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GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through
her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she
again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty
pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and
last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of
the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

HELD:
No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth
determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was
aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could
be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received
because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are
limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However,
moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did
not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment.

G.R. No. 75357, November 27, 1987
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION vs. IAC
FACTS:
Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the RTC of Legaspi with homicide and damage to property through reckless
imprudence because he had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven the Izusu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio
Construction. The vehicle hit the Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum and directly caused his
untimely death.
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but his appeal did not pursue because he died. A notice of death was filed by his counsel
and on the same notice, Atty. Beltran manifested Rufo Mauricios intention to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant
to his right as employer who is subsidiarily liable.
The lower court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him as appeallant for the civil aspect of the
case. On motion of the heirs of the victim, the court ordered a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned
unsatisfied because Cabiliza was found insolvent as manifested by the Certificate of Insolvency issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan.
The victims widow filed a motion for the Issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced against the
employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co. This was granted by the lower court and
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, Rufo filed an appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
W/N, the dismissal of criminal case against the accused wipes out not only the employees primarily civil liability but
also the employers subsidiary liability;
W/N, the petitioner can be condemned to pay the damages without the opportunity to examine the
witness;
RULING:
No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction( which
became final and executory ) extinguished his criminal liability to serve the imprisonment imposed and his
pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for
here, no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as
innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case.
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer
can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his driver).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for
the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and
the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses
he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be
reopened precisely for the purpose adverted to hereinabove.
The decision of the appeallate court was however, SET aside and the case was remanded to the trial court for hearing


People vs. Bayotas
236 SCRA 239

Facts:
- Rogelio Bayotas was charged with raped and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991.
- Pending appeal, he died due to cardio respiratory disease
- SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but required the Sol Gen to comment with regard to
the civil liability arising from the commission of the offense charged.
- Sol Gen ruled that the death of the accused did not extinguish his civil liability, the appeal should be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
- Counsel for the accused opposed arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction
is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability
Ruling:
Yes.

The death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on the act complained
of, i.e rape.

"The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

The claim for civil liability survives nothwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligations other than delict. Art. 1157 of the CC enumerates these other
sources:
a. Law
b. Contracts
c. Quasi-Contractsa
d. .
e. Quasi-delicts
In this case, the civil action may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action against the estate of
the accused depending on the source.
#27 Mansion Biscuit Corporation v. CA
G. R. No. 94713, November 23, 1995|250 SCRA 195

FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as the president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation (the
Company), ordered numerous cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation.
As payment of the orders, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion, four (4)
postdated checks as payment for the nutri-wafer biscuits before its delivery.
There were other four (4) postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each, issued by Ty Teck
Suan with Siy Gui as co-signor.
Subsequently, Mansion Biscuit delivered the goods. However, the first four
checks were deposited, the same were dishonored for insufficient funds prompting Ang Cho to
inform Ty Teck of the dishonor and requested him for its replacement.
Ty Teck failed to replace the dishonored checks, instead delivered 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to
Mansion plus cash, which were applied to the amount of the first postdated check that bounced
Ang Cho then sent Ty Teck a formal demand letter requesting him to make good the dishonored
checks within 5 days.
Thereafter, the second batch of checks was issued by Ty Teck and Siy Gui, but
these were later on dishonored again.
This prompted Ang Cho to send a final demand letter and upon failure to comply with it, he will then
file an action against Ty Teck.
For failure of Ty Teck to comply, an Information was filed against him for violation of BP Blg. 22;
identical information was likewise filed against Siy Gui as treasurer of Edward Ty Brothers Corp.
Both of them pleaded not guilty to the charges and thereafter filed a bond.
Notwithstanding the bond filed, the RTC issued an order of attachment on some of Ty Tecks real
properties, upon Ang Chos motion.
After the prosecution rested its case, Ty Teck filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence, which later on Siy Gui adopted, on the ground that the checks were issued as a mere
guaranty for the payment of the goods delivered and as replacement for the first batch of checks. This
was opposed by the prosecution.
The RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss claiming that the stare decisis in the cases
already decided involving the same issue is where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to
guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not the drawer is not
criminally liable for either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22, and found that Siy Guis liability had not
been established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal transactions with Ang
Cho although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of four checks
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification withregard to their civil
liabilities, which the RTC denied and held that they did not incur any civil liability due to their
acquittal.
Initially, Ang Cho filed a special civil action of certiorari with the CA to question the order of the RTC
setting aside the order of attachment, which the CA annulled. But thereafter, he filed another appeal
with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC absolving Ty Teck and Siy Gui from civil liability in
criminal cases.
Pending appeal, Ty Teck died so his counsel filed a motion to dismiss but the CA denied and ordered
his substitution by his children.
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and held that the civil liability sought to be
enforced by Ang Cho was not the personal obligation of Ty Teck but a contractual obligation of the
Company, hence, Ang Cho should file a separate civil action against it.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
W/N civil liability can be enforced against Ty Teck for non-payment of the goods notwithstanding the fact
that the contract was between the Company, on behalf of Ty Teck, and Mansion.

Ang Chos Argument: When Ty Teck issued the worthless checks inducing Mansion to deliver the goods, 2 civil
liabilities arose, arising from crime (Art. 100, RPC)and from tort or quasi-delict.

Ty Tecks Argument: They cannot be held liable for the Companys contractual obligations and that Ang Cho
should file a separate case against it.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

TY TECK AND SIY GUI ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING FROM THE
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS IT IS NOT THEIR PERSONAL
LIABILITY.

The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by Mansion Biscuit to the
Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against Ty Teck because the said civil liability
was not his personal liability to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of
Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit
Corporation
As held by the Court of Appeals:
o Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same must be
addressed still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation for the established facts show that
the post-dated checks were issued by accused-appellee not in payment of his personal
obligations but of the corporation's. Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-
appellee was merely incidental to the contractual obligation, not an
independent act which could serve as a source of obligation. The cases cited by plaintiff-
appellant, to illustrate that the existence of a contract does not preclude an action on quasi-
delict where the act that breaks the contract constitutes a quasi-delict, have no application
because the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing contract,
whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the
contractual relationship and as an incident thereof.
o In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their
criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of
the checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.Consequently, no civil
liability arising from the alleged delict may be awarded

Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED in toto.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.

Fausto C. Cuizon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.



STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories
prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to recognize and maintain, at P15
per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to pay
the costs.

The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18, who was the injured girl in
this case. She is therefore appellant's niece by marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are residents of the
municipality of Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita,
who was them about 18 years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and
they went over the river together into the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the appellant
conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid
them public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but
she refused to give her consent, and he finally notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by
force and against her will.

After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago,
who lived not far away. They arrived here about 11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the
afternoon Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the ceremony of marrying the
couple. After this was over the appellant gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to
be away that night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened, a this prosecution for
rape was started.

The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above stated, and the marriage
ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act.
We concur in this view of the case. The manner in which the appellant death with the girl after the marriage,
as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot
be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential
consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

The Attorney-General suggest that, in fixing the penalty, it would be proper to take into account the
aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in an uninhabited place. But the evidence fails to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that crime was committed en despoblado. The incident occurred only a few
paces from the Manila North Road, and it appears that there was an unoccupied house nearby to which the
girl was taken and where food was procured from Florentina Cuizon who lived not far away. It is the constant
doctrine of the court that an aggravating circumstance must be as clearly proved as any other element of the
crime (U. S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil., 23, 31; Albert, Law on Crimes, pp. 88-89); and we cannot feel certain, upon
the proof before us, that the place of the commission of this offense was remote enough from habitation or
possible aid to make appropriate the estimation of the aggravating circumstance referred to. 1awph!l.net

The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. So ordered, with costs
against the appellant.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are
merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the
said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting
marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it
should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
Case: Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria and Felipe Apelan Felix
Nature: Review of a decision of CA involving the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo
mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
Facts:
Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as
wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the
early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra

visited and persuaded her to go to confession.
They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that
the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to
ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the
confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of
Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,

Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an
accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la
Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix
resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of
first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which they
amply discussed in their petition and printed brief whether the events which took place in January
1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis?
Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also
no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr.
Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make
the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage
license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license
is not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity
of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration
of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such
marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to
see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded
couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused
by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.