possible expansion of Bulgaria
56
. Even the arming
policy seemed to be decided at one time according to Bulgarias moves:
When Bulgaria orders 50 cannons King Carol I said to German
Minister Kiderlen, in March 1905 we have to order 60
57
!
In reality, the way Romanian decision makers were thinking was
determined, following the Bulgarian-Russian reconciliation in 1896, by
a combined fear of Russia and Bulgaria. The government in Bucharest
strongly believed in a complete main mise of Russia in Bulgaria and
assessed that the country reverted, due to this development, to the
dangerous situation of a possible avenue between the two Russias.
Therefore, at the turn of the two centuries, King Carol I and his
advisors looked with great apprehension to both Russia and Bulgaria.
*
The crisis which progressively appeared in relation with Bulgaria
introduced new elements in the security equation and determined the
Romanians to seek the transformation of the alliance (calling for a

55
Ion Bulei, Atunci cnd veacul se ntea. Lumea romneasc, 1900-1908,
Bucureti, 1990, p. 286-287.
56
35 anni, no. 431, p. 485-486; Ernest Jckh (ed.), Kiderlen Waechter intime
(daprs ses notes et sa correspondance), Paris, 1926, p. 114-124.
57
Michael Behnen, op. cit., p. 351.

different definition of the casus foederis), as well as a inter pares
partnership with the members of the Dreibund, which would have
become according to the Romanian plan the Vierbund or the
Quadruple Alliance
58
. On several occasions, in the fall of 1900 and
during 1901, the Italian representative in Bucharest referred in his
reports to the dangers arising from infiltrating in the minds of the
Romanians the idea that in matters of international politics the small
kingdom could no longer rely on the actual assistance of the Triple
Alliance
59
. This, apparently, accredited the idea that in Bucharest
existed doubts on the efficiency and, especially, adequacy (in terms of
security) of the partnership with the Triple Alliance. In reality, in the
minds of some Romanian officials actually arise the (wrong) idea that
the treaty of 1883 was concentrated only on the Russian threat, while
others supported the dangerous idea that the treaty should have been
amended in order to allow Romania a preventive war against Bulgaria,
in the event of incorporating Macedonian territories. Such perceptions
explain the attempt of the Romanian government in 1901 to adapt the
alliance, as well as the change of military operational plans, the
reassessment of the military capabilities and the arming program after
1901.
On April 20, 1901, through a memorandum presented to the German
Chancellor von Blow by the Romanian Minister Plenipotentiary in
Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, the Romanian government tried to amend
the substance of the alliance treaty, requesting the extension of the
casus foederis conditions also for the event of an armed conflict
between Romania and Bulgaria (second point of the memorandum).
But the answer was negative and the German government pointed out
that such a possibility was already implied in the treaty, but of course,
in the event of an unprovoked attack from Bulgaria. The same memo
requested that in the future Romania be able to close separated treaties
of alliance with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy (first point),
which would have practically meant transforming the Triple Alliance
into a Quadruple Alliance: 1. Based on the relations set by the
existing treaty was shown in the memorandum Romania is indeed
allied with Germany and Italy exactly in the same way as it is with
Austria-Hungary. The rights and duties of the allies were established
by the treaty the same for everyone. However, formally Romania
signed only with Austria-Hungary an actual treaty of alliance, while the
other two powers expressed their adherence to it in special documents.
Factually and politically, there are no more reasons to keep the current
difference. Moreover, the royal government yearns that the future

58
Ibidem, p. 338 sqq.; Rudolf Dinu, Raporturi romno-italiene n cadrul Triplei
Aliane, 1888-1914, PhD thesis, University of Bucharest, 2003, p. 166 sqq.
59
ASDMAE, Roma, Serie P. Politica, 1891-1916, Rumania, pacco 286, R
2703/199 (Beccaria to Visconti Venosta, Bucharest, October 28, 1900); 35
anni, no. 386, p. 426-427, October 21, 1901.

230 RUDOLF DINU
shape of the new treaty concluded with the powers of the Triple
Alliance will match the actual realities
60
. However, the German
Chancellor rejected this request also, considering that to establish a
new form of agreement between Romania and the Triple Alliance could
give rise to unnecessary difficulties and talks, which had to be avoided
at the time, and that the existing form perfectly met Germanys
indirect, derived interest in the alliance with Romania. Regarding
the first point in the answer given to the Romanian Minister,
Beldiman the German government favours the idea that it might be
preferable that in the current form which stipulates Romanias
membership to the Triple Alliance does not take place any change. This
treaty of alliance between Austria-Hungary and Romania, which the
other two powers joined through a declaration of accession, caused a
few problems at the time Romania became part of the Triple Alliance,
in 1883. The solution agreed then in order to solve these problems
made Romania virtually covered as if it would have signed a treaty of
alliance directly with Germany and Italy, and it should remain so still
61
.
This episode, and in particular the subject of the second request
made by the Romanian government (second point of the memorandum),
can only lead, despite the confusion that still reigns over the real
intentions of the government in Bucharest, to negative remarks regarding
the objective negotiated in 1901. Whether it was wanted to repair an
apparent gap of the treaty of 1883 by inserting an explicit reference to a
Bulgarian aggression or, even worse, to change the casus foederis so as
to make possible a preventive war against Bulgaria (if it would have
occupied Macedonia), it is to be mentioned that false reasoning on
behalf of the Romanian diplomacy was behind both of the two hypothesis.
1) Because, the treaty of 1883, as it was written, guaranteed
assistance to Romania in the event of any unprovoked aggression (thus
including against a Bulgarian attack). Therefore, explicit references to
possible aggressor would have only served to limit the potential
coverage of the alliance at the expense of Romanian interests.
2) Because, if we accept the other idea, namely that it was desired a
different definition of the casus foederis, turns out that the Romanians
request was aimed at transforming the alliance with the Central Powers
from a strictly defensive alliance to an offensive one. This, clearly, was
unacceptable to the allies even for the simple reason that it would have
given Romania the power to open the whole Eastern question
whenever would have thought it necessary and appropriate to do so.
The refusal given by the German government to the first demand
(point 1) was due, in my opinion, mostly to the fear that it could have

60
GPEK, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswrtigen
Amtes, im auftrage des Auswrtigen Amtes, vol. XVIII/2, Johannes Lepsius,
Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme (ed.), Berlin, 1926, no.
5797, p. 651-654.
61
Ibidem, no. 5798, p. 655-656.

become a pretext and at the same time a support for future Italian
requests of transforming the alliance. Besides, in 1901, the German
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mhlberg, backed up his
attitude in a note to the Reich Chancellor, Blow, stating that: For
Germany and Austria-Hungary the current situation is totally
inappropriate for referring to a changed and extended alliance with
Romania. Because in such case we would have no choice, we would
have to involve Italy in the discussion and then Italy could count on the
idea that in the future, in her expansionist policy in the Balkans, she
can rely on the protection of the Triple Alliance. She would accept this
with enthusiasm [changing the agreement with Romania] and in turn
introduce in the treaty of the Triple Alliance a clause in respect of
Albania. But Austria would hardly accept such a clause and thus would
be put into question the existence of the Triple Alliance
62
. The
Austrian-Romanian Alliance therefore remained unchanged, being
once again renewed on April 4/17, 1902, based on a text similar to the
old treaty. At the request of Austria-Hungary, was introduced on this
occasion a clause stating the automatic renewal of the treaty every
three years, unless it was denounced by one or more parties. Germany
joined the extended treaty on July 12/25, 1902, while Italy on
November 12/ December 30, 1902
63
.
*
In her relation with the Central Powers, at least until the Bosnian
Crisis, Romania remained, largely, a loyal second to Austria-Hungary
and Germany, raising few question marks and little circumspection.
Sure, the original sins of the alliance were far from being solved, on
the contrary. Romanian public opinion continued to be hostile to
Hungary and this hostility was growing, just as the defense treaty of
1883 was still being kept secret, largely encompassing an artificial
connection. However, the governments in Vienna and Berlin regarded
Romania as a satellite certainly revolving in their orbits. Moreover,
with D. A. Sturdza, one of the last visceral Russophobes
64
, still as
head of the government and with Carol tightly controlling Romanias
foreign policy, it could have hardly been otherwise. The lack of concern
and the belief in the intact loyalty of Romania were quite obvious
during the Bosnian Crisis (1908-1909). The Austrian-Hungarian
Foreign Minister, Count Aehrenthal, was sincerely willing to consider
the interests of all the states affected by the annexation, of Russia, the

62
Ibidem, no. 5800, p. 660-661.
63
35 anni, no. 392, p. 438.
64
The term belongs to P. P. Carp: substituez au mot daustrophile celui de
russophobe et vous serez dans le vrai!, in BAR, Coresponden diplomatic
austriac, mapa XLIII, Acte 445-960, 1888, no. 16B (Goluchowski to Klnoky,
Bucharest, April 4, 1888).

232 RUDOLF DINU
Ottoman Empire, Italy, even those of Serbia, except those of
Romania, who was not given attention.
The only notable change that took place in Romania in late 1908
was the retirement from the government and the political life of the
Liberal leader, D. A. Sturdza, and his replacement with Ionel Brtianu,
about whom it was said he intended to promote a more independent
policy towards Austria-Hungary, despite the fact he considered the
alliance with the Central Empires to be still necessary. It should be
stressed that the event occurred as a result of an accident namely
Sturdzas mental illness
65
and not as a result of the Bosnian Crisis (or
of the deterioration of the Austrian-Romanian relations). It is true that
the change in the structure of the ultimate decision unit, which
virtually had the responsibility for the management of the foreign
policy, favored on the medium-term the development of the nationalist
trend, which eventually also had inherent effects on the security
options. Likewise, the Bosnian crisis pointed out with great clarity the
existing friction between the Balkan policy of Austria and that of
Romania (pro-Serbian, or more accurately anti-Bulgarian). This
divergence became chronic in the context of the Balkan crisis of 1912-
1913, amid unprecedented urban public hysteria urban, and brought
with it the storm in the Austrian-Hungarian-Romanian relations.
In the context of the Balkan wars, following an initial phase of
confused expectation, the entire political spectrum moved slowly but
surely towards a position of strength in relation to Bulgaria, despite the
moderating efforts of King Carol I and the Great Powers attempts to
solve the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute over Silistra. The correction of
border in the south part of Dobrudja was strongly requested as to
strategically compensate for Bulgarias territorial growth. The politicians
and the party press took this view in the street; the street embraced it
and made its fulfillment a sine qua non condition for any government,
regardless of its political orientation
66
. If we do not get Silistra
declared Ionel Brtianu to the Austrian-Hungarian Minister, in
February 1913, offering a sample of the bandwagoning policy he will so
successfully practice after August 1914 means that Entente is
stronger than the Triple Alliance and we will turn to the most powerful
ones
67
!
The Romanian government requested the Austrian-Hungarian ally
total and unconditional support in the dispute with Bulgaria, a support
understood as naturally deriving from the alliance agreement. However,
the government in Vienna holed on to its pro-Bulgarian policy and in

65
Carol I, Corespondena privat, p. 456 (Carol I to Maria de Flandra,
Bucharest, January 2/15, 1909).
66
ASDMAE, Roma, Telegrammi di Gabinetto in arrivo, registro 368, T 16
(Fasciotti to San Giuliano, Bucharest, February 22, 1913, 2:50 am).
67
35 anni, no. 481 p. 537 (Fasciotti to San Giuliano, Bucharest, (R 372/102)
February 22, 1913).

the early summer of 1913 ended up losing control of the actions of the
Romanian government. The attempt to revise the Treaty of Bucharest
increased the fracture occurred in the relations between the two
countries and led to a widespread sense of hostility within the urban
public opinion. Vienna wasnt completely passive to the rapidly
deteriorating situation. She tried to find remedies and the Czernin
mission, respectively the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations opened in
early 1914, were a step in this direction. But both have completely
failed in the spring of 1914 and their failure had the same effect upon
the Romanian irredentism
68
.
A slightly nationalist delirium became noticeable in Bucharest, at
the end of 1913, at least in certain circles, visibly encouraged by the
success obtained in the summer and currently intoxicated by the idea
Romania far da se
69
. However, as also observed by the Austrian-
Hungarian military attach, Hranilovi, in the fall of 1913, Romanian
irredentism did not pose a military threat as long as the Romanian
government was not encouraging the agitation in Transylvania
70
. The
government, at least as long as King Carol I lived, maintained its option
for alliance with the Central Powers. Deterioration of relations with
Austria-Hungary was compensated by Romanian decision makers
through an almost exclusively orientation towards Germany
71
and Italy.

68
Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Austria-Hungary ant the Origins of the First
World War, London, 1991, p. 143-150, 160-163; Gerald Volkmer, Die
Siebenbrgische Frage, 1878-1900. Der Einfluss der Rumnischen
Nationalbewegung auf die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen
sterreich-Ungarn und Rumnien, Kln, Weimar, Wien, 2004, p. 345.
69
1918 la romni. Desvrirea unitii naional-statale a poporului romn.
Documente externe, 1879-1916, vol. I, Bucureti, 1983, no. 69, p. 383 sqq.
(memorandum of count Haymerle, counselor at the Austrian-Hungarian
delegation in Bucharest, December 16, 1913).
70
Paul W. Schroeder, Romania and the Great Powers before 1914, in Revue
Roumaine dHistoire, XIV, 1, 1975, p. 43.
71
Ibidem, p. 41; Gabriel Hanotaux, Carnets (1907-1925), Paris, 1982, p. 96-97
(February 12, 1914 Jy ai vu Lahovary, le ministre de Roumanie, qui est
venu me mettre au courant des grandes volutions qui se prparent
actuellement en Europe. [] Lahovary ma dit quil y avait notamment un
rapprochement entre la Roumanie et la Russie, mais que cela nimpliquant
nullement une rupture avec lAllemagne, que, tout au contraire, il pouvait
maffirmer que le roi de Roumanie, dans cette circonstance, comme
antrieurement, navait rien fait sans se mettre daccord avec Berlin, et que,
jamais, les relations entre la Russie et lAllemagne navaient t plus
confiantes et plus troites. Il ajoutait (prenant peut-tre ses dsirs pour des
ralits) que lAllemagne envisageait ds maintenant une combinaison
politique ayant pour objet final la dislocation de lAutriche-Hongrie, elle-
mme y participant toute premire. Il disait encore que la Roumanie tait
linstrument cach de lAllemagne dans la pression quelle exerce, en ce
moment, sur la Turquie, pour amener la Sublime Porte cder les les la
Grce et renoncer toute hostilit avec les peuples des Balkans sous peine
dune dclaration de guerre de la part de la Roumanie. []); Antony di Iorio,

234 RUDOLF DINU
The relation with Russia has gradually improved since 1913, but
working with Petersburg did not become, not even for Brtianu, an
alternative in the security policy or the way to fulfill the national ideal.
Romania was ready and willing to cooperate with Serbia and Greece in
order to preserve the status quo which had resulted from the Treaty of
Bucharest and to control Bulgaria, which, of course, harmonized quite
well with Russia's desire to postpone for a few years the final decision
on the Eastern question by freezing the situation which had arisen from
the Balkan wars. However, the government was not at all prepared to
completely break away from the Triple Alliance and much less to
change camps by moving towards Russia and the Entente Cordiale
72
.
King Carol I, even after the much celebrated visit of the Tsar in
Constana, in June 1914, continued to see Romania as the mediator
that had to bring reconciliation between Austria-Hungary and Russia
73
!
Brtianus return to power in January 1914, the most nationalistic
political character and with an educational, political and ideological
profile significantly different from that of His Majestys advisors, did
not change, contrary to appearances, the realities of the foreign policy.
Moreover, Brtianu consciously or not, carried on the idea of arcana
imperii in Romanian foreign policy, showing, as an educational reflex
or personal characteristic, attachment to the practices of secret
diplomacy (otherwise he was characterized by a chronic mistrust and
suspicion towards his party and government colleagues). Brtianu was
willing t continue to normalize Romanias relation with Russia, but had
no desire to increase tensions with Austria-Hungary and respected
Germanys military and economic power. He intended to follow the
same cautious guideline of balancing between the competing Great
Powers followed by his father at the beginning of the Eastern crisis in
1875-78. His policy was not to risk anything that had been won and
thus to approach France and Russia without rushing an open rupture
with Austria-Hungary and Germany
74
. Moreover, in the first half of
1914 the internal affairs, the problems in the party, and the elections
held him away from international politics
75
. The King therefore
continued to control the foreign policy until, in the summer of 1914, an
external factor the outbreak of war radically changed international
and domestic settings. But the ultimate decision unit existing in the last

Italy and Rumania in 1914: The Italian Assessment of the Rumanian Situation,
1907 to 1914, in Rumanian Studies, Leiden, 1976-1979, IV, p. 128 sqq.
72
Paul W. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 47; I. V. Bestuzhev, Russian Foreign Policy,
February-June 1914, in Journal of Contemporary History, I, no. 3, July
1966, p. 96, 111.
73
Raymund Netzhammer, Episcop n Romnia, vol. I, Bucureti, 2005, p. 512
(Sunday, July 5, 1914).
74
Keith Hitchins, Romnia, 1866-1947, p. 173.
75
35 anni, no. 536, p. 589-593 (Fasciotti to San Giuliano, Bucharest, June 11,
1914).

two decades collapsed only with the death of the sovereign, on October
10, 1914.
As long as the old King lived was to note in 1927 Sir Winston
Churchill his influence was great enough to prevent Romania declare
war on Austria, despite the [outcome of the] Battle of Lemberg and
advance of the Russian troops in Galicia
76
.
In my opinion, Carols disappearance was a milestone in the
diplomatic history of modern Romania, maybe even more important
than the neutrality decided in August 1914. It led to a change in the
ultimate decision unit by propelling the Prime Minister as the supreme
leader, with all consequences deriving from I. C. Brtianus options and
intellectual and ideological background. Among them the decision to
enter the First World War on the side of the Entente Cordiale, after two
years of exasperating delays and tortuous policies.

76
Romnia n timpul Primului Rzboi Mondial. Mrturii documentare, vol. I,
p. 60. Romanian king, Carol I noted in his diary the French ambassador in
St. Petersburg, Maurice Palologue on October 12, 1914 died yesterday at
76. [] as long as he lived, we have had no chance to make Romania join our
cause. [], Ibidem, p. 270.

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