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Vladislav B. Sotirovi 2013



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FROM THE EUROBALKAN
STUDIES

Scientific Articles in English


Vladislav B. Sotirovi



Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
228












Vladislav B. Sotirovic

FROM THE EUROBALKAN STUDIES
Scientific Articles in English










Vilnius 2014

V|ad|s|av . 8ot|rov|c

FROM THE EUROBALKAN STUDIES: SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES IN ENGLISH

Publisher & editor
Yugoslavology An Independent Research Centre for the Yugoslav Studies
http://www.jugoslavologija.eu

Cover & design
Vladislav B. Sotirovic
http://www.sotirovic.eu
vladislav@sotirovic.eu

2014 Vladislav B. Sotirovic &
Yugoslavology An Independent Research Centre for the Yugoslav Studies

Printed by Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences Press
T. 8evenkos g. 31, LT-03111
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http://www.leidykla.leu.lt

First edition

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ISBN (printed book): 978-609-408-597-0
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CONTENTS


Serbian Patriarchate of Pec in iIc Oiionan Enirc. TIc Firsi PIasc (15571594}
.............................................................................. p. 5

The Southeastern Europe in international relations, the interest of the foreign
powers in the region and the Albanian Question, 18711912
.............................................................................. p. 28

The Balkans: On the crossroads of civilizations and political spheres of influence
.............................................................................. p. 49


The Idea of Pan-Slavic Ethnolinguistic Kinship and Reciprocity in Dalmatia and
Croatia (14771683)
.............................................................................. p. 63

The Great Economic Depression in the Weimar Republic, 19291933
............................................................................... p. 73

The European Union and the European Identity
............................................................................... p. 88

Turkey, Greece, Italy and Security in the Mediterranean Sea Area
............................................................................... p. 104

Kosovo & McioIija. Tcn Ycars Aficr iIc MarcI Pogron 2004"
............................................................................... p. 128

Anti-Serbian Collaboration of Titos Partisans and Pavelics Ustashi in the World
War II
p. 144

The Fair-Trade Movement and The European Union
............................................................................... p. 178

The Belgian Multicultural Federalism Laboratory of The European Integration
............................................................................... p. 190

The 1917 Corfu Declaration and its Importance for the Creation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918
............................................................................... p. 198

About the author
............................................................................... p. 224
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
5


Serbian Patriarchate of Pe in the Ottoman
Empire: The First Phase (15571594)




Introduction

The goals of this article are: 1) to investigate the role of the revived
Patriarchate of Pe in Serbian and Balkan history?; and 2) to explore and present
the results of investigation of the problems with respect to: a) the role of the
Serbian Church during the first decades of the Ottoman occupation of Serbian
lands in the process of the creation of a Serbian national identity; b) Serbian-
Turkish relations in the second half of the 16
th
century; and c) the reasons for
Serbian disloyalty towards the Ottoman government at the turn of the 17
th

century.
The article addresses the reasons and causes of the decline of the Ottoman
Empire, which was one of the most powerful European states in the New Age of
European history. Marking a period of prelude to the Eastern Question in the
Balkans, i.e. the question of the survival of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.
1
This
was one of the crucial questions in the history of Europe from the time of the
Reformation to the beginning of the First World War. The methodology employed
consists of analysis of available documents and comparison of different historical
sources and literature on the subject.
The Patriarchate of Pe is a subject of major significance as it was the only
Serbian national institution within the Ottoman Empire and whose role was of
crucial in influencing the Serbian population to remain loyal to their faith rather
than convert to Islam. The patriarchate was responsible as well for the fact that
the Serbs preserved their own national medieval heritage and the idea of an
independent national state. Under the influence of the patriarchate Orthodox
Christianity became the central and crucial element of Serbian national identity
that has been sustained to the present day.
2

The Patriarchate of Pe was one of the most important institutions in the
history of the Serbs, particularly with respect to their religious and cultural
history. This institution was founded in 1346 during the realm of the most
significant Serbian monarch: emperor Stefan Duan the Mighty (13311355).
3

The foundation of the national Serbian Patriarchate of Pe was a consequence of a
new political situation on the Balkan Peninsula, the emergence of Serbia as the
most powerful country in this region positioned to replace the Byzantine Empire.

1
For a discussion of the Eastern Question see: . , (, 1928).
2
Today is known that almost all former Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Raka (Sandak) who became
converted to Islam are Bosniaks, former Orthodox Serbs converted to Roman Catholicism in Croatia, Dalmatia,
Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are Croats and former Orthodox Serbs converted to Islam in Kosovo-Metohija
became Albanians (Arbanasi). In Kosovo-Metohija existed Arnauts (Arnautai) converted former Orthodox Serbs to
Islamic faith who still did not lose their ethnic identity before they finally became Albanians. It is estimated that c. 30%
of present-day Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija are of Serb origin (. . , -
(: , 2006), p. 3336).
3
On emperor Stefan Duan and his empire see: . , (: -, 2001).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
6


In the same year as the founding of the patriarchate, Duan the Mighty was
crowned by the Patriarch of Pe as the Emperor of Serbs and Greeks (i.e., the
Byzantines). The period that followed was one of full independence of the Serbian
medieval church from the Greek one (named as an Ecumenical Church in
Constantinople).
The history of Patriarchate of Pe can be divided into two periods, with a
long interruption between them which lasted approximately one century: 1) from
1346 to 1459; and 2) from 1557 to 1766. In the first period the Patriarchate of Pe
was the state church of the independent medieval Serbia. When the Ottoman
Turks conquered Serbia in 1459 the patriarchate, as Serbian national church, was
soon abolished (most probably in 1463) and it did not exist for a century, until its
revival in 1557. However, the new patriarchate found itself in a new political
situation in comparison to its previous position in independent Serbia. Now, from
1557 to 1766 the new Patriarchate of Pe was under total control of the
authorities of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the territory under the
jurisdiction of the second patriarchate was greater than that of the first
patriarchate.
The second Patriarchate of Pe had jurisdiction over all Serbs in the
Ottoman Empire. It is important to stress that only two (Orthodox) patriarchates
(the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Serbian Patriarchate of Pe)
were permitted to exist in the Turkish state after the Ottoman conquest of the
largest part of the Balkans. After the fall of the Serbian independent medieval
state, the Patriarchate of Pe was the only institution which could unite all Serbs
in the Ottoman Empire. The patriarchate actually became a representative
institution of the Serbs before the Ottoman government. Essentially, in the eyes of
the Serbs, the second Patriarchate of Pe was a substitution for the lost medieval
national Serbian state.
The main roles of the second patriarchate during the two centuries of its
existence were: 1) to prevent the Serbs from converting to the Islamic faith; 2) to
serve as the political representative of the Serbs in Sublime Porta (the Ottoman
government); and 3) to preserve the medieval cultural inheritance of the Serbian
state and people.
This article deals with history of the new Patriarchate of Pe during the
first thirty-eight years of its existence: from the revival of the patriarchate until the
incineration of St. Savas relics on the Vraar Hill near Belgrade (15571594).
The main issues discussed in this article are: 1) the reasons for the revival
of the patriarchate; 2) the reasons for the Serbian insurrection of 15941595
against Ottoman rule; 3) the reasons for the incineration of the relics of St. Sava
and the consequences of this action with respect to the relationships between the
Serbs and the Turks, 4) the tolerance and intolerance in the Ottoman Empire
regarding the relationships between the Islamic and Christian Orthodox faiths in
the areas under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Pe, and 5) consideration of
whether the second patriarchate was a new patriarchate, only with old name, or
was it a real resumption of the medieval (first) Serbian patriarchate?





Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
7





Territory of the Ottoman Empire in the year of 1801


The Serbian people under the Ottoman rule in the 16
th
century


The making the Ottoman state into a world power was the work of the
sultan Mehmed II al-Fatih, The Conqueror (14511481), whose conquest of
Constantinople in 1453 removed the last major barrier to expansion into the
northern Anatolia and enabled the Ottomans to dominate the Straits and the
southern shore of the Black Sea.
4
After the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed II
in four military campaigns succeeded in occupying Serbia and finally annexing it
in 1459 after the fall of Smederevo Serbias capital at the time.
5
Mehmed the
Conqueror soon occupied Bosnia in 1463, Albania in 1479 and Herzegovina in
1482. He also made the preparations for the Ottoman conquest of Negro Monte or
Montenegro (medieval Doclea or Zeta) in 1499. As a consequence, ultimately all of

4
For information on Mehmed the Conqueror see: J. Hammer, Historija Turskog/Osmanskog/Carstva, I, (Zagreb:
Ognjen Prica, 1979), pp. 151252.
5
H. Inalik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 13001600 (London, 1973), p. 27.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
8


the Serbian medieval states and Serb populated territories came under the
Ottoman sultan as parts of the Ottoman Empire. Actually, the Serbian people and
Serbian areas were being conquered by the Turks from 1371 (Macedonia) to 1499
(Montenegro). During the time of the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, the
smaller Ottoman provinces sanjaks, which were located at the Turkish borders
with Christian states, became the most important for the Ottoman administration
primarily from a military point of view. The strong military fortresses and a special
system of military stations were built on the territories of the borderland sanjaks.
A typical example was the Sanjak of Smederevo (northern medieval Serbia) which
existed from 1459 to 1552 (from the time of the fall of the city of Smederevo until
the conquest of the province of Banat).
During the 16
th
and 17
th
centuries the Serbian people lived in five larger
Ottoman provinces - pashaliks. The most important of these were the Pashalik of
Rumelia with its sanjaks: Skoplje, Kjustendil, Sofia, Prizren, Vuitrn, Scodra,
Kruevac, Vidin and Smederevo; and the Pashalik of Bosnia, divided into the
following sanjaks: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Klis, Zvornik, Biha and Lika. The other
pashaliks in which the Serbs lived were: the Pashalik of Timioara (in the sanjaks
of anad and Timioara), the Pashalik of Jeger (in the sanjaks of Seged and Srem),
and the Pashalik of Kanjia (in the sanjaks of Mohach and Poega).
6

The Ottoman administrative system was organized with the most important
goal of securing full military success and thus primacy.
7
A fundamental principle
of interethnic relations within the Ottoman Empire was a legal and practical
superiority of the Mohammedan creed (Islam) over all other creeds. The most
remarkable features of superiority and the privilaged position of the Muslims in
the Ottoman society were the requirement that Christian subjects pay extra taxes
in money (hara) and taxes in blood devirme (in Serbo-Croat - danak u krvi).
8

The last one devirme (collection of boys) was especially harsh for the Christians
as it was the practice in which the Ottoman authorities forcibly collected the boys
from the Christian families to be trained and later enrolled in the Ottoman
Empires military or civil service.
9
In general, in the Ottoman Empire there was a
legal declaration of religious tolerance (for instance, by the sultans firman in
1566) and a fairly complete political and social intolerance. The Christians were
clearly second class citizens. While formally proclaimed religious tolerance in the
majority of cases was not respected on the ground in the provinces by the local
Ottoman governors.
It is assumed by historians that approximately 9095% of the Serbs in the
Ottoman Empire in the 16
th
century lived in the rural areas.
10
Theoretically, the
sultan owned all Ottoman lands and he was the absolute master of all
inhabitants: Muslims and non-Muslims. In this way, the Christian Serbs were the
sultans flock or subjects (reaya) the members of tax-paying lower class in the
Ottoman society. However, in the 16
th
century there were Christian Serbs who
were timar owners.
11
A majority of them had been small and middle level feudal

6
I. Boi, S. irkovi, M. Ekmei, V. Dedijer, Istorija Jugoslavije (Beograd: Prosveta, 1973), see the map on p. 136.
7
H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia (New York, 1969), p. 106.
8
However, the Armenians and the Jews were exempted from devirme taxation (. ,
(: , 1993), p. 373).
9
About devirme see more in LookLex Encyclopaedia: http://i-cias.com/e.o/devsirme.htm.
10
F. Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (Cambridge, 1989), p. 38.
11
A timar was an inheritable solders small land-property.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
9


lords at the time of the independent Christian states. It was very rare to have more
Serb Christian than Ottoman Muslim sipahis (the Ottoman feudal lords) as in the
majority of cases the Serb Christian sipahis were a minority.
12

In the Serbian ethnolinguistic territories, the farmers, who were in the
majority Serbian reaya, had subordinated small-land properties (iftluks) and tax-
paying obligations to both the sultan and the Ottoman Muslim feudal aristocracy.
In addition to ordinary taxes, required of all members of the reaya social strata
(whether Muslim or not), Christian Serbs, as non-Muslim members of the reaya,
while having to pay to the sultan, had extra tax obligations: monetary, natural and
labour ones. The most important was the hara or dizija, which was paid by all
labour-able men per capita. During the second half of the 16
th
century,
meritorious Serbs were granted by the sultan abandoned lands as iftluks (private
possessions) along with peasants as their serfs.
13
Generally speaking, during the
first hundred years of the Ottoman rule, the status of the peasants was better
than it had been in the Christian medieval feudal states. This was the main reason
that until the end of the 16
th
century among the Christian Serbs there were no
rebellions against the new (Ottoman) rule. There were also some privileged
territories, as for instance Montenegro, where a feudal system was abolished by
the Ottomans and where all inhabitants were proclaimed as free-peasants (not
feudal serfs). In Montenegro even the Ottoman administrative system was not
established on the local level (nahijas). Local administration thus was left to the
domestic (Christian) aristocracy.
14

A main part of northern portion of the territory of the formerly independent
medieval Serbia was transformed into a borderland Ottoman military province
which was ruled by a paa whose administrative seat after 1521 was in Belgrade
(before 1521 it was in Smederevo). The paa determined the amount of the tribute
and taxation. He was also the head of the justice system and of the Ottoman
administration in his province paalik (pashalik, paaluk). The Christians, in
contrast to the Muslims, had no rights to complain against the paa, but they
could appeal to him for his protection against the local Ottoman feudal aristocracy
the sipahis. The Ottoman paaliks were territorially subdivided into several
sanjaks governed by sanjak-begs. The sanjaks were subdivided into vilayets or
subailuks administered by a subaa and finally, the subailuks were composed of
several nahiyes, or local districts, administered by mudirs. The administration of
justice was given to the kadi, whose administrative territory was the kadiluk.
15

Almost until end of the 17
th
century there were large districts in the
Serbian ethnolinguistic territory administered by the local Christian Serb bai-
knezes. They were persons were usually the descendants of Serbian nobles or
princes who had become dependent on the Turks, but managed by their services
to win the latters goodwill and retain their lands relatively intact. Bai-knezes
were responsible only to the paa in Belgrade as the administrator of the entire
province of the Belgrade paalik. The Ottoman Muslim kadis had no jurisdiction
in the territories administered by bai-knezes and the Turks did not have the right
to live in their districts. Thus, a large part of Serb populated land was not under

12
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, p. 137.
13
On the Ottoman feudal, states and military systems see in: .
XVI XVIII (: , 1960), pp. 938
14
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, p. 143.
15
, p. 1921.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
10


the Ottoman administrative jurisdiction in the 15
th
and 16
th
centuries. In many
cases the nahiyes were administered by local Serb Christian obor-knezes. They
were elected by their compatriots, but their election was subject to the paas
approval. The obor-knezes were mainly responsible for order in the nahiyas. Thus,
some type of local national-territorial autonomy existed among the Serbs under
the Ottoman rule during the first century and a half of the Ottoman
administration.

A revival of the Patriarchate of Pe in 1557

The (first) Patriarchate of Pe was established in 1346, at the time of the
height of the medieval Serbian state. In the same year the greatest Serbian ruler,
Stefan Duan, was crowned as emperor by the first Serbian patriarch, on Easter
Sunday (April 16
th
, 1346). The Patriarchate of Pe existed, at least, until the
collapse of Serbian medieval state in 1459 or some years later (until 1463) .
16

The status of the Serbian (Orthodox) church in the East-Christian world
was singular. In 1352 the Serbian church was excommunicated by the Greek
patriarch in Constantinople, but in 1374 the ban was removed at the request of
Serbian prince Lazar (the most powerful Serbian feudal lord at the time), and the
independent and autocephalous character of Serbian church was again
acknowledged by the Byzantine (Ecumenical Orthodox) church authorities.
However, after the fall of Constantinople (in 1453) the authority of the Greek
church of the Archbishopric of Ohrid (in Macedonia) was extended over the
autocephalous Serbian church (Patriarchate of Pe)
17
by permission of the
Ottoman authorities.
For the Serbs, the danger of denationalisation of their national church, as
it was put under the jurisdiction of the Greek church, after 1459 became much
higher, especially when the Greek-Phanariot system of administration was
established in the Balkans
18
. The Phanariot system of administration was a mixed
framework of governance by the Ottoman Islamic and the Greek Orthodox rule,
headed by the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. Although historians have not
determined the exact date of the abolishment of the Serbian patriarchate by the
Ottoman government, it was most likely that during the next several years after
the fall of the Serbian capital of Smederevo (in 1459) the Patriarchate of Pe
functioned in some form under the Ottoman occupation. The Serbian patriarchate
was, according to some historians, abolished in 1463 and was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Greek-governed Archbishopric of Ochrid (the Archbishopric of
Ohrid was established in 1018).
19
The archbishop of Ohrid was of Greek

16
The creation of an independent (autocephalous) Serbian (Orthodox) medieval church in 1219 was possible due to the
work of St. Sava (c. 11741236) (. , . , , (:
, 1926), pp. 124125). St. Sava, however, was and one of the most important Serbian
medieval profane national worker. About his profane activities see: . , (: ,
1988).
17
H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia, p. 123.
18
The so-called Phanariots were the Greeks who lived in the Phanar a suburb of Constantinople. This part of the city
was mainly populated by the Greeks. In this Greek quarter was located the Ecumenical Church (i.e. the Greek
Orthodox church) which enjoyed a large scale of privileges within the Ottoman Empire till 1821.
19
It has to be stressed that the authority of Archbishopric of Ohrid gradually was taking over the dioceses of the Serbian
Patriarchate and extended its own territory of jurisdiction up to the town of Pe in Metohija and monastery of ia in
Central Serbia.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
11


nationality but his archbishopric was independent from the Greek patriarch of
Constantinople and not subject to the Greek Phanariot system. The archbishop
succeeded, in the course of time, to enlarge his own area of jurisdiction, and
consequently, a main part of the Serbian population in the Balkan Peninsula was
put under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Archbishopric of Ohrid. This may have
been the result of: 1) a lack of Serbian loyalty to the Ottoman sultan on the eve of
an extremely important battle against the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526 and 2)
the personal position of the second person in command in the Ottoman Empire,
Ibrahim pasha, who was a grand vizier and a Greek by ethnic origin. The Serbian
clergy, led by bishop Pavle of Smederevo, rose in 1528 against this decision by the
Ottoman authorities and succeeded to, de facto, separate the Serbian church from
the authority of the archbishop of Ohrid. Such limited autonomy of the Serbian
church within the Ottoman Empire ended in 1541 (when the Ottoman army
conquered the city of Buda) at a council of Orthodox churches which was
convened by order of the sultan. It was the fist planned and executed action by the
Serbs as a nation after the loss of their national state in 1459 an event which
together with other favourable developments at the time, including first of all the
constructive and crucial role of Mehmed pasha Sokolovi (a Serb from Eastern
Bosnia who was converted to Islam)
20
, paved the way for the re-establishing of the
Patriarchate of Pe by the sultans firman issued in 1557.
During the Ottoman rule in Southeast Europe the Christians were bound
solely by their own church organisations. The Catholics were in a more difficult
position then the Orthodox believers because the Ottoman authorities were more
suspicious of the Catholics than the Orthodox since the greatest Ottoman enemies
were the Catholic states of Spain, Austria and Venice. Conversely, the Orthodox
churches were not a great danger for the Ottoman government - Porta, until the
emergence of a strong Orthodox Russia as a great and important European
military power (from the time of Peter the Great 16891725). The Ottoman
tolerance toward the Orthodox believers in the Balkans can be explained,
additionally, and by the fact that all the centres of the national churches of the
Balkan Orthodox nations were located in the Ottoman Empire and thus controlled
by the Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman government was particularly tolerant
toward the inhabitants living in the Ottoman borderland provinces since they
wanted to prevent any political co-operation between the Christian believers from
the Ottoman Empire and the hostile Christian border states Venice and Austria.
Particularly, the Orthodox believers and church institutions were protected by the
Ottoman authorities and enjoyed certain privileges during the time of the Ottoman
wars of conquest in the southern part of Central Europe north of the Danube and
Sava Rivers (Hungary and Transylvania) from 1521 to 1541.
In the Ottoman Empire the Christians were regarded as the zimias the
peoples who had the divine books. For that reason, Christian believers enjoyed
the rights of Ottoman citizens but not on the same level as Ottoman Muslim
believers.
21
As a part of the Ottoman system of religious tolerance (millet system)
there was recognition of the rights of the Christian churches and monasteries to

20
About the life of Mehmed pasha Sokolovi see: . , - (, 1975).
21
. , , . I (, 1991), pp. 303304.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
12


own real estate.
22
Serbian historian Milenko Vukievi has noted that just before
the revival of the Patriarchate of Pe, the Ottoman sultan Suleyman the
Magnificent (15201566), issued a firman ordering the free profession of all
religions in his state.
23

Until the end of the 16
th
century the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed
full religious tolerance offered by the Ottoman authorities. At the same time the
Serbs had a very important military role in the Ottoman army during the Ottoman
wars against Catholic Hungary and Austria. There were three reasons for sultan
Suleyman the Magnificents decision to re-establish the Serbian national church
(the Patriarchate of Pe) in 1557: 1) as reward for Serbian loyalty to the Ottoman
authorities; 2) to further encourage the Serbs to continue to actively participate in
the Ottoman wars in Central Europe; and 3) to fulfil the wish of the grand vizier
Mehmed Sokolovi (a Muslim Serb from the eastern Bosnian village of Sokolovii)
24

who played a very influential political role at the court of the sultan and in the
Ottoman government. It can be concluded that the revival of the Serbian
Patriarchate was a reward for Serbian national loyalty, and above all, for the full
military assistance in the sultans wars against the borderland Catholic Christian
countries in the southern part of the Central Europe. Naturally, the sultan
expected that such a reward would further encourage Serb national loyalty to the
Ottoman state and further Serb participation in the forthcoming decisive wars
against the Austrian Empire and its capital Vienna the main military target of
the Ottoman foreign policy at that time. However, Serb loyalty to the sultan was
sustained only until 1594 with the outbreak of the first Serbian uprising against
the central authorities in Istanbul.
There is no question that the re-establishment of the Patriarchate of Pe
occurred in 1557 and that it was the result of the sultans personal decision and
decree. It is also evident that the role of the second-ranked man in the Ottoman
Empire (the first one after the sultan) grand vizier Mehmed Sokolovi, was of
significant importance on the sultans decision to issue the decree (firman).
25

Additionally, Mehmed Sokolovi was strongly influenced by his brother Makarije, a
Serbian monk, who became the first patriarch of the restored Serbian church in
1557. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the influence of the grand
vizier on the sultans decision to re-establish the Patriarchate of Pe was a crucial
one since the revival of the Serbian Patriarchate was the sultans reward to the
Serbs for their contribution in the Ottoman wars against Hungary and the
Habsburg Monarchy. In this way, the sultan was attempting to assure future
Serbian political loyalty.
The Serbian national church was restored in 1557 under its own medieval
historical name. The Ottoman administration was effectuating an illusion that the
(first) medieval Patriarhate of Pe had continued its existence and function as an

22
On the relations between Christians and Muslims in the Balkans during the Ottoman domination see: G. Castellan,
History of the Balkans. From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin, (New York: East European Monographes, Boulder,
1992), pp. 109116.
23
. . , o (: , 1906), p. 43. (reprint in
1998 by , )
24
On the life of Ottoman grand vizier Mehmed paa Sokolovi see in: R. Samardi, Mehmed Sokolovi (Beograd:
1971). It was this grand vizier who built the famous bridge over the Drina River in 1567.
25
. , . , (:
, 1990), p. 127.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
13


institution. However, in fact, in the history of the Serbian church there was an
interruption of a real institutional existence for at least 30 to 50 years. It is
important to note that the medieval Serbian church existed as an independent
national institution from 1219 and it was an integral part of the Serbian national
state. However, the revived patriarchate in 1557 was under the total control of the
Ottoman administration, but with significant autonomous rights. The city of Pe
(Ipek in Turkish language) in Kosovo-Metohija once again became the seat of the
Serbian patriarch who was autocephalous, of Serbian nationality and who
supported Serbian national interests in the Ottoman Empire.
Moreover, with the permission of the sultan, the grand vizier Mehmed paa
Sokolovi provided for the continuation of the Patriarchate of Pe and inheritance
of the patriarchal throne by members of the Sokolovis family. The first patriarch
was the brother of grand vizier Makarije (15571571). After his death, the next
two heads of the Serbian church in the Ottoman Empire were Antonije
(15711575) and Gerasim (15751586); both of whom were nephews of Mehmed
Sokolovi.
26
In reality, the influence of the Serbian patriarch on Serbian society in
the Ottoman Empire was critical as he became the person with the most influence
on the political behaviour of the Serbs in their relations with the Ottoman
administration. In other words, the patriarchs in Pe in the new political and
historical climate assumed the role previously held by the medieval Serbian
monarchs as the heads of a nation - ethnarch.
27
Concurrently, they were the
political representatives at the court of the sultan of all Serbs as a nation in the
Ottoman Empire.

The territory and organisation of the Patriarchate of Pe

The sultans most important aim with regard to the revival of the
patriarchate was to gather all of the Serbian population living in the Ottoman
Empire under their own national church organisation. There were two crucial
political reasons for this decision by Suleyman the Magnificent: 1) it was a
reward for the Serbian loyalty and service to Ottoman civil and military
authorities; and 2) the sultan could more easily control all Serbian citizens within
the Ottoman Empire because the Patriarchate of Pe was under total Ottoman
administrative control and considered to be under the strong political influence of
the Ottoman administration and, thus basically instrument of Ottoman policy
among the Serbs.
One of the crucial points of difference between the old (first) and revived
(second) Serbian patriarchate was with respect to the territory under their
administrative and spiritual jurisdiction. The former medieval Serbian
patriarchate controlled a significantly smaller territory under its jurisdiction in
contrast to the re-established Patriarchate of Pe.



26
Ibid., p. 129.
27
The Serbian patriarchs were signing themselves in some documents as the patriarchs of All Illyricum, i.e. of the
main part of the Balkan Peninsula (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia, the Vardar Macedonia and the
part of Bulgaria) according to the old tradition that the Balkan lands were called according to their antique names and
that Serbia was the synonym for the Roman province of Illyricum (. . , .
, : , 2007, p. 17).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
14




Territory of the Serbian Patriarchate of Pe in 1557


Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
15


The centre of the renewed patriarchate was the ancient Serbian medieval
religious and cultural center the city of Pe (in Turkish Ipek), located in the
region of Kosovo-Metohija or Serbia proper.
The southern border of the new patriarchate included the cities of Tetovo,
Skopje and tip in Macedonia and in northern Albania the city of Scutari (Skadar).
The eastern border included in Bulgaria the city of Samokov and the
Serbian city of Ni. However, Bulgarias city of Sofia and Serbias city of Pirot were
left under the control of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The
city of Severin, which is located on the left bank of the Danube River, was also not
included in the Serbian patriarchate.
The north-eastern border of the patriarchate embraced the main part of the
area of the Mori River in Romania. Thus, Romanias cities of Timioara and Arad
were located within the patriarchates borders.
The northern border of the patriarchate extended far from the Hungarian
town of Sent Andrea which is only 25 km. north of Buda and Pest.
The north-western border passed between Balaton Lake and the Raba
River in Hungary and even included Slovenias city of Ptuj and the Dalmatian
cities of Nin and Zadar. Consequently, Croatias capital Zagreb, and Croatias
cities of Karlovac and Sisak were put under the jurisdiction of the Serbian
patriarchate regardless the fact that these cities were not part of the Ottoman
Empire.
The south-western border incorporated the Adriatic littoral from Nin, on
the north, to the Bojana River, on the south.
28

It is important to note one additional significant difference between the
medieval and the revived Patriarchate of Pe: the central territories of the first one
were located in the south-eastern parts of the Balkans, while the central territories
of the renewed patriarchate were located in the northern and north-western parts
of the Balkans including some territories which had never been a part of the
Ottoman Empire. The reason for this difference was the fact that the borders of
the new patriarchate followed the ethnographic boundaries of the Serbs at that
time. However, the new ethnographic territories of the Serbs were different from
those prior to the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans (more precisely, before the
Battle of Maritza in 1371). In other words, during the time of the Ottoman
conquest of South-Eastern Europe a great number of the Serbs migrated from the
south-east towards the north-west. Undoubtedly, the migrations were the most
significant consequence of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans from 1354 to
1912.
29

The territory of the re-established (second) Patriarchate of Pe was
divided into approximately 40 metropolitans or archbishoprics. Those located
southward from the Danube River were parts of the medieval Serbian church
organization. On the other hand, the archbishoprics located northward from the
Danube River and the Sava River and westward from the Drina River (i.e., located
in the Southern and Central Hungary, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia and

28
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, p. 146 (see the map 23 of the borders of the Patriarchate of Pe in the mid-17
century).
29
On these migrations see: . , (, 1922), pp. 60139.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
16


Dalmatia) were established by the authorities of the new Patriarchate of Pe after
1557.
30

There was a new moment in the development of the Serbian church
organization when after 1557 the Serbian churches in the Ottoman occupied part
of Hungary were included in the administrative system of the Patriarchate of Pe.
However, the Orthodox church in Transylvania the province mainly settled by
the Orthodox Romanians, was placed under the spiritual and administrative
jurisdiction of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople.
31

Accordingly, the south-eastern borders of the Patriarchate of Pe shared common
boundaries with the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. A southern
neighbour of the Serbian Patriarchate was the Greek Archbishopric of Ohrid in
Macedonia. Finally, in the north and west the administrative and spiritual
territory of the Patriarchate of Pe had common borders with the Roman Catholic
Church in the Habsburg Monarchy and in the Republic of Venice.
It is not possible to specify the exact date of the administrative re-
organisation of the Patriarchate of Pe. It most probably began within the first ten
years of the revived Patriarchate of Pe.
32
Nevertheless, it is known that the entire
Serbian church organization in Ottoman Hungary was restructured during the
second half of the 16
th
century into five eparchies (dioceses): Belgrade-Srem,
Baka, Slavonia, Lipova and Vrac. However, the eparchy of Budim was not
established at that time.
33
It was a fact that all of the lands of the Kingdom of
Hungary (northward from the Danube River and the Sava River) settled by the
Orthodox Serbs immediately after the Ottoman conquest (from 1521 to 1541) were
incorporated into the administrative-spiritual territory of the Greek Archbishopric
of Ohrid, but when the Patriarchate of Pe became re-established in 1557 they
were included into the administrative-spiritual territory of this Serbian national
church organisation and institution. The residences of the metropolitan of
Belgrade-Srem were in Belgrade and in the Hopovo monastery in Fruka Gora (in
present day Vojvodina province in Northern Serbia).
34

The province of Banat, at that time in the southern part of the Kingdom of
Hungary, but after 1918 in present day Romania and Serbia, was already settled
by the Serbs in the late Middle Ages. Banat had in the 16
th
century two eparchies
(Lipova and Vrac) and in the next century two additional ones (Timioara and
Bekerek). The first known metropolitan (archbishop) of Vrac was Teodor, who
was one of the most important spiritual leaders of the Serbs in the uprising of
1594 against the Ottoman government.
35





30
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, p. 146 (see the map 23 of the borders of the Patriarchate of Pe in the mid-17
century).
31
It has to be said that in Transylvania at that time lacking political power, the Orthodox faith, the religion of the
majority of the Romanian population, was not admitted among the official religions of the country, having only a
tolerated status (K. Treptow (ed.), A History of Romania (Iai: The Center for Romanian Studies and The Romanian
Cultural Foundations, 1996), p. 133).
32
, , . I ( , 1939), p. 389.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., p. 392.
35
. , 1594 (, 1899), p. 28.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
17



The inter-confessional relations, rights and privileges

One of the critical research problems in dealing with the history of the
revived Patriarchate of Pe is the question of the inter-confessional relations in the
southern part of the former Kingdom of Hungary, while under jurisdiction of the
Patriarchate of Pe. It is a question of the inter-confessional tolerance and
intolerance between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic believers living within the
borders of the Serbian patriarchate. The Catholic religion, which was dominant in
Hungary before the Protestant reformation and the Ottoman influence in the
Balkans and the southern parts of Central Europe, had simply disappeared in
many regions of Southern Hungary (present day Vojvodina province in Serbia)
which had become heavily populated by the Orthodox Serbs. Catholic clergy
together with the Hungarian feudal aristocracy fled from many parts of Hungary
and Transylvania during the Ottoman wars against the Hungarians
(15211541).
36
Several Catholic dioceses from Hungary such as Srem, Pecs,
Kalocsa and Csanad were even devoid of Catholic archbishops. Consequently, all
Catholic believers in Srem, Bacska and Banat (these three provinces constitute the
region of Vojvodina in present day Serbia) were put under the jurisdiction of Serb
Orthodox archbishop of Belgrade-Srem. The Orthodox archbishops (metropolitans)
received permission from the Ottoman sultan to collect ordinary taxes from
Catholic believers (such as dimnica and milostinja) and extraordinary taxes (such
as those for weddings).
The introduction of the new Gregorian calendar in 1582 by the Roman
Catholic Church caused some problems with respect to the relations between the
Catholic and the Orthodox believers within the Patriarchate of Pe. According to
some sources, in the province of Srem the Orthodox-Catholic relations were
negatively impacted after 1582 when the Orthodox believers became aware of the
intention of the Catholics to force Orthodox believers to adopt the Gregorian
calendar. However, according to documentation provided by one Catholic believer,
in the case of a Christian war against Muslim Turks the Catholics from the
Southern Hungary would have joined the Orthodox Serbs and Romanians from
Transylvania.
37

It is important to note that the tendency of Catholics to convert to the
Orthodox faith increased when the pope issued a bula Inter Gravissimos on
February 24
th
, 1582. There were some areas in Southern Hungary where the
Catholic and Orthodox believers celebrated holidays together according to the old
Julian calendar until the expulsion of the Ottoman authorities and Muslims from
Hungary during the Great Vienna War 16831699.
38
This fact can be explained
only by the strong influence of the Orthodox Church on the Roman Catholics in
Southern Hungary where the Catholics had become a minority without the
protection of their own church organization.

36
About Hungarian history from the Battle of Mohcs to the fall of Buda, Hungarian relations with the Ottomans and the
question of cohabitations of Protestants and Catholics in Hungary in the 16
th
century see: L. Kontler, Millennium in
Central Europe. A History of Hungary (Budapest: Atlantisz Publishing House, 1999), pp. 139158.
37
, p. 407.
38
Draganovi, Massenubertritte von Katholikenzur Ortodoxie im Kroatischen Sprachgebiet zur Zeit der Turken
hershaft, Orientalia Christiana Periodica, IIIIV (Roma, 1937), pp. 587592.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
18


Among other privileges, the Patriarchate of Pe was granted land
properties, the right to collect one ducat (gold currency) for each priest and the
right to collect the so-called bir - 12 akes (Ottoman currency) per house. The
Serbian church had the autonomy to elect its own patriarch and archbishops.
However, the elected patriarch had to be recognized by the Ottoman government,
the Porta. One of the most important privileges given to the patriarchate was the
right to adjudicate marital disputes of its own believers.
The organization of the Serbian church consisted of not only high officers
such as a patriarch, archbishops and bishops, but also lower rank servants - the
priests. The rural priests lived and worked basically like peasants while the urban
priests lived as did the other urban population.
39
According to Serbian philologist
Vuk Stefanovi Karadi (17871864), every priest in Serbia was beard while in
Montenegro it was not the case. Montenegrin Orthodox clergy did not wear the
religious caps of the clergy as it was done in Serbia. In Serbia priests served in
several villages and when they were at home they worked at the typical rural jobs
of the peasantry. In Montenegro priests carried arms like ordinary people, thus
eliminating differences between the priests and their congregations. Furthermore,
the priests in Montenegro participated in the battles against the Turks along with
the rest of the population.
40

The Serbian Church was a great landowner on the borderlands of the
Patriarchate of Pe. The residences of the church were located in the monasteries
and one part of their support was provided through the income generated by the
real estate holdings of the monasteries. The churchs incomes were guaranteed by
the sultans berats. In turn the patriarchate was required to pay special taxes for
the election of a new patriarch, archbishops and bishops.
41
However, this
regulation and practice was in many cases used by the highest church authorities
to bribe the sultan and the ministers in Porta. In order to insure that a new
Ottoman sultan confirmed all privileges of the patriarchate through the issuance
of a new berat the church authorities were required to pay new taxes. This
taxation was the miri-peke. For instance, the price of a berat for the appointment
of a new patriarch was 100.000 akes in 1766.
42

The legal relations between the authorities of the Patriarchate of Pe and
the Ottoman Empire were regulated by the sultans firman issued in 1557. From
the religious point of view the patriarchate was autonomous and self-governed.
Generally, the government of the Ottoman Empire did not interfere in the internal
religious life of the Christian churches. For all Ottoman Christian subjects it was
very important that destroyed or damaged churches and monasteries were re-
pared or re-built. This required special permission issued by the Ottoman
authorities. However, according to Ottoman law, any rebuilt Christian religious
structure could not be higher than its original height prior to destruction
43
or
higher than any local minaret.
The privileges and rights which the first patriarch Macarius ()
received from the sultan were equivalent to the privileges given to the Greek

39
, p. 464.
40
. . , & (, 1985), p. 7880.
41
, p. 102103.
42
. , p. 405407; . and others, (:
, 1989), p. 105.
43
Ibid., p. 401.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
19


church in Constantinople. The Serbian patriarch was recognised as a leader of all
Serbs in the Ottoman Empire (ethnarch, in Turkish milet baa).
44
The Serbs saw
their patriarch primarily as a secular national leader. For the Ottoman
administration the Patriarchate of Pe was a legal representative institution of the
Serbs in the Ottoman Empire, but for Serbian people it was both a religious and
court institution.
45
A patriarch, archbishops and bishops of the Serbian church
had received the right to freely profess their religion, to freely administer the
churchs properties and the right to collect taxes from the people, priests and
monks. The Ottoman sultan gave the Serbian patriarch the right to appoint
archbishops (, ) and bishops ()
with the sultans approval. The Patriarch also had the right to arrogate properties
of the priests, monks, archbishops and bishops which were left without any
successors (ius caducitatis) and to adjudicate marital or civil disputes. Thus, the
Ottoman state did not have jurisdiction over the Serbs. The Serbian church used
the medieval Christian laws such as Dushans Codex from 1349/1354, the
Vlastareva Sintagma (revised Byzantine Law) or the common law.
46
Taking these
rights and privileges into consideration, we can conclude that the Patriarchate of
Pe was in practice a Serbian state within the Ottoman Empire.

The historical role of the Patriarchate of Pe in preservation of
Serbian national and cultural identity

The Patriarchate of Pe was one of the most significant national
institutions in Serbian history. The importance of its role in the history of the
Serbs takes on even more significance if we know the fact that the second
patriarchate (15571766) was the only Serbian national institution that
functioned and subsequently could protect and unify all Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire. The Patriarchate of Pe basically assumed the role of the Serbian state
which had disappeared in the mid-15
th
century.
The upper structure of the patriarchate had a feudal organisation,
47
but
the lower structure was composed of priests who originated in the ordinary
Serbian folk social strata. The patriarchate succeeded in the course of time to
bring together the main groups of Serbs who were dispersed across large
territories of the European parts of the Ottoman Empire into a single national
organization - that of the patriarchate - which served as the Serbian national and
political representative in Istanbul. The main national task of the patriarchate was
to foster the idea of Serbian ethnic unity within Orthodox Christianity and the
spirit of St. Sava. Compared to the Patriarchate of Pe, all autonomous local
communities of Serbs in the Ottoman Empire played a secondary role of
importance in this regard.
48
A commonly held opinion of researchers of the history
of the Patriarchate of Pe is that this unique spiritual Serbian community in Turkey
took the most important merits, not only for preservation of the Orthodoxy but also

44
Ibid., p. 315; . . , - , p. 22. The independent
Serbian-milet (the Serbian religious nation) was separated from the Rum-milet with the establishment of the Patriarchate
of Pe in 1557 (. . , . , p. 32).
45
. , . , , p. 128.
46
. , (, 1931), p. 312.
47
, p. 462.
48
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, pp. 145147.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
20


for forming and developing of one common and strong Serbian national conscience
throughout all Serbian ethnic territories.
49
In addition, the patriarchate had a
significant influence on the Serbian population living in Hungary and under the
Habsburg Monarchy.
50

By protecting the spiritual and cultural tradition of medieval Serbia, the
Serbian church sustained and continued the cultural development of the Serbs
during the time of Ottoman rule. In the 16
th
century several new printing-houses
began to operate (in the monastery of Mileeva, in Belgrade, in Rujna, in Scodra,
etc.) in which the religious books written in the Old Church Slavonic language
were printed and later used by the Serbian clergy not only in the Ottoman Empire
but also in the Habsburg Monarchy. In Serbian monasteries some of the most
significant medieval Serbian manuscripts and books were re-written. That the
Serbian clergy, while under Ottoman rule continued to write in the traditional
(medieval) Serbian manner is exemplified by the case of Serbian patriarch Pajsije
Janjevac (16141648) who wrote a biography () of the Serbian medieval
emperor Uro (13551371) according to the style of the Middle Ages. The others
collected or revised ancient annals which were written in the Serbian type of the
Old Church Slavonic language (Serbian-Slavonic language).
51

After the revival of the Patriarchate of Pe the construction of Orthodox
shrines increased in Serbia, Slavonia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance,
immediately after the patriarchate was re-established in 1557 the most important
church buildings in the administrative centre of the patriarchate - the city of Pe
in Kosovo-Metohija were renovated. Patriarch Makarije (15571571), for instance,
became directly involved in supervising the construction of the narthex
() in the central church in the town of Pe and in the program of its
fresco paintings. In 1560 one of the most significant Serbian medieval monasteries
Graanica in Kosovo-Metohija near the city of Pritina was restored. The process
of restoration of ancient Serbian sacred buildings (monasteries and churches)
especially affected the region of Kosovo-Metohija, the cultural, political and
spiritual cradle of the Serbian nation.
52
According to Serbian art historian Sreten
Petkovi, during the first decades of the revival of the patriarchate approximately
one hundred monasteries and churches were restored; twenty of them in Kosovo-
Metohija.
53
However, this period of restoration and new construction lacked the
support of wealthy founders of churches and monasteries, typical of Serbia in the
Middle Ages. It was the main reason that the buildings and decorative art were
modest in comparison to those of the independent Serbian medieval state.
However, the style and execution characteristic of medieval Serbian churches and
traditional iconography served as the prototypes for the creation of the new fresco
paintings.
54


49
, p. 389.
50
Ibid.
51
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, p. 146147; , p. 102109.
52
. , 1683. (, 1984), pp. 3133.
About Kosovo and Metohija in Serbian history see: . , . There were
c. 1300 churches, monasteries and other monuments in Kosovo-Metohija before the Ottomans. However, there were only
c. 15 active Orthodox shrines in this region in the first decades of the Ottoman rule (. . ,
- , p. 22).
53
. , 15571614 ( , 1965), pp. 4950.
54
I. Boi, Istorija Jugoslavije, pp. 146147.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
21


From the time of the revived Patriarchate of Pe a special term emerged
among the Serbs the so-called Serbian faith, which, using the model of the
Serbian medieval tradition, defined Orthodox Christianity as the synthesis of state
and culture, infused with the spirit of St. Sava. The Serbian faith became in
the 1718
th
centuries a basic foundation of the Serbian national identity.
55

One of the most important features of the restored Patriarchate of Pe was
that it became more interested in domestic national questions rather than in the
broader questions of Christian dogma being debated in Europe at a time of
struggle and wars between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The reason for this
fact was that the patriarchate was primarily interested in the preservation of a
medieval Serbian national heritage and Serb national identity. In practice it meant
that the prime task of the patriarchate was to prevent the Serbs from conversion
to Islam.
56


A rebellion of the Serbs in Banat in 1594

The conflict between the Muslim Ottoman state and its own Christian
subjects started in the second half of the 16
th
century and very soon intensified in
severity. The Ottoman feudal system at the end of the 16
th
century ended the
process of destruction of the Serbian feudal strata and consequently formed
conditions in which the class and religious opposition to the system were united.
57

Enlarged political and social differences between the Ottoman Muslims and
Ottoman Christian citizens made a strong impact on the behaviour of the Serbian
church towards the Ottoman authorities. The Serbian church experienced
economic and financial pressure by the Ottoman state during the crises in the
Ottoman feudal system which began with the death of the sultan Suleyman
Magnificent in 1566, and even in the second half of the 16
th
century some old
rights enjoyed by Serbian monasteries were abolished by the Ottoman
government.
58
Such new Ottoman policies directed at the Serbian church
aggravated the position of the monasteries. Increased taxes required of the
Serbian monasteries and churches became a reality from the first years of the
reign of the sultan Selim II (15661574). There were even examples of Ottoman
feudal and military aristocracy appropriated properties of Serbian monasteries
and requiring bribes in exchange for solving every disputed question.
59

Just before the end of the 16
th
century the Ottoman Empire lost two great
battles in their struggle against the European Christian states: a naval battle near
Lepanto in 1571 (in the Ionnian Sea) and a land battle near Sisak in the Habsburg
Monarchy (present day Croatia) in 1593.
60
The moral impact of these two
Christian victories on the Ottoman Christians was of great importance for the
subsequent Christian uprisings against the Ottoman rule in the South-East
Europe. Most of the Ottoman Christians wrongly believed after 1593 that the
military power of the Ottoman Empire could be easily broken and subsequently

55
. , , . I, p. 317; . , - ,
, 1314 ( , 1956), p. 285.
56
. , , p. 418.
57
, . II, p. 462.
58
Ibid., p. 463.
59
Ibid.
60
On the Battle of Sisak see: J. von Hammer, Historija Turskog/Osmanskog/Carstva, I, pp. 118120.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
22


with the support of some Christian state they could be liberated from Ottoman
power. Particularly, they had been considering the Habsburg emperor Rudolf II (of
Austria and the Holy Roman Empire, 15761611)
61
as a potential liberator of all
Ottoman Christians. The Austrian emperor also viewed himself as a European
monarch determined to finally break Ottoman power in Europe and to become a
Saviour of Europe. In order to fulfil this holy mission he primarily expected great
support of the Transylvanian prince and the Serbs from Southern Hungary. In
1591 the Austrian imperial deputy Richard Schtreit promised the Serbs and the
Bulgarians Austrian military support in the case of a Christian rebellion against
the Ottoman Empire during the upcoming war (Long War 15931606) between
the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Both, Serbian and Bulgarian
negotiators pledged that in the event of war the Serbs and Bulgarians from the
Ottoman Empire would contribute fully in order to support the Habsburg
Monarchy a country seen by many Europeans as antemurale christianitatis.
Relations between the Serbs and the Ottoman government were drastically
aggravated during the last decades of the 16
th
century. There were several causes
for this fact but the most important was that at the end of the 16
th
century the
pressure on Serb tax-payers (and on other non-Muslims) in the Ottoman Empire
increased as the government in Istanbul needed additional funds in order to
continue their wars against Austria, Venice, Spain and the Vatican. Generally, the
situation of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire worsened at the turn of the
17
th
century. Basically, the Ottoman feudal system was in a great crisis and the
Ottoman administration was compelled to increase taxation in order to improve its
finances. It was a necessary measure in order to continue Ottoman military-
political expansion towards the heart of Central Europe, i.e. the city of Vienna
(Wien) which was unsuccessfully besieged in 1529 by the troops of the sultan
Suleyman the Magnificent. The Serbian church was already under economic and
financial pressure by the Ottoman administration during the reign of sultan Selim
II (15661574) when for the first time Serbian monasteries and churches were
being sold. The annual taxation rate, which the Patriarchate of Pe had to pay to
the sultan at the end of the 16
th
century was increased to 100,000 akes.
The highest Serbian church administrators became involved in the struggle
against the Turks at the end of the 16
th
century. Patriarch Jovan Kantul
(15921614) was the first head of the Serbian church who began to plot against
the Ottoman authorities.
62
As a national representative of all Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire, the Serbian church at the end of that century tried to find a protector for
the Serbs in some foreign country. The church representatives negotiated with the
representatives of Austria, several Italian rulers and the Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation.
63
Thus, hoping that the Austrian emperor would assist in Serbian
liberation from the Ottoman rule at the time of the Long War or the Sisak War
(15931606) between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire the Serbs
from the Banat region (historical southern province of the Kingdom of Hungary;
today divided between Serbia and Romania), led by their own church clergy, took
an active role in this war against the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Austrians.
Together with the Serbs from Banat and the Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija (in the

61
For information on emperor Rudolph II (15761611) see: J. Brenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 12731700
(London, New York: Longman, 1994), pp. 242260.
62
. , . , , p. 129.
63
, . II, p. 107, 493494.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
23


region of Pe in 1594) and from Herzegovina (in 1597) rose in arms.
64
Thus, the
Serbs and their national church entered into the overt hostilities against the
Ottoman government, siding with the Habsburg Monarchy for the attainment of
their national liberation and in defence of Christianity.
65

This Christian rebellion, the biggest up to this point against the Ottoman
authorities broke out in Southern Transylvania and the Banat region among the
Orthodox Serbs and Romanians. The Serbian intention was to involve on their
side the Transylvanian prince Sigismund Batory. In order to realize this aim, a
special Serbian delegation was sent to the Transylvanian city of Belgrade
(Giulafehervar in Hungarian or Alba Iulia in Romanian). The delegation
participated in a session of the Transylvanian feudal assembly of local magnates.
This Serbian delegation was led by one of the highest administrators of the
Patriarchate of Pe the metropolitan of Vrac, Teodor Tividorovi. The Serbian
deputies offered the throne of the Serbian kings to Sigismund Batory in exchange
for his support of the Serbian rebels. During the rebellion the Serbs were in
constant contact with the prince of Transylvania, as well as the Austrian general
Teifenbach. The Serbian deputy ore (Georgije) Rac, helped by general
Teifenbach, succeeded in meeting with the Austrian archduke Maximilian, who at
that time was leading the siege of the Hungarian fortresses of Esztergom on the
Danube River. ore Racs talks with him were on the future of the war and
Serbian destiny after the war.
A turning point in the Serbian rebellion occurred when the new beglerbeg
(or paa-the governor) of Timioara (Temivar), Sophy Sinan-paa, organized a
great military counter-offensive at the end of June 1594 against the Serbs,
Romanians (Wallachians) and Austrians. Firstly, he succeeded in ending the
Christian siege of Hungarian Esztergom and in the same month his troops were
merged with the Ottoman army of the paa of Budim. This united Ottoman army
(c. 30,000 soldiers) of two paas moved toward the Banatian Serbs. The Serbian
army numbered only about 4,300 men. The main battle took place near Bekerek
in Western Banat where the Serbs suffered a great defeat. Sinan-paa entered the
city of Bekerek and totally plundered it. The Serbian metropolitan of Vrac was
arrested and, by order of Sinan-paa, he was flayed. With the fall of Bekerek the
rebellion collapsed. In determining the main causes of the failure of the rebellion
the political role of the Roman Catholic pope Clement VIII (15921605) must be
considered. He had who sent many deputies to the Serbs to different Balkan
provinces encouraging them to rise in arms, while promising significant military
help from the West in their final struggle against the Muslim Ottoman Empire.
However, during the time of rebellion it became clear that these were only empty
verbal promises by the pope and no real military support and help for the rebels
was forthcoming. The latter were left to mainly deal alone with the much stronger
and far numerous Ottoman forces.

64
. , . , , p. 129.
65
However, the Habsburg authorities in all their wars against the Ottoman Empire never had in mind the re-
establishment of any kind of Serbian independent state in the Balkans in the case of Christian victory. In addition, the
Serb national-confessional identity was better protected in the Ottoman Empire than in the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy
or Venetian Dalmatia. For the reason of Catholic proselityzing the Orthodox Serbs, for instance Dalmatian Serbs, were
emigrating several times in the 18
th
century to Russia (regarding this issue see: . ,
XVIII (: , , 1984).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
24


During this Serbian rebellion of 1594 in Banat against the Ottomans there
was one unusual political event with a huge symbolic character. The Ottoman
authorities knew very well that this great Serbian revolt was directly inspired and
encouraged by the Serbian patriarch Jovan Kantul who blessed the revolt. The
rebels and their leaders had a picture of Serbian St. Sava on a flag of blue, white,
and red colours (the colours of the present-day Serbian national flag and
therefore, the rebellion was named St. Savas Rebellion. In order to exert revenge
on the Serbs and, particularly on the Serbian church, Sinan-paa (Koda) ordered
that on Easter day of 1594 (April 27
th
/May 10
th
) the body of St. Sava would be
burned and reduced to ashes. The Turks solemnly exhumed the body from his
holy grave in the 13
th
century-monastery of Mileeva (in Southern Serbia on the
border with Montenegro), conveyed it to Belgrade and there (near Banat), on
Vraar Hill (today the down town area of Belgrade), incinerated the body of the
most significant Serbian saint in Serbian history. Some parts of the saints relics
were saved by the people who had gathered around the bonfire and returned to
the Mileeva monastery. St. Savas relics were again burned by the Turks in 1692,
as revenge against the Serbs who had again sided with the Habsburg Monarchy in
its war against the Ottoman Empire in 16831699. In the Banat rebellion of 1594
the rebellious Serbs were lead by ore Slankamenac-Rac, Deli Marko and Sava
Temivarac. During the same Long War, the Herzegovinian Serbs were lead by a
local metropolit Visarion, who wrote a letter to the new Roman pope Paul V
(16051621) asking the Vatican for political and military help, and by the duke
Grdan from Niki (today in Montenegro). After putting down the rebellion the
Turks invited the Serbian patriarch to Istanbul where he was murdered in 1614.
66

The death of patriarch Jovan Kantul in Istanbul had a deep impact on the
subsequent policy of the Serbian Patriarchate with respect to the Ottoman
authorities. The patriarch was in fact betrayed by several western diplomatic
representatives to the Ottoman Empire, but above all by the Venetian one who
reported to the Ottoman authorities on the formers secret activities and even
negotiations with the western Christian states on the issue of the liberation of
Christian subjects on the Balkan Peninsula from the Ottoman yoke. This western
conspiracy against the Serbian patriarch, church and the nation became the
central reason that many prominent Serbs and above all the Serbian church
abandoned hope for the support of Serbian national liberation by western
European countries. They turned, instead, towards Orthodox Russia. That was in
fact the case with the first sucessor of patriarch Jovan Kantul patriarch Pajsije
(16141648).
Nevertheless, even the symbolic act of burning the relics of St. Sava in
1594 had failed to crush the rebellion as its success really depended only on
Austrian military support.
67
The Ottoman authorities had chosen this political act
because St. Sava actually was the most remarkable holy man in all of Serbian
tradition and history and the most significant symbol of the Patriarchate of Pe
and the Serbs as a nation. Basically, the Serbian church was identified with its
own founder. Nevertheless, after the incineration of the St. Savas body the
influence of his spirit and myth were not diminished. Rather, after 1594 the name

66
. , . , , p. 129. According to historian Vladimir orovi, patriarch Jovan Kantul died
in Istanbul in 1614. Obviously, for orovi it was not clear did he was murdered or not (. , ,
p. 431).
67
H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia, p. 125.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
25


of St. Sava passed into legend and the Serbs came to be known as the nation of
St. Sava.



Travelling of St. Sava from Serbia

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
26


Conclusion

The Patriarchate of Pe was one of the most important institutions in the
history of the Serbs, particularly regarding their religious and cultural history.
This institution was founded in 1346 during the reign of the most significant of
Serbian monarchs Stefan Duan the Mighty (13311355). The foundation of
the national Serbian Patriarchate of Pe was the consequence of a new political
situation in the Balkan Peninsula when Serbia reached ascendancy as the most
powerful country in this region poised to replace the Byzantine Empire. In the
same year, Duan the Mighty was crowned by the patriarch of Pe as emperor of
the Serbs and the Greeks (i.e., the Byzantines). Concurrently, the Serbian
medieval church became independent of the Greek church of Constantinople.
The first Serbian patriarchate was abolished in the mid-15
th
century after
the demise of the medieval Serbian independent state (in 1459). However, the
Ottoman authorities allowed the Serbs one century later (in 1557) to restore their
own national church, which took the name of the old Patriarch of Pe.
During several centuries of the Ottoman occupation, from the collapse of
the Serbian medieval state (in 1459) to the First umadija-Serb Uprising against
the Turks (in 1804), the re-established Patriarchate of Pe was the only national
institution of all Serbs under the Ottoman rule. This spiritual and national
institution of the Serbs lasted for two hundred years (15571766) during the most
difficult period of Serbian history when there was neither a national Serbian state
or any Serbian national institution. However, the Patriarchate of Pe assumed the
historical role of protecting Serbian national identity and national interests during
the Ottoman occupation. Consequently, the patriarchate was a political
representative of all Serbs in the Ottoman Empire.
Officially, according to Ottoman authorities, the Patriarchate of Pe was
restored in mid-16
th
century as a continuation of the medieval Serbian national
church. However, in reality, it seems to have been more a new church institution
of the Serbs than directly connected to the former (first) patriarchate.
Nevertheless, the new patriarchate accepted all the medieval traditions and the
spiritual legacy of the former patriarchate.
The most important historical achievement of the second patriarchate
was that it succeeded in legally protecting the majority of Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire and influencing them in the preservation of their own national medieval
heritage and Christian Orthodoxy as central to the national identity and character
of the Serbs. Finally, the history and the role of the revived Patriarchate of Pe
remained in the collective memory of all Serbs as the national lighthouse during
the dark years of the Ottoman occupation
68
inspiring the Serbs to persevere in
their resistance to the Ottoman policy of denationalization through the acceptance
of Islam.
69
The Islamization of the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman reign was

68
. , , , 1978.
69
The Ottoman successful policy of peaceful conversion of the Christians to Islam is best seen in the case of the
Albanians and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today a majority of ethnic Albanians are Muslims. After four centuries of
Ottoman rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina almost half (43,7%) of its population are the Muslims (T. Judah, The Serbs.
History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 317). For
additional readings on the topic of this article see: ,
, , 1969; . , , , 1995; T. Kosti, Serbia under
Ottoman Rule, Vienna, 2005; . , XVIXVII , ,
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
27


most successful only in those regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and the
Rhodopes region in Bulgaria where the Christianity was not rooted, as it was left
without a strong church organization.
70




The Serbian Empire in 1355


1961. The Serbs accepted Islam for two crucial reasons: 1) the feudal aristocracy from the time before the Ottoman
occupation in order to preserve their estates and benefits; and 2) the ordinary people for lucrative reasons (. .
, . , p. 36)
70
. . , . , p. 33.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
28


The Southeastern Europe in international
relations, the interest of the foreign powers
in the region and the Albanian Question,
18711912


Introduction

At the beginning of the 20
th
century the Great European Powers, divided
into two totally antagonistic political-military alliances, were preparing for the final
settling of accounts among each other concerning the new division of political-
economic spheres of influence and the redistributing the colonies around the
world. Their interests overlapped upon the territory of the Southeastern Europe,
much more look down at the other parts of the globe for the reason of regional
natural wealth and the military-strategic importance of the Southeastern Europe
as the strategic hinterland of the eastern Mediterranean and the most fitting bond
between the Central Europe and the Middle East. German driving towards
Baghdad, Austrian-Hungarian and Italian towards Salonica and Russian towards
Constantinople were going through the Balkans, while at the same time France
and Great Britain intended to protect status quo in the region. For Berlin and
Vienna it was more than obvious that the road to the oil-fields of the Middle Easts
Gulf is running along the Euro-Balkans.
71

The struggle for domination over the Southeastern Europe by both the
Central Powers (Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary) and the Entente (France,
Russia, Great Britain) during the years of the Balkan Wars appeared as the eve of
the First World War. Each member of those two military-political blocks had their
own interests in the region. The concrete policy towards the Balkans at the end of
19
th
and the beginning of the 20
th
century by each member of European Great
Powers was directed exactly according to those interests. Particularly the German
Balkan policy turned out to be of the crucial importance for the future national
liberation struggle of the Balkan people and states.


The national flag of Albania from 1912

71
., , , 1928, especially the chapter -
, pp. 210-216, and p. 8; .,
, , 1966, pp. 10-12.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
29


The German Drang nach Osten and the Southeastern Europe

The united German Empire, proclaimed in Versailles in 1871,
contemplated to balance the share of world colonies, the markets and the sources
of world raw materials.
72
Exceptionally the Pan-Germanic movement, established
in 1891, propagated the making of powerful German worlds empire. In order to do
it new distribution of the world colonies was of the first necessity.
73
The Balkans
was one of the regions in the world, which had to be redistributed in the German
favour.
74
In the spirit of such a policy the German Parliament (Reichstag) issued
the Law concerning enlargement of the navy in 1898 for the reason to secure the
maritime interests of Germany. In the next year (1899) during the First
International Conference in the Hague the German kaiser Wilhelm II Hohenzollern
(1888-1918) openly stated that the sharpened sword is the best guarantee for the
peace.
75
The German pan-Germanic imperialism after the unification was
primarily directed towards the East under the motto Drang nach Osten. One of the
aims of this policy was to make the Ottoman Empire subservient in economic and
political view in order to exploit Turkish reach natural potentials. To do this the
French and British influence in the Balkans, Asia Minor and the Middle East had
to be diminished and the Russian penetration into the Southeastern Europe and
the Straits should be made impossible with supporting political status quo in the
region. In the German concept of Drang nach Osten the Suez canal was to be
under Berlins domination for the purpose that Great Britain would be cut off from
its overseas colonies in Asia, Africa as well Oceanic ones. Around the year of 1900
German capital invested into Turkey already pressed back the French and Britain
ones. It was 45% of German capital out from the whole foreign capital investment
in the Ottoman Empire just before the Albanian crisis started.
76
The Ottoman
trade was financed on the first place by the German Deutsche Orientbank.
77
The
Turkish army was provided with the war material and technique, especially by
artillery, from German military factories (Krupp, Mauzer). Turkish army was
restructured and modernized according to the German war strategy primarily due
to German military mission in the Ottoman Empire led by General von der Goltz.

72
In regard to the German Unification see: Michael J., The Unification of Germany, Routledge, London and New York,
1996; Rodes J. E., The Quest for Unity. Modern Germany 1848-1970, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York,
Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Dallas, Montreal, Toronto, London, Sydney, 1971; Pflanze O., Bismark and the
Development of Germany. Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Yersey, 1962; Pflanze O., (ed.), The Unification of Germany, 1848-1871, European Problem Studies, Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, University of Minnesota, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Dallas, Montreal, Toronto, London,
1969; Medlicott E., Bismarck and Modern Germany, Mystic, Conn., 1965; Darmstaedter F., Bismarck and the Creation
of the Second German Reich, London, 1948.
73
Paul Rorbach became the most influential German proponent of creating the great German overseas empire. He was
writing that creation of great German empire in the world can not be fulfilled without the great world war, i.e. without
the blood and the lead.
74
About the problem of creating the mass nationalism in Germany see: Mosse G. L, The Nationalization of the Masses:
political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich, Cornel
University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991.
75
Kautsky K., Comment sest dclanche la guerre mondiale, Paris, 1921, p. 21.
76
About the problem of foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire at the eve of the Great War in the context of political
domination over Turkey see: . ., , , 1960.
77
About the penetration of German financial capital in the Ottoman-Balkan in the first decade of the 20
th
century see:
., , , 1925, pp. 553-572.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
30


The German financial-political expansion in Turkey got its peak when
German building companies got a concession to construct the Baghdad railway
(Konia-Baghdad-Basra), the railway line which had an extremely significant
economic as well military-strategic importance for the Middle East. In this context
it is not so surpassingly that German Middle Easts and Balkan policies were very
close. Namely, as between Germany and Turkish Asia Minor was located the
Balkan Peninsula it was as plain as day clear to the German diplomats that the
Southeastern Europe might be under German financial, economic, political and
even military domination. The creators of Drang nach Osten policy saw the Balkan
railways as the natural link between the railways in Mitteleuropa under Germanic
rule and those in Anadolia and further in the Gulf. Shortly, the railway network
connecting Berlin and the Persian Gulf, running through the Southeastern Europe
(the Orient Express), should be financially dominated and controlled by the
German banks. For that reason, German policy did not support any political
changes on the Balkans since the Ottoman Empire should avoid the destiny of
disintegration. However, Turkey would be surely dissipated by creation and
enlargement of Christian Balkan states on the expense of Ottoman Balkan
territories.
78
The projected German imperialism was directed towards the Middle
East but via the Habsburg Monarchy and the Balkans. Practically, in order to
realize the policy of Drang nach Osten Berlin might put under its oven control
Austria-Hungary and the rest of Southeastern Europe. Vienna, Budapest,
Belgrade, Sofia and Edirne were the main railways ties on the path to Istanbul,
Baghdad and Basra, while Pola, Trieste, Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and Kotor (Cattaro)
should be transformed into the chief German basis for Berlins lordship over the
Adriatic and the Mediterranean. It was exactly Russian newspaper
from April 29
th
, 1898, which warned Russian diplomacy that as a result of
German political-military-economic penetration into Ottoman Empire Anadolia
will become German India.
79




Flag of the Second German Empire (1871-1918)

78
Hobus G., Wirtschaft und Staat im sdosteuropischen Raum 1908-1914, Mnchen, 1934, pp. 139-151.
79
, , , 1898, -IV, -I, ,
962, - , , April 18
th
[old style], 1898.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
31


The Habsburg Monarchy was imagined as the forerunner of the German
interests in the Southeastern Europe and in this light the Viennese imperialistic
policy in the Balkan was welcomed and supported by Berlin and Pan-German
politicians in Potsdam.
80
The reason for German political supervision of the Dual
Monarchy was a strong Viennese economic and financial dependence on Berlin.
This Ausro-Hungarian subjection to German control and inability to act
independently was seen from the fact that 50% of Austro-Hungarian export was
aimed to the German market. Even before the Bosnian crisis of 1908 the
Habsburg Monarchy was financially depended on German banks (the Dresdner
Bank, the Deutsche Bank, Darmschterer Bank and the Diskontogezelschaft
Bank). In addition, at the same time the Balkan states were becoming gradually as
well more and more financially subjected to control of German capital. The main
German investor in Serbia was the Berlins Trade Society (the Berliner
Handelsgezelschaft). The Serbian export to Germany reached in 1910 42%.
81
The
similar situation was and with Bulgaria. Its import from Germany and Austro-
Hungary was 45% while 32% of Bulgarian total export was directed towards
Berlin, Budapest and Vienna.
82

The principal aim of such German financial-economic Balkan policy was to
transform the Ottoman Empire into its own India and for that reason Berlin
became the chief protagonist of Balkan status quo, helping the Bosporus sick
person to redeem. On the other hand, Berlin and Vienna endeavoured to thwart
creation of the Balkan alliance and its connection with Russia.
83
Nevertheless,
there were two crucial points of Austro-German disagreement in relation to their
collective Balkan policy. Firstly, while the Habsburg ruler wanted to see only
Bulgaria as a new member of the Central Powers, for the German monarch Serbia
could be included into this political-military block as well as. For Vienna, Serbia
and Montenegro should be kept out from the Central Powers in order not to
influence Austrian South Slavic population against the Viennese court. Secondly,
the German kaiser was not willing to support Austrian policy to enlarge Bulgaria
on Greek and Romanian territorial expense because the family links between
German Hohenzollerns and Greek kings George and Constantine, Romanian king
Karol respectively. Despite these disputes, both Berlin and Vienna reached a
common agreement on the question of Albania: in the case of Ottoman withdrawal
from the Balkans as greater as Albanian independent state was to be created and
exist under Germanic protectorate.
84




80
The German Prime Minister (kanzellar) stated during the crisis upon Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina that German Balkan policy will strictly follow Austro-Hungarian interests in the region.
81
- ., 1903-1914, , 1965, pp. 35-42.
82
. ., 1912-1913 ., 1960, pp. 59-61.
83
Huldermann V., La Vie dAlbert Ballin, Payot, Paris, 1923, pp. 207-213; Die Grosse Politik der Europischen
Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. XXXIV, 13428, 12926, Berlin, 1926. About Serbian endeavour to create the Balkan
Alliance in the mid-19
th
century, see, . ., , , 1893; .
., , , 1895.
84
Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimvertrge sterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914, Wien-Leipzig, 1920;
. , , 1899; Documents diplomatiques franais, vol. II, Paris, 1931;
, 25.- , 1902, ; Ilyrisch-
albanische Forschungen, vol. I, 1916, pp. 380-390; Neue Freie Presse, 2. IV 1903; British documents on the Origins of
the War. 1899-1914, vol. V, pp. 68-72.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
32




The Balkans after the Berlin Congress in 1878 up to the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913



Flag of Austria-Hungary from 1869 to 1918

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
33


The Austro-Hungarian Balkan course
After the unification of Italy (1859-1866) when the Habsburg Monarchy lost
all of its Italian provinces
85
the main interest of Viennese foreign policy became the
Balkans. Following the metamorphosis of the Habsburg Monarchy and its
transformation into Austria-Hungary in 1867 (Aussgleich) Vienna and Budapest
pointed its economic and political expansion in the first place towards Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Sandak, Kosovo and Metohija (), Albania and the
Salonicas bay in the Aegean. For the Austro-Hungarian ruling establishment this
direction of Viennese-Budapests foreign policy was determined by Austro-
Hungarys geographical position and as well by the inner (ethnic) structure of the
state, as the Austrian foreign minister Berhtold stated on May 2, 1913.
86
It means
that planners of the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy saw the Balkans as
Habsburgs colonial dominion with Salonica as southern port of Austria-Hungary.
The Austrian interest in the Southeastern Europe, principally in the southern
Balkans, arose simultaneously with the Italian intention to transform the Adriatic
into Italian mare nostro and to attain the southern Albania with the Strait of
Otranto, likewise with the Russian intendment to acquire Istanbul with the
Straits. Threatened that Italy would close the Adriatic doors to the Austrian
overseas trade Viennese and Budapests politicians intended northern Aegean with
Salonica as principal Austro-Hungarian export-import port opened to the world.
The prominence of the territory of Albania for Rome and Vienna-Budapest must be
seen in this context of Italo-Austro-Hungarian conflict over the Adriatic. Certainly,
for the both sides it was apparent that who is governing Albania is overseeing and
controlling the whole Adriatic.


Flag of the Kingdom of Hungary from 1867 to 1918

85
About the Italian unification and the Habsburg Monarchy see: Rene A. C., Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1962; Smith D. M., Mazzini, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994; Lucy R.,
The Italian Risorgimento. State, Society and National Unification, Routledge, London and New York, 1994; Smith D.
M., Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict, Cambridge, second edition, 1985; Beales D., The
Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy, second edition, London, 1981; Hearder H., Italy in the Age of the
Risorgimento, 1790-1870, London, 1983; Coppa F., The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence, London, 1992;
Delzell C. F. (ed.), The Unification of Italy, 1859-1861. Cavour, Mazzini or Garibaldi?, New York, 1965.
86
Hobus G., Wirtschaft und Staat im sdosteuropischen Raum 1908-1914, Mnchen, 1934, pp. 24-27.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
34


Pursuing its primal goal in the Balkan course to dominate over Morava-
Vardars valleys and Salonicas hinterland Vienna obtained significant concessions
for building Balkan-Turkish railways. The first direct railway traffic on the line
Vienna-Budapest-Salonica-Istanbul was established by Austro-Hungarian
financial capital in 1888. Four years before the beginning of the Albanian crisis in
1912 Ottoman import from Austro-Hungarian market extended to 22% out of total
Turkish import. Likewise the Ottoman Empire, Austria was putting and Balkan
states under its financial and political dependence after the Berlin Congress: the
Railway convention with Serbia in 1880, the Trade contract with Serbia in 1881,
the Secret convention with Serbian king Milan Obrenovi IV on June 1881, the
Veterinary convention with Serbia, the Trade (1875) and the Custom union with
Romania in 1883, etc.
87
At the beginning of the new century Austro-Hungarian
financial capital already had the leading role in and control of Serbian export-
trade. More than 85% of the whole Serbian export was intended for the Austrian
market while 90% of the total Serbian import was coming from the Habsburg
Monarchy.
88

For the further development of the Albanian crisis during the Balkan Wars
1912-1913 on the first place of importance should be put the Secret convention of
1881 between Serbian and Austrian monarchs. According to the convention
Kingdom of Serbia could not without Viennas approval conclude any political
agreement with foreign countries. In addition, Serbia gave up all activities to
liberate the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandak and to include these
two provinces into Serbia. In fact, the western enlargement of Serbia was unable
and because of that in coming decades Belgrades foreign policy was pointed
towards the South, i. e. in the direction of Macedonia and Albania. With giving up
the idea to occupy Sandak Serbia at the same time rejected the option of Serbian-
Montenegrin political unification. It had a serious consequence for the upcoming
Balkan wars. As the exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea through the unification with
Montenegro was cut of Belgrade intended to acquire the sea cost for continental
Serbia by occupation of north Albanian littoral on the Ionian Sea. Similarly,
Montenegro sought to earn the city of Scodra on the eastern coast of the Lake of
Scodra mainly populated by Albanian inhabitants.
89

The highlight of Austrian success in its Balkan policy against the Russian
influence in the region was the decision of Bulgarian government to accept Austro-
Hungarian project of building the trans-Balkan railway Vienna-Belgrade-Sofia-
Istanbul at the expense of the Russian project to construct the railway Ruse-Sofia.
In fact, after this decision Bulgaria was gradually becoming the part of Habsburgs
sphere of interest in the Southeastern Europe involving Bulgaria at the same time

87
1881; ., .
, , 1953, pp. 70-142; ,
( 9. . 1876. 11. . 1899), , 1899, pp. 603-630;
, , 1908; ., , , 1909, pp. 157-
172; ., I (1889-1897), , 1929, pp. 315-318.
88
British Documents on the Origins of the War. 1899-1914, V, 157-170;
1906, 250-270; 1905-1906, III, 1350-1410; Jugoslaviens
Entstehung, Amaltthea Verlag, 1929; , XXXI, 1904, . More about Serbian trade dependence on the Dual
Monarchy see: ., - 1906-1911, , 1962, and about
Serbian state loans: ., , , 1909.
89
The most important articles of the Secret convention are 2 and 4. About the convention see: .,
, , , 1924.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
35


into the block of Central Powers. Such, in 1910 50% of Bulgarian export-import
was directed towards Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The trade contracts with Romania signed in 1875 and 1883 enabled
Austria-Hungary to undertake the export of capital into this Southeast European
country. The economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was totally under Viennese and
Pests exploitation especially the woods industry and the mines one.
90

The territory of Albania and the lands inhabited by Albanian population
have very significant value in the concept of Habsburgs Balkan policy. It was true
primarily because of rich Albanias natural resources and its tremendously geo-
political-military importance as the territory located on the entrance to the
Adriatic Sea. On that account, the Austrian military establishment in Vienna did
not hide that Albania must be in close economic, cultural and political relations
with the (Habsburg) Monarchy.
91
The second reason for this close ties between
Albania and Austro-Hungary was the plan of Viennese Court Military Council to
transfigure Albania into the chief barrier and counterbalance against both: Serbo-
Montenegrin pretensions on the territories of Macedonia, north Albania and
Kosovo and Metohija and contra Italian and Greek aspirations upon the southern
Albania and Adriatic littoral. Italy was the principal and strongest fighter that
opposed the Habsburgs to convert Albania into their economic and political
colony. On the turn of century Austria-Hungary and Italy became only masters of
Albanian economic life. The main part of export-import trade through Albanian
sea port of Valona was controlled by Austrian capital. Similarly, the Austrian
Lloyd and The Fiume Oboti Company self-possessed the chief portion of
Albanian overseas trade. The Lloyds steamboats maintained in 1913 around 73%
of Albanian steamboats traffic. The most important mines and the best forests in
Albania were under Austro-Hungarian exploitation. However, Austrian domination
over the territory of Albania was tremendously challenged in 1913 when Italy in a
clean manner disagreed with Viennas intention to get concession to construct the
first Albanian railway line from Scodra to Valona. Generally, just before the
outbreak of the Balkan Wars Albania was economically much more relied on
Austria-Hungary than on the Ottoman Empire.
Austro-Hungarian policy of converting the Balkans into its own colonial
possession allowed to Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and
Romania to have their own governments, rulers, to use the national languages or
to have a fictive autonomy within the Monarchy but all of them might be highly
economically, politically, financially and military depended on Vienna and
Budapest.
92
Probably the Kingdom of Serbia was the main spine in Austrian eyes
in the Balkans since the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks 1804-1813
when an independent state of Serbia was established. The real reason of such
Austro-Serbian antagonism which finally led the whole world into the war of 1914-
1918 was the Viennese intention to dominate all the South Slavs and Belgrades
intendment to include all Serbs from the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg
Monarchy into united national state of the Serbs, respectively.
93
The most

90
., , , 1948, pp. 260-271.
91
Feldmarschall Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, Leipzig, Mnchen, 1922, vol. III, 558.
92
According to Berhard Singer, a member of the Viennas trade chamber.
93
., , , ,
, 1, , 1849, pp. 1-27; a ., , , 1844 (secret
manuscript); ., XIX , e, 1958 (1982), pp. 90-95.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
36


belligerent political factor in the Monarchy, the Court War Council, was suggesting
to the emperor (kaizer) Franc Joseph I Habsburg to resolve the Yugoslav
question by occupation of Serbia. The Chief of Austro-Hungarian General-Stuff
Conrad von Hezendorf was calling to imperial attention that when Austro-
Hungarian army will occupy the city of Ni in southern Serbia the southeastern
Balkan would be under Viennese monopoly.
94
Nonetheless, the emperor was not
willing to follow this policy as 50% of the population of the Monarchy were of
Slavic origin: in the case of Serbian or Serbian and Montenegrin inclusion into the
Monarchy the Slavic element would prevailed over Germanic and Hungarian ones.
For the time being the Viennese policy towards only two free and independent
Yugoslav states, Serbia and Montenegro, was focused on thwarting Belgrade to
unite Serbia with Montenegro. As the best instrument to keep Serbia and
Montenegro in political separation Austria found to build the railway from
Sarajevo to Kosovska Mitrovica via Sandak of Novi Pazar.
95
This railway line
should become a part of Austro-Hungarian railway network connecting Vienna
and Budapest with Istanbul, Salonica (Salonika, Thessaloniki) and Albanian sea
port of Valona.
96

Italy and the Balkans

After the unification of Italy from 1859 to 1871 Italian administration
accepted the foreign policy of creation the greater Italian state which should
resemble on ancient great Roman empire. The project of the new Roman Empire
was directed towards an acquisition of Mediterranean Sea, Adriatic Sea,
Tyrrhenian Sea, as well the certain territories of the northern Africa and Asia
Minor. Because Italian attempt to conquer Ethiopia in the years of 1886-1896
failed Italian pivotal aim in the foreign policy after the Ethiopian War was pointed
to the Balkans.
However, there were two most important focal points of Italian interest in
the Southeastern Europe: 1) Albania, and 2) the east-Adriatic littoral. The press in
Italy in the turn of century named openly the Adriatic as Italian mare nostro. To be
a master of Adriatic Sea was the principal precondition for Italian economic and
political infiltration into the both Balkan littoral and hinterland. The special
importance for Italian Balkan policy was Albania since the main rout of Italian
penetration into the Southeastern Europe was designed via Valona, Elbasan and
Bitola to Salonica. The Italians verily followed in this case ancient Roman military
road Via Egnatia, which connected Italy with the East. By contrast, the Austrians
followed in their penetration into the Balkans different but olso ancient Roman
military road, Via Militaris, from Belgrade (Singidunum) via Sofia (Serdica), Plovdiv
(Philipopolis) and Edirne (Adrianopolis) to Istanbul (Constantinopolis). Italian
project of Trans-Balkan Railway is the best illustration of Italian Balkan plans and
way of economic-political infiltration into the Balkan hinterland. Rome, in order to
be more active in the Balkan affairs, required in 1902-1904 that Italian police
forces would implement necessary reforms within the Bitola vilayet in Turkey; the

94
. . (ed.), , 2, , 1949, pp. 163-164.
95
Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimvertrge sterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914, ester Band, Wien, 1920, pp. 267-275.
96
, , 28. I 1914, 19; Die Grosse Politik, XXXVII, pp. 738-
740; Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, I, p. 95, II, 257, II, pp. 155-156.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
37


vilayet which was extended over the parts of western Albania as well as.
97
In the
year of 1911 when Italo-Turkish War started Italian trade and financial capital
already prevailed over the Austrian one in Albanian littoral of Ionic and Adriatic
Sea. What regards the whole territory of Albania in the years of the Balkan Wars
1912-1913 the presence of Italian capital in the country reached the second place,
just behind the Austro-Hungarian one. Italian trade companies mastered around
25% of the export-import trade from Scutari and 30% from southern Albanian
territories. It is important to notice that total financial operations in Albanian
cities of Valona and Durazzo (Duress) were going through Italian banks markedly
through The Society for the Trade with the East.
With the marriage of Italian hear of the throne, Vittorio Emanuel Orlando,
with the Montenegrin princess Helene (Jelena), a daughter of Montenegrin prince
Nikola I, in 1896 the door to Montenegro was open for Italian capital and political
influence. Till the outbreak of Albanian crisis Italian capital was predominant in
Montenegrin economy. The concession to construct the first Montenegrin railway-
line (Bar-Virpazar) was given to the Banca Comerciale Italiana. The same bank
started to exploit the steamboat traffic in the Scutari Lake.
98

Italian intention to use Albanian territory as the bridge for its penetration
into the Southeastern Europe, as well to transform Otranto gate into Italian
Gibraltar, followed with Romes scheme to incorporate Alto Adige (Sd Tyrol), Istria
and Dalmatia into Italian state territory led Rome to the open clash with Vienna
upon the lordship over the Adriatic and the Balkan hinterland. Austro-Hungarian
belligerent military as well political circles created a motto Our future is in the
Balkans, our stumbling block is Italy. In order to dismiss main obstacle for
Austrian-Hungarian predominance in the Balkan affairs the Chief of Austro-
Hungarian General Headquarters Conrad von Hezzendorf advised the emperor
firstly to settle the affairs with Italy.
99
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a hear of
Austro-Hungarian throne, predicted in February 1913 in conversation with von
Hezzendorf that Our principal enemy is Italy against whom we had to fight one
day in order to regain Venice and Lombardy.
100






97
, , , 14. 1903, . . 46;
, , 16. XII, 1904; ,
, . . 31 and 101; Documenti diplomatici, Macedonia, Roma, 1906, pp. 151-179 and 280-292;
Pavolni J. V., Le problme macdonien et sa solution, Paris, 1903, pp. 42-45; British documents on the Origins of the
War, 1899-1914, V, 71.
98
., 1912-1913, vol. III, , pp. 8-9; . .,
, , , II/1, pp. 10-13; .,
1903-1918, , 1918.
99
Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimvertrge sterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914, Wien, 1920, pp. 267-268;
Feldmarschall Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, Leipzig, Mnchen, 1922, vol. III, p. 171.
100
., 1914, , 1966, p. 245; , , ,
, 1913.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
38




The Kingdom of (united) Italy in 1889
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
39


For the Italian Balkan policy the most dangerous Austrian plan concerning
the region was its design to transform northern Albania into Austro-Hungarian
foothill for further advance towards the Balkan hinterland. Because of this Italy
made serious efforts to thwart Austro-Hungarian intention to master the east-
central portion of the Balkans, including and areas populated by Albanian
majority or minority as Albania proper, Kosovo and Metohija and Western
Macedonia. In other words, to keep Vienna as far as from Otranto Strait was a
crucial goal of Italian policy in the Balkans. Additional problem for Itally was
Serbian pretension on north Albanian territory as well Greek wish to dominate
upon southern Albania. In order to obviate Serbo-Greek division of Albania Italy in
princilpe did not support a creation of the Balkan alliance since the alliance would
make stronger both Serbia and Greece. Rome showed its real attitude towards the
Balkan alliance when Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria proclaimed the
war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912. Italy at the same moment stoped its
military operations against Turkey in Lybia in order to make easier Turkish
military position in the Balkans against the members of the Balkan alliance. The
Romes newspapers at that time were writing that the Slavdom is coming via
Montenegro to the Adriatic; the Slavdom which was just behind Albania and in
following years and decades the Slavdom will reqiure Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia.
101
Italian diplomatic representative in Vienna even
tried to convince his minister of foreign affairs that for Italian interest in the region
Serbia was more dangerous than Austro-Hungary.
102
Consequently, regardless on
the whole spectrum of Italo-Austro-Hungarian disputes over the Balkans the
disintegration of the Balkan alliance was their joint interes. Their common goal
was to prevent Slavic domination over the Adriatic.
103


Frances Balkan policy of the status quo

Fundamental iterest of France in the Southeastern Europe was economic
one but not political. The region was perceived by the French politicians as
primarily significant in the following three points: 1) as a well-suited area for the
investment of the French financial capital, 2) as the region which was the most
appropriate overland traffic bond with the Ottoman Empire, and 3) as a foothold
for the French economic domination over the eastern Mediterranean.
104
In this
respect, the French economic penetration into the region, followed by an
investment of the French capital in all of the Balkan states, acquired notable
success in the second half of the 19
th
century. It is true particularily for Serbia,
Bulgaria and Greece. The Kingdom of Serbia became among all Balkan countries
the most depended on the French financial capital especially after 1881 when the
French General Union gave a so far the uppermost loan for building the Serbian
first railway-line. Serbia became more depended on the French capital in 1910
when the French-Serbian Bank was established. Therefore, in the eve of the
Balkan Wars French capital dominated in Serbia. However, French economic

101
Tribuna, June 1913.
102
. ., , , 1960, p. 214.
103
Pribram A. F., Die politischen Geheimvertrge sterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914, Wien, 1920, pp. 292-293.
104
Documents diplomatiques franais 1871-1914, vol. VI-VII, Paris, 1933.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
40


concessions were closly connected with the French policy in the region. As a
result, the French government in great extent conntroled Serbias foreign policy.
However, the principal object of French financial subjugation inside the
Southeastern Europe was the Ottoman Empire. The French financiers and
businessmen financed around 32% of Baghdad Railways Co., while 63% of the
Turkish state loan should be paid for France. The most important, predominant
number of share-holdings of the state Ottoman Bank belonged to France. Hence,
the French entrepreneurs obtained very important concessions for construction of
Ottoman railways lines in Anadolia, Armenia and Syria. Subsequently, the
designers of French foreign policy in connection to the Balkans had seriously to
take into consideration the economic interest of Frances financiers and
businesspersons. The French entrepreneurs, however, in order to make money
inside the Ottoman Empire realised that Turkey must not be territorially and
politically disintegrated or dismembered. Moreover, they supported the idea of
Ottoman economic, institutional and political reformation and prosperity. Shortly,
the French financial capital and investment could earn the profit only in reformed
and prospered Turkey. This political economys fundamental principle became the
lading standard in French Balkan policy of the status quo.
105




The Balkans with the French created Illyrian Provinces during the Napoleonic time

105
See more about this problem in: Georgeon F., L conomie politique selon Ahmed Midhat, in Premire rencontre
internationale sur lEmpire ottoman et la Turque moderne, Edhem Eldem (ed.), Istanbul, 1991, pp. 464-479; Kunelarp
S., Les Ottomans la dcouverte de lEurope: Rcits de voyageurs de la fin de lEmpire Etudes turques et ottomans:
Documents de travail, theme issue on Voyageurs et diplomates ottomans, 4, December 1995, pp. 51-58; Inalcik H,
Quataert D. (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Cambridge, 1994.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
41


The French approach towards the Balkan alliance, especially to the
Serbian-Bulgarian accord, had a double standard. On one hand, Paris disagreed
with the creation of such alliance if it would be directed against Ottoman
territorial integrity. On the other hand, but, Paris supported the establishing of
the alliance in the case that it would accept an anti-Austro-Hungarian political
course. This was clearly pointed out by the French government to the Bulgarian
Premier Geshov: Frances aim in the east is: 1) a territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire and 2) the status quo in the Balkans. It must be said that
Frances policy of good and very friendly relations with Turkey dated back even in
1535 when French government concluded the fist bilateral arrangement with
Turkish Sultan and Porte.
106
When during the preparations for the Balkan Wars of
1912-1913 the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincar visited the Russian
Emperor in St. Petersburg in August 1912 he remarked that Balkan alliance of
Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece is not welcomed by France since it is
designed as anti-Ottoman military-political coalition.
107
The main reason for the
French animosity towards the Balkan alliance was the French appraisement that
such kind of military-political bloc would be put to the Russian political use in the
Balkans against French economic and political interests. Especially the article on
arbitrary of the Russian Tsar in the case of Serbian-Bulgarian controversy over
Macedonia made Paris suspicious towards the conception of any form of the
Balkan countries co-operation. In other words, the Balkan pact was seen as the
alliance under Russian patronage, which will be used by the Tsar to assist Russia
to gain the Straits and Constantinople. The French administration, taking into
consideration what is mentioned above, did not gave to Bulgaria the state loan in
the autumn 1912 being afraid that this loan (180 mil. francs) will be used for the
purpose of changing the Balkan status quo, i.e., for the war contra the Ottoman
Empire.
108
It is unambiguously accented in political-diplomatic memoirs of
Raymond Poincar.
109
Parisian Figaro shared his opinion as well. However, when
Balkan countries already defeated the Ottoman Empire in the spring of 1913
French diplomacy tried to co-operate with Russia in order to transform the
alliance into offensive-defensive anti-Austro-Hungarian military block.
110










106
., , , 1928, p. 56.
107
Renuvin P., Evropska kriza i prvi svetski rat, Zagreb, 1965, p. 144. See also: August T., The Selling of the Empire:
British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940, Westport, 1985.
108
p (The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic documents
about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913), , p. 8, doc. 11.
109
Poincar R., Les Balkans en feu, Paris, 1923, p. 33. See also: Becker J. J., The Great War and the French People,
Leamington Spa, 1985.
110
Documents diplomatiques franais, vol. VI, doc. 229. About this problem see more in: Thaden E., Russia and the
Balkan Alliance of 1912, University Park Pennsylvania, 1965; Jelavich B., Russias Balkan Entanglement, 1806-1914,
Cambridge, 1991; Jelavich B.., A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914, Philadelphia, 1964; .,
, vol. III, , 1997.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
42


The British policy of the balance of powers in Europe and the Balkans

The British Balkan policy likewise the French one followed essentially its
own economic interest in the region. The financial capital from the Islands was
present in each of Balkan states but especially was influential in Turkey. At the
beginning of the 20
th
century the British merchants controlled the biggest portion
of the Ottoman export-import trade.
111
For instance, 35% of the total Ottoman
import was coming from the Great Britain. The British entrepreneurs showed
particular interest to deal with the exploitation of the Ottoman oilfields in the
Middle East. The Anglo-Persian Company to one side with the Shell had
around 75% of investment in the Turkish Petroleum Company which had a
monopoly to exploit the Ottoman petrol. Similar situation was and concerning the
Ottoman cotton trade which was predominantly in the British hands. Henceforth,
the Persian Gulf was considered by the British businessmen as the terrain of the
first priority for the United Kingdoms economic as well political strategy towards
the Ottoman Empire. But, the similar interest upon the Gulf showed and Russia
which was a military-political ally of the Great Britain. The Russo-English
concurrence over the Persian and Turkish oilfields and other natural wealth
temporally was settled by the agreement on spheres of influence between St.
Petersburg and London in 1907. According to this arrangement, the Persian
territory was divided on the northern Russian and Southeastern British spheres of
economic-political influence. The central, and the principal apple of discord
between Russia and England, was left undivided. The Russian line of influence
was running from the River of Heri-Rud on the east to the city of Jsd in the south
and finally to the southern Kurdistan on the west. The British demarcation stripe
of sphere of influence in Persia ran from the town of Burudschnd on the north-
east to the city of Kirman on the west and finishes in the sea port of Bndr Abbas
on the south. For the British the Persian Gulf had additional point of importance
as in this region the Baghdad-Basra railway-line had to end. Thus, in order to
enlarge its own territory of protectorate under the Persian Gulf the British foreign
policy endeavoured to tear off the land of Kuwait from Turkey and to create semi-
independent Kuwait state under British patronage. The first phase of this plan
was successfully accomplished in 1899 while the second one was realised in 1913,
i. e, during the Balkan Wars.
There are indications in the sources that the Ottoman Empire had been
forced to hand over the territory of Kuwait in 1913 to the Great Britain
protectorate in order to obtain British support in the question of Albania which
was at that time under Serbian and Greek occupation. The British diplomatic
strategy considered its influence in the Persian Gulf as a counter balance to
Austro-Italian influence in Albania and Otranto Strait. It is not out of truth that in
fact British ruling establishment required on the London Conference of
ambassadors upon Albania to obtain the British protectorate over Kuwait in
exchange for the Austro-Hungarian and Italian protectorate upon de iure Albanian
independent state which should be recognised after the Balkan Wars.
112


111
Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849-1918, Oxford, 1954, p. 504.
112
Archives du Ministre des Affaires Etrangs, Corrspondence politique, Turquie, Guerres balkaniques, Confrence de
Londres; Decision of the Ambassadors Conference, Nov. 9, 1921, in Simmonard A., Essai sur lindependence
Albanaise, Paris, 1942; Commission Internationale de dlimination des frontires de lAlbanie. Frontire Serbo-Croato-
Slovene-Albanese. Protocole de delimitation, Florence, 1926. This question has been dealt with more extensively in Puto
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
43


The political influence of the British diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire was
maintained through many British officers and representatives who worked in
different sectors of the Ottoman state offices and organisations. The British
became in the first place influential in the Turkish ministries as employed
advisors.
The British financial capital gradually was more and more present in the
economic life of Serbia during and after the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian Custom
War of 1906-1911. The British financiers were interested in building of Adriatic
railway. According to the constructing scheme, its one branch would run via
Serbia to Danube and the Black Sea while other one would connect Albania with
Salonica and Istanbul. The crucial portion of English trade with Albania, Greece,
Serbia and Montenegro was hold by the brothers Begstons Balkan Committee.
The policy of the committee was to obtain an autonomous status for Macedonia
and Albania inside the Ottoman Empire in order to provide better conditions for
the investment of its capital in this area.
113

The British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans
was incorporated into the general British policy towards European affairs. This
policy supported an idea of maintaining the European balance of powers. Due to
this policy Turkey was saving its own territorial integrity for decades. England
preferred likewise France to keep alive the Bosphors sick man just not to allow
Russia to take advantage of Turkish disintegration and to establish its
protectorate over the Orthodox Christians on the Balkans.
114
Actually, the United
Kingdom was the principal opponent to the Russian conception to create one
united great Slavic Balkan state under its patronage. However, after the pro-
German Young Turkish revolution in Istanbul of 1908 and from the same year the
Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the British started to
closer co-operate with Russia and France in the Balkan affairs. The purpose of
this partnership was to prevent further penetration of Germanic Drang nach Osten
in the Southeastern Europe and the Near East. The British Minister of Foreign
Affairs Edward Grey launched an idea of the Balkan coalition in the following
years as a barrier to the Habsburg deeper entrance inside the Balkans.
115
The
British diplomacy worked to include Greece into the coalition in order to pursue
its own influence on the Balkan alliance. At the same time, Greece would make
the alliance unable to become subjugated to the Russian Balkan policy.
116







A., Albanian Independence and the Diplomacy of the Great Powers 1912-1914, Tirana, 1978, and Puto A., The Albanian
Question in the International Acts of the Period of Imperialism, 1912-1918, vol. I-II, Tirana, 1987.
113
p (The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic documents
about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913), , pp. 18-21.
114
Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849-1918, Oxford, 1954, pp. 504-506; Jankovi B., The Balkans
in International Relations, Hong Kong, 1988, pp. 89-119. See also: Rossos A., Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan
Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908-1914, Toronto, 1981.
115
Thaden E., Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912, University Park Pennsylvania, 1965, p. 120; See more about the
problem in Taylor A. J. P., The Habsburg Monarchy1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary,
London, 1990, pp. 276-302, Seton-Watson R. W., Britain in Europe 1789-1914.
116
British documents, vol. IX, doc. 461; Drosos D., La Fondation de l Alliance Balkanique, Athens, 1929.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
44


Russian driving towards the Straits

The Russian financial influence in the economies of the Balkan states in
the turn of the 20
th
century comparing with German, Austria-Hungarian, Italian,
British and French influence was notably lesser. Moreover, Russian financial
influence in the Turkish economic life was almost not existing. The trade exchange
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was underdeveloped. In addition, unlike
the other members of the Great European Powers, Russia did not have a single
one concession for the construction of the railway-line within the Ottoman
Empire. However, the presence of the Russian financial capital gradually
increased in Bulgaria and Serbia after the Berlin Congress of 1878. However,
Russian entrepreneurs did not succeed to get a very important railway building
concessions for the distances between Sophia and Ruse likewise Danube-Adriatic.
It was so far the most relevant indicator that Russia was losing its political-
economic positions in the Balkans primarily in behalf of Austria-Hungary.
The Russian capital set foot in Serbia in 1867 when the Serbian
government of Prince Mihailo (Michael) Obrenovi took the first state loan from
Russia. The loan was engaged in Serbias military preparation for the war against
Turkey. The principal meaning of this loan was political one but not economic.
This affair with the Russian loan indicated that Principality of Serbia intended to
tie its political destiny in the upcoming events with Russia.
117
It clearly shows two
diplomatic missions by Serbias diplomats Jovan Marinovi and Milan Petronijevi
in Moscow and St. Petersburg in the autumn 1866 and the spring 1867
respectively.
118
During his visit to Moscow in November 1866 J. Marinovi
promised to the Russian government that the Tsar would be informed in time
upon every diplomatic action of Serbia in the Balkans. In fact, this Serbias
obligation was the first condition under which Russian imperial government was
willing to support Serbia.
119
The second Serbias loan from Russia was taken in
1876 again for the war purpose contra the Ottoman Empire. This Serbian
political-economical linkage to Russia led Serbian government to conclude the first
trade contract with Russia in 1892.

117
., XIX , , 1956, pp. 11-16
(documents).
118
, , , Letter from Schtackelberg to Ignatiev, Wien,
November 27, 1866. In this letter there is and concept about the conversation between Marinovi and Gorchakov; Letter
from Garaanin to Risti, Belgrade, December 11, 1866; Letter from Garaanin to Risti, Belgrade, December 11, 1866;
Marinovi J., ; Haus-Hof und Staats-Archiv, Wien, Letter from Beist to Prokresch, Vienna,
December 20, 1866; , Letter from Prince Mihailo to Bismarck, Belgrade, October 24, 1866;
, , , Letter from Garaanin to Risti, Belgrade, February 1867;
Letter from Garaanin to Risti, Belgrade, May 11, 1867; , , ,
Letter from Garaanin to Risti, Belgrade, May 11, 1867, concept; Letter from Garaanin to Petronijevi, Belgrade, May
20, 1867, concept; , , 31. m 1867; .,
, , 1895, p. 15, p. 45 (memoires); . (ed.),
, vol. II, , XXII, , 1931.
119
, , , Letter from Marinovi to Gorchakov, Belgrade, February 17,
1867, concept; Letter from Stremoukov to Marinovi, St. Petersburg, February 9, 1867; , ,
, Letter from Shishkin to Marinovi, Belgrade, March 1867.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
45


The Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire was totally different in
comparison with the British and French policies towards the same country. While
London and Paris intended to prolong the territorial existence of Turkey in the
Balkans, St. Petersburgs politicians aimed to create a new Balkan order but
without Ottoman presence in the region. In other words, according to the Russian
conception how to resolve the Balkan question, the Ottoman Empire had to lose
all of its European possessions alongside with the capital Istanbul and the
Straits.
120
Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles, all of them the parts of
the territory of the Ottoman Empire, were for Russian trade and navy of the
principal importance. Consequently, the first goal for the Russian foreign policy
was to obtain control under these three objects of interest. The Russians believed
that this idea could be realised only in the case if Istanbul (Constantinople) would
be under either direct Russian administration or protectorate. Shortly, according
to the Russian concept of rearranged Balkan affairs, the place for Turkey was
reserved only in Asia Minor but not in the Southeastern Europe.
121
The Straits
with Constantinople became a real Russian historical myth.
122
The Russians were
especially scared that Germany would occupy the Straits in the case of Ottoman
territorial disintegration. According to the Russian opinion, in this case an entire
economic life of the southern Russia would be tutored by Germany.
123
The Straits
were important for the Russian economy since it connected the Russian Black
Seas trade with the Mediterranean and the Far East markets. In addition, the
Straits were the principal overseas ties between the Russian Baltic Seas
possessions and the southern lands of the Russian Empire. It should be notice
that the Russian export of the corns from the territory of Ukraine and the Russian
oil from the Caucasus highly depended on the free passage through the Straits
and the Sea of Marmara.
124
The Russian diplomacy found that the best way to
obtain Russian protectorate over the Straits and the Sea of Marmara was to
support liberation movement of the Balkan Orthodox Slavs against the Ottoman
authority. Finally, independent Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria but under the
Russian protectorate should provide Russian exit to the Mediterranean.
125
This
political task was hidden under the motto of Pan-Slavic solidarity as the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov pointed out in 1914.
126
Because of the
meaningfulness of the Straits in Russian economic and political strategy the
Balkans had the first importance in the Russian foreign policy. This region was

120
See the conversation between the representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Palologue, with
the Russian ambassador to France, Izvolsky in Taylor A. J. P., Taylor A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1849-
1918, Oxford, 1954, p. 505; Palologue M., An Ambassadors Memoirs, London, 1923.
121
See more about the problem in Taylor A. J. P., The War Aims of the Allies in the First World War and Balsover G.
H., Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 in Pares R. and Taylor A. J. P. (eds.), Essays Presented to Sir Lewis
Namier, London, 1956.
122
. ., . ,
, 1926.
123
Report by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to Emperor Nicholas II from December 1913.
124
The Russian economy enormously suffered when during the Italian-Ottoman war of 1991-1912 the Turkish
authorities closed the Straits only for two weeks in April of 1912.
125
Gottlieb W. W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London, 1957, pp. 148-162. See more in
. ., (1914-1917), , 1967;
. ., , , 1924; Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des
Imperialismus, II, 7 II, 493. Winston Churchill stated during the first months of the First World War that the Russian
soldiers will fight bravely only if the Straits would be the task of the victory.
126
Sazonov S., Les annes fatales, Paris, 1927.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
46


considered as more significant than the rest of Europe, Middle and Far East. In
addition, Byzantine Constantinople (Turkish Istanbul) was considered by the
Russian Emperors since the time of Ivan the Terrible as a spiritual centre of
Russian and Orthodox culture and civilisation.
127
Similarity of the importance of
Albania for Italy, the Persian Gulf for the Great Britain and the Bosporus, Sea of
Marmara and Dardanelli for Russia was obvious.




The Southeastern Europe after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 with territorial acquisitions by Serbia, Montenegro,
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece

127
See more about this problem in Mango C., Byzantium and its Image, London, 1984; Mango C., Byzantium The
Empire of New Rome, New York, 1982; Shevchenko I., Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World, especially
Constantinople viewed from the eastern provinces and Byzantium and the eastern Slavs after 1453, London, 1972.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
47


The main Russian opponent in the Balkans was the Habsburg Monarchy
since the first Russo-Turkish War of 1677-1681. The struggle between these two
European powers upon the spheres of influences in the Southeastern Europe was
only temporarily settled in 1782 when the Russian Tsarina Catherine the Great
and the Austrian Kaiser Joseph II divided the Balkans into Russian and Austrian
influence. The line of division ran from Belgrade to the Adriatic. The territories
eastward from this line belonged to the Russian protectorate while the lands
westward from the line went to the Austrian patronage. In fact, the Serbian lands
were shared between Russia and Austria while Albania was given to Russia. It was
the first and only example that Austria agreed to renounce the claim over the
territory of Albania and to cede it to Russia. The Russian imperial navy
implemented this agreement by occupied the Ionian Islands in 1799. This military
action was designed as an overture for the later Russian deeper penetration into
the Eastern Balkans exactly via the territory of Albania.
128
However, during the
whole 19
th
century the territory of Albania was under Austrian sphere of interest
but not Russian one. Moreover, Russian diplomacy signed two agreements with
the Habsburg Monarchy upon the Balkan status quo in 1897 and 1903.
Accordingly, the territory of Albania with the western Macedonia, Kosovo and
Metohija were recognised as the Austrian area of patronage.
129

The importance of the Albanian terrain for the Russian foreign policy
emerged again during the Serbian-Greek occupation of the territory of Albania in
1912-1913. At that time only Russia supported Serbia and Greece in expense of
Albanian independence while all other members of the European concert
opposed Russian plan to divide Albania into two while significant number of the
Muslim inhabitants of Albania expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. The
Russian intention to divide Albania between Serbia and Greece in 1913 was in fact
the compensation to Belgrade and Athens for Tsars design to give to Bulgaria
great territorial concessions in Macedonia and Trace. Additionally, the Russian
diplomacy had an idea in 1914-1915 to unite Serbia with Montenegro, Kosovo,
Metohija, Dalmatia, Northern Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single
federal state of the Serbian nation.
130
This idea was alive during the time of
creation of the Balkan alliance in 1912 and its the main protagonist became the
Russian ambassador to Serbia N. Hartvig.
131
However, during the Balkan Wars the
ultimate Russian ceding Albania to the Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1913
occurred under the Tsars deep conviction that the Albanian question would
provoke the third Balkan war what for Russia was not prepared at that moment.
Albania was seen in conception of the Russian foreign policy in the Balkans as the
territory which should thwart the Italian and the Habsburg penetration in
direction to the Straits
132
, and Constantinople where the keys of the Russian
home had been.
133


128
More about the Eastern question in the 18
th
century see in Sorel A., La question dorient au XVIIIe sicle, Paris,
1889; Driault E., La question depuis ses origines jusqua nos jours, Paris, 1898.
129
. ., , II, , 1963, pp. 345-351; ., , II,
, 1949, pp. 5-10.
130
, , Report from the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Military Supreme
Command, telegraph sent from the city of Valjevo on October 3, 1914, document 5714; , ,
, . . (Diary of J. J. Pion), box ?54, document 247.
131
.
1878-1917, vol. XX, , 1938, Report by the Russian representative in Belgrade from September
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
48


Conclusion
The Balkans is a term connoting peoples, cultures and states that make up
a peninsula of the Southeastern Europe between the Black, Adriatic, Aegean and
Mediterranean Seas. There are three crucial points of the Balkans significance in
geo-strategic point of view:
1) The territory of the Balkans is important connection between the
Western/Central Europe and the Near/Middle East.
2) Wealthy of the regions natural resources.
3) The region which is located betwixt the Danube, the Black Sea and the
Eastern Mediterranean is important part of Great European Powers
political-military-economic strategy.
The Albanians, who wrongly and for the pure political purposes, believe
themselves to be the last pure descendants of ancient Illyrians, the regions
inhabitants before the arrival of the South Slavs, were constantly on the road of
interests of the regional big powers and nations: the Roman empire, the
Byzantium, the Slavs, Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, etc. This fact
had extremely negative consequences for creation of independent national state of
Albanians throughout history. Historically, the first attempt to create Albanian
state was done in the 13
th
century by Carlo I of Naples who proclaimed himself as
the king of Albania. However, the first real creator of independent state of Albania
became the legendary Skanderbeg, the father of Albanian nation, who
established Albanian independence on November 28
th
, 1443. After falling down
under Ottoman sway in 1479, the Albanians had to wait till November 28, 1912
when the Albanias independence was re-announced. Nevertheless, when Albanian
sate borders were drawn in 1913 by the Great European Powers, nearly half of
ethnic Albanians were left out-side-most notably in the Serbias province of Kosovo
and Metohija and western Macedonia. It was a result of clashes of opposite
interests of both Great European Powers and Balkan national states in regard to
strategically very significant land of Albania.
Every powerful European state at the end of the 19
th
century and the
beginning of the 20
th
century was interested in the Southeastern Europe. Territory
of Albania became a part of this interest. Russias crucial driving force in her
Balkan policy was the wish to acquire an exit to the warm sea. Germany of the
Second Empire saw the territory of the Southeastern Europe as the transversal
area for its Drang nach Osten towards the Middle East and Central Asia. Austria-
Hungary was seeking to occupy the seaport of Salonica and to establish its
footholds on the territory of Albania. While Italy did not show great interest
concerning the question of Salonica, its foreign policy in regard to Albanian
territory became the main obstacle for Viennese plans about the land of
Skanderbeg. Similarly to the Great Britains policy of European power-balance,
France was pursuing the policy of status quo on the Balkans.


20, 1912; p (The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic
documents about the Balkans from August 1912 to July 1913), , pp. 19, 20, document 36.
132
See, 1896 ., , vol. IV-V, (XLVII XLVIII), , ,
1931; . ., , vol. II, , 1963.
133
. ., , , 1924, p. 7.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
49


The Balkans: On the crossroads of
civilizations and political spheres of influence



An usual, but more populist, description of both the Balkans and the
Southeastern Europe is bridge or crossroads between Europe and Asia, mixing
point or melting pot of races, powder room or keg of Europe and the battlefield
of Europe.
134
However, one of the most important features of both regions, the
Balkans and the Southeastern Europe, is the melting pot of cultures and
civilizations.
135


Geophysics and culture

The Balkan Peninsula is bordered by six seas on its three sides: by the
Adriatic Sea and the Ionian Sea on the west, by the Aegean Sea and Sea of Crete
on the South and by the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea on the east. The
fourth side of the Peninsula, the north, in geographical point of view has the
border on the Danube. If the factors of historical and cultural developments have
to be taken into consideration then the Balkan northern border is Rivers Prut,
Ipoly/Ipel and Szamos (the last two in Hungary). Practically, the first option refers
to geography while second refers to historical and cultural linkage and influences.
Correctly speaking, the second option refers to the region of the Southeastern
Europe under which should be considered the Balkan Peninsula in geographical
terms enlarged by Romanian and Hungarian lands which are historically and
culturally closely linked to both: the territories of East-Central Europe and the
Balkans.
136

The name Balkans most probably has Turkish root with the means of
mountain or mountain chain. For sure, the mountains are the most specific
characteristic of the region. Favourable natural conditions of the Peninsula
attracted through history many different invaders who created multi-cultural,
multi-religious and multi-ethnical societies and civilizations in this part of Europe.
Historical significance of the region enormously increased in the eyes of West
European civilization from the time of Ottoman conquest of the main part of the
Southeastern Europe (13541541) when this portion of the Old continent was
customarily marked as the lands between Europe, Turkey and Russia. Due to the
Ottoman lordship upon the region (till 1913), which significantly changed its

134
For example: Castellan, G., History of the Balkans. From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin, East European
Monographs, Boulder, Distributed by Colombia University Press, New York, 1992, p. 1.
135
About the problem of the sociogenesis of the concepts of Civilization and Culture see in: Elias N., The
Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Carnwall, 2000, pp. 345.
136
The option that Romanian and Hungarian lands belong to the Balkans is advocated, for instance, by The National
Geographic Society which printed Supplement The Balkans in February 2000s issue of its Magazine. Further,
according to Gazetter. Atlas of Eastern Europe the whole area from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea belongs to
the Eastern Europe. Poulton Hugh is sure that Hungary and Romania do not belong to the Balkans [Poulton H., The
Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, London, 1994, p. 12]. Finally, the authors of the famous Grosser Atlas zur
Weltgeschichte, published annually, are not quite sure where are the exact historical northern borders of the Balkans.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
50


image (in point of customs, culture, ethnography, human behaviour, economic
development, style of everyday life, appearance of urban settlement, cuisine, etc.)
many western authors, especially travellers, considered the Balkans as a part of
the Orient or by virtue of geographical remoteness as a part of the Near East. L. S.
Stavrianos, Professor of History at Northwestern University (USA), is quite right to
explain heterogeneity of regional historical and cultural developments essentially
by the Peninsulas intermediate location between Central and Eastern Europe on
one side and Asia Minor and Levant on the other.
137



Geographic map of the Balkan Peninsula




137
Stavrianos, L. S., The Balkans since 1453, Rinehart & Company, Inc., New York, 1958, p. 133.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
51


The Balkans and the Southeastern Europe culturally and historically are
integral parts of European civilization, influenced throughout of centuries by the
Eastern Mediterranean, Central, Western and East European cultural trends.
Being at the crossroads of three continents (Africa, Asia and Europe), the Balkans
is taken into account as the region of extraordinary geo-political and geo-strategic
importance even since the early days of the Antique. The regional geo-political and
geo-strategic significance had crucial impact on its inter-cultural development,
mixture and characteristics. While in physiographic viewpoint the Pyrenees and
the Alps separate the Iberian and Apennine Peninsulas from the rest of Europe,
the Balkan Peninsula and the Southeastern Europe were in contrast opened to it.
Danube River is more linking than separating this part of Europe with the outside
world especially with the region of Central Europe. Geographers are willing to see
the northern border of the Balkans on the Danube but such attitude is not
reasonable for historians as it excludes the Trans-Danubian territories of Romania
as well as the Sub-Carpathian region and the Great Hungarian Plain (Alfld).
138

Likewise the Danube, the seas around the Balkans became principal road to the
neighbourhood. For example, Straight of Otranto (50 miles long) was the closest
link between the Balkan and West European civilizations and in this point of view
Eastern Italy and the territories of Dalmatia, Montenegro, Albania, Epirus and
Peloponnesus, played the role of bridge connecting Western and Southeastern
Europe. As a result, Dalmatian and Montenegrin littoral urban settlements, for
instance, through history accepted West Adriatic Italian style of life, architecture,
municipal and social organization, culture and structure of economy. It is visible
particularly in the Adriatic islands that were in the same position of bridging two
Peninsulas and their cultures The Balkans and the Apennines. Probably, the
Adriatic islands, considerably influenced by both sides Italian and Balkan
culture and civilization, are the best historical examples of the phenomenon: the
Balkan melting pot of civilizations. The Aegean islands followed by Crete and
Cyprus were natural footsteps between the Balkans on the one hand and Egypt
and Palestine on the other. For Venetian six centuries long trade links (from 1204
to 1797) between Italy and Middle East, the Aegean islands, Crete (Candia under
Venetian rule), Rhodes and Cyprus were of the pivotal and even existential
importance. Even today there are numerous remains and examples of Venetian
material and spiritual culture and civilization in these islands that is constituent
element of inter-cultural feature of Balkan and East Mediterranean civilizations.
Over the centuries they were occupied by the Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines,
Knights of St. John, Venice, Ottomans, Italians and Germans until their ultimate
union with Greece. Nonetheless, thanks to its geo-physical characteristics, there
was no natural center of the Peninsula where about a great state could be
formed.
139



138
For example, close historical, economic, cultural and political connections between the Balkans, Transdanubia and
Great Hungarian Plain are indicated in many places in the book: Kontler L., Millenium in Central Europe. A History of
Hungary, Atlantisz Publishing House, Budapest, 1999. About church relations and influences between Central European
Hungary and Balkan Byzantine Empire see in: Moravcsik Gy., The Role of the Byzantine Church in Medieval
Hungary, The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. VI, 18019, 1947, pp. 134151.
139
About the relations of Balkan geo-physical conditions and creation of Balkan states see in: Cviji J., La Pninsule
Balkanique, Paris, 1918.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
52


The crossroads and division lines

An extraordinary historical earmark of the Balkans was the fact that
through the Peninsula, as well as the Southeastern Europe, ran several political
and cultural division lines and boundaries as between Latin and Greek
language, Eastern and Western Roman Empire, Byzantine and Frank Empire,
Ottoman and Habsburg lands, Islam and Christianity, Orthodoxy and Catholicism
and recently between the North Atlantic Threaty Organization and the Warsaw
Pact. The most remarkable examples of living between division lines are the
Romanians and the Serbs. Being decisively influenced in the Middle Ages by
Byzantine culture and civilization, both of them accepted Byzantine civilization
and Orthodoxy. However, in the course of following centuries and under peculiar
historical development of the region and political living conditions, one part of
Romanians and Serbs accepted either Unionism or Roman Catholicism. For
instance, on March 27
th
, 1697 the union of part of the Romanian Orthodox
Church in Transylvania (a part of historical Kingdom of Hungary) with the Roman
Catholic Church was signed, resulting in the creation of the Greek-Catholic or the
Uniate Church. The church union with Rome, based on four points of the Union of
Florence of 1439,
140
recognized the authority of the pope, in return receiving
recognition of the equality of the Romanian clergy with that of the Roman Catholic
Church.
141
Similarly to Romanians in Transylvania, part of the Serbs settled on
the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy (Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Istria,
Southern Hungary) from the mid-16
th
century converted themselves into Unionism
or Roman-Catholicism. Thus, for illustration, the Serbs who came to live in
umberak area (on the very border between Croatia and Slovenia) in the 16
th

century were Orthodox believers while in the next century majority of them
accepted the Union and finally in the 18
th
century declared themselves as
members of the Roman Catholic Church. Till the beginning of the 18
th
century, the
national alphabet of Romanians was Cyrillic one while in subsequent decades it
was replaced by Latin script that is used up to our days by Romanians. As a result
that through centuries Serbian nation was influenced by Byzantine, Ottoman,
Italian and Central European culture, living five centuries (from the 15
th
to the
20
th
) on the territories of Republic of Venice, the Habsburg Empire and the
Ottoman Empire, contemporary Serbs are using in every-day life a quite equally
Cyrillic and Latin scripts, while official national alphabet is only Cyrillic one. In
addition, Serbian nationhood is split in religious point of view into the Eastern
Orthodox, Muslim and Roman Catholic believers, while usual national
identification mark is only Eastern Orthodoxy (likewise the Cyrillic script).

140
The four essential points that had been the basis for the Union of the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic
churches proclaimed by the Council of Florence on July 6
th
, 1439 were: 1) the recognition of papal supremacy; 2) the
filioque in the profession of faith, whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; 3) recognition of the
existence of purgatory; and 4) the use of unleavened bread in the mass. The Uniates, or Greek-Catholics, as these
converts came to be known, preserved all of other traditions and rights. About the Florence Union in 1439 more details
can be obtained in: Hofmann G., Die Konzilsarbeit in Florenz, Orient. Christ. Period., 4, 1938, pp. 157188, 373
422; Hofmann G., Epistolae pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinium spectantes, Vol. IIII, Roma, 1940-1946; Gill J., The
Council of Florence, Cambridge, 1958; Gill J., Personalities of the Council of Florence, Oxford, 1964.
141
Bolovan I., Constantiniu F., Michelson P. E., Pop I. A., Popa C., Popa M., Scurtu I., Treptow K. W., Vultur M.,
Watts L. L., A History of Romania, Iai, 1996, pp. 185190.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
53


Three thousand years of the Balkan history being developed on the
crossroads and meeting ground of civilizations resulted in two most important
outcomes: I) the presence of great number of ethnical minorities; and II) the
existence and functioning of numerous different religions and their churches.
Present-day Balkan ethnical minorities with their peculiar cultures are distributed
on ensuing way. In Romania the biggest ethnical minority is Hungarian one living
in Transylvania, followed by Serbs in Banat and Germans in Transylvania.
Macedonian ethnical minority is not officially recognised in Bulgaria as well as in
Greece, while majority of Bulgarian ethnical Turks suffered forced assimilation
from 1984 to 1989 and finally emigrated to Turkey in 1989.
142
In Greece the
biggest ethnical minority are the Albanians, settled mainly in Epirus, while the
biggest ethnical minority in Albania are the Greeks followed by
Serbs/Montenegrins. The most number of Balkan ethnical minorities are living in
Serbia and Montenegro: Albanians, Bulgarians, Vlahs, Romanians, Hungarians,
Ukrainians, Gypsies, Croats, Slovaks and others. Croatia has Italian, Serbian and
Hungarian minorities, while in Macedonia the biggest ethical minority are the
Albanians, followed by Turks, Muslims, Gypsies and Serbs.
143
Finally, in Bosnia
and Herzegovina the biggest minorities are the Czechs, Poles and the so-called
Montenegrins.
144

Similarly to ethnical composition of the Balkans, its distribution of
religions is very complex too. In present-day Albania there are three the biggest
denominations: Muslim (confessed by 70% of the population), Roman Catholic
(confessed by 10% of Albanians) and Eastern Orthodox (confessed by 20% of
Albanias inhabitants). Such division is direct consequence of Albanias geo-
political position and the course of historical development. For example, Albanias
Orthodox population is located in the southern part of the country where the
Greek-Byzantine influences were dominant, while Northern Albania open to the
Adriatic and Italy was for centuries mainly under the influence of Roman Catholic
Church. The presence of great number of Muslims is direct outcome of Ottoman
lordship in Albania (14711912). Overwhelming majority of Bulgaria is of Eastern
Orthodox faith, while there are 800.000 Muslim Turks, 55.000 Roman Catholics
and 15.000 Greek-Catholics (Uniats). In addition, Bulgarias Muslims of Slavic
ethnical origin, the Pomaks, do not feel themselves to be Bulgarians and have a
closer affinity to the Turks due to the shared religion. Likewise citizens of
Bulgaria, significant majority of Greeces population is of Eastern Orthodox
Church. At the same time, in the mid-1970s there were 120.000 Muslims (in the

142
TANJUG, March 28, 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Eastern Europe / 7914 B/ 1, April 1985;
Bulgaria: Continuing Human Rights Abuses against Ethnic Turks, Amnesty International, EUR/15/01/87, p. 5; Amnesty
International, Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks and Human Rights Activists, EUR 15/01/89.
143
The total population of Macedonia according to 1981 census was 1.912.257 of which there were 1.281.195
Macedonians, 377.726 Albanians, 44.613 Serbs, 39.555 Muslims, 47.223 Gypsies, 86.691 Turks, 7.190 Vlahs and 1984
Bulgarians [Poulton H., The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, London, 1994, p. 47].
144
Sellier A., Sellier J., Atlas des peuples dEurope centrale, Paris, 1991, pp. 143-166; ., XX
. , , , , , pp. 5355; Statistical Pocket Book: Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1993. In order to illustrate the whole complexity of ethnical minority phenomenon on the
Balkans, the best example is Bosnia and Herzegovina where alongside with three recognised nations (according to
Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, Muslims, Serbs and Croats) the following national groups as ethnical
minorities are living too: Montenegrins, Gypsies, Ukrainians, Albanians, Slovenians, Macedonians, Hungarians, Czechs,
Poles, Italians, Germans, Jews, Slovaks, Romanians, Russians, Turks, Ruthenians, and Yugoslavs. This information is
based on data supplied by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) on January 17, 1999.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
54


Western Thrace), 43.000 Roman Catholics, 3000 Greek-Catholics and even 640
Armenian-Catholics.
145
On the territory of former Yugoslavia there are three major
religions: Roman Catholic (in the western part), Eastern Orthodox (in the eastern
part) and Muslim (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Sandak). In 1990,
there were 35 religious communities in Yugoslavia. According to census of 1953,
there was 41,4% Orthodox population, 31,8% Catholics, 12,3% Muslims, and
12,5% non-believers in Yugoslavia.
146
Similarly to Albanias case, such division is
direct product of Yugoslavias geo-political position and different historical,
cultural and religious influences on its territory.


The Jirechek division line at the Balkans between the Latin and the Greek cultural and linguistic spheres of
influence

145
Europa Yearbook 1975, London, 1976. For the matter of illustration the following ethnical and religious groups
lived in Aegean Macedonia in 1912: Macedonians, Muslim Macedonians (Pomaks), Turks, Christian Turks, Cherkez
(Mongols), Greeks, Muslim Greeks, Muslim Albanians, Christian Albanians, Vlahs, Muslim Vlahs, Jews, Gypsies, and
others. All of them made a total of 1.073.549 inhabitants of this part of the Balkans.
146
Jugoslovenski pregled, 3, 1977.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
55


A symbiosis between religion and nation is quite visible in this part of
Europe. The proper linkage between religious and ethnic identity among the
Balkan peoples, especially in ethnically, culturally and religiously mixed areas can
be seen in the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been a self-conscious
contributor to the development of a nationalistic ideology among the Serbs but
particularly among those from Kosovo and Metohija, Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
147
The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated literally on the
cross-roads of different cultures and civilisations, became in the 1990s a most
referring example of meeting-ground of divergent religions, nations, cultures,
habits and civilizations in the Balkans. The linkage between religious and ethnic
identity is crucial for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian Orthodox
Church, the Croatian Catholic Church, and the Bosnian Muslim community were
a defining factor in ethnic differentiation, perhaps even the single most important
factor. Religion became a badge of identity and guardian of traditions for the
Croats, Serbs, and Muslims (Bonjaks/Bosniaks), as well as for other peoples in
the region. This was particularly important for the preservation of identity and
culture as various foreign empires dominated the region.
148
In fact, the
simultaneous oppression of both religion and nation tended to solidify the
connection between the church and nation as well as religious and ethnical
identity.
149
Surely, quite complex Balkan ethnical and religious composition is
pivotal cause for existence of its different cultures but also for ethnical conflicts
which are very often in this part of Europe. The Balkan is at the same time both:
the meeting ground of civilizations and the powder room of Europe.

Balkan geopolitics: Between a bridge and battlefield

The peculiar geographical position of the Peninsula gives us answer to the
question why it has been throughout of all historical epochs both a bridge and
battlefield of different civilizations and cultures. Thus, the history of the region
was in a great extent determined by the site of the Balkans. Situated at the
meeting point of Europe, Africa and Asia both the Balkans and the Southeastern
Europe experienced alternate imperial drives, competing ideologies together with
conflicting social, political, and economic systems.
150
For the local people in the
region, to live in the area of high international tensions meant primarily to find a
way out from permanent pressure from abroad. It led to their resistance to any
foreign realm and outside attempts to annex or to dominate the region.
Accordingly, it was exactly this part of the Old continent to deserve the label of
Europes worst trouble spot.
151
At the same time, the Balkan and Southeastern
European societies accepted many of foreign institutions, customs, rules, habits

147
Steele D., Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation? in Janji D. (ed.), Religion &
War, Belgrade, 1994, pp. 163184.
148
Ramet P., Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia, in Ramet P. (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East
European Politics, Duram, 1989, pp. 299311.
149
Markovi I., Srpsko pravoslavlje i Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 34.
150
Jelavich B., History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1983, pp. ixxi.
151
Berend I., T. and Rnki G., East Central Europe in the 19
th
and 20 centuries, Akadmiai Kiad, Budapest, 1977, p.
41.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
56


which were in many cases modelled or reshaped according to the local traditions
and necessities.
152

Thoroughly high degree of international interest upon the Balkans and
Southeastern Europe for the whole time of mankind history comes on the first
place for the reason of geo-political and geo-strategic value of these two regions.
153

The Balkans, shoulder to shoulder with the Southeastern Europe, was during the
entire 19
th
and 20
th
century a real laboratory for expression and investigation of
different attributes of the geo-politics.
154

The region of Balkan Peninsula in geographical terms is straitened between
the Mediterranean basin and the Danube watershed what basically means that
one great long-time existed state-body could not be established. Moreover, for the
reason of mountain face of the region, broken and interlaced with many smaller
and bigger rivers, the local population was destined to live within smaller state
organizations. The ancient Greek city-state (o) was typical product of
geographical conditions of the area. When the borders of newly independent state
of Albania were drawn in 1913 they followed in great extent the geographical
shape of the area living nearly half of the ethnic Albanians outside the
motherland, majority of them in Serbian and Montenegrin provinces of Kosovo and
Metohija but also in the Western Macedonia. In one word, regional geographical
conditions became one of the most decisive hindrances for the Balkan peoples to
realize their maximized territorial aims and requirements. Besides this factor, the
long-time intermixture of different ethnical, religious and cultural groups became
the second obstacle which did not allow the South-East European nations to
effectuate their dreams of national unification within a single national statehood
without the conflict with their neighbours or co-dwellers who had similar national

152
Among selected bibliography of the Balkan and Southeast European cultural, political, historical and social
developments the following works deserve to be mentioned: Jelavich Ch., (ed.), Language and Area Studies: East
Central and Southeastern Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969; Edgar H., The Balkans: A Short History
from Greek Times to the Present Day, Crane, Russak, New York, 1972; Jelavich B. and Ch., The Balkans, Prentice-Hall,
New Jersey, 1965; Jelavich B. and Ch., The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 18041920, University of
Washington Press, 1977; Stavrianos, L. S., The Balkans, 18151914, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1963;
Stoianovich T., A Study in Balkan Civilization, Knopf, New York, 1967; Sugar P. E., Southeastern Europe under
Ottoman Rule, 13541804, University of Washington Press, 1977; Gleny M., The Balkans. Nationalism, War and the
Great Powers, 18041999, Viking, New York; Cviji J., Balkansko Poluostrvo i junoslovenske zemlje. Osnove
antropogeografije, vol. I, Zagreb, 1922. One of the most useful guides of selected bibliography of our interest is:
Horecky, P. L., (ed.), Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969.
153
It is important to notice that even today there are suspicious scientists and researchers who are following the pre-19
th

century attitude towards geo-politics as non scientific area or simply as the pseudo-science. It should be said that from
the time of the mid-19
th
century the geo-politics was accepted more and more as a field an equal with the other sciences
primarily due to the works of American Admiral Mahan A. T. (18401914) connected with the role of the navy in the
ruling the world, then the works of the German geographer Ratzel F. (18441904) concerning the relations between
geography and the living space (Lebens Raum), the Swedish university professor of the political sciences Kjelln J. R.
(18641922) about the state as an organism and the superiority of the German race, the British scientist Mac Kinder
Halford John (18611947) with regard to the importance of the heartland and finally but at the same time mostly due to
the German General and geographer Haushofer K. (18691946) who was writing primarily upon the geo-political
reasons of Hitlers wars of territorial expansion of the Reich. However, Greek historian Herodot (B. C. 484424), the
father of history and the author of the famous History of the Greek-Persian Wars, should be considered as one of the
early founders of the geo-politics as the science. In sum, the geo-politics was primarily discredited as a scientific field of
research and investigation since it was seen only as a justification and projection of German expansionism in the 19
th
and
the 20
th
centuries. In view of such spirit, the negative synonyms for the geo-politics were the doctrines of the Blood and
Soil (Blut und Boden), the Living Space (Lebens Raum), the Will for Power (Wile zum Macht) and the Lord-
Nation (Herren Volk).
154
., XX . , , , , , p. 10.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
57


visions. Southeast European nationalism led by the basic idea that each ethnos
has to live in one national state was essential ideological framework for constant
inter-ethnical collisions.
155
Creation of a single national state-body, composed by
all ethnographical and historical national lands, was in the eyes of the leading
Balkan politicians a final stage of national awakening, revival and liberation which
started at the turn of the 19
th
century on the ideological basis of German
romanticist nationalism expressed in formula: one language-one nation-one
state.
156
The struggle upon the same national territories which belonged to
everybody in accordance to historical, ethnical, military or geo-strategic
principles and reasons resulted with the certitude that in this part of the world
there was overmuch the blood then the land. In the other words, there were not
enough territories in order to satisfy all national aspirations. Thus, for example,
Serbian, Greek, Turkish, Montenegrin and Albanian dispute over the destiny and
fixed borders of independent Albania in 19121913, or the Yugoslav civil war
19911995 followed by Yugoslav-Albanian struggle over Kosovo and Metohija
province 19981999 are only the episodes of local nationalism but certainly not an
exemption.
157

The most important feature of the Balkan geo-politics is Peninsulas
geographical, historical, political, military-strategic and economic connections with
the Mediterranean. The most convenient geographical definition of the Balkans is
the Peninsula of the Mediterranean. Basically, all Balkan states are the
Mediterranean ones. Seas that belong to them are parts of Mediterranean basin.
For instance, due to the fact that Epirus and Albanias seacoasts are the part of
Mediterranean shore, located near Italy, the strategic importance of Epirus and
Albania attracted very often in history many foreign powers to posses them (the
Greeks, Romans, Byzantine Empire, Normans, Venice, Serbs, Ottomans, Italians).
The competition between Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Italy, Turkey and Austria-
Hungary over Albanian land in the years of 19121913 was in great extent
motivated by importance of Mediterranean character of Albania.

155
The pivotal nationality principle in Europe is: A nation is a people in possession of or striving for its own state. The
relationship between state and nation in Europe was gradually transformed from the model of the Augsburg Religious
Peace Settlement 1555 Cuius regio, eius religio to modern model of Switzerland, Belgium, Quebec and Bosnia and
Herzegovina Cuius regio, eius lingua.
156
Language-criteria as the crucial factor of national determination was established by German romanticist from the end
of the 18
th
century Herder who overlapped the language-borders with the national-borders. Herders model of
linguistic nationalism was further ideologically developed at the beginning of the 19
th
century especially by Germans
Humboldt and Fichte. It was Fichte who put on the paper the most influential interpretation of relationship between the
language and the national appertaining by writing his famous Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808). According to him,
only the Germans succeeded to preserve original (ursprnglich) Teutonic language in its purest form. It was the reason
for Fichte to claim that only the nation who conserved old Teutonic language has right to call itself the Germans, e.i.
the Teutons. Fichte further claimed that the power and greatness of the Germans was based exactlly on the fact that
only they spoke original national language. It is important to notice Fichte concluded that language influences the
peoples identity much stronger then people influence on language-shaping [Fichte, G. J., Reden an die deutsche Nation,
Berlin, 1808, p. 44]. The practical value of this work was the fact that Fichte, an ideological creator of German
linguistic nationalism, urged German national-political unification taking into consideration the most decisive national
determinator the language. It should be said as well as that one of the oldest examples of language-nation relationship
was pointed out in the book [Mielcke, C., Litauisch-Deutsches und Deutsch-Litauisches Wrter-Buch, Knigsberg,
1800].
157
The cult of war is present in every Balkan nationalism. For example, Serbian Orthodox Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi
stated on the day of proclamation of the beginning of the First Balkan War in 1912 in his oration about The Young
Serbia that the Lord is great warrior [ ., . , , 1914, p.
12].
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
58


Historically, the notion of the Balkans was in conjunction with the
Ottoman Turks who gradually spread their lordship over the Peninsula from 1354
keeping it under their sway till 1913. However, certain European powers saw the
Balkan seaside either as their legitimate historic possession or the sphere of
influence, endeavouring to keep back Turkey from Balkan littoral. From the cause
of historic-cultural factors, continental Balkans was related to the Orient while
littoral Balkans was cognate to the Occident. The crucial reason of Russian
interest in the Balkans was an aspiration to possess the exit to the warm seas.
For the German Second Reichs diplomats (18711918) and Nazi politicians (1933
1945) the Southeastern Europe became attractive as the transversal corridor
connecting the Middle East and Asia with German European possessions; in the
other words, the corridor very suitably located for Berlins policy of Drang nach
Osten. In the eyes of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy creators the region was of
pivotal prominence as only overland way to Viennas final goal-to have ownership
of Aegean sea-port of Salonika. Especial point of interest in the Balkans among
European powers at the turn of the 20
th
century became the entrance to the
Adriatic Sea bordered by Italian and Albanian littorals. In this light, for Viennese
politicians Albanian territory, especially its seacoast, should play the role of
western obstacle to Italy to keep Rome far from this port which should be
transformed into the principal Austro-Hungarian commercial export-import point
in the Mediterranean. The Adriatic and Ionian littorals became from the 1860s
extremely attractive for the Kingdom of Serbia as one of the possible strips of
Balkan territories where Serbia could find exit to the sea. Montenegrin Principality
(from 1910 Kingdom) was infatuated only by the ultimate north-western portion of
Albania the area around the city of Scodra. The Kingdom of Bulgaria from its de
iure acquainted independence in 1878 expressed its thirstiness for Aegean littoral.
The Greek pretensions for the same territory led finally Sofia and Athens to the
war in 1913. In the Balkan politics of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria in
turn of the 20
th
century the Albanians and Albania were the wedge against the
others. It was true especially for the Bulgarians in which political conception of
the southern Balkans the Bulgarian-Albanian axis was imagined as the best
impediment against the Serbian-Greek teamwork and joint political actions.
Finally, the Ottoman Empire had its own political-economic interests to keep
Ionian littoral as its own possession. For this purpose, for Istanbuls diplomats the
eastern entrance into the Adriatic should be under Sultans control.
It has to be stressed that Ionian littoral with its hinterland played
significant role for the Turkish sultans at the time of the Ottoman subduing the
Southeastern Europe. For instance, sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (14511481)
established on the hinterland of the Ionian seacoast two the most important
Ottoman footholds in the Balkans for the further intended military actions across
the Adriatic. These two military fortresses were built at Akcahisar (Kruja) and
Avlonya (Valona). The Ottoman commanders (beys) on the northeastern Albanian
border were allowed by the Sultan to increase their raiding expeditions into Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, respectively.
158


158
The center of Ottoman government over Albania was set up at Gjirokastra following the annexation of all the
property of the nobility in central Albania. Among the expropriated Albanian noblemen was and John Kastriota the
father of George Kastriota Skanderbeg. (14051468). The latter succeeded to liberate Albania from the Turkish sway
and ruled independent Albania from 1443 to 1468. The day when Skanderbeg raised a flag bearing his familys arms on
the citadel of Kruja (November, 28) 1443 became a national holiday for Albanians. Knowing that, it is not surpassingly
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
59







French ethnographic map of the Balkan Peninsula in 1918


In the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries the eastern portion of the Southeastern
Europe was under the Russian sphere of influence because it was closer to the
main Russian objects of acquisition Constantinople (Istanbul), Sea of Marmara,
Bosporus and Dardanelles. Beginning with the time of Empress Catherine the
Great (17621796) the conquering of Constantinople was put on the pedestal of

that restoration of Albanian independent statehood in 1912 was announced exactly on the day of November 28. In
addition, Skanderbeg flag became a national emblem of independent Albania. In any case, the day of November 28
remained the national feast day. However, the Ottomans finally subjugated Albania in 1479 taking control over the
fortress of Scutari (Shkodr/Skadar) from the hands of Venice (according to the peace agreement signed between Turkey
and Venice in Constantinople on June 25, 1479). This capture of Scutari became later on a part of principal anti-Ottoman
propaganda among the Italians, Albanians and Montenegrins in their struggle contra Ottoman lordship in the northern
Albania. All of them claimed that the Ottomans captured their historical city of Scutari and recapture of it from
Ottoman posses became a driving force of their national duties and prudence.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
60


the Russian Balkan policy.
159
On the other hand, the western piece of the
Southeastern Europe was considered as the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) sphere
of influence. Consequently, Russo-Austro-Hungarian spheres of influence
overlapped on the territories of Serbia and Montenegro
160
, while the territory of
Albania experienced similar overlapping of Italo-Austro-Hungarian Balkan spheres
of influence. Taking in mind this, it was quite naturally that those members of the
Great European Powers supported different Balkan states during the Balkan Wars
of 19121913 and First World War 19141918.
The military-strategic factors of the Southeastern Europe have five delicate
points: 1) the Ljubljana door, adjoining the Central Europe and the Northern
Adriatic; 2) Morava-Vardar valley, bounding the Central Europe with the Northern
Aegean; 3) Pannonian plain, on the confines of the Southern Central Europe and
the Northern Balkans; 4) Danube River, the main bridge of the Southeastern
Europe with both Central and Western Europe; and 5) the Black Seas seashore.
161

Many invaders through the history used these five points as the roads in order to
cross from Central Europe to the Balkans or vice versa (for example the Crusaders
and the Ottomans).
162
The Sub-Danubian region of the Southeastern Europe
played a significant role in the German-Austrian foreign policy course of Drang
nach Osten in the years from 1871 to 1918. Under this course should be grasped
the German military-political-economic penetration into Asia Minor and after the
Suez Canal was opened further into India (the German plans concerning the
Baghdad and Anadolian railways). Austria-Hungary became the locomotive of this
course after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, interested on the
first place to drive toward the Aegean through the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and the
valley of Vardar river. At the time of Austria-Hungarian emperor Franz Josef I
(18481916) the synonym for his country was Sub-Danubian Monarchy referring
to the importance of Danube for the very existence of the Habsburg Empire which
was composed by Balkan and Central-European lands.
163
The Black Seas
seashore became the principal terrene of battlefield between the Imperial Russia
and the sultans Turkey from the time of the Russian empress Catherine II
through the whole 19
th
century and the beginning of the next one. Both belligerent
sides tried to increase political influence in the Southeastern Europe and the
Balkans in order to provide its own hegemony in the area of the Black Seas
maritime. Nevertheless, the other European Great Powers had as well as its own
particular interests in the sector of European part of the Black Seas shore and its
waters as Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria and even Italy. The struggle of
the Great European Powers upon mastering the Black Seas trade and military
directly or indirectly affected domestic affairs of Serbia and Greece. It was true
particularly from the time of the Crimean War (18541856) to the time of the
Great War (19141918) when the fight of the small Balkan nations for national

159
., , , , 484, 1970.
160
., , , , 498, 1971.
161
About Danube see: . ., , , 1940.
162
About Balkan military-strategic features during the Cold War see: ., ,
, , 448, 1968; Mates L., Meunarodni odnosi socijalistike Jugoslavije, Nolit, Beograd, 1976.
163
Kann R. A., The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration, New York, 1973; Brenger J., A
History of the Habsburg Empire 12731700, London and New York, 1994; Brenger J., A History of the Habsburg
Empire 17001918, London and New York, 2000.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
61


liberation and unification depended to a large extent on the result of Russo-
Ottoman wars and Russian diplomatic support to the Balkan Christian states. By
way of illustration, after Russian military and diplomatic defeat during the
Crimean War and the Paris Peace Conference in 1856, Serbia, Montenegro,
Bulgaria and Greece could not expect the achievement of their national goals till
the next Russo-Ottoman War of 18771878. Due to the Russian victory and the
San Stefano Peace Threaty in 1878, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia
became independent states according to the Berlin Congress decisions in 1878. At
that time the Russian protg in the Balkans was Bulgaria what was the prime
reason for Serbia to turn its eyes towards Vienna and Pest. The Russian pro-
Bulgarian Balkan policy during the war against the Ottoman Empire 18771878
had its foundations in the Russian effort to establish as firm as foothold on the
Black Seas littoral in order to easily acquire Istanbul and the Straits. For this
purpose Bulgaria was the most suited Balkan state being a vanguard of Russian
Euro-Balkan policy and main forerunner of St. Petersburgs interests in the
region.
The Balkan geo-strategic importance can be sublimated in three points: 1)
the Balkans together with the Southeastern Europe is significant overland tie
between Europe and the Middle East; 2) the region has important reserves of
natural wealth in raw materials, energy etc.; and 3) the Euro-Balkans located
among the Sub-Danube terrain, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean was
important item of European and even global system of security and strategy of
imperialistic powers.
164
It should be concluded that the Balkans and the
Southeastern Europe had the highest geo-strategic importance in international
relations accurately at the beginning of the 20
th
century when these regions
became notable links in the chain of European system of balancing powers. The
both the Central Powers and the Entente made considerable efforts to obtain as
better as military, strategic, political and economic positions in the Balkans before
the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
Taking into account historical, cultural, national and religious aspects of
development of the Balkan civilization(s), there were and are three possible main
political axis-alliances to be made in this European region:
I) The Muslim axis (the Ottoman empire, the Muslims from Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Sanjak and the Muslim Albanians from Albania,
Western Macedonia and Kosovo.
II) The Orthodox alliance (Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria,
Romania and the Orthodox inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and Metohija and Central-Eastern Macedonia).
III) The Catholic bloc (Croatia, Slovenia, Habsburg Monarchy (Austria and
Hungary), Germany and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Catholics).
165


164
About general problems of geo-strategic importance and security of the Southeastern Europe see: Luki R, Lynch
A., Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, SIPRI and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; Yazakova A. Shmelyov B.,
Selivanova I, Kolikov N. (eds.), The Balkans: Between the Past and the Future, Moscow, 1995; Poulton H., Balkans,
minorities and states in conflict, London, 1991; Castellan G., Le monde des Balkans: poudriere ou zone de paix?,
Voubert, Paris, 1994.
165
In regard to the problem of religious ground of national determination and making political alliances in the Balkans
see: ., , , 1973, esspecially p. 100; Janji D. (ed.), Religion
and War, Belgrade, 1994.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
62


During the Second World War, the Balkans became the battlefield of three
opposite political-ideological forces: 1) the Nazi and Fascist; 2) the Communist;
and 3) the parliamentary democrat. After 1945 the region was sharply divided
between the members of NATO Pact and Warsaw Pact while Socialist Yugoslavia as
a member of Non-Alignment movement was in certain extend a Balkan political
mediator. Finally, the Balkans became once again in the 20
th
century in the very
focus of world attention during the process of bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia
(19911995) and Kosovo conflict (19981999) followed by the NATO military
intervention in the Balkans in April-June 1999.


Conclusion
The Balkans is a term connoting peoples, cultures and states that make up
a peninsula of Southeastern Europe between the Black, Adriatic, Aegean and
Mediterranean Seas. There are three crucial points of the Balkans significance in
geo-strategic point of view:
1) The territory of the Balkans is important connection between the
Western/Central Europe and the Near/Middle East.
2) Wealthy of the regions natural resources.
3) The region which is located betwixt the Danube, the Black Sea and the
Eastern Mediterranean is important part of Great European Powers
political-military-economic strategy.
Located on the crossroads of different civilizations, the Balkans during its
3.000 years of historical and cultural development preserved many material
remains from different civilizations and was under strong spiritual influence from
the West European, East European, Central European, Mediterranean, Christian,
Muslim, Jewish and many other cultures. If some part of the world really deserved
the name of melting pot of civilizations it is the case with the Balkan Peninsula
for sure.






Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
63



The Idea of Pan-Slavic Ethnolinguistic
Kinship and Reciprocity in Dalmatia and
Croatia, 14771706

Abstract: This paper sets out to examine and clarify historical development of the
ideological concept of Pan-Slavism, which was created by the writers of Dalmatia
and Croatia at the time of the late Renaissance and early Baroque (from the end of
the 15th century to the end of the 17th century). The literary works of that time by
many of Dalmatias and Croatias writers deal with the ethnolinguistic aspect of
Pan-Slavic unity, solidarity, kinship and reciprocity. Their writings established an
ideological framework for making both Pan-Slavic common national identity and
program of the united single national state of the South Slavs in the Balkans. This
ethnolinguistic framework of Pan-Slavic, and especially South Slavic, national
identity became in the 19th and the 20th century the cornerstone of national
ideology of Yugoslavism and Pan-Slavism which ultimately led to the creation of
Yugoslavia in 1918 and its recreation in 1945. The main aspect of the ideology of
Pan-Slavism and Yugoslavism that was developed in the literature and historical
writings in Dalmatia and Croatia from 1477 to 1683 was based on the old domestic
thought and tradition that all Slavs originated in the Balkans and that the South
Slavs are autochthonous inhabitants of this peninsula.
Key words: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Croatianism, Slavic solidarity, Yugoslavism,
Dalmatia, Balkans, South Slavic ethnolinguistic identity, South Slavic
nationalism.

Dalmatian and especially Ragusian (Dubrovnik) humanists in the 16th
century accepted the old domestic thought that all Slavs originated in the Balkans
and that the South Slavs are autochthonous inhabitants of the peninsula. More
precisely, the entire Slavic population had their own forefathers in the ancient
Balkan Illyrians, Macedonians and Tracians. Principally, the ancient Illyrians were
considered as the real ancestors of the South, Eastern and Western Slavs.
Consequently, according to this belief, the Eastern and Western Slavic tribes
emigrated from the Balkans and settled themselves on the wide territory of Europe
from the Elbe River in the west to the Volga River in the east [about the western
borders of Slavic extension in the early Middle Ages see, Engel 1979, 36]. However,
the South Slavs remained in the Balkans the peninsula that was considered as
the motherland of all Slavonic peoples [ 1960,
224227]. Subsequently, all famous historical actors originated in the Balkans
were appropriated as members of the Slavdom: Alexander the Great of Macedonia,
Aristotle, St. Jerome (Hieronimus), Diocletian, Constantin the Great, SS. Cyril and
Methodius, etc.
Famous Ragusian humanistic poeta laureatus Ilija Crijevi (Aelius
Lampridius Cervinus, 14631520), for instance, knew that inhabitants of his
born-city were of both Roman and Slavic origins as he pointed it in his poem Oda
Dubrovniku (Ode for Dubrovnik). Crijevi in his work Super comoedia veteri et
satyra et nova, cum Plauti apologia (Apology for Plaut) called the language of the
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
64


ordinary people from Ragusa/Dubrovnik as stribiligo illyrica (Illyrian solecism),
or as scythica lingua (Scythian language), following the tradition that ancient
Slavs are called among other names and as Scythians and Sarmatians. These two
old Indo-European Iranian people lived during the time of ancient Greeks and
Romans on the territory of the present-day Southern Ukraine and Russia (from
the Volga River to the Danube River) and became in the Middle Ages synonyms for
the Slavs ([Hammond MCMLXXXIV, 3, 5; Westermann 1985, 11, 1415, 2223,
24; Fine 1994, 2526]. About a homeland of the Indo-Europeans see [Mallory
1989; Gimbutas 1985, 185202]). In the song Qui proavi solio et patrueli culmine
regnas, written for Bohemian-Hungarian King Wadysaw II Jagiello (King of
Bohemia 14711516 and King of Hungary 14901516), Crijevi considered the
East Adriatic littoral as Illyrian coast [Franievi 1983, 310313; Banac 1991,
29; Tadin 1903, 265278]. His contemporary, priest Mavro from Dalmatia, in his
Glagolitic Breviary from 1460 indicated the town of Salona nearby Dalmatian city
of Split as the birthplace of SS. Cyril and Methodius, who were in fact the brothers
from Salonika. Moreover, these two apostles of the Slavs, according to the priest
Mavro, were descendents from Roman Emperor Diocletian, and Pope St. Gaius: V
Dlmacii Soline grd. roistvo svetago Kurila i brata ego Metudie. ot roda Doklicina
csara. i svetago Ga papi [Panteli 1965, 133; Banac 1991, 9]. St. Jerome from
Dalmatia was as well appropriated as a Slav and later on exclusively as a Croat.
Consequently, the Latin-language Bible, which was written by St. Jerome and
used by all Catholic Slavs in Europe, was recognized by Dalmatian Catholics as
achievement of the Slavic Croat. Moreover, St. Jerome was unjustifiably
proclaimed as an inventor of the oldest Slavic alphabet the Glagolitic one, named
as well as Jeromes script and later this alphabet became appropriated by Croats
as their own original and national alphabet that became used and by other
Slavonic peoples.
As a result, the first written Slavic language (named by scholars as Old
Church Slavonic), and devised in fact by Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius in the
middle of the 9th century [Fine 1994, 302], became appropriated by Croats in the
Middle Ages and almost immediately as Croatian national and indigenous literal
language. This belief founded an ideological doctrine in the later centuries for
claiming that all people (i.e., Slavs) who used this language virtually belonged to
Croatian ethnic community. In the late medieval times following a popular
tradition about St. Jerome he was assumed as spiritual progenitor of Croatian
people who translated Hebrew and Greek holy writings (sacre scripture) to both
Latin and Slavonic languages [tefani 1963, 3436]. Even the Roman Catholic
Church accepted this popular opinion that St. Jerome was founder of Slavonic
literacy. It is clear from the letter by the Pope Innocent IV (12341254) to Philip,
the Bishop of Northern Dalmatian city of Senj: in Sclavonia est littera specialis,
quam illius terrae clerici se habere a beato Jeronimo asserentes, eam observant in
divinis officiis celebrandis [Jeli 1906a, 9]. The same Pope confirmed twice, in
1248 and 1252, the usage of Jeromes script in the liturgy among Catholics in
the area of Northern Dalmatia [Jeli 1906a, 910]. The Croats were granted once
again with the right to use Jeronimska pismena (Jeromes script) in 1754 by
Pope Benedict XIV in his Ex pastorali munere. In this pastoral letter the Pope
named Croats as Illyrians [Jeli 1906c, 3940]. The same alphabet, which
according to the local South Slavic tradition originated in Dalmatia, was used
among Central European Slavs in the Middle Ages too. Thus, King of Bohemia and
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
65


Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, Carlo IV (13461378)
noticed that the church service in the monastery of Emmaus nearby Prague is
served in Slavic language according to translation by St. Jerome: ob reverentiam
et memoriam plorisissimi confessors Beati Jeronymi Strydoniensis Doctoris egregii et
translatoris interpretisque eximii sacre scripture de Ebraica in Latinam et
Sclavonicam linguas [Jeli 1906b, 5]. However, there are today claims that St.
Jerome was ethnic Serb, born in ethnic Serb area in present-day Bosnia (in
Bosansko Grahovo), speaking Serb language of Shtokavian dialect and that he
was, likewise many other Roman Catholic tokavian speakers, Croatized by the
Roman Catholic church [ 2003].
Still at the turn of the 17th century some of the well-known Dalmatian
publicists and scientists, like Dinko Zavorovi from ibenik/Sebenico (Domenico
Zavoreo, 15401610), believed that the real inventor of Glagolitic script was Slav
St. Jerome from Dalmatia (Hieronymus Dalmatiae) [tefani 1963, 3839], while
others, like Faust Vrani as well from ibenik (Faustus Verantius, 15511617)
were sure that brothers Cyril and Methodius invented Cyrillic letters but not
Glagolitic ones. This opinion resulted in logical conclusion that all Slavonic
peoples who used either Glagolitic or Cyrillic alphabets in fact practiced Illyrian
or Dalmatian or Croatian script. All of these three script-names became
synonyms for the national language and alphabet of the Croats, i.e., Illyrians. As
this language and alphabet was used among all Slavs, Croatian language and
alphabet became ones of the most used and important in the world.
The principal and most influential protagonist of this doctrine became
already mentioned historian and philosopher Faust Vrani who printed the book
Dictionarium quinque nobilissimarum Europae linguarum, Latinae, Italicae,
Germanicae, Dalmatiae & Ungaricae (Dictionary of the five most nobles European
languages, Latin, Italian, German, Dalmatian & Hungarian) in Venice in 1595. He
recognized that Illyrian, Croatian and Dalmatian names are acctually the
synonyms [Verantius 1595; Vrani 1971; Banac 1991, 31; Franievi 1983, 675;
Cronia 1953; Dukat 1925, 102136]. According to him, Dalmatian language was
the purest Slavonic dialect [Banac 1991, 39]. This ideology was followed and
further developed into the concept of Pan-Croatianism at the end of the 17th
century by Cratian nobleman of German origin, Pavao Ritter Vitezovi (16521713)
who saw all Slavs as Slavonic-Croats who spoke Slavonic-Croatian language
[Ritter 1689; Ritter 1696; Vitezovi 1700]. However, contrary to this Vitezovis
claim, today there are many researchers who claim that autochthonous Balkan
people have been the Serbs [ . ., 2009; , 2011].
A Dominican from Dalmatian Island of Hvar, Vinko Pribojevi (the
15th/16th centuties), did the first written systematization of the doctrine of Slavic
origin in the Balkans and their kinship in his speech in Latin language given for
the local aristocracy in the city of Hvar in 1525. This apologetic speech of
glorification of the Slavdom was published in Latin in Venice in 1532 under the
title De origine successibusque Slavorum (On Origins and history of the Slavs).
Pribojevi suggested that all non-Hellenic well-known personalities from the
Balkans in the Antiquity were of Slavic origin, as Macedonians Philip, Alexander,
Aristotle, twenty four Roman emperors born in the Balkans and St. Jerome
(Hieronimus). Finally, according to Pribojevi, three Dalmatian noble brothers
Czech, Lech and Ruswere the forefathers of the modern Czechs, Poles, and
Russians. Moreover, Pribojevi during his three-years period of living in Poland
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
66


and traveling in other Slavic countries became convinced that all Slavonic peoples
spoke a single language. More precisely, according to him, the Russians were
speaking Dalmatian tongue, and the Slavic appellation was younger than
Dalmatian, i.e., Illyrian name [Pribojevi 1951, 6570;
1960, 224; Istorija Jugoslavije 1973, 129; Novak 1951, 947;
Schmaus 1953, 243254; Gortan 1958, 149152; Barii 1961, 227257].
According to him, the mythical Illyrus was an ancestor of all Slavs. Thus, this
famous Dalmatian humanistic and renaissance writer connected the history of the
Slavs with the history of the ancient Romans and Macedonians sugesting that
current Slavic history is continuation of glorified history of Roman and
Macedonian Empires. The Pan-Slavic doctrine of Pribojevi became more
influential and known among the South Slavs and other European readers when
his speech was translated into Italian and published in Venice in 1595.
This Pribojevis thought was followed by many various South Slavic
writers among them the most important became the abbot of a Benedictine
congregation, a historian from Ragusa (Dubrovnik), whose family came to this
city-Republic from Kotor (present-day a Montenegrin city), Mavro Orbin,
Dalmatian Thucydides (Mauro Orbini, d. 1611 or 1614). Orbin wrote the first
and most influential general Slavic history published in Pesaro 1601 under the
title Il Regno degli Slavi (The Slavic Kingdom) based mainly on the old popular
tradition upon the origins of the Slavs. The book was translated into Russian by
Sava Vladislavi who was a Serb retainer of the Russian emperor Peter the Great,
and published in St. Petersburg in 1722. Orbini further developed an idea that all
Slavs spoke a common language named as Illyrian (Lingua Illyrica) and that
their national languages were in fact only dialects of mutual Slavic inter-dialect
(koine), which was called among Dalmatians and Ragusians simply as na/naki
(our) or slovinski (Slavic) language. Orbin accepted the way of thinking of
various writers of medieval chronicles from Poland, as well as of Pribojevi and
Pope Pius II (14051464) that the ancestors of the Czechs, Poles and Rus, i.e., the
legendary brothers Czech, Lech and Rus, were actually natives of the Roman
province of Illyricum, which was called in Pribojevi-Orbinis times as Dalmatia
[Orbini 1601; Orbin 1968, 1162; Radoji 1950, 8082; Mati 1950, 193197;
1960, 227]. The ancient notion that Dalmatia
encompasses the main portion of the Balkan Peninsula was alive in Vitezovis
time as well. For instance, a founder of Croatian critical historiography, Ivan Lui
16041679, a native from Dalmatia, issued a map entitled Dalmatia post Imperii
declinationem in Croatiam, Serviam et Dalmatiam ipsam distancta (Dalmatia after
the fall of the Empire divided into Croatia, Serbia and Dalmatia proper) claiming
that Western and Central Balkans belonged to the province of Dalmatia.
A Canon Juraj Rttkay (16121666) in his work Memoria regnum et
banorum regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Sclavoniae (Remembrance of the kings
and bans of the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia), printed in Zagreb
in 1652, located the birthplace of the brothers Czech, Lech and Rus in the
Northwestern Croatia around the Krapina region that is 50 km. far from Zagreb on
the border with Slovenia. Both Orbini and Rttkay became familiar with personal
experiences upon Slavic ethnolinguistic kinship of several South Slavic travelers
who visited Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy in the 16th and 17th
centuries like: Ragusian physician and bishop Tomo Nadal Budislavi (15451608)
who lived several years in Krakow (Cracow/Krakw) and Aleksandar Komulovi
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
67


from Split who was working under direction of Pope Clement VIII on organization
of the Pan-Slavic military action against the Ottoman Turks for the sake to liberate
the South Slavs and for that purpose he travelled to Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth and Muscovite Russia (15941598) [Reetar 1915, 136141;
Gluck 1939, 150154; Bazala 1954, 255259; Kolendi 1962, 211240; ic 1935,
162181; Vanino 1936, 4054; tefani 1938, 150; orovi 1993, 436].
A popular legend upon Slavic ethnic-linguistic kinship and common origin
in the Balkans that became systematized by Mavro Orbin had a strong influence
among the 17th-century South Slavic writers and public workers. Thus, the most
prestigious and celebrated South Slavic author from Dubrovnik, Ivo (Divo)
Gunduli (15891638), praised in his poem Osman the Slavic victory of future
Polish king and Lithuanian grand duke, Wadysaw IV Vasa (Vladislovas IV Vaza,
16321648), over the Turks in Chotin in 1621. Gunduli hoped that Wadysws
army will cross Danube and liberate all South Slavic population from Ottoman
yoke. Finally, Gunduli sugested to the prince Wadysw to re-establish medieval
Serbian Empire and to take a title of Serbian emperor. Subsequently, Kingdom of
Poland, Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Serbian Empire would be united by
personal union in the name of Wadysw IV Vasa. Gunduli, like many others,
followed the pattern of Pribojevi and Orbin that famous historical figures from the
Balkans belonged to the family of the Slavs. For example, he called Alexander the
Great of Macedonia as the Serb (Serbljanin) [ J
1960, 227228; Samardi 1983, 94; Istorija Jugoslavije 1973, 193; orovi 1993,
436].
The awareness of existence of a mutual spoken language of all Slavs
inspired great number of South Slavic scholars in the 16th and 17th centuries to
work on creation of a single South Slavic and Pan-Slavic litteral language taking
as a model the local South Slavic, i.e., Illyrian, dialects. The most succesful in this
matter was Jesuit Bartol Kai (15751650), from the Dalmatian Island of Pag who
lived in Dubrovnik as well, and who was working for many years as a missionar
among the South Slavs within the Ottoman Empire. He recognized that all Slavic
subjects of the Ottomans spoke one language and thus he chose a tokavian
(tokavski) dialect spoken in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a model for his common
South Slavic grammer published in 1604 in Rome under the headline
Institutionum linguae illyricae libri duo. Authore Bartholomeo Cassio Curictensi
Societatus Iesu (Foundations of Illyrian language) [Cassio 1604; Kai 1997, 15
75; repel 1890, 172201; Stojkovi 1913/1914, 19; Stojkovi 1919, 170263;
Laszowski 1923, 2; Vanino 1934, 123127; Vanino 1940, 1144; Cronia 1952,
2237; Gabri-Bagari 1976, 5568; Gabri-Bagari 1984]. With much less
success was an attempt to create a single South Slavic inter-dialect by the litteral
circle around Slovenian Protestant and reformer of Slovenian language, Primo
Trubar (15081586), who called himself as Illyrian patriot. Their idea was to
create a single South Slavic literal, i.e., Illyrian language, by combining all South
Slavic dialects and Latin and Cyrillic alphabets into a single South Slavic language
and alphabet [Istorija Jugoslavije 1973, 124134].
Croatian Jesuit student and forefather of the 19th century Slavophilia and
Pan-Slavism [Wandycz 1997, 86], Juraj Kriani (16181683) who devoted his life
to bring together all Slavs predicting their glorified future succeeded finally to form
a single Slavic inter-dialect, or mutual Slavonic literal language. Working on Pan-
Slavic ethnolinguistic unity of all six Slavic peoples (according to Kriani, the
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
68


Rus, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Croats and Serbs) he chose the speech of the
Ozalj area in Western Croatia nearby Slovenia as a model for a single Slavic literal
language. His opinion was that spoken language of Ozalj area was the purest and
the closest to the original Pan-Slavic tongue in both grammar and accent. The
reason for such opinion came from the fact that the spoken language of this area
had inter-dialectical character, i.e., was consisting of three the most spread South
Slavic dialects: tokavian, Kajkavian and akavian (tokavski, Kajkavski and
akavski) [Kriani 1859, iiiiv; Golub 1976, 100103; murlo 1926, 34; murlo
1927, 321325; Teak 1996, 8594].

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, 1477. .1706. .

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Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
71


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Political map of Europe c. 1560





Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
72



ETNOLINGVISTINIO PANSLAVIZMO GIMININGUMO IR SVEIKOS IDJA
DALMATIJOJE IR KROATIJOJE, 14771706

Docentas Dr. VLadislav B. Sotirovi
Mikolo Romerio universitetas, Politikos moksl institutas, Vilnius

Santrauka

Tekste dstomi istorinio ideologins panslavizmo svokos, kuri buvo
sukurta Dalmatijos ir Kroatijos raytoj vlyvojo renesanso ir ankstyvojo baroko
(nuo 15 amiaus pabaigos iki 18 amiaus pradios) laikotarpyje, vystymosi
tyrinjimai ir aikinimas. Literatriniuose daugelio to meto Dalmatijos ir Kroatijos
raytoj veikaluose svarstomas etnolingvistinis panslavizmo vieningumo,
solidarumo, giminingumo ir sveikos aspektas. J tekstuose idstyta ideologin
panslavizmo bendrajai nacionalinei tapatybei ir programa bendrai vieningai
nacionalinei Piet Slav valstybei Balkanuose sudaryti apybraia. i
panslavistin, ypa Piet Slav, tautins tapatybs schema, tapo kertamuoju 19 ir
20 ami nacionalins ideologijos Jugoslavizmo ir Panslavizmo akmeniu, kuris
galiausia prived prie Jugoslavijos sukrimo 1918 metais ir jos pertvarkymo 1945
m. Pagrinidinis panslavizmo ir jugoslavizmo ideologijos aspektas, kuris buvo
vystomas literatroje ir istoriniuose veikaluose Dalmatijoje ir Kroatijoje nuo 1477
iki 1706 met, buvo pagrstas senuoju vietiniu mstymu ir tradicija, jog Slavai
kilo i Balkan ir Piet Slavai yra autochtoniniai pusiasalio gyventojai.



Unofficial flag of Macedonia


Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
73


The Great Economic Depression in the
Weimar Republic, 19291933


Abstract: The article deals with the Great Economic Depression of 19291933
and its negative consequences on the economy of the German Weimar Republic.
The aim of the article is to present the main causes and consequences of the
global economic and financial crises known as the Great Economic Depression
and to investigate how this depression influences the economy and finance of the
newly democratic post-war German state called as the Weimar Republic. The
particular importance of this research subject is the fact that among all European
states at the time it was exactly the Weimar Republic to be mostly affected by the
global crises with terrible consequences on social and political life which finally
brought Adolf Hitler and his NSDAP to the power in Germany.

Key words: Weimar Republic, Great Economic Depression, capitalism,
protectionism, crises


Introduction

During the greatest, and at the same time, the most difficult economic
crisis, in the world history from 1929 to 1933, the (German) Weimar Republic
166

was one of the most affected countries in the world. The consequences of the
Great Economic Depression were the most visible and destructive exactly in the
Weimar Republic, which economy became revealed during the second half of the
1920s. In 1928 the German industrial production increased up to 12% of the
world one, or 26% of the American level. In 1929 Germany reached 20% of the
national income and 70% of the foreign trade of the United States. It is, however,
worth nothing that the German economic crisis was not only the direct
consequence of the American contraction, but that Germany also sustained the
international economic slump by having her own crisis within the crisis.
Nevertheless, the economic crisis of 19291933 was the most severe in Germany
among all European countries.
Our intention in this paper is to present some of the most important
aspects of the economic crisis in the Weimar Republic during the time of the Great
Economic Depression. The crucial problems to be dealt with are:
I) The roots and origins of the Great Economic Depression on two levels:
global and German.
II) The problems regarding the financial crisis and its outcomes on German
economy.
III) The German industrial production during the crisis.
IV) The problems concerning the German trade and trade policy.

166
On history of the Weimar Republic see: Stephen Lee, The Weimar Republic; Colin Storer, A Short History of the
Weimar Republic.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
74


V) The problems with regard to unemployment in Germany and the social
and economic measures carried out by the German government in order to
alleviate this the most difficult social problem in the Weimar Republic during the
Great Economic Depression.




The Weimar Republic (19181933)


The origins of the Great Economic Depression

Throughout the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s the world
was in the worst economic depression in history. This economic crisis began with
the dramatic collapse of the American stock market in October 1929 that was
followed by spreading up throughout Europe until 1933. This world-wide financial
collapse was the manifestation of deeper weaknesses of the world economy.
Various factors contributed to recession:
1) Cyclical contractions in demand in much of Europe.
2) A general tendency for primary product prices to fall.
3) Financial crises in Europe and the USA.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
75


The global sources of this economic crash and instability were:
1) The First World War caused a dramatic increase in productive capacity,
especially outside Europe, but there was no corresponding increase in demand.
2) There was a world-wide imbalance between agriculture and industry.
3) The rewards of growth accrued disproportionately to the industrialized
countries and, within these countries, to their industrial and financial sectors.
4) International finance was never fully recovered from the dislocation of
the First World War.
167

5) Increased production allowed food and raw material prices to decline
through the 1920s, worsening the terms of trade for countries depended on the
export of such commodities, and decreasing their ability to buy the industrial
products of Europe and the USA.
More specified and concrete origins of the slump and economic recession in
1929 must be located in the USA. It is clear that the American economy was the
storm centre of the world depression. Here national economic management was
powerless to prevent the collapse of money and commodity markets together with
the manufacturing production.
168
The major destabilizing influence came with the
collapse in American lending. This began in the summer of 1928 and it was
prompted by the domestic boom and the action of the Federal Reserve to check it
by raising interest rates. Both of them had the effect of attracting funds into the
home market.
169
This dramatic curtailment of lending exercised a powerful
deflationary impact on the world economy. It was sufficiently widespread to
undermine the fragile stability of the international economy. It also in turn
reduced Europe's import demand for products outside the region.
The second economic shock came in the summer of 1929 when the USA
boom petered out. A tightening in monetary policy at this time may also have
contributed, though monetary factors probably played a relatively minor part in
the initial breaking of the American economic boom. The American economic
slump was touched off by financial crisis.
The Great Bull Market of 1928 gave way to a precipitous fall in stock prices
in October of 1929.
170
In conditions of monetary instability and imbalance of
payments, the gold standard as a kind of fundamental law of international
monetary relations was obsolete.
171
In the other words, easiest solution for the
overhaul the Wall Street Crash was to break the links by abandoning the gold
standard. This was done by several Latin American countries and also by
Australia and New Zealand late in 1929 and early in 1930. On the other hand,
this action inevitably imposed a greater burden for the countries still depended on
the gold standard and hence intensified the deflationary spiral either

167
The pre-war system of fixed exchange rates and free convertibility was replaced by a compromise - the Gold
Exchange Standard - which never achieved the stability necessary to rebuild world trade. In regard to this problem is
important to present opinion by Derek H. Aldcroft: it would be difficult to argue that the First World War and its
aftermath was the prime causal factor of the crisis than began at the and of the 1920s (Derek H. Aldcroft, The European
Economy 19141990, p. 66).
168
Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History. Contemporary Economies-1, p. 332.
169
The US capital issues on foreign account fell by over 50% between the first and second halves of 1928.
170
The American downturn in economic activity was accompanied by a further reduction in foreign lending and a sharp
contraction in import demand , the consequences of which were a severely reduced flow of dollars to Europe and the rest
of the world.
171
David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe
from 1750 to the Present, p. 364.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
76


automatically or through deliberate government action. Once started, therefore,
the deflationary process became cumulative and eventually it led to the general
collapse of the gold standard and the adoption of restrictive policies to protect
domestic economies. With regard to the problem of the origins of the depression in
the United States it is important to quote the words by H. J. Braun: it seems that
not so much monetary but real factors caused it and that the failure of the
international economic system contributed to it.
172

One contributory factor as causer of the depression was the fall in prices of
foodstuffs and other primary products which resulted in declining incomes and
purchasing power for agricultural producers and exporters. Such price falls
contributed in rising of the real incomes elsewhere.
In the ensuing scramble for liquidity, funds flowed back from Europe to
America, and the shaky European prosperity collapsed. In May 1931, the Austrian
Credit-Anstalt bank defaulted. But, when the United Kingdom left the Gold
Standard, allowing sterling to depreciate in September 1931, virtually the entire
world was affected. The world market for commodities followed the American
crash. For instance, by 1931, the price of wheat on the Liverpool Stock Exchange
was only a half in comparison to 1929. The prices of the British imports of raw
material were down by two-fifths; and food import prices as a whole were to fall
down as well as in the following year. The earnings of overseas suppliers were
correspondingly reduced; and the markets for Europes exports were consequently
diminished. The collapse of overseas demand was transmitted into the European
economy through those European countries with a large overseas export trade.
The production followed the exports down. In 1932, the European manufacturing
production was 28% lesser than in 1929. The industrial production fell down to
53% of its 1929-level in Germany and the United States, and world trade mark
sank to 35% of its 1929-value.
173
The level of decrease of the industrial production
reached its peak in 1929. It became accompanied by the rising level of
unemployment and falling prices for all goods, but particularly of primary
produce.
174
Nonetheless, the new policies of trade protection and currency
manipulation turned to be the hammer for the economy. According to Lewis, the
decline of trade in manufactures was due neither to tariffs nor to the
industrialisation of new countries. In reality, the trade in manufactures was low
only because the industrial countries were buying too little of primary products by
paying so low price for what they bought.
175

We think it would be of a great value to present here opinion by Roger
Munting and B. A. Holderness that the Wall Street crash did not cause the
depression in Europe, but the loss of financial confidence resulting from it and the
poor monetary policies which followed, together with the collapse of American
demand, made the recession more severe in Europe than in the USA having
negative consequences in the rest of the world too. Thus, although the European

172
Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century. The German Reich and the Federal Republic,
p. 64.
173
The Times, Atlas of World History, chapter The Great Depression 19291939, Table: 3 The world economy, 1929
to 1939, p. 266; Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, pp. 306309.
174
Roger Munting, B. A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War. An Economic History of Continental Europe
19181945, p. 15.
175
W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey, 19191939, p. 155.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
77


recession did not originate in the USA, the American depression undoubtedly
adversely affected the rest of the world.
176




Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic 19181923

176
Roger Munting, B. A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War. An Economic History of Continental Europe
19181945, p. 17.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
78


The crisis of financial policy and the declination of
industrial production

In the autumn of 1929 it was by no means clear that a general economic
depression in almost all industrial countries was underway and that the slump
would have a duration of several years. According to H. J. Braun, there were two
main reasons for the deterioration of economic conditions in the Weimar Republic:
1) The disintegration of international economic relations, especially the
decline of international trade and banking, accompanied by protectionism and
competitive devaluation.
2) The high degree of monopolisation of the German industry.
177

The fact was that instead of lowering prices, big corporations tended to
reduce production and dismiss employees.
178

There was a sharp cyclical recession in Germany in the first quarter of
1931, but the second quarter already showed signs of economic recovery. The
ensuing collapse of the German capital market in the summer of 1931 turned a
normal temporary crisis into a crisis of the whole economic and consequently of
the political system of the republic. Now, in order to prevent a total collapse of the
economy, the German banks provided further loans. Obviously, the German
banking crisis was triggered off by events in Austria. On May 11
th
, 1931 the
sterreichische Creditanstalt, which was the largest Austrian commercial bank,
published its own reports which showed huge losses. Subsequently, this financial
crash was followed by other Austrian banks. However, it is important to observe
that French creditors did nothing to support the Austrian banks.
179
The collapse
of the Austrian banks aroused concern about the German banks because they too
were lacking in financial liquidity. The German banks also had a large amount of
the foreign debt, approximately 40% of the American. In the second part of May
1931 Reich-Mark (RM) 288 million of short-term loans were withdrawn from the
German banks.
180
During the coming six weeks the Reichbank lost almost 2
billion RM in gold and the foreign exchange. The German private financial
institutions had huge losses as well, especially it was the case with the leading
Berlin Grossbanken, which accounted over the half of the nations foreign
banking debits.
181
The German deposits rushed to withdraw their money, and
once again it was the Grossbanken of Berlin that became in the hardest position
it reimbursed 2 billion RM in June and July.
182
The economic and financial
situation was drastically worsened when two large German companies, the
department store chain Karstadt and the large insurance company Nordstern,
became financially crashed. The foreign credits, again, were withdrawn. The
Reichbank had to increase its discount rate from 5 to 7%, but in fact this

177
Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century. The German Reich and the Federal Republic,
p. 66.
178
In the depression year of 1932 industrial production in Germany was approximately 30% below in comparison with
its the pre-war level. From 1929 to 1932 consumer goods productions declined by 18%, producer goods production by as
much as 52% (G. Hardach, Zur politischen Oekonomie, Reinchard Khnl, Gerd Hardach (eds.) Die Zerstrung der
Weimarer Republik, pp. 2630).
179
Harold James, The causes of the German banking crisis of 1931, pp. 6887.
180
Freidrich-Wilhelm Henning, Die Liquiditaet der Banken in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 4392.
181
David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, p. 375.
182
C. W. Guillebaud, The Economic Recovery of Germany: 19331938, p. 20.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
79


financial measure did not help very much because in the same time the
Nordwolle concern had lost RM 200 million in some speculative dealings.
Nevertheless, two big German banks, the Danat Bank and the Dresdner Bank
were directly and heavily involved in financing Nordwolles undertakings. Further
withdrawals of deposits caused the Reichbanks gold and foreign currency
reserves to dwindle again. A consecutive rises of the discount rate reached in July
the level of 15% and later on even 20%. On May 13
th
, 1931 the Danat Bank was
closed. According to James, at the root of the problem was a crisis of confidence,
especially foreign confidence, which could not be overcome by the German banks
or the Reichbank.
183

From 1929 the ratio between the banks own funds and the capital from
outside deteriorated to 1:10 for all private banks and to 1:15 for the Big Banks of
Berlin. By the end of 1930 about half of the RM 26 to RM 27 billion in German
commercial debts was short-term in nature, and foreign funds had come to
account for some 40% to 50% of deposits in the Big Banks of Berlin. Of the total
German commercial debt, about half was owed by industry, one-third by the
banks, and about one-fifth each by the Reich, the states and the municipalities.
The German foreign assets amounted to RM 9 to 10 billion, of which 5 to 6 billion
were on a short-term basis.
184

A trend of increasing of the prices was one of the heaviest outcomes of the
economic depression in the Weimar Republic. The main reasons for increasing of
the prices were: 1) the great inflation, and 2) the reduced German agricultural and
industrial production. The prices of consumer goods, dropped as: from an index of
100 in 1928 to 98 in 1929, 91 in 1930, 80 in 1931 and 67 in 1932; one-third
lower than it was the pre-crisis level. During the same period of time, the wages
were severely depressed, partly because contractual rates were lowered by the
state emergency decrees and partly because the employers became engaged in
wage undercutting. The fall of wages, which achieved the adjustment in the wage
costs for which employers had repeatedly been calling, was so enormous that
despite the simultaneous falls in prices, real wages also dropped substantially - to
87% of the 1928-level.
185

A contracting market of depressed economies produced falling demand and
the prices, bankruptcy and inevitable unemployment for the German industry. For
the export-oriented German industrial companies it was a major problem to find
foreign markets after 1930. Even before 1930 Ruhr steel companies were over-
producing their cartel quota. After 1930 the market difficulties became more
generalised. The German large scale industry, depended on the cartels, far more
extensively than the other producers, became more inclined to respond to this
problem by restricting production by at the same time keeping the prices rather
than to reduce them down (the same practice was done in the USA as well during
the Great Economic Depression).
The German industrial production fell by almost half between 1929 and
1932; national income declined from 75.4 billion RM in 1928 to 45.2 billion RM in
1933. According to the report which was made by the Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation, industrial production in the Weimar Republic during the

183
James H., The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924 1936, p. 291.
184
Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, p. 41.
185
Detlev J. Peukert, The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modernity, p. 257.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
80


period from 1929 to 1932 declined for 40.8% and GDP for 15.7% in the same
period of time.
186
In Germany particularly declined production of the coal, the
shipbuilding industries, the steel and the iron. In the Weimar Republic
rationalisation often meant that the industry ownership was concentrated in a
few companies likewise the production became concentrated in the most
productive pits and fields. Increased mechanisation of a coal cutting, enabled
production per one worker to be doubled between 1924 and 1931. By 1929, 91%
of the coal in Germany was cut mechanically.
187
The Index of industrial production
in Germany for 1932 in comparison with 1928 (index 100) was: capital goods
45.7% and consumer 78.1%.
188
According to H. J. Braun and D. S. Landes, during
the world economic crisis, the industrial production in Germany declined by 42%
and in 1932 amounted to only 73% of the 1913-figure.
189
According to D. J. K.
Peukert, in 1930 German industrial production fell to 91% of its 1913-level, and
it collapsed even more dramatically over the next two years.
190
According to D. S.
Landes, Index of industrial production in the Weimar Republic during the Great
Economic Depression was (1928=100): 1929=101, 1932=59, 1933=66 and
1934=83. According to the same author, GDP in 1928 was 91 billion RM, in 1929
was 89, in 1932 was 72, in 1933 was 75 and in 1934 was 84 billion RM.
191
It is
important to note that this industrial stagnation was paralleled by agricultural
depression, a world-wide phenomenon that had devastating effects on the East
Elbian farming, which suffered from structural weaknesses, as well as in many
regions of small and medium-sized peasant holdings.
German trade during the Great Economic Depression
The pattern of trade for the Weimar Republic, before the Great Economic
Depression, was comparable with that of the Second German Reich (18711918)
before 1914. However, from 1930 the real crisis of the German external trade was
one of the outcomes of the Great Economic Depression. In contrast to the mid-
1920s, the German export during the depression could not compensate for the
lower demand at home. Still, even in the crisis Germanys foreign trade balance
was favourable, with a surplus of RM 1,560 million in 1930, RM 2,780 million in
1931 and RM 1,050 million in 1932.
192
Nevertheless, the most important point
was that this was not sufficient to compensate for the gold and foreign currency
losses by credit withdrawals and capital flight. A bright spot was, for instance, the
German trade with the Soviet Union (the so-called Russengeschaeft) which
increased continuously.
193
The most significant reason for this was the fact that

186
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, Industrial statistics, 19001959, p. 9.
187
In Belgium the figure was 89% , in France 72%, in Poland 31%, and in Great Britain only 28% (R. Munting, B. A.
Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War. An Economic History of Continental Europe 19181945, p. 82.
188
The index of industrial production in (Nazi) Germany in 1938 was: capital goods 135.9% and consumer 107.8% (for
both examples the source is R. Munting, B. A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War. An Economic History of
Continental Europe 19181945, p. 147.
189
Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 49; David S. Landes, The Unbound
Prometheus, Table 25, p. 391.
190
Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic. The Crisis of Classical Modernity, p. 121.
191
David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, p. 411, Table 31, (source: Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic
Preparations for War, p. 10).
192
H. J. Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 66.
193
Hans-Juergen Perrey, Der russlandausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaf, pp. 128202.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
81


the Soviet Union was not affected by the Great Economic Depression and actually
successfully continued with the process of great industrialisation. In 1932
German capital goods exports to the USSR amounted to 26% of her total exports.
The German government decided to reduce the German imports in order to
improve her payments to abroad. However, foreign trade problems and difficulties
became very severe and dangerous after the mid-1931. Protectionist measures by
most Germanys trading partners negatively influenced the German export of the
final products.
194
According to Dietmar Petzina, Anselm Faust and Werner
Abelshauser, if the 1913 year has index 100, export to import was: in 1929-105.8;
in 1930-115.4; in 1931-128.8; in 1932-147.5; in 1933-152.6; and in 1934-144.8.
The situation regarding a raw material to raw material was as the following: in
1928-112.9; in 1929-109.2; in 1930-116.1; in 1931-126.7; in 1932-125.1; in
1933-120.3; and in 1934-112.6. Regarding final products to final products the
situation was: in 1929-99.4; in 1930-98.4; in 1931-93.1; in 1932- 100.6; in 1933-
109.1; and in 1934-111.9.
195

The terms of trade changed in favour of industrial goods and at the
expense of primary goods. For Germany they decreased by 20% between 1890 and
1913, and increased by 7% from 1910/1913 to 1924/1930, and more than 30%
during the 1930s.
196
From 1931 onwards import prices fell below their pre-war
level whereas export prices remained above that level for another two years. It is
important to notice that the export prices in 1933 reached their highest point at
more than 50% above the 1913 level. With regard to import, the raw material
played the most important role. Although their import share fell from 43.1% in
1910/1913 to 38.8% in 1924/1929 it later rose up to 39.9% in 1930/1934. The
import of foodstuffs rose until 1924/1928, but then fell in the late 1920s and early
1930s while the import of the final products rose up constantly during the period
of the Weimar Republic.
197

Germany had introduced exchange control in 1931 and Berlin introduced
measures to settle import and export, as far as possible on a bilateral basis. In
some cases, Germany was able to manipulate trade to her advantage and
accumulate trade deficits with primary product exports. The Weimar Republic
established new bilateral trading arrangements with many countries in both
Europe and outside. However, the German most important economic (export-
import) sphere of influence was in the South-Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,
Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Germany had a surplus on the trade with the
rest of Europe and a deficit with the rest of the world, but especially with the
USA.
198
Germany gained particularly from her trade with the UK. The German
industrial export was funding the import of the raw material and some of the
foodstuffs. From 1931 Germany made preferential trade threaties with Romania
and Hungary which allowed these two agricultural exporters an access to a major
European national market at a time of severe price depression as an outcome of
the economic crisis. For instance, Hungary signed a new threaty in 1934 which
guaranteed a quota of food exports to the German market. According to D. E.

194
Verena Schroeter, Die deutsche Industrie auf dem Weltmarkt 1929 bis 1932, pp. 5459.
195
Dietmar Petzina, werner Abelshauser, Anselm Faust, Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, p. 77.
196
Hoffmann, W.G., F. Grumbach, H. Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19.
Jahrhunderts, BerlinHeilderbergNew York, 1965, pp. 548549.
197
Hans - Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 58.
198
Roger Munting, B.A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War, p. 3640.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
82


Kaiser, the figures regarding the German share of the trade in the Eastern and the
South-Eastern Europe were as the following: in 1928 with Czechoslovakia export
22.1%, import 24.9%; Hungary 11.8% export and 19.5% import; Romania export
18.4%, import 23.7%; Yugoslavia 12.1% export, 13. 6% import, Poland (including
Danzig) export 34.2%, import 26.9%, and Austria 18.5% export and 19.9% import.
The figures concerning the German trade with the same countries in 1933 were:
Czechoslovakia export 17.7%, import 19.9%; Hungary export 11.2%, import
19.7%; Romania export 10.6%, import 18.6%; Yugoslavia export 13.9%, import
13.2%; Poland (with Danzig) export 17.5%, import 17.6%; and finally Austria
15.1% export and 18.8% import.
199

Germany was able to make a marginal transfer of trade to the economics of
the South-Eastern Europe, but this was trade diversion rather than creation. By
1936 Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Poland
and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) together provided nearly
13.8% of the German import against 5.9% in 1928. During the same period, a
total German import had fallen to 41% of their 1928-level. Generally, Germany
was the largest market for the Netherlands (24% of export in 1928), Austria,
Czechoslovakia (over 20%), Poland (40%) and the agrarian countries of the South-
Eastern Europe. Anyway, Germany without the overseas colonies was forced to
extend her influence in Europe.
200


The economic downturn and the problem of unemployment

The mass unemployment in the Weimar Germany in the early 1930s was
one of the greatest and most difficult outcomes of the economic downturn and
declination of the agricultural and industrial production. The main problem in
agricultural sphere of economy became severe unemployment similar to the case
of the German industry. In 1929 unemployment figures had amounted to 1.9
million, but they quickly rose to 5.6 million as a yearly average in 1932 and
reached their maximum in the period from January to March 1933 with 6 million
registered as unemployed. However, the actual figure was much higher than the
official one because many people who had given up hope of finding job or were
longer eligible for unemployment benefits were not registered as unemployed.
201
In
reality, it is very difficult to assess the real number of unregistered unemployed
people, but the figure probably amounted from 1.7 to 1.8 million at the end of July
1932. In addition, the short-time work was another problem as, for instance, in
February 1933 24.1% of those employed were on the short-time. Mainly because
of the vast reserve army of the unemployed people the wages were reduced from
1930 onwards. The reduced wages became the direct aftermath of the mass
unemployment in the Weimar Republic. Between 1929 and 1932 real wages were
reduced by 16%. According to F. Blaich, the civil servants did not have to fear
unemployment, but their salaries were particularly affected by the crisis and
government policy, failing by 25% to 28% in real terms during the depression
years.
202


199
D. E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War, pp. 325326.
200
Roger Munting, B. A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War, p. 33.
201
See: Peter D. Stachura (ed.), Unemployment and the great depression in Weimar Germany.
202
F. Blaich, Der Schwarze Freitag. Inflation und Weltwirtschaftskrise, pp. 6871.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
83


According to Karl Hardach, in 1932 the German unemployment was
30.8%. This figure compared to 7% of the unemployment in 1928 (the last of the
so-called golden years) is surely quite unfavourable.
203
According to R. Muntling
and B. A. Holderness, the unemployment mounted to over 30% of the labour force
in 1932, an annual average figure of 5.6 million. The unemployment was most
severe in the major industrial regions of the Ruhr and Silesia, but was lesser
locally concentrated than in Great Britain, for instance.
204

The huge unemployment figure in Germany gave rise to various job
creation plans, some of them sensible, other less so. To the latter category
belonged, for instance, a programme worked out by the Reich association for the
reform of male clothing, founded in Munich in 1931, which was of the opinion that
the economic recovery could be positively affected by producing of the large
quantities of the mens clothing.
205
During the years 19311932 the Bruning,
Papen and Schleicher governments set up various employment programmes in
order to save the German economy and social peace. During the Bruning
government the unemployment rose up from 2.3 to 6 million. Nevertheless, his
export-based policy of promoting employment had failed for two basic reasons: 1)
the other countries responded to the crisis with protectionist measures: 2) the
world market prices had fallen faster than those of the German export
commodities. In addition, the Bruning domestic market policy for promoting
employment, for which the preparations had been started in the second half of
1931, had equally little success. The planned emergency work projects, for
example the land improvement, settlements, etc., did, however, provide a
counterbalance to certain very unpopular economic measures, particularly the
drastic reduction in unemployment benefits, and were supposed to show the
governments good intentions from the social point of view. The employment of the
jobless masses rather than a stimulation of the economy was the goal of the RM
135 million program decided on in May 1932, for which the government had
succeeded in gathering of the tight-fisted Reichsbank to provide credits.
A long-standing plan of a plant-based Werksgemeinschaft - a trade union
of free works community on the basis of individual or factory contracts became a
sort of way out. However, under the conditions of mass unemployment, which was
running at an average of 23.4% already in 1930 (36.2% and 46.8% in 1931 and
1932 respectively), the offer of a Werksgemeinschaft took on the form of hardly
disguised blackmail. The Papen government continued the RM 135 million
employment scheme begun under Bruning one and, having in mind that a budget
deficit was unavoidable, added RM 220 million for immediate job creating
purposes. According to H. J. Braun, in September 1932 Franz von Papen
increased the funds available for a public works programme by another RM 167
million to a total of RM 302.
206
The main task of Papens governments policy was
to reduce the number of 1.75 million unemployed men by the end of 1933. The
policy was based on indirect job creating measures, what meant that the
entrepreneurs would receive tax incentives to employ workers and to expand
production. However, for the reason of an unstable political situation, a ponderous

203
Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, p. 40.
204
Roger Munting, B. A. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War, pp. 136137.
205
Willi A. Boelcke, Die deutsche Wirtschaft 19301945. Interna des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums, p. 13.
206
Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 72.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
84


bureaucracy, and the limited size of the programme, the effects of Papens
governments efforts were rather small. His successor from December 1932,
Schleicher, put more emphasis on public works in order to reduce the
unemployment. Schleichers government continued with Papens employment
efforts and supplemented them by a new RM 500 million programme for
emergency measures, of which RM 100 million were earmarked for the armament
contracts. In order to employ as many people as possible, machinery had to be
used sparingly and the maximum working time per week was fixed at 40 hours.
207

Nevertheless, these measures were insufficient to produce an immediate or
magic cure for the economic depression but the fact was that at the time of A.
Hitlers appointing as the chancellor of the Republic on January 30
th
, 1933 there
were already glimmerings of economic recovery as the unemployment was falling
down in general point of view (the 1933-average was 4.8 million or 26.4%).



The soup-line in the Weimar Republic during the Great Economic Depression

Conclusion
In the whole complex of causes of the world-wide Great Economic
Depression in 19291934, the most important were: 1) the mistaken equation of
the post-war backlog demand with a long-term demand; 2) the overestimation of
the markets ability to absorb the products of the new industries; 3) the creation of

207
Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, p. 48.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
85


over capacities resulting from these miscalculations; 4) vast speculative dealings
in securities; 5) long term investment of funds from short-term credits; 6) the
international money transfers with no counterblow of goods and services; and
finally 6) disrupted international trade relations through restrictive measures on
the part of individual states.
The Great Economic Depression and its outcomes were strongest in the
Weimar Republic because of several reasons, but the most direct and important
was that the German post-war economy was not sufficiently recovered from the
First World Wars struggles and its consequences.
208
As additional economic
problem in which was Germany as a loser of the Great War were the wars
reparations, particularly to be paid to France. During the depression years every
country held the so-called policy of protectionism which made the German export
very difficult and particularly to the western partners. These reasons influenced
negatively the German production especially in the area of industry, but in the
agriculture as well as. The most difficult and also politically serious outcome of the
economic slump in Germany was the mass unemployment. Actually, the
unemployment in Germany took the highest level all over the world during the
time of depression, but the governments attempts and measures to solve or
alleviate this problem were unsuccessful. The offer by A. Hitler (18891945) and
his NSDAP to try to resolve the German economic problems became accepted and
he became appointed as a chancellor of the Weimar Republic on January 30
th
,
1933. However, together with economic recovery of Germany under his
dictatorship, it was and a road to the Second World War in which Hitler wanted to
expand his countrys boundaries, most particularly southward and eastward.
209



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Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York:
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Verena Schroeter, Die deutsche Industrie auf dem Weltmarkt 1929 bis 1932.
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W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey, 19191939, London, 1949.

Willi A. Boelcke, Die deutsche Wirtschaft 19301945. Interna des
Reichswirtschaftsministeriums, Dsseldorf, 1983.




Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
88


The European Union and The European
Identity


Abstract: The paper deals with relations between on the one hand the supporters
of the pan-European identity, which has to take the place of the particular national
ones, and on the other hand the proponents of maintaining specific national
identities as the top priority within the European Union (EU). Certainly, the
European Union continues to expand its borders, individual national currencies are
becoming unified into the common EU currency - Euro (), and the political and
economic climates are gravitating towards pan-continental unification. However,
what does this unification process mean in terms of identity? The crucial question
is: will the success of the EU rest solely in economic and political interdependence or
will a strong pan-European identity emerge in a fashion similar to what we see in
the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, etc? This research paper will try
to identify already existing views and models in regard to the creation of the pan-
European identity before addressing additional factors which have to be taken into
consideration as well as.
Key words: European Union, United States of Europe, pan-European identity,
national identities, enlargement, modernity, openness.

Introduction

The EU is today a composition of 28 member states across the European
continent with a perspective to include more member states from the East in the
future within the common policy of the so-called Eastward Enlargement.
Currently, the status of the candidate states have Montenegro, Turkey, Serbia
(without Kosovo) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On May 7
th
,
2009 started the initiative given by Poland of closer relations and cooperation
between the EU and several post-Soviet republics: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The initiative became a program of the Eastern
Partnership with the final task to attract those countries to finally become the
members of the EU. It is obviously that the EU have a great chance to become
more that present-day 28 member states, but the crucial question of the
Eastward Enlargement policy still left unsolved: the question of internal
coherence, stability, functionality and above all solidarity among all so different
and historically antagonistic member states and their national and ethnolinguistic
groups.
210
Nevertheless, the EU eastward enlargement with possible inclusion of
Turkey and former socialist states of ex-Yugoslavia and ex-USSR is for sure the
biggest challenge to the whole EU institutional, political and financial construction
from the very beginning of the present-day EU in 1951 (the European Coal and
Steel Community). But moreover, it is a major challenge for our understanding of
the meaning of Europe as a geographical, social and cultural space. It is also a
question of the identity of Europe as one shaped by social or systemic

210
On the very important issue of who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics see: Jeffrey T. Checkel,
Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), European Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 132166.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
89


integration.
211
In the other words, if the EU political construction is intended to
survive for a longer period of time it is necessary to be developed and accepted a
sense of a common pan-European identity among its citizens. Otherwise, the EU
will degrade itself to the integration level of the EFTA: just a common market for
the goods and capital.
Ethnic Indifference and the Pan-European Identity
In our strong opinion, if the pan-European identity is going really to
succeed it must follows the main features of the French model of ethnic
indifference according to which, all citizens within the state borders belong to the
state-nation identity. This model presupposes and the use of only one official
language in the public sphere. The French model of ethnic indifference can be
described as a model in which all persons who hold the citizenship of a state
(regardless on ethnic or national origin, etc.) form the people of the state.
Basically, this model of a group identity is derived from the concept of a
citizenship-nation which defines the nation as its people (inhabitants) plus their
citizenship. Simplified models formula state-nation-language is implied in many
states across the world including, for instance, France, the United States of
America, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand and Belgium.
The French model of ethnic indifference is built on the following five basic
principles:
1. It uses a state-nation model emphasizing the importance of the state over
the nation.
2. It creates a civic society as opposed to an ethnic society favored by the
German model of ethnic difference.
3. It creates a nationally-linguistic homogeneous state.
4. It integrates minorities into society.
5. It leads to no ethno-linguistic minorities with a consequence to
assimilate them.
However, at the first glance, the French model of ethnic indifference seems
an ideal way to establish the pan-European identity. Nevertheless, when the
model became deeply analyzed there are fundamental issues which must be
ironed out. The fact is that the EU is a collaboration of (up to now) 28 historically
unique parts. Thirteen of them are newly accepted members (in 2004, 2007 and
2013) from the former Eastern Europe with a highly expressed ethno-linguistic
nationalism for the sake to protect their particular ethno-linguistic identity.
212
We
have to remind ourselves that even one-party dictatorial regimes of the former
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia could not succeed to introduce widely accepted

211
Gerard Delanty, The Making of a Post-Western Europe: A Civilizational Analysis, Thesis Eleven, No. 72, 2003, p.
8.
212
The issue of connection between nationalism and identity in the Eastern Europe, and particularly at the Balkans, is
more complex if we know that the national churches frequently sustained and protected the national identity. In
international conflicts religious differences played an important role in defence mechanisms, especially of weaker
nationalities, as in the cases of Catholicism in Ireland and in Prussian Poland (Ina Merdjanova, In Search of Identity:
Nationalism and Religion in Eastern Europe, Religion, State & Society, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000, p. 235).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
90


supranational identity of homo Sovieticus, homo Yugoslavicus respectively,
among their citizens.
213




Europe and the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 by 10 new member states (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and [Greek] Cyprus)

Here the crucial question is how it is possible to assimilate the ethno-
linguistic cultures in the case of the EU (or the United States of Europe USE), as
the way of the full integration according to the French model of state-nation
formation that is presented above? In our belief, the only possible way to do this is
in fact to develop a common sense of solidarity based on a common sense of a
pan-European identity rather than to assimilate in a real meaning of the word

213
For instance, according to the 1981-census in Yugoslavia, it was only 5,4% Yugoslavs (1,219,000) out of
22,428,000 inhabitants of the country (Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia,
MinneapolisLondon, 1994, p. 29).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
91


(and a French real experience from 1795 onward) so ethno-culturally different EU
milieu at least for two very reasons: 1) it is not necessary, and 2) practically it
would be impossible. An extra problem is that the EU is in a unique world-wide
situation as it is still multiethnic experiment and not truly unified as a state in a
real meaning of the term although in many ways it plays the role of it.
214

The French model is, anyway, a great starting point, but modifications are
necessary to make it applicable to the situation of the EU or in the future in the
USE. However, contrary to the French model of ethnic indifference, the German
model of ethnic difference (the language-nation-state formula) is in our opinion
not practicable and applicable for the creation of the pan-European identity and a
common solidarity based on it for the sake of better and stronger internal EU
integration as it fosters ethno-linguistic differences, ethno-nationalism and
historical particularities.
215

Some of research results of the public opinion in the EU say that
according to a poll conducted by the European Commission in all 25 member
states last year, more than two-thirds of respondents say they feel attached to
Europe. Fifty-seven percent see their identity as having a European dimension in
the near future, up five percentage points from 1999, while 41 percent say their
identity remains entirely national.
216
As the EU citizens are feeling attached to
Europe, the question is why did it happen?
The next part of the paper will try to define the concepts of the pan-
European identity in order to try to give an answer to this question.

The Concepts of the Pan-European Identity
There are many discussions on the question how to establish a pan-
European identity. We think that the starting step in this process is firstly to
investigate how do the EU citizens feel the idea of the pan-European identity. In
the next paragraph we will present some of the relevant research results on this
issue.
According to the Herald Tribune, most of the EU citizens who say they feel
European still rank their national identity higher than their European one,
opinion polls show. But among those aged 21 to 35, almost a third says they feel
more European than German, French or Italian, according to a survey by Time
magazine in 2001. Additionally, a survey conducted by Eurobarometer found that
at the end of 2004 only 47% of EU citizens saw themselves as citizens of both their
country and Europe, 41% as citizens of their country only. 86 % of the
interviewees felt pride in their country, while 68% were proud of being European.
In general, people feel more attached to their country (92%), region (88%), city
(87%) than to Europe (67%).
217

214
On this problem see: John McCormick, Jonathan Olsen, The European Union: Politics and Policies, Westernview
Press, 2014; Brent F. Nelsen, Alexander Stubb (eds.), The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of
European Integration, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003; Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Michelle Cini, Nieves Prez-Solrzano Borragan, European Union Politics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
215
On the question of ethnicity and nationalism see: Montserrat Guibernau, John Rex (eds.), The Ethnicity Reader:
Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 4379.
216
Bennhold Katrin, Quietly sprouting: A European identity, Herald Tribune, April 26
th
, 2005.
217
European Values and Identity, EurActiv.Com., April 19
th
, 2006.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
92


The question is what causes this lack of the pan-European identity despite
the expansion of the EU and a falling of the borders? First, assuming that the
pan-European identity emerges from an exchange of intercultural relations follows
what it refers to as the constructivist view of Europe as space of encounters: as
identities undergo constant change, European identity would be encompassing
multiple meanings and identifications and would be constantly redefined through
relationships with others. United in Diversity would mean the participation in
collective political and cultural practices. It would be wrong and impossible to fix
EU borders.
218
The critics of this theoretical concept claim that it overestimates
the ability to adapt, underestimates the need for stability and too much diversity
can eventually lead to the loss of identity, orientation and coherence, and
therefore undermine democracy and established communities.
219
Nevertheless,
we believe that any kind of successful and functional concept of the pan-European
identity has to be developed within the framework of the liberal democracy.
220
With a little period gone by since the EU more than doubled in size, adding
13 new members from 2004 to 2013, it is quite difficult to claim precisely what is
the future of the pan-European identity. Without any ability to conduct empirical
tests the effect of Europe as space of encounters can only be discussed
theoretically leading to inconclusive results. Nevertheless, we think that there is a
reason for optimism. Both the EU and Europe are rapidly changing, but the
question is will this change constantly redefine the multiple meanings of
European identity portrayed by the view of Europe as a space of encounters?
221

If the EU is not solely a Europe of space of encounters, then the question
becomes how to define the pan-European identity? For the theory of the EU (the
USE and Europe as a continent) as a space of encounters certainly has its fair
share of critics allowing for alternative definitions to arise. One of the most
prosperous starting points for establishing the pan-European identity is the
common (unifying) culture and (positive) history throughout the Old continent.
222

The so-called communitarians believe in the view (concept) of Europe of culture or
European family of nations. This view is defined as: The European identity has
emerged from common movements in religion and philosophy, politics, science
and the arts. Therefore, they tend to exclude Turkey from the ranks of possible
future member states and argue a stronger awareness of the Christian (or Judeo-
Christian) tradition. United in diversity is taken to refer to Europe as a family of
nations. On this basis, it is high time to define EU borders.
223
We think that two most important lacks of this concept are: 1) it excludes
the inclusion of minority populations within the EU
224
; and 2) it opposes Turkeys

218
ibid.
219
ibid.
220
On debates on the concept of the liberal democracy see: Christopher Hobson, Liberal democracy and beyond:
extending the sequencing debate, International Political Science Review, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2012, pp. 441454. On the
question of borders and identities see: Steven G. Ellis, Luda Kluskov, Imagining Frontiers, Contesting Identities,
Pisa: Plus, Pisa University Press, 2007.
221
See, for instance, on multilingual encounters in Europe: Johann W. Unger, Micha Krzyanowski, Ruth Wodak,
Multilingual Encounters in Europes Institutional Spaces, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.
222
On the problem of current challenges of writing European history see: Laurence Cole, Philipp Ther, Introduction:
Current Challenges of Writing European History, European History Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4. 2010, pp. 581592.
223
European Values and Identity, EurActiv.Com., April 19
th
, 2006.
224
On the question of forms of cultural pluralism see: Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures,
OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 123178.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
93


EU membership.
225
The fact is that such culture-nationalistic approach is usually
the main source of conflict within the EU. Furthermore, defining the pan-
European identity as Europe of culture will undoubtedly bring forth further
tensions with the minority groups throughout the EU (or in the future the USE).
For instance, in 2004, tensions flared in the Netherlands after filmmaker Theo van
Gogh was brutally murdered by a citizen of Moroccan descent in response to van
Goghs controversial film about the Islamic culture.
226
In response, the protestors
took to the streets of Amsterdam banging pots and pans as an expression of
freedom of speech. Several mosques were also burnt throughout the country by
the Dutch extremists (or patriots?). Further, in Germany, the gastarbeiter (guest
worker) question is a highly contested issue during several last decades. The
situation revolves around a large portion of people who are moving to Germany
from the mid-1960s onwards in order to fill vacant positions and help the
economy to grow. However, the original idea was that they would go back to their
native countries after Germany had achieved her economic success. However,
most gastarbeiters decided to stay and many had children who were born and
raised in Germany.
227
In general, it is essential for the European well being to
incorporate its national minorities; therefore, a view of the pan-European identity
as a Europe of culture seems to be a radical and very dangerous definition, which
could certainly backfire causing immense difficulties throughout the EU. In the
other words, it is highly advisable to search for a definition that encompasses
Europe as a whole without excluding the beliefs, customs, and history of both the
national minorities (autochthonous or not) and the stateless nations in Europe.
228

The third applicable concept can be Europe of citizens or Constitutional
patriotism.
229
The main attributes of this concept are: [Establishing a] common
political culture, or civic identity, based on universal principles of democracy,
human rights, the rule of law etc. expressed in the framework of a common public
sphere and political participation (or constitutional patriotism, a term coined by
the German scholar Jrgen Habermas). They believe that cultural identities,

225
On the question of Turkeys accession to the EU and the question of identity challenge see: Mirela Bogdani, Turkey
and Dilema of EU Accession: When Religion Meets Politics, Library of European Studies, I. B. Tauris, 2010; Belgin
Akay, Bahri Yilmaz (eds.), Turkeys Accession to the European Union. Political and Economic Challenges, Lanham,
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013; Catherine MacMillan, Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to
the EU: Through the Looking Glass, Burlington, UT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2013.
226
Gunman Kills Dutch Film Director, BBC News, November 2
nd
, 2004.
227
On gasterbaiter question in Germany see: Brett Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the
Transformation of Citizenship, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002; Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in
Postwar Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
228
On Europes stateless nations see: Mikael Bodlore-Penlaez, Atlas of Stateless Nations in Europe, Y. Lolfa Cyf., 2011.
This unique atlas takes us on a panoramic tour of the stateless nations in Europe today. It maps their physical and
linguistic character, and graphically summarises their history, politics and present position. The Alsacians, Basques,
Corsicans, Frisians, the Scots and the Welsh are all peoples who are not sovereign and are fighting for their cultural and
political identity. This atlas depicts the marvellous mosaic that is Europe today, and paints a picture of a future Europe of
flourishing small nations.
229
Among many concepts on definition of the European identity, Jrgen Habermass understanding of the term through
the concept of Constitutional patriotism is one of the most attractive. This concept was especially relevant during the
drafting and discussing the possible implications of the EU Constitution in 2004. However the No votes in
referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 abolished for some time the possibility of a Constitution for the EU,
thus changing the nature and the focus of discussions on the pan-European identity. However, the concept of
Constitutional patriotism has still plenty to offer to contribute to those debates on the pan-European identity. On the
post-constitutional debates, the possibility of the evolution of the concept, the new forms of interpretation of the term and
its relevance to the pan-European identity see: Jan-Werner Mller, Constitutional Patriotism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007; Hande Grdag, Revisiting Constitutional Patriotism Beyond Constitutionalism, Saarbrcken:
Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
94


religious beliefs etc. should be confined to the private sphere. For them, European
identity will emerge from common political and civic practices, civil society
organizations and strong EU institutions. United in diversity, according to this
view, means that the citizens share the same political and civic values, while at
the same time adhering to different cultural practices. The limits of the community
should be a question of politics, not culture.
230
Surely, this view calls for an
assimilation of local patriotism and identities which is now reserved for the
regional and private spheres, but on the general level of the whole EU only the
common pan-European patriotism and identity have to be on agenda. However,
the critics of the concept of Europe of citizens or Constitutional patriotism state that
this approach is too artificial in distinguishing the private and public, as well as
subjective and universal spheres of life. These critics also claim that the national-
cultural differences by this approach are ignored, but the feelings of solidarity can
only occur from the cultural feelings of belonging together.
231
It means that the
common solidarity feeling has to be established on the entire sum of particular
national-cultural reciprocity sympathies. Otherwise, it will not function properly
and for a longer period of time.
However, now the practical question is: can common citizenship solidarity
replace in the real life of the EU citizens historically antagonistic cultures based on
different confessional denominations (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam,
Orthodoxy, and Judaism). As an answer, a proposal from the EU Commission in
Brussels came: it can if we will teach at the schools only positive historical
experiences of the relations between the EU nations.
232
In spite of this, such
approach of building solidarity effects within the EU will surely be labeled by the
historians as something like genocide against the science or the politics of
washing brains so experienced in all kinds of totalitarian regimes. Finally, the
view of Europe of citizens or Constitutional patriotism took a major setback in late
May and early June 2005, when the French and Dutch electoral bodies voted a
resounding No on a referendum to ratify the proposed EU Constitution. We have
to remember that according to the Article IV, section 447 of the proposed EU
Constitution, the constitutional threaty is not valid unless all countries of the EU
ratify it.
233
The extreme portrayal of the concept of Europe of citizens or Constitutional
patriotism is what is being labeled as the United States of Europe, a phrase
firstly coined by Winston Churchill in his address in Zrich in 1946. This theory
states that the nation-states of the EU would give into the state-nation concept of
the EU thus losing their sovereignty in the process. The outcome would be a result
similar to the fifty states in the United States of America. In this context, the
Belgian PM Guy Verhofstadt proposed the idea to have a core of federal Europe
within the European Union, involving those states who wished to participate.
According to his idea, five policy areas should be federalized: 1) an European
social-economic policy; 2) technology cooperation; 3) a common justice and
security policy; 4) a common diplomacy; and 5) a common European army.
234

230
European Values and Identity, EurActiv.Com., April 19
th
, 2006.
231
ibid.
232
Told during the workshop conversation in Brussels at the Transatlantic Summer Academy Euro-Atlantic Relations in
the 21
st
Century: The Challenges Ahead (June 5
th
30
th
, 2001), organized by the University of Bonn and attended by the
author of this paper.
233
Caldwell Christopher, Why Did the French and Dutch Vote No?, The Weekly Standard, June 13
th
, 2005.
234
More about the issue in: Simon Serfaty, Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States, The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 2000, pp. 1529.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
95


Whether to be a proponent of Europe of citizens, Europe of culture or Europe
as space of encounters view, one similarity that all three concepts has to share has
to be, in our opinion, a consensus on preconditions necessary for the emergence
of the pan-European identity. These preconditions can be in the following spheres:
Politics: the strengthening of democratic participation at all levels and
more democracy at the EU level in particular;
Education and culture: strengthening of the European dimension in
certain subjects (especially history), more focus on language learning,
more exchanges, etc.; and
Social and economic cohesion: counteracting social and economic
differences.

Additional Factors on Creation of the pan-European Identity

The above presented views address possible concepts which can be applied
in the practice in order to establish the pan-European identity, yet it is probably
difficult to chose one view over another without encompassing a kind of mixture
from all of them. The existing views also neglect very important issues of
additional factors which could play a crucial role in the emergence of the pan-
European identity. The next paragraphs address these additional factors.
At the heart of the creation of a strong pan-European identity is the fact
that the borders within the EU have dissipated and the citizens of the EU are able
to travel freely without any visa requirements regardless the fact that many of the
outsiders (foreigners) have to pass a certain, and even very difficult, bureaucratic
procedure in order to get the EU visa. In the other words, at the same time of
lifting the wall-borders between the EU member states, especially of those who
signed the Schengen Agreement (June 14
th
, 1985) followed by the Schengen
Convention (1990) which led to creation of the Schengen Area (March 26
th
, 1995),
the EU wall-borders with the outside world became even stronger.
235

Together with the Schengen Area policy there are additionally very
successful factors which strongly contribute to the creation of the feeling to be a
European. For instance, the Erasmus/Socrates student and teaching staff
exchange (mobility) program (est. 1987) has allowed for 1.2 million Europeans to
study abroad within Europe
236
up to 2005. This unique opportunity allows
students and teachers to experience life in/of another country, participating to
their understanding of a common European identity. The Erasmus/Socrates
program (Lifelong Learning Programe from 2007) is just one element for a
diversification of transcontinental experience and surely a part of the EU policy of
the European integration.
237


235
On this problem see: Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers,
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
236
Bennhold Katrin, Quietly Sprouting: a European Identity, Herald Tribune, April 26
th
, 2005. Erasmus (European
Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) program was proposed by the European
Communitys (EC) Commission in 1985 and was accepted by the EC Council in 1987. The European Free Trade
Associations (EFTA) member countries became part of this program in 1991. Socrates program of the EU works from
1995. The task of this program is to make better EU policy of enlightenment. Erasmus program became the most
important branch out of six breaches of Socrates program to which it is given 55% out of total Socrates program
budget.
237
On this issue see: Kathrin Eitel, Cultural Globalization and the Exchange Program Erasmus: An Institutional and
Cultural Homogenization?, Grin-Verlag fr academische texte, 2010; Mark Gilbert, European Integration: A Concise
History, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
96


A lifting of the labor restrictions within the whole EU is a very important
additional factor in creating the common European identity and feelings of
solidarity as a basis for the further process of (stronger) European integration. In
this respect, for instance, the EU has passed a law after May 2004 requiring from
all old member states (EU-15) to lift their labor restrictions on the EU-8
(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and
Hungary) by the year 2011. Following this requirement, Sweden, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom were the first to lift their labor restrictions. Finland, Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and Greece are now completely open to the EU-8 as a result of
such a policy. At the beginning Denmark allows EU-8 citizens stay up to 6 months
to search for a job, if they find one they are allowed to work legally and to arrange
their residence permits. For the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania (accepted in
2007 to the EU), only Sweden and Finland have completely lifted all restrictions
from the very beginning, with the other member states implementing permit
schemes. Today, traveling from place to place within the EU and working in
different EU countries has been made both easier and cheaper.
238
Budget airlines
offer extremely competitive prices to destinations across the continent, while the
interconnectivity of bus and rail lines offer easy access throughout Europe often at
discounted prices as well. The lack of restrictions and the access to move
comfortably has created a new understanding of the European unity and
subsequently of the pan-European identity .
If a strong pan-European identity has to emerge, conventional wisdom will
tell us that it will certainly begin with the young generations who easily adapt to
the change and novelties. The possibilities to become the European for the youth
are numerous, with the open borders within the EU, and strong cultural and
educational EU exchange programs, such as above mentioned
Erasmus/Socrates, etc. The fact is that the possibilities for the young Europeans
today are vast compared to the past. Technological advancements, like the
internet, make cross-cultural communication both easy and effective. All of these
facilities are undoubtedly contributing to the process of creation of the common
pan-European solidarity and identity. Moreover, the interconnectivity of the
national youth councils protects and aids the voice of youth throughout the EU
and beyond. Many complex networks of the youth councils have emerged,
including the EU Youth Forum, the Council of Europe, and the European Youth
Portal. By protecting the voices of youth today, these networks are paving the way
for the leaders of tomorrow. Throughout the process, the interaction between the
national youth councils would help to break down cultural barriers and aid in the
process of the pan-European identity formation. As one of the EU officials said:
they [the European youth] are not asked to give up their national or regional
identity - they are asked to go beyond it, and that it what pulls them closer
together. We are creating a community in which diversity is not a problem but a
characteristic. It is an integral part of feeling European.
239


238
On the evolution of the labor law within the EU, the distinct national and regional approaches to the question of
employment and welfare, and the pressures for change within a further enlarged EU see: Catherine Barnard, EU
Employment Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Stephen Hardy, Mark Butler, European Employment Laws: A
Comparative Guide, Spiramus Press, 2011.
239
Bennhold Katrin, Quietly Sprouting: a European Identity, Herald Tribune, April 26
th
, 2005. On the European
transnational identity and citizenship see: Mabel Berezin, Martin Schain (eds.), Europe Without Borders: Remapping
Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age, John Hopkins University Press, 2003; tienne Balibar, We,
The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004;
Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2010.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
97


As the EU becomes more centralized and intercultural communication has
become common place, an established means of communication has become
essential. The English language has become a global phenomenon, serving as an
auxiliary language for the citizens across the globe and more importantly
throughout whole Europe as a continent. The English language emerged as a
world-wide language largely as a legacy of the colonial policy of the British Empire
and as well as the evolution of the United States into an economic and political
super power in the 20
th
century.
240
For these reasons the English language has
established itself as a lingua franca in international business and subsequently as
de facto auxiliary language for international communication which can
significantly participate in the process of the European solidarity and identity
creation.
241
Despite the rise of the English language as an auxiliary and mediator
language, the EU still has almost 30 official languages and therefore spends
heavily on translational services. In fact, for instance, in 2005 the total amount
was 1123 million, which is 1% of the annual general budget of the European
Union. Divided by the population of the EU, this comes to 2.28 per person per
year.
242
However, the EU has no plans of reducing the amount of official
languages anytime soon and according to the official website of the EU this is
justified as follows: in the interests of democracy and transparency it has opted to
maintain the existing system. No Member State government is willing to relinquish
its own language, and candidate countries want to have theirs added to the
list.
243
The EU has decided not to switch to one official language (the English?) by
now because of at least two reasons: 1) it would cut off most people in the EU
from an understanding of what the EU was doing. Whichever language were
chosen for such a role, most EU citizens would not understand it well enough to
comply with its laws or avail themselves of their rights, or be able to express
themselves in it well enough to play any part in EU affairs, and 2) of the EU
languages, English is the most widely known as either the first or second language
in the EU: but recent surveys show that still fewer than half the EU population
have any usable knowledge of it.
244
However, despite the EU decision to keep
almost 30 official languages, having a common communicator amongst everyday
citizens is essential for creating of a common identity. Moreover, English language
is often the preferred taught language for foreign students partaking in many
different Erasmus/Socrates exchange locations. While the EU statistics claim
that the half of the EU population has no usable knowledge of the English
language, naturally this statistic weighs heavily towards the older population. As
addressed in the previous section a role of the youth in establishing a pan-
European identity is (very) probably crucial one. With the English language (or any
other) as a lingua franca, the speaking youth brake cultural barriers and this
process is going to continue for sure in the future.
245


240
Universal Language, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_language).
241
On the question of the English language as a modern lingua franca see: Anna Mauranen, Elina Ranta (eds.), English
as a Lingua Franca. Studies and Findings, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010; Barbara
Seidlhofer, Understanding English as a Lingua Franca, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Jenifer Jenkins, English
as a Lingua Franca in the International University. The Politics of Academic English Language Policy, LondonNew
York, Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.
242
Europa: Languages and Europe, Europa: Gateway to the European Union, January 1
st
, 2007
(http://europa.eu/languages/en/document/59).
243
Europa: Languages and Europe, Europa: Gateway to the European Union, January 1
st
, 2007
(http://europa.eu/languages/en/document/59).
244
ibid.
245
On the question of language and language policy of the EU and within the European continent see: Stephen Barbour,
Cathie Carmichael (eds.), Language and Nationalism in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Robert
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
98


The role of pop-culture supported by transnational mass media is
particularly important for creation of the common European identity as practically
it has a decisive effect on it.
246
In many instances pop-culture can help to
establish a common identity particularly among the younger generations. For
instance, within the music industry, each year the Eurovision song contest
encapsulates the attention of millions of viewers. Regardless on the fact that many
experts stress that the context of it is of (very) low quality, there are and those who
are seeing the Eurovision song as a good promoter of the pan-European identity
and reciprocity.
247

A development of common European sport teams is also of an extreme
importance for creation of the pan-European identity and solidarity. Such steps
are already done and have to be further built-up in the future. For instance, in
professional golf there is a European team who faces an American team in the
semi-annual Ryder Cup. There has been discussion of creating a European Union
Olympic team; however, a Eurobarometer survey shows that only 5% of the EU
citizens claim that this would make them feel more European.
248
A pan-European
sport competitions such as footballs (soccer) UEFA Champions League and UEFA
Cup or basketball Euro League and Euro Cup can strongly contribute in creation
of the feelings to be European. However, although such competitions might help
define the pan-European identity from a pop-culture sense, the events also aid to
national pride as fans often take pride in supporting the teams from their country.
Thus such events both aid and hurt the establishment of the pan-European
identity. Furthermore, international football competitions such as UEFAs Euro
and the FIFA World Cup, like similar competitions in basketball and other mass
popular sports, put strong emphasis on national pride as they see individual
states competing against one another for pride and glory (aside from enormous
financial compensations). Such events are not necessarily detrimental to the
European identity if the Europeans are not asked to give up their national or
regional identity - if they are asked to go beyond it, what would probably pulls
them closer together. In the other words, it has to be created a community in
which diversity is not a problem, but a characteristic in order that national-
regional differences would become integral parts of the feelings to be European.
249
In 2005, the internet domain .eu was launched under the title Your
European Identity. In order to register a .eu domain one must be located in the
EU.
250
This step indicates a common gravitation towards switching to a European
mentality. The success of the .eu domain system has been extremely positive. The
same is expecting and from the policy of labeling the EU products as made in
European Union.
Finally, the common EU currency known as the Euro () has to play one of
the real factors in making the EU citizens to feel themselves as the Europeans.
251


Phillipson, English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy, New York: Taylor & Frances, 2004; Xabier Arzoz
(ed.), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008.
246
On the role of transnational mass media for creation of the pan-European identity see: Michael Brggemann, Hagen
Schultz-Forberg, Becoming Pan-European? Transnational Media and the European Public Sphere, International
Communication Gazette, Vol. 71, No. 8, 2009, pp. 693712.
247
On Eurovision song contest and European identity see: Dafni Tragaki, Empire of Song: Europe and Nation in the
Eurovision Song Contest, Lanham Maryland: Rowman, 2013; Karen Fricker, Milija Gluhovic (eds.), Performing the
New Europe: Identities, Feelings, and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
248
Pan-European Identity, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-European_identity).
249
Bennhold Katrin, Quietly sprouting: A European identity, Herald Tribune, April 26
th
, 2005.
250
Pan-European Identity, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-European_identity).
251
On the Euro currency see: David Marsa, The Euro: The Battle for the New Global Currency, New HavenLondon:
Yale University Press, 2011.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
99


The existence of a common EU currency and monetary union means above all an
acceptance to live in a common state (the USE) what is and the final political
purpose of the whole process of the so-called Europeanization from 1951
onwards. In the other words, to accept to live in a common political unity in a form
of a state with the others above all means acceptance of a common reciprocity and
solidarity based on a common (pan-European) identity.
252


Conclusion

The European identity seems fit to take on a new a life given the EU
continuous expansion. The workable concept of a European identity should fell
within the framework set by the theory of ethnic indifference which allows citizens
not to give up their national identity but to expand their identity into a pan-
European one. Different proponents support different views of the European
identity, be it Europe as space of encounters, Europe of culture or Europe of citizens.
It is particularly important not to ostracize national minorities in the process of
defining the European identity. For a definite European identity to emerge one
must focus on the young generations. These are the generations which are willing
to adapt to change and these are the generations which will carry forth the
European identity. Through free mobility of labor, the lack of visas, and
intercultural exchange programs, the opportunities to experience another nation
are immense. Communication is easier than ever with technological
advancements, such as the internet, and the emergence of English as an auxiliary
language has allowed citizens to clearly communicate with one another. These are
the advancements which will enable a European identity. Shared values and
common pop-culture surely help link the continent. If in the future the Europeans
would further unite in their diversity it could be expected that more clear
European identity will emerge.
It is true that The EU always needed a political purpose beyond just trade.
Without political purpose the EU construction will start to fall apart.
253
To create
and to maintain a common pan-European identity (alongside with particular
national and regional identities) is a crucial project of keeping the whole political
construction of the EU (or some kind of the United States of Europe in the future)
together for the very reason that without common identity no common solidarity
and common wish to live together within the same political framework (state).
We have to say that there are four existing types of the states in the world
in relation to the nature of their subjects:
1) People-nation state organized on the ethnic basis of the states
inhabitants.
2) Cultural-nation state organized on the basis of commonly shared
culture by its subjects.
3) Class-nation state organized on the ground of the class belonging of
its subjects.

252
On this problem see: Neil Fligstein, Euro-Clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010.
253
Luiza Bialasiewicz, The Uncertain State(s) of Europe?, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1,
2008, p. 72.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
100


4) Nation of state citizens organized politically on the normative basis of
legally interpreted individual rights.
254

In this context, we strongly believe that the only successful, long standing
and democratic type of the state building applied in the case of the United States
of Europe is the last fourth one for the reason that only a Constitutional patriotism
can be a functional framework for the creation of the pan-European identity which
has to be followed by the change of the political system of the EU in order to be
more compatible with the common European identity.
255


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103






The European Union in 2007



















Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
104


Turkey, Greece, Italy and Security in the
Mediterranean Sea Area



Abstract: The research object of the paper is the NATOs Southern Wing
contribution to the security policy in the Mediterranean Sea area during and after
the Cold War period of time. The research countries taken into consideration are
Turkey, Greece and Italy. A crucial aim of the article is to investigate a role and
contribution of these countries to a broader security framework of the NATO pact in
the Mediterranean Sea area. An additional aim of the paper is to present potential
challenges for the future security question within both the NATO and the
Mediterranean Sea area. In order to realize our task we used a relevant research
results presented in the scientific literature including the sources dealing with the
question of the security issue in the Mediterranean Sea area from different points of
view.
Keywords: Security, Mediterranean Sea, Italy, Greece, Turkey, NATO, Cold War


An Importance of the Mediterranean Sea Area in Global Security
During and After the Cold War (19491989)

An importance of the Mediterranean Sea area in geopolitical and
geostrategic standpoint one can understand from the very fact that this area is
situated at the cross-roads between three continents and making de facto a bridge
between Europe, Asia and Africa.
256
The Mediterranean Sea area as well as
connects two oceans - the Atlantic and Indian. It is a true fact that the lands
around the Mediterranean Sea were the core of the Ancient Worlds culture,
civilization and history which gave basis for the present-day modernity and
especially the background of the western civilization.
257
An economic importance
of the area is in the fact that the Mediterranean was and is on the way of vital
world trade routes.
The Mediterranean Sea area is actually the demarcation line between
several worlds: Judeo-Christian and Islamic; developed and underdeveloped;
democracy and authoritarianism, etc. It is important to notice that this area was
faced with the highest number of the wars in whole history. In modern time, the
Mediterranean was one of the most significant places of the Cold War
(19491989), between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the first two

256
On geopolitics, see: Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, OxfordNew York: Oxford University
Press, 2007; Jeremy Black, Geopolitics, London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2009; Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The
Geography of International Relations, Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2009; Eric
Walberg, Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great Games, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2011; Colin Flint,
Introduction to Geopolitics, New York: Routledge, 2012; Harvey Starr, On Geopolitics: Space, Place, and International
Relations, Paradigm Publishers, 2014.
257
On this issue, see: Robin W. Winks, Susan P. Mattern-Parkes, The Ancient Meditteranean World: From the Stone
Age to A.D. 600, New YorkOxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; Ralph W. Mathisen, Ancient Mediterranean
Civilizations: From Prehistory to 640 CE, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Thomas S. Parker (ed.), History of
The Ancient Mediterranean World, Kendall Hunt Publishing, 2011.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
105


post-Cold War crisis all over the world, the First Gulf War (1991)
258
and the
dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia (19911995) followed by the Kosovo War
(19981999)
259
involved the Mediterranean Sea area and had a direct
implications on the political life on the area.
Today, in the area can be distinguished five military-political-economic
influential groups:
1) The European Unity, the Council of Europe and the NATO.
2) The Russian Federation.
3) The League of Arab States.
4) Independent countries (Israel, Albania and the group of the newly
formed states on the soil of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia).
5) China.
During the Cold War period the worlds security system was grounded on
the concept of the Balance of Fear.
260
According to the NATO strategy, the main
danger was expected in both the Central Europe and the Western Wing of the
NATO.
261
Subsequently, the Mediterranean Sea area, as the Southern Wing of
the NATO was considered as of a lesser importance in general NATOs war strategy
during the Cold War time. Further, parts of the area outside the NATO was called
as Out of Area.
262
The whole region was considered in fact as a part of the key
Central-European frontline toward the Warsaw Pact at least till 1960s when the
USSR fleet was present in the Mediterranean Sea. The US Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean Sea was also supposed to symbolise the support to the allies within
the global confrontation.
263

The fact of importance is that within the NATO Mediterranean segment
there were and still are political fragmentations and even the conflicts (Cyprus
crisis in 1974). On one side, Turkey, Italy and Portugal are completely integrated
into the NATO while Greeces involvement into the organisation was and is strictly
determined by the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus, Aegean islands and Trace at
the Balkan Peninsula. France and Spain do not participate fully in the NATOs
military structure. In general, the conflict between Greece and Turkey was and is
the most significant one within the NATO serving as both: 1) as the crucial source

258
See: Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 1991, Osprey Publishing, 2003; Richard S. Lowry, The Gulf War Chronicles: A
Military History of the First War with Iraq, Lincoln, NE: Iuniverse, 2008.
259
See: Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, New HavenLondon, Yale University Press, 2002; Alastair Finlan, The
Collapse of Yugoslavia 19911999, Ospray Publishing, 2004.
260
See: John Lamberton Harper, Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Carole K. Fink, Cold War: An
International History, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2014; William T. Walker, America in the Cold War: A
Reference Guide, ABC-CLIO, 2014.
261
On the NATO Cold War strategy, see: Mark Smith, NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System
in the Western Alliance, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
262
Luigi Caligaris, Security Challenges in Alliance: The Southern Periphery, International Spectator, No. 4, 1992, p.
5.
263
On the US navy presence in the Mediterranean Sea area, see: Importance of United States Naval Forward Presence
in Mediterranean Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School: Pennyhill Press, 2014.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
106


of fragmentation within the NATOs Southern Wing, and 2) as a source for
destabilizing security of the Mediterranean Sea area.
264





The Mediterranean Sea area as a main part of the Roman Empire and Ancient World

However, with the dissolution of the USSR, unification of Germany and
abolishment of the Warsaw Pact (19891991) a period of the Cold War became
over with a clear western military-political victory primarily by the USA. The post-
Cold War era is firstly characterized by the disappearance of the balance of super-
powers, the clash of civilizations and with the international relations within the
framework of the West against the rest.
265
The most significant outcome of those
events is the fact that the block division of Europe so far disappeared. Moreover,
instead of being the main rival to the USA and the NATO, the post-Soviet Russia
turned into its main partner in attempts to establish a new global security system
known as The New Order lead by the US administration.
266
This term was used

264
On the post-Cold War Mediterranean security challenges, see: Nikolaos A. Stavrou (ed.), Mediterranean Security at
the Crossroads: A Reader, Duke University Press, 1999; Stephen C. Calleya, Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area
in the 21
st
Century: Mare nostrum, New York: Routledge, 2013.
265
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1992; Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, NY: Touchstone Rockfeller
Center, 1997; Susanne Peters, The West Against the Rest: Geopolitics After the End of the Cold War, Geopolitics,
1999; Kanayo Nwankwo, The West and the Rest: In the Wells of Hell, Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2008; The
Clash of Civilizations? The Debate: Twentieth Anniversary Edition, Foreign Affairs, 2013.
266
Richard Rosencrance: A New Concept of Powers, Foreign Affairs, New York, 1992. However, more accurate term
for the post-Cold War international relations framework is The NATO World Order (Vladislav B. Sotirovi, The
NATO World Order, The Balkans and The Russian National Interest, Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Balcania. Scientific
Articles in English, Vilnius: Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences Press Edukologija, 2013, pp. 110129).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
107


by the US President Bush (Senior) in November 1990 in his address to the US
Congress. The US is using this maxim in order to inform all the world actors that
it has reserved for itself the leading role in the new international relations. The fact
is that after the period of bipolar world division, the dominant East-West
confrontations now are replaced by crossing and mixing in the Mediterranean Sea
area with tensions and conflicts of the North-South relations.
Disappearance of one out of two Cold War superpowers eliminated the
global threat in the area of the Mediterranean at least until 9/11 2001. Instead
of the bipolar struggles, the Mediterranean Sea area became in strategic point of
view the so-called a Grey Zone.
267
Concerning the security of the Mediterranean
area, after the removing of the Iron Curtain in 1989/1990 the new challenge
reflected through focus shifted from the East-West toward the political, economic
even and cultural confrontations and friction between the North and the South,
between the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world, with regard to the
demographic explosion of the South (i.e., the North and Central Africa in the case
of the Mediterranean Sea area) and the problems of an unemployment followed by
the illegal migration waves from the South to the North.
268

A security issue of the last decade of the Cold War period followed by the
post-Cold War time in the area of the Mediterranean Sea was and is characterised
and challenged by increased regional nationalism in many cases, but not
exclusively connected with the Islamic fundamentalism, like during the time of the
Arab Spring started on December 17
th
, 2010.
269
It is important to notice that
many Mediterranean countries have almost 100% Islamic population, what means
that political life is mainly based on Islamic values.
270
An influence of Islam on the
political life in those countries is day by day in the process of increasing what is
very visible, for instance, in Egypt and Libya after the successful street-style
revolutions in which Hosni Mubarak and Muamer el Gadafi lost power or even
more visible in the case of Syrian civil war.
271
The objective of Islamic
fundamentalists is to establish pure Islamic states based on Koran like it was a
case with the Taliban Afghanistan before the US military intervention after
9/11.
272
The model of such kind of theocratic state gave the Islamic revolution in
Persia in 1979 when the pro-western regime of Shah Pahlavi (directly supported
by the US) was abolished and removed with the model of Islamic fundamentalist

267
Richard Falk: In Search of a New World Model, Current History, Philadelphia, April 1993, p. 145.
268
On the problem of migration and security, see: Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21
st
Century, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2009; Thanh-Dam Truong, Des Gasper (eds.), Transnational Migration and Human Security,
BerlinHeidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2011.
269
On the Arab Spring, see: Brynen Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, Marie-Joelle Zahar, Beyond the Arab
Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2012; Paul Danahar, The New
Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013; Fawas A. Gerges, The New Middle
East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
270
Mark Gasiorowski (ed.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, Co: Westview
Press, 2014.
271
On this issue, see: Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World,
PrincetonOxford: Princeton University Press, 2013; John McHugo, Syria: From the Great War to Civil War, Saqi
Books, 2014.
272
On Taliban case, see: Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (eds.), The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Harvard
University Press, 2008; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, LondonNew
York: I.B.Tauris, 2010.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
108


regime in the Republic of Iran.
273
This example was and is followed by several
ultra Islamic parties, movements and organisations all over the Islamic world as it
is case, for instance, with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. Speaking
about the regional nationalism of Arabic and Islamic countries it is necessary to
mention, alongside with Homeinis Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, and the pan-
Arabism of Gammal Abdel Nasser supported by the society-organization of
Muslim Brothers
274
or Saddam Husseins neo-pan-Arabism, etc.
There is no doubt that the Mediterranean region was and is, and probably
will be, one of the most conflict-prone areas all over the world. There is virtually no
one country in the region whose state boundaries were not or are not questioned
by their neighbours or cannot be questioned from historical point of view. After the
end of the bipolar confrontation between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact there
were two military struggles in direct relations with the Mediterranean region.
There are the Gulf War, in which one of the Mediterranean country (Turkey) was
strongly involved, and the civil war in former Yugoslavia as one of the
Mediterranean countries. In addition, there are several conflict sources in the
region. The most important of them are:
1) Israeli-Palestinian friction.
2) The question of the Kurds, who are living in four countries - Turkey,
Syria, Iraq and Iran.
3) Friction between Libya and Egypt and Libya and Algeria.
4) The local conflicts in Sudan, Chad and Southern Sahara.
Finally, its eastern part is of the enormous conflict potential out of the
whole area of the Mediterranean Sea region.
The Turkish Position and a Role at the Southern Wing of the NATO
Turkey has geopolitically and from the geostrategic point of view the most
important role on the Southern Wing of the NATO from the very beginning when
both Turkey and Greece became the members of this military pact in 1952 as
Turkish Asia Minor together with the Balkans is a bridge between Europe and
Asia. Turkey is both European and Asian country having exit to two seas being a
part of both Near and Middle East. The geostrategic and geopolitical advantages of
Turkey have been very visible and of extreme use by the US administration in both
Gulf Wars in 19901991 and 2003
275
after which the position of Turkey among
the other NATOs European allies became much stronger and respectable.
276

Finally, Turkeys great importance for both the US administration and NATO is
and in the very fact that this country is becoming a pivotal state in the Muslim
world the only one involved into the western political and military structures.
277


273
On Islamic Republic of Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, see: Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the
Islamic Republic, New York: Times BooksHenri Holt and Company, 2006; Lawrence Davidson, Islamic
Fundamentalism: An Introduction, Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2013.
274
See: Hesham Al-Awadi, The Muslim Brothers in Pursuit of Legitimacy: Power and Political Islam in Egypt under
Mubarak, I.B.Tauris, 2014.
275
Isa Eraslan, Turkey-NATO Relations After the Cold War: Ascending Importance of Turkey Within the Changing
Mission of NATO After 9/11, Saarbrcken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2013.
276
Janne Haaland Matlry, Magnus Petersson, NATOs European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
277
Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, Washington: United
States Institute of Peace, 2008; Soner Cagaptay, The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Centurys First Muslim Power,
Potomac Books, 2014.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
109


Turkeys NATOs membership, in turn, is of the crucial security importance for the
country and its bridge towards further Euro-Atlantic integration.
278

However, during the Cold War time the Greek-Turkish relations became
the main problem on the Southern Wing of the NATO for Washington and
Brussels. It was exactly Turkish clash with Greece over the Cyprus issue in 1974
to be the only open friction between two member states of the NATO pact during
its history (est. in 1949). The US attitude toward both countries in conflict during
the period of the Iron Curtain was officially equal. Nevertheless, Turkey became
much more privileged by both the USA and Great Britain in comparison to Greece
or much more equal.
279
The reason was and is of a simple nature: Turkey was
and is much more important in strategic point of view for the Southern Wing of
the NATO than Greece. In fact, according to the NATO Cold War strategy, in the
case of Soviet (today Russian) expansion in the Mediterranean Sea area through
the Black Sea and the Straits the crucial defensive military action should play
Turkey because of its geographical position. In addition, Turkey could be useful
very well against the Arab and Iranian challenges in the area of the Middle East.
280

It is a fact that Turkeys position within the Southern Wing of NATO seriously
increased after the Islamic revolution in Iran at the end of 1970s.
Ankaras foreign policy was and is pointed toward both the East and the
West. In regard to the Turkish western policy the crucial aim by Ankara is to
include Turkey as an equal member into the European Union. However, in this
respect the crucial EU requirement to Turkey during the process of accession
negotiations from 1999 onward is to radically change its Cyprus policy. It means
that Ankara is obliged to recognize territorial integrity of whole Cyprus island and
to open sea and air borders to it. Of course, in this case the price is abolishment of
the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1981 that is
recognized only by Turkey.
281
The Turkish eastern foreign policy is dealing
primarily with the Middle East and with the Islamic and Arab countries in the
region. Turkey formally applied for entrance into the EU in 1987 and received a
status of candidate state in 1999. However, up today the process of Turkey-EU
accession negotiations are going very slowly for different economic, political,
demographic, cultural, financial, minority rights, the question of democracy and
religious reasons.
282
From the western political-military point of view, Turkey has

278
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa).
279
On this issue, see: Maria Hadjipaulou, The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2007, pp. 349365; Jan Asmussen, Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict
During the 1974 Crisis, I.B.Tauris, 2008; Andreas Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974:
Calculated Conspiracy of Foreign Policy Failure?, Central Milton Keynes: Authors House, 2009; Clement Dodd, The
History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010; Andreas Constandidos, Britain and
the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Responsibility Without Power, Saarbrcken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011.
280
John Redmond, Security Implications of the Accesion of Cyprus to the European Union, International Spectator,
Roma, 1995, No. 3, p. 34.
281
On this issue, see: Mirela Bogdan, Turkey and the Dillema of EU Accession: When Religion Meets Politics,
I.B.Tauris, 2010; Kenan Aksu (ed.), Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and the Future, Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012; CRC Report for Congress: European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on
Turkeys Accession Negotiations, March 15, 2011-RS22517, BiblioGov, 2013.
282
On the question of democratization of the Turkish society and policy and the accession to the EU, see: Binnaz
Toprak, Islam and Democracy in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2005, pp. 167186; Cigdem Kentmen,
Determinants of Support for EU Membership in Turkey, European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2008, pp. 487510;
Alper Kaliber, Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey, International Relations,
Vol. 27, No 1, 2012, pp. 5273.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
110


to be a NATOs member, but regarding the western economic point of view, Turkey
should stay not completely incorporated into the western structures. In fact,
several internal armed conflicts in Turkey, the military cups and a strengthening
of the parties with Islamic fundamentalist orientations are the most significant
reasons why Turkey is not accepted to the EU yet.
The Gulf Wars were the crucial military-political events after the
dissolution of the bipolar world for the Turkish emancipation within the NATO,
particularly in regard with its relations with the USA. Giving its territory for the
military actions against Iraq, Ankara made stronger her relations with the USA
and the UK and made firmer Turkeys position within the NATO. Generally, the
strategic position of Turkey during and after the Gulf Wars was and is more
consolidated, particularly in the American eyes. Turkey is encircled with both the
unstable regions and the regions of the high risk: the Balkans, the Caucuses,
the Central Asia, the Middle East and the Central East. A value of Turkey is and
for the reason that this country can be a good example for the other Islamic states
as a prosperous, secularised, modern and above all pro-western orientated
country, what means a country which creates its economic and political
development on the western values. In the other words, there is no other example
like Turkey of so westernized country among the Islamic world.
An external political situation of Turkey after the collapse of the USSR is
better than it was during the Cold War time. The neighbouring Iraqs military
power is weakened after two lost wars, with Iran in the 1980s and the western
coalition during the Gulf Wars. Syria without Soviet support is not also a
dangerous military threat for Turkey especially during the time of a civil war. With
Russia Turkey has not even the common state borders and Russia is not posing
any security challenge to Turkey. With Greece Turkey has all the time bad
relations, but Greece cannot be a firm military danger for Turkey without support
by some of the great powers what Greece today does not have.
However, the internal political problems are the crucial challenge to
Turkeys state security and even territorial integrity and one of the fundamental
barriers on the Turkish road to the EU. A large scale of the state economy
alongside with enormous corruption are making time to time a high inflation and
unemployment in Turkey. Probably, the crucial internal political problem which is
the barrier for Turkey to became a full member of the EU is its military friction
with the Kurds, lead by their own national PKK party,
283
who are not recognised as
a national minority by the Turkish authorities.
284
Actually, the question of the
Kurds is seen by the EU throughout a prism of the question of the peoples self-

283
On the question of PKK party, see: Ali Kemal zcan, Turkeys Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and
Abdullah calan, LondonNew York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006; Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The
Kurdish Fight for Independence, New YorkLondon: New York University Press, 2007; Abdullah calan, Prison
Writings: The PKK and the Kurdish Question in the 21
st
Century, London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd, 2011; Charles
Strozier, James Frank, The PKK: Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions, VDM-Verlag Dr. Mller, 2011.
284
On the Kurdish question in Turkey, see: Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Cenk Saraoglu, Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and
Exclusion in Turkish Society, Tauris Academic Studies, 2010; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds: The Evolving Solution to
the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Noah Beratsky (ed.), The Kurds,
Greenhaven Press, 2013; Ramazan Aras, The Formation of Kurdishness in Turkey: Political Violence, Fear and Pain,
LondonNew York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
111


determination and protection of the human and minority rights.
285
However, any
western anti-Turkish attitude is surely inclining Ankaras foreign policy toward the
East and the Muslim world.



Divided Cyprus after 1974

A rising challenge of the Islamic fundamentalism is another internal
problem for Turkeys security. This problem became visible after the electoral win
of the pro-Islamic Party of Prosperity in 1995. On the one hand, this problem
became one of several pivotal obstacles for Turkeys EU accession, but on the
other hand, the EU is forced to enlarge and make stronger its own market in a
competition with the US, Japanese and Chinese economy. It means that Turkey
for the EU (and all Mediterranean Sea area countries) is very important and highly
acceptable for the cooperation.
The eastern Turkeys foreign policy is actually of alternative nature and a
kind of Ankaras blackmailing instrument on Turkeys way to the EU. First of all,
Ankara is trying to establish as stronger as position in the Black Sea region. In
fact, Turkey is the initiator for creation of the regional Organisation of the Black
See Economic Cooperation (the BSEC) with intended Turkish leading role.
286
It is
of extreme importance for Turkish foreign policy an attempt to establish some
kind of the Turkish Commonwealth in which the former Soviet republics from the
Central Asia and Caucasus with predominant Turkic population would be

285
Doygu Bazoglu Sezer, Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: Evolving Domestic and Foreign Policy Trends and
Challenges, The Southeast European Year Book, 19941995, p. 527; Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession
and Human Rights, Pluto Press, 2005.
286
Lambert M. Surhone, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Betascript Publishing, 2011; Markus
Philipp Vogtenhuber, Analyse der Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), GRIN Verlag, 2012.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
112


assembled with a leadership of Ankara. At the Balkans Ankara is creating a sort of
the Ottoman Commonwealth with the Muslim states based on the common
Ottoman cultural and political inheritance (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania).
The Turkish relations with the Islamic Conference are made stronger during the
last two decades, particularly during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(19921995) and the Kosovo War (19981999). Finally, it cannot be forget that
Turkey at the same time is working on creation of the common market of the
Middle East region, which is, needless to say, an alternative option for the EU
market for the Turkish economy.
In conclusion, by nature of Turkeys geostrategic location at the crossroads
of Europe and Asia, this country plays a pivotal role in the post-Cold War system
of states. It lies at the epicentre of a series of conflicts, real and potential, in both
continents. This very fact gives Turkey a special geopolitical value. It also has
enjoyed noticeable growth in both economic prosperity and democracy since 1980.
For the reason that Turkey has been, and remains, a faithful US and NATO ally,
Washington and Brussels have called upon it to play an important role in the
Balkans, Near East, and former Soviet Union republics commensurate with its
new-found political and economic development.
287

Greece in the Mediterranean Security System
An end of the Cold War and Iron Curtain period in the European and
Mediterranean security system was not so profitable for Greece as it was in the
case of Turkey.
288
In fact, the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact for
Greece were not so important as for instance it was for the Central and East
European countries or for Turkey. It was for the reason that security of Greece
and Greek national interest were never challenged by the Warsaw Pact or the
USSR, but they were challenged within the NATO as from 1974 Greece had a
crucial Cold War time friction with Turkey over Cyprus. Both Greece and Turkey
at that time were the member states of the NATO and this clash of interests over
Cyprus is so far solved at the Turkish favour. The relations with Turkey are
aggravating constantly from 1990, when for the last time two prime ministers met
each other in London, in every point of view. During the First Gulf War in
19901991 the Greek politicians, for instance, made equality between the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait with Turkeys occupation of the northern parts of Cyprus (40%
out of all Cyprus territory) in 1974.
289
However, an additional blow to the Greek
policy toward Cyprus and position in the EU came from 2008 when Greece
became bankrupted as a state and subsequently fully depended on the EU
financial support and policy.
290


287
Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, William T. Johnsen, Turkeys Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World
Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012.
288
On this issue, see: Ruud van Dijk (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Cold War, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group, 2008; Keith Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II, New York: St. Martins Press,
2012; Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 19441956, New York: Anchor Books, A
Division of Random House, Inc., 2012.
289
On the post-Cold War Greek identity and politics, see: Vangelis Calotychos, The Balkan Prospect: Identity, Culture,
and Politics in Greece after 1989, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
290
Gregory Zorzos, The Greek Debts 18212010 and the New Seventh Bankruptcy, CreateSpace Independent Publishing
Platform, 2010 (Greek edition).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
113


The Greek attitude toward the NATO after 1974 is mainly framed by the
problem of Cyprus. The fact is that Greece did not resolve this problem within the
NATO for the reason that the US administration supported the Turkish side. This
fact became the crucial political reason for the Greek accession to the European
Community in 1981 (from 1992 Union) as Athens hoped to solve the Cyprus
question in the Greek favour by the help of the EU the organization in which
Turkey is not a member state. The main idea of the Greek new policy toward
Turkey after 1981 is to use a veto right as the EU member state against the
Turkish accession to the EU as a political instrument of pressure in order to force
Ankara to recognize a territorial integrity of Cyprus as one of two national states of
the Greeks. However, even within the EU, the Greek position in regard to the
Cyprus problem was radically reduced as Greece was not a member state of the
Western European Union (the WEU, 19552011) until 1995. The Greek standpoint
toward a policy of the WEU is that this defence organisation, having the most
important voice in creation of the EU foreign policy, was marginalizing the Greek
position within both the EU and the NATO by indirectly supporting the Turkish
side.
291

A decision that Greece can be accepted as the WEU member state was
done in Maastricht in December 1991 and this decision was realised in March
1995. However, according to the Article 5 of the founding act of the WEU (the
Brussels Contract) the member states of the WEU are not obliged to intervene in
the case of a conflict between two or more members of the NATO. The Article 5 was
confirmed in Petersberg in June 1992, by the Ministerial Council of the WEU.
Nevertheless, the Greeks explained this article as a non-solidarity policy within
the WEU membership as a giving support to Ankara for military action against
Greece in the case of deepening of the Cyprus conflict in the future. During the
Yugoslav civil wars of the 1999s, because of the pro-Turkish policy by the NATO
and giving non-support to Greece in the conflict with Turkey by the WEU and the
EU, Athens decisively supported territorial integrity of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia from the very beginning of the war and later the Serb side
and Serb national interests especially in the case of the Kosovo crisis and war in
19981999.
292
The Greek support for the Yugoslav state integrity and the Greek
pro-Serb policy were against the German pressure in December 1991 that the EU
should recognize Slovenia and Croatia as the independent countries. From the one
hand, Athens was understanding Slovene and Croat independence as an
unsupportable secession from a legal point of view. From the another hand, the
Greek pro-Yugoslav policy had and a very practical reason as the Greek diplomacy
was scared that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia can spill over the whole
region including and the neighbouring Socialist Republic of Macedonia (from
November 1991 an independent state) in which the ethnic conflict with the local
Albanian population could escalate in the new Balkan civil war (what actually
happened in 2001 for several months). In fact, the so-called New Macedonian
Question became from 1991 the crucial problem for the Greek diplomacy at the
Balkans including the questions of 1) the state independence, 2) the Albanian

291
Yannis G. Valinakis, Southern Europe between detante and new threats: The view from Greece, Roberto Aliboni
(ed.), Southern European Security in the 1990s, Pinter Pub Ltd, 1992, pp. 6263.
292
See, for instance: Costis Hadjimichalis, Kosovo, 82 Days of an Undeclared and Unjust War: A Geopolitical
Comment, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, pp. 175180.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
114


position in the country, 3) the state emblems, 4) the state constitution, 5) the
national identity, and 6) the state name.
293




Fighting for united geographic-historical Macedonia: A flag of the Macedonian Slav rebels against the
Ottoman authorities in August 1903 (the Ilinden Uprising)

The Macedonian Question historically was one of the most nebulous,
complex, and brutal of all conflicts at the Balkan Peninsula. It is divided into the
Old Macedonian Question (18701945) and the New Macedonian Question
(from 1991 onward). It is basically a question of destiny of Macedonians and
survival of the Republic of Macedonia or the Former Republic of Macedonia in
the region and is connected with a national self-determination and nationalism of
the Macedonian Slavs on the one hand and the nationalism of all five Macedonias
neighbours (remains of Serbia, Kosovo, Greece, Albania and Bulgaria) on the other

293
On this issue, see: Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, Hong Kong, 2000; James
Pettifer (ed.), The New Macedonian Question, London: 2001; Victor Rounometof, Collective Memory, National Identity,
and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002; P. H.
Liotta, Cindy R. Jebb, Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004; George C.
Papavizas, Claiming Macedonia: The Struggle for the Heritage, Territory and Name of the Historic Hellenic Land,
18622004, Jefferson, NC: Mc Farland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2006; Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and the
Macedonians: A History, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008;Ernest N. Damianopoulos, The Macedonians: Their
Past and Present, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Zhidas Daskalovski, Marija Risteska (eds.), The Macedonian
Question: 20 Years of Political Struggle Into European Integration Structures, Rangendingen: Libertas, 2012.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
115


hand. The Greek authorities today do not recognize existence of any ethnic
Macedonians in the so-called Aegean Macedonia (after 1913 a part of Greece) as
on this territory the Slavic speakers are officially called as the Slavophone
Greeks.
294
Nevertheless, the point of the Macedonian position is primarily based
on a concrete de facto political reality in the country that the majority of the Slavic
population of the FYROM is firmly convinced that they are Macedonian nation and
speaks a Macedonian language separate from both Serbian and Bulgarian.
However, regarding this question the Greek and Bulgarian academicians and
politicians are saying that self-identification means only what the people
themselves say irrespective of whether they are scientifically correct or not.
The Greek, like Bulgarian, academicians share, in general, the same
opinion that the Macedonians are an artificial political nation not based on the
ethnolinguistic reality especially from historical perspective. Greeks refute the
main Skopjes claim that there is the link of the present-day Macedonian Slavic
speakers with the ancient Macedonians of Philip II and his son Alexander the
Great. However, the Greek academia claims that the ancient Macedonians either
have been of a Greek origin or became very much Hellenized, i.e. became the
Greeks (Hellenes) by their culture and used language.
295
It means that if ancient
Macedonians were the Greeks, then no one other that contemporary Greeks has
the right to use the Macedonian name, symbols and legacy. For that reason the
Greek diplomacy rejected to recognize Macedonias independence until
Macedonian authorities changed the state flag, a part of the Constitution and even
accepted to become the UN member state under the official name of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In general, Athens was and is in opinion that a
state with the name of Macedonia can be permanent source of conflicts and
instability at the Balkan Peninsula and for the reason of the regional security the
Greek proposal for the name of the present-day FYROM is the Republic of Skopje
what is for the Macedonian authorities in Skopje so far unacceptable.
Greece was in diplomatic conflict with Turkey as well as during the 1990s
in regard to the question of Yugoslavias succession. Differently from Greece,
Turkey understood the civil war in former Yugoslavia as Serbias aggression on
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, respectively. The process of bloody destruction of
the former Yugoslavia in 19911995 in Turkeys eyes was an attempt of Serbian
aggressive nationalism to include Bosnia-Herzegovina with 44% of the Muslim
Bosniak population into the Greater Serbia.
296
Very soon, during the Kosovo War
in 19981999 Ankara also supported the local Muslim Albanian population and
the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army against the central authorities in Belgrade. A
true face of Turkeys policy toward Kosovo issue Ankara showed in 2008 when
became one of the first diplomacies to recognize self-proclaimed Kosovo

294
After the Balkan Wars of 19121913 geographic-historical Macedonia was divided up among Greece (51%,
Aegean Macedonia), Serbia (39%, Vardar Macedonia from 1991 the FYROM) and Bulgaria (10%, Pirin
Macedonia). On the Balkan Wars, see: Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 19121913: Prelude to the First World War,
LondonNew York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2000; Jacob Gould Schurman, The Balkan Wars: 19121913,
A Public Domain Book, 2013.
295
See, for instance the book The Falsification of Macedonian History, which with reliable proofs clearly demonstrates
the Hellenic origin and national feeling of the Macedonians as it is noticed in the prize for the book of the Academy of
Athens. The prize was awarded to the author at the Festive Plenary Session of the March 25
th
, 1985 (Nicolaos K. Martis,
The Falsification of Macedonian History, Athens: Graphic Arts of Athanassiades Bros. S.A., 1984).
296
Sabri Sayari, La Turque et la crise Yugoslave, Politique Etrangere, Paris, No. 2, 1992, p. 315.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
116


independence. Moreover, Turkish policy in this matter became much more
radicalized in 2013 when Turkeys PM openly told in Kosovos capital Prishtina
during the official states visit that Kosovo is Turkey! During the Yugoslav civil
war, the Turkish President Turgut Ozal had a great deal to create an anti-Serbian
coalition at the Balkans by the regional Muslim nations who traditionally
supported the idea of the Ottoman commonwealth. However, this newly reborn
political concept of the Turkish foreign policy at the Balkans is aimed and to
marginalise a political role of Athens in the region.
Finally, Macedonia became already the new source of deterioration of
relations between Turkey and Greece. Turkey recognised Macedonia as an
independent state in February 1992, only several hours after the Greek minister of
foreign affairs applied to his Turkish colleague to wait for final decision about this
question by the European Community.
297
A great victory of Turkeys Balkan
diplomacy in the 1990s was the UN decision that among other troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina can participate and the Turkish soldiers as the UN peace-keepers.
This decision was understood by Greece as Turkeys intention to play a role of
American supervisor at the Balkans. The Greek side even after the end of the
Gulf Wars felt that a strengthening of the Turkish position in the Balkan affairs is
a serious threat for both the peace process in the region and a regional political
stability.
The Italian Position in the Mediterranean Sea Area
Italy is in position, looking from a geographic and geostrategic points of
view, to play one of the most significant roles in the Mediterranean Sea area. Italy,
together with Sicily, is dividing the Mediterranean Sea area into two parts: the
eastern and the western one. According to Sergio Romano, this fact was and is
giving to Italy a real possibility to play a role of the most important factor of naval
balance of powers in the region.
298
This truth became an important reason for the
decision to establish in Italy the southern NATOs headquarters a fact which
emphasises at the best an importance of Italy for the NATOs strategy in the
Mediterranean Sea area.
The Mediterranean Sea area is actually divided into four sections,
according to the Italian defence strategy. These sub-regions are as following: 1)
Northern Africa, 2) the Middle East, 3) the Balkans and 4) the NATO countries. It
has to be stressed that the Italian military forces were participating in all
multinational operations in the Mediterranean Sea area after 1981 up today.
Currently, the most important Italian military involvement in the region is a
participation in Kosovo mission under the umbrella of the (UN-NATO) Kosovo
Forces (KFOR) from June 1999 onward. A real importance of the Italian position
within, and a role in the NATOs Mediterranean strategy can be seen and from the
fact that Italy received a separate military-police-administrative region in Kosovo
together with a Great Brittany, France, Germany and the USA. The Italian
administrative sector in Kosovo is in the western part of the region with the
headquarters in Pe/Pej.
299


297
Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey and the Balkans, The International Spectator, Roma, No. 4, 1994, p. 57.
298
Sergio Romano, Italys New Course in the Mediterranean, Australian Outlook, Canbera, No.2, 1987, p. 101.
299
On the issue of the Kosovo crisis and war, the NATOs military involvement in the conflict and the present-day
US/NATO peace-keeping mission in the region, see: Hannes Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma,
Beograd: 2009 (original title: Experiment Kosovo: Die Rckkehr des Kolonialismus).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
117


During the 1980s Italy tried to develop more comprehensive policy
concerning the Mediterranean Sea area which should be a ground for a broader
security concept. Subsequently, the Italian-Spanish military co-operation in the
Mediterranean Sea area was in direct connection with a new Italian policy
concerning the region in the last decade of the Cold War.
300
A priority of the Italian
Mediterranean policy is focused toward the south-western NATOs member states
from Europe: Spain, Portugal and France. As a part of such policy, Italy and
France reached an agreement on the air-naval cooperation and defence and Italy
signed a similar treaty with Spain, but without provisions on the air-defence.
These contracts between France, Italy and Spain are reached within the NATO
having technological, naval and intelligence character.
A role of Italy in forming the Group 9 was one of the most significant part
of the Italian security policy in the Mediterranean Sea area. This organisation was
formed in October 1990, encompassing four West European countries (France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain), and five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria,
Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia)
301
while Malta became an associated
member state later on. The Italian Mediterranean Sea area policy depends on the
attitude by Rome on political-security importance of these regions for the Italian
foreign policy. From this point of view, these countries are divided into three
groups:
1. The first group are the key actors states of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt,
Israel and Jordan as the countries which are playing the crucial role in
their respective sub-regions.
2. The second group is composed by the old friends of Tunisia and Egypt.
3. To the third group are going the problem countries of Libya, Lebanon,
Syria and Iran.
With Tunisia and Egypt Italy has significant the contract on economic and
political relations. Italy and Tunisia are linked by territorial closeness that is a
significant reason for the cooperation in security area. Even during the Cold War
time Egypt was the first among non-EU Mediterranean countries to sign with Italy
a bilateral agreement on anti-terrorist activities in 1986 after the hijacking case of
the Italian ship Achille Lauro.
302
At that time Italy has with Malta and Morocco
and formal agreements on military co-operation. However, Italy used to export
military equipment to Libya and especially to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War in
19801988.
303
During this conflict in the Middle East happened that the Italian
territory was bombed in 1986 by Libyan air-forces after the US bombing of Tripoli
as a matter of reciprocity as two Libyan SCUD missiles reached the Italian island
of Lampedusa, where the US military base was situated. It was the first case after
the WWII that the Italian territory was directly military attacked.
A contemporary Italian security policy is still based on the new defence
model developed in the 1980s which brought the Italian peace-keeping forces to

300
On this issue, see: John A. Agnew, Place and Politics in Modern Italy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2002.
301
On the politics in the Maghreb, see: Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and
Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring, London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2012.
302
On this case, see: Michael K. Bohn, The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of Terrorism,
Washington, D.C.: Brasseys, Inc., 2004.
303
On Iraq-Iran War, see: Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, New York: Routledge, 1991;
Efraim Karsa, The Iran-Iraq War 19801988, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
118


Lebanon. Probably, the most important document with regard to this new Italian
defence policy is the White Book, issued by Defence Ministry in 1985. An
importance of the book is in the fact that it was for the first time that Italy openly
spelled out that Rome had other national security interests alongside with those
within the NATO what meant that the Italian national security was not seen only
within the NATO umbrella. Three the most important Italian national interests out
of the NATOs protection framework from that time onward are:
1) Defence of the southern parts of the national state territory.
2) Protection of free trade of strategic products.
3) Protection of the Italian citizens abroad.
In fact, the new Italian security policy in the Mediterranean Sea area is
oriented toward re-emergency of Italy as the strongest Mediterranean Sea naval
power. It is the most important reason that Italy officially supports the US stand
to refuse any talk about naval disarmament, and about any connection between
naval disarmament with the other aspects of disarmament. It is important to
notice that the Italian navy very much profited during the (First) Gulf War against
Iraq for the reason that around 95% of the NATOs war equipment was shipped by
the sea.
The Balkans remained one of the crucial regions of importance for the
Italian security policy within the Mediterranean Sea area what was very visible
during the process of destruction of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
304
In fact,
Italy played one of the most decisive roles in the policy of breaking up of ex-
Yugoslavia in 1991 as Rome was directly supporting Slovenias and Croatias
policy of secession and independence. The same policy Italy had and in the case of
secession and proclamation of the independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992
or during the Kosovo War in 19981999 by supporting Albanian secessionists and
even taking direct military action against Serbia and Montenegro during the
NATOs air war for Kosovo (March-June 1999).
305
Italy was one of the EC countries
supporting the common foreign and security policy of the future EU according to
1992 Maastricht Treaty. That was a reason that Italy followed a common EC/EU
policy on the question of Yugoslavias succession. Thus, in January 1992 Italy
recognised Slovenia and Croatia as an independent states, however with a note
that they are the countries that under Yugoslavia expended their territories at the
expense of Italy.
306
The question of Slovenias and Croatias reparations to Italy
for the expulsion of the ethnic Italians from Istria, Dalmatia and Venezia Giulia
from 1943 to 1956
307
by the Yugoslav communist authorities (headed by half
Slovene, half Croat Josip Broz Tito)
308
is still formally not solved as Italy requires
that all Italian real estate property in Istria and Dalmatia, nationalized after 1945,

304
On the Italian Balkan policy, see: Paolini Margharita, Italy and the Balkans, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, 1998.
305
On the NATOs air war for Kosovo in 1999, see: Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), NATOs Empty Victory: A Postmortem
on the Balkan War, Cato Institute, 2000; Banjamin S. Lambeth, NATOs Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and
Operational Assessment, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001; Dag Henrikson, NATOs Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and
Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 19981999, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
306
John Zametica, Italijansko iskustvo sa Balkana, Politika, Belgrade, November 13
th
, 1992.
307
On this issue, see: Arrigo Petacco, A Tragedy Revealed: The Story of Italians from Istria, Damatia, and Venezia
Guilia 19431956, TorontoBuffaloLondon: University of Toronto Press, 2005.
308
On Titos biography, see: , : 20. , : ,
2011.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
119


has to be returned back to the families of their real (Italian) owners including and
the land. This issue can be a destabilizing factor in the future relations between
Italy on the one hand and Slovenia and Croatia on the other. As an additional
factor of the regional insecurity can be and the Piran Bay question between
Slovenia and Croatia.



Istria, Trieste and Kvarner Islands

It is fact that the Italian diplomacy had together with Germany a crucial
impact at a most decisive moment (December 16
th
, 1991) when a decision on
Slovenias and Croatias recognition of self-proclaimed state independence was
discussed at the EC (the EU from 1992) summit in Brussels. This fact confirms a
very important role of the Italian diplomacy in a creation of a common EU foreign
policy. In regard to the nature of the Yugoslav conflicts in 19911995 the Italian
diplomats shared the same standpoint as their Turkish colleagues the core of the
problem was Serbias aggression, and for that reason Italy supported Slovenias
and Croatias UNs and CSCE (today OSCE) membership. An additional area of
activity for the Italian diplomacy after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia
became Montenegro and Kosovo. Italy openly supported international recognition
of self-proclaimed independence by both Montenegro (in 2006) and Kosovo (in
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
120


2008) and it is known that Italy has traditionally protective policy toward
Albania and ethnic Albanians from the region. The Italian pro-Albanian policy
became fully expressed during the Kosovo crisis in 1998 when Italian diplomacy
required that international (including and the Italian) troops had to be sent on the
Yugoslav-Albanian border in order to protect Albania from possible Yugoslav
military intervention and even to intervene against Serbia in the case that the
conflict will escalate to the open war in Kosovo. Italy, as the EU member state, is
giving a full support to Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo on their way to the EU
likewise to Serbia, but as a country without Kosovo province.
In the future, the Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean Sea area, more
precisely at the Balkan Peninsula, can face a problem of a re-establishing of the
Italian state borders with Slovenia and Croatia as several Italian political parties,
as the Italian Liberal Party, Socialist Party, the right wing Forza Italia, were
demanding and can demand a cancellation of the Ossimo Agreements signed
with a Communist regime of the former Yugoslavia in 1975 according to which,
Italy lost a part of its state pre-war territory to Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia). A
legal bases for such demand is that these Ossimo Agreements have been signed
with the former Yugoslavia, but not with Slovenia and Croatia. In this case the
legal subject is the former Yugoslavia which does not exist and because of this fact
a treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia from 1975 is already legally over.
309
Finally,
Italys state security can be faced and with the question of its own territorial
integrity as there are several separatist political parties and movements in Italy
which are propagating a political independence of their own regions for different
reasons of the economic, historical, financial or identity backgrounds.
310
In this
respect, it cannot also be forgotten that Italys central authorities are traditionally
weak in their fight against corruption and the Mafia.
311


Conclusion

A security policy of Turkey, Greece and Italy primarily depends on general
security strategy of the NATO pact which is determined by geopolitical and military
interest of the alliance whose member states are they. The area of the
Mediterranean Sea was and is one of the key strategic points of interest for the
NATO from the very time of creation of this military organization in 1949 during
the Cold War in order to challenge a real or potential threats for its own security.
Within a global concept of the NATOs security system, Turkey, Greece and Italy

309
It has to be stressed that the so-called Trieste Crisis between Italy and Yugoslavia, which was finally solved by the
Ossimo Agreements, was a part of the Cold War confrontation between the East and the West (on this issue, see: Tony
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, New York: Penguin Books, 2005). The postwar 1947 Treaty of Paris
recognized Yugoslavias acquisition of all former Italian territory on the eastern side of the Adriatic. This included the
Dalmatian city of Zadar/Zara and the islands of Cres/Cherso, Loinj/Lusino, and Lastovo/Lagosta, as well as the
formerly contentious city of Rijeka/Fiume, and, further north, western Slovenia and part of Istria. The fate of Trieste and
its immediate hinterland remained undecided. Consequently, it was transformed into a Free Territory administered by
Anglo-American forces in the north and by Yugoslav forces in the south (Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of
Central Europe. Revised and Expanded Edition, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 187).
310
On this issue, see: Anna Cento Bull, Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Manlio Graziano, The Failure of Italian Nationhood: The Geopolitics of a Troubled Identity,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism,
Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord, Montreal & KingstonLondonIthaca: McGill-Queens University Press, 2011.
311
Paul Ginsborg, Italy and its Discontents 19802001, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2001, pp. 179212.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
121


compose a sub-system of countries which belong to its Southern Wing. The main
areas of activities by these countries are the Middle East and the Balkans.
However, regardless a fact that Turkey, Greece and Italy belong to the same
security umbrella system offering by the NATO, there are serious differences in
regard to the NATOs regional policy, especially between Turkey and Greece, which
brought these two countries almost to the open war conflict in 1974 over the
Cyprus question. They also had different policies toward the question of
succession of the former Yugoslavia in 19911995 followed by the Kosovo War of
19981999. The future of their mutual cooperation within security model offered
by the NATO primarily depends on the question how Turkey and Greece can settle
their bilateral problems in particular connected with the question of the future of
Cyprus.

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Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
127





The Free Zone of Trieste, 19451954
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
128


Kosovo & Metohija: Ten Years After The
March Pogrom 2004


Abstract: This paper deals with the question of political and human/minority rights in the
region of Kosovo & Metohija ten years after the March Pogrom 2004 and fifteen years after
the NATO's military aggression on Serbia and Montenegro and occupation of the region. An
importance of this research topic is in a fact that for the first time in the European history a
terrorist-style and mafia-ruled (quasi)independent state was created by a full diplomatic,
political, economic, military and financial sponsorship by the West under the umbrella of the
NATO's and the EU's protective administration. The precedence of Kosovo's self-proclaimed
independence in February 2008 already had several negative domino effect consequences
elsewhere in Europe (the Caucasus, the Crimean Peninsula...). The aim of the paper is to
present a current situation in Kosovo & Metohija and possible consequences of the Kosovo
case for the international relations and the post-Cold War world's order. In this short
analysis of the situation in present-day Kosovo & Metohija, in order to realize our research
goal we used the comparative method, the method of analysis of the text and the method of
the mutual complement of the data from the sources and literature.
Keywords: Kosovo, Metohija, terrorism, separatism, NATO, EU, security, Yugoslavia


It passed ten years after the March Pogrom 2004 in Kosovo & Metohija
against the local Serbs organized and done by Kosovo Albanians, led by the
veterans from the Kosovo Liberation Army the KLA and logistically suported by
the NATO's occupation troops in Kosovo & Metohija under the name of the Kosovo
Forces the KFOR. That was simply a continuation of the last stage (up to now) of
dismemberment of ex-Yugoslavia the Kosovo War (19981999) and the NATO's
military intervention (March 24thJune 10th, 1999) against and aggression on
Serbia and Montenegro (at that time composing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
the FRY) by violating the international law.
312
In this context, we can say that at
the end of the 20th century the fate of ex-Yugoslavia was being determined by
several international organizations, but not decisively by the Yugoslavs
themselves.
313


312
That the NATO violated the international law by bombing the FRY in 1999 was clearly recognized in March 2014 by
at that time Germany's cancellor (the PM) Gerhard Schreder ( , March 10
th
, 2014:
http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/gerhard-sreder-intervenicija-na-krimu-je-krsenje-medjunarodnog-prava-ali-to-je-bilo-i-nase-
bombardovanje-srbije-1999.html). On this issue see documentary movie in three parts: NATO's Illegal War Against
Serbia (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joaNkHKxapk; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gaz8rzUW0Lc;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4vzr8l3FvU). On the identity and politics in the post-Yugoslavia's successor states,
see: Robert Hudson, Glenn Bowman, After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States, LondonNew
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
313
On the issue of destruction of ex-Yugoslavia and Kosovo question, see: F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), The Volatile
Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1994; Susan L.
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1995; Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavias Wars, New York: A Council on Foreign Relations, 1996;
James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, London: Hurst & Company,
1997; John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; Jelena Guskova, Istorija
jugoslovenske krize 19902000, III, Beograd: IGAM, 2003; Ian King, Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the
World Failed Kosovo, London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2006; David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
129


The NATO's military intervention against the FRY in MarchJune of 1999
(led by the USA) for the formal reason of protection of the human (Albanian) rights
in Kosovo,
314
marked a crucial step toward finishing the process of creation of the
global Pax Americana in the form of the NATO's World Order the NWO.
315
As
the NATO used force against the FRY without the UN Security Council sanctions
and permission and also without an official proclamation of the war we can call
this military intervention in fact as a pure agression against one sovereign
state.
316
In the Balkans NATO acquired not only a big military experience and an
opportunity to exhaust old and use new weapons,
317
but also managed to enhance
its activities, making its way to a global organization.
After the Kosovo War the UNs Security Council Resolution 1244 (from
June 1999) gave the mandate for the effective protection of the universal human
and minority rights values of all inhabitants on the territory of the southern
Serbias Autonomous Region of Kosovo & Metohija (in English language known
only as Kosovo).
318
At such a way, the responsibility for protection of human lives,

Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, LondonAnn Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006; David L. Phillips,
Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science, 2012; Misha
Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers 18042011, New YorkLondon: Penguin Books, 2012.
314
See: Ken Booth (ed.), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, LondonPortland, OR: Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd, 2001.
315
On the issue of the NWO and the Russian Balkan policy, see: Vladislav B. Sotirovi, The NATO World Order, the
Balkans and the Russian National Interest, Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Balcania: Scientific Articles in English, Vilnius:
Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences Press Edukologija, 2013, pp. 110129; James Headley, Russia and the
Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin, London: Hurst & Company, 2008.
316
Costis Hadjimichalis, Kosovo, 82 Days of an Undeclared and Unjust War: A Geopolitical Comment, European
Urban and Regional Studies, 7 (2), 2000, pp. 175180.
317
On the issue of used depleted uranium by the NATO during the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo War, see: Darryl P.
Arfsten, Kenneth R. Still, Glenn D. Ritchie, A Review of the Effects of Uranium and Depleted Uranium Exposure on
Reproduction and Fetal Development, Toxicology and Industrial Health, 17, 2001, pp. 180191. It has to be noticed
that the depleted uranium was used by the NATOs forces in 1999 bombing of the FRY in armour-penetrating munitions,
military vehicle armor, and aircraft, ship and missile counterweighting and ballasting applications. The combat
applications of the depleted uranium alloy in the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo War resulted in human acute
exposure to the depleted uraniums dust, vapor or aerosol, and to the chronic exposure from tissue embedding of the
depleted uraniums shrapnel fragments.
318
On the universal human and minority rights, see: Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, OxfordNew
York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Jan Knippers Black, The Politics of Human Rights Protection, Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010; Dinah L. Shelton, Paolo G. Carozza, Regional Protection of Human
Rights: Basic Documents, OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press, 2013. It has to be stressed that the Albanian
minority in Serbia within the region of Kosovo & Metohija in the Socialist Yugoslavia enjoyed all kind of minority
rights according to the international law and even above it. The region has its own president, constitution, parliament,
police, academy of science, law, press, education system, etc. In the other words, Albanian-run and dominated Kosovo &
Metohija was in fact an independent political subject in Yugoslavia equal with all Yugoslavia's republics. Within such
political conditions Kosovo Albanians developed a high range of the policy of the oppression and expulsion from the
region of the ethnic Serbs with a strong tendency to separate the region from the rest of Serbia and include it into a
Greater Albania. What Miloevis government did in 1989 it was abolishment of just political independence of both
autonomous regions in Serbia Vojvodina and Kosovo & Metohija in order to protect the country from territorial
destruction. However, even after 1989 Kosovo Albanians enjoyed minority rights according to the basic standards of the
international law. Many minorities in Europe or elsewhere today can just dream about minority rights left to Kosovo
Albanians by Serbias government in 1989. For the matter of comparison, for instance, the Kurds in Turkey (from 1999 a
candidate country for the EU membership) enjoy no single minority right for the very reason as they are not recognized
as minority group at all. From the legal point of view by the Turkish government, the Kurds do not even exist in Turkey
as the ethnocultural and linguistic group. For this reason, the process of Kurdish assimilation in Turkey is on the way on.
On the Kurdish question in Turkey, see: Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Cenk Saraoglu, Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and
Exclusion in Turkish Society, Tauris Academic Studies, 2010; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds: The Evolving Solution to
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
130


freedom and security in Kosovo was thus transferred to the international public
authorities, but in fact only to the NATO: the administration of the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo the UNMIK, and the international military forces - (the
KFOR, Kosovo Forces). Unfortunately, very soon this responsibility was totally
challenged as around 200.000 ethnic Serbs and members of other non-Albanian
communities were expelled from the region by the local ethnic Albanians led by
the KLAs veterans. At any case, mostly suffered the ethnic Serbs. It left today only
up to 3% of the non-Albanians in Kosovo in comparison to the pre-war situation
out of a total number of the non-Albanians in this province that was at least 12%.
Only up to March 2004 around 120 Serb Orthodox Christian religious objects and
cultural monuments were devastated or destroyed.
319




A member of the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army during the Kosovo War 19981999

However, the most terrible in the series of Kosovo Albanian eruptions of
violence against the Serbs living in this region was organized and carried out
between March 17
th

19
th
, 2004, having all the features of the Nazi-style organized

the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Noah Beratsky (ed.), The Kurds,
Greenhaven Press, 2013; Ramazan Aras, The Formation of Kurdishness in Turkey: Political Violence, Fear and Pain,
LondonNew York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.
319
On this issue, for instance, see: , . (, , ...),
: , 2006;
Video: Boris Malagurski, Kosovo: Can You Imagine?, Canada, 2009
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nHWsWOgtiw&index=2&list=PL999EB6ACC07FC959);
Video: La Guerra Infinita, First part, RAI, Italy
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ho2yXwa2dtE&index=21&list=PL999EB6ACC07FC959);
Video: La Guerra Infinita, Second part, RAI, Italy
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8EnMJXvK7Bw&index=37&list=PL999EB6ACC07FC959).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
131


pogroms. During the tragic events of the March Pogrom 2004, in a destructive
assault of tens of thousands by Kosovo Albanians led by armed groups of
redressed the KLAs veterans (the Kosovo Protection Corpus the KPC, a future
Kosovo Albanian regular army), a systematic ethnic cleansing of the remaining
Serbs was carried out, together with destruction of houses, other property,
cultural monuments and Serbian Orthodox Christian religious sites. Nevertheless,
the international civil and military forces in the region have been only stunned
and surprised what was going on. The March Pogrom 2004, which resulted,
according to the documentary sources, in the loss of several tens of lives, several
hundreds of wounded (including and the members of the KFOR as well), more
than 4.000 exiled ethnic Serbs, more than 800 Serbian houses set on fire and 35
destroyed or severely damaged Serbian Orthodox Christian churches and cultural
monuments,
320
surely revealed the real situation on the ground in Kosovo even 60
years after the Holocaust during the WWII. Unfortunately, the attempts of the
Serbs and especially by the government of Serbia at that time led by dr. Vojislav
Kotunica (a leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia) to call an international
attention to the human and minority rights violation situation in this region
proved to have been both unsuccessful and justified.
It is thus necessary to reiterate that ethnic cleansing of the Serbs (and
other non-Albanian population) in the region of Kosovo by the local Albanians
after the mid-June 1999 means putting into practice the annihilation of a Serbian
territory of exquisite historic, spiritual, political and cultural top-level significance
in terms of the Serbian nation, state and the Church, and its every-day visible
transformation into another Albanian state in the Balkans with a real wish and
possibility to unify it with a neighboring motherland Albania. At such a way, the
main geopolitical goal of the First Albanian Prizren League from June 1878 is
being brought to its attainment, including its implications for the Preevo Valley in
South-East Serbia, Western Macedonia up to the River of Vardar, a Greek portion
of the Epirus province and the Eastern Montenegro. It is known that the Albanian
political workers required within a framework of the First Albanian Prizren League
(18781881) a creation of a Greater Albania as an autonomous province in the
Ottoman Empire composed by all Albanian ethnic territories. More precisely, it
was required that four Ottoman provinces (vilayets) of Scodra, Ioannina, Bitola
and Kosovo would be combined into a single Albanian national Ottoman province
of Vilayet of Albania. However, in two out of four required Albanian provinces
Bitola and Kosovo, the ethnic Albanians did not compose even a single majority at
that time.
321
Nevertheless, such a Greater Albania with a capital in Tirana existed
during the WWII under Mussolinis and Hitlers protectorate.
The Albanian national movement, established in accordance with the
program of the First Albanian Prizren League in 1878, is keeping on with its
terrorist activities up today. It was particularly active in the period of Italian and
German supported Greater Albania from April 1941 to May 1945, when it
undertook the organization of the Albanian Quisling network of agents. During
this period of time around 100.000 Serbs from Kosovo & Metohija have been
expelled from their homes to addition of around 200.000 expelled during Socialist

320
March Pogrom in Kosovo and Metohija. March 1719, 2004 with a survay of destroyed and endangered Christian
cultural heritage, Belgrade: Ministry of Culture of the Republic of SerbiaMuseum in Pritina (displaced), 2004, p. 8.
321
. , : , : , 2007, p. 61.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
132


Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1980 lead by Josip Broz Tito who was of Slovene and
Croat ethnic origin born in Croatia and notorious anti-Serb.
322
The process of
articulation of the Albanian secessionist movement in Kosovo & Metohija
continued during the post-WWII Yugoslavia and was carried out by Kosovo
Albanian anti-Serb communist partocracy. The process became particularly
intense and successful in the period between 19681989. For instance, only from
1981 to 1987 there were 22.307 Serbs and Montenegrins who were forced to leave
Kosovo & Metohija.
323
The entrance of the NATOs troops in the region in June
1999 marks the beginning of the last stage of the Albanian-planned and carried
out the Final Solution of the Serbian Question on the territory of Kosovo &
Metohija a historical and cultural cradle of the Serbian nation, but in which only
the ethnic Albanians have to live in the future.



Destroyed Serbian Orthodox church Samodrea from the 14
th
century by Kosovo Albanians during the
March Pogrom 2004

In the light of the main Albanian goal to establish ethnically pure Greater
Albania it is understandable why it is so important to destroy any Serbian
trace on the territory defined by the aspirations. The Albanian terrorism has been
developing for more than two centuries. It has the profile of ethnically, i.e. the

322
On Tito's biography, see: Jasper Ridley, Tito. Biografija, Zagreb: Prometej, 2000; , . 20.
, : , 2011.
323
, , : , , (22. ) 1988, p. 38.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
133


Nazi-racist style motivated terrorism (like the Croat one), marked by excessive
animosity against the Serbs.
324
Its principal features are the following:
1. All kinds of repressive measures directed against the Serbian
population.
2. Carrying practical actions to force the Serbs to leave their homes.
3. Devastation of the Serbian Orthodox Christian religious objects and
other cultural monuments belonging to the Serbian nation which are
clearly testifying ten centuries long presence of the Serbs in Kosovo &
Metohija.
4. Destruction of the complete infrastructure used by the members of the
Serbian community.
5. Destruction of the Serbian cemeteries what means de facto destruction
of the historical roots of the Serbs in the region.
A long standing Muslim Albanian oppression and terror against the
Christian Orthodox Serbian community in Kosovo & Metohija is a specific
phenomenon with the grave consequences not only for the local Serbs. It became,
however, clear that sooner or later it will bring about severe problems for the rest
of Europe as well.
Ten years have passed from the March Pogrom 2004 and fifteen years
since the NATO's military aggression against a sovereign European state of the
FRY. At the moment, the crucial questions are:
1) What goals did NATO pursue?
2) Whether it managed to cope with its tasks in the following (15) years?
3) What did these years bring to those who threw bombs and those who
were attacked?
It has to be made clear that during the Kosovo War the NATO did not
achieve a military victory as it failed to destroy the army of the FRY and the
soldiers' morale. However, a campaign of bombing got the right political
atmosphere for destroying Serbia (purposely not so much Montenegro) and for
imposing their conditions on the Serbian government, including the rules of the
cooperation with the EU, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (in the Hague) and with the NATO as well. After June 1999 Serbia lost
almost all opportunities to control its own state's sovereignty, territorial integrity
and national security becoming in a pure sense of meaning a western political and
economic colony. After several years of injustice and punishment by the West
before 1999 the Serbs as a nation lost the will to fight, to resist as they were
practically alone when tried to repel the attack of the powerful western military
alliance in MarchJune 1999. As a consequence, after June 1999 it became much
easier for the West to continue a process of destruction of Yugoslavia and to carry
out a policy of transforming the region into its own colonial domain with occupied
Kosovo & Metohija as the best example of die rckkehr des kolonialismus.
325

In October 2000 Slobodan Milosevi, who was a head of Serbia for ten
years, was ousted by the street revolution putsch-style like it was done with

324
On terrorism in Yugoslavia, see: , , : , 2002.
325
Hannes Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma, Beograd: Albatros Plus, 2009 (original title:
Experiment Kosovo: Die Rckkehr des Kolonialismus).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
134


Ukrainian president Viktor Janukovich in Kiev in February 2004.
326
At first sight,
the move came as unexpected, easy and legal, in the other words - Yugoslavia's
home affair. However, the Revolution of the Fifth October 2000 in Belgrade, in
fact, had been very thoroughly prepared by special divisions (Otpor or
Resistance) sponsored by the West, especially by the CIA. The method proved to
be so successful that, according to one western documentary movie based on the
testimonies by the members of the Serbian Otpor movement, it was later used in
Georgia (the Rose Revolution in November 2003) and Ukraine (the Orange
Revolution from late November 2004 to January 2005 and finally in 2013/2014),
but failed in Moldova and Iran in 2009. The same source claims that the Georgian
opposition were taught in Serbia, while their Ukrainian colleagues of the Orange
Revolution were drilled also in Serbia and in Georgia.
327

From the time of the end of the Cold War (1989) Serbia remained as a
symbol of independence and disobedience to the NATO's World Order in Europe.
However, the new authorities in Serbia after October 2000 obeyed to the NATO's
World Order and everything went smoothly. The dismemberment of the FRY
started when having arrived in Belgrade in February 2003, Javier Solana, a top
the EU representative and official, suggested to a group of officials from Serbia and
Montenegro to admit that the FRY ceased to exist, and adopt the Constitution
charter, written in Brussels. Its text was proclaiming, for the beginning, the
appearance of a new country. Solana did not face any resistance. Consequently,
the FRY was renamed to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and officially
abolished the name ''Yugoslavia'' that was in official use from 1929. In 2006
Montenegro and Serbia declared independence, thereby ending the common
South Slavic state (only Bulgarians have been out from this state as the South
Slavs) established in 1918 under the original name of the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (this name was used till 1929). It was Javier Solana who did
it regardless the fact that he up today remains a war criminal for majority of the
Serbs as he bombed their country in 1999 as the General Secretary of the NATO
killing 3.500 citizens of Serbia including and children and women with a material
damage to the country around 200.000 billion US $.
328

After the year of 2000 it was easier to implement the NATO's plans which
seemed simply fantastic under Slobodan Miloevi as president of Serbia and later
the FRY.
329
The last Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) was undermined, its
integration slowed down till final dissolution in 2006 and Serbia's strength
exhausted. What the NATO, USA and EU failed to achieve in the castle of
Rambouillet (in France) in 1998/1999 (during the ultimatum-negotiations with S.
Miloevi on Kosovo crisis) and through 78 days of cruel and inhuman bombing in
MarchJune 1999, they got on July 18th, 2005, when Serbia and Montenegro
signed a deal with the NATO "On the Lines of Communication". This was a

326
On the street-putsch in Ukraine in February 2004, see: Vitrenko Says World Must Name Neo-Nazi Putsch in
Ukraine; Cites Zepp-LaRouche on Danger of World War III (http://larouchepac.com/node/29889).
327
Video: Beyond the Revolutions: The CIA's Otpor Organization
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWhtdPZNsns).
328
On the NATO's humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia, see: David N. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian
Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.
329
On Slobodan Miloevi from the western perspective, see: Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the destruction of
Yugoslavia, DurhamLondon: Duke University Press, 2002; Adam LeBor, Milosevic. A Biography,
LondonBerlinNew YorkSydney: Bloomsbury, 2012.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
135


technical agreement which allows the NATO's personnel and equipment to transit
through the country. Under the deal, the NATO could enjoy such opportunities for
quite a long time - "until all peacekeeping operations in the Balkans are over".
Thus the NATO was given the green light to enlarge its presence in the region and
control the army of both Serbia and Montenegro. On April 1st, 2009 Albania and
Croatia have completed the accession process, and have joined the NATO as full
members and at a such a way surrounding Serbia and Montenegro by NATO
members from all sides except from Bosnian-Herzegovinian. Today the Balkans
are NATO's permanent military base. For instance, in October 2008 Serbia's
defence minister and the NATO's officials signed agreement on information
security, which allows the NATO to control everyone who deals with their
documents or just cooperates with them. For the very reason the NATO insisted on
secrecy of the negotiations with Serbia.



One of burned Serbian houses in March 2004 by Kosovo Albanians
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
136


The aftermath of the 1999 aggression on Serbia and Montenegro for the
NATO was the most favourable. Nobody condemned NATO and they felt even more
confident in global perspective (Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003...). In the recent
years the world has witnessed that the NATO was making several attempts of its
own expansion. Currently, the NATO's military bloc is occupying more positions at
the Balkans, using old and building new military camps with attempt to include
into its organization Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the later one after
cancellation of the Republic of Srpska). Still existing a huge NATO's military camp
Bondsteel in Kosovo & Metohija is the best proof that the region is going to be
under the US/NATO's dominance for a longer period of time if the balance between
the Great Powers (the US/Russia/China) will not be changed. However, the
current crisis over Ukraine is the first herald of such change, i.e. of the beginning
of the new Cold War era.
The most disappointed fact in the present post-war Kosovo reality is for
sure an ethnic and cultural cleansing of all non-Albanians and not-Albanian
cultural heritage under the NATO/KFOR/EULEX/UNMIK umbrella. The proofs are
evident and visible on every corner of Kosovo territory, but purposely not covered
by the western mass media and politicians. For instance, on the arrival of the
KFOR (an international, but in fact the NATO's Kosovo Forces) and the UNMIK
(the United Nations' Mission in Kosovo) to Kosovo & Metohija in 1999, all names
of the towns and streets in this province were renamed to have the (Muslim)
Albanian forms or new names. The monuments to Serbian heroes like the
monument devoted to duke Lazar (who led the Serbian Christian army during the
Kosovo Battle on June 28th, 1389 against the Muslim Turks) in the town of
Gnjilane, were demolished. The Serbs were and are getting killed, assassinated,
wounded and abducted, their houses burned to the ground. As we mentioned
earlier, the most infamous ethnic cleansing was done between March 17th and
19th 2004 the March Pogrom.
As of today, a number of the Serbs that were killed or went missing in
Kosovo & Metohija from June 1999 onward (after the KFOR arrived), is measured
in thousands, the number of demolished Serbian Christian Orthodox churches
and monasteries is measured in hundreds, and the number of burned down
Serbian houses in tens of thousands. Even though the KFOR had as much as
50.000 soldiers in the beginning as well as several thousand of policemen and
civilian mission members, mainly none of the above mentioned crimes have been
solved. In fact, murdering a Serb in Kosovo is not considered as a crime, on a
contrary, the murderers of children and the elderly are being rewarded as heroes
by their ethnic Albanian compatriots. The province is almost ethnically cleaned
like Albania and Croatia. For the matter-of-fact, according to the last pre-war
official Yugoslav census of 1991 there were 13% of non-Albanians in Kosovo &
Metohija (in reality surely more). However, it is estimated that today 97% of
Kosovo & Metohija's population is only the ethnic Albanian. In the light of the
main national goal by the Albanians the establishment of another Albanian state
in the Balkans and Europe, as the first step towards the pan-Albanian state
unification we can understand why it is important to destroy any Serbian trace
in the territory defined by the aspirations.
330


330
On this issue, see: Petar V. Gruji, Kosovo Knot and Destruction of Yugoslavia, Vilnius, 2014 (http://kosovo-
knot.webs.com/).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
137


The final stage of cutting of Kosovo & Metohija from their motherland of
Serbia came on February 17th, 2008 when Kosovo Albanians received
Washington's permission to proclaim its formal (quasi)independence what
happened in fact later than expected by Russia and China. At the UN Security
Council Moscow said no to Kosovo's independence as Russia respects interests
of Serbia and officially condemns all attempts to impose decisions on other
members of the international community by breaking the international law (in the
Kosovo & Metohija case it is the UN Resolution 1244). The fact is that the Serbs
have not forgotten Kosovo, but have not done much about it either. Now there are
some 80 states that recognized Kosovo independence, including 23 EU and 24
NATO members (out of 192 UNO members).
331
Almost all of them are the
neighbours of Serbia and with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina all the ex-
Yugoslav republics have recognized Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina did not recognize
it for the very reason: the Republic of Srpska, still as an autonomous political unit
within Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside with the Muslim-Croat Federation according
to the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement in 1995, has and use the veto right. At the
moment, in Kosovo there is the EULEX (European civil mission) and the Kosovo
issue is gradually being moved out of the UNO jurisdiction and out of reach of the
Russian veto in the UN Security Council becoming more and more the NATO and
the EU governed territory. There is and the so-called Kosovo Security Forces (in
fact the redressed members of the KLA, which is formed according to Martti
Ahtisaari's plan with active support from the NATO to be in the next years
transformed into the regular Army of the Republic of Kosovo.
What is true about today political reality in Kosovo & Metohija is a fact that
this territory in a form of a client (quasi)state is given to be administered by the
members of the KLA a military organization which was in 1998 proclaimed by
the US administration as a terrorist one. Anyway, the KLA is the first successful
rebellious movement and terrorist organisation in Europe after the WWII. The
movement was originally developed from a tiny Albanian diaspora in Switzerland
in the second half of the 1980s to around 18.000 soldiers
332
financed and clearly
supported by all means by the US administration.
333
In order to realize its own
crucial political task a separation of Kosovo & Metohija province from the rest of
Serbia with a possibility to unite it with Albania, the KLA was allied with the NATO
between 19971999. The KLA's strategy of the war terror was based on a long
tradition of the Albanians to oppose by arms any organized authority in a form of
a state from the Ottoman time up today. However, the military intervention by the
NATO in 1999 against Serbia and Montenegro over the Kosovo question was
portrayed in the American and the West European media as a necessary step to
prevent the Serbian armed forces from repeating the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. But the truth was that Serbia trained its military on Kosovo &
Metohija because of an ongoing armed struggle by the KLA's terrorist and

331
On Kosovo's transition to (quasi)independence, see: Aidan Hehir (ed.), Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The
International Community and the Transition to Independence, LondonNew York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group,
2010. On the question of contested states, see: Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics, LondonNew
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
332
James Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 19482001, London: C. Hurst
& Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2012, the back cover. This book is official history of the KLA ordered and financed by the
Albanian-run Kosovo government composed by the KLA veterans.
333
Sinisa Ljepojevic, Kosovo Murky Reality, Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorsHouse, 2008, p. 1.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
138


separatist organization to wrest independence from Serbia for the sake of creation
of a Greater Albania with ethnically pure Kosovo & Metohija and later on the
western parts of the FYR of Macedonia, the Eastern Montenegro and the Greek
Epirus.
334

Nevertheless, an active US President Barrack Obama congratulated at the
very beginning of his presidential mandate the leaders of the multiethnic,
independent and democratic Kosovo regardless to the facts that those leaders
(especially Hashim Tachi the Snake and Ramush Haradinay) are proved to be
notorious war criminals, that the region (state?) is not either multicultural, nor
really independent and particularly not democratic one. However, there are several
official EU's declarations and unofficial political statements encouraging Belgrade
and Pritina to cooperate and develop neighbourly relations what practically
means for Serbia that Belgrade has firstly to recognize Albanian Kosovo
independence in order to become the EU member state after the years or even
decades of negotiations. The another fact is that the process of international
recognizing of the Kosovo's independence is much slower that Pritina and
Washington expected at the beginning. From the time of Kosovo's self-
proclamation of independence Serbia's greatest diplomatic success is the
majority of votes in 2008 of the UNO General Assembly supporting the decision
that the case of Kosovo independence should be considered by the International
Court of Justice in the Hague (established in 1899). On the one hand, the Court's
decision on the issue in July 2010 was very favourable for Kosovo's Albanian (the
KLA's) separatists and terrorists as it was concluded a verdict that an unilateral
proclamation of Kosovo's independence in February 2008 was done within a
framework of the international law. However, on the other hand, the Court's
verdict in 2010 already became also very favourable for separatism movements
elsewhere like in March 2014 for the separatists in Crimean Peninsula or maybe
soon for their colleagues from Catalonia, Scotland, the Northern Italy (Lega
Nord)...
335
Kosovo's self-proclamation of independence has a direct domino effect
only a few months later when in August 2008 the South Ossetia and Abkhazia did
the same from Georgia.
336

The (murky) reality in the present day Kosovo & Metohija, on the other
side, is that there is not a single ethnic Albanian party at the deeply divided
Kosovo's political scene which would be ready to accept a peaceful reintegration

334
See pro-Albanian and pro-western points of view on historical background for the KLA with described its activities
up to and including the NATO intervention: Henry H. Perritt Jr. Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of An
Insurgency, University of Illinois, 2008. The Albanian KLA is not lesser separatist and terrorist than, for instance, the
Kurdish PKK. However, it is allowed for the Turkish government by the international community to use all legal and
other means to fight the PKK including and a clear violation of the human rights. On the question of the PKK party, see:
Ali Kemal zcan, Turkeys Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah calan, LondonNew York:
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006; Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The Kurdish Fight for Independence, New
YorkLondon: New York University Press, 2007; Abdullah calan, Prison Writings: The PKK and the Kurdish
Question in the 21
st
Century, London: Transmedia Publishing Ltd, 2011; Charles Strozier, James Frank, The PKK:
Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions, VDM-Verlag Dr. Mller, 2011.
335
On Lega Nord, see: Anna Cento Bull, Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Manlio Graziano, The Failure of Italian Nationhood: The Geopolitics of a Troubled Identity,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism,
Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord, Montreal & KingstonLondonIthaca: McGill-Queens University Press, 2011.
336
Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Kosovo and the Caucasus: A Domino Effect,Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Balcania: Scientific
Articles in English, Vilnius: Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences Press Edukologija, 2013, pp. 130141.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
139


of the region into Serbia's political sphere and there is no a single ethnic Albanian
politician who is not concerned about the danger posed by the division of Kosovo
to the Albanian (major) part and Serbian (minor) part and does not oppose
slightest suggestions of the Serbian autonomy for the northern portion of Kosovo
& Metohija. However, what is more important: Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders
and even the citizens of the Albanian ethnic origin do not even consider national
dilemma like Europe or independence! There is no doubt what their answer is
going to be in that case. On the other side, what is going on about and in Serbia?
The answer is that a nation unable to make a choice between a territorial integrity
on the one side, and a membership in an international association (although an
important one) on the other, i.e. a nation who cannot choose between these two
priorities really deserves to lose both.
At the end, if the international law and fixed order are broken on the one
side of the globe (ex. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) it is nothing strange to expect that
the same law and order are going to be broken somewhere else (ex. at the
Caucasus, Ukraine, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, France...) following the logic of
the so-called domino effect reaction in the international relations. Finally, it has
to be noted that if the Albanian extremism is not stopped, the FYR of Macedonia
and Montenegro will have to give parts of their territories populated by the ethnic
Albanians (the Western Macedonia and the Eastern Montenegro). In this case,
Europe will have to decide how to discuss the issue of the borders' revision and
how to recognize a new enlarged state of (the Greater) Albania.

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144


Vladislav B. Sotirovi
Mykolas Romeris University
Faculty of Politics and Management
Institute of Political Sciences
Vilnius, Lithuania


Anti-Serbian Collaboration Between Tito's
Partisans and Paveli's Ustashi in the World
War II

Abstract: The aim of this article is to give a significant contribution to both Balkan and
South Slavic historiography in clarification of the question of direct and indirect military-
political cooperation between the Partisans of Corporal and Marshal Josip Broz Tito and
the Ustashi leader (Poglavnik) Ante Paveli on the territory of the Independent State of
Croatia during the World War II (19411945) and to highlight the ideological and political
roots and objectives of this cooperation. The article is mainly based on the primary
archival documents housed in Belgrade, but never used by the official states Titoist
historiography, and on the testimonies of participants in historical events from the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (the so-called Chetniks) who were after 1945 in exile.
Keywords: Partisans, Ustashi, Josip Broz Tito, Ante Paveli, Independent State of Croatia,
Chetniks, World War II, Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland

Titographic history against the scientific historiography

As more time passes after the death of the greatest son of our nations and
nationalities Josip Broz Tito (18921980), and as more and more are fading the
tapes of the feature films about heroic and patriotic combats of Titos Partisans
made by his regime propaganda (such as Battle of Neretva, Battle of Sutjeska,
Republic of Uice, Battle for the Southern Railway, Red Land, Walter
Defends Sarajevo, Raid on Drvar...)
337
against the occupiers and domestic

337
The feature film Battle of Neretva was the most expensive film ever made in Socialist Yugoslavia. It was
extremely important for the Yugoslav regime that in those films will starring well-known Hollywood and other foreign
actors in order to give to the regime more moral and political credibility from historical perspective. This credibility was
important concerning both and the people of Yugoslavia and the international community, especially regarding the
Western countries of the liberal democracy. For instance, in the movie Battle of Neretva together with the Yugoslav
actors, the most important roles are given to Orson Welles, Franco Nero, Yul Brynner and Sergei Bondarchuk. In the
film Battle of Sutjeska, the role of J. B. Tito, as a Partisan military leader, plays Richard Burton. However, all of these
films are based on invented stories rather than on historical facts. Some of them are based on a pure falsification of
historical truth like the film Battle for the Southern Railway, directed by Zdravko Velimirovi, in which the
destructions of the railways in Serbia and other sabotage actions committed by the forces of General Dragoljub
Mihailovi the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (named by Germans, Titos Partisans and the Croats as the Chetniks)
simply are attributed to Tito's Partisans. According to some experts, the Yugoslav state invested more money for making
such kind of war-Partisan films than to all other films together for the very simple reason: the war-Partisan films
were the most effective public lessons of history of the Yugoslav peoples in the World War II. They have been shown in
primary and secondary schools and the students were taken to the cinemas to watch them as a part of history class
curriculum. The contents of the films, of course, have been properly matched with the contents of the compulsory school
history teaching program. Moreover, these films had even the function of the textbooks. However, not one of these war-
Partisan feature films is made according to the real historical events so that they all remain in the realm of political
propaganda of a totalitarian one-party system and the regime (see more in: .,
, 79121). Recording of these films was directly supported by the Yugoslav Peoples Army as it is noticed at
the beginning of the film Republic of Uice.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
145


quislings, the truth about the true character of this struggle and the World War II
in the areas of the Independent State of Croatia from 1941 to 1945 is becoming re-
researched by a critical Serbian historiography.
During Tito's Yugoslavia and, unfortunately, long time after 1991 the
Yugoslav history of the World War II was, and still in many cases is, treated only
as a history. However, we believe it is a time for the real science to deal with this
period of the Yugoslav past, what means that finally a historiography has to
replace a quasi-science of politicized Titography. A phenomenon of the
revolutionary taking power in Yugoslavia during the World War II by Tito's
Communists and Partisans, provoking for that purpose a civil war, still remains
incompletely explained in the Yugoslav historiography due to a number of
circumstances. The most important are in our opinion the next two: 1) a lack of
original and authentic archival material; and 2) unwillingness and fear of the
home Yugoslav historians to reveal the truth. What concerns the lack of relevant
(original and authentic) historical sources for the period of the civil war and violent
Communist revolution in Yugoslavia during the World War II, the main reasons for
such de facto state of affairs are:
Revolutionary winners in the civil war, Tito's Partisans (officially called
by themselvs as the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia) and the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia, organized a deliberate and well-
orchestrated policy of removal, and even physical destruction, of the
archival material of both their own documents and the documents of
their political enemies. The Titoists succeeded in short period of time
after their military occupation of Belgrade and Serbia in October-
November 1944 to eliminate almost all compromising authentic and
original documents, which could challenge to a greater or lesser extent,
politically coloured Titoist propaganda within the framework of the
official (quasi)-historiography about the war years of 19411945. Thus,
for example, in the Yugoslav archives the researcher can not find the key
documents of Tito's Partisans open cooperation and collaboration with
the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi, Albanian (Shquipetar) Fascist detachments
and the German Nazi occupation forces, as well as an open anti-Serbian
policy and military actions by Tito's Supreme Command of his
revolutionary the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and its
subordinated operational command headquarters. Therefore, preserved
German and Italian documents (archival material) and the memoirs
(including and the diaries) of German and Italian commanders (for
instance, by the General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau from Austria in
service of the Wehrmacht)
338
are essential for uncovering the truth
about the policies and real political objectives of Tito's forces, fighting for
overtaking a political power in Yugoslavia in 19411945.
The same winner in the civil war was after 1945 inserting for his
enemies compromising archival documents and photos either to its own
or enemy's files, which even today could be found in the archives on the
territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Many of such inserted documents have been
written after the war to be as a corpus delicti of the anti-people's policy

338
See, for instance: Kriegsarchiv Wien (KAW), Glaise von Horstenau's Inheritance (B/67) including and his diary notes
from Zagreb from April 1941 to September 1944 (KAW, B/67-diary); Kazimirovi, Nemaki general u Zagrebu.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
146


of the anti-communist and anti-fascist forces, but such policy of
inserting the forgery and falsificated historical documents and photos
was systematically applied mostly to compromise the Supremme Staff
and other subordinated commanders of the Yugoslav Army in the
Fatherland under the leadership of General Dragoljub Draa
Mihailovi.
339

The reason for this policy of inserting the forgery documents and other
material to the Chetnik files can be easily explained and understood if it is

339
There are documents (i.e., the letters) with forged signatures of the commander of the Royal Mountain Guard
Nikola Kalabi, who was under direct command by General Mihailovi (as for example, the letter from December
1920
th
, 1945), and retouched photos of the Chetnik commanders, but mostly of Kalabi, who was attributed by the
Communists to false betrayal of the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. According to the
Communist version, only due to this betrayal General Mihailovi became located and arrested by the Titoist security
service (led by Aleksandar Rankovi - Leka) in March 1946. The most insidious Titoists arson against General
Mihailovi is allegedly his, but in fact forged letter, (however in two versions and typed in the Latin alphabet), which is
supposedly Draa Mihailovi sent to Dr. ALOIS STEPINAC, the Archbishop of Zagreb and the Croatian Metropolitan
(d-ru ALOJZIJU STEPINCU, nadbiskupu zagrebakom i metropoliti hrvatskom) on April 15
th
, 1945. In the letter
General Mihailovi was asking Archbishop Stepinac for close cooperation with the Croatian people (i.e., with the
Ustashi and Home Guard soldiers) with Stepinac's blessing in order to halt the victory of the Communist high tide. If
nothing else, to avoid the discussion of originality and authenticity of the letter from the technical point of view, it would
be absolutely illogical that before the very end of the war, General Mihailovi required close cooperation with the Croat
Nazi Ustashi and Croatias Home Guard soldiers (domobrani) against whom he was fighting during the whole war and
who (especially Ustashi, composed by the Croats and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim Bosniaks) committed terrible
crimes of genocide against the Serb Orthodox inhabitants in Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Srem and Bosnia
(i.e., on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia). Moreover, it was a time when the Ustashi and Home Guard
detachments were preparing to leave Yugoslavia in order to surrender to the American and British military authorities in
Austria or Italy. Finally, General Mihailovi was from the very beginning of the war absolutely aware that Pavelis
Ustashi and the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito are of the same anti-Serb army fighting for the Croat national interest.
However, in this case it is of extreme surprising the sloppiness of the Titoist forgers who made the letter of the same
matter in two different variants, but forgot to destroy the first (older) one, or at least to move it to safety. Specifically, in
the shorthand notes to the Communist called the process of the century, i.e. the process to General Mihailovi in 1946
in Topider in Belgrade, Mihailovis facsimile letter to Archbishop Stepinac was released on a single page (97-th), but
39 years later the same letter was published in the Titoist collection of the Chetnik documents in the 14
th
book in the 4
th

volume on two pages (not on one page as the first version was written). In this second version of the letter, in
comparison to the first one, it was changed the place of the address and the date of writing (typing) next to the last
letters paragraph, which appears in the later version on the second page of the letter. In the first version of this alleged
letter by General Mihailovi to Archbishop Stepinac the caption Supreme Command, April 15
th
, 1945, Army General
with Mihailovis signature is below the text of the whole letter, but in the second version of the letter the caption
Supreme Command, April 15
th
, 1945 is put at the upper right corner of the letter over the beginning of the text of it.
Both of these letters, nevertheless, do not have the appropriate Command memorandum, seal and a number under which
they were registered in contrast to the original and authentic documents issued by the Supreme Command of the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. It is known that General Mihailovi was signing himself as a (eneral), but
not as (general) as it is in this case (, , 365; Collection of the documents and
information, XIV/4, 989990. See also: Zeevi, Dokumenta sa suenja Ravnogorskom pokretu; Izdajnik i ratni zloinac
Draa Mihailovi pred sudom). This alleged letter to Archbishop Stepinac dated on April 15
th
, 1945 has and falsified
signature of General Mihailovi like in some other forged letters (for instance, to Brai or to Mate Matievi). Original
and authentic Mihailovis Latin script signature can be found in his letter to the Greek General Zervas, which is written
in French language. This letter to General Zervas is dated on February 5
th
, 1944 and verified with clearly legible stamp
Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, that is, however, not the case, for example, with the stamp on the
letter dated on November 29
th
, 1944 (29. studenog) to Mate Matievi (,
, 36). The U.S. findings on how Titoist propaganda experts after the World War II created the photographs of
alleged Mihailovis army collaboration with the Germans and the Ustashi are published in the recent book: ,
. . In the same book it can be found a new evidence of how it is mounted the judicial
process against General Mihailovi in Topider in 1946, or in other words, how the Titoists removed the original
documents from the files issued by the authorities of Mihailovis Chetniks during the war and instead of them were
putting the fake documents as the originals. The book is also offering the proves on the Communist torture of the arrested
General.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
147


known that from the very beginning of the civil war between Tito's Partisans and
Serbia's patriots in July 1941 and especially between Tito's detachments and
Mihailovi's Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland from November 1941 until March
1946, when Mihailovi was arrested by the Communist security forces, the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland was the only military and political enemy who
seriously stood on the way to the Communist takingover the power in the whole
country. Knowing the pre-war political aims of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,
it is not surprising that its armed forces began the civil war on July 7th, 1941 in
Western Serbia, and tried to finish it with capturing Mihailovi alive what they
finally succeeded on March 13th, 1946 in a house on the road Vardite-Priboj in
Eastern Bosnia under still unknown circumstances.
340
The Titoists needed the
General much more alive than dead in order to publically, in the name of the
people, discriminate him, his movement and the Yugoslav Government in Exile
(in London) in a rigged process of the Stalinist type for collaboration with the
occupying forces, and finally to formally legalize their revolutionary way of taking
power in the country. However, there were exactlly Tito's Partisans who on their
way to power collaborated during the war with the foreign invaders and primarily
with their domestic satellites, and most of all with the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi.

With historical sources for the historiography against the Titographic
history

As for clarifying the issue whom Titos Partisans kept as their main, if not
perhaps the only, political-military opponent and enemy during the entire World
War II in Yugoslavia, that is directly related to the topic of this article - the
Partisan cooperation and collaboration with the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi, we will
here present the transcript of one archival, original and authentic Partisan
document from the period of their struggle for the national liberation. From this
document is clear against whom the Partisans were fighting and against whom
they did not fought, but what is the most important it is clear from the document
what fore they fought four years (this document is written in Latin letters and
consists grammatical and linguistic errors):

Dear Isa, you will wonder how I presented you this letter. But let it not make
doubt to you. When we will once meet you, we will explain everything. Here
is what it is about. You have with the Sixth Brigade, augmented with the
parts of the Majevica of Fruka Gora detachment, immediately to move
between Gorade and Medjedje on Sandak side and there to clean terrain
from the Chetniks in the direction of Zlatibor and ajnie. Here you will catch
a connection with the left wing of our First Division and receive further
directives.

On your way, i.e., during the move, do not fight with the Germans, do not
undertake any action on the railway as it is in the interest of our current
operations. Send even before your move your couriers towards Ustikolina,
where they will catch a connection with our units.

340
13. 1946. , -,
(, , III, 314).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
148



Our most important task now is to destroy the Chetniks of Draa Mihajlovi
and break his administrative machine which is the greatest threat for the
further national-liberation struggle.

Everything else you will find out when we meet.

In the Eastern Bosnia, leave smaller detachments whose task will now be to
fight against the Chetniks and to mobilize the new men. Making stronger of
the Sixth Brigade must not go at the expense of speed of moving to direction
indicated above.

29-III-1943 g.

With comradely greetings
(signed by Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Rankovi and Sreten ujovi)
341


From this archival corpus delicti we think that it is clear who was the only
enemy to Titos revolutionaries who were in Yugoslavia nothing else but only the
client detachments of Stalin's Red Army.
342
It is of extreme importance to
emphasize that this document is signed by Josip Broz Tito himself. We would like
to stress as well and the fact that his political partys leadership several times at
the Comminterns meetings in Moscow in the interwar period were issuing the
directives to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a Greater Serbia created by the
Versailles Order after the Great War. Therefore, it is not surprise that in this
document the Chetniks of Draa Mihailovi (considered as the Serb nationalists)

341
Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI), Belgrade, Staff of the Supreme Command, Chetnik Archives, K-
12, 30/12 (Letter to Isa, March 29th, 1943). In original language:

Dragi Iso, malo e te zauditi nain na koji ti dostavljam ovo pismo. Ali neka to ne dovodi u sumnju. Kad se
jednom sastanemo objasniemo vam sve. Evo o emu se radi.

Sa VI Brigadom, pojaanom sa delovima majevikog odreda ili frukogorskog, hitno se prebacite izmeu
Gorada i Medjedje na sandaku stranu i istite teren od etnika u pravcu Zaborka i ajnia. Ovde ete
uhvatiti vezu sa levim krilom nae I Divizije i dobiti dalje direktive.

Na svome putu, tj prilikom prebacivanja ne sukobljavajte se sa Nemcima, ne preduzimajte ma kakve akcije na
pruzi, jer je to u interesu sadanjih naih operacija. Jo pre vaega prelaza poaljite kurire u pravcu
Ustikoline, gde e uhvatiti vezu sa naim jedinicama.

Najvaniji na zadatak sada jeste unititi etnike Drae Mihajlovia i razbiti njegov upravni aparat koji
predstavlja najveu opasnost za daljnji tok narodno-oslobodilake borbe.
Sve ostalo saznaete kad se sastanemo.

U istonoj Bosni ostavite manje odrede iji e zadatak za sada biti borba protiv etnika i mobilizacija novog
ljudstva. Pojaavanje VI Brigade nesme ii na raun brzine pokreta u gore predvidjenom pravcu.

29-III-1943 g.

S drugarskim pozdravom (potpisali Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Rankovi i Sreten ujovi)
342
About the relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union see in: Sotirovi, Shaping the
Borderlands of Pax Sovietica Commonwealth in Central and Southeastern Europe.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
149


are the only real enemy who was standing on the Communist way to build a new
Socialist Yugoslavia primarily at the expense of the Serb national interests.
343

A similar letter to the above one, which was sent to the Communist
commander Isa Jovanovi, and signed by the top Communist leadership Tito,
Rankovi and ujovi, is a letter in the form of a military order, which was written
and signed by Tito on March 30
th
, 1943. This letter (also written in the Latin
script) is addressed to the Headquarters of the Bosnian Corps of the Peoples
Liberation Army of Yugoslavia:

All your fights direct against the Chetniks in Central Bosnia and Krajina,
and fight only in defense against the Ustashi if you are attacked by them.
344


Official Yugoslav state historiography of the 1980s and the 1990s, has
quite appropriate responses to these corpus delicti archival documents from the
World War II that there was an apparently only separate case, which can be
explained by at that time military and political situation on the front in western
parts of Yugoslavia as the Germans organized the military operation Weiss 1 and
Weiss 2 (the Battle of Neretva) against Tito's Partisans and as it is known, a
drowning man clutching at straws and catches. However, the central point of
Titos offer to the Germans in March 1943 was not the only tactical maneouvre
due to the new unfavorable situation in order to save a head, but rather it was a
strategic policy and practical actions by Brozs Supreme Command during the
entire World War II in Yugoslavia. The truth was that the Germans organized
offensive Weiss 1 and 2 Weiss not against Titos Partisans, but in fact against
Mihailovis Chetniks in order to destroy them in Krajina, Bosnia, Herzegovina and
Dalmatia prior to the Allied landings on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea.
345
By
making a direct agreement with Titos political representatives of the Supreme
Command in March in 1943 (The March Agreement) the Germans were actually
sent the Partisans to the Chetniks on the Neretva River in order to do the job for
them. Titos fighters met the German requirements singing the song the Partisans
prepare your machine guns to fire at the King and the Englishmen!
346
Thus, the

343
About the anti-Serbian character of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia see in: Sotirovi,
.
344
Archives of the Military-Historical Institute, Belgrade, A copy of Tito's personal letter. In original language:

Svu vau borbu upotrebite protiv etnika u centralnoj Bosni i Krajini, a odbrambenu borbu voditi protiv
ustaa ako vas napadnu.
345
On direct cooperation between Titos Partisans and Pavelics Ustashi in the area of the so-called Republic of Biha
indicates and German general Fortner who commanded the German 718-th Division. In his report of December 26
th
,
1942 it was assessed that the Communists ruled the territory around Biha in the length of 250 km. and the width of 100
km. On this territory according to him, there were about 63,000 Partisans. In a new report of January 6
th
, 1943 General
Fortner reported to his superiors that Titos Partisans in this region could get the booty in food and weapons without
problems from the garrisons held by Croatian Home Guard (domobrani) and the Ustashi (Collection of the documents
and information, vol. XII, book 2, 952; Collection of the documents and information, vol. XII, book 3, 18). It has to be
noticed that all the so-called liberated territories by the Partisans westward from the River of Drina were in the
Independent State of Croatia and that in fact they were given to them by the Croat Nazi regime in Zagreb. The
garrisons held by the Croatian Home Guard and the Ustashi which have been under the attack by the Partisans in fact
were not defended and they very quickly surrendered. That was a game played by both the Partisans and the Croatian
armed forces as a very smart way how to provide the Partisans with the food, arms, ammunition and medicaments. Of
course, the local German commanders new very well what was going on.
346
The song was in original language: Partizani spremte mitraljeze da pucamo na kralja i Engleze!.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
150


common and the only enemy of both the Germans and the Partisans were the
Chetniks (the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland) led by General Dragoljub Draa
Mihailovi. The Chetniks were in the spring of 1943 prepared to wait and accept
the Anglo-American allies in Dalmatia. For the Germans, the Anglo-American
invasion of Dalmatian and/or Montenegrin sea cost meant the opening of a second
front in Europe and retreat back to Germany, while the same Anglo-American
action with the help of the Chetniks meant for Titos Partisans the end of a policy
of the Communist takeover of Yugoslavia.
347

It is necessary to draw attention to the episode from the Soviet Republic
of Biha in Bosnia-Herzegovina established by Titos Partisans in 1942 when the
Partisans when leaving the territory of Biha under the German offensive in Spring
1943 by force launched a large part of Serbian civilians with them, but not
Croatian and Muslim, to the River of Neretva and possibly further towards Serbia.
It was moved by force c. 40,000-50,000 Serbian civilians and this Partisan action
had a three-fold function: 1) the civilians were the shield for the Communist
leadership and the Partisan detachments who were going to fight the crucial battle
against the Royal Chetniks on the left bank of the River of Neretva; 2) in this way
the (anti-Serb) ethnic cleansing of the area was done; and 3) the Serbian civilians
were prevented to escape to the neighboring safe area around Gacko which was
under the Chetnik control. On this occasion the Supreme Commander of the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, General Draa Mihailovi sent to the Yugoslav
Government in London the following dispatch:

Because of this Communist terror the masses of the people are retreated
from Biha to Glamo. As soon as the Germans approach, the unprotected
peoples are left to the mercy of the Germans and the Ustashi who
mercilessly massacred them. Who escaped by chance is freezing in the snow
and ice. Between Drvar and Glamo there are over 500 frozen corpses of
women and children. This is more than a horror. It is a struggle of the
Communists who are encouraged by the foreign propaganda to
systematically destroy our [Serb] people.
348


However, after the World War II, the Yugoslav state and party
historiography has placed the thesis that in the above case (Serbian) people
voluntarily went with Titos Partisans. In the other words, it was a humanitarian

347
The Comintern adopted in 1935 the view that due to the impending threat of Nazi Germany and the war (as an
exponent of the Western bourgeoisie) against the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Communists will not work anymore on
destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Contrary to the prior-1935 Comintern policy, Yugoslavia has to be as
stronger as possible in order to as longer as resist the German attack before the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22
nd
, 1941 and during the whole war, Moscows position was
that Yugoslav Communists under the guise of anti-fascist struggle would take over the power in the country at the end
of the war after which Yugoslavia will join the Soviet military, political and economic bloc.
348
, , 186. In original language:

Zbog ovog komunistikog terora mase naroda povlae se od Bihaa ka Glamou. im se Nemci
priblie, ove nezatiene narodne mase ostavljaju se na milost i nemilost Nemaca i ustaa koji ih
nepotedno masakriraju. Ono to sluajno izbegne, smrzava se na snegu i ledu. Izmeu Drvara i
Glamoa ima preko 500 smrznutih leeva ena i dece. Ovo je vie nego uas. To je borba koju vode
komunisti i na koju ih podstie inostrana propaganda, da bi se planski unitio na narod.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
151


action in order to rescue the civilians what Josip Broz Tito confirmed in 1948 at
the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Belgrade literally
saying the following:

With our army of huge crowds of 50,000 women, children and old men
retreated towards Livno ... All units were left in their positions, while the
Supreme Command with the three Proletarian Divisions retreated to the River
of Neretva.
349


In reality, however, this civilian people protested and demanding to be
allowed to be transported and provided with food and clothing in order to survive a
harsh Bosnian-Herzegovinian winter. What happened after this protest we can
found in the following source:

Reluctance of the people, the elderly men, women and children - the
Communists declared as a type of rebellion, sabotage, Fascism and all other.
They were then killing on the spot. They killed for every little thing. They
killed mothers, who were fighting not for himself, but for the salvation of
their children, because they did not want to lead them to the death. Political
commissars,"popular committees", field workers and their servants, were at
work. They were going from house to house, expelling from them the women
and children. They were expelling them into the street, on the road. They
were putting this poor people in the convoy of death, which was going
through the Golgotha, on which had to die.
350


It is clear that in this action (Serbian) civilians had to play the role of
human shield of Brozs Partisans in the coming conflict in the valley of the River
of Neretva against the main and sole military and political opponent Mihailovis
Chetniks (supporters of the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile). The Communist
detachments went to Neretva in (March) agreement with the Germans. The later
had a plan to defeat the winners from the final battle between the Partisans and
the Chetniks in the vally of the River of Neretva in Herzegovina and in this way to
destroy both enemies the Partisans and the Chetniks. For that purpose, after the
Communist victory on the left bank of the River of Neretva over the Chetniks, the
Germans with the Ustashi immediately launched the new offensive (Schwarz,
that is called in Yugoslav Communist historiography as the Sutjeska or the

349
Ibid. In original language:

Sa naom vojskom ogromna masa od 50,000 ena, dece i staraca povlaila se ka Livnu... Sve jedinice
ostavljene su na svojim poloajima, dok se Vrhovni tab sa tri proleterske divizije povlaio ka Neretvi.

350
, , 225. In original language:

Nekanja naroda, staraca, ena i dece komunisti su proglasili vrstom pobune, saboterstva, faizma i sveg
drugog. Ubijali su oni tada na licu mesta. Ubijali su za svaku sitnicu. Ubijali su majke, koje su se borile ne za
sebe, ve za spas svoje dece, jer ih nisu hteli voditi u smrt. Politkomesari, narodni odbori, terenski radnici i
njihove sluge, dali su se na posao. Ili su oni od kue do kue, izbacivali su iz istih ene i decu. Izbacivali su ih
na ulicu, na puteve. Svrstavali su oni ovaj jadni narod u kolonu smrti, koja je krenula putem golgote, na kojoj
se moralo umreti.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
152


Fifth enemy offensive).
351
About the personal destiny of one part of (Serbian)
civilians from this Column of death says, drawing on the evidence by Mane
Peut, another witness of the event - Vladimir Dedijer (the Jew, who was after the
war official biographer of Josip Broz Tito), but this time from the Communist side:

The mother is going tonight barefoot on the ice, with some rags around the
legs, which are so long to pull the frost to it. On the back in the bag baby
hook. Another kid pulls the arm, while the third kid, the oldest one, is going
and weeping. They did not eat anything for two days...

I approach one window boarded. Someone cries from the ground. I walked
around the house, went down to the road and came to the door of the ground
floor. I saw through the broken doors the people who were sitting around the
fire, covered with the blankets, silent, motionless. A child cries out with a
loud voice. Something struggled under a blanket. I walked up as closer as
and cried as hard as I could. The wrestling stopped, but not and the child's
voice. The blanket was lifted, revealing the face of the mother, whom I saw
today with three children. Glassy eyes, she was all in a sweat. I realized
what was happening. She was smothering her own baby. She was tired of.
Griping, griping, looking for the bread. She was tired, hungry, back of her
was painful from wearing the youngest kid, the hands were painful of
carrying the rest of two kids. She just wanted to release both the child and
herself from the further horrors. If I came a minute later at the morning we
would find only a dead body of the child. It is no coincidence that this
woman said at the evening when I met her on the road: Holy Death, take
me!

For the twenty-one day she escapes from Banija region with the children
before the Prinz Eugen Division and the "Devil's Division. She walked on
the frost 350 kilometers.
352


351
The Partisan Supreme Command Staff with Josip Broz Tito succedded to break the enemy surrounding during the
Swartz offensive exactly on the part of the line hold by Croat Ustashi soldiers what can be another one direct proof of
(Croat-led) Communist collaboration with the (Croat) Ustashi movement. After that, very weak Partisan detachments
succeeded to establish another one liberated territory in Bosnia lasted for several months arround the city of Jajce that
was also (as previous Biha Republic in 1942) existing exactly on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia.
352
, , 227. In original language:

Ide veeras majka po ledu bosa, s nekim krpama oko nogu, koje su tako duge da se vuku po mrazu za njom. Na
leima u daku dete kuka. Drugo vue za ruku, a tree najstarije, ide i plae. Nisu jeli nita ve dva dana...

Priem jednom prozoru zakovanom daskama. Neko narie iz prizemlja. Obiao sam kuu, siao na drum i
doao pred vrata prizemlja. Vidim kroz razvaljena vrata ljudi sede kraj vatre, prekriveni ebadima, nemi,
nepomini. Jedno dete iz sveg glasa zapomae. Neto se otima pod ebetom. Priao sam korak blie i viknuo
to sam jae mogao. Presta rvanje, ali deji glas ne. Podie se ebe i ukaza se lice one majke, koju sam danas
video s troje dece. Oi staklaste, sva je bila u znoju. Shvatio sam ta se dogaa. Ona je davila roeno dete.
Dojadilo joj. Kuka, kuka, trai hleba. Ona je umorna, gladna, lea su joj otpala od noenja najmlaeg, ruke
od teglenja ono dvoje. I jednostavno je htela da oslobodi i dete i sebe daljih muka. Da sam doao minut
kasnije ujutro bismo zatekli samo detinji le. Nije sluajno ena rekla veeras kad sam je sreo na drumu:
Sveta smrti, uzmi me!

Ve dvadeset i jedan dan ona bei iz Banije s decom pred Princ Eugenom i Vrajom divizijom.
Prepeaila je na ovom mrazu 350 kilometara.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
153


About mass suffering of (Serbian) civilians from the Column of Death in
February 1943, that is above-mentioned, there is an eye-witness testimony by the
commander of the Dinara Chetnik Division, Duke (vojvoda) Momilo uji,
whose testimony sheds a whole new light on official Yugoslav state Titoist
historiographic phrases about Partisans humanity in the Battle for the
Wounded Men (the Battle of Neretva or German Weiss) in the winter/spring of
1943:
The Communists disseminate that the Germans, the Ustashi and the
Chetniks go together in order to kill everyone. And they took with them many
women and children from the Lika region [in present-day Croatia]. I was
around Grahovo [in present-day Western Bosnia] waiting for Titos columns
and was collecting these peoples [Serbian civilians], accommodating them in
my villages and later on returning them to their homes. Many women,
however, dragged the little children with them: mother did not want to leave
a child! Tito cleverly came up with the idea - as the army moves slowly
because the women and children that a special battalion would take the
children and mothers let them go with their husbands. Nurses and special
units reportedly will take care of the children. And now, he has taken these
children ... about one hundred and fifty. Beneath a mountaintop of the Mt.
ator there is the ators Lake with fresh water. There was here a state
house for the forest guards. It was a luxury villa in mountain style. All those
kids, I counted their skeletons, were put in this house and the house was put
on fire.

I came a month later, it was the snow, and little bones of these children were
sticking out from the snow. This picture also I can not forget. We did not have
a photographic camera, but one scene could be taken as an eternal
monument: a mother from Lika region (Lianka) who did not want to hand
over her children, sat on a stone of the forest trail, approximately one km.
from that house. The bodies were not disintegrated, they were still frozen.
The mother was keeping one child on her breast, one child on his knees
caught her under the armpit, and one was lying on the ground, the oldest,
taking with his arms her legs. This image was never out of my had. And who
would not want to kill the Communists, who would not want to kill the
Ustashi?
353


353
, , 132133. In original language:

Komunisti razglase da Nijemci, ustae i etnici idu zajedno, da kolju sve, sve redom. I povukli su za sobom
dosta ena i djece iz Like. Ja sam na visini Grahova saekivao Titove kolone i kupio taj narod, smjetao ga u
moja sela i kasnije vraao kuama. Mnoge su ene, meutim, vukle djeicu sa sobom: nee mater da ostavi
dijete! Tito je lukavo doao na ideju poto se vojska sporo kree radi ena i djece da jedan poseban
bataljon preuzme djecu, a matere neka idu sa svojim muevima. Bolniarke i posebne jedinice, navodno,
vodie rauna o djeci. I sada, on je pokupio tu djecu... jedno sto pedeset. A ispod vrha planine atora postoji
atorsko jezero, vrlo ive vode, i tu je bila dravna kua za uvara ume. Luksuzna vila, planinski stil. Sva ta
djeca, ja sam brojao kosturie njihove, sva su smjetena u tu kuu i kua je zapaljena.
Ja sam kasnije naiao, mjesec dana kasnije, snijeg je bio, a koice one djeice virile su iz snijega. Tu sliku
takoe ne mogu zaboraviti. Nijesmo imali fotografskog aparata, ali jedna scena mogla bi se uzeti za vjeni
spomenik: Lianka, majka koja nije htjela da preda djecu, sjela je na kamen umske staze, otprilike jedan
kilometar od one kue. Jo se leevi nijesu raspali, jo su bili zamrznuti. Majka jedno dijete ovako na dojku
pritisla, jedno je, na koljenima, uhvatilo ruicama ispod pazuha, a jedno lei na zemlji, najstarije, uhvatilo se
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
154


That this first-hand testimony about the behavior of Titos Partisans with
the wounded men in early spring in 1943 is not invented and/or occasional, and
that in fact corresponds to the actual situation on the ground during the World
War II (as opposed to Yugoslav Communist movie the Battle of Neretva, also
called as the Battle for the Wounded Men) gives us another relevant source from
the same 1943, from December. This document is also historically very important
for resolving the enigma of war life and work of Josip Broz Tito of whom it is
written so far an impressive number of biographic studies, but usually without
reference to all relevant and reliable archival documents and testimonies. In all of
these biographical writings still it remained unresolved question of his true origin
and his distinctive character up to his seizure of power in Yugoslavia by armed
forces of the Partisan detachments which originated from the territory of the
Independent State of Croatia and were mainly composed by the Serbs.
354
In order
to contribute to the writings of both Titos true (war time) biography and his
Partisan movement we present in bellow paragraph one of extremely important
archival documents which is putting much more lights on the nature of the
Communist movement in Yugoslavia during the World War II.
This is a top-secret document issued by the Special Police Department of
the Command of the City of Belgrade about Tito on December 13
th
, 1943
archived in the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. It was sent to the Presidency of
Government of Serbia:

This Department has the honor to report to the Presidency that it was
received a notice containing certain details of the Partisan army, the
personality of their commander Tito, his way of life, as well as about the
relationship between him, his closest associates and his army. These notices
are received from the persons who some time ago, came from Montenegro.
That was received notice that Tito with his [war] Staff last summer spent in
the mountains near Niki and at a place called Goransko. Here at
Goransko Partisan staff organized and a medical service using the local
hospital, where and wounded Partisans were getting a medical help. In the
hospital were getting medical help and the local people from whom partly
this notice is received. What concerns the personality of Tito, the data we
had are absolutely identical with the data received from these persons. In
addition to already known data we received and those that Tito is mid-
height, his exterior is smooth, he carries a civil suits which are mostly new.
He speaks a corrupted Serbian language, which resembles to Kajkavian
[speech].


rukama oko njene noge. Ta slika mi nikada ne izlazi iz glave. I ko onda ne bi ubijao komuniste, ko ne bi ubijao
ustae?

354
It was published in Belgrade in 2010 so far the first collection of more than 250 top-secret documents from Yugoslav
and Soviet (today Russian) archives about Josip Broz Tito: , , , .
. About the results of psycho-political analysis of Titos personality see: , :
, , . . This is so far the best and most completed Titos psycho-
biography. One of the most glorifying Titos biography by the western authors is: Fajn, Diktatori mogu imati blagotvoran
uticaj: izuzetan sluaj Josipa Broza Tita. One of the most balanced and objective Titos biographies so far is: ,
: 20. .
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
155


The relationship between Tito, his staff and members is authoritative in both
official dealings and private life. This difference is reflected in particular in
Titos dealing with his co-workers, even with the closest. And his way of life
is very different from the life of the others, as Tito has a plenty of food, a
variety of sweets, having immoral life and beside him a young Jewish girl
with whom he previously lived, while his army receives very little food.
Such poor food gets even sick - wounded Partisans.

His most intimate environment along with the others makeup and a Jew
Moa Pijade and former Yugoslav officers general Orovi Savo and captain
Jovanovi [Arso], although about these two it is claim that they accidentally
joined them [Partisans]. Among other things, it is reported that Titos Staff is
composed by just younger people, except their important officials.

Titos Staff is very mobile and it is a rare case to be at one place for a longer
time. Movement occurs always when it is received a notice from the
intelligence about coming danger. Such a case occurred with the last place of
being, where from originated these data. During moving from the mountain
and the place called Goranjsko the Partisans burned all the archives, as
well as the very building where they stayed, and even 40 of their most
seriously wounded [soldiers], as they frequently do it.

Their intelligence service is developed very much and mainly for this service
they use the local women, rarely local men, whose external looking did not
draw attention of the local authorities. From the same source we know today
that Tito and his Staff are in the mountains between Plevlja, Pavino Polje
and Niki.

Front notification is given to the title, with a request for knowledge and using
it.

According to the order, the Administrator of the City of Belgrade, Head of the
Department of Special Police. Inspector.
355


355
Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), top secret report of Belgrade special police about Tito (originally written in Cyrillic
and stamped). In original language:

Ovom Odelenju je ast izvestiti Pretsednitvo, da je primljeno obavetenje, koje sadri izvesne pojedinosti o
akciji partizanske vojske, o linosti njihovog komandanta Tita, njegovom nainu ivota, kao i o odnosu
izmeu njega, njegovih najbliih saradnika i njegove vojske. Ova obavetenja primljena su od lica koja su pre
izvesnog vremena dola iz Crne Gore.

Tako je primljeno obavetenje da je Tito sa svojim tabom prologa leta boravio na planinama blizu Nikia i
to na mestu zvanom Goransko. Tu na Goransko, partizanski tab je organizovao i sanitetsku slubu
koristei tamonju bolnicu, gde su se leili i ranjeni partizani. U ovoj bolnici leili su se i metani, od kojih je
jednim delom i primljeno ovo obavetenje. U odnosu na samu linost Tita podaci s kojima se raspolae su
apsolutno identini s podacima koji su primljeni od ovih lica. Pored poznatih podataka primljeni su jo i ti, da
je Tito uzrasta srednjeg, spoljanjosti uglaene i da nosi graansko odelo koje je mahom novije. Govori
jednim pokvarenim srpskim jezikom, koji lii na kajkavski.
Odnos izmeu Tita, njegovog taba i lanova je autoritativan i to bilo u slubenom ophoenju ili privatnom
ivotu. Ova razlika naroito se ogleda u ophoenju Tita prema svojim saradnicima, ak i onim najuim. I sam
nain ivota znatno se razlikuje od ivota ostalih, jer dokle Tito ima izobiljnu hranu, razne slatkie i ivi
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
156


We think that the most important value of this document is in exactly what
happened at the very end of this story according to the report. This is the claim
that Titos Partisans killed during their withdrawal all of their 40 seriously
wounded comrades, i.e. all of those who could not move what means at the same
time all of those whom the others had to carry. And this is not for the first time,
but it is already common practice by Titos soldiers as claimed by the source. That
is what testifies local informants whose testimonies are the foundations of writing
of this police report. So, in reality probably it left nothing from post-war Partisan
propaganda about Partisan humanity for their wounded comrades as presented,
for instance, in well known Titos regimes sponsored Partisan action movie Battle
on the River of Neretva (about the event from 1943).
In the context of our particular contribution to the revision of official
Titographic history of our [Yugoslav] nations and nationalities during the World
War II we would like to deal in the next pages with the crucial research problem of
this paper: the real nature of the relationships between Titos Partisans and
Pavelis Ustashi. In fact, after the breakup and dispersal of Titoslavia in the
1990s at the hands of the researchers are coming more and more of the relevant
archival material confirms (so far only the Chetnik propaganda from abroad
according to the Yugoslav Titographic historians) the open, systematic and
strategic cooperation of the Croatian Ustashi with Titos Partisans (two armies
from the same state territory Independent State of Croatia, and both led by the
Croats). In this particular case, which we would like briefly to elaborate, we will
deal with documented collaboration between the Nazi Ustashi and the Communist
Partisans in the area already mentioned above the territory around Gacko. More
precisely, the territory of the Valley of Gacko in the Independent State of Croatia
(today in the Republic of Croatia).
This valley as a whole Gacko area is named after the River of Gacka which
spreads from Medak over Gospi and Gorski Kotar until Serbian Moravica in the
north nearby the border with Slovenia (Kranjska). In this area there were Italian,
Ustashi, Partisan and Chetnik (Dinara Chetnik Division under the command of a

nemoralnim ivotom i ima kraj sebe jednu mladu devojku jevrejskog porekla sa kojom je i ranije iveo, dotle
njegova vojska dobija vrlo slabu hranu. Ovakvu slabu hranu dobijaju ak i bolesnici ranjeni partizani.
Njegovu najuu okolinu pored ostalih sainjavaju i jevrejin Moa Pijade kao i biv[i] jugoslovenski oficiri
general Orovi Savo i kapetan Jovanovi [Arso], mada se za ovu dvojicu tvrdi da su sluajno prili njima.

Pored ostalog tvrdi se da u tabu Titovom ima samo mlaih ljudi, ukoliko se to ne odnosi na njihove vane
funkcionere.

tab Titov je vrlo pokretljiv i redak je sluaj da se negde due vremena zadri. Pokret se javlja uvek onda kada
je primljeno obavetenje od strane obavetajaca o pretstojeoj opasnosti. Takav sluaj dogodio se je i s ovim
poslednjim mestom bivakovanja, odakle su i potekli ovi podatci. Prilikom pokreta s planine i mesta zv[anog]
Goranjsko partizani su spalili svu arhivu, kao i samu zgradu u kojoj su bili, pa ak i 40 svojih najteih
ranjenika, to oni to esto i rade.

Obavetajna sluba razvijena im je u vrlo jakoj meri i mahom su za ovu slubu upotrebljavane tamonje
metanke, ree metani, iji spoljanji izgled nije skretao panju tamonjih vlasti. Iz istih izvora saznaje se da
se danas Tito i njegov tab nalaze u planinama izmedju Plevalja, Pavinog Polja i Nikia.

Prednje obavetenje ustupa se naslovu, s molbom radi znanja i upotrebe istog.

Po naredbi, Upravnik Grada Beograda, ef Odelenja specijalne policije, Inspektor.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
157


former priest and a war duke Momilo uji) military formations. Titos Partisans
with the Soviet military insignia during the entire war period tried by the military
strikes of guerrilla type to take over this area from the hands of the Dinara
Chetnik Division, but they did not succeed. One of the crucial reasons for their
failure was the fact that the local Serbs (who have been a majority of population in
the area) mainly sided with the royalist Chetniks (the Yugoslav Army in the
Fatherland), but not with the Croat-led Partisans. However, the crucial reason for
such policy of the local Serb population was double-natured: 1) the apparent
cooperation with Pavelis Ustashi by Titos Partisans, and 2) participation in the
genocidal anti-Serb policy of the Ustashi regime in Zagreb by the Communist-
Partisan Supreme Staff of Croatia. It was exactly in this area during the World
War II to happen an open and unequivocal collaboration between the Ustashi and
the Partisan unites. One of the classic examples of such collaboration was the
case of two Croat brothers Ivo Rukavina, a commander of the Communist-
Partisan Supreme Staff of Croatia and Juca Rukavina, a commander of the most
notorious Nazi Ustashi military (SS) formation the Black Legion.
356

About what kind of concrete Partisan-Ustashi collaboration on the military
field, in this case was told by historical first-hand source which is saying that the
Communist formations were drawn on a peoples assembly in the village of Kuni
at a time when 1,500 Ustashi soldiers were passing through the territory of
Kordun and Lika with the aim to slaughter the local Serb villagers. So, at the
moment when one brother Croat penetrates with his combatants to destroy as
much as he can what is Serb, at that same moment, another brother Croat
instead of defending the people from slaughtering he is withdrawing his military
forces from the direction of passing of the formations of the second brother to
some peoples conference. In the other words, those who had to protect the
people from slaughtering are rather going to the rural political gatherings.
This is what Mane Peut, as whitness, wrote about this event:

While the Partisan heroes played a wheel
357
and having rejoicing, the
Ustashi freely exercise their bloody feast. What was the prey, hunting Serbs,
was visible at the best according to the kind of killing. Booty was so great,
that the Ustashi did not have a time in their innate principle, firstly to do a
sadistic torture against the victims and then to kill them, but only to cut their
necks. The biggest crime was committed in Tri and Primilje and then in
Veljun and Perjasica. Many of the victims, who did not die immediately, were
transported by the bullock carts to the Chetnik territory in Plaki, where they
were given the first aid. Throughout the whole period of the massacre it was
not fired a single Partisan rifle to the Ustashi.
358


356
, , 181217. Mane Peut was a commander of the battalion of Dinara Chetnik Division.
After the war he imigrated to the West Germany where he wrote mentiond book that is a first-hand historical source
written in a form of memoirs. Peut was editing in West Germany the journal White Eagles.
357
The wheel (kolo) is a typical popular playing of the Serbs.
358
In original language:

I dok su, partizanski heroji, igrali kolo i veselili se, dotle su ustae nesmetano vrile svoj krvavi pir. Koliki je
bio plen, lov na Srbe, videlo se najbolje po vrsti ubijanja. Plen je bio toliki, da ustae nisu imale vremena po
njihovom uroenom principu, rtve najpre sadistiki muiti a potom ubijati, ve su samo presecali vratove.
Najvei zloin poinjen je u Triu i Primilju a potom u Veljunu i Perjasici. Mnoge rtve, koje nisu odmah
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
158



This evidence largely resembles the case of the bloody Kragujevac October
from 1941 when Titos Partisan units literally had a great rejoice in the nearby
village of Divostin during the shooting of Kragujevac civilians (2,300 including and
300 pupils from the city Gymnasium) in front of the city (umarice) by the
Germans. The Communist leaders explained their behavior to Divostin peasants
that, according to their strategy, whoever is not with them (the Partisans) is
against them.
359

However, this is not the end of the collaboration story of two Croat brothers
from a family of Rukavina. In fact, there is evidence by Captain Ilija Popovi, who
was an officer of the American intelligence service known as the OSS (later the
CIA) who was sent as an intelligence connection to Titos Partisan units during the
conference in Tehran in November 1943.
360
The American officer with his own eyes
saw the Ustashi commander Juca Rukavina as a guest at a banquet organized by
the Partisan Staff, just during the time of the session of the big three in Tehran,
when among other things, it was discussed and the fate of the post-war
Yugoslavia. On this occasion, the Political Commissar of the host Partisan
detachments invited and Captain Ilija Popovi to the dinner and the banquet
event. From this dinner and banquet we have a first-hand source testimony from
the U.S. intelligence officer Ilija Popovi who wrote:

I came to a house and saw two Lieutenants (Ustashi) and Major Rukavina
(also Ustashi) as they are sitting around table. Major Rukavina was wearing
a German suit with the German Iron Cross. I then said to Commissioner: I
did not come to Yugoslavia to sit and eat with the bloodsuckers who
murdered Serbian people. I have come to fight against them. Four times I
came to Yugoslavia and never saw that the Partisans were fighting the
Germans. From Yugoslavia I brought out many wounded men to Italy and
every man told me that his wounds are not from the enemies, but: My
wounds are from my brother
361


umrle, prevezene su volovskom upregom na etniku teritoriju u Plaki, gde im je ukazana prva pomo. Za
celo vreme pokolja nije ispaljena ni jedna partizanska puka na ustae.

359
When the (trans-Drina) Partisans occupied the city of Kragujevac in Central Serbia in October 1944 they executed
several thousends of civilians under the accusation to be the collaborators and national betrayers of whom 4,700
were burred at the same graves as those from October 1941 execusion case. However, in 1945 the Communist authorities
of Yugoslavia officially reported to the International Red Cross organization in Geneve that the Germans executed 7,000
Kragujevac civilians in October 1941. In the other words, all corps from the Kragujevac umarice Memorial Park
(2,300+4,700) are officially treated after the World War II by both the Yugoslav (titographic) historiography and state
authorities as those executed in October 1941 by the Germans.
360
The Allies (USA, UK and USSR) of the anti-Fascist coalition at this conference, which lasted from November 28
th
to
December 1
st
, 1943 recognized the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito as the allied and anti-Fascist force, but only under the
pressure by Stalin and, more importantly, the Partisan movement became recognized by the big three as the only
legitimate political representative of the whole Yugoslavia. On the conflict between on one hand the Soviet Government
and on the other the Yugoslav Royal Government in London and the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, see: Popovi,
Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 90108. One of the best mini anthologies of the documents of the Government in
exile of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the World War II was published in 2008: ,
.
361
This testimony by the American Captain Ilija Popovi is taken from the journal , Kragujevac, 74, January
11th, 1991:

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
159


On direct cooperation and collaboration between the Communist Partisans
and the Nazi Ustashi on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia indicates
and the map of the Ustashi crimes against the Serbian population made by
Bogdan L. Bolta (a participant in the war events) who in his book on Graaka
Chetnik Brigade concludes on the basis of the facts:
We know that where there were the Chetnik units in Southern Lika, or
anywhere, the Ustashi were not able to kill a single Serb through the mass
slaughtering. But there, where there were the Partisans, and even with their
strong forces, such as they had in the Central Lika and Krbava, in the
counties od Udba and Korenica, the Ustashi in those local Serbian villages
were undisturbedly massacring [the Serbs] during the war, just they did it
and in 1941. It has been proven that the party Partisan Command of Croatia
in the summer and fall of 1942 intentionally was removing the Partisan units
from the Serbian villages in this part of Lika, in order to open the way for the
Ustashi, to commit massacres in them.
362

To the same conclusion about the Partisan-Ustashi political and military
collaboration on the territory of the entire Independent State of Croatia tells and
another one map named as Massacres of the Serbs in Yugoslavia (April
1941August 1942) from the book: , , 44.
New German documents from the German archives on collaboration
between the Partisans and the Ustashi in their joint fight against the Chetniks (the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland) of Jezdimir Dangi
363
are published in 2005 in
Belgrade scientific journal Vojnoistorijski glasnik (Military Historical Review) issued
by the Military Historical Institute dealing with the review of the book by the
German historian Klaus Schmider The Partisan War in Yugoslavia 19411944.
According to the book review, the author of the book claims that the collapse of
the Chetnik units of Jezdimir Dangi in Bosnia and Herzegovina was influenced
by tactical cooperation between the Ustashi and the Partisans at the beginning of

Doao sam u jednu kuu i za stolom video kako sede dvojica ustaa (porunici) i major Rukavina (isto ustaa).
Taj major Rukavina imao je na sebi nemako odelo i gvozdeni krst. Ja sam onda komesaru rekao: Nisam
doao u Jugoslaviju da sedim i jedem sa krvopijama koje su ubijale srpski narod. Ja sam doao da se protiv
njih borim. etiri puta sam ulazio u Jugoslaviju i nikada nisam video da su se partizani borili protiv Nemaca.
Iz Jugoslavije sam izneo mnogo ranjenika u Italiju i svaki mi je kazao da njegove rane nisu od neprijatelja
nego: Moje su rane od mojega brata.

As direct evidence of collaboration between Titos Partizans and Pavelis Ustashi during the World War II serves and
authentic photo showing the Ustashi soldier (standing) and one Partisan (on horseback) to be handled in their uniforms
and with guns surrounded by several of their fellow soldiers. The photo is published in: ,
, 163. See Appendix 1.
362
Bolta, Graaka etnika brigada, 205206. In original language:

Mi znamo, da tamo gde su bile etnike jedinice u junoj Lici, ili ma gde, ustae nisu mogli ubiti ni jednog
Srbina putem masovnog pokolja. A tamo, gde su bili partizani, i to sa svojim jakim snagama, kao to su ih
imali u srednjoj Lici i Krbavi, u srezu udbinskom i korenikom, ustae su u tamonjim srpskim selima
nesmetano vrili pokolje tokom rata, kao to su i 1941. g. Dokazano je da je partijska partizanska komanda
Hrvatske u leto i jesen 1942. g. namerno sklanjala partizanske jedinice iz srpskih sela u tome delu Like, da
otvori put ustaama, da u njima izvre pokolj.

363
Major Jezdimir Dangi was a commander of the Chetnik units of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland in the Eastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina till April 1942. On this territory he was protecting Serbian civilians from the Croat Ustashi
massacres. He became arrested in April 1942 by the Germans and sent to the lager of Styj (Stryi) in at that time the
Southeastern Poland (Galicia, present-day Ukraine).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
160


April 1942, which lasted about two weeks. During this period, the Ustashi twice
delivered ammunition to the Partisans.
364

We would like to point out and to a document from the Yugoslav archives,
which also clearly indicates to direct collaboration of the Partisans with the
Ustashi. It is, in fact, the order by the Supreme Headquarters of Josip Broz Titos
Peoples Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (NOV i
POJ)
365
as strictly confidential dispatches that is registered under 785 dated
July 25
th
, 1943. A part of the order that is for us at the moment of the most
importance is:

To as soon as establish the connection with the Ustashi of the comarade
Drekalom, who is sent by the General Staff of the Ustashi in Zagreb. He is
visiting the places where there are Ustashi units and propagates, i.e. orders,
a fusion of Ustashi with the Partisans...according to obtained instructions
from Zagreb. So far, he visited all of the Ustashi units that are located in the
Coastal area, and as rearmost he visited Imotski. After the meeting in
Imotski he went publicly to the Western part of the Imotski countys villages
of Studenica, Arano, Lovreno and ista, in order to determine the details
with them. With him cooperats Bogli, a Ustashi Headquarters member from
Omis, like most of the Franciscan friars, who on his account are doing the
fiercest propaganda in this direction. These data were received from
comarade Colonel A. Jovanovi and as completely accurate they are
submited to you for the orientation. In regard with this, immediately get in
touch with comrade Drekalo and if you have not done it in relation to
previously issued instructions start with the organization of the U-2
territory on this basis.
366


Agreements on collaboration

From all the above we believe that it is clear that the coordination of
military operations, political and tactical cooperation between Titos Partisans and
Pavelis Ustashi during the World War II on the territory of the Independent State
of Croatia was planned and systematically carried out during the whole war. From

364
Citation according to the book: 19411945, 332.
365
That was official name for the Partisan units of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from December 1942 till March
1945. From March 1945 till 1951 Titos armed forces were named as Yugoslav Army (JA), but from 1951 their name
was Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA). However, their original name from July 1941 till January 1942 was People's
Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (NOPOJ), but from January till December 1942 they changed the name
into People's Liberation Partisan and Volunteer Army of Yugoslavia (NOP i DVJ).
366
Citation according to the book: 19411945, 336. In original language:

Da to pre uhvatite vezu sa ustaima drugom Drekalom, koji je upuen iz glavnog taba Ustakog u Zagrebu.
On obilazi ona mesta u kojima se nalaze ustake jedinice i propagira odnosno nareuje fuziju ustaa i
partizana...a u vezi dobivenih instrukcija iz Zagreba. Do sada je obiao sve ustake jedinice koje se nalaze u
Primorju, a kao najzadnje obiao je Imotski. Posle sastanka u Imotskom otiao je javno u Zapadni deo
Imotskog sreza po selima: Studenici, Arano, Lovreno i ista, da bi sa njima utvrdio detalje. Sa njim sarauje
Bogli ustaki stoernik iz Omia, kao i veina fratara Franjevaca, koji za njegov raun vode najeu
propagandu u tom pravcu. Ovi podaci primljeni su od druga pukovnika A. Jovanovia, kao potpuno tani
dostavljaju vam se radi orijentacije. U vezi ovoga stupite odmah u vezu sa drugom Drekalom i ukoliko to
nijeste uinili u vezi ranije izdatih instrukcija otpoeete na toj bazi organizaciju U-2 teritorije.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
161


the military and tactical sense, this cooperation was based on an agreement
between Corporal/Marshal Josip Broz Tito and Fhrer Ante Paveli at the end of
December 1941 when at the meeting between Secretary-General of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and representatives of the Croatian Ustashi in
Rogatica (Bosnia) was obtained the consent by the Ustashi leader Ante Paveli to
deliver weapons and ammunition to Brozs Partisans and to permit for them both
an uninterrupted residence and free passing through the territory of the
Independent State of Croatia. Based on this agreement between two Croat armies
the Partisan supreme military and political leadership resided on the territory of
the Independent State of Croatia from January 25
th
until the May 25
th
1942
without any interaption in the Bosnian town of Foa although in this region there
were both Ustashi and Italian garrisons and even to the range of their guns,
mortars and machine guns. This smooth residence of the Partisan military and
political leadership of almost half a year on the territory of the Independent State
of Croatia was a result of the signing Ustashi-Partisan agreement on collaboration
after January 12
th
, 1942 when Titos special commissioner Edvard Kardelj (a
Slovene), as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, went from evljanovii (nearby Rogatica) to Zagreb in order to sign
this agreement and then travelled to Ljubljana. The Ustashi deputy from Sarajevo
came to Titos headquarters in Foa already on February 16
th
, 1942 with Pavelis
personal letter for the formation and arming of the Communist Second
Proletarian Brigade. The ammunition and weapons from the Ustashi were soon
delivered to this newly formed Partisan brigade on the territory of Mataruga, near
ajnie. On this occasion, the Ustashi delivering of the ammunition and weapons
by one Ustashi major from notorious Black Legion of Jure Franceti was
accepted by the Partisan commander Sava Kovaevi (later on in 1943 he was shot
in the back from the Partisan rifle during the Sutjeska Battle) and Sava Brkovi,
a senior Communist political commissar. Such a well-armed just formed Partisan
the Second Proletarian Brigade was immediately sent to a nearby battlefield
arround Srebrenica and Vlasenica in the Eastern Bosnia, where in collaboration
with the local Ustashi formations was fighting against the detachments of the
Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland under the command of Majors Dangi and
Todorovi.
J. B. Tito at the end of March 1942 sent his two officials, Ivo Lola Ribar
and Petar Velebit, to negotiate an agreement with the Ustashi authorities on
getting certain territory for the Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia in the
case that they will be expelled from Montenegro (under Italian protectorate) due to
a popular revolt against both the Communists and the Italians. I. L. Ribar and P.
Velebit (both Croats) went together with the Ustashi Colonel Beir Kulenovi (a
Muslim Bosniak) from Zagreb. While Beirovi left in Sarajevo until the day when
a meeting with Tito should be agreed upon, Ribar and Velebit continued travelling
together with the assigned Ustashi escort soldiers and arrived in Foa via Gorade
to J. Broz Tito on April 1
st
, 1942. Then it was agreed about the exact date of the
meeting between Tito and the official representatives of the Independent State of
Croatia in the town of Rogatica April 5
th
, 1942. From the Partisan side this
meeting with the Ustashi representatives was attended by Tito himself, Peter
Velebit and a member of the British military mission to Titos Supreme
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
162


Headquarters Major Terence Atherton.
367
As the negotiators from the side of the
Independent State of Croatia appeared Sulejman Filipovi and Beir Kulenovi
together with other Muslims from Sarajevo. On this occasion in Rogatica it was
agreed between the Ustashi and the Partisans on the precise conditions under
which Titos forces can cross over (from the east to the west) the territory of the
Independent State of Croatia to their assigned areas in the Western Bosnia. On
this liberated (by the Titoist historiography) territory in the seconf half of 1942
the Communists proclaimed the Republic of Biha that was after the Republic
of Uice (in the autumn 1941 in the Western Serbia) the second Soviet-style
republic founded by Titos Communists and Partisans on the territory of
Yugoslavia.
At the beginning of June 1942, due to the anger of the people of
Montenegro to the politics of the left turn by the Partizans and the red terror by
the Communists (Titos dogs cemeteries in Montenegro and the Eastern
Herzegovina) Broz was in Pluine eventually forced to make a decision on the
implementation of the agreement with the Ustashi in Rogatica. Following this
decesion, the remains of the First and Second Communist Proletarian Brigades,
along with a Third Sandak Brigade and two Montenegrin proletarian brigades
started in early June 1942 to leave the territory of Durmitor Mt. in the Northen
Montenegro by crossing over Volujak. Brozs detachments were on their way from
Kalinovik to Trnovo supplied by Sarajevo Ustashi with trucks full of food and
ammunition. However, the official Ustashi report says that those tracks the
Partisans captured from the Ustashi who have been allegedly ambushed and
attacked by the Partisans on the road. This farce with alleged capture of large
quantities of weapons and ammunition from the Ustashi by the Partisans will be
very often repeated until the end of the war when even very well equiped and
supplied Ustashi garrison were seized by the Partisans, but in fact they were
voluntarily and amicably handed over to the Communists according to the
UstashiPartisan bilateral agreements. It is necessary to mention that the German
command in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, headed by Glez von
Horstenau, accepted both direct and indirect cooperation agreements between
Pavelis Ustashi and Brozs Partisans in order to maintain a balance, a control of
the warring forces, and most importantly, the mutual destruction of the Partisans
and Mihailovis Chetniks.
368
However, this cooperation Berlin, and especially
Hitler, never approved.
A ceded territory within the Independent State of Croatia to the Partisans
encompassed the area between the towns of Karlovac, Livno and Petrinja with a

367
Major Terence Atherton (19031942), who was married to a Muslim from Sarajevo, was together with his technician
liquidated by Titos Partisans around April 16
th
, 1942 at the moment when he wanted to send a radiogram to his British
command about the result of an agreement between Titos and Pavelis representatives. However, Broz after the
liquidation officially announced that the British major, together with General Novakovi, left his headquarters and
defected to the side of the Chetniks who had allegedly killed him.
368
About German-Partisan cooperation at the local level can be shown by the fact that strong German forces in the fall
1941 simply handed over to Titos Partisans entire city of Uice in the Western Serbia with the factory for the
manufacturing and repairing the weapons and ammunition. It is very strange and unusual that the Germans did not
destroy or dismantle this factory before they left the city regardless the fact that they had quite enough time to do that.
Moreover, there was no real need for the Germans to leave the city at all taking into account the fact that the Partisan
units have been at that time weak. Military-political interplay between the Partisans, the Germans and the Yugoslav
Army in the Fatherland on the area of occupied Serbia during the World War II was analyzed in the book: Gruji,
Boromejski vor.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
163


center in the town of Biha. At such a way, the Ustashi regime in Zagreb provided
liberated territory to Brozs soldiers of about 15 districts of Bosanska Krajina,
Lika, Korduna and Banije, but this fact did not stop the Ustashi to continue with
their genocidal policies against the local Serbian civilians on this territory ceded to
the Partisans for the very reason that the Partisans did not defend civilians at
all.
369
On this, according to the Communist post-war historiography, liberated
territory (Republic of Biha), Josip Broz Tito convened in Biha two days
(November 26
th
27
th
, 1942) session of the first revolutionary peoples council
(i.e., a Bolshevik Soviet) Anti-Fascist Council for the Peoples Liberation of
Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).
370
The same AVNOJ had a year later (November 29
th
30
th
,
1943) also two days session (the Second one) on the Ustashi controlled territory
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the town of Jajce when Brozs Communists decided to
proclaim themselves as the only legitimate political power in the country i.e.,
committed a coup dtat. However, both of these AVNOJ sessions were absolutely
undisturbed by the local Ustashi detachments and Croatian government in
Zagreb. The Second session in 1943 was held on the newly liberated territory by
the Partisans from the Ustashi where it was proclaimed a new Soviet (Bolshevik)
republic (Republic of Jajce) in the Central Bosnia-Herzegovina. Brozs Partisans
on the ceded territory around Biha were successively aided by the Ustashi
government in Zagreb in combat gear, weapons, ammunition and food so that they
were completely able to reorganize their detachments and to transform them into a
powerful army to be ready for conquering of Serbia. On this liberated territory
with Ustashi support Tito suceeded to form from survived Serb refugees before the
Ustashi soldiery the First and Second Proletarian Divisions, Third Montenegrin
Strike Division, two divisions of Krajina Serbs, one division of Lika Serbs, one

369
The Independent State of Croatia was declared on April 10
th
, 1941 as fascist state. However, in many ways it was
different from its models and the sponsors: the Nazi Germany and the Fascist Italy. The Ustashi ideologues have always
openly insisted that this state was based primarily on the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church especially from the
time of the so-called Social Catholicism. The state was mainly a Roman Catholic dictatorial ideological construction
based on the idea of the medieval crusades against the infidels (in this case against the Orthodox Serbs). It was accepted
Vaticans standpoint that democracy, parliamentarism and liberalism are destructive teachings leading to atheism of the
society. Croatian Roman Catholic masses in the Independent State of Croatia were swayed by the ideological propaganda
that this Roman Catholic country creates a future community of God on earth, but of course, without infidels the
Orthodox Serbs. Therefore, the main route guidance became Civitas Dei. In contrast to the Orthodox Christianity,
which was declared to be unbelief, the Islam was accepted as a nest of the Croatian nation. A basic Ustashi political goal
was to create through a comprehensive genocide against the Serb Orthodox population a necessary majority of the
Croatian Roman Catholic population within the borders of the Independent State of Croatia (including and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). According to the original Ustashi concept, the first huge concentration and death camp for the Orthodox
Serbs was to be built somewhere in the sector of the lower River of Neretva in Herzegovina. However, since the Italian
occupation authorities did not allow the Ustashi regime in Zagreb to build such a camp on their (southern) occupation
sector of the ex-Yugoslavia, the Ustashi government did it on the River of Sava in the village of Jasenovac that was in
the German occupation (northern) zone (, , 445446). On the direct
complicity of the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church in the commission of the crime of genocide in the death camp of
Jasenovac is best illustrated by the fact that three commanders of this death and sadistic camp were the Roman Catholic
priests alongside with the another fact that a huge number of them (especially the members of the Franciscan order)
participated in the Ustasha crimes against the Orthodox Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia. Most bloodthirsty
among all Roman Catholic priests was the commander of Jasenovac death camp a monk Miroslav Filipovi-
Majstorovi (known as friar Satan), who was before the war, a Franciscan friar and a chaplain in the village of
Petrievac in Bosnia. Friar Filipovi was even once held a Holly Mass in a Roman Catholic church in the bloody Ustashi
uniform and with a gun on the belt through which pulled the priests cassock (, ,
263). About the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the baptism and the massacres of the Orthodox Serbs in the
Independent State of Croatia, see: , .
370
AVNOJ Antifaistiko vijee narodnog osloboenja Jugoslavije.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
164


division of Banija Serbs and one Dalmatia division (around 25,000 soldiers). Later,
all of these Partisan divisions became a core of the Communist army in its
conquest of Belgrade and Serbia in the autumn 1944.
371

It was during staying in this ceded territory within the Independent State of
Croatia by the Ustashi regime in Zagreb in the middle and second half in 1942
when the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia revealed to us the essence of the Communist-Partisan way of combat
for the sake of the revolutionary conquest of power. It was exactly a speech given
by the top Communist Moshe Pijade at the First session of the AVNOJ in
November 1942 in the town of Biha in the Western Bosnia who, as a senior
member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, shortly and clearly explained what was the best way of creating a
Partisan army led by Josip Broz Tito:

It is necessary therefore to create so many homeless people in order to be the
majority in the country.

Therefore, we need to burn. We will fire and withdraw. The Germans are not
going to find us, but they will for revenge burn villages. Then the villagers,
who will remain without a roof, will by themselves come to us and we will
have the people with us, and we will thus become a master of the situation.
Those who have no home or land or cattle, will quickly join us, because we
promise them a big heist.

The harder it will be with those who have some property. We will attract
them by lectures, theater performances and other propaganda... We will
gradually go through all the provinces. The farmer who owns a house, land,
cattle, a worker who receives a salary and bread for us is useless. We have
to make them homeless, proletarians... Only unfortunates become the
Communists, because we have to create the misfortune, to throw the masses
to desperation, we are mortal enemies of any welfare, law and order...
372


371
, (19411945), 140, 173. Here we will mention one documentary report by the German army
general, obergrupenfhrer Arthur von Flebsa, from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia on Ustashi-Partisan
open collaboration. A sector of Flebs commands included the South Dalmatian and parts of Bosnian-Herzegovinian
territory. The General was in 1943 and 1944 sending the military reports directly to Himmler in Berlin and he took his
private war diary. So, Flebs writes about five Ustashi officers who went to the Partisan side but before that they issued to
their men a short command: Run away to save your lifes! ... Ustashi battalion at the confluence of the River of
Neretva is unable to reject even the simplest attack by the bandits, they are running cowardly away after the first bullet
and they are informing the Partisans. One Ustashi detachment even sold the ammunition to the Partisans (Tagesbuch Nr.
Ia&545).
372
Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI), Belgrade, Speech by Moshe Pijade at the First session of AVNOJ,
Staff of the Supreme Command, Chetnik Archives, K-12, 30/12. In original language:

Potrebno je zato stvoriti toliko mnogo beskunika, da ovi beskunici budu veina u dravi.

Stoga mi moramo da palimo. Pripucaemo pa emo se povui. Nemci nas nee nai, ali e iz osvete da pale
sela. Onda e nam seljaci, koji tamo ostanu bez krova, sami doi i mi emo imati narod uza se pa emo na taj
nain postati gospodari situacije. Oni koji nemaju ni kue ni zemlje ni stoke, brzo e se i sami prikljuiti
nama, jer emo im obeati veliku pljaku.

Tee e biti sa onima koji imaju neki posed. Njih emo povezati uzase predavanjima, pozorinim predstavama
i drugom propagandom... Tako emo postepeno proi kroz sve pokrajine. Seljak koji poseduje kuu, zemlju i
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
165


The roots and reasons for the collaboration between the Ustashi and the
Communists/Partisans

The roots and causes of the wartime collaboration between the Ustashi and
the Communists/Partisans date back to the time of the prewar Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, and, on the basis of documentary material, at least from the year of
1932. The reasons for this collaboration were of the ideological-political nature
and their basis is a common goal of both sides to destroy the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and on its ruins to form the new states including at the first a Greater
Croatia. In order to achieve this goal, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was
logically supporting all anti-Yugoslav movements and their actions and, of course,
has sought to establish close cooperation with them. Given a fact that the Croats
were the most numerous in Yugoslavia after the Serbs as well as that their
financial and industrial bourgeoisie was strongest in the country it was logical
that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will support all kinds of Croatian
nationalism, anti-Yugoslav policy and separatism for the sake of breaking the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Such policy the Communist Party of Yugoslavia even
officially included into its party program as a long-term political goal of the
Yugoslav Communists. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in the interwar
period, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia openly supported, even in its public
media, (a Greater) Croatian Revolutionary Organization (Hrvatska revolucionarna
organizacija HRO), i.e. the Ustashi movement, formed in 1929. For instance, the
official Magazine of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
(Section of the Communist International), how exactly was the title of the
magazine Proleter, at No. 28 from December 1932 (i.e., less than two years before
the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander in France by the Croatian
Revolutionary Organization) published an article on the support of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia to the Ustashi movement. The first and main paragraph of the
article reads as follows:

The Communist Party welcomes the Ustashi movement of Lika and
Dalmatian peasants and placed itself completely on their side. It is the duty
of all Communist organizations and every Communist to facilitate the
movement, to organize and to lead. At the same time the Communist Party
indicates the current shortcomings and mistakes in this movement, which
are explained by the fact that the Croatian Fascist elements are playing in
the movement so far a significant impact. (Paveli Perec), who are against
developing of one Serbian mass movement against Greater Serbian military-
fascist dictatorship because they fear that such movement will turn not only
against the dictatorship but also against themselves and their Italian
masters. Therefore, they are limited to the actions of small units and
methods of individual terror.
373



stoku, radnik koji prima platu i ima hleba, za nas nita ne vredi. Mi od njih moramo nainiti beskunike,
proletere... Samo nesrenici postaju komunisti, zato mi moramo nesreu stvoriti, mase u oajanje baciti, mi
smo smrtni neprijatelji svakog blagostanja, reda i mira...

373
Proleter.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
166


Such a Communist perspective on the Communist-Ustashi collaboration is
directly inspired by the attitudes of the Stalinist Comintern (under direct and
hegemonic leadership of Georgian Josef Visarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin) on the
resolution of the national questions across Europe. It means in practice that any
real or fabricated nation have the right to self-determination to the final territorial
secession. Therefore, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, influenced by the
Comintern, accepted the standpoint that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was a Versailles creation in
1919 despite the fact that Croatias Zagreb proclaimed the unification with the
Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro even during the war on November 23
rd
,
1918,
374
i.e., before the start of sessions of the postwar international conference in
Paris and the castles around the city. In fact, the Communist Party of Yugoslavias
Central Committees Politbureau adopted an official position of the Comintern
from its Fifth Congress in Moscow in 1924 following the suggestions of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia itself, that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, as a Versailles creation of a Greater Serbia, has to be destroyed what
meant that every anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav alliance and action were legitimate
and welcome. On this occasion, it was adopted and issued a special resolution in
Moscow on the national question in Yugoslavia with a request for creation of
independent states of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, i.e., for territorial
destruction of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At the same time, the
Croatian Republican Peasant Party (the HRSS) was by Stalin himself labeled as an
advanced and revolutionary party with which the Yugoslav Communists should
cooperate. Here it is necessary to point out that the resolution of the Comintern in
1924 did not schedule an independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro
from Yugoslavia and also did not determine any borders of Slovenia, Croatia
and Macedonia. Therefore, the question of the republican-national borders was
practically left to be solved by the Yugoslav Communists by themselves after the
war with a new Moscow policy that (Communist) Yugoslavia has to exist. It was
finally done in 1946 without any public debate on the border issue and with
official proclaiming of the three new nations: the Montenegrins, Macedonians
and Muslims. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia accepted the 1924 Comintern
policy on the rights of peoples to self-determination up to the final territorial
secession from existing and internationally recognized states. This policy was in
the case of Yugoslavia finally realized in the 1990s with dissolution of the country
by the Communists themselves. In summ, in 1924 under the direct influence of
the Comintern the Yugoslav Communists have adopted the official position of
Soviet Moscow that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes /Yugoslavia was
an artificial creation of the Versailles Order after the World War I that became a
formal justification for the Yugoslav Communists to adopted an official policy
guidelines on the destruction of Yugoslavia untill 1935 when the Comintern
changed a policy towards Yugoslav state and its territorial integrity. Anyway,
Communist-Ustashi collaboration was a crutial one in any combination of the
destruction of Yugoslavia from inside (no matter before or after the World War II).
The Communist final policy about breaking up the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia was finaly shaped at the Fourth Congress of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Dresden in November 1928 (held in the building

374
Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, 151153.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
167


of the Party School of the Communist Party of Germany Rosa Luxemburg)
when the destruction of the Yugoslav state was included in the official program of
the Party. At the same time, the Yugoslav proletariat was called to the fight to
defeat the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and to contribute to the victory
of the Soviet government in Moscow in the coming imperialistic war planned by
the Western countries against the Soviet Union. On this occasion, it was adopted
and the revolutionary task of the Yugoslav Communists to lead the peasants and
other oppressed national masses in the upcoming civil war in order to destroy the
current imperialistic state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for full national
independence of the oppressed nations, the overthrowing of the bourgeoisie, the
workers and peasants government and for the establishment of a Balkan
federation of the republics of the workers and peasants.
375
Here should be given a
special attention to the fact that the text of the 1928 Dresdner Resolution of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the linguistic sense is very much coloured with
a standardized vocabulary of the Croatian language which says a lot about the
character of the leadership of the Party, which phrased the Resolution. The
Yugoslav Communists in their anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian policy were even
ready to collaborate with Mussolinis Italy or Horthis Hungary in order to destoy
their main political enemy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thus, Milan Gorki (i.e.,
Joseph iinski, who was from the second half of 1932 an interim Secretary
General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, appointed directly by the
Comintern in Moscow) declared in April 1929 that in the case of rebellion in
Croatia the Party must make temporary strategic agreement with foreign
imperialism (Italy and Hungary) and even to give to those countries some
Yugoslav territories, for the sake of destroying Yugoslavia and her regime of the
Greater Serbian hegemony with the help of Rome and Budapest.
376

Subsequently, the Yugoslav Communists were during the World War II loyal to
this Gorkis declaration and guidelines, collaborating with both the German
occupiers and Pavelis Croat Ustashi.
377

The 1928 Dresden Resolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was
a direct supporting response to the conclusions adopted at the Sixth Congress of
the Comintern in 1928 in Moscow that the world is coming closer to a general
crisis of the global capitalism which will be followed by the Western imperialistic
war against the USSR. Therefore, the Comintern in Moscow issued a directive to
all its branches (i.e., the Communist parties) abroad that the Communists have to
be prepared for participation in direct class conflict in order to break bourgeoisie
order in their countries by the socialist revolution and to replace it with a socialist
order. For that reason, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia already in 1928 after its congress in Dresden issued a directive for
organizing of the armed uprising in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the sake of its
dissolution.
The first concrete political cooperation between the Croatian Ustashi
movement and the Yugoslav Communists occurred already in 1932 when the
Communists called all Yugoslav peoples in open rebellion against the Kingdom of

375
Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, 160. On the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the
first Soviet (Bolshevik) republics were created in Labin, Ptuj and Southeast Banat. In Banat it was established agrarian
republic in November 1918 as the Soviet Republic of Kusii.
376
Petranovi, Zeevi, Agonija dve Jugoslavije, 191.
377
, (19411945); mider, Partizanski rat u Jugoslaviji 19411945.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
168


Yugoslavia in order to assist the Croatian national revolutionaries (the Ustashi) in
their fight against the royal dictatorship (introduced on January 6
th
, 1929). This
Ustashi uprising broke out in September 1932 when, with the help of Mussolinis
Italy, an Ustashi group attacked a Yugoslav gendarmerie station in the village of
Bruani at Velebit Mt. in Dalmatia with the intent to launch a mass uprising
against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the establishment of an independent
Greater Croatia on the basis of the Croatian historical and states rights. Thus,
in this case, Mussolinis Italy, Pavelis Ustashi and the Yugoslav Communists
became politically united in their mutual collaboration.
One of the most important documents and details from the history of pre-
war collaboration between Pavelis Ustashi and the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia is a concrete and comprehensive Agreement between the Communist
Party and the Croatian Ustashi liberation movement reached in June 1935 and
signed by Moshe Pijade for the Communist side and Dr. Mile Budak for the
Ustashi movement in a prison of Sremska Mitrovica. The aim of this agreement
was a very clear and unambiguous: a total destruction of the Yugoslav state and
everything that was Serbian and Christian Orthodox.
378
The text of the agreement
became publically known in the World War II as Serbias government of General
Milan Nedi reprinted it several times and at such a way informing the Serbs who
were the Communists and Brozs Partisans and for whom and what fore they have
been fighting in the war. However, it is true that from a historiographic-scientific-
methodological point of view there is a problem of authenticity of this crucial
document on Ustashi-Communist collaboration as the text of the agreement is
preserved only in the transcript, i.e. not in the original form. Therefore, the only
argument against the Communist-Ustashi collaboration by the post-war
titographic historiography is that this document was misused as pure war
propaganda by the government of General Milan Nedi (Nedis forgery) against
the patriotic freedom fighters Partisans. However, by using the basic principles of
analogical methods we come to the conclusion that such an agreement (written ,
signed or oral no matter) between the Communists and the Ustashi certainly
existed since the crucial points of it on the destruction of the Orthodox Serbs were
implemented by both sides during and after the World War II. In this sense, we
have to notice at least six facts:
1. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not issue any communiqu in
regard to the proclaimation of the Independent State of Croatia in
Zagreb on April 10
th
, 1941 but we know that the Yugoslav Communists
were well known for their propensity for issuing the partys
communiqus on every political occasion and new situation.
2. Brozs Partisans during the whole World War II even did not think to try
to liberate the most notorious death camp in Europe Jasenovac (the
Nineth Circle of Hell, the Balkan Auschwitz) in which the Ustashi
soldiers killed up to 700,000 men including and children of whom the
ethnic Serbs were the overwhelming majority.
379

3. After the war the new Communist authorities transformed the death
camp of Jasenovac into very beautiful park by destroying and removing

378
The most important parts of this Communist-Ustashi collaboration agreement is published in: ,
, 6667 according to Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI), Belgrade, Agreement Pijade-Budak.
379
www.jasenovac.org; www.jasenovac-info.com.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
169


all camp buildings and other material proofs of the genocide (totally
different policy in comparison with the post-war Auschwitz, for
instance). It is even erected a monument (called Cracked Rose) in 1966
devoted to all camps victims but which consists of four Latin letters U
which Pavelis Ustashi soldiers wore on their caps as an official insignia
of the movement.
4. Josip Broz Tito (of Croat-Slovene origine), as a President of the post-war
Yugoslavia for 35 years, never visited the place of Jasenovac and never
participated in any of annual comemoration meetings on the place of
this wartime slaughtering house or any other mass-grave place of the
Serbs on the territory of the Ustashi-run Independent State of Croatia.
5. About direct wartime collaboration between the Croatian Ustashi and
the Croat-led Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its Peoples Liberation
Army (the Partisan movement) of Josip Broz Tito in order to be solved
the Serbian question in the Independent State of Croatia indirectly tells
the case from July 31
st
, 1966 just at the opening ceremony of the
memorial museum to the victims of the Jasenovac death camp (a
factory of death). In fact, as one of the guests and also the official
representative of the governing structures of Croatia at this ceremony
was present and the President of the Parliament of the Socialist
Republic of Croatia Stevo Krajai, who was one of the most trusted
associates of Tito. However, when the opening ceremony ended but
thinking that the microphones are muted, Krajai turned to the
Serbian Partisan soldiers (his wartime commarades) telling them
literally: Here, we kill you not enough. Nevertheless, the microphones
were not turned off and as a consequence after this scandal Krajai
was forced to resign from the post.
380

6. It was a very fact that many Ustashi soldiers and officers during the
war, but mostly in 1944 and 1945 when it was already clear who is
going to be a loser and who a winner, changed a side and finished the
war as Titos Partisans and therefore participated in the Communist
mass terror against Serbias civilians in 1944/1945 when Serbia
became occupied by the Partisans who came from the territory of the
Independent State of Croatia. It is estimated that at that time up to
100,000 Serbias Serbs lost their lives under the Partisan-Ustashi terror
under the name of a fight against the collaborators with the Germans,
i.e., the Chetniks. Nevertheless, two cases of a changing side by the top
Ustashi officers are here of extreme relevance as the examples:
381

A Croat Franjo Pirc was a commander of the Royal Yugoslav air
squadron on April 6
th
, 1941 when the German Luftwaffe started the
war against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by heavily bombing its capital
Belgrade. However, on the military air-port in the city of Ni in
Serbia Captain Franjo Pirc burned all his airplanes except one which
he used to fly to the Germans who sent him to Croatia where he
became a chief commander of all air forces of the Ustashi
Independent State of Croatia. During the war, there is a testimony of

380
, , 99.
381
, , 58.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
170


the US officer Ilija Eli Popovich (of the Serb origin) who was at Titos
General Staff how on one occasion the Ustashi chief commander of
all Croatias air forces Franjo Pirc came in the official car of the
Independent State of Croatia with all Ustashi insignias escorted by
the Ustashi soldiers to Josip Broz Tito who organized to him a
welcome ceremony with a Partisan guard of honor. Tito was very kind
with and welcome to Pirc for whom Broz organized and reach
banquet at evening. However, Franjo Pirc at the end of the war joined
the Partisans and was appointed by Tito as a commander of the
Yugoslav (Partisan) Military Air Forces. Officially, according to the
post-war Communist titography, Pirc was even the establisher of the
military air forces of the Communist Yugoslavia. After his retirement,
Pirc was appointed for the Yugoslav ambassador in Argentina the
country that accepted a huge number of the Ustashi after May 1945.
A Croat Ustashi General Marko Mesi was a commander of the
Ustashi troops during the Battle of Stalingrad where he was arrested
by the Soviet soldiers. However, under the personal intervention of
Josip Broz Tito, all arrested Croat soldiers became transformed into
the Peoples Army for Yugoslavias Liberation under Mesi command
fighting as a part of the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, redressed Croat
Ustashi soldiers took a participation in the Red Armys liberation of
Serbia in October 1944 committing the war crimes against her
civilians. Nevertheless, a General Marko Mesi became after the war
appointed as a commander of the Guard of Josip Broz Tito for many
years.


Conclusions

1. Collaboration between the Croat Ustashi movement and the Croat-led
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its Partisan movement during the
World War II on the territory of the Ustashi-governed Independent State
of Croatia was a sistematic, direct and above all anti-Serb oriented with
the main political task to solve the Serbian question on this territory on
the most brutal and Croat-favour way.
2. The roots of this collaboration are from the inter-war period when both
the Ustashi and the Communists reached an agreement on destruction
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Serbs for the sake of creation of a
Croat dominated Greater Croatia.
3. For the Yugoslav Communists and their Partisan movement during the
World War II the only military-political enemy was the Yugoslav Army in
the Fatherland (the Ravna Gora Movement) commanded by the General
Dragoljub Draa Mihailovi
4. In order to defeat the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, as the only
legal representative of the only legal government of Yugoslavia, the
Comunists collaborated with both the Ustashi and the Germans.
5. After the World War II the Communist quasi-historiography
(titography) did everything to falsificate a role of the Communist Party
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
171


of Yugoslavia and its Partisan movement during the war in order to
present itself as a patriots and freedom-fighters.
382

6. Even today, 70 years after the end of the World War II, the most hidden
and untachable topic of historiographic investigation on the terrytory of
ex-Yugoslavia regarding the World War II history of the Yugoslav
peoples is collaboration of the Yugoslav Communists and their Partisan
detachments with the Ustashi regime in Zagreb and the Germans.

Bibliography


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13. decembra 1943. g., signatura 838, LF JBT III-11/15].

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enemies' troops, Reg. No. 3/2, K-116/1638, Agreement Pijade-Budak in 1935
[Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta, Beograd, Arhiva neprijateljskih jedinica, br.
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Command, Chetnik Archives, K-12, 30/12 (Letter to Isa, March 29th, 1943)
[Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta, Beograd, tab vrhovne komande, etnika
arhiva, K-12, 30/12 (pismo Isi od 29. marta 1943. g.)].

Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI), Belgrade, Staff of the Supreme
Command, Chetnik Archives, K-12, 30/12 (a copy of Tito's personal letter )
[Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta, Beograd, tab vrhovne komande, etnika
arhiva, K-12, 30/12 (kopija Titove svojerune depee)].

Collection of the documents and information about People's-liberation war of the
Yugoslav peoples [Zbornici dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilakom
ratu jugoslovenskih naroda], Vol. IXIV, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd.

Izdajnik i ratni zloinac Draa Mihailovi pred sudom, Savez udruenja novinara
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With regard to the issue on the titographic forgeries about Josip Broz Tito, Brozs Partisans and the Ravna Gora
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.
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Kriegsarchiv Wien (KAW), Glaise von Horstenau's Inheritance (B/67) including and
his diary notes from Zagreb from April 1941 to September 1944 (KAW, B/67-
diary) [Ratni arhiv u Beu, Ostavtina Gleza fon Horstenau (B/67)
ukljuujui i njegove zabeleke u formi dnevnika iz Zagreba od aprila 1941. g.
do septembra 1944. g. (KAW, B/67-dnevnik)].

Proclamation by the National Council of the unification of the State of Slovenes,
Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro, Zagreb,
November 23
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, 1918 u Sneana Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through
Documents. From its creation to its dissolution, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 151153.

Proleter, Magazine of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (Section of the Communist International), year VIII, No. 28,
December 1932, article The Communist Party welcomes the Ustashi
movement, Archives of the National Library of Serbia, Department of
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Jugoslavije (Sekcije Komunistike Internacionale), god. VIII, br. 28,
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primerka].

Tagesbuch Nr. Ia&545, 44 J. G. Kdos. Tgb. Nr. Ia&547&44 J-G-Kdos. SS Frw.
Geb. Division Prinz Eugen f. 1c Nr. 513/44 Jahr G. K. Dos.

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SUBNOR Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2001.

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., , : , 2012 [original title: The
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Southeast Europe During World War Two].

. ., (19411945), , , 1965.

. ., ( ), III,
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., ., , . ,
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Articles

Fajn V. A. D., Diktatori mogu imati blagotvoran uticaj: izuzetan sluaj Josipa
Broza Tita, Fier J. B. (ed.), Balkanski diktatori: Diktatori i autoritarni vladari
Jugoistone Evrope, Beograd: IPS MedijaProsveta, 2009, pp. 305360.

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Central and Southeastern Europe: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union during the Second World War, Lietuvos Istorijos Studijos,
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Sotirovi V. B., ,
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Svedoenje amerikog kapetana Ilije Popovia, , , . 74, 11.
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., , , , 1991.

Books

Bolta L. B., Graaka etnika brigada 19411945: prilog istoriji narodnog
ravnogorskog pokreta, Sidnej, Australija, 1987.

Gruji P., Boromejski vor. Ko je bio patriota u Srbiji 19411945?, ATC Avangarda,
Beograd, 2006.

Kazimirovi V., Nemaki general u Zagrebu, Prizma/Centar film, Kragujevac-
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Petranovi B., Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, I, NOLIT, Beograd, 1988.

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., .
(14921992), , , Evro Giunti, , 2010.

., , III, , , 1999.

. ., . ,
, 19411945, , , 1999.

., , ,
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., , UNA PRESS, Beograd,
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., . , , , 2012.

., : 20. , :
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. ., ,
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Internet pages

Jasenovac Info www.jasenovac-info.com

Jasenovac Research Institute www.jasenovac.org


www.partizani.blog.com


















Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
175


Appendices


Appendix No. 1:
Croat Ustashi soldiers together with the Croat-led Partisans



Appendix No. 2:
A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Milovan ilas and Partisan commander
Koa Popovi together with the German officers and soldiers during the March negotiations (Bosnia-Herzegovina) in
1943 when both sides agreed to collaborate against the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland





Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
176




Appendix No. 3:
A shameful monument to the victims of the Ustashi-lead genocide on the place of a death camp of Jasenovac on the River
of Sava in Croatia erected by the Yugoslav Communist authorities in 1966. It is made in a shape of the Ustashi U
insignia

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
177




Appendix No. 4:
A German soldier August Heller together with the Yugoslav Partisans of the Ljubis Partisan Detachment in the
Western Serbia around the city of aak in 1941
























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The Fair Trade Movement and the European
Union


Assoc. Prof. Vladislav B. Sotirovi
Institute of Political Sciences
Mykolas Romeris University
Faculty of Politics and Management
Vilnius, Lithuania
vladislav@sotirovic.eu
vsotirovic@mruni.eu
http://vsotirovic.home.mruni.eu
http://www.sotirovic.eu


Abstract: The European Union (EU) is known for being economically liberal. It
means that the EU believes in a free market where goods, services and people can
cross freely the boarders. This is what are telling the treaties since the very
beginning of the European communities construction (from 1951 onward). From the
European Coal and Steel Community (1951/1952) and the free market of coal and
steel to nowadays and the accomplishment of a whole process, free market
economy has always been an objective to be achieved.
While the economic part of the European unification was going on, another economic
construction was on its way as well. That was an economy where partnerships are
based on dialogue, transparency and respect, which seeks greater equity in
international trade. That contributes to sustainable development by offering better
trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and
workers. That construction is the so-called Fair Trade movement.
Between those two movements, which at first seem not to fit together, the main
questions to be answered are as such: 1. Can we make any connections between
them? 2. Are they any common goals and interests between them?, and 3. If yes,
how it is expressed on the political and social fields?


Key words: Trade, European Union, Fair Trade, Economy, North/South,
Empowerment
383


1. The Fair Trade Movement Today

During its own history there were very different and many understandings
and particularily definitions of the Fair Trade movement. We can summarize
them and conclude that the Fair Trade is as an organized economic and social
movement, but on the first place it is the market-based approach with the final
task to help producers in developing countries of the Worlds South, to contribute
to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing
the rights of, marginalized producers and workers in the South. More practically,

383
This article is written originally for the Work Group 3 meeting in 2010 (Differences and Inequalities, Oslo,
Norway, May 7-8, 2010) as a part of the COST Action IS0803: Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network
Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe's Eastern Peripheries. The research on the topic and writing
the text are financed by the COST Action.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
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this movement advocates the payment of a higher price to producers as well as
social and environmental standards. It focuses in particular on exports from
developing countries to developed (western) onces by dealing mainly with
handicrafts, coffee, cocoa, sugar, tea, bananas, honey, cotton, wine, fresh fruit,
chocolate and flowers.
The Fair Trade movement today has a global character as over a million
small-scale producers and workers are organized in as many as 3,000 grassroots
organizations and their umbrella structures covers over 50 countries in the
southern part of the Globe. Their products are also sold in thousands of
Worldshops or Fair Trade shops, supermarkets and many other sales-points in
the northern portion of the World.

2. Short Historical Background of the Fair Trade Movement

Regardless to the fact that the Fair Trade movement exists almost for a
half of the century the academic literature is still in no agreement upon the very
beginning of the movement that is the unique World's trading and campaign
movement between the Southern producers and the Northern buyers and
consumers. However, for the matter of fact we can say that the Far Trade
movement can, in one sense, trace its origins back to the development of the co-
operative movement in the late 19th century. In the form in which we know this
movement today it began with the Mennonite Central Committee trading with poor
communities in the southern part of the Globe; that was in the 1940s. This action,
however, began to expand and become a movement only in the late 1960s and
the early 1970s.
The earliest traces of the Fair Trade in Europe date back from the late
1950s when the Oxfam UK started to sell crafts made by Chinese refugees in the
Oxfam shops. In 1964 it created the first Fair Trade organization. Parallel
initiatives were taking place in the Netherlands and in 1967 the importing
organization the Fair Trade Original, was established. At the same time, Dutch
third world groups began to sell cane sugar with the message by buying cane
sugar you give people in poor countries a place in the sun of prosperity.
These groups went on to sell handicrafts from the South, and in 1969 the
first Third Worldshop was opened. The Worldshops (or the Fair Trade shops as
they are called in other parts in the world) have played a crucial role in the Fair
Trade movement. They constitute not only points of sales but they are also very
active in campaigning and awareness-raising. During the 1960s and the 1970s
too, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and socially motivated individuals in
many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America perceived the need for fair
marketing organizations which would provide advice, assistance and support to
disadvantaged producers. Many, such the Southern Fair Trade Organizations,
were established, and links were made with the new organizations in the North.
These relationships were based on partnership, dialogue, transparency and
respect. The goal of all of them is a greater equity in international trade.
The Fair Trade movement has grown significantly from its beginnings
but, unfortunatelly, still it remains relatively small in trading terms. However,
despite this economic fact, the movement already attracted attention in the
various kinds of academic literature from a wide range of disciplins including
economics, marketing, design, agriculture, rural studies, development studies and
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
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even theology. However, the exposure within the bussines and management
literature has ben limited especially what concerns academic writings within the
the discipline of business ethics.

3. The European Union and the Fair Trade Movement

The European Union's policy towards the Fair Trade movement is traced
back in the year 1994 when the European (Union) Commission prepared the
Memo on alternative trade in which it declared its support for strengthening the
Fair Trade in the South and North and its intention to establish an European
Commission's Working Group on the Fair Trade. At the same year, the European
(Union) Parliament adopted the Resolution on promoting fairness and solidarity
in North- South trade (14.2.1994) - a resolution voicing its support for the Fair
Trade.
The further step occured two years later when in 1996, the Economic and
Social Committee of the European Commission adopted an Opinion on the
European Fair Trade marking movement. A year later, in 1997, the document
was followed by a resolution adopted by the European Parliament, calling on the
European Commission to support the Fair Trade banana operators. At the same
year, the European Commission published a survey on Attitudes of EU
consumers to Fair Trade bananas, concluding that the Fair Trade bananas
would be commercially viable in several EU Member States. In 1998, the European
Parliament adopted the Resolution on Fair Trade (20.07.1998), which was
followed by the European Commission in 1999 that adopted the Communication
from the Commission to the Council on Fair Trade (29.11.1999). In 2000, public
institutions in the European Union started purchasing the Fair Trade Certified
coffee and tea. In 2004, the European Union adopted the Agricultural Commodity
Chains, Dependence and Poverty A proposal for an EU Action Plan, with a
specific reference to the Fair Trade movement which has been setting the trend
for a more socio-economically responsible trade. Finally, on July 6th, 2006, the
European Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution on the Fair Trade,
recognizing the benefits achieved by the Fair Trade movement, suggesting the
development of an European Union's wide policy on the Fair Trade, defining at
the same time and certain criteria that need to be fulfilled under the Fair Trade
to protect it from abuse and finally calling for greater support within the European
Union to the Fair Trade (European Parliament's resolution Fair Trade and
development, July 6th, 2006).
The Fair Trade contributes to the European Unions commitments as laid
down in Article 177 of the EU Treaty, which states that the European Unions
development policy will foster the sustainable economic and social development of
developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them,
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world
economy, - the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. The Fair
Trade has been repeatedly recognized by the European Unions institutions as a
key tool for sustainable development and poverty reduction. An European Unions
policy framework and support for the Fair Trade are excellent tools to fulfil these
commitments and to reach the so-called Millennium Development Goals. By
signing the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, the European Union became committed
to support the Fair Trade.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
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However, current support to the Fair Trade and its different Fair Trade
organisations is limited and fragmented. Recent research shows that the Fair
Trade sales in Europe have been growing at an average 20% per year since 2000.
The European Union's consumers are increasingly interested in purchasing
products that were produced and traded under the Fair Trade conditions.
Overall sales of the Fair Trade in Europe have arrived at 660 million in 2005. A
typical the Fair Trade products reach now considerable market shares in some
European Union's countries. For instance, 20% of ground coffee in the United
Kingdom and about 2% of all coffee sales in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium
and Germany carry the Fair Trade label. The Fair Trade bananas reach market
shares of up to 5.5% in Austria, Belgium, Finland and the United Kingdom.
However, in some European Union's Member States like in Greece, Hungary, the
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania) and Slovenia, the Fair
Trade is hardly known. With a coherent European Union's wide policy framework
and sufficient support to the Fair Trade and the Fair Trade organisations,
consumer awareness and demand for the Fair Trade could be boosted,
particularly in those countries where it is not yet well established.
In some of the European Union's member states, related legislation is
currently being developed. An European Union's framework, sketched out in a
recommendation, could be helpful to avoid that legislation differs between the
member states and thus hinders the free movement of goods within the European
Union. The Fair Trade system is based on voluntary standards for labelled and
non-labelled products and organisations. These standards have been developed
over the last five decades by the international Fair Trade movement. They are
constantly being reviewed and assessed in cooperation with the producers who are
at the heart of the Fair Trade system. The Fair Trade organisations are
responsible for fulfilling these standards and the related criteria. The compliance
with the standards is regularly monitored and assessed. The Fair Trade
organisations actively work with other companies such as retailers and other
commercial partners.
In view of the success of the Fair Trade and the lack of legal protection,
there is a risk that the concept may be abused by companies that enter the
market without complying with the related criteria. Consumers' rights and
appropriate product information are at the heart of the Fair Trade and low-
criteria labels might mislead consumers and reduce their support to the system.
An European Union's policy framework for the Fair Trade could help to clarify
the use of the term Fair Trade and to serve as a reference for national policies on
the Fair Trade and the Fair Trade organisations. Beyond taking legislative acts,
the European Union's institutions are drawing consequences, they link their
words to their attitude. For instance, in 2004, the value of the Fair Trade goods
purchased by the European Union's Parliament stood at around 39,000 .

4. The European Fair Trade Association EFTA and The European
Union

The EFTA - European Fair Trade Association (not to be mixed with the
EFTA European Free Trade Association composed (in 2014) by Iceland,
Switzerland, Norway and Lichtenstein) is an association of eleven Fair Trade
importers in nine European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
182


The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Close relations
between the EFTA and the EU can be seen if we know that eight of the EFTA's
member states are at the same time and the members of the European Union
while only one (Switzerland) is not (but it is a member of the European Free Trade
Association). The EFTA was established informally in 1987 by some of the oldest
and largest the Fair Trade importers and very soon this European trade
organisation gained formal status in 1990. The EFTA's headquarters is based in
The Netherlands and has Dutch Articles of Association.
The aim of the EFTA is to support its member organizations and member
states in their work and to encourage them to cooperate and coordinate their
mutual policies. The EFTA's three basic actions are:
It facilitates the exchange of information and networking.
It creates conditions for labour division.
It identifies areas of coordination and cooperation such as joint projects,
research and systems to facilitate the Fair Trading with suppliers.
Four EFTA members (the Fair Trade Organisatie in The Netherlands, the
CTM in Italy, the Oxfam Wereldwinkels in Belgium and the IDEAS in Spain), have,
together with the EFTA, initiated a project that is called the Fair Procura. The
overall aim of the project is to encourage European institutions, national, regional
and local authorities to increase their contribution to sustainable development
through sustainable (the Fair Trade) purchasing policies and practice. More
precisely, the specific objectives of the projects are:
To raise awareness of the European, national, regional and local
authorities and public purchasers on the impact of public consumption
on sustainable North/South relations.
To secure a commitment from policy-makers to include the Fair
Trade/social criteria in public procurement legislation.
To strengthen the social dimension of sustainable purchasing practices
among institutional buyers.
The project is co-financed by the European Commission (EuropeAid) and
started in September 2004. It includes a background legal research report, a
training and a campaign kit for the Fair Procura Animateurs, the Fair Procura and
best practice brochure, national and the European conferences and close
cooperation with other networks involved in sustainable procurement such as for
instance the Eurocities.
The EFTA established an Advocacy Office in Brussels in 1995. The office
supported EFTA members and other actors of the Fair Trade movement in their
advocacy and campaigns work and influenced the European Union's institutions
towards making international rules on trade fairer. Over the course of the years,
the office has achieved a lot. Various campaigns, e.g. on the Fair Trade in
general, on coffee, chocolate, rice, have been executed.
To stress once again, from the EU's side, the European Union's Parliament
adopted a resolutions on the Fair Trade and the European Union's Commission
adopted a Communication on the Fair Trade. The Cotonou agreement also
mentions the Fair Trade. The advocates of the movement would probably stress
the fact that the Fair Trade coffee is being served in the building of the European
Union's Parliament.


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5. The Fair Tourism and The European Union

The practice of the so-called Fair Tourism is based on the idea of
implementation of the Fair Trade principles to the services. The Fair Tourism is
essentially a part of the alternative ways of travelling with the visions of solidarity
tourism, ecotourism or sustainable tourism. The Fair Tourism is the way
that is responding to the principles of the Fair Trade as according to the country
of the supplier, the travel agency will have to respond to a label, respecting the
Fair Trade criterias. The Fair Tourism is gathering activities of services,
proposed by the travel agencies to responsible travellers, and developped by local
communities. Those communities are mainly involved in the implementation of the
activities and they are able to modify, reorient or stop them if and as they want.
They manage as much as they can their activities in order not to use to much
intermediaries who do not subscribe to the principles of the Fair Tourism.
These principles are:
Different social, cultural and financial benefits of their activities have to be
mainly distributed to the local community.
The benefits have to be fairly shared between the actors.
Both host and visitor should have respect human rights, culture and
environment. It includes: safe working conditions and practices,
protection of young workers, promoting gender equality, understanding
and tolerance of socio-cultural norms, conservation of the environment,
HIV/AIDS awareness, etc.
The services delivered to tourists should be reliable and consistent.
Basic safety and security should be provided and ensured by both the host
and the visitor.
Ownership of tourism businesses must be clearly defined.
Employees and all other participants should be able to access information
that concerns them like sharing of profits.
Benefits and losses must be transparent.
However, the fact is that there is not yet a Fair Tourism label that would
cover a wider territory such as, for instance, Max Havelaar lable for the Fair
Trade. On the other hand, one label, the first, has been created in 2002 in the
South Africa. That is Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa (FTTSA). Since 2002,
FTTSA has labelled 30 suppliers all over the South Africa and expect to spread its
model to the other countries. The second one appeared in the European Union
and was created in 2007 in France: ATR (Agir pour un Tourisme Responsable or the
Association for a Responsible Tourism).
The Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa is a non-profit company registered
in the South Africa that promotes sustainable and equitable tourism development.
This is achieved primarily through awareness raising and the facilitation of a
voluntary certification programme that awards a special Trademark or label to
tourism enterprises that meet specific common criteria like mentioned above: fair
wages and working conditions, fair operations and purchasing, fair distribution of
benefits, ethical business practice and respect for human rights, culture and
environment.
The Association for a Responsible Tourism is an association registered in
France that promotes sustainable and equitable tourism development. This is
achieved primarily through awareness raising to the society and the facilitation of
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
184


a voluntary certification programme that awards a label to tourism companies or
organisations that meet specific common criteria like in the South African case.
The ATR has wanted a non-refuttable label out of any suspiscion. In order to
achieve its objectives, the association has processing to get an official label,
recognised by the French state and controlled by an independant audit office. The
recognition of the label is done on March 16th, 2007. After the first year of
implementation and work, three tourist companies have already been audited with
success: Atalante, Allibert and Chamina, while the other companies are still
auditing. It is expected that the number of labelled agencies should raise in the
coming years.
Already involved in the Fair Trade, the European Union has naturally
welcomed and the movement fighting for a Fair Tourism. Consequently, the
European Union's Parliament has adopted on May 23rd, 2005 a Resolution by 368
MP votes in favour compared to 81 MP against and 17 MP abstentions. By this
Resolution, the EUs Parliament stated that tourism undeniably constitutes a
driving force behind growth in developing countries at all levels.
The EUs Parliament called for the promotion of locally controlled tourism
initiatives aimed at poverty alleviation, the conservation of biodiversity and the
promotion of human rights. It recommended that the European Union's
Commission stress the EU's tourism policies within its relationship with the ACP
(Africa, Carrabian and Pacific) countries. The ACP governments should examine
policies designed to guarantee planning gain benefits for the local communities
where tourism projects will take a place. The EUs Parliament insisted on the need
to reinvest the profits of tourism in local development. It called on tour operators
to review their all-inclusive packages which prevent spin-off benefits to the local
communities, and encourages these operators to source materials/staff locally as
far as possible, including managerial staff. It also encouraged governments to
promote the creation and/or development of public-private partnerships and to
facilitate the setting-up of enterprises in the tourism sector. It has to be stressed
that there are sustainable tourism-oriented projects financed under the European
Development Fund (EDF).
The EUs Parliament as well noted that in many developing countries the
tourism sector is fundamentally a private-sector activity, and that the European
Union must therefore find ways to ensure that the interested parties and other
social partners are fully involved in all discussions regarding development policy
affecting the tourism sector. The EUs Parliament advocates that criminal activity
has to be combated with all transparency in order to discourage activities such as
money laundering, sex tourism, etc. Such criminal activities should be combated
in such a way as not to damage countries' tourist image. The Governments of
developing countries must ensure the full involvement of local communities in
tourist activities and to ensure the fair sharing of the economic, social and
cultural benefits generated. It called also on both the EU's member states
Governments and the EU's Commission, with the support of tour operators and
experienced organisations, to act to promote ethical standards in tourism by
introducing a certified European the Fair Trade Tourism label.
The EUs Parliament asked the Union and its member states to make
available to developing countries with tourist potential their experience and know-
how with a view to the on-site training of the personnel. It considered that
sustainable tourism income may contribute to improving the standard of living of
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
185


the population in the developing countries and to public health, as well as to
communications, energy and technology infrastructures. There should be the EU's
financial support for the World Tourism Organization (WTO) initiative ST-EP (the
Sustainable Tourism-Eliminating Poverty) and other initiatives that work
towards alleviating poverty in developing countries. The EU's Parliament asked for
the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism to be incorporated by all countries into their
national law. It also proposed to the Governments of the EU's member states to
circulate among themselves an annual list of visa refusals, to be confined to
grounds of sex tourism offences, crimes against humanity or terrorism. The EU's
Commission is asked to adopt effective programmes to combat sex tourism at the
European level. The EUs Parliament went further on to demand that the
Governments of the countries concerned and the EU's tour operators enforce
human rights standards, workers' rights in accordance with the ILO (International
Labour Organization) core labour standards, the protection of the European
tourist-consumers and the recommendations concerning tour operators.

6. Conclusion

At the end, we can make a conclusion that today there are the real and
functionable connections between the Fair Trade and the European Union. From
the Memo on alternative trade prepared by the European Union's Commission in
1994 to the Resolution adopted in 2006, recognizing the benefits achieved by the
Fair Trade movement, an undeniable way in those relations has been made.
The process of cooperation between the Fair Trade and the Fair Tourism
movements on the one hand and the European Union on another is going on, the
association between these two entities is just beginning but for sure can't stop
now. Already strong alone, because it is coming from the base, the Fair Trade
movement has everything to win from that bilateral alliance but only under the
conditions that the European Union will use all its weight in the coming years to
undermine and spread the Fair Trade firstly within the territory of the European
Union, then all around the rest of the continental Europe, but also and the World.
If not for all other reasons then at least because, quoting Mr. Peter
Mandelson - the European Union's Trade Commissioner in Brussels on the 22th of
June 2006: Fair Trade reminds us that trade is about people, their livelihoods,
their families sometimes their survival.

7. Bibliography:

Books:

Barratt Brown Michael: Fair Trade: Reform and Realities in the International
Trading System. London: Zed Books, 1993

Bowes John (ed.): The Fair Trade Revolution. LondonNew York: Pluto
Press, 2011

Brown R. Keith: Buying Into Fair Trade: Culture, Morality, and Consumption.
New YorkLondon: New York University Press, 2013

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186


Business Unusual: Success and Challenges of Fair Trade, published by the
Fair Trade Advocacy Office

DeCarlo Jacqueline: Fair Trade: A Beginnerss Guide. Oxford: A Oneword
Book, 2007

Granville Brigitte, Dine Janet (eds.): The Process and Practicies of Fair
Trade: Trust, Ethics, and Governance. New York: Routledge, 2013

Howells Geraint, Micklitz Hans, Wilhelmsson Thomas: European Fair
Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial Practicies Directive. Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006

Jaffee Daniel, Justice Brewing: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability, and
Survival. LondonBarkleyLos Angeles: University of California Press,
2007

Linton April: Fair Trade From the Ground Up: New Markets for Social
Justice. SeattleLondon: University of Washington Press, 2012

Littrell Mary Ann, Marsha Ann Dickson: Social Responsibility in the Global
Market: Fair Trade of Cultural Products. London: Sage, 1999

Lyon Sarah, Moberg Mark (eds.): Fair Trade and Social Justice: Global
Ethnographies. New YorkLondon: New York University Press, 2010

Nicholls Alex, Opal Charlotte: Fair Trade MarketDriven Ethical
Consumption. LondonThousand OaksNew Delhi: SAGE Publications
Ltd, 2005

Raynolds T. Laura, Murray L. Douglas, Wilkinson John: Fair Trade: The
Challenges of Transforming Globalization. New York: Routledge, 2007

Stiglitz E. Joseph, Charlton Andrew: Fair Trade For All: How Trade Can
Promote Development. OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press, 2005

Reports:

Annual report EFTA 2006

Fair trade in Europe 2005, published by EFTA

European Parliament supports Fair Trade, press release, 6th of July
2006, published by the Fair Trade Advocacy Office

Communication from the commission to the council on Fair Trade,
Brussels, 29.11.1999 COM(1999) 619 final

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
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FLO (Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International): 2001 Report 2000
2001: Developing Fair Trades Labelling. Bonn; 2003a Fair Trade
Standards in General. Bonn; 2003b Report 20022003: Cum Laude.
Bonn

Researches on the impact of fair trade, October 2006, published by EFTA

Articles:

Fridell Gavin: Fair Trade and Neoliberalism: Assessing Emerging
Perspectives. Latin American Parspectives, Issue 151, Vol. 33, No. 6,
2006, pp. 828.

Moore Geoff: The Fair Trade Movement: Parameters, Issues and Future
Research. Journal of Business Ethics, No. 53, 2004, pp. 7386.

Internet sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_trade

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_tourism

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5209932&noticeType=null
&language=en

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference
=A6-2006-0207&language=EN&mode=XML#_part1_def1

http://www.european-fair-trade-association.org/efta/

http://www.european-fair-trade-association.org/Efta/index.php

http://www.european-fair-trade-
association.org/FairProcura/presentation.php

http://www.european-fair-trade-
rganization.org/fairprocura/doc/database/best_practices.pdf

http://www.fairtrade-advocacy.org/EUofficialtexts.html

http://www.unwto.org/frameset/frame_sustainable.html








Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
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Appendices



No. 1: The Fair Trade Labeling Organisations International - a structure





No. 2: The Fair Trade International a label


Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
189




No.3: Ten Fair Trade principles




No. 4. the Fair Trade coffee




Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
190


The Belgian Multicultural Federalism
Laboratory of The European Integration


Abstract: The aim of this short article is to present the main inner-political
problems in multilingual and multicultural Belgium a country in which the
capital of the European Union (the EU) is located and a country as one of the
original six establishers of the present day the EU. The question of destiny of
the Belgian multicultural federalism is of the crucial importance for the future
process of European integration or disintegration.

Key words: Belgium, multiculturalism, Flanders, Walloons, federalism,
nationalism


The Belgian multicultural society: Long united and long divided

The population of the Kingdom of Belguim is 10 million and it is divided
into two main linguistic groups: the northern Duch speakers (the
Flemish/Flanders) 6 million and the southern French speaking population (the
Walloons) 4 million. The main third speaking group are the Germans (67,000)
living on the German border. The capital Brussels upsets this neat division as its
is mainly French-speaking city within the Duch-speaking Flemish part of Belgium
on the north. For the matter of comparison, the whole country is a quarter size of
the United Kingdom, fitting into France 18 times and having 70% of the
population number of the Netherlands (16 million).
Belgium not so often attracts outside attention. Yet the country is more
than fine chocolates, delicious beers or Tintin. Usually, the others celebrate
Belgium as a federal, post-nationalist country, which combines cultural
pragmatism with a rather solid social consensus. The historians present the
country without a critical vision of the origins of the Belgian independence in 1830
as a part of a game between the great European powers. Belgium as well as
illustrates how the deep-seated tradition of local autonomy and suspicion towards
state authority go hand in hand with a strong sense of individual tolerance and
solidarity, with a rejection of violent confrontation and a continuous search for
consensus between the Flemish and the Walloon parts of the country. Belgian
history from the very beginning in 1830 up to the present is a history of linguistic
diversity, cultural plurality and a search for a kind of a Belgian common identity
of its all citizens who are constantly living between states integration and its
territorial disintegration.
Belgium is an example of the ambivalent relation between history, national
myths, and the lasagne identity of most Belgians for whom the King, as a
political institution, is de facto the only factor of the national unity. The Belgian
case of multicultural federalism can be at the same time and a model but also and
a warning for the rest of Europe. Its history addresses questions of identity and
security, of a sense of cohesion and common purpose or the lack thereof. Like for
the rest of Europe as well.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
191


Any history of the Belgians from 1830 onwards has to describe the
traditions and transitions that have developed on the territory of the present-day
Belgium in a sense of shared identity, common government, and a centralized
nation-state - and then over a few recent decades paved the way for Flemish-
Walloon schism that now threatens to break up Belgium. However, it has to
respond to the crucial question: Why does a government, unified for more than
150 years, no longer seem capable of holding together a linguistically divided
country? If Belgium, as a symbol of the west European successfull policy of
multiculturalism and multilingual cohabitation, can not function anymore as a
united political system and a country based on it, what other parts of Europe with
the same structure and problems as Belgium can expect in the post-Cold War
future of Europe which basically already started in 2014 in the multilingual and
multicultural Ukraine?
In historically tracing the evolution of the governance of Belgium, one have
to describe why and how the dominance of the French-speaking propertied elite
eroded after having monopolized the land's governance for centuries. The
extension of suffrage, combined with the rise of literacy and schooling enabled
labor and the Flemish movement to gather sufficient power to fracture the Belgian
polity, splitting its parties and frustrating its politics. The presence of the
European Union (the EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (the NATO)
has, in a tangential way, enable the Belgian separatists to discount the merit of a
national government that is no longer needed to defend the country militarily and
economically.
Therefore, for example, in 2008, after 196 days after parliamentary
elections Belgium finally got a new government. This new Belgian record in not
having state government is achieved due to the main historical disputes between
two major ethnolinguistic groups the French speaking Walloons at the south and
the Flemish/Duch speakers (the Flanders) at the north (both of them are Roman-
Catholics). Previous record in not having government was from the year of 1988
148 days. The winner of the spring 2007 parliamentary elections Ive Leterm
Flemish nationalist could not form a new Belgian government even after several
rounds of negotiations and interventions by the King. Ive Leterm, irronically a
politician with a French name, was accusing at that time the Walloons for
obstruction, while at the same time, the French speakers were accusing him for
uniform nationalistic mind. At such a way, Belgium, as one of the central
protagonists of the pan-European integration, is in the stage of real disunity and
possible territorial dismemberment in the recent future.

Historical disputes

The struggle between the Walloons and the Flanders (the Flemish/Duch
speakers are 60% of the Belgium population) at linguistic, political, national and
cultural levels is not novelty in Belgium as they are historically rooted from the
very beginning of common political life from 1830 when the Kingdom of Belgium
was established. Belgium's federal structure is established on the principles of two
ethnolinguistic regions (northern Flanders and southern Wallonia) and Brussels
with special bilingual status (the Flemish dialect of Duch language was recognized
as an equall official language in 1922). Two federal units are governing one parts
of their regional economies, transport, education, while the federal power has
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
192


jurisdiction over foreign politics, defence, justice and social insurence. However,
the Flemish winning coalition in 2007 was requiring more federal rights: higher
level of taxation policy independence, regionalization of social insurence,
autonomy in traffic regulations, separate car-plates, and even constitution
autonomy. On the other hand, the Walloons are in a real fear that such
requirements will finally end with disapearence of the common state (which
economic weight buttressed the industrial domination of the French-speaking
Walloon south over the Flemish/Duch-speaking majority in the north, whose
wealth derived from agriculture and commerce). What concerns economy, we have
to remember that Belgium was the first industrialized continental European state
(second one in geographical Europe, i.e. after the United Kingdom or better to say
- England).
The Belgium's political life historically had always the same main problem:
the Flemish north was wishing more power and separation, while the French-
speaking south was for preservation of Belgium as one state. Thus, for instance,
after the Second World War the Belgian society was in unpleasent debate upon
collaboration with the Nazi-Germans which left deep scars in the Belgian political
life, as the population of Wallonia accused many Flemish/Duch-speaking
Belgians of symphatizing with the occupiers and even helping them for the reason
of hope to get independence (like, for instance, the Ukrainians did during the
Second World War).

Economic differences

As the Belgians became from the 1950s emphatically European, their own
national identity was under question, which has and economic background as
well. Namely, the structural difficulties of heavy industry, which had been the
backbone of Wallonia's prosperity, gradually shifted the economic advantage to the
Flemish north of the common country. Flanders continued to prosper through
trade and commerce, and was a favoured location for the new industries owing to
its ready access to the sea. Similarly to the case of the North Itally (Lombardia
region), the reach regions of Flanders are propagating to stop to feed any more
poor Wallon south which is arrogant towards the Flemish language and culture.
For instance, the Walloons consider the Flamish language as underdeveloped to
be used as the official university language in Belgium. Basically, one of the main
Flemish political complains is of economic nature: financial capital of developed
north is directed to underdeveloped south by the rulling Walloon politicians in
Brussels for the matter of economic help to Wallonia. For the Flemish population
of Flanders that is economic exploitation by the Walloons as the Flemish north is
much more participating in the central budget than lesser developed Wallonia (the
same complains of economic nature started Yugoslav crisis when at the end of the
1980s Slovenia and Croatia advocated policy of non-supporting any more
underdeveloped Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro). The most fervent critics of
current financial policy on relations Flanders-Wallonia are the big Flemish capital
owners and managers who in 2005 openly advocated division of the country as
Flanders is overburdened by taxation in the favor of Wallonia. Such Belgian
financial politics, originally introduced to form and maintain state unity and
Belgian nation, was later implemented within the framework of the European
Community/Union. In addition to this pure economic problem, the Walloon
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
193


politicians are accused by their Flemish colleagues for deliberate settlement of
Francophone immigrants to Brussels in order to Francophonize this once upon a
time biggest Flemish city.

Political instability

The growing economic, social, and emotional gulf between the two
ethnolinguistic parts in Belgium led to political instability, firstly heightened in the
1970s and secondly today. In addition to the emergence of a number of regional
parties, the Flemish and the Walloon sections of the main parties (the Christian
Democrats, the Socialists, and the Liberals) split to form separate regional parties.
In en effort to address its growing divisions, the country was built into a
federal state in three stages (in 1980, 1988, and 1993). By 1993, there were
parliaments for the Walloon region, the Flemish region, and the bilingual city of
Brussels (three parliaments one state!). The federal regions were given authority
over around 40% of the public expenditure for matters in their purview (education,
culture, health, economic and the labor policy). In these areas, Flanders and
Wallonia are also empowered to conclude international treaties (similarly with
Muslim-Croat Federation and Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Further powers to the regions in matters of agriculture, transport, and foreign aid
were granted in 2001. The contrast between the Flemish part and Wallonia was
exacerbated by the growth, in the Flemish part, of separatist and xenophobic
parties from the mid-1990s, most notably the Vlaams Blok (the Flemish bloc).
Advocating the Flemish independence (like northern parts of ex-Yugoslavia
Slovenia and Croatia) and racist immigration policies, it polled over 20% of the
vote in Belgium's second city Antwerp in 2000. In federal politics, a major
political shift occured in 1999, when the Christian Democrats lost the leading role
in the politics which they had occupied throughout the century, owing to a series
of corruption scandals. From that time, the Liberals became the biggest party bloc
in the parliament.

The Belgian Pandora Box

During the last political crisis in Belgium it bacame obvious that the
Walloons are making all kinds of obstacles for the creation of a new functional
government in Brussels what gives an argument to the Flanders to claim that
basically the southern Walloons are the main separatists. The crisis was a quite
serious with unpredictable consequences for territorial integrity of Belgium in the
future, but also and what concerns the everyday political activities. For instance,
it was at that time in question could Belgium sign a new European agrrement in
Lisbon without the government. The Flemish political parties, frustrated because
of the Wallooon obstructions, are threatening the south to unilaterally proclaim
the city of Brussels as their own with the Flamish/Duch language as the only
official one. As a response, the Francophone parties proclaimed they will stop any
further negotiations if the Flemish north will realize its threat concerning
Brussels. It can be said that the roots of the Belgian governmental-political crisis
are so historically deep that the territorial decomposition of the state is becoming
more and more realistic. When the Belgian Pandora Box will be open is probably
only the question of time. However, the Belgian Pandora Box can have quite
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
194


negative consequences for further European unification as in the case of its
decomposition the Belgian experiment of multiethnolinguistic integration is going
to be definitelly put to the archives. In this case, Belgium as a laboratory of
European integration (deffinition given by one Belgian Prime Minister) would have
a great influence to numerous European separatist movements and to the
remapping of the European political reality. For instance, according to one public
research, 54% of interviewed French citizens expressed wish to incorporate
Wallonia into France in the case of the Belgian dismemberment as a state. The
boomerang of selfdetermination rights sent to the ethnolinguistic nations of ex-
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union from Brussels at the beginning of the 1990s is via
Kosovo today returning back to Brussels with 87% of Flemish/Duch speakers
from Belgium supporting separation and with 77% of their linguistic-historic
cross-border compatriots from the Netherlands wishing to include Flanders into
the mortherland as historic region of the Netherlands (till 1830). At such a way,
the supraethnolinguistic Belgian nation could experience the same destiny of its
Yugoslav counterpart, however, with a lesser chances to finish its existence by
the civil war and ethnic cleansing as it was in the case of the destruction of ex-
Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999. Finally, indication that the Belgian laboratory of
European integration is collapsing have been and dramatic appeals in 2007 to
the Belgians by their King Albert II to preserve national unity as anachronic and
catastrophic separatism could erode international role of Brussels (and deprived
him from the throne in the case of constitution of two republics in stead of one
Kingdom).

Bibliography

Antony Mason, Xenophobe's Guide to the Belgians, Kind Edition, 2009

Benno Barnard, Martine van Berlo, Geert van Istendael, Tony Judt, Marc
Reynebeau, How Can One Not Be Interested in Belgian History: War, Language and
Consensus in Belgium Since 1830, Academia Scienic, 2005

David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, Routledge, 2014

Dean Amory (compiled), The Flemish: Origins, History, Culture, Influence and
Migrations of the Flemings, Edgard Adriaens, 2014

Els Witte, Jan Craevbeckx, Alain Meynen, Political History of Belgium: From 1830
Onwards, Academic & Scientific Publishers, 2010

mile Cammaerts, A History of Belgium from the Roman Invasion to the Present
Day, A Public Domain Book, 2011

Guy Vanthemshe, Belgium and the Congo 18851980, Cambridge University
Press, 2012

Joseph Ernest Morris, Beautiful Europe: Belgium, Kind Edition, 2014

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
195


Karen Shelby, Flemish Nationalism and The Great War: The Politics of Memory,
Visual Culture and Commemoration, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014

Lon van der Essen, A Short History of Belgium, Nabu Press, 2010

Manfred Kohler, Language Politics in Belgium and the Flemish-Walloon Conflict:
Reason for a State to Fail or Driving Force Behind Federalism and Conciliation, VDM
Verlag Dr. Mller, 2010

Mark Elliot, CultureShock! A Survival Guide to Customs and Etiquette: Belgium,
Marshal Cavendish Corporation, 2011

Marleen Brans, Lieven De Winter, Wilfried Swenden, The Politics of Belgium:
Institutions and Policy Under Bipolar and Centrifugal Federalism, Routledge, 2009

Michel Seymour, Alian G. Gagnon, Multinational Federalism: Problems and
Prospects, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012

Samuel Humes, Belgium: Long United, Long Divided, Hurst, 2014

Stef Feyen, Beyond Federal Dogmatics: The Influence of European Union Law on
Belgian Constitutional Case Law Regarding Federalism, Leuven University Press,
2013

Stephen B. Wickman, Belgium: A Country Study, Washington, 1985

Theo Hermans, Louis Vos, Lode Wils, The Flemish Movement: A Documentary
History, 17801990, Athlone Pr, 1992

William Elliot Griffis, Belgium: The Land of Arts, Its History, Legends, Industry, and
Modern Expansion, Forgotten Books, 2012



Assoc Prof. Vladislav B. Sotirovi
Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius
Faculty of Politics and Management
Institute of Political Sciences
vladislav@sotirovic.eu










Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
196


Appendices



No. 1: A political map of the Kingdom of Belgium



No 2: A flag of Flanders (the Flemish/Duch-speaking community in Belgium)
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
197




No 3: Administrative division of the Kinfdom of Belgium



No 4: A flag of Wallonia (the French-speaking community in Belgium)
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
198


The 1917 Corfu Declaration and its
Importance for the Creation of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918



Abstract: The aim of this research article is to give answers to the following
four scientific research problems about the 1917 Corfu Declaration: 1. the
reasons for convocation of the Corfu Conference as a conference which
should finally resolve the main political problems between the Royal Serbian
Government and the Yugoslav Committee, i.e. between two the most
important negotiating representatives of the South Slavs during the process
of the Yugoslav unification at the time of the First World War; 2. a nature of
the opposite political conceptions and attitudes towards a process of
unification and internal organisation of a new Yugoslav state between the
negotiating parties as the most important question to be solved before the
proclamation of the single South Slavic state; 3. an interpretation of the text
of the 1917 Corfu Declaration as a legal act of the agreement between the
Yugoslav Committee and the Royal Serbian Government pretending to be a
final political settlement upon the political form, internal organization and
functioning of the new state; and 4. an importance of the 1917 Corfu
Declaration for the further process of unification of the South Slavs. In order
to realize our research aims we will deal with the relevant historical sources
followed by relevant historiographical literature on the topic. However, the
most significant stress in this article is put on the text of the Corfu
Declaration itself as the basic historical document with regard to the creation
of the common South Slavic state in the fall of 1918.

Key words: Corfu Declaration, Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs, Balkans, Serbs,
Croats, Slovenes, Yugoslav Committee


Introduction

The most important consequence of the First World War (the Great War)
384

concerning the Balkan Peninsula were a dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian
Monarchy (the Dual Monarchy) and a creation of the new Balkan state - the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the KSCS)
385
proclaimed in Zagreb on
November 23
rd
, 1918 and confirmed as a new political reality in Belgrade on
December 1
st
, of the same year.
386
However, in the Balkan, Yugoslav and even

384
On the Great War, see: H. Strachan, The First World War, New York: Viking Penguin, 2004; P. Hart, The Great
War, 19141918, London: Profile Books Ltd, 2013; G. Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and
the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Basic Books, 2014; W. Philpott, War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War,
Overlook, 2014.
385
Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Kraljevina SHS).
386
S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution,
DordrechtBostonLondon: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 151160.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
199


international historiography there is still a false interpretation of the historical
sources and political events based on them upon the question when and where
the KSCS was proclaimed as it is interpreted to be in Belgrade on December 1
st
,
1918.
387
However, the sources and facts are clearly telling that a common
Yugoslav state was in fact proclaimed in Zagreb (Croatia) on November 23
rd
, 1918
but not in Belgrade (Serbia). In the capital of the Kingdom of Serbia on December
1
st
, 1918 it was only confirmed already proclaimed a common state of all Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes by a Montenegrin regent Alexander Karaorevi on the
throne of the Kingdom of Serbia.
388
The new state was composed by three pre-war
territorial parts: the territories of the Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Montenegro
and the Dual Monarchy populated by the South Slavs. The last (third) territory
gave around 50% of the new state. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes became after December 1918 the biggest country at the Balkans and one
of the bigger states in Europe from the territorial point of view.
389
The country was
in fact created, proclaimed and recognized as such just by the politicians in
Zagreb and Belgrade but not by any kind of the peoples referenda or plebiscite
either on the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia or the South Slavic lands of the
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy.
During the process of political-states unification of the South Slavs into
their own single national and independent state during the First World War
several important documents were issued by the representative institutions of
them with regard to the creation and internal political and administrative
organisation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Without any doubt,
the 1917 Corfu Declaration is the most significant and crucial document among
all of them. It was signed on July 20
th
, 1917 between the government of the
Kingdom of Serbia and the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee a political
organisation established in 1915 in London and representing the South Slavs from
the Dual Monarchy. The Corfu Declaration became a basis for further process of
unification and, what is even more important, a basis for the conception of the
internal political organisation of the new state. However, the conclusions of this
document were changed in the Geneva Declaration signed on November 9
th
, 1918
by the representatives of the government of the Kingdom of Serbia, the National
Council in Zagreb, the Yugoslav Committee and the parliamentary groups.
Nevertheless, the proclamation of the new state in Zagreb on November 23
rd
, 1918
was officially accepted and verified in Belgrade by Serbias side on December 1
st
,
1918 mainly on the basis of the Corfu Declaration but not on the Geneva one.
The aim of this research article is to give answers to the following four
scientific research problems about the 1917 Corfu Declaration:

387
For instance: B. Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, Vol. 1, Beograd: NOLIT, 1988, p. 26; . ,
, : , 1990, p. 141; B. Petranovi, M. Zeevi, Agonija dve Jugoslavije, Beogradabac:
Zaslon, 1991, p. 14; . , I , : , 1988, p. 27.
388
According to the French writer and good friend of Alexander I, Claude Eylan, the King of Yugoslavia identified
himself as a Montenegrin (K. , I , : , 1988, p.
27). For the matter of fact, he was born in the capital of Montenegro - Cetinje in 1888 at the court of the Prince of
Montenegro. From the mother side (Zorka), his origin was comming from the ruling dynasty of Montenegro as his
mother was a daughter of the Prince of Montenegro - Nicholas I. About the life and death of Alexander I of Yugoslavia,
see: C. Eylan, La Vie et la Mort DAlexandre Ier Roi de Yugoslavie, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1935.
389
Before December 1st, 1918, Serbia was already united with Montenegro, Vojvodina (a southern region of ex-
Hungary) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (. , , 1, : , 1996, p.
441).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
200


1. The reasons for convocation of the Corfu Conference as a conference
which should finally resolve the main political problems between the
Royal Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee, i.e. between
two the most important negotiating representatives of the South Slavs
during the process of the Yugoslav unification at the time of the First
World War.
2. A nature of the opposite political conceptions and attitudes towards a
process of unification and internal organisation of a new Yugoslav state
between the negotiating parties as the most important question to be
solved before the proclamation of the single South Slavic state.
3. An interpretation of the text of the 1917 Corfu Declaration as a legal act
of the agreement between the Yugoslav Committee and the Royal Serbian
Government pretending to be a final political settlement upon the
political form, internal organization and functioning of the new state.
4. An importance of the 1917 Corfu Declaration for the further process of
unification of the South Slavs.
In order to realize our research aims we will deal with the relevant
historical sources followed by relevant historiographical literature on the topic.
However, the most significant stress in this article is put on the text of the Corfu
Declaration itself as the basic historical document with regard to the creation of
the common South Slavic state in the fall of 1918.

The reasons for convocation of the Corfu Conference in JuneJuly
1917
The preparations for the 1917 Corfu Conference can be traced from the
moment when the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia Nikola Pai
(18451926) sent an invitation to the President of the Yugoslav Committee in
London, a Croat from Dalmatian city of Split Dr. Ante Trumbi, at the beginning
of May 1917. Dr. Trumbi was invited in fact to come to the Corfu island in Greece
with other four members of the Yugoslav Committee in order to make an
agreement with the Government of Serbia with regard to the most urgent and
important questions about the creation of the new Serbo-Croat-Slovene state.
390

Therefore, the most significant question which needs appropriate answer is: Why
did Nikola Pai decide to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee at that time and
at such a way to recognise it de facto (but not and de iure) as equal political side to
the Royal Serbian Government upon the process of unification which is
representing all South Slavs from the Dual Monarchy?
In order to give answer to this question we have to take into
consideration N. Pais opinion about the functions of the Yugoslav Committee
from the time of its very foundation. The Yugoslav Committee was established on
April 30
th
, 1915 in Paris by the South Slavs who were exiled from the territory of
the Dual Monarchy during the first months of the war. The reason for its
establishment was of the very practical political nature: it was the answer to the
secret Treaty of London, signed between Italy and the Entente states of the United

390
M. Zeevi, M. Miloevi (eds.), Diplomatska prepiska srpske vlade 1917 (Dokumenti), Beograd: Narodno
deloArhiv Jugoslavije, without year, p. 321. However, according to . . Stankovi, the Prime Minister of Serbia
invited Dr. A. Trumbi to come to the Corfu island not with four but with five members of the Yugoslav Committee (.
. , , vol. II, : , 1985, p. 160).
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
201


Kingdom, France and Russia. It was signed on April 26
th
, 1915 at the expense of
Austria-Hungary but primarily of the South Slavic territories in the Dual
Monarchy claimed by the Croats and Slovenes (Istria, Dalmatia and the Adriatic
Islands). Therefore, the creation of the Yugoslav Committee was in fact an act of
protection of national interests and rights of the South Slavs from the Dual
Monarchy,
391
i.e., of the Austro-Hungarian Croats and Slovenes but not of the
Austro-Hungarian Serbs or Serbia. The member-politicians of the Yugoslav
Committee (established in Paris but soon moved to London because of diplomatic
reasons) claimed to represent all South Slavs from the Dual Monarchy to the
Entente powers in order to protect their national interest and ethno-historical
rights for the time after the end of the First World War at the peace conference.
392

It means that the Yugoslav Committee was pretending to represent the peoples
from the following South-Slavic ethno-historical regions: Istria, Dalmatia,
Meumurje, Prekomurje, Kranjska, the Southern tajerska, the South-West
Koruka, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kotor Bay, Baranja, Srem Banat
and Baka. At that time, as the South Slavs, in these regions have been
recognized as the separate ethnolinguistic nationalities: the Slovenes (Kranjci),
Croats and Serbs.
393

In regard to the question of N. Pais attitude towards the existence of the
Yugoslav Committee and its function during the war, the most important problem
was the fact that the Yugoslav Committee understood itself as the only competent
political representative organisation of all South Slavs from the Dual Monarchy,
what means including and the Austrian-Hungarian Serbs. On the other hand,
Serbias Prime Minister did not want to accept the Yugoslav Committee as the
legal political-national representative organisation of the South Slavs from the
Dual Monarchy but only as the patriotic organisation with the only aim to fight for
the Yugoslav (the South Slavic from the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary)
national interests, and to inform the public opinion in the United Kingdom (where
it was located) and Europe about the Yugoslav question in Austria-Hungary.
394

According to Vojislav Vukovi, N. Pai was in opinion that the political role of the
Yugoslav Committee was just to inform the Allies about the sufferings of the
South Slav lands under the Austrian-Hungarian rule and to present their national
intentions.
395
These were the crucial reasons for N. Pai that he never before the
Corfu Conference recognised in practice the Yugoslav Committee as de facto the

391
According to J. Woodward and C. Woodward, by this treaty the Entente in return for Italys entrance to the war on
their side assigned to Rome the following territories: Gorizzia/Gradisca, Trieste, Carniola, Istria and part of Dalmatia
with most of its islands; with the exeption of the city of Trieste (J. Woodward, C. Woodward, Italy and the Yugoslavs,
Boston, 1920, pp. 317 320).
392
On the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, see: M. MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World,
Random House, 2007; D. A. Andelman, A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 2008; N. A. Graebner, Edward M. Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy: The Failure of the
Wilsonian Vision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
393
After the Second World War a new Communist Government of the Socialist and federal Yugoslavia proclaimed
additional three South Slavic ethnolinguistic nationalities: The Macedonians, Muslims and Montenegrins. For that
reason, the country was re-arranged into the six Socialist republics. See: J. B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, New
York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
394
. N. Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pai and Yugoslavia, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974, pp.
112113; . , 1914, : , 1990, pp. 354355.
395
. , O, , vol. XIIXIII, , 1963,
pp. 345350.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
202


equal political-representative institution to the Royal Serbias Government upon
the process of the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian states unification. However, in May
1917 he decided to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee as a representative
institution of the South Slavs from the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and at
such a way to recognize it as one of the legal subjects in the process of unification.
Moreover, thus, he de facto recognized the Yugoslav Committee even as the equal
negotiating-representative subject with Serbias Royal Government. Nevertheless,
up to that time he claimed only for Serbia exclusive rights to represent all South
Slavs before the Entente contracting powers and only for the Kingdom of Serbia to
work on their unification into a single national state. Therefore, the most
significant question in regard to the mentioned above is: What was the main
reason for N. Pai to drastically change in May 1917 his opinion towards the role
and function of the Yugoslav Committee?
The answers to the above questions are coming from the very fact that the
Imperial Russia was the only supporter of Serbias plan to create the united
national state of all ethnolinguistic Serbs in the South-East Europe after the war
on the ruins of Austria-Hungary. On the other side, Serbias Government was
aware that both the country and the national interest of the Serbs can be
protected only by the Imperial Russia. N. Pai was convinced even in 1912, just
before the Balkan Wars started, that only Russia can save Serbia from the
aggression by the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
396
It is known that the
Balkan 19
th
century policy of Russia was led by the main idea that the Russian
influence in this region should be realized by supporting Bulgaria and Serbia.
397
It
was the main reason for the Imperial Russia to create either a Greater Bulgaria
(like according to the San Stefano Peace Treaty with the Ottoman Empire on
March 3
rd
, 1878)
398
or a Greater Serbia (during the First World War in
19151917). Because of the very fact that in the First World War Bulgaria from
October 1915 was fighting on the opposite side (together with Germany, Austria-
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) the crucial pivot in the Russian Balkan policy
became from October 1915 the Kingdom of Serbia.
399
Probably as the best
example of the Russian attitude about the Balkan affairs can be seen in proposal
given by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei D. Sazonov (18601927),
in September 1914 to Serbias ambassador to Russia: regardless to the fact that
Sazonov understood well that the purpose of Serbo-Croat-Slovenian common state
in the future is to be a counterbalance against Italy, Hungary and Romania but,
however, he did not advise Serbia to create a common state with the Roman
Catholic Croats and Slovenes as they will be in such state all the time just an
instrument used by the Vatican in its policy of destroying the Orthodoxy in
Eastern Europe.
400
The Russian authority, therefore, preferred creation of a strong

396
A. . , , , : , 1994, p. 112
397
J. M. Jo, , Vol. III, : 1928, p. 47.
398
See, for instance: A. Von Bulmerincq, Le Passe De La Russie: Depuis Les Temps Les Plus Recules Josqua La Paix
De San Stefano 1878, Kessinger Publishing, 2010.
399
On the Bulgarian war aims during the Great War, see: . Avramovski, Ratni ciljevi Bugarske i Centralne sile
19141918, Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985.
400
On the Russian policy and diplomacy at the Balkans in 19141917, see the memoires of the Russian ambassador to
Serbia Count Grigorie Nikolaevich Trubecki: . . , 19141917.
, : , 1994.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
203


Orthodox united national state of the Serbs in a form of a Greater Serbia at the
Balkans.
401

Nevertheless, the basic and ultimate aim by N. Pai and his war time
Government of Serbia during the entire Great War was firstly to resolve the
Serbian question if possible by creation of a single and united common state of all
Serbs in the Balkans (a Greater Serbia). A prospect for creation of such state after
the war in the case of the Entente military victory was given by the Entente powers
to Serbias Government during the secret negotiations in London in April 1915
that was over by signing of the London Treaty on April 26
th
. In order to realize this
offer by the Entente, Serbia had to cede to Bulgaria her portion of Macedonia
gained after the Second Balkan War in 1913 (the so-called Vardar Macedonia).
Nevertheless, the main guarantee to Serbia upon realization of this offer was the
Russian Empire. However, the Government of Serbia rejected to cede the Vardar
Macedonia to Bulgaria in 1915 hoping to create a Greater Serbia after the war
including into the united national state of all Serbs and her portion of Macedonia
that was called by the Serbian academicians and politicians as the Southern
Serbia.
The Yugoslav option for the Government of Serbia was only the second
one, or better to say an unhappy alternative, just in the case that the option of
united national state can not be realized in the practice after the war for any
reason. It means that any kind of Yugoslavia (centralized, federal, etc.), as a
common state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, for Serbia was also part of her
war aims: to solve the Serbian national question just in this case the Serbs have to
live together with the Croats and Slovenes in a single state. N. Pai himself was a
strong supporter of creation of a Greater Serbia (first and prime option) instead of
the common South Slavic state (second and only alternative option) until the
spring 1917 when he decided to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee on the
equal political level for the sake of creation of Yugoslavia instead of united national
state just of the Serbs in a form of a Greater Serbia. Therefore, the crucial
question is: What was the real reason for N. Pai to finally opt for creation of
Yugoslavia but not for a Greater Serbia in the spring 1917?
On the other hand, the Yugoslav option was and for the Yugoslav
Committee only the alternative one, but not the main political aim to be realized
after the Great War. We have to keep in mind that the top leadership of the
Yugoslav Committee was composed by the ethnic Croats (like the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia during the Second World War) and it was led primarily by two
Croat politicians from Dalmatian seaport of Split: the President Dr. Ante Trumbi
(18641938) and Dr. Josip Smodlaka (18691956). After them, the most
influential comittee members have been also the Croats: Ivan Metrovi, Hinko
Hinkovi, the brothers Gazzari and others. Even the original name of the Yugoslav
Committee was the Croatian Committee, established in Rome but the name was
changed very soon for the political reasons. Nevertheless, it was obvious, and for
N. Pai and for the rest of his Government, that the Yugoslav Committee was
fighting exclusively for the Croat national interest and that the Yugoslav name

401
About the truth, blunders and abuses upon the Greater Serbia, see: . . , . (eds.), :
, , .
2426. 2002. , : , 2003.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
204


was chosen just to hide the Croat nationalism under the quasi-Yugoslavism.
402

What is the most important to say about the Yugoslav Committee is that this in
fact Croat national organisation was deeply imbued by the political ideology of the
ultra-nationalistic Croatian Party of Rights, established by Ante Starevi in 1861.
According to the party ideology, all South Slavs have been ethnolinguistic Croats.
Therefore, the Slovenians were nothing else than Alpine or White Croats,
Montenegro was Red Croatia and all Serbs were understood just as the Orthodox
Croats. The President of the Yugoslav Committee Dr. A. Trumbi was a member of
this party till 1905 and Dr. Frano Supilo was in his youth a fellow of the party.
The main political aim of the Croatian Party of Rights was to establish ethnically
pure Greater Croatia including all provinces of the Dual Monarchy populated by
the South Slavs what was at the same time and the crucial political aim of the
Yugoslav Committee to be achieved after the war.
403
However, the Yugoslav
option was for the leadership of the Yugoslav Committee, like for N. Pai in the
case of Serbia, just the alternative one if the crucial political aim (a Greater
Croatia) was not to be realized for some reason.
With regard to the convocation of the Corfu Conference in 1917, according
to Dr. A. Trumbi, the main reasons and tasks of the conference were:
1) The 1917 February/March Revolution in Russia followed by the U.S.
entering the war in April of the same year created a new war
circumstances and international atmosphere favourable for direct and
ultimate negotiations between the Government of Serbia and the
Yugoslav Committee upon the future of the South Slavs after the Great
War.
2) Therefore, from the spring 1917 it was impossible any more to keep
Serbias Government's principles of the unification.
3) It was necessary to formulate officially one and common programme of
the unification of the South Slavs.
4) It was necessary to agree with the Royal Government of Serbia on
territorial unification and internal organisation of the common
state....
404

It is a true fact that after the 1917 February/March Revolution in Russia
all hopes by N. Pai and his Government with a possibility to create a Greater
Serbia after the war disappeared for the very reason that a new Russian
Government in St Petersburg (Petrograd) did not give support for creation of
united national state of all Serbs. At such a way, after March 1917 and
dethronement of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II an idea of a Greater Serbia was
not supported by any of Great Powers during the war.
405
In the other words,

402
On relations between N. Pai and A. Trumbi, see: D. Djokic, Pai and Trumbi: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, London: Haus Publishing, 2010. On N. Pais relations with the Croat politicians in 19181923, see: .
. , , 19181923, : , 1995.
403
About the political ideology of the Croatian Party of Rights, see: M. Gross, A. Szabo, Prema hrvatskome graanskom
drutvu, Zagreb, 1992, pp. 257265.
404
A. Trumbi, Nekoliko rijei o Krfskoj deklaraciji, Bulletin Yougoslave, No. 26, November 1
st
, 1917,
Jugoslavenski Odbor u Londonu, Zagreb: JAZU, 1966, p. 167.
405
The main figure in the 1917 February/March Revolution in Russia was Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky
(18811970). He was a member of a moderate Socialist party Trudoviks. In the new Russian Provisional Government
he became a Minister of Justice and later a Minister of War. He was born in Ulyanovsk like Vladimir Ilich Lenin and
was of the same ethnicity as Lenin was. Beyond the 1917 February/March Revolution in Russia was the British
diplomacy, while beyond the 1917 October/November Revolution, led by Lenin, was Germany.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
205


historically and naturally, only Imperial Orthodox Russia was interested in
creation and existence of a Greater Serbia a state to be under the Russian
protectorate.
406
N. Pais main war-time task of the Kingdom of Serbia, based on
a support by the Imperial Russia, disappeared when the new Russian Provisional
Government declared on March 24
th
, 1917 that Russia wants to create around
Serbia one strongly organised Yugoslavia - as a barrier against the German
aspirations,
407
but not a Greater Serbia with the same function as Yugoslavia. In
one word, the Imperial Orthodox Russia, as the only supporter of the idea of a
Greater Serbia, did not exist anymore, and for that real fact the Prime Minister of
Serbia had to adapt his post-war political plans to the new political reality in
Europe after the 1917 Russian February/March Revolution.
408
It means that the
alternative Yugoslav option of solving the Serbian national question after the war
became optimal reality for the Government of Serbia in the spring 1917, likewise
for the Yugoslav Committee as well.
In the case of N. Pai, it is obvious that the 1917 February/March
Russian Revolution was the crucial reason to change an attitude about Serbias
war aims as he finally gave up idea to create a Greater Serbia and therefore
accepted idea of creation of a common South Slavic state. However, in order to
fulfil this new goal he had to directly negotiate with the representatives of the
Yugoslav Committee, i.e., with the Croats. Nevertheless, it was only one out of
three real reasons to bring together in the Corfu island in JuneJuly 1917 around
the table of negotiations the Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee.
The second reason, or better to say a danger, became the possibility to preserve
the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary after the war in some rearranged inner-
administrative political form. The point was that for both Serbia and the Yugoslav
Committee any kind of preservation of Austria-Hungary after the war was
unacceptable political solution. The problem was that this idea from the side of
the South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy emerged again on May 30
th
, 1917 when the
Yugoslav deputies in the Austro-Hungarian Parliament (the Yugoslav Club)
demanded reconstruction of the post-war Dual Monarchy on the bases that all
Austria-Hungarys provinces populated by the South Slavs (the Yugoslavs)
should form a separate federal part of the Dual Monarchy under the sceptre of
the Habsburg dynasty.
409
From this point of view, the Corfu Conference and its
Declaration were the answer to the May Declaration by the South Slavic deputies
in the Austria-Hungarys Parliament. The third reason for convocation of the Corfu
Conference was diplomatic mission to the Entente powers and its allies by Sixte de
Bourbon, a brother-in-law of the last Austro-Hungarian ruler (Emperor Charles I
of Austria and King Charles IV of Hungary, 19161918), with regard to the
possibility of signing a separate peace treaty with the Entente by the Dual
Monarchy and at such a way to preserve territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy
after the war. Therefore, the Corfu Declaration was political demonstration by the
Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee against any diplomatic attempt

406
About the first serious Serbian plan to call Russia to become the protector of united national state of the Serbs, see:
Vladislav B. Sotirovi, The Memorandum (1804) by the Karlovci Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirovi, Serbian Studies:
Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies, vol. 24, 12, Bloomington, 2010, pp. 2748.
407
A. Mandi, Fragmenti za historiju ujedinjenja, Zagreb, 1956, p. 77.
408
Jugoslavenski Odbor u Londonu, Zagreb: JAZU, 1966, p. 173.
409
F. ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 19141919, Zagreb 1920, p. 94; B. Petranovi,
Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, Vol. 1, Beograd: NOLIT, 1988, p. 18.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
206


to preserve the Dual Monarchy after the war with the South Slavic provinces.
However, in order to succeed in their anti-Austro-Hungarian plans, Serbia and the
Yugoslav Committee had to achieve bilateral agreement for the sake to have a
common political platform before the Entente powers.
410

The Italian diplomatic and military campaign in Albania and Epirus in the
spring of 1917 was the last reason for convocation of the Corfu Conference, which
resulted in signing of the Corfu Declaration. At that time, both Serbia and the
Yugoslav Committee were under the menace by the Italian territorial aspirations in
the Western Balkans. As it was noticed earlier, the Yugoslav Committee was
established in 1915 in order to protect one part of the Yugoslav (Croat and
Slovenian) lands from the Italian territorial demands. However, at that time the
territory of the Kingdom of Serbia was not in danger either from the Italian
territorial aspirations or the Italian diplomatic and military influence in the
Central-Southern Balkans. That was one of the reasons why Serbia was not in a
hurry to make a final agreement concerning the creation of Yugoslavia with the
Yugoslav Committee. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1917, alongside with the
Yugoslav Committee, the Royal Government of Serbia was as well as under strong
Italian threat as the Italian diplomatic and military activities in Albania and
Epirus the territories in the neighbourhood of the Kingdom of Serbia. It means
that the states territory and the borders of Serbia were in a question for the time
after the war.
The first statement about the Italian political activities in Albania and
Epirus, as a threat for Serbia, was sent to Serbias Regent A. Karaorevi, by
Serbian vice-consul in Salonika, Nikola Jovanovi, on March 3
rd
, 1917. According
to him, the Italian plan was to unify Albania according to the Albanian claims on
their ethnic rights. At that moment some Albanian ethnic lands (claimed by the
Albanian propaganda to be only Albanian) have been under the Italian military
occupation, and under political protectorate of Rome. In fact, according to the
report, a newly post-war Albania was to be in fact a Greater Albania, enlarged at
least with Kosovo-Metohia and the Western Macedonia (and most probably with
the Greek Southern Epirus), i.e., with the territories included into Serbia and
Montenegro after the Balkan Wars 19121913. The Serbian vice-consul thought
that Italy wants to create a Greater Albania as the basis for the Italian political-
economic post-war influence at the area of the Southern Balkans (basically as the
Italian colony as a substitution for the lost Ethiopia in 1896). The Serbian
authorities have been in strong opinion that a Greater Albania under the Italian
protectorate would be a totally hostile towards Serbia. In addition, the north-
western Greek province of the Southern Epirus was for the Italians only the
question of the Great Powers, but not the question of Greece.
411
Only five days
later, N. Pai sent a telegram to the Regent Alexander with information that one
Italian general gave an anti-Serbian speech in Albanian town of Argirocastro
criticising Esad-Pashas pro-Serbian policy.
412
At that moment Esad-Pasha was
only Albanian leader who co-operated with the Serbian Government among all
Albanian political leaders. The Serbian ambassador in Athens, ivojin Balugdi,
informed his Government on April 8
th
, 1917 that an agreement upon Albania

410
A. . , , , : , 1994, p. 128.
411
A , , . . , -2.
412
A , , , 80-9-44. Esad-Pasha was an Albanian feudal lord
and politician who sided on the Serbian side during the First World War.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
207


between Italy and France was achieved in Paris. According to this agreement, Italy
would get territorial concessions in the Southern Albania and Epirus in return for
the Italian support of the Entente policy towards Greece.
413

That Italy was making a serious threat for Serbia in relation to Albania and
Epirus in the first half of 1917 was finally approved on June 3
rd
, 1917 when the
Italian general Ferraro, under instructions given by his government, proclaimed
the Italian protectorate over Albania. According to N. Pais circular note sent to
France, United Kingdom, Russia and the U.S.A., this proclamation was against the
axioms adopted by the Entente states that this war was fought against the
German imperialism and militarism for the principle of the self-determination of
the nations. N. Pai noticed that this Italian proclamation was against the vital
interests of the Serbian people for their future, but also and against the vital
interests of the Serbian state.
414
In fact, he was afraid that Italy could close
Serbias exit to the sea via the Morava-Vardar valley. At the end of June 1917,
during the Corfu Conference, N. Pai confirmed that Italy was working against
Esad-Pasha, Serbia and Greece by making two Albanian governments the
northern and the southern ones.
415
For the Government of Serbia it was totally
clear that the Italian diplomacy was working against the interests of the South
Slavs in July 1917, what was again confirmed in December 1917. Taking into
account the information given by Serbias ambassador in London, Jovan M.
Jovanovi, to the Regent Alexander I, only Italy was against the South Slavic
unification among all Entente members. It has to be noticed that the Italians had
three crucial principles of their Balkan policy: 1) Sacro egoismo Italiano; 2) not to
allow a total dismemberment of Austria-Hungary under the principle of the self-
determination of the nations; and 3) not to allow a creation of a single South
Slavic state.
416
According to the information given by J. M. Jovanovi from
December 1917, the Italian politicians around the Italian Premier Vittorio
Emmanuelle Orlando (18601952) in the Italian government wanted to occupy
Dalmatia for Italy,
417
to create a small Serbia, and to thwart the South Slavic
unification. This Orlandos political orientation was pro-Germanic and naturally
anti-Serbian.
418

The Italian territorial aspirations as well as its diplomatic and military
threat at the Balkan Peninsula was for both Serbias Government and the
Yugoslav Committee one of the most important reasons to convoke the Corfu
Conference. Both of them wanted to make publicly known that one single and
vigorous South Slavic state would be created on the central and western parts of
the Balkans which could defend itself from the Italian pressure. Consequently, the
Yugoslav Committee would preserve the South Slavic Adriatic littoral, while
Serbias Government would be in position to preserve the South Slavic territories

413
A , , . . , -2.
414
A , , , ,
, 30. 1917. . (old style), p. 182.
415
A , , , 80-9-44.
416
A , , . . , -2.
417
The Italian claims on both Istria and Dalmatia were strongly based on Italian historic and ethnic rights. On this issue,
see: L. Monzali, The Italians of Dalmatia: From Italian Unification to World War I, Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2009.
418
A , , . . , -2.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
208


of the Western Macedonia and Kosovo-Metohia. It is interesting to notice that the
Corfu island, as a conference meeting place, was located just between Albania and
Epirus two territories under a strongest Italian political-military pressure at that
time.

Opposite conceptions about the process of the Yugoslav unification
and the internal political organisation of the new state

Before his coming to the Corfu island for the negotiations with the
Government of Serbia A. Trumbi met in Nice Stojan Proti, the former Minister in
the Government of Serbia and at that time a representative of this Government in
the Yugoslav Committee. Their consultations ended by making the mutual draft
about the basic subjects for the coming discussions in the Corfu island. However,
they did not make any final conclusion about the subjects of the future
negotiations as they have not been authorised to do it. That was a reason that
they in Nice only agreed about the main questions to be discussed at the Corfu
island where the Government of Serbia was exiled after the military collapse of
Serbia in the autumn 1915.
The Government of Serbia on its session on June 14
th
, 1917 decided to
officially negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee. However, according to the Royal
Government of Serbia, fundamental questions about the final type of the internal
political organisation of the future South Slavic state had to be agreed after the
war but not during the Corfu Conference. Therefore, the Government of Serbia
decided to recognise the Yugoslav Committee as an important factor in a process
of creation of Yugoslavia but not as a representative-political institution of the
South-Slavic people from the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
419
During the
Corfu Conference a President of the Yugoslav Committee A. Trumbi demanded
that this organisation should be recognised by Serbia as an official representative
Government of all South-Slavs in the Dual Monarchy but this demand was
rejected by N. Pai.
420
During the Corfu negotiations an intention by the
Government of Serbia was to present the Yugoslav question as the international
problem as well as.
421

It is very important to notice that during the Corfu Conference the opposite
conceptions about solving of the Yugoslav question did not exist. Namely, there
is an opinion at the Yugoslav historiography that during the Corfu Conference one
conception was advocated by N. Pais in a form of a Greater Serbia, i.e.,
Yugoslavia without Slovenes and Croats while the opposite conception was
advocated by the Yugoslav Committee as the unification of all Yugoslav lands into
a single state. However, Serbias Prime Minister concluded already before the
Corfu Conference that a liberation and unification of all Yugoslav people and their
lands into a single state should be realized at the end of the war but not a Greater
Serbia. He finally accepted the idea of Yugoslavia instead of a Greater Serbia
under both the new international circumstances after the 1917 February/March
Russian Revolution and the pressure by Serbias parliamentary opposition.

419
The Government of Serbia was in fact treating the Yugoslav Committe as its own propaganda agency in Europe for
the very reason that the committee was mainly financially supported by Serbia.
420
. . , , vol. II, : , 1985, p. 181.
421
. , , , 1967, p. 197.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
209


Therefore, the unification of the South Slavic people into a single state and
political form of such state were the topics on the agenda of the Corfu Conference.
One of the basic problems during the Corfu negotiations between the
Yugoslav Committee and the Government of Serbia was a question about the
name of a new state of the South-Slavs. The final agreement upon this question
was to be the state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
422
but not Yugoslavia for
two reasons. Firstly, such name of the state was an expression of a commonly
accepted theses by both negotiating sides, but mainly for political reason, that the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are the three-names nation (the same nation just
with three different names). Secondly, N. Pai was extremely reserved towards the
terms Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs and Yugoslav as it was originally the ethno-
name for the South Slavs of the Dual Monarchy used by the Austro-Hungarian
authorities, but also and a propaganda terminology misused by Vienna and
Budapest as a synonym for a Greater Serbia to be established at the ruins of the
Dual Monarchy.
423
N. Pai himself did not insist on the concept of national
pluralism, as an opposite to the national unitary state favoured by the Yugoslav
Committee as he wanted to preserve Serbian national name as a part of the name
of the new state. He did not want to replace a name of the Serbs by some
artificial one like the South Slavs, Yugoslavia or the Yugoslavs. A fact was that
only the Serbs had at that time in independent states (Serbia and Montenegro)
424

among all Yugoslavs and exactly the Serbs have been the most historic nation
among all of those who had to create Yugoslavia after the war. Up to that time
(and later as well as) Serbia as the country mostly suffered during the First World
War among all states involved in the conflict taking into consideration material
damage and the loss of population in per cents. For these reasons, N. Pai was in
strong opinion that Serbia and the Serbs deserved to preserve their own national
name within the official name of the new state after the war taking into
consideration and the fact that Serbia had the crucial political role in the process
of unification as the Yugoslav Piedmont.
The Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee had opposite
attitudes and about much more important question that was of the internal
political form and organisation of the new state as the Yugoslav Committee was in
favour of the republic and federation, while N. Pai insisted on the monarchy with
the Karaorevi dynasty and centralized internal political administration of the
state. Without any doubt, the question about republic or monarchy and
federalization or centralization of the future state of the Yugoslavs was the crucial
problem to be solved not only during the negotiations between the Yugoslav
Committee and the Royal Serbian Government in Corfu in 1917 but even during
the first years of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. With regard to this
problem it is important to present a letter written by Giullio Gazzari, a member of

422
The state cultural policy between 1918 and 1941 was put within such identity frame (see: . ,
19181941, vol. IIII, Beograd: , 1997).
423
B. Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, Vol. 1, Beograd: NOLIT, 1988, p. 17. The Croatian historians
Dragutin Pavlievi and Ivo Peri claim that all Serbias governments during the last hundred years (with N. Pais war-
time government on the first place) had for their ultimate national goal a creation of a Greater Serbia (D. Pavlievi,
Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, p. 307; I. Peri, Povijest Hrvata, Zagreb, 1997,
pp. 209232).
424
At that time overwhelming majority of the citizens of Montenegro were declaring themselves as etnolinguistic Serbs.
About the ethnic and national identity of the Montenegrins, see: M. Glomazi, Etniko i nacionalno bie Crnogoraca,
Beograd: Panpublik, 1988.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
210


the Yugoslav Committee, to the President of the Yugoslav Committee, on April
20
th
, 1917. In the letter G. Gazzari emphasised that some Serbian politicians, like
Proti, Nei and Jovanovi, have opinion that the federal principle was the best
political form for the future Yugoslav state. According to the letter, even N. Pai
himself was more and more inclining to the idea of the federal form of the common
state instead of the centralized one, but the heir to the throne (regent Alexander I)
under the influence of the courts camarilla preferred the centralization of the
state. G. Gazzari wrote that it was the crucial reason for the heir to the throne to
support the centralized form of the state during the Corfu negotiations.
425

Therefore, it comes that the strongest opponent to the federal concept of the future
common Yugoslav state was a regent of Serbia, Alexander I, but not her Prime
Minister.
426

F. Supilo was among all members of the Yugoslav Committee the strongest
supporter of the idea that Croatia should have a special autonomous status within
the new state. On the other hand, he was in a strong opinion that the Yugoslav
state should be organised as a federal or confederate state. In contrast to the
Prime Minister of Serbia, who was a strong supporter of the centralist internal
organisation of the new state arguing that any kind of the inner (con)federal
arrangement would finally lead to destabilisation of the state structure.
427
F.
Supilo became a main supporter of the idea of federalization of the country after
the unification. His idea of federalism was anticipated by historical provincialism
that he used as a basis for the creation of the following five federal units within
the new state: 1) Serbia with Macedonia and Vojvodina; 2) Croatia with Slavonia
and Dalmatia; 3) Slovenia; 4) Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 5) Montenegro.
Consequently, Yugoslavia would have the inner administrative organisation
similar to the Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary after the Aussgleich (settlement
between Austrians and Hungarians) in 1867, with the leading role in Yugoslav
politics played by the Serbs and Croats.
428

The Yugoslav Committees standpoint on the process of unification had as
the crucial aim to protect the Croatian national interest, as well as the interests of
Croatia as a historical land with autonomous rights. F. Supilo was the most
important defender of the Croatian national interests during the process of
unification. His main political conception was a unity of the Croats, or as he was
saying the western part of our people (i.e. the South Slavs), what means that all
South Slavic lands eastward from the Alps and westward from the River of Drina
have to be the parts of Croatia. For that reason F. Supilo requested a plebiscite
about unification with Serbia and Montenegro not only in Croatia but in all

425
Arhiv JAZU, Zagreb, Fond Jugoslavenskog Odbora, fasc. 30, doc. No. 29.
426
However, for the federal form of the new state did not exist a great interest even among many members of the
Yugoslav Committee for the very reason to avoid the clash between two opposite concepts of Yugoslavias
federalization: a Greater Croatia vs. a Greater Serbia. Therefore, according to A. Trumbis biographer, Ante Smith-
Pavelitch, even A. Trumbi was not so ardent advocate of the federalization of the Yugoslav state during the war-time
for the very reason that N. Pai could use this idea in order to promote and finally create a Greater Serbia as one and the
biggest federal unit (out of three) of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, a Greater Serbia, as one of three federal units of
Yugoslavia, would be a dominant political factor in the country (. . ,
, vol. I, : , 1985, p. 213).
427
, , vol. IV, 5. 1917. ., , 1921.
428
Difference between F. Supilos and J. B. Titos arrangement of the inner administrative structure of the country was
that the Communist leader (of the Croat and Slovene Roman Catholic origin) created additional sixth federal unit
Macedonia, according to the general attitude concerning the national identities at the Balkans by the Commintern.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
211


AustroHungarian Yugoslav provinces for particular and political reasons.
429
He
was sure that only Baka and the Southern Banat would opt for Serbia, while the
rest of the Yugoslav lands within the Dual Monarchy (Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Croatia, Slovenia, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia) would choose Croatia. The Yugoslav
Committee, in contrast to the Royal Government of Serbia, supported an idea of
plebiscite as one of the most legitimate, justifiable and proper ways for unification
of the South Slavs into a common state. It means that the Yugoslav people had to
be asked to decide upon their own fate after the war.
430
For F. Supilo, an
agreement about Croatian confederate status within the future common state with
Serbia and Montenegro was a starting point in the process of creation of
Yugoslavia.
431
He divided political subjects concerning the unification on two
parts: 1) Croatia and 2) Serbia with Montenegro. According to him, Croatia had to
have a leading political role among the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs, while
Serbia had to have the same role among the Yugoslavs outside the Dual
Monarchy. His demand, which became as well as the main demand by the most of
the Yugoslav Committees members, was that the unification had to be
accomplished on the equal level between Serbias Government and the Yugoslav
Committee, because any other way would be a domination of Serbo-Orthodox
exclusivity.
432
The President of the Yugoslav Committee, Dr. A. Trumbi,
summarised the whole issue of the process (the way) of unification into two points:
the unification could be realised either with a liberation of the Yugoslav lands in
Austria-Hungary and their incorporation into Serbia, or it could be done with the
union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the equal level. The Yugoslav
Committee chose the second option. However, in both options the South Slavic
lands within Austria-Hungary had to be liberated by great help of Serbian army.
However, from Serbias point of view, the main lack of such approach by
the Yugoslav Committee was the fact that either the Committee or the
Montenegrin Royal Government in exile (in Rome) did not have a single soldier of
their own to fight for the unification in comparison to Serbias 150,000 soldiers at
Salonika (Macedonian) Front. In the other words, the Yugoslav Committee
required for itself an equal political position in the unification process but only
Serbia had to spill over the blood of her soldiers (and civilians in occupied Serbia)
for creation of a single Yugoslav state. Serbia even succeeded finally to beat back
the Croatian requirement for the federal type of Yugoslavia by nominally accepting
this idea during the negotiations at Corfu but only under the condition that united
Serbian federal unit within Yugoslavia would be created, what means that the
Croatian federal-territorial part is going to be composed by only one-third of the
required lands by the Croats, who at any case have been well informed that Italy is
willing to make a deal with Serbia about the territorial division of Dalmatia
between Rome and Belgrade.
The standpoint towards the way of union of the Royal Government of
Serbia was different to the Yugoslav Committees one. Serbia never officially

429
D. epi, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 19141918, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 141142, 170171; Dr. N.
Stojanovi, Jugoslovenski Odbor. lanci i Dokumenti, Zagreb, 1927, pp. 15, 43. F. Supilo was in strong opinion that
Serbia required Croatian and Slovenian territories as a compensation for her lost territories to Bulgaria in 1915 (the
Vardar Macedonia, part of Kosovo and the Eastern Serbia).
430
H. Hanak, The Government, the Foreign office and Austria-Hungary 19141918, New York, 1979, pp. 165166.
431
See more in: H. Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia, vol. 12, London: Leonard Parsons Ltd., 1922.
432
D. epi, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 19141918, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 106107.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
212


recognised the Yugoslav Committee as a representative institution of the South
Slavs from Austria-Hungary. Therefore, Serbia played a role of only representative
side of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before the Entente states. Moreover,
especially for N. Pai, the Yugoslav Committee could not be an equal partner with
Serbias Government in the process of unification for political, moral and military
reasons. The crucial request by the members of the Yugoslav Committee that a
plebiscite about the unification and states inner organisation had to be organized
was rejected by Serbia likewise the internal federalist state organisation favoured
by the Yugoslav Committee. Particularly, F. Supilos idea of federal Croat province
within Yugoslavia was never accepted by N. Pai who always was in the opinion
that such Croatia would be constantly a corpus separatum and state within the
state. The crucial aspect of N. Pais policy about the process of unification was
that Serbias politicians should be natural representatives of all Yugoslavs before
the Entente powers until the Peace Conference. He justified this requirement by
three facts: 1) Serbia had legal Government, 2) Serbia was internationally
recognized state, and 3) Serbia was allied member of the Entente block.
The attitude of Serbia was that if Yugoslavia was to be created, territorial
borders had to be clearly defined between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia
433
as N.
Pai wanted firstly to unify all Serbian lands and people within one political
unit and after that to unify such territory with other Yugoslav lands into a single
state. It is likely that the Government of Serbia was not in principle against the
federal organisation of the new state but for Serbia it was unacceptable that if
Yugoslavia was to be federation, the Serbian population would be divided into
several federal units. In the other words, only a federal Yugoslavia with three
federal units was possible: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The Serbian federal unit
had to embrace all Serbian people and lands.
434
Nevertheless, at the Corfu
Conference the federal organisation based on this principle was given up, taking
into account the fact that ...when we started to make borders we understood that
it was impossible, as N. Pai explained to the Parliament of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1923.
435
Even A. Trumbi understood that in the
case of the federal organisation of the new state on the national basis, a Greater
Serbia (composed by all Serbs and Serbian lands) would dominate the country
that became finally the crucial reason for him to reject the federal project of
Yugoslavia during the Corfu Conference.

The Corfu Declaration (July 20
th
, 1917) as a political compromise

The Corfu Conference was held from June 15
th
to July 20
th
, 1917 what
means for more than a month. It shows both how much the conference was
important and how much political solutions proposed by the both sides have been
different. From the side of the Yugoslav Committee as the negotiators came A.

433
Serbia had during the whole war much clear picture about the borders of united Serbia towards the Hungarians than
towards the Croats. Thus, new Serbian-Hungarian post-war border should run northern from the line of Timisoara-
Subotica-Maros-Baja-Pecs (. , 1918, , vol. X, 7, 1.
XII 1923, pp. 511525).
434
. , , , 1989, p. 143. On the British policy with regards
to the creation of Yugoslavia, see: J. Evans, Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan
Nationality and Identity, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008.
435
18451926, , 1926, p. 110.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
213


Trumbi, D. Vasiljevi, B. Bonjak, H. Hinkovi, F. Potonjak and D. Trinajesti.
The Kingdom of Serbia was represented by N. Pai, M. Nini, A. Nikoli, Lj.
Davidovi, S. Proti, V. Marinkovi, M. urii and M. Drakovi.
436
The basis for
discussion under the official title Provisional State Until Constitutional Organization
was prepared by the Close Board of five members who worked out drafts about the
basic problems upon creation and organisation of the future state to be solved.
After very laborious negotiations of more than a month both sides signed a
common declaration in a form of the basic agreement upon a political form of a
new state to be proclaimed at the very end of the war. The joint Corfu Declaration
is the most significant legal document about the creation of a single Yugoslav
state, signed on July 20
th
, 1917 by two representatives of the Royal Serbian
Government and the Yugoslav Committee: Nikola Pai and Ante Trumbi.
437
The
declaration was composed by twelve points based on two principles: 1) the
principle of national unity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and 2) the principle
of self-determination of the people. Nevertheless, the Corfu Declaration did not
have constitutional character as it just regulated some of the most important
questions of the future state. It was only the joint statement (declaration) of the
representatives of Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee with regard to the
foundations of the common state and about some of its fundamental
principles.
438

In regard to the question of the internal political-administrative
organisation of the future state the most important point was that the state of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary
monarchy under the Karaorevi dynasty, which has always shared the feelings
of the nation and has placed the national will above all else.
439
This point of the
declaration was a great political victory of the Government of Serbia as the idea of
republic was rejected. Therefore, the Yugoslav Committee accepted the new state
as a monarchy. In stead of federalization of the country, the local autonomies were
guaranteed and based on natural, social and economic conditions but not on
historical or ethnic principles. The two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin, have been
proclaimed as an equal in public use in the whole country likewise the Orthodox,
Roman Catholic and Muslim creeds were proclaimed to be equal and will have the
same rights in regard to the state. It was proclaimed as well that The territory of
the Kingdom will include all territory in which our people forms the continuous
population, and cannot be mutilated without endangering the vital interests of the
community. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is
its own. It desires freedom and unity. Therefore it consciously and firmly refuses
all partial solutions of the propositions of the deliverance from Austro-Hungarian
domination, and its union with Serbia and Montenegro in one sole State forming

436
The national structure of the conference on its second session, when it had the greatest number of the participants
was: the Serbs 11, the Croats 4 and 1 Slovene (. , , ,
1967, pp. 201206).
437
According to the Croatian historian Ferdo ii, N. Pai signed the document as Serbian Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs, while A. Trumbi did the same as President of the Southern Slav Committee (F. Sisic,
Abridged Political History of Rijeka, Fiume, 1919, Appendix, p. LXXV).
438
. , , , 1967, pp. 228292.
439
S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution,
DordrechtBostonLondon: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 141.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
214


an indivisible whole (the 8
th
point).
440
Obviously, this point of the declaration was
in fact a great victory of the Yugoslav Committee and pointed out against the
articles of the secret London Treaty signed on April 26
th
, 1915. Presumably, the
army of Serbia at the end of the war had to protect the South Slavic (i.e., Croat
and Slovene) lands in Dalmatia and Istria against the Italian territorial
aspirations. Finally, the deputies to the national Parliament of the new state will
be elected by universal, direct and secret suffrage. The Constituent Assembly
would accept a Constitution with numerically qualified majority. The Constitution
of the Yugoslav state shall be established after the conclusion of the peace treaty
and it will come into force after receiving the Royal sanction. The nation thus
unified will form a State of some 12,000,000 inhabitants, which will be a powerful
bulwark against German aggression and an inseparable ally of all civilised States
and peoples (the 12
th
point).
441

The most important victory of the Yugoslav Committee (i.e., the Croat and
Slovene politicians as the representatives of the South Slavs from the Dual
Monarchy) against the Government of Serbia at the Corfu Conference was the fact
that Serbia did not get any privileged position or the veto rights in the new state as
it was, for instance, the case with Prussia in united Germany after 1871. The
Kingdom of Serbia even, for the sake of creation of a single Yugoslav state,
cancelled its own internationally recognized independence, denied her democratic
Constitution, national flag and other national symbols.
442
N. Pai denied
liberating role of Serbia during the war and succeeded only to impose the
monarchical type of the state under the Karaorevis dynasty,
443
i.e., under the
realm of the Regent-King Alexander I from Montenegro.
It is false interpretation of the Corfu Declaration by some Yugoslav and
international historiographers that by this declaration Serbia received rights to
annex Austro-Hungarian territories settled by the South Slavs (Yugoslavs):
Slavonia, Banat, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia.
444
However,
according to the text of the Corfu Declaration, the ethnic Serbs from the Dual
Monarchy were de facto left to be united with Serbia and Montenegro into a single
Yugoslav state by Zagreb as a political centre of the Yugoslav lands from the Dual
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Therefore, on October 29
th
, 1918 it was proclaimed
in Zagreb the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs pretending to have a legal
competence over all Yugoslav lands from the Dual Monarchy. This state was
proclaimed de facto as a Greater Croatia with a Croat national and historic flag as
the states one (red-white-blue horizontal tricolour). However, the ethnic Serbs
were a simple majority in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the capital
in Zagreb a state declared to exist on the Croat ethnic and historic rights
formulated by the Croatian Party of Rights in the mid-19
th
century. Nevertheless,
the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were internationally recognized only by
the Kingdom of Serbia in the spirit of the Corfu Declaration when Serbias Regent
Alexander I read in Belgrade on December 1
st
, 1918 a letter of answer to the
official delegation which came from Zagreb to the act of Proclamation by the

440
Ibid., pp. 141142.
441
Ibid., p. 142.
442
Jugoslavenski Odbor u Londonu, Zagreb: JAZU, 1966, p. 129.
443
. . , , vol. II, : , 1985, p. 182; A. ,
O , , 1975, pp. 198, 206208.
444
For instance: . , I , : , 1988, p. 27.
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
215


National Council in Zagreb of the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and
Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro.
445

Finally, the Corfu Declaration accepted the idea of compromised national
unitary state of three-names nation: the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
446
It was
the main reason why the name of Yugoslavia was rejected and instead of it the
official name of the new state was proclaimed to be the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes.
447


Conclusions

1. The 1917 Corfu Declaration was a joint pact between the Government of
Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee for the sake of creation of a single
Yugoslav national state under the name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes. The Corfu Declaration was a basis for proclamation of such
state at the end of the First World War and for its first Constitution in
1921.
2. The crucial problems in relation to the internal states organisation have
not been solved by the Corfu Declaration. They were left to be finally solved
for the time after the war, by the Constituent Assembly, which should be
elected by the universal suffrage.
3. All Constituent Assemblys decisions should get the royal sanction in
order to be verified. This meant that the monarch had the right of the veto.
4. For both the Yugoslav Committee and the Government of Serbia the
most urgent aim was to issue a common declaration concerning the
creation of a single (united) South Slavic state, in order to try to protect the
Yugoslav lands from the Italian territorial aspirations. Therefore, some of
the most significant questions with regards to the internal state
organisation could wait to be resolved after the war and especially during
the Peace Conference when the state borders would be finally established.
5. The Italian territorial aspirations at the Balkans during the First World
War were the most important reason for a convocation of the Corfu
Conference. It can be seen from the telegram sent by J. M. Jovanovi to the
Regent Alexander I just after the publishing of the Declaration, in which
Jovanovi noticed that the time for its issuing was chosen accurately
when the Italians came to the conferences convoked in Paris and
London.
448




445
S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution,
DordrechtBostonLondon: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 147160. The general attitude of Croatian
historiography is that Belgrade was carring on an anti-Croat politics during the whole period of the modern history for
the sake to establish the Serbian Orthodox dominance over the region and to exploit both the Roman-Catholic and
Muslim Croats (for instance: J. Jareb, Pola stoljea hrvatske politike, 18951945, Zagreb, 1995). However, contrary to
the idea of a Greater Serbia the Croatian dream during the last two centuries was nothing else than a creation of a
Greater Croatia (M. Marjanovi, Hrvatski Pokret. Opaanja i misli na pragu novoga narodnoga preporoda g. 1903,
Dubrovnik, vol. I, 1903, p. 48.].
446
Jugoslavenski Odbor u Londonu, Zagreb: JAZU, 1966, pp. 178179.
447
Nevertheless, the offical name of the state became from January 6
th
, 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
448
A , , . . , -2.

Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
216



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Assoc. Prof. Vladislav B. Sotirovi
Institute of Political Sciences
Mykolas Romeris University
Faculty of Politics and Management
Vilnius, Lithuania
vladislav@sotirovic.eu
vsotirovic@mruni.eu
http://vsotirovic.home.mruni.eu
http://www.sotirovic.eu








Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
220


Appendices



Figure No. 1: The London Treaty of April 26th, 1915 and the new Italian borders after the
war





Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
221





Figure No 2: Lands offered to the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro by
the Entente powers according to the London Treaty of April 26
th
, 1915. At the exchange,
Serbia had to cede the Vardar Macedonia to Bulgaria















Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
222





Figure No. 3: The Albanian question and the London Treaty of April 26
th
, 1915


Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
223



Figure No 4: The ethnographic map of the Yugoslavs submitted to the Paris Peace
Conference in 1919 by the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes



























Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
224


About the author



Comprehensive academic C.V./Resume:
http://www.sotirovic.eu/resume
Europass
Curriculum Vitae

Personal information

First name(s) / Surname(s) Vladislav B. Sotirovi
Address(es) Gerosios Vilties g. 24-48, LT-03144 Vilnius, Lithuania (Lietuva)
Telephone(s) (+370 5) 213 6787 Mobile: 867 664 317 (LTU)
062 166 27 00 (SRB)
Fax(es) (+370 5) 274 06 24
E-mail vladislav@sotirovic.eu
Nationality Republic of Serbia
Date of birth 1967-01-14
Gender Male
Desired employment/
Occupational field
Teaching and researching at the university/institute
Work experience

Dates
2007-onward, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania
2009-2011, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
2005-2010, European Humanities University, Vilnius, Lithuania
2000-2007, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania
1999-2000, Central European University, Open Societies Archives, Budapest, Hungary
Occupation or position held Associate University Professor
Associate University Professor
Associate University Professor
Associate University Professor/Lector
Reading Room Coordinator
Main activities and responsibilities Teaching and researching
Name and address of employer Mykolas Romeris University
Faculty of Politics and Management
Institute of Political Sciences
Office I-57
Valakupi g. 5
LT-10101 Vilnius, Lithuania (Lietuva)
phone (+370 5) 2740 611, fax (+370 5) 274 06 24, e-mail pmi@mruni.eu
Type of business or sector Education and research
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
225


Education and training

Dates
2002, Vilnius University, Faculty of Philology, Slavic Philology Department, Vilnius, Lithuania
1997, Central European University, Budapest College, Budapest, Hungary
1996, Central European University, Budapest College, Budapest, Hungary
1991, Belgrade University, Faculty of Philosophy, History Department, Belgrade, Serbia
Title of qualification awarded Ph.D. in Humanitarian Sciences (Philology)
M.A. in South East European Studies
M.A. in Central European History
B.A. in History
Principal subjects/occupational skills
covered
History, Political Science, Philology
Name and type of organisation
providing education and training
Vilnius University, Central European University, Belgrade University
Personal skills and
competences

Mother tongue(s) Serbian
Other language(s) English, Lithuanian, Croat, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Russian
Self-assessment

Understanding Speaking Writing
European level (*) Listening Reading Spoken interaction Spoken production
English
C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
Lithuanian
C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
(*) Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
Computer skills and competences
Windows system, Word Processors, Wind Word and Word Perfect, Excel, Access, Databases,
Electronic Mail Program, CCMAIL for Windows, JSTOR, website creation and maintenance and
INTERNET.

Driving licence
Republic of Lithuania, B category
Additional information
Reference persons:
Prof. Vygandas Kazimieras Paulikas, Mykolas Romeris University, Faculty of Politics and Management,
Political Science Institute, Office I-57, Valakupi g. 5, LT-10101 Vilnius, Lithuania (Lietuva), E-mail:
vpaul@mruni.eu, Phone: (+3705) 2740 611; Fax: (+3705) 2740 624
Prof. John Dryzek, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT 0200 Australia, E-mail: jdryzek@coombs.anu.edu.au, Phone: (+61) 262
492256
Annexes
Personal online presentations:
http://www.sotirovic.eu
http://www.sotirovic.blog.com

Professional online presentation:
http://vsotirovic.home.mruni.eu

Online presentation at Academia.edu:
http://mruni.academia.edu/VladislavSotirovic

Comprehensive C.V./Resume with scientific publication list:
http://www.sotirovic.eu/resume
http://sotirovic.blog.com/sotirovic-resume-publications/

Book Creation of the First Yugoslavia: How the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was
Established in 1918, Saarbrucken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Germany, 2012:
Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
226


http://yugoslavia1914-1918.webs.com

Books about the Balkans:
http://balcanica.webs.com

Book (On the Cataphalque of Titography), Vilnius: Lithuanian University of
Educational Sciences Press, 2012:
http://anti-titologija.webs.com/

















































Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
227




































SOTIROVI, Vladislav B.
From The EuroBalkan Studies: Scientific Articles in English
50 copies
First edition
227 pages

ISBN 978-609-408-597-0 (printed book)
ISBN 978-609-408-598-7 (electronic book)
UDK 94 (497.1) So-121
Barcode 9786094085970

) Balkan studies b) European studies c) European history and politics








1
Vladislav B. Sotirovi 2013

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FROM THE EUROBALKAN
STUDIES

Scientific Articles in English


Vladislav B. Sotirovi



Vladislav B. Sotirovi From The EuroBalkan Studies
228