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The aim of this paper is to explore the unfolding of the climate change regime throughout
its passageway to energy security and its implications to international relations. The
objectives are to determine if the climate change regime is driving the energy policies,
and if the transformation of energy system affects EU-Russia relations. Implications
include an assessment of the scope of technological developments of non-fossil energy
sources and international cooperation towards climate security. This research highlights
why it is necessary for the advocates of the climate change regime to riposte to the
criticism on the validity and execution of the climate change regime.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents..................................................................................................................2
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................3
List of Figures.......................................................................................................................4
Table of Appendices..............................................................................................................4
2.1. IR theory....................................................................................................................8
2.2. The energy system.....................................................................................................9
2.3. The origins of climate change policy......................................................................10
2.4. Sustainable development.........................................................................................12
2.5. Russia.......................................................................................................................14
4.1. Solar energy: photovoltaic and thermal...................................................................19
4.3. Bio-energy...............................................................................................................22
4.4. Nuclear energy ........................................................................................................23
4.5. Carbon Capture Storage...........................................................................................26
6.1. Meeting ‘20-20 by 2020’ goal.................................................................................29
6.2. Implications for EU-Russia relations......................................................................32
6.3. Implications to IR....................................................................................................33

List of Abbreviations

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage

CDM Clean Development Mechanism - a credit based trading scheme that allows
trading of the credits gained from carbon reduction projects in developing

EAP Energy Action Plan

FEC Final Energy Consumption - energy consumed in all industries and
households, except for energy consumed by energy industry.

GHG Greenhouse gases

GWe Gigawatt energy

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IR International Relations

ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

JET Joint European Torus

JI Joint Implementation - a credit based trading scheme that allows trade of
credits gained from carbon reduction projects in developed countries.

MS Member State

Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent

MW Megawatts

NWS Nuclear Weapon State

NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State

PV Photovoltaic

RE Renewable energy

RES Renewable energy source

SD Sustainable development

TD Technological development

List of Figures

Figure 1 RES and Nuclear Energy Contribution to Final Energy Consumption in the EU in
2006 and 2020 (Mtoe)..............................................................................................................29
Figure 2 Projected EU Final Energy Consumption in 2020 (Mtoe)........................................29
Figure 3 EU’s Final Energy Consumption: Fossil Fuels in 2006 and 2020 (Mtoe).................30
Figure 4Scenarios of the Global Electricity Production in 2100 (%)......................................31
Figure 5 Oil and gas consumption in the EU by supplier in 2006...........................................31

Table of Appendices

Appendix A Comparing Energy Technology Investment Costs .............................................38
Appendix B Comparing EU’s Final Energy Consumption in 2006 with estimates from the
EU’s reports..............................................................................................................................39
Appendix C Scenarios of the global energy system in 2100 ...................................................40
Appendix D EU’s fossil fuel imports in 2006 .........................................................................41


The purpose of this research emerged from a realisation that climate change issues, or turning green,
is becoming highly politicised. Nevertheless, before assuming the role of advocating the climate
change regime, it is worth conducting a risk assessment on the transformation of the energy system.
This is done by reviewing technological developments of EU’s non-fossil energy sources, using
articles from renewable energy technology journals, climate journals and environmental policy
journals. Scenarios of complete transformation of the global energy system in the penetration of
groundbreaking nuclear technology are discussed. It appears that the energy system assumes the
provision of energy security and energy supply security. Dynamics of this provision are described
with an insight to the EU’s fossil fuel trade, which indicates an interdependent relationship with its
biggest supplier, Russia. Current policies and corporate developments in the energy industry indicate
distinctive acts of power bargaining which result in zero-sum outcome. The author converges
constructivist, post-structuralist and English school explanations on EU-Russia relationship in an
attempt to reveal why the dynamics for providing energy security and energy supply security, do not
function to generate positive non-zero-sum results. It is found that exacerbation of this relationship is
avoided because transformation of the EU’s energy system towards clean energy consumption is
protracted. Finally, certain controversies in implementation of the climate change regime are raised,
which debilitate the validity and aims of the climate change regime. The researcher is indebted to her
Supervisor Dr. Kevin Gray for his time in assisting with the research from the very beginning. The
researcher thanks all individuals for their suggestions for writing and their devotion to proofreading
the final paper.

1. Introduction

The climate change regime crescendos in the discourse of international affairs in conjunction with
security issues. Its appeal for portent in international relations is facilitated through the EU’s
aspirations to assume leadership as the navigator of the climate change regime. The
‘securitisation’ of environmental issues and its inclusion in energy security offers a contested
debate in academia (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001; Trombetta, 2008; Umbach, 2009). The aim of
this paper is to explore the unfolding of the climate change regime throughout its passageway to
energy security and its implications to international relations. The object of investigation is what
could be considered the fiercest advocate of the climate change regime; the EU. The objectives of
this research are (1) to determine if the climate change regime is driving the energy policies, and
(2) if the transformation of energy policies affect EU-Russia relations.

The current literature review confirms that concerns over the impacts of climate change have
encouraged states to rethink their energy strategy, switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy
sources (RES). This change, among other factors, has brought the focus closer on energy security
and energy supply security issues. Another issue, which crops up in conjunction with the climate
change regime, and which remains contested in academia and politics, is sustainable development
(SD). The disagreement between developed and developing1 countries on the implementation of
SD, which is in accordance with climate change regime objectives, namely to reduce carbon
emissions, is exacerbating the collective efforts to deal with the impacts of climate change.
Refraining from using the existing and accessible ‘dirty’ fuels and instead investing in the
expensive ‘clean’ technologies in developing countries, is seen as a detriment to national
economic growth and an extension of the West’s superiority. This sets limits on international
cooperation and limits critical status of the climate change regime.

International relations (IR) perspective of the climate change regime has been concerned with the
development of international cooperation throughout the Kyoto negotiations from 1992 up to its
cul de sac status met from US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (Andonova 2008;
Rowland, 2008). A gap in this discourse appears in the literature, which would enable researchers
to assess the integration of climate change policies with energy policies. This problem, however,
has been recognised in academia as a cognitive issue, which is intrinsic to explaining the issues of
climate change. This means that due to the uncertainties of explaining climate change and
exposure to a variety of scientific interpretations, the climate change regime suffers from a
credibility problem. So, in the need for a pragmatic way around the problems that occur in
explaining the depth of the climate change regime, the author analyses the transformation of the
energy system, to which the climate change regime is claimed to have contributed (Umbach,

1 This includes the BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China, even though their economies were growing at an
expansional rate.

2009). A conjoining point is the EU’s aspiration to become green by implementing its ’20-20 by
2020’ policies, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing RES
contributions by Member States (MS) by 2020 (EC, 2009a).

Academic discourses could suffer from limiting access to other disciplines. It is beyond doubt that
transforming the energy system could not be performed merely by efforts of policy-makers but
needs flocking support from technology, traders and the public. This paper is an attempt to cross
the theoretical discourse with technology research. The researcher set out to analyse the state-of-
the-art alternative non-fossil energy production technologies in the EU, to assess their feasibility
to achieve the ‘20-20 by 2020’ goal. The author discusses feasibility of solar energy, wind energy
and bio-energy production to provide energy security, energy supply security and climate security
in the energy system. In doing this, the risks of turning green, and the implications to IR, are
detected. Nuclear energy is anticipated in the global energy system to continue to provide energy.
Thus, its development under the climate change regime is discussed. It appears that the climate
change regime anticipates R&D for groundbreaking technologies such as fusion nuclear energy
production and also Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) systems, which might have irreversible
effects to the global energy system.

It is proposed here that the energy system functions to maintain energy security and energy
security supply. Dynamics of the provision of the securities are described with an insight to the
EU’s fossil fuel trade, which indicates an interdependent relationship with its biggest supplier,
Russia. Current policies and corporate developments in the energy trade indicate distinctive acts
of power bargaining which result in zero-sum outcome. The author converges constructivist, post-
structuralist and English school explanations on EU-Russia relationship in an attempt to reveal
why dynamics for providing energy security and energy supply security, do not function to
generate positive non-zero-sum results. It is found that exacerbation of EU-Russia relationship is
avoided because transformation of the EU’s energy system towards clean energy consumption is
protracted. Finally, certain controversies in implementation of the climate change regime are
raised, which debilitate the validity and aims of the climate change regime.

2. Literature Review

2.1. IR theory

Understanding the relationship between global political forces and climate change is gathering
momentum in the discourse of IR. In an effort to bring the IR focus on issues of climate change,
Graham identified the gap in the research that would enable us to identify ‘the realistic extent of
R&D into RE resources to replace finite sources within the next 10 years’ (2008: 470). His
observations concentrate on methodologies for the UN to identify and solve the problems of
security threats, environmental threats and sustainability threats (2008: 462). A counteractive
discussion is offered by Watson and Scott (2009). They analyse and reject claims that fossil fuel
sources are depleting and that there is a need for resource diversity. They identify a number of
additional insecurities that would occur with increasing the proportion of nuclear energy and, to a
lesser extent, RES-s.

IR perspective on climate change could be understood when investigating if and how international
cooperation has been successful in addressing the threats of climate change. Rowland analysed
international cooperation on climate change and found that realist and neorealist; historical
materialist; and neoliberal institutionalist approaches do not fully explain the outcomes for
international negotiations (2008: 60). He analysed the negotiation processes for the Kyoto
Protocol. It appears that the neorealist interpretation, whereby cooperation is possible because of
the presence of a hegemonic power, in this case is defunct (2008: 41-46). In neorealist terms, the
superior powers would gain a favorable outcome in negotiations. For example, in the case of
Kyoto negotiations at the 1992 Climate Change Convention, neither the US, or the EU, achieved
what they expected. Moreover, it was the Russian Federation, with low levels of hegemonic
influence at the time, which gained considerable bargaining power and was allowed to increase its
carbon emission allowance by 34% and expect investments through Kyoto mechanisms
(Andonova, 2008: 489).

Rowland discusses the ‘dependency theory’ in the context of the discourse of the climate change
regime. This is drawn from the historical materialist analysis, where Northern domination and
exploitation of the South, in the form of economic influence, has continued during the post-
colonial period (2008: 51; also Parks & Roberts, 2008). This, he argues, cannot be applied any
further because the interests of the elitist ‘capital’, that determine climate change policy, is absent
(2008: 52-54). There are alliances and disagreements between the major interest parties of the
supposed ‘capital’. For instance., there have been fundamental dissensions between the EU and
the US with regard to the implementation of carbon tax. Another point of disagreement is the US
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Costa argues that this refusal has in return facilitated the unity
among EU MS-s and contributed to the establishment of its climate policies (2008: 538).

Strengthening the climate change regime, he argues, is in the interests of the EU, which has an
aspiration to play a leadership role in an area that has not found its dominator yet, but has become
a point of international concern (2008: 534).

Rowland’s application of the neoliberal institutionalist view is limited to the organisational
cooperation under anarchy and ignores the influence of non-state actors (2008: 60; see also
Underal & Young, 2004). Rowland sees the most valuable approach in explaining international
negotiations on climate change in the cognitive approach, first proposed by Peter Haas (1992, in
Steinberg, 2003). They acknowledge that the climate change issue is exposed to uncertainty, is
dependent on scientific evidence and is consequently losing its ability to deliver ‘political
empowereness’ (2008: 61). Therefore, it is important to incorporate scientific debate (see also:
Newell, 2000) in the IR discourse on climate change.

2.2. The energy system

This paper has been designed with the assumption that the climate change regime ordains state
energy policies, with the purpose of maintaining energy supply security, which has caused states
to restructure their energy strategies. This also affects their external policies as energy trade takes
place internationally. Consequently, it is argued here, that a transformation of the energy system is
taking place. The energy system includes actors which produce, trade, govern or consume energy;
and factors which influence demand and supply of energy. For example, a household, as well as a
corporation, as actors are both forced to consume the energy that is either provided by the
country’s natural resources or that is being delivered by energy companies. Environmentally
motivated international agreements, the creation of the carbon trade market, economic growth and
technological development are all factors which seek to influence energy demand and determine
the available supply. These actors and factors are interlinked and are closely studied by various
researchers (Balocco & Grazzini, 2000; Dincer and Rosen, 2005; Midililli et al, 2006).

It is proposed here that the energy system functions to maintain energy security and energy
security supply. Removing realism from this argument, it could be restated that: the energy system
functions to maintain access to energy supplies and maintain the sustainability of energy supplies.
Umbach argues the disappearance of the traditional view of energy policy, which used to focus
purely on economic factors and ‘market strategies’ (2009: 1), has been replaced with an energy
policy which is reviewed in conjunction with energy supply security, foreign policy and security
policy. He explains this with the emergence of ‘resource nationalism’ that has enabled some
resourceful governments to use their resources as a tool to apply political pressure (2009: 4-5).
The government can command the change in energy delivery to foreign customers if it feels the
need to do so. As this contributes to political instability, it has magnified the energy consuming
states’ security concerns. On the other hand, Umbach argues, the EU’s efforts to diversify its

energy mix and reduce its oil and gas demand, are a direct function of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy. This blocks the ability of the EU to use the resources as a tool for applying
political pressure on countries who have done so in the past (2009: 10). At first, this seems to
nullify the original argument. Yet, with further investigation, it becomes evident that there are
other artifacts that Umbach’s realist interpretation could not defeat so easily. There are other
factors interrelated to the energy system, such as SD. For example, if one state possessed infinite
resources of energy, but all others were suffering from energy deficit, and were threatened by
rising sea-levels and a lack of food, these states would eventually be forced to change the status
quo by, perhaps, forceful migration. Eventually, the state that had the highest level of energy
security is most exposed to attacks. Scrase et al suggest that the focus of energy policy-making
should not only be on aspects of security and access to energy, but also on aspects of efficiency
and environment (2009, pp. 44-51). A study in green energy strategies by Midilli et al view the
energy system as a component for a SD strategy. They proposed that adopting green energy
strategies will contribute to national economies (2005: 3623). The authors draw out the factors
enabling implementation of green technologies. These are, for example, public and media
support; education and training; public relations and counseling; financing of innovative
technologies; and the evaluation of the process (2005: 3626). The transformation of the energy
system, the authors predict, is now advanced to the point where a ‘fossil and partially green
energy-based life’ is changing to a ‘green energy based life’ (2005: 3631).

2.3. The origins of climate change policy

Although the climate change problem has been recognised in the international community, there
are a number of fundamental issues upon which are not yet agreed. Luterbacher and Sprinz (2001:
306) recognised that climate change debate fills the implementation of the climate change regime
with obstacles which are not present in other international regimes. In other words, there is no
precedent that would motivate states to cooperate for a mutual goal, unlike in the case of state
security where wars provide an example of experience. There are a number of disagreements. The
first is over whether the occurring climate changes are anthropogenic - that is, originating from
human activities. Hager puts forth that global warming is a part of a natural cycle and cannot be
fully attributed to human activity (1993: 16). There is also a disagreement over whether the
climate is warming up or cooling down. The most prominent is the dispute on what to do to
prevent climate change. If it is accepted that climate change, whether cooling or warming, is of
natural origin, then people could do nothing but adapt to it. On the other hand, if it is accepted
that the intensity of carbon release in the atmosphere and the production of environmentally
hazardous substances in the past century has had a role in the recent rise of the global
temperature, then those responsible should deal with the consequences. At the same time, the old

‘dirty’ ways of production should be substituted by all countries with the new ‘clean’, yet
uncertain and expensive ones.

One of the sceptics of climate change is Bjorn Lomborg. He demonstrates that what people fear
about the impact of climate change is an outcome of a manipulated presentation of scientific data
and rhetoric in politics (2007). This rhetoric would be of little importance if as a result the
economy did not suffer from costly decisions that are implemented within the Kyoto negotiations.
For example, setting targets and timeframes for developed countries to curb their carbon
emissions and organising an additional fund to the Global Environment Facility, that would aid
developing countries (Bodinsky, 2001: 33). With the establishment of Kyoto mechanisms,
developed economies suffer from unnecessary spending at the expense of funds that could be
directed towards health, education and employment in developed countries. The environmental
policies of Kyoto are seen as a threat (Trombetta, 2008: 596). Such views still hold amongst
some. US Alaska governor, Sarah Palin suspects that the cap-and-trade energy plan ‘is an
enormous threat to our [US] economy’ (quoted in Zabarenko, 2009). However, as the historical
materialist approach analysis done by Rowlands suggests, these claims are mostly advocated by
the likes of the Global Climate Coalition and the energy companies. As the obligation to reduce
carbon emissions affects the enjoyed way of life and interests of energy companies, they simply
discredit climate change claims as subject to a lack of scientific proof (2001: 51-52).

Lomborg also falsifies the evidence provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (2001, p. 168-170). This evidence, he says, is provided with the intention of legitimising
the claims for public funds and maintaining the supervisory position in developing countries.
Concerns over problems with data collection and modeling of IPCC working groups have also
been addressed by Swart et al (2007). They conclude that IPCC fails to highlight the degree of
uncertainties in the working groups’ assessments (2009: 17-18). Furthermore, the statements
about the ‘attribution of temperature change to anthropogenic causes, attribution to ecosystem and
other changes to climate change’ are of subjective rather than objective perspective and lead to
imprecise information (2009: 22-23). Lomborg’s findings have been explicitly criticised.
Ackerman points out a number of cases where Lomborg’s calculations and conclusions are of
error (2008: 440), and where his selection of citations by climate sceptics and scientists favours
those that support his arguments (2008: 437-438). However, the climate change regime is
materialising regardless of such claims. Benwell argues that carbon emissions trading is a
‘functioning reality’ and ‘may prove to be one of the most important markets in the world’ (2008:

Lastly, in what is possibly the most undermining evidence of Lomborg’s accusations, is the
knowledge that an explicit attention to the impacts of climate change was not initiated by IPCC or
any other organisation trying to curb the development of other countries, but came from the fields

of IR. Concerns over tensions between the accelerated growth of both population and the
environment were addressed by John Herz in the late 1940s (Graham, 2008: 458). Of his and the
Parliamentarians for Global Action’s research grew the ‘planetary interest’ concept, which in 1989
already considered climate change as one of the issues of concern threatening global interests
(2008: 459). These interests were especially concerned with ‘the protection of [the Earth’s]
ecological systems and biosphere from major anthropogenic change’ (2008: 460). This concept,
along with Herz’s ‘survival research’ however, have remained of insignificant attention in
mainstream IR theory (2008: 469). More recently, Trombetta’s analysis on the discourse of
environmental security and climate change in IR reassures the cause for interventional and
preventive measures to eliminate international conflicts (2008: 593). So, the climate change
regime generates actions that provide, using her words, ‘climate security’ It is the absence of
climate security that presents a threat to the people and societies who are affected by abrupt
changes in the climate (2008: 595).

2.4. Sustainable development

The implications of the climate change debates mirror debates in national and international
politics. As mentioned, the scepticism that persists in climate change debates rests on the
argument that the expenditure allocated for climate change prevention is detrimental to national
economies (Lomborg, 2007). Even more heated is the debate in international politics of who
should take responsibility for causing accelerated global warming, and thus carry the costs of
containing the impacts. The claim is that Western countries have established their wealth while
exploiting the resources of others without sparing nature from GHG emissions (Giddens, 2009:
67-68). Shyam Saran, India’s international negotiating team on climate change, defends ‘India’s
right to industrialise’ and points out that the GHG-s produced by rich countries in the past have
occupied most of the space in the atmosphere, and that now the poor countries have the right to do
that too (“Wanted: fresh air”, 2009, p. 59). Now, to catch up, developing countries, whose
resources were once depleted by the West, should be less concerned about subsequent carbon
emissions (Bodansky, 2001: 31).

Moreover, developed countries still produce a significant proportion of the world’s carbon
emissions. The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre estimates that in 2006, the US was
the world’s second largest national source of fossil fuel-related carbon emissions behind China
(Boden et al, 2009). The top ten carbon emitters in 2006 were: China, the US, Russia, India,
Japan, Germany, Canada, the UK, South Korea and Iran. Together they emitted 69% of all the
world’s carbon emissions (EIA, 2006). In addition, the biggest carbon emissions released per
capita remains notably higher in developed countries. In 2006 carbon emissions per person were
19.78 metric tons of CO2 in the US, 4.58 in China and 0.07 in Ethiopia (EIA, 2006a). These
numbers do not reflect the amount of carbon emissions that are released in the manufacturing of

products in the developing world for developed markets, or as Giddens refers to it - this does not
account for ‘extended polluter responsibility’ (2009: 67).

This paradox is also part of a historical materialist critique of the ‘North-South divide’ that
enables the elite to perpetuate their interests at the expense of the resources of developing
countries (Rowlands, 2001: 52). Developed countries argue that developing countries should
adopt an SD strategy - maximising the modernisation with minimal costs to the environment. In
1987 the UN released a report which acknowledges the need of the developing world to prosper
but concludes that it should do so ‘without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs’ (WCED, 1987: IV, 1). Reddy and Assenza have revisited the climate change
debate in order to bring about developing countries’ positions on the climate change regime. They
argue that SD and climate policies should be integrated, particularly that ‘(i)nstead of focusing
attention on policies to reduce climate change risks, the starting point should be the development
issues that are vital to economic development and how this can be achieved in an environment-
friendly manner’ (2009: 3005). The focus should be on food security, employment opportunities,
energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, which in turn translate to monetary, health and
environmental benefits (2009: 3003). This, they argue, mildly satisfies the claims of climate
change sceptics and supporters - enhancing the benefits for national economies through
investments, and for the environment through increased efficiency (2009: 3004). This is enhanced
by the opportunity of ‘leapfrogging over old technologies,’ so that developing countries can save
on R&D costs (2009: 3003). This, they add, is conditional on removing the technological,
financial and capacity barriers (2009: 3006). A particular point of concern are the obstacles in the
transfer of technology. These occur where the access to and operation of technology in the
developing country is still maintained by the donor country. In the worst case, the implementation
process ignores local needs and brings little benefits to the community. Giddens suggests that
patent protections set up by developed countries should be relaxed; imported high-tech
technology should be synchronised with local knowledge; and technological implementation
should take place through the extension of education and funding of R&D within the developing
country (2009: 220).

A study investigating the outcome of integration of the SD and climate change regime indicates a
controversy. International climate change regime was institutionalised with the Kyoto protocol in
1997. Initially, developing countries resisted allowing developed countries to meet their emission
targets in a flexible manner. The EU too considered that the main means of setting and assessing
targets should be domestic. However, the US argued for receiving credits when it contributed to
projects decreasing emissions in developing countries (Bodansky, 2001: 36-37; Rowlands, 2001:

46-47). Three mechanisms were introduced2. The objectives of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) projects set out in the Protocol are two-fold, with the achievement of SD in
developing countries, and the achievement of a reduction in GHGs from developed countries. In a
study assessing these objectives by Holm Olsen and Fennham, it was discovered that while the
CDM projects succeeded in delivering environmental benefits, in most cases, these did not
generate the realisation of SD potentials (2008: 2830). The problem, they observed, is that
selection of projects which are supposed to achieve both objectives, are left to market forces.
Since additional benefits of SD, other than environmental benefits, such as social and economic
benefits, are not monetised in the carbon trade market, developed countries have little incentive to
propose projects that most of all enhance SD (2008: 2820).

2.5. Russia

The discourse on climate change in the Russian Federation has proceeded from a perception of
the Kyoto Protocol as an ‘undeclared war against Russia, against the entire country, against the
left and the right, against the liberals and conservatives, against business and the Federal Security
Service, against the young and the old who live in Moscow or in the provinces’ (quote by Andrei
Illarionov, Putin’s chief economic advisor 2000-2005 in Andonova, 2008: 493) to an appreciation
and support by the country’s major gas and electricity producers (Andonova, 2008). However,
judging by the communications of the authorities and reports by scientists in Russia, it appears
that the climate change issue is being approached in a wholly different manner. Whereas in other
countries which ratified the Kyoto Protocol, climate change is seen as a problematic issue with
possible catastrophic consequences, in Russia, climate change is at times anticipated for its
benefits. The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring reports that
by 2015 heating consumption will decrease by 3-4 days a year (Roshydromet, 2005). Also, the
decrease in wind loads will similarly reduce electricity consumption and minimise the number of
building-related accidents. Consequently, companies can cut costs on extra payments that occur in
instances where work is suspended (2005:12-13). In agriculture the frequency of crop freezing is
expected to drop. There is already a recorded improvement in corn yielding as a result of
temperature increase (2005: 16). The shortened freeze-up periods of rivers is expected to
stimulate cargo traffic (2005: 20). The release of icebergs will increase the market for producing
systems for protection and monitoring of subsurface icebergs (2005: 21). What encouraged Russia
to ratify the Protocol, Wilson Rowe argues, are potential investments that are facilitated through
Joint Implementation (JI) projects and revenue from the sale of emission credit surpluses (2009:
595). Since the EU is to facilitate the investments in question, it will bare the net costs from

2 Three mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are: (1) an international cap and trade scheme for developed countries that
allows trade with each other under the system of International Emissions Trading; (2) Joint Implementation (JI), a credit
based trading scheme that allows trade of credits gained from carbon reduction projects in developed countries; and (3) the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a credit based trading scheme that allows trading of the credits gained from carbon
reduction projects in developing countries (Sorrell, 2009: 185).

ratification. In which case, this suggests that the ratification by the EU is not motivated by
monetary incentives. On the other hand, this validates the suggestion made by Costa that the EU’s
aspiration is to assume leadership as the navigator of the climate change regime (2008).

In this section, the author explores constructivist perceptions of EU-Russia relations.
Constructivism in IR theory focuses on inter-state relations, and proposes that relations between
states are constructed by state-specific interests and identity, and is consistent with past
experiences (Wendt, 1992). The perception states have of other states often defines the outcome
of the relationship. The constructed relationships, constructivism maintains, can be used in IR
theory to explain cooperation and conflict between states. A study examining the interaction
between scientific debates and policy-making on the issue of climate change in Russia, perhaps
elucidates what makes up its identity (Wilson Rowe, 2009). The climate change regime, it is said,
is becoming politicised and bundled with energy security (2009: 606). However, the focus on
environmental issues in Russia has traditionally been minimal as it does not concern high politics,
that is long-established as strategic in nature. As the climate change regime is merging with
international agenda, and becoming intertwined with international energy security as well as
Russia’s political and economic interests, it is now integrating with high politics. The decision to
ratify the Protocol after initial resistance, the author claims, was purely made by president Putin
(2009: 607). The discourse on causes and responsibility for climate change in Russian academia
rather followed than led policy-making. Given that it is political and economic interests that
influence Russia’s attitude towards climate regime, it could be assumed that major changes in
energy trade relations may become threatening to these interests. However, the EU is seemingly
preparing to do just that. Its decision, it has been argued in the discourse, has also been influenced
by the loss of confidence in Russia as an energy supplier after the Russo-Ukrainian gas disputes
(Trombetta, 2008; Umbach 2008).

The dynamics of energy strategies between Russia and the EU are thoroughly researched by
Godzimirski (2008). His methodology looks at the evolution of state interests based on historic
experience and the creation of perceptions of each other’s intentions. He shows how the
cooperation between some of the ex-Soviet states and Russia has halted because of perceptions
which have been created through the experiences from Soviet rule. Other states which lack such
experience are more likely to be cooperative with Russia. However, these perceptions are subject
to change with new experiences, such as international disputes. This is why, it could be explained,
the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 has been considered by some as a reason to decrease the
EU’s energy from Russia (Lucas, 2008).

Prozorov rejects the constructivist methodology and questions in a post-structuralist manner the
substance of the European identity, which is a prevalent topic in the identity conflict discourse.
Post-structuralism is understood as an approach which analyses the meanings that are believed to

be ‘facts’. These are the meanings of the object and the meanings of the systems to which the
object is related. The ‘facts’ are held as truth by these who assert them. Different objects believe
in different ‘facts’. This dynamic creates the concept of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’. Inconsistencies
between ‘facts’ of ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’ are what offer the problematique in IR. Prozorov
argues that the lack of cooperation between the EU and Russia persists because of ‘self-exclusion’
and identity politics. The EU has become ‘a normative hegemon’ defining common values and
goals, expecting others to accept these without scrutiny (2007: 316). It follows that the ‘facts’
about climate change are unquestionable and the climate change regime should thus be allowed to
run congruent to other policy areas. The problem for Prozorov lays in the hierarchical inclusion
whereby the EU treats Russia as its subject rather than an equal. The EU’s restrictive policies act
as a tool in ‘othering Russia’ (2007: 314) despite the fact that the latter insists on belonging to the
European Christian Civilisation. This leads Russia to reinforce cultural differences rather than
commonalities between itself and the EU. It is clear that the dynamics between the EU-Russian
identities have inconsistencies, and the practice of the climate change regime will set these
identities against each other even further.

This turns the author to find out whether there are any other ‘players’ which Russia could get
along with any better. In an English school study on Russia, Aalto articulates Russia’s position in
international society by comparing its relations and identities to other great powers, China, the
EU, Japan and the US. He suggests ‘the EU is a sole candidate for Russian foreign policy makers
for developing a thicker and strongly identity-based international society among the great powers’
(2007: 466). However, different attitudes remain towards the climate change regime; in particular,
towards the institutions of equality of people; human rights and humanitarian intervention when
comparing the EU and Russian attitudes (2007: 466). The Four Common Spaces 3, an agreement
of cooperation between the EU and Russia, Aalto finds, creates interdependent economic ties
between the two. This is where an instance of mutual interest occurs, and where appreciation of
the institution, in this case the market, is shared by both (2007: 469).

In 2006, 33.5% of oil and 42% of gas to the EU came from Russia (EC, 2009b: 31). According to
the scenario drawn out by the EU, in 2020 its total consumption of energy from oil will have
decreased by 49%, from gas increased by 26% (gas consumption increases as it emits less CO 2)
and from RES increased by 118% (EC, 2008a: 39). These anticipated changes in EU energy
policy will be outlined later on. Although it is expected that the EU remains a net importer of
energy, the changes in trade volume are expected to make Russia more assertive to maintain its
political and economic interests in energy trade. It is this aspect that the author wants to
understand. It is evident that there are dynamics in EU-Russia relations that, on one hand, force

3 This is a road map agreed between the EU and Russia in May 2003 to cooperate in: the Common Economic Space,
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, Common Space of External Security; and Common Space of Research
and Education (EC, 2005).

the two apart from one other, and on the other hand, prevent distancing from each other. Given
that the constructivist analysis expects inconsistencies in EU-Russia relations due to the
fundamental differences in their identities, and Russia’s denouncement of a common European
identity; what are the risks of the EU’s aspiration to take the leadership of and navigate the
climate change regime, to its relations with Russia?

3. Methodology

Assessing the integration of climate change policies with energy policies enables us to determine
the political strength of the climate change regime. In order to understand the extent to which
climate change policies influence energy security and energy policies, it was relevant to analyse
the academic discourses on climate change and energy security debates; and make assumptions
from the reflections in the policy-making. This is first determined by looking at data retrieved
from the Oil & Gas Journal, which publishes global corporate and political developments in the
energy industry. This data confirms EU-Russian energy trade relations and interdependence in
trade. However, opportunities to gain bargaining power exist for both the EU and Russia. In
particular, some of these opportunities come from changes in the energy system and the use of
non-fossil energy sources. This analysis and inclusion of viewpoints from within the discourse in
Russian academia contribute to an attempt to provide a converged constructivist, post-structuralist
and English school explanations on EU-Russia relationship It was realised that some valuable
information was needed from technology-specific areas. In order to establish the scope of the
climate change regime affecting the energy system, and evaluating the EU’s initiatives of turning
green, the researcher set out to analyse state-of-the-art alternative non-fossil energy production
technologies. The technologies under investigation are: solar photovoltaic (PV) and thermal
energy, wind energy, bio-energy, nuclear energy and carbon dioxide CCS systems.

The information was collected from: energy, energy policy and security journals; RE technology
journals; climate journals; and environmental policy journals. The articles were chosen if they
addressed the following variables: (1) EU climate change policy and energy policy; and (2) the
technological developments (TD) of the specific energy source. In total 30 articles were included
in this research. Based on technological issues and challenges addressed in the articles, the author
compared the feasibility of RES-s, nuclear energy and CCS systems to provide energy security,
energy supply security and climate security. The starting point for unfolding of the climate change
regime passageway to energy security is analysing the transformed energy system in 2020
provided in the EU’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan (EAP) under EU energy policy. It
states that MS-s are required to set their targets to reduce their GHG emissions by 20%; and
achieve the share of energy from RE at 20% by the year 2020, also known as ‘20-20 by 2020’
(EC, 2009a: 11). Execution of the climate change regime in the EU is assessed combining 4 data
4 All calculations are in Appendix 2 in Findings sections.

from EU’s Final Energy Consumption5 (FEC) and Energy Production in 2006 and estimations for
2020. The researcher compares EU’s targets for achievement of each energy source with the
predictions of oil and gas energy consumption in 2020. Data is retrieved from ‘Europe’s Energy
Position: present & future’ (EC, 2008a), which classifies RES, nuclear and fossil fuel
consumption; ‘EU Energy and Transport in Figures’ (EC, 2009b), which includes RES, nuclear
and oil and gas energy production; and ‘The EREC Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap
20% by 2020’, which concentrates exclusively on energy production of each type of RES (EREC,
2008). The following section explores the opportunities presented by innovations in non-fossil
energy production which might provide for further power bargaining by the EU.

It was expected that the assumptions could be filtered through post-structuralist analysis of EU-
Russia relations, and would reveal why dynamics for providing energy security and energy supply
security, do not function to generate positive non-zero-sum results. However, it is noted that
research on non-state units could enhance the outcome of this paper considerably. The time of
writing fell in the period of pre-Copenhagen Climate Conference 2009; the outcome of which
could determine whether the climate change regime really has penetrated into the high politics
agenda. The comparative research design is not without its problems. The design does not
explicitly provide a tool for indicating causality. It cannot be determined, only assumed, that a
connection exists whereby one TD leads to a specific event (Ragin et al, 1996, pp. 763-764). In
addition, numeric data is always estimated and subject to change; and could be institutionally
biased. Nevertheless, the author adheres to the principle of integrity, accepting that the data
presented in the EU’s reports are valid to real estimations and are leading, not following, policy-

5 FEC is energy consumed in all industries and households, except for energy consumed by energy industry.

4. Transformation of the energy system: Emerging alternative non-fossil energy technologies
and CCS systems

4.1. Solar energy: photovoltaic and thermal

In 2005, solar energy represented 0.7% of EU energy production from RES-s (EC, 2007b: 9). If
the EU’s aims are achieved, the energy consumption from solar energy sources will have
increased 30-fold by 2020 (EREC, 2008). The most widely used technology for converting
sunlight to electricity are PV panels systems. Panels consist of solar cells which catch a fraction
of solar radiation within a certain range of wavelengths. Concerns with PV panels include
intermittence and storability of output energy as production of energy fluctuates with sunlight,
which ultimately does not enhance energy supply security. Secondly, the production of silicon-
made solar-cell modules, technology that enables direct conversion form heat to electricity, are
expensive and production does not offset net carbon emissions (Lee, 2009: 1285), therefore
contradicting with the aims of the climate change regime. Significant research has been put into
finding alternative materials and conversion techniques to replace silicone cells. Using organic
materials, such as dyes and polymers, is an option, but today’s development has not enabled
electricity conversion efficiency of more than 5%, and material lifetime of up to five years in
these materials (Kalowekamo & Baker, 2009). The EU has stated that MS-s should promote TD-s
and achieve the efficiency of 35% (EC, 2008c: 30). A development to this could come from nano-
engineered materials, which use multi-junction solar cells for electricity conversion. Multi-
junction solar cells have an increased capability of capturing energy from a particular wavelength,
or colour in the sunlight spectrum. Existing capability only allows conversion from a single part
of the spectrum (Kinsey & Edmondson, 2009: 282-285). This brings efficiency up from 20% to
40-50%, which is competitive with the efficiency of coal, 32-45% and gas, 45-53% (Evans et al,
2009: 1085).

TD-s in domestically installed PV systems have advanced through the combination of PV and
thermal technology. A study points out that the existing PV technologies do not fully utilise the
radiation received (Joshi et al, 2009). The conventional panels consist of cells that capture energy
only at a certain wavelength. The rest of the potential energy, as heat and light, passes through the
cells and is not utilised. This excess energy received as heat could be used to warm water in the
household. The scope of TD has been proven as feasible for residential installations (Dubery &
Tiwari, 2009). The design of thermal PV panels along with standard PV panels would thus
considerably increase the overall energy efficiency. These innovations through cost efficiency and
operational efficiency potentially minimise the energy supply security and climate security

A further TD has been made in increasing cost-efficiency by the fabricating high-efficiency solar
cells. The use of a nickel-copper contact instead of expensive titanium-palladium-silver contacts
reduces material costs. It was proved that this new method is applicable for mass production (Lee,
2009). A study of the cost-efficiency of installing solar panels and connecting the energy stream
with the national grid system in Germany generated positive results. A grid system is a network of
domestic and commercial energy producers. If solar radiation fails to generate enough electricity
for the household, this household starts receiving commercial electricity. If there is superfluous
energy produced, and less usage by the household, the surplus electricity is fed back into the grid.
This is calculated into revenue for the domestic user (Bhandari & Stadler, 2009). Considering the
politically-accepted need to include RES in the energy mix, and the expectation that the RES
energy price will equalise with cheap fossil fuel prices; their study found that the grid system is
economically feasible only if the lifetime of the panels is increased from the existing 25 years to
40 years.

Another type of solar energy production techniques are non-PV thermal solar-power plants. There
are variants to these, but in principle, instead of converting sunlight directly to electricity, the heat
is fed into a receiver configuration that then converts heat into electricity. The most widely-used
system consists of a parabolic configuration of tanks containing oil that is heated by sunlight; a
turbine that enables movement of the oil in the tubes; and a central boiler that receives heat and
converts it to electricity. Such projects have been launched in Spain (Solar One and SOLGATE
project). A more advanced system does not use a generator to move the oil within the parabolic
tubes, but other liquids that are able to transfer heat to a central turbine (Plataforma Solar de
Almería) (Muńos et al, 2009). Another innovation in heat transportation reduces oil consumption.
Muńos et al demonstrated that this can be done by mirrors (2009). Their study found a 20%
efficiency rate which is comparable with conventional thermal solar plants, and an anticipated
reduction in building and maintenance costs as this type of system does not use oil in energy
production. This lowers carbon emissions and contributes to climate security.

4.2. Wind energy

In 2005, wind energy represented 5.1% of EU energy production from RES (EC, 2007b: 9). Wind
energy met its 2010 RES target five years early (EC, 2007a: 6). EREC predicts the energy
consumption from wind energy sources to rise from 7 Mtoe in 2006 to 41 Mtoe in 2020 (EREC, 2008)
The use of wind energy in RES energy mix is hindered by public debates over economic and
environmental costs rather than TD-s. Public objection to developing domestic energy sources
manifests in threats to energy security. It is therefore important to overcome this public objection or
risk continuing dependency on conventional energy sources.

Wind energy is produced by wind turbines. Conventional turbines consist of a tower (40 m-100 m in
height), three-blade rotor (60 m in length) and nacelle housing. The tower is usually made of rolled
steel, a lattice structure or concrete. The blades are made of a combination of epoxy, glass fibre and
carbon fibre. Mechanical energy from wind movement is transferred by blades into a generator, that
converts it to electrical energy. Other elements, yaw system, pitch system and break system, maintain
operational efficiency to adjust to changes in wind force and direction (Blanco, 2009: 1375). Wind
energy turbines have an electricity efficiency of 24-54%, depending on the location in which they are
placed. It is thus a major contributer to energy supply security. Wind energy does not use any oil or
gas in production of energy6. Neither does it rely on large sources of freshwater. However, wind
power balance is affected by wind speed fluctuations and demand fluctuations, and offers main
challenges to technology of onshore wind warms (Chen & Blaabjerg, 2009). Wind farm must be able
to deliver electricity at a time when there is an overload of demand but a slump in wind speed and
reserving it in the opposite case. If energy load from the wind farm does not meet real time demand, it
has to be provided by alternative sources from other energy plants, thus threatening energy supply

A study, which analysed economic and environmental impacts of wind farms, points out the prime
challenges requiring innovative solutions (Snyder & Kaiser, 2009). It is claimed that wind energy
could not survive without subsidies and is thus detrimental to the economy. However, as the authors
also conclude, this is a universal problem in the energy sector and not solely an issue with wind
energy. The environmental impact, they add, are that high levels of audibility are seen as harmful to
humans and animals. Blades on turbines contribute to the mortality rate of birds and affect their flying
route. An oft-cited reason for public objection is the aesthetic problem that wind farms mar the natural

To overcome public objection, large amounts of R&D have been carried out developing offshore wind
farms. These offer higher levels of operational efficiency and reduce the impact on the visual
environment. 18 offshore wind farms have been built between distances of 1-27 km from the
shoreline in Europe since 2000 (Snyder & Kaiser, 2009). A cost-benefit analysis study of offshore
wind farms found that overall costs of building and maintenance lowers the cost of energy from
offshore farms when compared to onshore farms due to economies of scale. Costs increase due to
extra time and personnel wages involved in the maintenance of the farm. The projects need further
investment to replace equipment, which corrodes faster in sea water. The cost-benefit analysis
demonstrates, however, that these arguments are mitigated by benefits achieved elsewhere. Out of
sight, the farms are able to use less attractive materials and the turbines can use designs, which offer
enhanced electrical generation capacity when compared to onshore wind turbines. Stronger wind also

6 Oil-based insulators are used in cables transferring energy from offshore wind farms.

provides consistency in the energy stream. If public acceptance towards wind farms is achieved, it
will enhance domestic energy production and decrease energy dependency.

4.3. Bio-energy

Bio-energy is energy gained from combustion of biomass and fuels 7 derived from biomass, such
as wood, plants, cereals and waste residues8. EU energy policy aims for a minimum of 10%
biofuels for use in transportation by 2020 (EC, 2007a; EC, 2008a: 49). A study on the biomass
industry estimates that it is in its early stages of vast expansion due to increasing energy security
concerns (Heinimö & Junginger, 2009). In 2005, bio-energy represented 67.8% of energy
production from RES (EC, 2007b: 9). In 2020, it is anticipated by EREC, biomass electricity
capacity will reach 50 GWe in 2020 from 22.3 GWe in 2006 (EREC, 2008: 4). The increase in
biofuel production in transportation will be 6-fold (EREC, 2008: 6). A study assessing the
application of biofuels in EU policy-making anticipates that the EU is capable of producing two
thirds of the required biofuels (Londo et al, 2009). However, currently, it has to import the raw
material from countries with adequate land and cultivation skills. This means that bio-energy does
not provide straightforward security of supply and fuel independence. It is anticipated that
biomass-derived ethanol trade will increase 4% a year between 2007 to 2020 between the EU,
Russia and Ukraine (Özdemir et al, 2009: 2987). Energy security from biomass requires TD-s that
would enhance efficiency of fuel production.

There are a number of arguments against using bio-energy, which attenuates its credentials of
sustainable development and thus providing climate security. First is the food/energy dichotomy
(Rathmann et al, 2009). Arable land has five main uses: food, bio-energy, pastures, forests and
reserves. Cultivating food plants and energy plants requires similar climate and surface
conditions. If growing plants for biodiesel production proves more profitable, as it has been in
Brazil, more land is cultivated for energy at the expense of less-profitable uses. This, it is pointed
out, increases food stock prices, and consequently biodiesel prices, making it less competitive
with cheap fossil fuels. Second, removing forest reduces global oxygen emissions and natural
carbon capture, and unlike solar and wind energy, biomass and biofuel combustion accounts for
net carbon emissions. This is at variance with the aims of the climate change regime.

One challenge in TD-s of biodiesel production, which both address these arguments, is innovating
for techniques which increase quality of oil and marginalise land used for cultivation. An
innovational shift in biofuel production is the development of ‘second generation’ biofuels (Londo
et al, 2009). ‘First generation biofuels’ are processed from sugars, grains, seeds and animal fats
using the conventional method of production, fermentation. ‘Second generation’ biofuels use
innovational techniques, like gasification and anaerobic digestion. More importantly, it focuses on
7 These are: ethanol, biodiesel, fuel wood, charcoal, wood pellets, palm oil (Heinimö & Junginger, 2009).
8 Heinimö and Junginger distinguish between: agriculture residues, forest residues, dung, organic wastes (2009:1313).

fuel extraction from non-food plants or food plant residues. One innovation in the TD of ‘second
generation’ biofuels has been researched by those proposing bio-oil production from microalgae
(Mata et al, 2009). Although the industrialisation of this method is still in the pilot stage, it could
present a major development in the food/energy debate. Its major advantages, when compared to
‘first generation’ biofuels, are that it releases tillable land for growing food, prevents deforesting
and removes CO2, nitrogen and sulphur oxides. An assessment study of algae-produced oil found
considerable advantages in efficiency of cultivation, processing and quality of oil when compared
to seed-produced oils. For example, algae-oil production uses 0.5% of the land that is used to
extract 1 kg of biodiesel when compared to seed oil production (2009: 5). The cultivation of algae
is less demanding, and possible in different climatic conditions. It also uses water that is
unsuitable for human consumption. The amount of CO2 consumed by algae, it is argued, makes up
for the emissions that are released from the combustion of biofuels (2009: 12). The implication of
these benefits is that microalgae oil production provides higher levels of EU energy supply
security, and soothes the food/energy dilemma in land competition thus providing climate

4.4. Nuclear energy

Nuclear energy is not classified as a RES. However, since it produces carbon free electricity, it
has been prominent in climate change and energy policies for many years. There is no distinct
majority of support for or objection against nuclear energy in the EU, it has adopted an ‘agnostic
stance’ (“Energy and climate change: Towards and integrated EU policy”, 2007). Phase-out of
nuclear plants is anticipated in some MS-s (EC, 2008: 13), but has again appeared on the agenda
as a measure of energy security in other countries (Watson & Scott, 2009). EU reports anticipate a
9% decrease in nuclear energy production in the EU by 2020 as a result of closure of some plants
on safety concerns (EC, 2008a: 52). Plans for new nuclear plants have been criticised for concerns
over consequences of possible accidents; radioactive residues; technical underperformance;
vulnerability to activist and terrorist attacks on infrastructure; and the inability to deliver energy
security (2009: 9). Others have attacked this energy option for its incompatibility with sustainable
development and large investment demands, which means that energy security through the
combination of RES and nuclear power is unfeasible (Verbruggen, 2008). Verbuggen suggests that
nuclear energy does not fit into the EU energy system because nuclear plants are only
economically feasible when working at full capacity. This makes it necessary for energy providers
to encourage energy consumption and receive revenues to cover their vast investments. He also
stresses the devastating impacts nuclear accidents can have, and suggests the immediate phase-out
of nuclear plants (2008: 4045). In the presence of these claims, it is irrational for the EU to treat
nuclear energy as a contributor to energy security and cleaner energy (EC, 2008a). What justifies
nuclear energy, it is argued, is that it is equally capable of providing ‘clean’ energy and, unlike

RES-s, meet increasing demand without fluctuations in supply. Its main advantage over other
energy sources is the capability to meet vast energy demands. It is seen as more suitable for
countries with fast growing demographic and economic growth, like India and China. That is why
total global nuclear capacity is expected to increase, despite the reduction in the EU. Nuclear
Energy Agency states, this will have increased from 16% in 2006 to 22% in 2050 (NEA, 2008: 4).
This implicates a prevalent impact on global gas and oil consumption. Thus, even if EU growth in
nuclear energy was relatively modest, the changes in other countries’ energy mix, mainly
increasing nuclear energy, would still impact EU relations with its gas and oil suppliers. It would
increase the EU’s bargaining power as diversity in global oil and gas consumer countries

A brief look at the industry ensures that nuclear energy will not disappear despite its fierce critics.
Conventional nuclear energy production technologies have been developed since the 1950-s.
Different systems prevailed in France, Soviet Union, the US and the UK. All the developed
systems share a common principle of operation - fission technology. Vast amounts of energy are
captured by bi-dividing a heavy atomic core. The systems are only differentiated by transport
methods of heat, modified water or gas. Life-time of a reactor is about 30 years. According to a
study in an overview of nuclear technologies, 90% of existing reactors are light water reactors
(Vaillancourt et al, 2008: 2298). Cost-efficiency is still far lower however, when compared to
other energy sources. Using data from Vaillancourt’s study, it was calculated here9 that investment
costs into fission nuclear energy are 3 times higher than wind-based energy and 1.7 times higher
than biomass-based energy.

A second major difference is whether the reactor operates to produce renewable fuel, which is the
principle of operation in breeder reactors. The input fuel is normally uranium-235. When this gets
processed it generates plutonium-239. This has the same qualities as uranium-235. Eventually,
about half of the fuel used renews itself. The beginning of this century is witnessing a cross-
industry replacement of power plants, however 80% of the plants under construction are still non-
renewable (Vaillancourt et al, 2008: 2298). 5% of the world’s plants, and 15% of these under
construction, are renewable. The reason for this smaller representation is nuclear proliferation.
Plutonium-239 is classified as of weapon grade quality and could be used to produce nuclear
warheads. It is in the interests of the international community to ensure that a state possessing a
breeder reactor does not use it for purposes other than producing energy (Jonter, 2008). The
maintenance of this condition has been the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims
for a nuclear-weapon free world. It recognises that there are states that are Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS), and states that are Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). However, the Treaty sets

9 The average maximum investment cost per kW of different types of technologies was calculated (see in Appendix 1), and
compared with fission nuclear plants using data from Vaillancourt et al (2008: 2299).

obligations that all states should follow; primarily that no nuclear weapon transactions should take
place between NWS and NNWS; and disarmament should lead to eventual termination of nuclear
warheads (Jankowitsch-Prevor, 2008: 72-73).

A revolutionary TD in nuclear energy is nuclear fusion. Unlike fission, fusion is argued to be
inherently safe in its operation and produces much lower levels of radioactive waste materials
than fission power generation (Fiore, 2006; Tokimatsu et al, 2003; Vaillancourt et al, 2008).
Fusion reactors work using a fundamental physical reaction which takes place in our Sun and all
stars like it. In principle, two light atomic cores are merged. The atomic cores used are deuterium,
heavy hydrogen readily available in all sea water, and tritium, synthesised from lithium –
abundant on Earth. The process releases about 500 MW of power in a single reaction. Current
fusion processes involve the production of a plasma (superheated gas). It is only at very high
temperatures that a plasma is formed, and only then can fusion take place. The energy from fusion
is in the form of heat energy, and is transferred in a conventional way by driving a turbine to
produce electricity. Several test fusion reactors, like Joint European Torus (JET), have been built
under the support of European Fusion Development Agreement. The EU invests some €60m each
year into the current JET test reactor at Culham in Oxfordshire, UK (Watkins, 2007). Whilst the
physics is fairly simple, the technological challenges with this method of power generation lay in
containment and sustainability of the plasma. In the case of JET, the plasma has been achieved for
only a few seconds and input power far exceeds output (Tokimatsu et al, 2003: 776). The
temperature of the plasma runs at some 100 million degrees Celsius, and even at this temperature,
the plasma cannot be sustained for a long enough duration to produce enough power to run a
conventional electricity turbine. Advantages over fission technology are that it consumes less fuel
(400 kg deuterium-tritium equivalent to 175 t uranium, Fiore, 2006: 3337). The fuel is available
for up to 1000 years. The physical principles of fusion technology are such that it is incapable of
causing explosion, therefore eliminating the risk of nuclear attacks. It has negligible radioactive
wastes when compared to non-GHG fossil fuel residues.

A new international research reactor has been at a planning stage for several years and is now
becoming a reality. Work started in 2008 on International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(ITER) and it is hoped sustainment of the plasma will be 5-10 minutes (versus JET's 5-10
seconds) and the energy out will be greater than energy in. Once the reactor has proven safe,
reliable and sustainable power generation, commercial models can be rolled out and will be
economically feasible in 2050-2060 (Tokimatsu et al, 2003). Research started in 1980 in France
and Japan, but is now a joint collaboration between the EU (financing 40% of the project; Fiore,
2006: 3339), USA, Japan, China, India, South Korea and Russia. Candidates have also been
presented by Brazil and India. This cooperation for TD per se is an unprecedented development to
international cooperation. A technology which once defined the global polarity and cold war has

become a point of cooperation despite political differences. In light of such vast TD-s, the
problem with fusion technology remains with its economic feasibility and public acceptance.
According to Vaillancourt et al investment costs are twice as much as is presently channelled into
constructing fission nuclear plants. However, it is argued, these costs will be abated when
considering long-term effects. This is suggested in a study investigating the economic feasibility
of fusion technology considering plants will be up and running by 2050 and comply with Kyoto
targets (Tokimatsu et al, 2003). By 2100, it is found, nuclear fusion technology will represent a
significant proportion of global10 electricity production. Separately, the proportion exceeds wind,
coal, oil, natural gas, hydro and geothermal energy sources; but matches innovatives, nuclear
fission and biomass energy sources (2003: 781, Fig. 3).

4.5. Carbon Capture Storage

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems are included in energy security because if TD-s prove
successful, it would legitimise the continuation of coal as an energy source and decrease energy
dependency. Australia has initiated leadership in promoting CCS by launching the Global CCS
Institute. The EU plans on building CCS integrated plants by 2015 (EC, 2008b). In principle, CCS
processes have four stages. Carbon is captured at the combustion point of fuel or another
chemical reaction. It is then ‘packaged’ into a form that is ready to be transported. Transportation
takes place by road tankers and/or pipelines. Finally, carbon is ‘stored‘ in a selected site in either
an unused subterranean destination of about 1 km in depth; or a depleted oil/gas field for an
undetermined period of time. Depending on CO2 emission and site preparations, ‘packaged’
residues might need interim storage before final destination (GCCSI, 2009: 5). Some thoughts
suggest that collected CO2 could be re-used to enhance oil sources. CCS is technologically the
least developed out of all the discussed options, and is, as a recent study confirms, filled with
‘uncertainties and barriers’ (Hansson & Bryngelsson, 2009: 2274). What makes it different from
fusion technology which is also perceived risky, is that unlike nuclear technology, it has had far
less investment in R&D in the past, and is expected to experience ‘negative learning curves’ and
underestimation of costs (Hansson, 2009: 2275). The study concludes that there is little anchored
knowledge on estimated capacity of the amount of GHG-s eliminated from the atmosphere.
Storage capacity is finite and the area of disposal is limited. The handling of it is also perceived as
risky in a similar way as containing radioactive waste.

Besides technological and academic expertise, the study used ‘a social construction of
technology’ methodology to determine interpretations that are attributed to CCS (2009: 2276). It
finds that social feasibility of CCS technology emerges amongst those whose interests are at risk
through the climate change regime, such as coal and oil-producing companies or countries.
10 Although it is stated in Methodology that EU will be the primary focus, Tokimatsu’s analysis is relevant here for two
reasons: 1) the EU is one of the main financiers of ITER; 2) revolutionary TD-s in fusion nuclear energy could significantly
moderate global energy trade.

Academic proponents justify CCS as a stepping stone for a green future consisting of RES and
nuclear energy. The global energy system is not universal, and each actor should adopt a specific
energy source that suits their needs. CCS happens to complement sustainable development of the
developing world. The prominent argument is that it is more dangerous to continue carbon
emissions into the atmosphere than it is to pump it into the ground. Public awareness on the issue
is unattached. Criticism prevails amongst NGO-s and ‘a few countries’ (2009: 2277). It is not
possible to determine whether specific countries have vested interests in non-fossil technologies.
CCS, by its critics, strengthens the position of coal in the energy system and prevents its
transformation. It encourages building coal plants, when instead RES or nuclear technology could
be supported. An interesting concern, the authors point out, is that the climate change regime and
its claims might contribute to extending the use of fossil fuels. It has induced fear and encouraged
acceptance of technologies promising a fast solution without rationally assessing their
environmental cost-efficiency in the long term.

5. EU-Russian energy interdependence

The substitution of oil with gas in the EAP is potentially good news for Russia - it has the largest gas
reserves in the world. However, for energy security reasons and efforts to avoid potential vulnerability
in trade relations from political instability, the EU prefers to minimise its dependence on a single
supplier (Volkov et al, 2009). The importance of gas trade to the Russian economy cannot be
underestimated. Gazprom is Russia’s biggest gas company, with a state ownership of 50.002%. It
provides 20% of Russia’s annual state budget, 10% of GDP and 15% of total export revenues. Its
plans include the construction of Yamal, Shtokman, Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, costing
$120 billion. These are overshadowed by $42 billion debt and estimations of a 22% decline in
revenues in 2009; due to the decline in oil prices, the economic recession and quarrels with Ukraine
(Gazprom data, EPRINC calculations in Pugliaresi et al, 2009).

The prospect of a change in the EU’s energy consumption is therefore detrimental to Gazprom. The
EU is a well-paying customer providing 59% of Gazprom’s revenue, while it only receives 30%
volume in supplies. In 2005 to 2007 the EU-27 received 55.7% of Gazprom’s overall gas exports
(Volkov et al, 2009: 53). Gazprom’s attempts to diversify its customer base have resulted in new
agreements that predict China will make up 15%-17% of total gas exports in 2020 (Volkov et al,
2009). However, these predictions remain questionable due to the aforementioned difficulties the
company is experiencing with debt levels. Adding to the vulnerability of the Russian economy is the
claim that the EU’s dependence on Russian gas is highly exaggerated (Watson & Scott, 2009). The
criticism questions the fear that gas and oil sources are depleting, points out that blackouts from
disruptions in energy delivery are rare and are more likely to occur from technological incapability,
and highlights under-investment into energy infrastructures. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, this

situation does not give the EU more bargaining power. In 2006 the EU’s total dependence on Russian
supply for gross inland energy consumption was 54% (EC, 2009b).

Consequently, changes in the energy system provoke states to react to make up for the experienced
losses. This has led to a strategic division into spheres by actors in the energy system, where a
construction of complex deals between countries and consortiums that thrive on rivalry and power
bargaining, is taking place. In a broad view, the EU and China seek to maintain access to oil and gas
from a variety of countries, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Russia is interested in maintaining a superior position vis-á-vis Europe, and maintain access to
alternative Asian markets. For example, it tries to cope with the EU’s efforts to build a Russia-
independent Nabucco gas pipeline by obstructing access to the very supplies from which Nabucco is
supposed to maintain its gas stream (Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan, see Watkins, 2009).

Also, Gazprom has made a 50-50 joint venture with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation -
Nigaz. This new consortium will develop a starting section of the trans-Sahara pipeline, which was
proposed to deliver gas directly to Europe. The EU, it is reported in Oil & Gas Journal, tried to secure
funding for the trans-Sahara pipeline but failed. This will enable Russia to seize more control over gas
streams to Europe (Watkins, 2009). Another bilateral agreement has led to the construction of the
Nord Stream gas pipeline from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany. The involved littoral
Baltic Sea states have resisted the construction of the pipeline on security grounds. This came in
reaction to Russia’s insistence that the security of the pipeline should be guaranteed by the Russian
Navy, granting it with a military presence within the EU (Larsson, 2007: 35). These voices are less
likely to be heard, as construction is already taking place and the pipe is hoped to go online despite
these difficulties in 2011. These developments exemplify how power bargaining through the energy
system is realised to protect one’s interests. Thus, a transformation of the energy system poses risks to
international relations.

6. Discussion

6.1. Meeting ‘20-20 by 2020’ goal

The climate change regime is gaining momentum in international politics and is becoming an
expression of power bargaining. The EU seeks to assume leadership as the navigator of the
climate change regime by enforcing climate security through Kyoto requirements across MS-s by
unilaterally and vigorously implementing green energy strategies. Evidence in this study shows
that these ‘green strategies’, RES technologies, and less so nuclear fusion technologies, certainly
have environmental advantages over conventional fossil fuels. Implementing these technologies
across MS-s, rather than achieving technological superiority in a minority of locations, enhances
EU capabilities to navigate the climate change regime. The probability of achieving the ‘20-20 by
2020’ goal looks optimistic by forecasts, based on the number of energy plants under
construction, which anticipate a many-fold growth in solar, wind and bio-energy (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 RES and Nuclear Energy Contribution to Final Energy Consumption in the EU in 2006
and 2020 (Mtoe)





Solar Wind Biomass Other Nuclear

Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC and The
EREC Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap 20% by 2020, EREC.

Figure 2 Projected EU Final Energy Consumption in 2020 (Mtoe)

2% 3%


3% Wind
Other RES*
60% Nuclear
18% Fossil

Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC and The
EREC Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap 20% by 2020, EREC.

However, each discussed energy source has its disadvantages, which are diminishing energy
security, energy supply security or execution of the climate change regime. TD-s in RE
production concentrate on improving areas which cause economic deficiency and public
objection. In the case of R&D of solar PV technologies it is critical to achieve higher levels of
energy efficiency from low-cost solar cells and low-cost production to improve energy supply
security. For wind energy, a major challenge is to overcome public objection, which ultimately
threatens domestic energy production and thus, energy security. Public objection to wind farms
persists for aesthetic reasons, which are maintained by unnatural visibility and audibility of wind
turbines on landscapes and seascapes. The offered solution, distant offshore wind farms,
overcome aesthetic public objection but were at first not economically attractive due to reductions
in cost-efficiency, which occur from losses in energy delivery and increases in maintenance costs.
TD-s enable increased energy efficiency and cost efficiency, which are achieved from freedom to
design bulkier turbines, which is not possible in onshore wind farms.

Bio-energy from biomass remains the largest proportion of RE consumption. As a proportion of
FEC in the EU in 2006, it surpasses consumption from all other RES, and is expected to provide
14% of consumed energy in the EU in 2020 (Fig. 2). Energy from biomass, especially from
forests, is rejected by some as a RES on the grounds that it does not assist achieving the target to
reduce GHG emissions and is not inherently a sustainable source, thus failing to achieve goals of
the climate change regime. The problem with bio-energy from biofuels is that growing plants for
biofuel production takes place at the expense of food production, which affects global food
security. However, it could be concluded from RE literature with confidence that TD-s in biofuel
production, in particular microalgae biofuel, will help to overcome this problem and transform the
energy system. In the meantime, despite promising projections for energy consumption from solar
and wind sources, the energy system will have not, as was anticipated by Midilli (et al 2005),
become a ‘green energy based life’ by 2020 (Fig. 3).

Figure 3 EU’s Final Energy Consumption: Fossil Fuels in 2006 and 2020 (Mtoe)




800 Fossil fuel

600 All sources in total



2006 2020

Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008.

The probability of achieving the goal of 20% reduction in GHG emissions is enhanced by the use
of nuclear energy. Research on the assessment of nuclear energy TD-s in academia is of course
much more sophisticated than that presented in this paper. In absolute terms, nuclear energy
production will decrease as defunct energy plants are dismantled (Fig. 1). However, a stream of
investments by MS-s and the EU continues to be channelled into nuclear energy R&D and
constructions to replace some of the decommissioned plants. The majority of the plants under
construction in the world are enhanced by TD-s to achieve better energy efficiency and cost
efficiency with a lower output of radioactive waste. By 2020, the number of nuclear energy plants
using a breeder reactor, which enables the production of weapon grade quality fuel, will have
increased from 5% to 15% in the world. It is predicted, nuclear energy will provide 18% of the
FEC in the EU in 2020 (Fig. 2).

Figure 4Scenarios of the Global Electricity Production in 2100 (%)


No fusion technology
50 penetration



Fusion technology penetrates
the global energy system

Fossil Nuclear RES

Source: Tokimatsu et al (2003) Role of nuclear fusion in future energy systems and the environment under future
uncertainties. Data calculated from Figure 8, p. 2304.

Figure 5 Oil and gas consumption in the EU by supplier in 2006.

Saudi Arabia Libya
Libya 5% Saudi Arabia

Russia Algeria Algeria
38% 9% Iran

Iran Kazakhstan
Kaz akhstan Nigeria
Nigeria2% Other
O ther 4%

Source: Calculations used data from EU energy and transport in figures 2009, 2009, EC and Europe’s energy position:
present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC.

This research has hitherto included forecasts based on technologies of energy production, which
have each demonstrated realistic performance and are expected to contribute to energy production
keeping in mind the ‘20-20 by 2020’ goal. Implications from the discourse on TD-s of nuclear
fusion energy technology, which is not expected to provide commercialised energy until 2050, is
included here. Under investigation is the ITER project, to which the EU is committed through
providing funds and demonstration sites. ITER brings together the EU, USA, Japan, China, India,
South Korea and Russia, and possibly Brazil and India, in the thermonuclear research arena - an
unorthodox incident in the history of nuclear research. The most important reason for addressing
TD-s in nuclear fusion energy is provided from a study by Tokimatsu. Two of his global energy
system scenarios are used here to explain the EU’s continuous support for nuclear fusion energy
development. The first scenario predicts the conditions in the global energy system in 2100,
where the climate change regime is gathering momentum but where ITER-type projects have
failed. The second scenario assesses the impact of the anticipated penetration nuclear fusion
energy will have on the global energy system in 2100 (Fig. 4). It is assumed, based on all
scientific predictions used in his study, that TD-s are capable of bringing nuclear fusion energy
into production for the global market by 2050, which decreases global energy consumption from
fossil fuel from 52.5% to 8%, and increases global nuclear energy consumption from 28% to
68%. The entrance of fusion energy into the global energy system does not affect the growth of
RES contribution.

6.2. Implications for EU-Russia relations

TD-s in RES combined with nuclear energy contribution satisfies the EU’s aim to consume 20%
of all energy from RE, reduce its GHG emissions and consolidate the EU’s role in navigating the
climate change regime. However, the second component of energy security, which is not climate-
specific but supplier-specific, is perhaps more problematic. Energy security, it is argued in the
academia (Umbach, 2009), is gained through gaining bargaining power from having a diversified
energy supplier mix. It was found here, comparing the EU’s own energy production from fossil
fuels, fossil fuel imports and FEC in 2006 (Fig. 5), that 26% of all fossil fuel imports (oil and gas
combined) came from Russia, whereas EU productions provided for 31% of its FEC from fossil
fuels. A considerable 14% was provided by Norway, meaning that 29% of fossil fuel energy was
received from a diversified supplier base, where 26% of imports in oil and gas would generally be
a sign of good trade relations. However, the findings from publications of global corporate and
political developments in the energy industry report a number of cases, which in IR theory
translate into a kind of state behaviour; where power bargaining is exercised to protect one’s
interests and cooperation is random, i.e. occurs only if cooperating states’ interests happen to be
similar. Such developments often become harmful to others creating conditions for conflicts.

It is evident from energy industry publications that energy trade forms the backbone of Russia’s
economy, with a large chunk of this energy trade taking place with EU MS-s. There is a drive for
control of this energy trade, which leads to acts of power balancing, such as the EU’s effort to
secure a Russia-independent Nabucco pipeline, and Russia’s subsequent effort to gain control of
the planned supply source of the Nabucco pipeline. Such behaviour is explained here using a
constructivist interpretation. States’ interests and identities create perceptions and drive states to
behave in a certain way. The EU’s interest is to secure cheap energy supply adequate to its needs,
Russia’s interest is to secure the demand for its supply to strengthen its economy. Both have an
interest to protect themselves from climate change impacts, which present catastrophic threats.
Gas-disputes between Russia and Ukraine and the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August
2008 have led the EU to realise its energy supply security is vulnerable to arbitrary events outside
its area of influence. Hence, there is a prevalence of suggestions in energy security discourse for
the EU to minimise its energy dependency on single supplier states. It becomes clear, how
advocating the climate change regime could become an inconvenience to fossil fuel-exporting
states. However, it was found that the outcome of Kyoto negotiations was rather ‘beneficial’ to
Russia due to the financial incentives it could expect from JI and carbon trading.

The depiction of Russia’s identity and its perception of the EU concludes with Russia’s
denouncement of a common European identity. In Prozorov’s post-structuralist assessment of EU-
Russia relations, he explains Russia’s assertive behaviour as a response to the EU’s exclusionary
policies. This implicates first-hand, that the EU-Russian relationship is conflictual. Cooperation is
facilitated through the interdependence which occurs in energy trade and generates random
mutual interests. EU aspiration to turn green and ‘20-20 by 2020’, it is concluded in here, is not
threatening Russia’s interests, and is unlikely to facilitate conflict simply because fossil fuel
consumption will continue to form the majority of FEC in the EU in 2020. The increase of RES
contribution to FEC will only be sufficient to meet the increase in demand. Thus, realistically, the
energy system, as Midilli et al anticipated, will not have transformed into a ‘green energy based
life’ by 2020 (2005).

6.3. Implications to IR

At the Kyoto negotiations in 1992 it was perhaps hoped that fighting for a common cause; a safe
environment, could follow the bipolar world, defined as North vs South, capitalist vs communist,
or cosmopolitan vs communitarian. At the ratification in 1997, however, it could have been feared
that the climate change regime lacked ‘political empowerness’ and capacity to replace anarchy in
international relations. Surprisingly, disinterest of some and resistance by others, have not
obstructed the climate change regime gathering momentum, and, as is experienced in the energy
system, from becoming a tool in power bargaining. Since 1992, the duality in IR has indeed been
replaced by multiplicity, as the unprecedented powers rise in the wealth of economy and security.

The climate change regime is intended to be conducive to the SD of these developing economies
through Kyoto mechanisms. Developed countries can meet their GHG reduction targets through
gaining carbon credits when they contribute, through investment and technology/knowledge
transfer, to SD of developing countries. Notwithstanding the apparent benefits, it is critisised
(Olsen & Fennham, 2008), the targets of investment tend to be enhancing climate security but
neglect projects that would bring benefits in education, health and land conservation.

Unfolding the artefacts of the climate change regime is more complicated because it lacks the
kind of evidence that the experience of wars provide to international security. This research
intended to cross with other disciplines to address the cognitive problem of the climate change
regime. This is also a point of departure for climate change debates, which question the claims
like ‘global warming’ and ‘anthropogenic nature of cause’. Although, this research sided with the
conventionally accepted truth that climate change is anthropogenic and that international
cooperation, by implementing the institution of the climate change regime, could successfully
mitigate potentially catastrophic climate change impacts; it does not resist the solitary voices,
which question the validity, aims and implementation of the climate change regime. Evidence of
this was encountered within CCS systems research, which revealed a paradox, by which the
climate change regime facilitates the extension of fossil fuel production and continues to gather
momentum under the protection of Kyoto mechanisms. Examples like this suggest that the
climate change regime has yet to riposte to postmodernist critique, which would inspect the aims
and validity of the climate change regime.

7. Conclusion

The climate change regime is gaining momentum in international politics as it is realised in the
international community that guaranteeing climate security is a global concern. Despite the precarious
commencement of the climate change regime, marked by the beginning of Kyoto negotiations in
1992 and a following uncooperative evolution, the EU seems to be succeeding in consolidating it as a
security agenda. Climate change regime has not, however, gained an impetus of its own, but is
exerted through other policies, such as energy policies, which are the subject of this paper. In
particular, it is found that to mitigate the impacts of climate change, international institutions, like
Kyoto mechanisms, and energy policies, like the EU’s ’20-20 by 2020’, are executed in the attempt to
transform the energy system. It is argued in the academia that the EU is faced with threats to its
energy security and energy supply security.

The main function of the energy system is to maintain access to and the sustainability of energy
supplies. In the EU this manifests in achieving decreased energy dependency by enhancing domestic
non-fossil energy production and diversified energy mix from a number of suppliers. These two
objectives also serve as goals of the climate change regime, which aims to use ‘clean’ energy sources
to reduce GHG emissions and restrict resource depletion. The EU anticipates a multi-fold growth in
solar, wind and bio-energy production, which by 2020 should provide 20% of the EU’s FEC. The TD-
s of these energy sources are reviewed in this paper to analyse their feasibility to replace fossil fuels
and provide energy security, energy supply security and climate security. It is found, provided the
stream of investment continues, the TD-s would significantly enhance domestic energy production in
the EU. Current TD-s in RES technologies, which aim to enhance their competitiveness with fossil
fuel energy sources are:

1. in solar energy production, manufacturing cheap but equally efficient solar cells, which use
multi-junction technology; using innovative processes in electricity conversion, which reduce costs
of producing panels; combining PV and thermal energy technologies to enable higher energy
efficiency; developing national feed-in energy grids, which provide value for households and
encourage opting in over fossil fuel energy sources;
2. in wind energy production, constructing offshore wind farms with a production capability that
matches onshore wind farm production capabilities and requires lower building and maintenance
3. in bio-energy, producing bio-fuels from microalgae.

Nuclear energy production, it is predicted, continues to provide a significant 18% of the EU’s
overall FEC in 2020 (Fig. 1). Current production technologies still produce radioactive waste and
have high maintenance costs. By 2020, the number of reactors using renewable fuel will have
risen globally from 5% to 15%. This enables energy production with less radioactive residues and

higher operational efficiency. However, this phenomena is a security concern on its own as these
types of reactors use breeder technology, which enables the production of weapon grade quality
fuel. Although the focus of this paper began with TD-s of non-fossil energy sources, which are
conventional in that these are in the pre-stage of being commercialised or are already being used
by households, it was also decided to study fusion nuclear energy and its effect on the energy
system. Firstly, because the EU continues to be a major financier of ITER, a fusion nuclear energy
research; and secondly, its effect on the global energy system, if successful, will be irreversible in
terms of energy trade and therefore, international relations. Penetration of fusion nuclear energy in
2050, it is found, would have such an impact that global consumption from fossil fuel energy
would decrease from 52.5% to 8% and consumption from nuclear energy would increase from
28% to 68% (Fig. 4). Fusion energy production has negligible radioactive residues and an
incapability to cause explosions. This penetration would not, it is anticipated by Tokimatsu et al
(2003), affect the consumption from RES-s. Were this to happen, the implication is that while the
execution of climate change regime is likely to consolidate further, as GHG-free energy
production will be achieved; states, which hitherto gained majority of bargaining power from
control over fossil fuel trade, will be exposed to economic instabilities, and are likely to be
looking to compensate this loss of bargaining power.

It is revealed that EU-Russia relationship is conflictual due to mismatches in interests and
identities, some EU’s exclusionary policies towards Russia, and Russia’s persistance to maintain
political strength through control in energy trade, which result in zero-sum outcome.
Transformation of the energy system has its risks on international relations, where security is
economy and economy is energy. It is recorded and exemplified that changes to status quo
provoke power bargaining with zero-sum results. In particular, the EU’s attempts to increase its
energy independence through developing domestic energy production and securing Russia-
independent energy import; and Russia’s attempts to re-assert control over the streams of supplies
heading towards Europe. In 2006, 26% of the EU’s FEC from fossil fuels was imported from a
single supplier state, indicating a significant energy dependency. However, it is found that
exacerbation of the EU-Russia relationship is avoided because transformation of the EU’s energy
system towards clean energy consumption is protracted. It is drawn out here, the scope of the
transformation of the energy system is not significant enough to exacerbate the conflictual
relationship the EU and Russia share. The EU’s predictions do not confirm that the energy system
is transforming to a fully diversified one, with a renewable energy mix, as is suggested in the

Certain controversies in implementation of the climate change regime are raised, which debilitate the
validity and aims of the climate change regime. Implementation of SD in countries where Kyoto
CDM-s are executed seems to emphasise development of areas, which are first of all beneficial to

developed countries. The critics argue, SD should be first of all beneficial to the developing country.
A more daunting implication of the climate change regime and the EU turning green is provided by a
paradoxical example, where the regime possibly facilitates the extension of fossil fuel production
through developing CCS systems. This brings us back to the initial climate change debate, in
particular, over the aims and validity of the climate change regime and why it is necessary for the
advocates of the climate change regime to riposte to the criticism on the validity and execution of the
climate change regime.


Appendix A Comparing Energy Technology Investment Costs

←Calculations for cost ratio between energy sources and fission nuclear energy source.

Ratio between energy source
Maximum Investment Cost (USD and Nuclear (fission) energy
Energy source 2000/KW) source
Gas 700
Combined gas/oil/turbines
Oil 900
Nuclear (fission) 1
Nuclear (fusion) 8820
Source: Vaillancourt et al, 2008. The role of nuclear energy in long term climate scenarios: An analysis with the World-
TIMES model.

Appendix B Comparing EU’s Final Energy Consumption in 2006 with estimates from the EU’s reports

1. Calculations for Figure 1: RES and Nuclear Contribution to Final Energy Consumption
Energy source 2006 2020
Solar 0.99 29.7
Wind 7.05 41
Biomass 73.11 175.5
Other RES*
Nuclear 255.34 233
* - Hydro, geothermal,
Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC and The
EREC Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap 20% by 2020, EREC.

2. Calculations for Figure 2: Projected EU Final Energy Consumption in 2020 (Mtoe)
Energy source: 2020
Solar 29.7
Wind 41
Biomass 175.5
Other RES* 42.8
Nuclear 233
Fossil 744
Total 1266
* - Hydro, geothermal,

Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC and The
EREC Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap 20% by 2020, EREC.

3. Calculations for Figure 3: EU’s Final Energy Consumption: Fossil Fuels (Mtoe)
Energy source: 2006 2020
Fossil fuel 809.03 744
All sources in total 1177.39 1266

Source: Data from Europe’s energy position: present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008.

Appendix C Scenarios of the global energy system in 2100

← Calculations for Figure 4: Scenarios of the Global Electricity Production in 2100 (%)

Scenarios Fossil energy Nuclear energy RES energy
- No fusion technology 53 30 17

- Fusion technology 8 68 24
penetrates the global
energy system

Source: Tokimatsu et al (2003) Role of nuclear fusion in future energy systems and the environment under future
uncertainties. Data calculated from Figure 8, p. 2304.

Appendix D EU’s fossil fuel imports in 2006
1. Calculations for Figure 5:oil and gas consumption in the EU by supplier in 2006.

Oil Gas Combined oil EU’s FEC Representation from
and gas (Mtoe) EU’s total FEC from oil
imports* and gas.

All Imports:
Russia 33.5% 42.0% 37.8% 330.04 26.07%
Norway 15.8% 24.2% 20.0% 174.85 13.81%
Libya 9.4% 2.7% 6.1% 52.89 4.18%
Saudi Arabia 9.0% (inc. in Others) 4.5% 39.34 3.11%
Algeria 18.2% 9.1% 79.56 6.28%
Iran 6.4% (inc. in Others) 3.2% 27.98 2.21%
Kazakhstan 4.8% (inc. in Others) 2.4% 20.98 1.66%
Nigeria 3.6% 4.8% 4.2% 36.72 2.90%
Other 17.5% 8.1% 12.8% 111.91 8.84%
Total: 100% 100% 100% 874.27

EU’s energy 391.73 30.94%
used in FEC:

Total FEC from
oil and gas.

* - Data for oil and gas imports in reports is
presented in Million Tonnes and Terajoules, that
is why percentages are used in the calculations.

Source: Calculations used data from EU energy and transport in figures 2009, 2009, EC and Europe’s energy position:
present & future. Market observatory for energy report 2008, EC.

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