Three Letters Written By John G.

Munsell To An Angevine July 1863 – August 1864

Version 1 31 December 2001

Prepared by:

John R. Angevine, 2006 Swan Terrace, Alexandria VA 22307 Email:



This document contains the images and transcripts of three letters written by John G. Munsell over the period of July 1863 to August 1864. The recipient of all three letters is a “Brother Angevine” that resides in Pataskala, Licking County Ohio. I am unsure which member of the Angevine family this is, but John G. Munsell’s (JGM) would have been contemporaries with Edwin Angevine, b. Dec 1830 in NY; Hiram R. Angevine, b. Jun 1834 Harrison Twp; or Frank Angevine, b. Nov 1841Granville Twp. The letters came into my possession through my father Robert C. Angevine, who received them from the estate of my Aunt, Dorothy Angevine. The letters are dated July 6th 1863, Nov 5th 1863, and Aug 2nd 1864. There are no envelopes or other supporting documentation. They are in generally fair condition with folds, creases, yellowing, and minor stains and tears. The writing is still legible, although some parts require a magnifying glass to better discern what is written. Who is John G. Munsell: At the time JGM wrote these letters he was assigned to the 110th Illinois Infantry Regiment, a history of the regiment is attached at Appendix A.1 JGMs historical references all seem to match the documentation that I have found in multiple sources and are identified in endnotes throughout the transcripts. His service within the regiment is recorded2 as follows:
Rank Private Hosp Steward 2nd Asst. Surg. Residence Mt. Vernon Mt. Vernon Mt. Vernon Date of Rank Aug 14, 1862 Mar 10, 1864 Date of Muster or Enlistment Sep 11, 1862 Sep 11, 1862 Apr 6, 1864 Remarks Prom. Hospital Steward Prom. 2nd Asst Surg. Mustered out Jun 8, 1865

JMG became a First Lieutenant when he was promoted to 2nd Asst. Surgeon and it appears that he mustered out of the Army at that rank. The record shows that he was mustered out on June 8, 1865. I posted a query on and got a quick reply back from Bill Munsil and Nancy Cunningham. Bill provided the following information: John G MUNSELLE was born in 1836 in Harrison Twp, Licking, Ohio. He appears in the 1850 Ohio Census at age 14. He may be the same John Munsell as 1900 Illinois census (b. Aug 1838) or in the 1900 Ohio Census (b. 1837). If he is the Munsell in the IL census, he lived at 128 N. Walnut, Centralia, Marion Co. IL. Copies of the emails are attached. According to Bill the last name is spelled nine different ways: Muncel, Muncell, Muncil, Muncill, Munsel, Munsell, Munselle, Munsil, and Munsil. However it is spelled most of the family descended from Thomas Munsell (and other spellings) who showed up in Connecticut prior to 1680.

From JMGs letters we learn that he was a medical school student in Cincinnati at the beginning of the war and that he sat for the Illinois Medical Board Exams in September 1863. It is plausible then that JGM knew one of the Angevine’s from his early years in Harrison Township, Licking County Ohio – perhaps school, church, or grange? We will do some more investigation to see if we can confirm this. It is clear from the letters that number were exchanged over the period covered, so we only have a small sample.

Historical Context 1863 was the third year of the war; the first two had not gone well for the Union. In fact the state governors were having trouble raising enough troops and conscription was instituted, unrest grew and draft riots occurred in New York City. Lincoln faced reelection in 1864 and knew he must improve the performance of the Army if he was to win the election. The year did not begin well, and hit a low point in May when Gen Hooker was decisively defeated by Lee's much smaller forces at the Battle of Chancellorsville. During this battle Stonewall Jackson was killed along with 13,000 other confederates and 17,000 union soldier. In June, Gen Lee launches his invasion of the North but is defeated at Gettysburg and chased south. At almost the same time, July 4th, Grant also takes Vicksburg. The Union was now in control of the Mississippi, the Confederacy was effectively split in two, cut off from its western allies. The 110th and JGM marched with Rosecrans from Readyville in May, fought at Tullahoa, pushed onto Manchester and then to the Elk River when the first letter is written on July 6, 1863. The Union is headed towards Chickamauga. On September 19-20 the decisive Confederate victory by Gen. Bragg's Army of Tennessee at Chickamauga leaves Gen. William S. Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland trapped in Chattanooga, Tennessee under Confederate siege. The siege continued until late November when Union forces under Grant defeat the confederate siege by Bragg. The 110th didn’t participate in Chickamauga, but was nearby. JGM plays down the defeat in his second letter on November 5th, but the loss is significant enough that Rosencrans was relieved. The year 1864 opened with the North in control and in the spring a series of coordinated attacks was launched to defeat the confederacy. In Virginia, Grant with an Army of 120,000 begins advancing toward Richmond to engage Lee's Army of Northern Virginia that included battles at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. In the west, Sherman, with 100,000 men begins an advance toward Atlanta to destroy Johnston's Army of Tennessee. Richmond was considered the “mind” of the confederacy and Georgia the “heart”. Destroying the confederate forces in these areas would position the Union for victory. The third and final letter from JGM is dated August 2, 1864 – in the field, before Atlanta. The 110th participated in the battle for Atlanta which began on July 20th, and is described in

the letter by JGM. Atlanta was finally taken in September, Richmond was under pressure, and a final decisive victory by Gen Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley over Early's troops all helped to reelect Lincoln on 8 November. The war continued into 1865, with Richmond finally being taken on 2 April and Gen Lee surrendered to Gen Grant on 9 April at the village of Appomattox Court House in Virginia. On April 15th, President Abraham Lincoln dies. Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston surrenders to Sherman near Durham NC on April 18th – the 110th Ill is present for the surrender In May the remaining confederate forces surrender. The 110th marched to Washington DC and participated in the Grand Review celebrating the end of the war. The 110th was mustered out on June 5, 1865. JGM was muster out on June 8, 1865; perhaps he participated in the parade. I am not an expert on the Civil War so I apologize for any errors in the above description, needless to say I have left out many key events. I have included the briefest descriptions of these three battles at Appendix B (Tullahoma), C (Chickamauga), and D (Atlanta). Future Revisions: I will revise this in the future based on any additional information I obtain. In particular I will try to determine: - which Angevine JGM was writing to, - JGMs history in Ohio, and - JGMs life after the war Future editions will be indicated with a new version number and date on the cover sheet. Editing Notes: I have preserved the original spelling and punctuation from the original letters in my transcript. If I could not decipher a word or letter – it is indicated by a question mark in the transcript. Any editorial comments made by me within the transcripts are surrounded by { }.

Letter 1
“In the Field” on Elk River, Franklin Co. Tenn. July 6th, 1863 Bro. Angevine Yours of the 28th ???. came duly into camp. It found me in good soldiering condition - health of the Army, ordinary. Having, from various causes, been reduced to less than 400 men, the 110 Ill Vol. was by petition of officers, consolidated into 4 comp’s {companies}. The surplus officers being mustered out. This arrangement cleared us of “Wrongdoodles” & “Old Grannies” after which the command improved so rapidly in appearance, drill, and discipline that “special mention” was made of us by Gen. Rosecrans3. We were consolidated about the 10th of May last, at which time we left the 22 Brigade at Readyville4 and have belonged to no Brigade since but are used by Gen. Palmer as a “Light Battalion” and camp by his Hd. Quarters5. When this Army left its base (40 miles long) the calculation was that the rebs would “stand” at Tullahoma6, and we moved with a view of concentrating on that point. The “Advance” was made as follows: Left Wing, Gen. McCooks corps on the Shelbyville Pike, Center, Gen Thomas’ Corps on the Manchester pike – Left-wing. Gen. Crittenden’s Corps on byroads to Manchester; then, still to the left – Crittenden’s Corps consists of 3 Divisions viz: 1st. Gen. Hood, 2nd Gen. Palmer, 3d Gen Vancleve, the latter was left a Murfreesboro to hold it7. (Letter 1- Page 1)

Figure I. Letter July 6, 1863, page 1

Gen Palmer’s Divison consists of 3 Brigades, viz: - 1st Gen. Cruft, 2d Gen. Hazen, 3d COL Grose (act. Brig. Gen.). I give you the foregoing order of things so when you read accounts of the doings of the army you may know where the “Battalion 110 Ill” is. We commenced our advance June 24. (St John’s Day) I speak of the “Left Wing” I know no more about the Right & Center then you do; (by reading the papers) Our Division took the front and Gen Hood’s Div. followed. The “110th” took the advance and of course was the first to find the Rebs, which we did about 3 o’clock P.M. and immediately “went for ‘em”. Gen. P’s Escort (Part of Co. C 7th Ill Cav.) also “went in” They always do it tho’ it is not their place to do so; They seem to delight in fighting. The enemy (about 75 or 80 I should think) were posted in a very advantageous position, the ground being hilly and brushy – but an hour’s skirmishing drove them back. Losses on our side, one killed & 3 wounded, Co’s “A” & “C” of our Batn {Battalion}. Only were engaged and I was “mightly much magnified” to see Co. “A”. (composed of old Co’s. B & D) march steadily and briskly forward under a tolerably sharp fire from the concealed foe, thereby giving renewed evidence of the “grit” they exhibited on the battle-field of Stone River. I forgot to state that we got one prisoner. After the “Skrimage” we went into Camp for the night. The next day and subsequently on the march we were ordered to march in the rear of Battery “M” 4th U.S. Art. (Regulars) and support it in case of an action. (Letter 1- Page 2)

Figure II. Letter July 6, 1863, page 2

Candle Light

The roads are awful bad and we have moved very slowly. It rained heavily the day we started and has kept it up every day since with the exception of the 1st and 2d of this month on which days it sprinkled slightly. The weather is fair now (7 P.M.) has not rained since early this morning. The amount of rain that falls is astonishing and makes the roads almost impassable for the Artillery some of which is very heavy (24. P’drs.) We crossed Duck River8 at Manchester on a pontoon bridge. On the 3d of July we arrived at this river (Elk) on (it is said) our way to Winchester, but we could not ford it and having no pontoons we are unable to cross and as it rains very hard every day, I do not know how long we will stay here or what – we will do next.9 This (Franklin) is the last Co. between us and Alabama. Distance to State line between 25 & 30 miles. On the 3d ????, Gen. Palmer informed us that Gen. Rosecrans had ordered that the Battalion 110th Ill, shall be “mounted” Consequently as soon as horses can be procured we will “mount”. But t is so dark I must get a candle, Since writing the above I have I have rec’d & read an epsistle from Simon Slough, which was very “good for me”. I have taken some pains to inform myself in regard to the politics of Ohio soldiers in this Division, and I have not found one that will vote for “Val”10, most of them Swear if they hear his name mentioned. They watched for him every day at the depot a Murfreesboro, but he came (Letter 1- Page 3)

Figure III. Letter July 6, 1863, page 3

“like a thief in the night” on a Special train and was hurried thro the lines before the Soldiers knew anything of it. Maj. Wall, Prov. Marshall on the Gen. Jeff C. Davis’ Staff, and brother of our Asst. Surgeon, said that there was no doubt in his mind but that the Ohio soldiers would have hung Vallandigham had they known the he was in the lines. The n. {number} in favor of it being so great opposition would have been useless. (‘Tis raining again; an hour ago the sky was clear) I feel and felt for a long time very doubtful as to our ability to put down the Rebellion. However, we may do it – very quickly when we get a good start. But I am in favor of continuing the war as long as there are men and money to do it. I don’t like soldiering altogether so well, but as long as we have an Army in the field I expect to be with it or be “rubbed” out in the service. Since we have been on this march we have run almost constantly we?, day and night, marched several nights most of the night, is dark and rainy. Such exposure would ruin a new Regiment, but we seem to stand it – very well, tho’ considerable Dysentery prevails, which, I attribute mainly to the wet weather. We find some Union men even down here, but not many. But little farming is being done – most of the fields are lying idle, and it seemeth to me that the prospecs of starvation in this “neck of woods” is flattering. We are in about 10 miles of the Cumberland Mountains, probably we will have to cross them. I am told that the rebel army will make a “stand” at Bridgeport where the ?? & Chattanooga R.R. crosses the Tenn. River. Prisoners uniformly say that the Ky. & Tenn. Troops will not fight if driven out of this State farther than Bridgeport. They say if Vicksburg is taken and Bragg driven out of Tenn. The confederacy is “gone down”. Concerning “Jaky” Simon writes that he is in Nashville Tenn. Sick with Consumption. I know ?ou about him. I am Hospital Stewart of the Battalion, wages $30.00 per mo11. Write - ??? yours ?? J.G. Munsell (Letter 1- Page 4)

Figure IV. Letter July 6, 1863, page 4

Letter 2
North Chickamauga, Tenn. Nov. 5th 1863 Bro. Angevine Your communication of the 12th last has been graciously permitted to catch up with us, and I was pleased to read of the welfare of you and yours. I am laboring under good health, and am able to promptly check any tendency to the accumulation of “rations” in my department of the mess-box. The health of the Battalion is good, none to sick for locomotion. The weather is cool and wet generally, but when a clear day comes it is very warm. We are encamped at the mouth of North Chickamauga seven miles up the river from Chattanoga. We came from the city on the 24th last. We were not in the battle of “Chickamauga”. The Battalion was detailed at that time by Gen. Palmer to guard a supply train to and from Bridgeport. I was at that time in Illinois, having left the Battalion at Battle Creek, Tenn. On the 4th of Sept. on a furlough, for the purpose of going before the State Medical Board for Ill., at Chicago, to the examined for Assistant Surgeon. I went via. Bridgeport & Stevenson, (Ala.) Nashville, Louisville, Indianapolis, Logansport & so home12 to Chicago. I tarried there (Letter 2- Page 1)

Figure V. Letter November 5, 1863, page 1

two days; “passed” the “Med. Board”; - went to Springfield and filed my “certificate of qualification: with the Adj’s. General, who said he would give an appointment as soon as a vacancy occurs (of which there are none at present.) From Springfield, I set my countanance “as tho’ I would go down into Egypt.” I arrived at home on the 11th; taking the “natives” by surprise – found the “old folks at home” all well – got an “honorable (?) mention” in the local column of the “Unconditional Unionist.13” (County paper, edited by a discharged soldier; disabled at “stones river”) Marched and counter marched over the country, occasionally storming and taking breastworks and forts, (with crinoline defences) in which I used a great deal of “strategy” in making flank movements – heard the army of the Cumberland were fighting; started to return two days sooner than I had calculated to – heard of the results of the battle on the way – felt particularly anxious about the “110th” Saw an officer of my acquaintance at Bridgeport who informed me that the Battalion was there (at Bridgeport) at time of battle – felt better concerning the safety of my personal friends, also to know that they had not been thro’ the firey ordeal of battle, when I was “luxuriating” at home, etc, etc. I found the boys all right, behind the outer defences at Chattanooga. I was immediately ordered to report at the Div. Hospital every morning to dress and re-dress wounds as the wounded were brought from battlefield under flag of truce. I spent several hours daily dressing wounds ‘til they were nearly all removed over the river, when I was relieved. Since when I have been with the Battalion. On the 5th Oct. the rebs “shelled” us nearly all (Letter 2- Page 2)

Figure VI. Letter November 5, 1863, page 2

day. Some shells came into our “neck of woods” One by Lt. Duke’s (Co. A) tent, but fortunately did not “crack open” there, but “bounced” far to the rear. Several shells passed over, lighting ½ mile in the rear, and some burst 200 feet high over our heads. Our guns in the mean time replied quite briskly. A Parrott in fort “Wood”, near us, made the rebs move a signal station (that had been working and “sassin’ ” us evry day) move its “traps” in a hurry. The same gun made Bragg move his Hd. Qrs. from Missionary ridge a few days after; a deserter pointing it out. After the battle the entire army was reorganized, and we were taken from our independent position under Gen. Palmer (2d Div. 21 A.C.) much against his will, and placed in the 3d Brigade, 22 Div. 14 A.C. Gen. Palmer was appointed to command 1st Div. 4th A.C. But the Removal of Gen. Rosecrans and the appointment of Gen. Thomas to command of Army (under Grant) left a vacancy of Corps Commander in 14th A.C. (ours) and Gen Palmer was appointed to fill it by order of War Dept. Which places us again under his command. Our Brigade is commanded by Col. Dan McCook (of the “fighting family.”) Our Division, by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, of Ind. Our Corps, by Gen. Palmer of Ill. Our Army by Gen. Thomas, and the Department (of the Mississippi) by Gen. Grant. Grant arrived here from the “Mississippi” on the 23d last and is now in Chattanooga. The Army was very sorry to part with “Old Rosy” but the necessity of the armies of the west acting in concert is very apparent, and probably, the present arrangement is the best that can be done Our Brigade is composed of the 22d Mich., 52d. O. (Col. McC’s Reg.) 85th, 86th 125th and Batt. 110th Ills. Col. McCook says he considers himself an Illinoisan, (Letter 2- Page 3)

Figure VII. Letter November 5, 1863, page 3

having been an inhabitant of that state since his 10th year. Jackson Charles, (son of Geo. Charles14 by Kirkersville O.) is Capt. Co. A 125 Ills. Capt. Lee, Co. G. 125 Ill. was a med. Student and room-mate of mine in Cincinnati. He (Capt. Lee) is going before the Ill. Med. Board of examiners to be examined for Ass’t Surg. Preferring that “posish” to a captaincy. I was offered the Adjutancy of this Batt. Last May and would not accept, as I then had an idea of going before the “Board” as I since have done, and would have much rather be Asst. Surg. Than Adj’t, in fact would rather remain Hosp. Steward as I do not wish to leave the Med. Dept. In regard to our defeat at Chickamauga I do not think it was a very bad one, tho’ we lost the field. Alltho’ under their manifold disasters the rebels catch at anything to magnify into a great victory, the tone of the rebel press show very clearly that they look upon the battle as a failure on their part in not retaking Chattanooga. Hooker’s battle on Sand Mountain in which he “cleaned them out” and opened the river to within 7 miles of Chattanooga was fought in the night and was a very sanguinary affair. Our loss was 200 killed with a proportionate no. of wounded. The rebel loss was still heavier as Hooker buried 200 of their dead and they carried many off, of course. It was a “great victory” for us, as our supplies now come up the river to within 7 miles, and from there to the city there is a good road. Previously all of our supplies had to be brought over the mountains, and the recent heavy rains had made it almost impracticable. Our “cracker line” is all right now, if we can hold what we have gained, and I think we can. I think it will take a year or two longer to end the war, but such calculations are of no weight, as no man can tell anything about it for certain, and all speculations are valueless. I have been acquainted with Dr. Bugh for some time but did not know that he was from Pataskala ‘til the last time I saw him. He is Asst. Surg. of 41st Ohio, of the Brigade to which we used to belong before our consolidation. When Bugh told me he was from Pataskala, I remembered that you had mentioned that some Dr. had by some means got into the army from Pataskala. He’s a weak brother. His Reg. is down at Shell Mound, on the Tenn. R. below Chattanooga, and probably I may not see him soon again. He pretended he did a heavy business about Pataskala. I have no idea as to the tenor of future military movements here. It is generally believed here, that if the rebs do not leave our front that Grant – will try to coerce them to fall back before long, and if so, a “hell of a battle” will be fought. Our men picket the river on this (North) side and the rebs on the south side, in free view of each other. Have quit shooting at each other by mutual agreement. Probably you have learned ?? this that Burnside did not reenforce us, and the 112th Ill. Did not come here. Write us soon – By the way, I saw Jacob Steed when on my way to Ill. At Stevenson Ala. Don’t know where the 3d Ohio is now. Remember us to “Br. David” – Mrs A. etc. etc. J.G. Munsell (Letter 2- Page 4)

Figure VIII. Letter November 5, 1863, page 4

Letter 3
In the Field, Before Atlanta, Georgia Aug. 2d 1864 Brother Angevine I do not know whether I owe you a letter or not, be that as it may. I will make a short report on the present occasion. I have been able to report “able for duty” everyday so far during the present campaign. The health of the army as far as I know, is as god as could be expected. The 110th ILL has lost “nary man” so far, by the enemy’s “engines of destruction” from which you will justly infer that we have done no fighting, which is correct, except that we have “skrimaged” with the rebels in establishing our lines; and exchanged shots with them on the picket line. We (110th) were relieved from the Division Train on the 20th ???. and ordered to report to the 3rd Brigade of this (2d) Div. which we did and were assigned to duty on the right of the Brigade (then in line of battle on Peach Creek) as a support to the 5th Wis. Battery L.A. {Light Artillery}. We had just got in position and were constructing breast works when the enemy charged our line to our left, including the left Div. of our Corps (Letter 3- Page 1)

Figure IX. Letter August 2, 1864, page 1

all of the 20th Corps and the right Div. of the 4th Corps (That was the battle of the 20th July) Our Div. was the extreme right of the Army and our line was a very weak one, and it was “good for us” that the enemy’s assault did not extend to our portion of the line. On the 22d we found the enemy in our front had disappeared and we moved up, still keeping our position on the extreme right, to within three miles of Atlanta, our position being west and south of the city. We could hear the “roar of battle” on our left (battle of the 22d) but we met with but very little opposition in our front. On the 26th the 16th, 17th, and 15th Corps came from the left and passed to our right, the 1st Brigade of the Div. drove the enemy’s cavalry pickets off the ground for the above Corps to camp on. The next morning (27th) our Div. being cut out of line by the 16th Corps (we having been “refused” on the flank) was ordered to go to Turners Ferry on Chattahoochee R. and then feel for *Howard’s flank who in the mean time was to take position We found only rebel cavalry, which we skirmished with for several hours driving them slowly back, as we turned from the Ferry and started for the point as above ordered. Our “job” was to protect Howards flank and rear which we did with out loss, but we had a hard day’s march and got into camp at 2 o’clock A.M. 28th * Commands Army of the Tennessee vice McPhereson (Letter 3- Page 2)

Figure X. Letter August 2, 1864, page 2

About the time we reached the Ferry the sound of Artillery and heavy musketry informed us that Howard had found his game (the battle of the 27) I could not help feeling uneasy as I listened to the sound of battle; many of my friends were there, I felt better however upon hearing in the night that our loss was comparatively very small while the rebels severely punished, having been repulsed in five successive charges on our lines; all of which news was more than verified on inspection of the field which I did next day, after our Div. had advanced an formed a line still on the right of the 15th Corps, which was the right of Howard’s army and it did most all of the fighting that day. Our loss was not quite 500 in killed wounded and missing, nearly a thousand rebels were found dead in front of the 15 A.C. {Army Corps ?} Over 800 were reported and afterward (two days) in advancing our skirmish line 120 more were found dead in a hollow where there seemed to have been a temporary hospital during the battle, this latter number was not in the official report. Itho’e I had seen “great slaughter” at Stone River Mission {?} Bridge &c. but I saw nothing on those fields to (Letter 3- Page 3)

compare with the battle ground in front of the 15.A.C. When I visited the field our dead were all buried, but the rebels still lay on the field as they fell, from Col. To privates. Captains and Lieutenants were thickly mixed in (Bars on their coat collars indicated their rank). Col. Shiels 30th La, (an Ohioan) was killed in front of the 4th Div. while holding the rebel banner. The Major and Adjutant took their turn next, and were all found dead together. I was not surprised at the difference between the Union and rebel loss upon an examination of the ground, which was all in our favor. The 111th Ill lost only 7 men slightly wounded. In their front were more dead rebels than the 111th had men in the Reg. They were mostly killed by other Regiments on the left who had a cross fire on them, our men in woods, the rebels in open field. I was at the 76th O. {Ohio} yesterday. Saw Barrett Root and Jesse Ewing, only of my acquaintance, as I staid but a few minutes. Bill Elliot had been sent back (leg give out where it was broken once) Presley Johnston slightly wounded on 22d and sent to Hospital Ed. Aris and Chryslar boys all well. Jess Ewing had heard his father was taken prisoner at Martinsburg. The boys in the 113 O. {Ohio} are all well. I have not heard from John Eggleston since he was sent to rear after battle of “Kinesaw”. The 23d A.C. is now passing from the extreme left of our lines to our right. They will probably get into position without a fight unless they get too close to the R. {Rail} Road. The arrangement now seems to be to extend our lines to the right and draw back our left either to draw the rebels out of Atlanta or to get possession of the Macon R.R. I think we will “take” Atlanta sometime, but maybe not soon. As for the end of the war, I can’t see it. Not even if Richmond and Atlanta are both taken. The weather is “misarebly warm” down here, making active military operations almost impossible. Cases of sun stroke are very frequent. The country is tolerable level here; rather poor sandy soil, Thick brush and heavy timber; principally oak and pine. Don’t fail to write soon. Remember us to family and friends. ?irech Yours J.G. Munsell 110 Ill. 23 Div 14 A..C. via. Chattanooga. (Letter 3- Page 4)

Figure XI. Letter August 2, 1864, page 4

Appendix A
110th Illinois Infantry Regiment Adjutant General's Report The One Hundred and Tenth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry was organized at Anna, Illinois by Colonel Thomas R. Casey in September, A.D. 1862 and was mustered into the United States service September 11, 1862 by Captain Washington, of the Sixteenth Regular Infantry. The Regiment was recruited from the counties of Jefferson, Washington, Wayne, Hamilton, Saline, Franklin, Perry and Williamson. On the 23rd day of September, A.D. 1862, the Regiment was ordered to Louisville, Ky., and there was assigned to the Ninteenth Brigade, compromised of the Fortyfirst Ohio, Ninth Indiana, Sixth and Twenty-seventh Kentucky regiments, and commanded by Col. W.B. Hazen. The Brigade formed a part of the Fourth Division, general William Sooy Smith commanding, Army of Ohio. September 27th, 1862, left Louisville in pursuit of the Rebel General Bragg, who had followed General Buell from Nashville Tenn., to Salt River, about forty miles from Louisville, The march was by the way of Bardstown to Perryville, when the Regiment with the Brigade was in line of battle by noon the on the 8th of October, 1862, and not more than two miles distant from where the battle of Perryville was being fought. An advance was not ordered. The regiment lay in line of battle the night and advanced in that order in the morning only to find that during the night Bragg had retreated and escaped. On the 11th day of October the Brigade encountered the enemy a mile in front of Danville. A line of battle was formed and the rebels were driven thriugh and beyond the town of Danville. This was the first skirmish that the Regiment was engaged in. The Regiment remained near Danville until the 11th of October, and on that day moved toward Crab Orchard in pursuit of the enemy. On the 16th of October, not far from Mt. Vernon, Ky., the rear of the enemy was encountered drawn up in line of battle. The Ninteeth brigade advanced in line of battle, and after sharp skirmishing the rebels were driven from their position and retreated. On the 15th and 16th of October the Regiment was constantly skirmishing. On the night of the 16th the camp was at Big Rock Castle Creek. On the 17th moved to Wild Cat. On the 18th and 19th encamped at Petman's Cross roads, within fortyfive miles of Cumberland Gap. From there the Regiment moved by the way of Somerset, Columbia, Glasgow and Gallatin to Nashville Tenn., where it encamped on the 7th day of November, 1862.

Of the campaign in southeastern Kentucky, the Brigade Comander, Colonel, (now Brigade General) hazen, in his report said: " It is proper to remark that during the entire campaign, although we were destitute of many of the comforts usual in campaigns, without tents, often without sufficient food, through the most inclement weather, marches of almost unprcedented length, I have never heard a murmur, and now have to report a condition of health better than ever before know in the Brigade, and a state of thorough discipline in the highest degree satisfactory." On the 26th of December, the Regiment marched toward Murfreesboro. At Lavergne, the Regiment came up with the rebels, and a considerable skirmish ensued. The Twenty-seventh marched on the Jefferson pike and crossed Stewart Creek. On the 29th of December the Regiment was within three miles of Murfreesboro, and on the 30th in line of battle. On the 31st engaged in the battle of Stone River. In that battle the Regiment lost in killed and wounded very heavily, Lieutenant Jesse G. Payne, of Company D, a valiant and brave officer, being among the killed. The battle ground of the Regiment was exactly where the monument to " Hazen's Brigade" now stands. On the night of the 31st the Regiment slept where they had fought during the day in the extreme advance until the early dawn of the first day of January, when it took a position on the bank of the Stone River. Of the conduct of the Regiment in the battle of Stone River the Brigade Commander said: "It displayed that fearless courage one admires in vetrans." of this brigade he said: "Such heroic service rendered their country this day, such heroic and daring valor justly entitles these men to the profound respect of the people and the country." After the battle of Stone River the Regiment, with the the remainder of the Brigade, was posted at Readyville, ten miles from Murfreesboro, on the exterme left of the army. On the 2nd day of April, breaking camp at 11 p.m., the Regiment participated in the attack on the rebels at Woodbury, and in this expedition at daylight on the 3rd of April, captured one picket post consisting of thirty mounted rebels with their horses. One of the rebels captured was a brother of one of the assistant surgeons of the Regiment. He was a mere boy, 17 years old, who after being properly advised was sent back back to his aged mother, who lived in the immediate neighborhood. In May, 1863, the Regiment being much reduced because of losses in battles, sickness and discharges, was consolidated. After that the Regiment was engaged in the battles of Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, the battles around Atlanta and in the "March to the Sea," then in the march north through the Carolina's and was at the surrender of General Johnston's Army. Marched from there to Washington City, participated in the Grand Review of General Sherman's Army, and was there on the the 5th day of June, 1865 mustered out of the service. From there the Regiment was

moved by rail to Chicago, Ill., where on the 15th day of June it received final payment and discharge. ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION ----------------------The consolidation of this Regiment was ordered by Paragraph 6, Special Field Orders 123, Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, May 7, 1863, and approved by Major General John M. Palmer, which order is as follows: "Major General Palmer, commanding Second Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, will cause the consolidation of the One Hundred and Tenth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, under the instructions contained in General Orders No. 86, War Department, current series. The officers to be retained in service will be selected by him. The Assistant Commissary of Musters, Second Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, will muster out of service all officers rendered supernumerary by the consolidation. A report of the battalion as re-organized will be made to these Headquarters. By command of Major General ROSECRANS. H. THRALL, Captain and A.A.G.

May 8, 1863 - Consolidations made, by reducing the Regiment to four (4) Companies. HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF GEORGIA NEAR WASHINGTON, D.C., June 5, 1865. SPECIAL ORDERS No. 80, Extract XVII. In accordance with telegram orders from War Department, dated May 18, 1865, the men belonging to the One Hundred and Tenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, whose terms of service do not expire prior to October 1, 1865, are hereby transferred to the Sixtieth Illinois Veterans Volunteer Infantry. By command of Brevet Major General J.C. DAVIS A.C. McCLURG, A.A.G. and Chief of Staff

Appendix B (Tullahoma)
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The Tullahoma campaign 23 June - 3 July 1863
Rosecrans & Thomas vs. Bragg vs. Hardee and Polk
A military masterpiece which did more damage to the Confederacy than Vicksburg or Gettysburg
From Bragg's report: "We were now back against the mountains, in a country affording us nothing, with a long line of railroad to protect, and half a dozen passes on the right and left by which our rear could be gained. In this position it was perfectly practicable for the enemy to destroy our means of crossing the Tennessee, and thus secure our ultimate destruction without a battle. Having failed to bring him to that issue, so much desired by myself and troops, I reluctantly yielded to the necessity imposed by my position and inferior strength, and put the army in motion for the Tennessee River."

After the battle of Murfreesboro (31 Dec. 62, 2 Jan. 63) Rosecrans established his winter camp there. Bragg withdrew south and prepared a defensive line north of Tullahoma which was to block any Federal advance toward Chattanooga. Rosecrans prepared thoroughly for the coming battle by stockpiling supplies and training the troops by means of constant skirmishing. His biggest problems were his inferior cavalry forces. The solution to this problem was tossed into his lap by a volunteer Col. named John T. Wilder, a mechanical engineer from Indiana, who came to Rosecrans with a revolutionary idea: take infantry, mount them on horses, arm them with the brand new 7-round Spencer repeating rifle, and use them as mobile shock troops who would ride ahead, dismount, and use their tremendous firepower to attack the enemy in the rear with the force of a much larger body of conventionally armed infantry. Rosecrans listened and gave Wilder the approval to round up the horses. Wilder made an arrangement with his bank so that the members of his brigade would pay the purchase price ($35 dollars per rifle) in installments out of their monthly pay. In the plan for dealing with Bragg, Wilder was assigned to Thomas. Meanwhile, the pressure from Washington for action steadily increased. However, Rosecrans (like Buell) had little patience and diplomatic skill for parrying such incursions and responded with sarcasm to sarcasm. When Grant crossed to the east side of the Mississippi below Vicksburg on 1 May 63, the volume of messages demanding an attack reached a crescendo due to the fear that Bragg "unoccupied" would be able to send reinforcements to Johnston (which were not sent, by the way). Rosecrans refused to budge until he was ready. That he turned out later to have been right did not further endear him to Halleck. At the risk of his military career Rosecrans was carefully preparing a plan to utilize the revolutionary tool which Wilder had put in his hands. The plan was both audacious and complex involving 4 separate attack columns, and it went off like clockwork, in spite of incessant rain and bad roads, thanks to the months of preparation and, according to Bradley, just the right amount of improvisation. On the Federal right Stanley and Granger's cavalry demonstrated toward the fortified town of Shelbyville. In the middle McCook and Thomas threatened the passes, and on the left Crittenden gestured toward McMinnville before becoming literally stuck in the mud caused by the rain, the most which had fallen in that period since records had been kept. Stanley's movement on 23 June was a feint (rendered more convincing by the presence of most of Rosecrans' cavalry), because Rosecrans had no intention

of directly attacking the fortifications. On the other side of his line on the left, Crittenden was feinting at a feint according to Woodworth, that is, it was supposed to be recognized as being not the main thrust, thus diverting attention back to Stanley on the Federal right in front of Shelbyville. In the middle, McCook's movment twoard Liberty Gap was also a demonstration, and a few days later his forces moved east to join those of Thomas. The main thrust with the 14th corps under Thomas took place on 24 June. First Wilder's newly mounted "lightning" brigade (with the firepower of a division) stormed through Hoover's Gap and overwhelmed the forces under Stewart which were supported by a small unit of Wheeler's cavalry. Never before in the history of warfare had so much firepower covered 12 miles so quickly. Wilder was thus able to establish himself close to Tullahoma and await Thomas's infantry. When Thomas arrived, he said to Wilder that his action had prevented 2000 casualties. Hardee, just to the west of Hoover's Gap, knew only that huge force had suddenly appeared on his right flank. For some reason for two days he sent no messages back to Bragg (whom he despised) about the fighting, and then he retreated without orders into Tullahoma. This isolated Polk's corps in Shelbyville which therefore also withdrew into Tullahoma, as ordered by Bragg. On 28 June Hardee and Bishop Lenoidas Polk (Davis's plant in the AoT who constantly fomented rebellion against Bragg) advised in guarded and less guarded terms to abandon Tullahoma because Rosecrans was now solidly placed in Manchester and poised to make another flanking maneuver to the east and cut Bragg off from Chattanooga. The next day Bragg's army began its withdrawal to Chattanooga. On 3 July the Federals effected the crossing of the Elk River to the south of Tullahoma, and on the next day the pursuit was called off, as Bragg was safely across the Cumberland plateau on his way to Chattanooga. By a strange coincidence, the Tullahoma campaign and the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg (which unjustly overshadow it), all ended on the same day. At the price of about 500 casualties Rosecrans swept forward 100 miles and was set to permanently establish a Federal presence on the all-important trunk line from Virginia to Memphis. To take Chattanooga (the door to the deep South), Rosecrans first had to get there, and get there he would. This campaign did not and still does not receive much attention and has little attraction for those who thrill to high body counts. All the more reason for discerning students of history to give this masterpiece of planning and execution its due consideration. If you want to get a feel for how much fun it is to be the object of "soft war", read the reports of Bragg, Polk, and Cleburne. Battle reports: Rosecrans US, Thomas US, Wilder US, Bragg CS, Polk CS, Cleburne CS,

Appendix C (Chickamauga)
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The Battle of Chickamauga 19-20 Sept. 63
The bloodiest 2 days of the Civil War. Rosecrans planned badly, but Thomas saved the Union army. Bragg planned well enough, but some of his subordinate generals (Polk and Hindman) betrayed him. After the Tullahoma Campaign (23 June - 3 July 63), Rosecrans prepared his movement toward and around Chattanooga very carefully. First he feinted in front of Chattanooga and upstream. On 29 Aug. 63 his forces crossed the Tennessee at 4 points in the vicinity of Bridgeport, Ala., downstream from Chattanooga. He then sent the AotC in 3 groups on a 50 mile wide front around Chattanooga. McCook was to the south of Lookout Mountain, Thomas occupied Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps of Lookout Mountain (with the help of a local Union sympathizer), and Crittenden was to occupy Chattanooga after Bragg had left, which he did on 8 Sept. However, all reports that Bragg was fleeing in disorder toward Atlanta or Rome, Ga. were false. Thomas warned Rosecrans that Bragg was not far away and dangerous to Rosecrans's widely dispersed forces, and that it was much safer to first concentrate and consolidate the Union hold on Chattanooga before going further. However, Rosecrans was under ceaseless pressure from Stanton and Halleck to pursue and "destroy" Bragg, and Rosecrans decided to go after him. He was also upset because he had received practically no recognition for his brilliantly concieved and executed Tullahoma campaign, and he wanted advancement as much as many another general. But Bragg too was aware that Rosecrans was widely dispersed and prepared several attempts to defeat Rosecrans in detail before Rosecrans could concentrate. However, every one of these attempts was vitiated by the dissension of Bragg's subordinate commanders and their disobedience of orders. One such attempt took place at McClemore's Cove directly east of Stevens' Gap. It was a strange valley with few exits and located just west of La Fayette, Ga. (accent on the 2nd syllable). A portion of Thomas's command under Negley had advanced into the cove by Stevens' Gap, the one entrance from the west from the southern end of Lookout Montain. Negley was supposed to continue to La Fayette, but Negley and Thomas, disturbed by sightings and reports of large masses of Confederate troops a few miles away, finding suspiciously stiff resistance at Dug Gap (a narrow pass through the considerable obstacle of Pigeon Mountain), and also warned by the local Union sympathizers, stopped and waited for 2 days (11-12 Sept. 63), despite Rosecrans' remonstrance’s. It also helped Thomas that his secret service had cracked Bragg's signal code (the Union not only had better cannon, it also had the better mathematicians). Bragg had prepared a trap. Hindman was to attack Negley from the wide-open valley opening to the north, and A.P. Hill was to attack from Dug Gap in the East upon the signal of the sound of Hindman's attack. Negley might have been caught in a bottle if Hindman hadn't perceived discretion in his orders and delayed. Bragg, waiting with Hill at Dug Gap and listening for gunfire from the north side of the Cove, hesitated also, and perhaps for good reason. The Confederates at Dug Gap would have had to descend from the gap in a single column before being able to form a battle line. While Bragg attempted to get Hindman to move, Negley pulled back west out of the Cove and escaped the trap.

Bragg then ordered Polk to attack the isolated corps of Crittenden, but Polk declined. During the next week Rosecrans frantically got his 3 groups concentrated while Bragg tried to outflank him and take the main roads back to Chattanooga. This led to the general battle at Chickamauga Creek on 19-20 Sept. According to Ambrose Bierce, topographical engineer under Hazen (Thomas) during the battle of Chickamauga, the battle was about the "control of a road". Actually it was about two roads leading from the Union left back to Chattanooga, namely the La Fayette Rd. and McFarland Road. Neither Rosecrans nor Bragg were prepared to fight a battle. Bragg's was more concentrated but, until the arrival of Longstreet's corps on 18 Sept., he was numerically inferior to the AotC. Rosecrans's separated units were making forced night marches in order to come together and simultaneously move closer to Chattanooga. Bragg was moving north from La Fayette at the same time in order to try to get between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. The first large scale contact actually took place on the 18th between the respective cavalries. The terrain was utterly unsuited for a coordinated attack or defense as most of the area was virgin forest. Steele writes: "Neither army knew the exact positions of the other...It is probable that division commanders on either side hardly knew where their own commands were, in the thick woods, let alone the other troops of their own army, or the troops of the hostile army. The lines were at this time about six miles long". Add to this the arrival of Longstreet's corps on the 18th, the day before the battle began with Longstreet himself arriving late the next night, it is easy to imagine the confusion in the dispositions on both sides. Again the first fighting was between cavalry units, which then brought on the general engagement, which turned into an all day melee in which neither side could claim any advantage. During the night units on both sides were shuffled around as Rosecrans prepared to defend and Bragg prepared to attack. Bragg made a complicated battle plan which dictated an early attack by Polk against the Union left, but there was no early attack. Polk either did not pass the order on to Hill, or he did pass on the order, but Hill received it too late to get an early start. The truth is buried in the murk of accusation and counter-accusation, but in any case Polk adhered to his pattern of not accepting Bragg's authority. Longstreet, having arrived the previous evening and been given command of Bragg's left, was to attack upon hearing the battle begin on the other end of the line, but when there was no attack there, Bragg sent orders to move forward directly to the division commanders. In any case the battle began. Thomas by that time was on the Union left protecting the all-important roads back to Chattanooga. His call for reinforcements led to a hole being created inadvertently on the Union right when Rosecrans sent a poorly written order to Wood to leave his place in the line. The oft-repeated tale that Wood, on his own and out of spite carried out an order he knew to be ill advised is probably not true. Since Longstreet's attack had already begun, Wood certainly knew that to move just then was risky. However, he had recently been twice reprimanded by Rosecrans for not rigidly following orders. Now he was handed ambiguous orders, and McCook, his superior in rank although not his direct commander, told him to try and carry them out. McCook was later court-martialed but not convicted (for leaving the field of battle), whereas Wood was not. In fact, later that day Wood played an essential role in stabilizing Thomas's position. The question is moot anyway because Rosecrans, through his impetuous pursuit before consolidating in Chattanooga, had created a situation in which any error would have dire consequences, and there are always errors.

In any case a hole was made, and the massed column under Hood happened to find it while making one of Hood's famous all-or-nothing attacks, and the Federal right, already in a state of advanced confusion, collapsed. Rosecrans and many of the high command fled back to Chattanooga, thus effectively ending their military careers. Negley even took back with him 22 guns, which represented most of the remaining Union artillery. Charles Dana, Assistant Secretary of State and spy to Stanton, panicked as well and told Wilder the entire army was routed. He positively ordered Wilder (whose brigade with its Spencer repeaters until then seemed to be everywhere on this battlefield) to escort him back to Chattanooga. That morning his brigade on the Union far right had stopped the Confederate attack cold. At this moment Wilder was about to attack Longstreet in the flank and cut his way through to Thomas because anyone with ears and a clear mind knew that Thomas hadn't quit. Being only a colonel and not knowing that Dana did not have the authority to give such orders, he stopped his preparations, sent Dana back to Chattanooga with some scouts, and restored order in his sector during the withdrawal to Rossville. Another prominent general who performed poorly on the 20th was Sheridan. According to the author Glenn Tucker, Sheridan, who had not been involved in the fighting on the 19th and although barely touched by the Confederate attack, abandoned the Union right in the morning while Wilder fought on. He had a second opportunity to come to Thomas's aid when he, in the company of Negley and Davis, was specifically requested to do so by Colonel Thruston who found them about 1 1/2 miles away from Snodgrass Hill. Jefferson C. Davis, the general under a cloud who had murdered Nelson, made an about face and took his division back toward the battle and helped cover Thomas's retreat. Sheridan and Negley continued with their troops to Rossville. For some reason Sheridan was forgiven, while the other higher commanders who left the field during the rout were not. Did Sheridan's friendship with Sherman have anything to do with it? In his Personal Memoirs Sheriden wrote that he too had gone back and helped cover Thomas's retreat. Here as elsewhere in his memoirs Sheridan lied. It is relevant here to quote from a telegraph dispatch (20 Sept. 63 - 3:45 PM) from Garfield to Rosecrans:
I arrived here [Thomas's HQ] ten minutes ago, via Rossville. General Thomas has Brannen's Baird's, Reynold's, Wood's, Palmer's, and Johnson's divisions still intact after terrible fighting. Granger is here, closed up with Thomas, and is fighting terribly on the right. Sheridan is in with the bulk of his division, but in ragged shape, though plucky and fighting...If we can hold out an hour more it will be all right. Granger thinks we can defeat them badly tomorrow if all our forces come in. I think you had better come to Rossville tonight and bring ammunition.

Cozzens writes ("This Terrible Sound", p. 469) that "where Garfield heard this is unclear". If you consider, however, that Garfield as Rosecrans's chief of staff had previously sent damaging (and false) reports about Rosecrans to his protector Chase back in Washington, then the possibility suggests itself that Garfield invented the bit about Sheridan remaining with Thomas in order to ingratiate his way into the "Ohio Gang". By noon or thereabouts, Thomas was alone with about 25,000 men on the field against the 60,000 or so Confederates. As his situation became clear to him, Thomas concentrated most of his troops around Snodgrass Hill and resolved to stay and fight until nightfall, which he did. He was helped by relative passivity of Polk, whose troops were apparently fought out. Polk disregarded repeated orders by Bragg to attack, but Polk was also plagued by insubordination from, for example, D.H. Hill who refused to attack until certain conditions had been met. The key, however, to Thomas's survival that afternoon were the uncoordinated frontal attacks which an overconfident Longstreet carried out from the southern end of the Confederate line (just the

sort of error which Thomas had speculated upon), and by the arrival of Granger in the afternoon with the reserve corps (2 divisions) and ammunition. As Thomas said, his opponents that day "fought without system". It helped also that Thomas's men were the best trained soldiers in either army or even in the entire country, and that Thomas had the knack of getting extraordinary performances from subordinate officers, many of whom on this day were from other commands and had found him by following the sound of battle. But then, Thomas always seemed to enjoy this sort of luck. The performance and personal heroism of the generals Brannan, Beatty, Johnson, Reynolds, Steedman, Palmer, Baird, Turchin, Willich, and Wood on this day deserve special mention. Other officers (including colonels and brigadier generals) separated from their commands fought on the line along with the privates. Thomas himself thanked mostly his ordinary soldiers. In fact, during the final withdrawal he got down from his horse to shake the hand of a nameless private. When the day ended, Thomas was able to withdraw through McFarland Gap to Rossville in stages in a fairly orderly manner, and he thus saved the Union army. For this exploit he became known as the Rock of Chickamauga. More than a year later his stand at Chickamauga was cited as the reason for his promotion to major general of the regular army, not for his intervening victory at Nashville, by the way. But that is another story... The casualty statistics are eloquent. Out of 58,000 Union effectives there were 16,000 casualties (28%), and out of 66,000 confederate effectives there were 18,000 casualties (also 28%). This battle has been called the bloodiest two days of the war. Bragg had won a victory of sorts, but his army was almost as bad off as Rosecrans's. Bragg was not willing, and his army was probably not able to pursue, so Rosecrans held onto Chattanooga. Bragg's victory was barren, while Rosecrans's loss was, in the long run, inconsequential. Rosecrans, perhaps undermined by frustration and driven by ambition, had been pressured into pursuing Bragg with more impetus than was prudent, and this was the cost. Was it worth it? Even today many commentators fault Bragg for not having vigorously pursued on the following day. They overlook the fact that no victorious Civil War army on either side, after having sustained such high losses, had undertaken decisive action immediately. This was not because the commanders had not recognized the advantages from a successful pursuit, but because their armies were not capable of it. Some commentators, even today, also leave out the Thomas factor from their calculations. On 21 Sept. 1863 Thomas was not defeated, and by then Bragg and other clear thinking Western theater commanders on both sides knew what that meant after having either faced Thomas or fought beside him at Murfreesboro and Hoover's Gap. Other astute observers also knew and drew their conclusions. At Chickamauga Thomas's contribution was unique and decisive. The reluctance of many to accord him his rightful place in history has various reasons. Some of his fellow Union officers could not advance their careers unless they checked his and tarnished his reputation. Southern commentators regarded him as a traitor to their cause, discounting the possibility that he acted also in the South's best long-term interests. Northern commentators perhaps would rather not admit that the Union victory was largely the work of a Virginian. So what's your excuse? Thomas van Horne in Major General George H. Thomas, 1882, p. 143: "Seldom in war has such a burden of responsibility fallen upon a subordinate, as upon General Thomas at Chickamauga. The battle was left to him before noon on the 20th. He received no instructions from the commanding general. He was ignorant of the disaster on the right until the on-coming left wing of Bragg's army revealed it. Uninformed as to the general situation, he could not anticipate emergencies, but he was strong and versatile to master them as they were developed. It was not a

light matter to command the Army of the Cumberland, as a whole, against a vast army that had been gathered from the East and West to crush it; an army superior in numbers, and inspired by the hope that in winning a decisive victory the general contest would be decided also. But, to take command of half of the Army of the Cumberland, with no supporting cavalry, with exposed flanks, and unconnected lines - to be supreme on the field by the demands of the situation rather than by the orders of a superior, and under such circumstances to contend successfully against Bragg's whole army, infantry and cavalry, was an achievement that transcends the higher successes of generals." Battle reports: Rosecrans US, Thomas US, Wood US, Parkhurst US provost marshal, Dana US dispatches, Bragg CS plus correspondence, Longstreet CS, Polk CS, Cleburne CS

Appendix D (Atlanta)
Source: Map:

The battles for Atlanta 20 July - 1 Sept. 64
(the siege of Atlanta)
Hood's 4 desperate attempts to defeat various portions of Sherman's army This is actually pretty dull stuff. Hood's army was much smaller than that of Sherman, and Hood was repulsed every time he attacked a portion of Sherman's army. The continuously lopsided casualty ratios reveal the futility of Hood's efforts; reveal as well the Götterdämmerung psychosis which grips the losing side in any war. The fact that Sherman scattered his forces when he knew that Hood was going to attack in any case (in order to offer Richmond his contrast to Johnston) makes it even duller. Foregone conclusions which the victorious commander can't mess up, no matter how unimaginative he is, are not my idea of fascinating history. Anyway, The 4 main phases were: 1) Peachtree Creek 20 July; 2) Battle of Atlanta 22 July; 3) Ezra Church 28 July; 4) Jonesboro 31 Aug -1 Sept. 1. After being flanked out of the positions behind the Chattahoochee, Johnston retired south of Peachtree Creek, an east to west flowing stream about three miles north of Atlanta. Sherman split his army into three columns for the assault on Atlanta with Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland moving from the north. Johnston had decided to attack Thomas, but on 17 July Davis replaced him with Hood whose direct correspondence with Davis may have had some influence on the decision. In these letters Hood represented the opinion of the major commanders of the Army of Tennessee as being unfavorable to Johnston. This was pretty much what Davis wanted to hear because Johnston and he had been feuding since the beginning of the war about a date on a piece of paper. On 20 July Hood's army (including boys and old men) attacked Thomas while his army was astride Peachtree Creek. Hooker's troops fought very well. The Federal artillery under Thomas's personal direction was particularly effective against the Confederates who outnumbered this portion of Sherman's army, but were nevertheless repulsed. If I had been the Confederate commander, I would have avoided Thomas like the plague, but Hood apparently thought he could gain more glory by defeating his former artillery instructor. The price for this hubris was high. Estimated casualties: 6,506 total (US 1,710; CS 4,796) 2. During what is called the battle of Atlanta on 22 July, Hood again attacked in detail one of the groups of Sherman's army, this time singling out McPherson. Hood sent Hardee with his corps (including Cleburne) on a fifteen-mile march to surprise and hit the unprotected Union left and rear, east of the city. Thirty-seven hundred casualties including McPherson, the only army commander in the Union armies to be killed in action, was the price of another juvenile decision of Sherman who wrote in his memoirs: "I purposely allowed the Army of the Tennessee to fight this battle almost unaided because I knew that...if any assistance were rendered by either of these two armies, the Army of the Tennessee would be jealous." The issue was finally decided by Sherman's artillery, which prevented a breakthrough on the part of Cheatham, whereupon Logan led a counterattack, which restored the Union line. Estimated casualties: 12,140 total (US 3,641; CS 8,499) 3. At the battle of Ezra Church on 28 July 64 the commander of the Army of the Tennesse was now Howard who had replaced McPherson. Hooker resigned when his former subordinate who, in his opinion, had helped cause the debacle at Chancellorsville, was chosen for this command

intead of him. Howard was now ordered to cut the railroad line on the western side of Atlanta. Hood moved out of Atlanta to attack and ran into Howard's fortifications. Again the Confederate losses were heavy, although Howard failed to cut the railroad line. Estimated casualties: 3,562 total (US 562; CS 3,000) 4. At the battle (or non-battle according to Sam Watkins) of Jonesboro south of Atlanta on 31 Aug. - 1 Sept. 64 it was Hardee who, with 2 corps, tried to attack 6 corps of Sherman who avoided battle. Thomas had proposed a plan for eliminating Hardee, but Sherman was more interested in cutting the last railroad link, which he did. Estimated casualties: 3,149 total (US 1,149; CS 2,000). Hood evacuated Atlanta on 1 Sept., and on 2 Sept. Sherman moved in and sent his telegram to Lincoln. Church bells rang all over the North and Lincoln's reelection was assured. Thomas summed up Jonesboro in his report: "Federal forces occupy Atlanta, Georgia. Sherman withdraws his forces from Lovejoy's Station rather than attacking and destroying or dispersing the Army of Tennessee. He leaves Hood to mend his Army." Battle reports: Thomas US, Grant US, Sherman US, Hood CS plus correspondence

The information regarding the 110th Ill Inf reg was obtained from:
2 1

I obtained the military service record information from, where I conducted a name search for John G. Munsell. Additional information and unit rosters located at , #1 above, also confirmed the information


William Rosecans was born in Kingston, Ohio, on 6th September, 1819. He studied at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and after graduating in 1842 joined the United States Army. He specialized in engineering and after a period based in New England he lectured on the subject at West Point. In 1854 he resigned from the army and became a civil engineer, architect and oil refiner in Ohio. He also joined the Democratic Party and was active in local politics.

On the outbreak of the American Civil War Rosecans joined the Union Army and was commissioned as a colonel in the Ohio Volunteers. He joined the staff of George McClellan in June, 1861, and successfully defeated Robert E. Lee at Rich Mountain. Rosecans took part in battles at Iuka and Corinth before being given the rank of major general and the command of the Army of the Cumberland. In December, 1862, Rosecrans moved his army towards Chattanooga. General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, who had just retreated from Perryville, was also in the area. When Bragg's scouts told him of the Army of the Cumberland movements, Bragg decided to confront them at Murfreesboro, on the Stones River. Braxton Bragg attacked Rosecrans on 31st December. Taken by surprise Rosecrans was in danger of being routed but he was eventually able to repulse the attack. Rosecrans was able to hold his position for the next two days and on the night of the 3rd January, 1863, Bragg and his Army of Tennessee retreated to Tullahoma. It is estimated that the Union Army lost 12,906 men in the battle. At Chickamuga (September, 1863) where he made a serious tactical blunder that opened up a gap in the Union Army lines. Rosecrans and his men fled to Chattanooga leaving General George Thomas on the battlefield. General Braxton Bragg followed and was attempting to starve Rosecrans out when union forces led by Ulysses S. Grant, Joseph Hooker and William Sherman arrived. As a result of the Chickamuga disaster Rosecans was transferred to the Department of Missouri. He went on sick leave in December, 1864, but did not officially resign until on 28th March, 1867. After the war Rosecrans returned to politics and represented California in the House of Representatives (1881-85) and served as register of the U.S. Treasury. William Rosecans died on 11th March, 1898. (1) In his autobiography, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Ulysses Grant looked at William Rosecrans record in the American Civil War (1885) After the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, with a large and wellequipped army from early in the year 1863, with General Braxton Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own. But after Vicksburg, Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen General Joseph Johnson, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order. Finally he did move, on the 24th June. Rosecrans very skillfully maneuvered Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he stopped and entrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chickamauga. Some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th

September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded or captured. (2) Henry Villard worked for the New York Tribune during the American Civil War. In his memoirs he wrote about the abilities of William Rosecrans. General Rosecrans was of middle stature, with a broad upper body and rather short, bow legs (owing to which peculiarities he presented a far better appearance when mounted than on foot); a head not large, with short, thin, light-brown hair; a narrow, long face with kindly blue eyes, strong nose and mouth, and scanty full greyish beard. His general expression was very genial. He was a great talker, voluble, earnest, and persuasive. He invited me to his camp so urgently that I grew suspicious, and thought that he cared more for my pen than my person. My subsequent experience proved that I had judged him correctly. Source:


Readyville, TN is located due east of Murfreesboro TN (central Tennessee)


I haven’t found anything to support this. I did find the Union Order of Battle for the Fourteenth Army Corps, or Army of the Cumberland, The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign (DECEMBER 26, 1862-JANUARY 5, 1863). This was of course before the reorganization in May: Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U.S. Army, commanding SECOND (LATE FOURTH) DIVISION. Brig. Gen. JOHN M. PALMER. First (late Twenty-second) Brigade. Brig. Gen. CHARLES CRUFT. Second (late Nineteenth ) Brigade. Col. WILLIAM B. HAZEN. 110th Illinois, Col. Thomas S. Casey. 9th Indiana, Col. William H. Blake. 6th Kentucky, Col. Walter C. Whitaker. 41st Ohio, Lieut Col. Aquila Wiley. Third (late Tenth) Brigade. Col. WILLIAM GROSE. Artillery. Capt. WILLIAM E. STANDART.

Tullahoma, TN is Northeast of Lynchburg TN (south-central Tennessee) Munsell’s description in not particularly clear but appears accurate, a clearer description of the advance: ….the plan was both audacious and complex involving 4 separate attack columns, and it went off like clockwork, in spite of incessant rain and bad roads, thanks to the months of preparation and, according to Bradley, just the right amount of improvisation. On the Federal right Stanley and Granger's cavalry demonstrated toward the fortified town of Shelbyville. In the middle McCook and Thomas threatened the passes, and on the left Crittenden gestured toward McMinnville before becoming literally stuck in the mud caused by the rain, the most which had fallen in that period since records had been kept. Stanley's movement on 23 June was a feint (rendered more convincing by the presence of most of Rosecrans' cavalry), because Rosecrans had no intention of directly attacking the fortifications. On the other side of his line on the left, Crittenden was feinting at a feint according to Woodworth, that is, it was supposed to be recognized as being not the main thrust, thus diverting attention back to Stanley on the


Federal right in front of Shelbyville. In the middle, McCook's movment toward Liberty Gap was also a demonstration, and a few days later his forces moved east to join those of Thomas. Source:

Duck River is west of Manchester, TN.

The historical account: …….Hardee, just to the west of Hoover's Gap, knew only that huge force had suddenly appeared on his right flank. For some reason for two days he sent no messages back to Bragg (whom he despised) about the fighting, and then he retreated without orders into Tullahoma. This isolated Polk's corps in Shelbyville which therefore also withdrew into Tullahoma, as ordered by Bragg. On 28 June Hardee and Bishop Lenoidas Polk (Davis's plant in the AoT who constantly fomented rebellion against Bragg) advised in guarded and less guarded terms to abandon Tullahoma because Rosecrans was now solidly placed in Manchester and poised to make another flanking maneuver to the east and cut Bragg off from Chattanooga. The next day Bragg's army began its withdrawal to Chattanooga. On 3 July the Federals effected the crossing of the Elk River to the south of Tullahoma, and on the next day the pursuit was called off, as Bragg was safely across the Cumberland plateau on his way to Chattanooga. By a strange coincidence, the Tullahoma campaign and the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg (which unjustly overshadow it), all ended on the same day. Source: Clement Larid Vallandigham (1820 - 1871). Vallandigham made a national reputation as a conservative and as a contentious states-rights advocate. He became brigadier general of Ohio militia in 1857, met with the captured abolitionist John Brown in 1859, subsequently spread rumors of a national abolitionist conspiracy, then supported a moderate course in the secession crisis, backing Democratic presidential candidate Stephen A. Douglas in 1860. Vallandigham opposed the Federal government's prosecution of the Civil War, publishing a letter in the 20 Apr. 1861 Cincinnati Daily Enquirer stating his belief that the South could not be coerced into reentering the Union. Supported by vocal immigrant and farm constituencies in Ohio, he blamed the war on Pres. Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party, voted against national Conscription, refused to cooperate with congressional war measures, and alienated the powers within his own political party. A Copperhead, falsely believed to belong to the Knights Of The Golden Circle, he was abandoned by the state's War Democrats in a fight to keep his original congressional district intact. It was gerrymandered to contain a minority of his supporters, and he was not reelected in 1 862. Determined to run for the governorship in 1863, he began an unofficial campaign in spring 1862, following Democratic victories in Dayton, and tried to rally support for his candidacy over that of Democratic elder-statesman Hugh J. Jewett. The preliminary Ohio Democratic convention met 28 Apr. and rejected Vallandigham's bid for the gubernatorial nomination. On 13 Apr. 1863, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, Commmander of the Department Of The Ohio, had issued General Order No. 38, forbidding expression of sympathy for the enemy. On 30 Apr. Vallandigham addressed a large audience in Columbus, made derogatory references to the president and the war effort, then hoped that he would be arrested under Burnside's order, thus gaining popular sympathy. Arrested at his home at 2 a.m., 5 May, by a company of troops, he was taken to Burnside's Cincinnati headquarters, tried by a military court 6-7 May, denied a writ of habeas corpus, and sentenced to 2 years' confinement in a military prison. Following a 19 May cabinet meeting, President Lincoln commuted Vallandigham's sentence to banishment to the Confederacy. On 26 May the Ohioan was taken


to Confederates south of Murfreesboro, Tenn., and there entered Southern lines. Outraged at his treatment, by a vote of 411 -11 state Democrats nominated Vallandigham for governor at their 11 June convention. Vallandigham was escorted to Wilmington, N.C., and shipped out to, Bermuda, arriving there 1 7 June. He traveled to Canada, arrived at Niagara Falls, Ontario, 5 July, and from there and Windsor, Ontario, conducted his campaign for the governorship. Candidate for lieutenant governor George Pugh represented Vallandigham's views at rallies and in the press. Lincoln interested himself in the election, endorsed Republican candidate John Brough, downplayed the illegalities of a civilian's arrest and trial by military authorities, and claimed that a vote for the Democratic contender was "a discredit to the country." In the election of 13 Oct. 1863, Brough defeated Vallandigham 288,000 - 187,000. With the election crisis passed, Lincoln and the military ignored Vallandigham's return to the U.S, in disguise 14 June 1864. Here established residence in 0hio, attended the August national Democratic convention in Chicago, and helped construct the disastrous "peace" plank in presidential candidate George B. McClellan's platform. In postwar years the Democratic party declared him persona non grata at its 1866 Philadelphia convention, a meeting of old Federals and recently reconstructed Southern Democrats, where it was felt his presence was disruptive. After he lost a bid in 1867 for election to the state senate, he resumed his law practice. In a Lebanon, Ohio, hotel, 16 June 1871, a gun went off while he was demonstrating to other attorneys how a defendant's supposed victim may have accidentally shot himself. He died there the following day. The Ohioan is best remembered for the Feb. 1864 Supreme Court decision, Ex Parte Vallandigham, which decreed that the Court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus in a military case, and for a Democratic campaign slogan he created May 1862: "The Constitution as it is, the Union as it was." Inspired by the story of Vallandigham's banishment and his remark at that time that he did not care to live in a country where Lincoln was president, Edward Everett Hale wrote "The Man Without a Country" (1863). Source: Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War
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Military records show that he was promoted to Hospital Steward Aug 14, 1862.

I’m not sure if this says “Logansport & so home to Chicago” or “Logansport & (another town name) to Chicago” The first letter after “&” looks like the old form for a script “S” but could also be an “H”. I couldn’t find a town located between Logansport and Chicago that seemed to match so I’ve left it as “so home” Source: Illinois Newspaper Project Database, Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, OCLC Number: 25625688 Title: Unconditional unionist Town of Publication: Mount Vernon Area of Coverage: Mount Vernon County: Jefferson State Or Non-US Country: Illinois Life Span: 1863-18uu Ethnic Group/Subject Access: Institutions listed below hold the reflected dates of this title: Illinois State Historical Library: Year(s) Held:1863 It appears that the Illinois State Historical Library may have copies. It would be interesting to see if the “honorable mention” can be found.
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The 1866 Licking County Atlas, Plan of Harrison Township, shows George Charles owned land NNW of Kirkersville. It appears the farm’s name is Pleasant View. In the bottom corner of the same plan is a map of Kirkersville. One of the businesses advertising (sponsoring) the map is a “J. Charles Stock Handler.”

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