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The petitioners herein assails the constitutionality of BP 22 (Anti
Bouncing Check Law). They insist that it is violative of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment against nonpayment of

Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision
against imprisonment for nonpayment of debt.

Petitioners insist that since the offense under BP 22 is consummated
only upon the dishonor of nonpayment of the check when it is
presented to the drawee bank, the statue is really a "bad debt law"
rather than a "bad check law". What it punishes is the nonpayment of
the check, not the act issuing it.

The graven of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making
of the worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.

The law has been made as malum prohibitum in the exercise of police
power. What the law punishes the effect of the offense in the

Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented
abduction in the CFI of Pampanga. The accused pleased
not guilty, but the trial on the merits ensued and a
judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez.

On appeal, the CA reversed and acquitted Perez of the
crime of Consented Abduction.

Subsequent to petitioners acquittal, complainant Yolanda
Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez,
but this time is for Qualified Seduction.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash invoking double

Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of
qualified seduction after acquittal to consented seduction
constitutes double jeopardy.

No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner
relates to the identity of the two offenses of Consented
Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was
charged arose from the same facts. This. however does
not preclude the filing of another information against him if
from those facts two distinct elements, arose.

A single act may be an offense against two
statutes and if each statutes requires proof of
an additional fact, which the other does not,
and acquittal or conviction under either statute
does not exempt t he def endant f r om
prosecution and conviction under the other.

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be
accorded merit, as the two indictments are
perfectly distinct in point of law however closely
they may appear to be connected in fact.

The similar elements between Consented Abduction and
Qualified Seduction.
1. That the offended part is a virgin
2. That she must be over twelve and under 18
years of age.

Consented Abduction requires that:
1. The taking away of the offended party must be
with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery
from the offender.
2. The taking away of the offended party must be
with lewd designs.

Qualified Seduction requires that:
1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority,
confidence or relationship.
2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the

Petitioner while driving an owner type jeepney hit and
bumped a tricycle with three passengers. Two information
were filed against the petitioner.

1. Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property with multiple injuries under Article 365
of RPC and,
2. In violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 275 of
the RPC on Abandonment of one's victim.

The petitioner was found to be guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the RPC.

In the meantime, the petitioner was arraigned in criminal
case as regards to the first information, which is reckless
imprudence resulting to physical injuries.

During the appeal for the conviction for the second
information charged, the court affirmed with modification
consisted merely in the reduction of the penalty of
imprisonment from 6 to 2 months, arresto mayor.

Upon arraignment for the first information, the petitioner
contended that he should not be charged under
Abandonment of one's victim since he was already
prosecuted with violation of Article 365 of RPC. Hence,
accident and reckless imprudence cannot arise in the
same act.

Whether or not prosecution of the first information
(Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Physical Injuries) shall
put a bar to the second information charged against the
petitioner (Abandonment in one's victim)

No. In the case at bar, the judgement of conviction in the
former was rendered on June 29, 1987, while his
arraignment in the latter took place only on April 1989.
Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that
the accused must have been arraigned in the previous

In People Vs. Bocar:

Legal jeopardy attaches only 1. upon a valid
indictment, 2. before a competent court, 3. after
arraignment, 4. a valid plea having been entered
and 5. the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the

Moreover he was charged for two SEPARATE OFFENSES
under the RPC.

It is a cardinal rule that double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offense. A simple act
may offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision required
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal under one does not bar prosecution under
the other.

In the case at bar, the informations were for separate
offense - the first against a person and the second against
public peace and order - one cannot be pleaded as a bar
to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.

Wherefore, petition is denied.

Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision
dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel
Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974
for illegal installation of electric wire do reduce electric
consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An
information however was filed after almost 9 months. The
responded herein then moved to quash the charges for
grounds of prescription, that since the violation is classified
as light felony, only two months is given for prescription.

The lower court granted the motion to quash. The
prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed
another charge against the respondent company owner,
on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor, illegal
installation which is punishable under the municipal
ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the
RPC are different.

Whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly
pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the
first or prior prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set
of facts.

But the protection against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of facts.

The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under
the first sentence, one may be twice put to jeopardy
provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charges is not included or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies even if the offenses charged are not the same,
owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two
charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution under other.

In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of
electric current contended by the prosecutor is indeed part
of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance of
Batangas, which is the illegal or unauthorized installation
of electrical wiring because immediate physical effect of
the installation is the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencias ice plant.

The petition is dismissed.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner
herein, Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig with two separate offenses:

1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical

2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property

Petitioner pleaded guilty for the first charge, but moved to
quash the second charge invoking double jeopardy having
been convicted for the previous offense.

MeTC however, refused quashal finding no identity of offenses
in the two cases.

Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense
charged, bars his prosecution in the second offense charged.

Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on
persons and property are material only to determine the

The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same
facts were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC,
as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi

The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simple a way of
committing it.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense.

The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both
coincide in that ones convicted or acquitted to a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determined the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of an offense.

Tests to determine double jeopardy:

1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
2. Whether the evidence which proves one would prove
the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether the
crime is an ingredient of the other.

Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
Numancia Naitonal Vocational School in del Carmen, Surigao del
Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting and Disbursement Officer to
hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines. That while being in the said position, he
intentionally, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and
misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding
in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total amount to
PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account for the said amount during
the audit.

Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he was
nowhere to be found.

On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD
No 1606, conferring to it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the RPC

November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He
was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of the bail
bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. Upon
motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and
transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor
Quiones-Marcos however opined that since Navallo had already
been arrai gned before the case was transferred to the
Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the
case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which
held otherwise. The information was however docketed in
Sandiganbayan. A new order of arrest for the petitioner was issued by
the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash contending that since he had already
been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

Whether or not double jeopardy sets it when petitioner was arraigned
by the RTC.

NO. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it
conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already
been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the
case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.

Petition is dismissed.

The petitioner herein did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control 0/08 grams of
Methampethamin Hydrochloride wrapped in aluminum foil, which is a
regulated drug.

During the arraignment petitioner plead not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued, and the counsel for the petitioner on that time, was willing to
change the plea of not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of violation
of Section 17 RA No 6425, as amended. The trial judge of the lower
court granted the plea of guilty to the lesser offense

The prosecutor however, filed Opposition to the Request to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds:

1. the prosecution already rested its case.
2. the possibility of conviction of private responded for the crime
originally charged was high because of strong evidence of the
3. the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had
expended would be put to waste.

Hence this petition.

Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private
respondent of the lesser offense of violation of section 17, RA No.
6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of
violation of Section 16 of the same law, in view of the absence of a
valid change of plea.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some
of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence
than that for the graver charge.

Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by
a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the
crime charged.

The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private
respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense
of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open
to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy
will be violated.

Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy
given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent
to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege.

Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable.

However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily included the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances..

1. ....,
2. ....,
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the Fiscal and the offended party.

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under
the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA No 6425 as
amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

Petitioner herein was charged with homicide in Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte.

Upon being arraigned, the respondent entered a plea of guilty. In
doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de officio counsel's
petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the
effect that he stabbed the victim in self-defense since the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.

Subsequently, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the
accused, the court rendered a decision acquitting the accused.

The prosecution appealed therefrom.

Whether or not the People of the Philippines through the Solicitor
General can appeal the decision acquitting the accused, and that
this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rule of Court provides that:

The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would
be placed in double jeopardy. This is applicable even of the accused
fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy.

It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true that the accused had
first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently however, he testified in the
course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore - as the
court recognized in its decision - had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on
the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered
for him.

This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal. There can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal

Wherefore, judgment appealed from is set aside.

Petitioner herein was elected as the Municipal Mayor of Palawan,
while his relative Orlando Tiape lost the election as Municipal Mayor
of Kitcharao. After then, the petitioner appointed Tiape as the
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

On February, 2000, Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez
charged the petitioner herein for violation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code (Unlawful Appointment) before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.

During the arraignment, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile the
case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his

After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to
file a demurrer to evidence.

The lower court rendered a judgment acquitting Villapando for the
crime charged on grounds that the legal qualifications pertains to
education attainment. By granting the demurrer of evidence.

Whether or not the granting of demurrer of evidence by the lower
court amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double

The Ruling that demurrer of evidence followed by the another
prosecution equates to double jeopardy cannot be disturbed in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan's interpretation of the Revised
Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be
read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the doctrine, Ube lex
non distinguit nec nos distenguere debemos. When the law does not
distinguish, the court should not distinguish.

Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not grant Villapando a leave for
demurrer of evidence but give him a 5 day time frame to which to
inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for
resolution without leave of court.

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or
without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation.
Thus, in the case at bar, it cannot be said that the demurrer of
evidence and acquittal resulting therefrom, violates the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy.

Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having
allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and
with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the
body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30
days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for
the same period of time.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on
the same day, during the night, the victim died from his wounds.
Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution
and the information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information
alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition.

Whether or not the amended information constitutes double

Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at any time before the judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court may dismiss the original complaint or information
and order the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense, provided the defendant would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. It meant that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second
jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated
in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act. SAME OFFENSE
under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not
only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one
alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant
a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS
of the former as alleged in the information constitute the
latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple
reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that
was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which charges the
character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at
the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense.

Respondent herein, was charged for less serious physical
injuries to the victim, which would require medical attendance of
10-15 days and will incapacitate the victim from the
performance of his customary labors for the game period of
time. During the arraignment, the respondent pleaded guilty.

However, the injuries of the victim did not heal within the
estimated time. The Provincial Fiscal filed a charge against the
respondent for serious physical injuries. During the trial, he was
found guilty and charged with higher sentence.

Whether or not the conviction of the respondent for less serious
physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious
physical injuries.

In Melo Vs People, the Supreme Court held that:

After the first prosecution and a new set of fact
supervenes which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense, together
with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense, the accuse cannot be said to be
in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

In the case at bar, the first examination done by the physician
did not utilize x-ray, which in the second examination did.
Having used X-ray during the first examination to the victim, it
could have revealed that there was a fracture which caused the
delay of the healing, more than the estimated time frame of
10-15 days. This fault can be attributed to the incompetence of
the physician who first examined the victim.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the
decision rendered by Judge Tria-Tirona acquitting the accused,
respondent herein from the crime charged.

Armed with two search warrants, members of the NBI searched the
house of the respondent herein and found 498 grams of shabu. The
respondent was charged with violation of RA 6425.

During the arraignment, the accused, respondent herein pleaded not
guilty. After the trial on merits, public respondent, Judge Tria-Tirona
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Petitioner, People of the Philippines appealed the decision on
ground of grave abuse of discretion by ignoring the material facts and
evidence on record.

Whether or not the appeal made by the People of the Philippines after
the acquittal of the accused constitutes double jeopardy.

The doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may
apply only when the court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham"
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process.

In People Vs Velasco:
That as mandated by the Constitution, statutes and
jurisprudence, acquittal is final and unappealable on the
ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens in trial court
level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that
a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought
before the Supreme Court on certiorari canon the had unless
there is a finding of MISTRIAL. Only when there is finding of a
sham trial scan the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked
because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were
denied due process.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of the accused was based on merits
of evidence and therefore is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy.The only exception where
double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a dining of
mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.

Wherefore, petition is denied.

Petitioner herein is one of the accused in estafa thru falsification of
public document, and estafa with respondent RCBC, as offended
party in both cases.

The hearing to try the information filed against the petitioner herein
was cancelled for different reasons, and was scheduled to different

On September 1995, the private complainant failed to appear despite
due notice. Hence the motion of petitioner's counsel to dismiss the
case on the ground of speedy trial, responded court issued the
following order:

The case was dismissed since the complainant was absent despite
due notice.

However, upon the petition of the prosecutor and despite the
opposition of the petitioner, respondent court, reconsidered the Order
dated September 1995.

The court, citing Hipolito Vs CA, held that the right of the accused to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured or
when without cause, or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to lapse without the party having his case tried.

In the case at bar, there has been no vexations, capricious and
oppressive delays, or a long time is allowed to lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute a violation of the right of
the accused to speedy trial.

Since the lower court reconsidered the case for trial, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration to Court of Appeals which was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Whether or not the reconsideration of the case by the Court of
Appeals was a violation of the doctrine double jeopardy, as the
criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Clearly double jeopardy attached only:
1. A valid indictment
2. Before a competent court
3. After arraignment
4. After a valid plea had been entered
5. When the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed without express consent of the accused.

1. Insufficiency of evidence
2. Denial of right to speedy trial

Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been
prolonged unreasonable, in violation of accused's right to speedy trial.

After a closer analysis by this Court as regards to cancellations of
cases/ trial of the accused, it found that there were only three
instances which the case was reset. And the cause of the resettings
were for valid grounds such as the postponement if the trial for lack o
f proof of notice to the accused and their counsel, lack of proof of
service of notice to co-accused, the judge suffered gout and arthritis.

The trial was delayed due to circumstances which are beyond the
control of the parties and of the trial court.

Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals reconsidering the
case was affirmed.

Petitioner herein was one of the accused in the case of Vizconde

On 2010, the Court of Appeals acquitted, among others, the petitioner
herein on grounds of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable

Complainant Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims
asked the court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the
prosecution due process of law, seriously misappreciated the facts,
unreasonable regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility, issued a tainted
and erroneous decision, decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice, or committed grave abuse in its treatment
of the evidence and prosecution witness.

Hence this petition.

Whether or not the reconsideration sought for by the complainant
would constitute a violation of the right against double jeopardy.

Yes. The acquittal of the petitioner herein, among others was due to
the appreciation of the evidence presented.

Section 21 of Article 3 of the Bill of Rights provides:

No person shall be twice put to double jeopardy for the same offense.
If an act is punishable under a law and an ordinance, the conviction
or acquittal under wither shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already
been absolved. There is reason for tho provision of the Constitution.
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for
the same after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity
of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelmed the accused in terms of resources stamina, and the will
of fight.

The Court held that reconsideration may be granted when he trial has
been a sham or when there is denial of due process. In the case at
bar, the complainant was not able to established that the trial
conducted by the Court of Appeals in acquitting the petitioner on
grounds of appreciation of evidence and or lack of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, was a sham.

Wherefore the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.

This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-
stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of
the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights
and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, which
materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said
petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who
will propagate its ideology.

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns
because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the
ground that it violates the due process clause, right of
association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex
post facto law.

Whether or not the section 8, paragraph 7 of RA No. 6132' is an
ex post facto law.

The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision
constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise untenable.

An ex post facto law is one which:.

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful;

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Armed with warrant of arrest and based on the probable
reason to believe based on surveillance conducted in
herein petitioners hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and
Bulacan, and when the petitioner is about to board a
tricycle, he was then arrested and was charged in violation
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD
1866, as amended.

The lower court imposed a penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1
day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the
fine in the amount of Php 15, 000.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision with modification of a period of 4
years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as

The petitioner herein was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of PD No 1866, as amended. It
provides that the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition.

PD 1866 as amended,was the governing law at the time
the petitioner committed the offense/ however RA No 8294
amended PD No 1866 during the pendency of the case
with the trial court.

Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
di sposi ti on or possessi on of Fi rearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
- the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Php
15, 000 shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfuly manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, suc

Whether or not the amended PD 1866 imposing prisional
correccional as punishment shall be imposed to the
petitioner in the case at bar.

Yes.As a general rule, penal laws should not have
retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of
an ex post facto law. An EXCEPTION to this rule, however
is when the law is advantageous of the accused.

A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.
however penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These
are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception
on effectivity of laws.

Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA
1700 or Anti Subversion Law by instigating, recruiting,
inciting others to rise up and take arms against the
Government with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Philippines.

Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700
(Anti Subversion Law) moved to quash the charged and
alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder.

The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive organization.
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti
Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.

No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of
burden on it, and a legislative intent to stigmatise statute
as a bill of attainder.

1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in
its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is
simply to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of
the prohibition.

The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely
for definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only to
the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
organisation having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Respondent herein was born on March 13, 1975 in Queensland
Australia to Alfio Pennisi and Anita Quinto, an Australian and Filipino
citizen respectively. Respondent applied for petition for recognition as
Filipino Citizen before the Bureau of Immigration submitting
documents as follows:

Birth certificate of Quintos, issued by the Local Registrar of San

Antonio, Nueva Ecija, stating the she was born on August 1949,
of Filipino Parents.

Marriage Certificate of his parents, indicating Philippines as

Quinto's birthplace.

Certified copy of Quinto's Australian certificate of registration of

alien indicTing her nationality as Filipino.

Certified true copy of respondent's birth certificate, indicating

Philippines as his mother's birthplace.

Certified true copy of the letter date July 1999, if the Australian
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs stating that
as of July 1999, Quintos has not been granted of Australian

Bureau of Immigration granted his application. In 2nd endorsement,
Secretary of Department of Justice disproved the application. But
upon submitting additional documents, it was then granted.

Respondent became a member of the Red Bull team in PBA.

On August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and
Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted a report to
deport several Filipino-foreign PBA Players including the respondent.

The presented documents of the respondent herein were held highly
suspicious relying on the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta, barangay
officials of San Antonio Nueva Ecija. The affidavit stated that there
were no Quintos in that Place.

Whether or not the respondent herein is a Filipino Citizen based on
the documents that he submitted.

The Supreme Court held that the authenticity of the documents
submitted by herein petitioners were remain undisputed. The
petitioner herein, People of the Philippines, mainly relied on the
affidavits of Soliman and Peralta.

Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that Pennisi
is a Filipino Citizen is affirmed.


FPJ was a candidate for presidential election. However his
qualification was questioned, specifically he being a natural born
Filipino Citizen. Petitioner herein contended that FPJ, being an
illegitimate son of an alleged Filipino Citizen and an America Citizen
could have not acquired that Citizenship og his father.

Whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizenship.

In arriving at the answer whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizen,
the Supreme Court reviewed the following instances:

1. The citizenship of the father and the grand father of FPJ.
2. The constitutional provision existing at the time the father of FPJ
acquired his citizenship from the former's father, the grand father
of FPJ.

The Supreme court held that,t he the constitutional provision
applicable in finding out the answer is the Philippine Organic Act of

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only
be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived at the port of Cebu on January
18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan
Bangco. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny
him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been
passed upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus
was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. 308),
which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli,
having been born in Manila on February 27, 1893. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals, by decision of February 23, 1939, up- held the
conclusion of the lower court and declined to overrule the doctrine in
Roa v. Collector of Customs

Whether or not the petitioner herein is a Filipino Citizen.

Yes. Following the doctrine laid down in Roa Case.

A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of
Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities:
Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas
Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner) was born here in 1893,
both before the advent of American sovereignty; (2) the fathers of both
Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers,
Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, both were minor residents
of the Philippines; and (4) both, in their boyhood, went to China for
the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines.

When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein
to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a
general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but
to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all
persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and
Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned in
the treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter, going to
China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to
live here.

Vicente Ching was born on 1964, to a Chinese father and an Filipino
mother under the existence of the 1935 Constitution. Vicente , took up
Bachelors of Law and passed the same. Upon filing for bar
examinations, he submitted documents stating he being a Filipino
Citizen. He passed the bar examinations.

Upon passing the bar examinations, he was then required to take the
oath. But before he could take the same, additional requirement was
asked from him, among others is to elect Filipino Citizenship. In 1999,
Ching made an election.

Can the election of citizenship, 14 years after reaching the age of
majority grant the Filipino Citizenship.

No. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.

CA 625, which was enacted pursuant to the provision above,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of the Philippine Citizenship. However it did not
prescribed the time to which the election shall be made.

The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The
interpretation however was mean to be within three years after
reaching the age of majority, but may be extended upon presentation
of special circumstances.

In the case at bar, Ching was not able to explain the reason of his
delay for 14 years before having elected Philippine Citizenship. Hence,
the 14 years lapse is clearly beyond the contemplation of "upon
reaching he age of majority."

Wherefore, petition is denied.

This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from
causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen

Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking
and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to
visit her great grand uncle for a period of one month.

When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen
Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the
period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb.
13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary

During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not
write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not
speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.

Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a
citizen of the Philippines.

Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon
which petitioners rely, reads.

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who
might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.

Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age,
residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct,
lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak
and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.

In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to
prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not
one of the disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the
law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here
follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with
any associations or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
the success and predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United
States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.




Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the respondent from
implementing RA 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers the constitutionality of RA 9225,
specifically its Section 3 and 3:

Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine Citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the condition of this Act.

Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship.

During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the
purpose of these contended sections is to recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the Republic.

Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section 2 and 3 say, the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the
foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the
former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the Philippines and to the
United States, as the case may be. And by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign

Further it was held that the bill recognizes the Philippine citizenship
but says nothing about the other citizenship.

Wherefore the petition is denied.