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Modern & Contemporary France (1997), 5(3), 309-317

The police and the deportation of Jews from the Bouches-du .. Rhone in August and September 1942

SIMON KITSON Universite de Paris-Xll


In the last 20 years, a number of scholarly studies have convincingly shown the responsibility of Vichy in the deportation of Jews from France. This article sets out to explore how this policy was interpreted lower down the administrative ladder. Hierarchical pressure was one of the major limitations on police resistance to this measure, but despite this many police officers were shocked by the reality behind the measures they were being asked to impose and implement. Coming into personal contact with the victims of deportation was a significant factor in shaping their reaction.

The first person to raise the question of the transfer of Jews from the unoccupied zone in the Franco-German negotiations of 1942 was not a Nazi, but Rene Bousquet, the Vichy Police chief, who brought up the subject during Heydrichs visit to Paris between 5 and 12 May. In response to Heydrich's announcement that the deportation of stateless Jews from the occupied zone to eastern Europe was imminent, Bousquet inquired whether it would be possible at the same time to send off those Jews interned in the southern zone for the last 18 months. Bousquet's initiative was inspired by the desire to rid Vichy of a group of refugees it had been forced to accept in the summer of 1940 when the Nazis had expelled them from Baden-Palatinate. The May negotiations were inconclusive on this point because Heydrich was still waiting for the necessary rolling-stock for the transfer to the east. By July, when the question came up again, the tone of the negotiations had hardened. The Reich now made explicit its desire to see the progressive expulsion of Jews, implying that this measure would ultimately result in the wholesale deportation of all Jews including French ones. Believing that his Jewish compatriots faced what Bousquet termed 'une menace directe et grave', it was decided, first in negotiations between Bousquet and the SS chiefs on 2 July, then in talks between Laval and Knochen on 4 July, that the measures

0963-9489/97/030309-09 © 1997 Association for the Study of Modern & Contemporary France


concerning foreign Jews should be extended, in the hope that the sacrifice of immigrant Jews would spare their French counterparts. Such calculations may have satisfied Bousquet and Laval's political position but from any humanitarian perspective they were odious.'

To ensure that the agreed discrimination by nationality was put into effect, Bousquet insisted that the French Police had exclusive control over these operations, which would therefore become a test of obedience for his subordinates, and whose successful completion could restore much of the discredit lost during Resistance demonstrations of 14 July 1942, when the Police in Marseille and Aix-en-Provence had clearly sided with the demonstrators. The SS-Obersrurmfiihrer Dannecker, responsible for the Gestapo in France, raised the stakes by calling into question the capacity of the French Police to resolve this question in a way which he considered to be in keeping with the interests of Europe. He claimed that they were generally corrupt and understood nothing about 'the Jewish question'. In reality, however, the Germans had little choice but to rely on the support of French forces in these operations. In mid-1942, the German Police in France comprised somewhere between 2500 and 3000 officials. If the number was sufficient with the help of French auxiliaries to ensure informationgathering missions, it was clearly inadequate for round-ups on the scale now being proposed.'

There were three essential phases in these deportations. For the first phase, long-term internees were to be assembled in the 'camp des Milles', an ancient brickworks between Aix and Marseille, which since 1940 had provided a forced residence in dusty and primitive conditions to many seeking emigration. On 30 May 1942, it contained 1331 foreigners. By the beginning of August, the number of internees had increased to around 1500.3 On 3 August were added to this contingent 76 women previously interned in the 'Bompard' and 'Terminus des Ports' hotels in Marseille, and a further group of women and children transferred from the 'Hotel du Levant'. The chaplains of the camp and the charitable assistance organisations present persuaded parents to entrust their children to the Quakers and the YMCA on 8 August." Long-term internees account for most of the 260 persons transferred from the 'camp des Milles' to Draney by the convoy of 11 August, as well as a majority of the 538 individuals sent on the same journey on 13 August. The second stage began when 144 Jewish members of the Groupements de travailleurs etrangers (OlE) in Mandelieu, Vidauban, Aubagne, Salins-de-Giraud and Beaucaire were transferred to the camp for the convoy of 23 August' The involvement of Police officers in these two phases took various forms. The sealing-off and the guarding of the 'camp des Milks' between 2 and 12 August were carried out by 180 gardiens of the Groupe Mobile de Reserve (GMR) 'Provence'. The GMR and the gendarmerie thereafter shared this task. The drawing-up of the lists of those to depart using criteria of age, date of entry to France and French relations was undertaken by Police officers in conjunction with the staff of the camp." Searches of dormitories and the accompanying of trains from the camp to the northern zone also fell to the Police and the gendarmerie.


It was in the third stage, which began in earnest on 26 August, that the Police were asked to perform their most active role and this time the activity was generalised to other branches. This involved the arrest of foreign Jews living in French towns and cities,especially those of central or eastern European origin, as well as any from other categories whose situation was found to be irregular (lack of identity card, expired carte de sejour, etc.). Besides round-ups in the street, there were also controls of passengers arriving in or leaving from bus and train stations, checks of hotel registers and searches of convents and religious boarding schools with a view to uncovering concealed children." In addition, there were visits to the addresses of those known to the authorities, either through lists established by the 'Police aux questions juives', the Police or the Prefecture, or of those who had been assigned to residence in 1941. Police officers and gendarmes were to present themselves in pairs, often comprising officers from different services who did not know each other, at the homes of those indicated, to give them an hour to prepare their suitcases and then to bring those arrested into their Commissariats or gendarmeries from whence they were transferred to the 'camp des Milles'. Once again, the guarding of the internees fell to the GMR and gendarmerie, both - in the camp and on the trains subsequently transferring them to the northern zone. Those arrested by the Police in the last week of August and the first week of September account for the majority of the 574 Jews transferred from Aix to Draney on 2 September and of the 594 who were sent the same wayan 11 September by the last of the five convoys to leave the 'camp des MUles'.

It would be of little comfort to the victims of these measures, but figures of those arrested during these operations establish that they were a relative failure. For the Marseille region, the central services had forecast the arrest of 1170 of the 1700 Jews appearing in the August 1942 census; 706 had been caught in the round-ups.i Bousquet called the attention of his Prefects to the insufficiency of these results and instructed them to intensify the Police operations with all available personnel and reduced the number of categories of exemptions from 11 to six." Andre Kaspi has listed four possible reasons for this shortfall: the exaggerated statistics of the census of Jews; clandestine departures and changes of address; the warnings to Jews broadcast by British radio; acts of resistance by the Police and gendarmerie. to To this list should be added above all the severe practical difficulties posed by the enormity of this measure against the Jews, but also the resistance activities of the civilian population and charitable organisations, without whose cooperation and the shelter they could provide, any results achieved by other means of resistance would have been short lived. This is not the place to assess the exact weight of each of these factors, but it is worth noting before assessing its extent that any Police resistance was only one factor in this list.

'Through their institutional position in the forefront of anti-Semitic persecution, the Police had the possibility to spearhead resistance to these measures. Some Police officers seized these opportunities. Certain types of Police resistance on this issue had begun before the August operations. A number of officers



jn the second arrondissement of Marseille testified that their superior, the Commissaire Vincentelli, had passed down instructions not to bother the Jews and had personally undertaken the fabrication of false identity cards. Similar work was undertaken in the Service des Etrangers.'! Police resistance also existed at each stage of the operations themselves. The importance of discreet warnings of the imminence of round-ups or the non-arrest of 'deponables' needs no underlining.'? One internee at the 'camp des Milles', Hans Fraenkel, has indicated that although the Police guard around the camp was rigorous, their attempts to flush out Jews hidden in cellars in the camp were lethargic. Moreover, he described how another internee caught after having made his way through the perimeter fence was congratulated on his attempt by a Police officer who then personally escorted him back to the assembly point and made sure that he was placed amongst those who were not to be deported.l ' During the transit of one convoy which left the 'camp des Milles ', an internee escaped in circumstances suggesting the complicity of the gendarmerie accompanying the train: not only had a carriage been left open (despite strict instructions to the contrary) but the senior gendarme present did not report the escape to the GMR officer in charge of the convoy until any thought of recapture was problematic.

Despite the multiplicity of the forms of Police resistance on this question, such behaviour should not be exaggerated. If the round-ups in the southern zone fell short of their targets, Vichy still managed to transfer a large number of Jews into the hands of the Nazis. As Marrus and Paxton point out, 'disciplinary problems did not seriously hamper these operations. Not until August 1943 were German officials having to take account in their planning for a general unreliability of the French Police in serious cases' .14 Police resistance on this issue remained the activity of individuals and never assumed the proportions of rebellion.

Any attempt to understand the limits of this resistance would necessarily look to the attitude of the senior administration. There can be no doubting Vichy's desire to achieve the maximum number of arrests. The almost daily reduction in the range of exemptions that Donald Lowry noted was, as Manus and Paxton claim, an attempt to 'catch more Jews in the Police net'. Bousquet's instructions were to be as thorough as possible. He has been quoted as saying: 'it is preferable to arrest all the Jews in a single round-up rather than to go ahead with several isolated round-ups that will enable the Jews to hide or flee'. To Prefects he underlined his desire to liberate their regions totally of those foreign Jews whose internment was programmed.P He ordered the maximum mobilisation of personnel, an order which was not overlooked by local services. A Swiss witness, noting the massive mobilisation of the Police in Marseille, claimed that within two hours she was asked to prove her identity five times." To stimulate the zeal of local services, Bousquet sent out a circular on 20 August reminding Prefects of the illegal activities of Jews, who were said to engage in the black market and anti-governmental propaganda, and instructing a constant surveillance of Jews in their regions.'? In the Bouches-du-Rhone, the senior Police hierarchy needed no prompting. During an inspection of internment camps carried out in


July 1942, SS-Oberstunnfuhrer Dannecker had included de Rodellec du Porzic, the intendant de police for the region, in the category of the intermediary hierarchy of the French administration who were favourable to a rapid resolution of the Jewish question and were just waiting for instructions to this effect." Once these instructions were received, his cooperation knew no bounds. In a conversation with the Protestant pastor, Henri Manen, the intendant justified the Police measures claiming that although the measures taken against these Jews were harsh they· were nonetheless in French interests.'? A number of the categories of exemptions authorised were not respected: men aged over 60 were included in the departures.i" Most witnesses underline that the convoy of 2 September included carriages made up of the sick and untransportable. Although this is generally attributed to the intendant's personal initiative, the provision of these two carriages featured in a government instruction of 28 August. 21

To focus too exclusively on the attitude of the senior administration, however, would be to overlook the fact that it was not Bousquet who knocked on the doors of Jews to be arrested, it was not de Rodellec du Porzic who carried out the identity checks in the street. This does not mean that the pressure exerted on junior personnel had no importance in determining Police behaviour. Bousquet had asked the Prefects and their delegates, the intendants, to supervise personally anti-Semitic operations and had insisted that they should smash any resistance to these measures which they might observe in the civilian population, and report any indiscretion, passivity or disobedience among their civil servants. He ordered the internment of anyone caught hindering the execution of his instructions.22 Ordering Prefects to give strict instructions to Police services underlined the degree of hierarchical pressure exerted, but also implies a distinct lack of faith in Police personnel. In the event, even if there were examples of Police resistance, many officers attempted to pass the initiative of saving Jews on to others. Thus, the Protestant parson in Aix, Pasteur Manen, remembers the case of a Police officer who, overcome by emotion, had solicited the clergyman's help, announcing that he had had to arrest someone and asking Manen to intervene on their behalf.P Others made no attempt to recognise what made these round-ups different from those of the period 1939-41. One Inspecteur claimed that he was unable to say what had happened to the Jews he had arrested, because they were immediately passed to the GMR who escorted them to the 'camp des Milles'.24 Such ignorance was, of course, an inevitable consequence of the tradition where the involvement of Police officers in a case frequently stopped at the moment of the arrest, subsequent enquiries being carried out by specialist branches. The specific circumstances surrounding the arrests of Jews during the summer of 1942 should have alerted Police officers to the fact that these were no ordinary arrests. BBC warnings, widespread public knowledge of the handing over of Jews to the Germans, and the horror on the faces of those arrested, all ought to have helped Police awareness in this sense. The weight of hierarchical pressure, combined with the general sense of urgency in these operations, caused many to reject the most basic initiatives and at best to content themselves with expressions of sympathy.


These expressions of sympathy coexist with numerous accounts of maltreatment of Jews by the Police, of insults to internees or simply a lack of respect for their dignity, as in the case of policemen who made women to be arrested get dressed in front of them during the home visits.F' Both Henri Manen and the representative of the Union generale des Israelites de France (UGIF) , R.-R. Lambert, reported that Jews loaded onto the convoy of 12 August were subjected to brutalities." Moreover, during a roll-call of internees in the 'camp des Milles' on 10 August, the Police, together with staff of the camp, carried out a search of the dormitories after which 154 thefts of internees' possessions, ranging from gold watches to pairs of shoes, were reported." The brutalities committed might be attributed to the boredom of those guarding the camp, in much the same way that riot Police lash out at demonstrators after long hours of waiting for something to happen; the thefts might be explained by a Police desire to improve their own material conditions; but in both cases the specific circumstances of the summer of 1942 lead to the conclusion that such atrocities were underpinned by a certain degree of anti-Semitism. There were still signs of such a current amongst the rank and file. A gardien de la paix involved in the operations in the 'camp des Milles' took the initiative of denouncing to his superiors the activities at the 'Bar du nord' in proximity to the camp, claiming that the bar was a meeting place for Jews interned at the 'camp des Milles' who would spend their weekends there with their wives and mistresses, and underlining that the bar was a centre of prostitution and suspect goings-on.f

Despite the existence of this current of blatant anti-Semitism in the Police, it would be wrong to portray it as representative of the attitudes of the majority of officers that summer. The internee Hans Fraenkel, addressing the attitude of the Police in his account, claimed that hard-line anti-Semites were rare, although the intendant de police and his assistant, Robert Auzanneau, could be considered as such." The Rabbi Israel Salzer remembers that in the evening following the theft of internees' possessions, he overheard the conversation of a group of GMR who were saying that this theft was unacceptable and that they must find the culprits so that they would not all be accused of such a crime.f' The hierarchy's attempt to instill the lower ranks with their anti-Semitism were less likely to be greeted with success, as Police officers came increasingly into personal contact with the victims of anti-Semitic persecution. Giving evidence concerning the orders, which the GMR accompanying the convoys had received, a gardien of this unit claimed that an officier de paix had issued oral instructions portraying the 'Juifs allemands' that they were to transfer as extremely dangerous individuals who should be sent to their destination dead or alive. This representation was contradicted by what this gardien saw with his own eyes when he realised during the journey that there were only pitiful individuals in the wagon."

The effect of seeing these events at first hand cannot be over-stressed.

Lambert remembers that many Police officers made no attempt to hide their disgust at having to carry out such a mission.F The reports concerning Police attitudes to these measures feature a number of high points of emotion .

. Following the separation of adults and children in the camp on 8 August 1942,


Pasteur Manen noted that the officers around him were pale. The following day one of them approached him, saying that during his service in China and the colonies he had seen massacres, wars and famines, but nothing he had seen was as dreadful as what he was now witnessing. The events themselves caused a noticeable progression in Police attitudes. Commenting on the preparations for the departure of 2 September, Pasteur Manen could by then write of the admirable attitude of all the Police officers present, claiming that they were full of compassion, trying their best to help the internees and overtly happy when a Jew was released. From this Manen concluded that they had been touched by sentiments of humanity. Lambert remembers seeing Police officers cry while this departure was going on?3

Resistance sources talk of some officers resigning in protest over the inhumanity of these procedures." The directeur de La Police nationale, Henri Cado, did acknowledge in September that a large number of uniformed officers were resigning and taking up posts in other administrations, and indeed that this defection of personnel had reached such levels that he was imposing measures to limit it before it caused too much disruption of Police services. While it is likely that the anti-Semitic measures accounted for or encouraged some of these transfers out of the institution, Cado's letter makes plain that the main destination for those transferring was the Gendarmerie Nationale, whose involvement in the operations of summer 1942 was certainly no less important than that of the Police." Hence, the majority of these resignations were undoubtedly more the result of a desire to change status in order to improve working conditions than the sign of a protest. Such discontent was summed up by the Inspection generale des services administratifs in September who claimed that the demands

. of de Rodellec du Porzic, coupled with those of the central administration, were creating a weariness amongst the personnel:

il semble qu'a trop demander au personnel des services actifs, on pTOvoque une lassitude. Cette observation prend une importance particuliere par le fait que les exigences de M. de Rodellec aggravent le rnecontentement engendre par la multiplicite des taches demandees par l' administration centrale. Depuis quelques mois, les operations de Police qu'elle demande se sont succedees rapidernent. Le personnel est dans un etat de tension soutenue, 11 ne connait pas de detente.36

In any event, any resignations inspired by anti-Semitic persecutions took place after the operations and in no way represented an initiative to undermine the efficiency of these measures. The disgust felt within Police ranks did not stop them taking part in subsequent operations aimed at Jews, and in particular the round-ups which accompanied the destruction of the old district of Marseille at the beginning of 1943. But it is noticeable that during these later round-ups, the attitude of the Police was most polarised in the branches of the GMR and Gendarmerie, the very branches who had witnessed first-hand the distress of Jews during the 1942 deportations. This suggests that the 1942 operations had repercussions on the round-ups six months later, causing those officers who had


seen the horror more vividly than their colleagues from other branches to be much more definite in their reactions, either for or against the Jews.

Notes and references

L Archives Nationales [henceforth AN} 3W 9] [1008], Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres du Reich, Paris, telegr, no. 4004, 11/9/42; Centre de Documentation Juive et Contemporaine [henceforth CDJCJ CCCLXIV-9, Proces Knccnen-Oberg, deposition de Bousquet, 30/9/54; KLARSFELD, S., Vichy-Auschwitz (Fayard, 1983), vol, J, p.9.

2. AN 3W 91, proces-verbai de Helmut Knochen, 5J2I47; KITSON, S., The Marseille Police in their context, from Popular Front to Liberation, D. Phil thesis (Sussex University, 1995), pp. 103-8; GRANDJONC, J. and GRUNDTNER, T. (eds), Zone d'ombres, 1933-1944 (Alinea, 1990), p.330; MARRUS, M. and PAXTON, R.O., Vichy France and the Jews, (Basic Books, 1981), p.241,

3. KLARSFELD, S., Le Calendrier de la persecution des Iuifs en France. 1940-44 (Les Fils et Filles des deportes juifs de France, 1993), p. 234; RIBOT. 1., 'Les Juifs errangers a Marseille et dans la region: transit, intemcment, deportation', in C. OPPETIT (ed.), Marseille, Vichy et les Nazis (Amicale des Deportes d'Auschwitz et des Camps de Haute-Silesie, 1993), p, 102.

4. GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER op. cit. note 2, p. 338; RIBOT, op. cit., note 3, p. 102.

5. RIBOT, op. cii., note 3, p. 102; AN 3W 91, le Secretaire General a la Police it MM. Ies Prefers Regionanx, no. 2765, 5J8/42; AN 3W 9J, le Secretaire General a la Police a MM. Ies Prefets Regionaux, no. 12519, 18/8/42.

6. AN 3W 91, Police cabinet a Prefet, Marseille, relegr. no. 11485, 3017142; Archives Deprn:tenientales des Bouches-du-Rhcne [henceforth AD BDRJ 56W 101, proces-verbal d'Antoine Chiaverini, 4/4/45.

7. RIBOT, op. cit., note 3, p. 103-5; MARRUS and PAXTON. op. cit., note 2, p.258; AD BDR 5W 378, rapport quotidien du Commissariat Special, 6e section, Gare St Charles, 28/8/42.

8. These are the figures quoted by KASPI, A, Les Juifs pendant L'occupcuioti (Seuil, 1991). pp.240--1.

According to the intendant de police in Marseille, writing on the first and biggest day of round-Ups; in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhone (the most populous of the six departments of the region) the found-ups should have resulted in 1090 arrests instead of the 425 achieved; AN 3W 91, handwritten note of the intendant de police, 26/8/42. According to a note made by a member of Bousquet's cabinet, by 28 August the figure for the Bouches-du-Rhone had risen to 44() for the departement, 706 for the region; AN 3W 91, Police Cabinet, renseignements telephones, 28/8/42. In view of this relative failure, the central services ordered the continuation of the operations into September. On 1 September, the central services were claiming that 850 Jews had been arrested in the region on 26 August, but that 2300f these had been released after verification of identity. Another 100 were said to have been arrested in the region after 26 August; AN 3W si. Direction de la Police du Territoire et des Etrangers, note pour M. le Secretaire General it la Police, 1/9/42.

9. AN3W 91, Secretaire General a la Police aux Prefers Regionaux, 20/8/42; AN 3W 91. Note de la Direction de la Police, 3/914-2.

10. KASPI, op. cit., note 8, pp. 240-1. Asher Cohen lists the reasons as: the fact that the round-ups 'touchaienr une population composce en majorite de refugies peu stables'; 'l'aide de la population environnante'; 'l'approche des rafles fut connue': 'le manque d'Initiutive des policiers"; and COHEN, A., Persecutions et sauvetages (Cerf, 1993), p. 295.

11. AD BDR 55W 86; AD BDR 56W 87. See also LABERNEDE. K. 'Pilieres Juives it Marseille', in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 413.

12. Evidence from Pasteur Henri Manen in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER. op. cit., note 2, p.369;

COHEN. op. cit., note 10, p.295; POLIAKOV, L., L'Auberge des musici~ns (Mazarine, 1981), p.96.

13. Evidence from Hans Fraenkel in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER. op. cit., note 2, p. 388.

14. MARRUS and PAXTON, op. cit., note 2, p.260.

15. Ibid., pp. 258, 260; RlBOT. op. cit., note 3, p. 105; CDJC CCIX-69.

16. Evidence from a Swiss citizen, published in Berner Tagewacht quoted in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 342. Police records confirm the massive mobilisation of personnel: AD BDR 5W 378, Commissariat Special des Ports, La Grande Bigue,rapport quotidien, 27/8/42.

17. AN 3W 89, Je Conseiller d'Etat it MM. ies Prefers, no. 489. Pol. 4/ circ., 20/8/42. J 8. CDJC XXVb-87, Rapport de Dannecker, 2017142.

19. Pasteur Marien in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 358.

20. RIBOT, op. cit., note 3, p. 103.


21. KLARSFELD, S., Le Transfert de Juifs de la region de Marseille {les Fils et Filles des deportes juifs de France, 1992); GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, pp. 343,373.

22. AN 3W 91, Secretaire General a la Police aux Prefets Regionaux, telegr, no. 12776,22/8/42; AN 3W 91,

Secretaire General a La Police aux Prefers Regionaux, telegr. no. 12640, 20/8/42.

23. Pasteur Manen in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 368.

24. AD BDR 56W 47, deposition d'un Inspecteur de La Police Regionale d'Etat, 9/2146.

25. Pasteur Manen in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 367.

26. LAMBERT, R.R., Carnets d'un temoin, 1940-43 (Fayard, 1985), p. 185; Pasteur Manen in GRANDlONC and GRUNDTNER op. cit., note 2, pp.362, 367.

27. Pasteur Manen in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p.361; Israel Salzer in ibid.,


28. AD BDR 5W 368, proces-verbal no. 1141, 5/8/42.

29. Hans Fraenkel in GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 388.

30. Israel Salzer in ibid., p.395.

31. AD BDR 56W 101, proces-verbal de Joseph C; exGardien des GMR, 31/5/45.

32. LAMBERT, op. cit., note 26, p. 185. Cf. also Hans Fraenkel, who remembers that a number of Police officers commented on what a painful task they were fulfilling; GRANDJONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, p. 388.

33. Pasteur Manen in GRAND~ONC and GRUNDTNER, op. cit., note 2, pp. 359, 372.

34. The anonymous work La Liberation de fa pensee [rancaise, Alger-Paris 1943-44, published by the documentation centre of the French Press and Information service, New York, gives the example of a gendarme's resignation in the Auvergne in direct protest to these round-ups (lowe this reference to Karen Adler). C[ also AN Fla 3922, CN!, docnment no. 2263/RNA-Z, 1/9/42.

35. AN F7 14908 [752], Secretaire General 11 la Police it MM. les Prefets Regionaux, no. 99-Pol. 2, 10/3/43.

36. AN F1a 4525, IIGSA, Rapport no. Ill, 23/9/42; see also AD BDR M6 11052, Ie Secretaire General a [a Police it MM. les Prefers Regionaux, 11/9/42.